



# WAR & NATIONALISM

THE BALKAN WARS, 1912–1913,  
AND THEIR SOCIOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

*edited by*  
M. Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi

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Foreword by Edward J. Erickson

Utah Series in Middle East Studies

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Utah Series in Middle East Studies

M. Hakan Yavuz, series editor



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*Cry of the Homeland*

NÂZIM HIKMET

It was yet a foggy morning.  
Smoke filled the air.  
There came a voice from far away...  
Listen to this cry of the homeland, listen!  
Listen and command your conscience.  
The shattered heart of the homeland  
Awaits you with hope.

July 3, 1913  
Translated by Kemal Silay



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## A Note on Transliteration

Modern Turkish spelling is used, adopted from the system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* with minor modifications.



# Foreword

## Lessons Learned from the Balkan Wars

*Edward J. Erickson*

As we all know, the centennial of the First and Second Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 is fast approaching; yet they remain, even today, scantily researched and little-understood conflicts. Aside from Professor Richard C. Hall's splendid groundbreaking work *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913* it is impossible to find a comprehensive single-volume history in English of the diplomatic and military history of these wars. Nevertheless, the battles of these wars were the largest fought in Europe between 1870 and 1914. Like the later Spanish Civil War, they were something of a test bed for tactics, weapons, and military institutions. Moreover, the wars had a profound impact on the countries involved in them and were, in part, a causal agent in the outbreak of World War I. Almost one hundred years have passed, yet we have very little in print that draws the threads of history together in a coherent exposition of cause, conflict, outcome, and effect. Why is that? Well, I am somewhat of a reductionist, and I think that there are two principal reasons. First, the magnitude and ferocity of World War I almost totally obliterated the memory of the wars of 1912 and 1913. Second is the problem of languages and access to archives, especially works written in Ottoman Turkish, which is, of course, a dead language today. Even Serbo-Croat and Bulgarian, for example, are much further from the academic mainstream than, say, French or Chinese. I believe, therefore, that the Balkan Wars remain marginalized in our collective historical memory and, perhaps equally importantly, isolated linguistically by the small numbers of scholars who are able to work on the primary sources.

How did I happen to become engaged in the military history of the Balkan Wars? Well, let me take you back to a time when we did not have Wikipedia, a time when we could not simply Google “First Balkan War.” I know—it is hard to remember and to get back there from here, but let's try... In 1985 I was an army captain stationed at a small American army



base in Turkey near a rural farming village called Çakmaklı. My base sat on the dramatically high ridgeline that runs south from Hadımköy to Büyük Çekmece, which in 1985 lay over twenty kilometers out in the open countryside to the west of the city of Istanbul. From that dominant terrain, largely unchanged from 1912, we overlooked the village of Çatalca. Every day on my morning runs I passed the fortifications and the remnants of trenches and bunkers, which still studded the ridge in those days. I knew that huge battles had raged there in 1912; but to my endless frustration, I could not find much in print that informed me about what had happened there. So I said to myself way back then that someday I would find out the story of what had happened there. And I have. Sadly though, I find myself twenty years behind the power curve, because today most of those reminders of the past have been demolished and replaced by the new high-rise apartments and warehouses of the constant westward movement of the city of Istanbul. As many of you know, the city of Istanbul now actually extends well beyond even Hadımköy and Büyük Çekmece. I suppose that in the not too distant future Istanbul will eventually merge with Edirne. And I sometimes wonder: if Professor Hall's book and mine had come out earlier, say in 1980, might they have generated enough interest to fuel some sort of preservation effort to save what was until 1990 a largely intact and pristine historical battlefield?

I published a book on the Ottoman army in World War I in 2000. Then I published another book in 2003 on the Ottoman army in the Balkan Wars. But only with the publication of a third book in 2007 about Ottoman army combat effectiveness in World War I was I able to connect the dots coherently in regard to the effect of the Balkan Wars on the Ottoman army. My evolving argument starts with a question: "In World War I, how did the Ottoman army manage to stay active and in the field until the very end of the war in late October 1918?" After all, it was essentially a multiethnic, multilingual, nonindustrialized, and largely illiterate peasant army. It had no professional noncommissioned officer corps. Other than having courageous fighting soldiers, it seems to fit no model of what a good army ought to look like. Two other armies famously similar to the Ottoman army were soundly beaten and quit the field. These were, of course, the multiethnic and multilingual Russian and Austro-Hungarian armies, which both collapsed under the pressures of modern war. Smaller Bulgaria's army collapsed as well, as did the Romanian army. Even the more advanced Western European armies like the French and Italian armies came perilously close to this state as well. Some historians even maintain that the German army in late 1918 was on the

edge of collapse too. So I ask again: “How is it that the Ottomans stayed the course for so long in World War I?”

Our received wisdom regarding this question tends to give credit to German generals and tenaciously tough Turkish soldiers as well as the singular leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This is a simplistic and incomplete answer, however, because it fails to address the Ottoman army as an institution fighting a multifront war against industrialized and powerful enemies. Here is what I think I have learned in a very roundabout way over a ten-year period. The Ottoman army was competitive and resilient in World War I because of its defeat in the Balkan Wars and the subsequent “putting the army right” as a result of the “lessons learned” from those earlier struggles. In effect, the lasting impact of the Balkan Wars for the Ottoman army was its prolonged survival in World War I.

Let us look at the chain of evidence. The Ottomans failed in the Balkan Wars for a variety of reasons, but chief among them were an incomplete mobilization and concentration plan that failed to deliver combat forces to locations where they were needed; a reserve system that fielded poorly trained and inadequately equipped reserve infantry divisions (today we would call this a two-tier army); obsolete tactical doctrines and processes that failed to gain fire superiority; and, finally, a command structure that included a number of older and incompetent commanders. But they also had successes of note. The newly established triangular division architecture composed of three infantry regiments proved very adaptable to modern combat conditions. The centralization of Ottoman artillery during and after the First Battle of Çatalca was extremely effective. Finally, the competence of the individual officers of the general staff officer corps enabled the army to continue operations while enduring tactical reverses.

The wars ended on terms unfavorable to the Ottoman Empire; military defeat became the engine of change throughout the unhappy Young Turk government. We do not often think of the late Ottomans as being particularly innovative or view any of the empire’s institutions as capable of rapid action, yet the catastrophic defeat in 1913 galvanized the Young Turk leadership, which had seized power in the infamous Raid on the Sublime Porte. After the conclusion of the Treaty of London in 1913, a controversial public debate analyzing the weaknesses of the Ottoman military system sprang up. We can see this in the critical writings of staff major Asım Gündüz (who wrote *Why Were We Defeated in the Balkan Wars?*) and in the public exchanges regarding combat leadership between staff major Mehmet Nuri Conker and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Similar

commentary also appeared in the *Military Magazine* (*Mecmua-i Askeri*). Such criticisms became the basis for dialogue, leading to changes in military policy as the Young Turks, primarily under the dynamic leadership of thirty-two-year-old minister of war Enver Paşa, implemented changes based on what they thought had gone wrong in the Balkan Wars.

Starting in the summer of 1913, the Ottoman general staff tore apart its failed reserve system to create a unique mobilization system that absorbed individual reservists into divisions maintained at cadre level. In 1914 this ensured that while a smaller number of combat divisions were mobilized they were fielded at full strength and ready to fight. Enver also forced over thirteen hundred elderly or conservative senior officers into retirement, so that younger, more modern thinking officers with combat experience might take high command. He streamlined the army's unique triangular infantry divisions themselves by stripping out the independent rifle battalions to find enough units to rebuild the divisions lost in the Balkan Wars. In the spring of 1914 Enver issued new training guidance that recognized the primacy of fire superiority, communications, and entrenching over blunt frontal attacks and tightly controlled maneuver. He also standardized the army's reporting system and tactical procedures. Moreover, that spring about seventy Germans arrived under Gen. Otto Liman von Sanders, who made a major contribution in discarding the cumbersome system of multiple war plans and replacing them with a single streamlined plan. Finally, but probably equally importantly, Enver set the army to training itself to fight modern wars collectively and with the combat arms in mutual support of one another. These changes gave the Ottoman army tactical advantages over its adversaries. In effect, the deficiencies uncovered in the Balkan Wars became the engine that pulled successful army reform into World War I.

However, the European powers tended to ignore or misread these startling developments. As a result, reciprocally, the Balkan Wars became a blurry lens through which the European powers came to perceive the Ottoman army erroneously on the eve of World War I. These perceptions, based largely on cosmetic aspects of defeat, then led to dangerously flawed appraisals of Ottoman combat effectiveness and capability. The British military attaché's report from Constantinople in 1913 opined that the Ottoman high command showed "an absolute incapacity for getting such machinery as there was into order."<sup>1</sup> The British general staff's director of military operations visited the capital in October 1913 and reinforced this with the judgment that "the Turkish army is not a serious modern army...no sign of adaptation to western thoughts and methods.

The army is ill-commanded and in rags.”<sup>2</sup> Another report in 1914 characterized the Turkish soldier as “very much afraid of the bayonet, clumsy and dull-witted, lacking in initiative.” Ottoman officers were characterized as being of “inferior physique, nervous and excitable.”<sup>3</sup> Contemporary Russian and even German commentators filed similar reports.

The Ottoman army mobilized in August 1914 and began to concentrate and train its divisions. The new war plans were not “spring loaded” to move regiments on a timetable basis to the fronts regardless of their readiness, and units did not deploy until they had reported levels of readiness appropriate for movement. So, when the war began for the Ottomans in November, the army was in relatively decent shape, it was deployed, and it was training. It was immediately capable of difficult offensive operations in the snow-clad mountains of Sarikamış and the waterless deserts of the Sinai. While these operations failed, we should remember that so too did almost all offensive operations in 1914 and 1915, with the German victory at Tannenberg as the sole successful exception to the rule. The Western allies, however, and particularly the British, understood the Sarikamış and Suez operations to be further evidence of Ottoman decay. Today we characterize this kind of intelligence analysis as “cherry picking.” This contributed to Britain’s decision to launch the disastrous Gallipoli campaign, which pitted mediocre allied divisions against the best divisions in the Ottoman army.

From studying the Gallipoli campaign it is clear that the Ottomans had absorbed the lessons of defeat and reconstructed a combat-capable force. For example, they had more effective direct support artillery, their commanders and staffs were creative and frequently exercised personal initiative, they could task-organize their forces by attaching regiments from one division to another, and they could process and issue combat orders much faster than their British opponents. In practice, these skills enabled the Ottomans to mass their forces more rapidly than the allies, giving the appearance that the Ottomans enjoyed numerical superiority, which was never the case on the peninsula. It was, in fact, these kinds of institutional strengths, rather than sheer numbers and German commanders, that led the Ottoman army to victory. How much of this success can we attribute to the transformational years of 1913 and 1914, which was indeed a very short period?

If we examine the records of the Ottoman regiments and divisions before the Gallipoli landings of April 25, 1915, we see earnest efforts to implement Enver’s directives about how the army ought to prepare itself for war. We see task organization and actual combined arms training. We

see an emphasis on digging trenches and integrating machine guns into defensive preparations. We see artillery linked to infantry in a flexible supporting relationship that worked under combat conditions. We see infantry divisions, commanded by young, highly trained and experienced officers, committed to combat with extremely high levels of training and morale. Of course, not every unit and not every leader was operating at high levels of combat effectiveness, but enough of them were to tip the balance in favor of the Ottomans. The period from the summer of 1913 through November 1914 was just long enough to change a few things, which made the Ottoman army more resilient in combat. One thing is certain—without the changes of 1913 and 1914, the Ottoman army would have fielded an army that mirrored the one that the Balkan League had defeated. At Gallipoli the British and Australians fought an army that was much different from the one that they expected to fight.

What the Europeans never seemed to catch on to was the idea that effectiveness often has little to do with efficiency and appearances. As we know today, the Ottoman army was very effective, especially when on the defensive, although it had substantial inefficiencies. Ragged soldiers can be good soldiers despite appearances. The quotation that I think captures the effectiveness with which the Ottoman military applied its understanding of the “lessons learned” from the Balkan War came from Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton, who was the British commander at Gallipoli in 1915. Hamilton was called to testify in 1916 before a Parliamentary Commission convened to investigate the embarrassing and costly British defeat at Gallipoli. When asked to explain why his army had not prevailed against the poorly equipped and ragged Turks, he replied simply, “I did not know, to tell you the truth, that they were nearly as good as they were.”<sup>4</sup> Beyond that statement Hamilton was unable to explain why this was so. In truth, he knew nothing about the Ottoman army’s experiences in the Balkan Wars and even less about what Enver and the Ottoman army had done to rectify its deficiencies.

I would leave you with an all too obvious observation about the state of the scholarly literature and historiography of the First and Second Balkan Wars. It is incomplete and episodic. There is a scholarly need to bring together many of the threads and loose ends that we specialists understand separately into a coherent and congruent collective understanding of these events. Competing against that is the challenge of memory, geographic diversity, and linguistics. But thanks to the vision and energy of the organizers and editors of this volume, the future of establishing a unified field of understanding for the events of 1912 and 1913 has become

a little bit easier. So I end by thanking all of the contributors for their scholarly endeavors and for their willingness to share their findings in this work.

## NOTES

This chapter is an edited version of the keynote speech delivered at the “Lasting Socio-Political Impacts of the Balkan Wars” conference, May 5–8, 2011, at the University of Utah.

1. National Archives (NA) of the United Kingdom, H.D. Beaumont, *Turkey, Annual Report 1913*, December 4, 1914, 31, Foreign Office papers, FO 371/2137.
2. John Gooch, *The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900–1916* (New York: John Wiley, 1974), 271.
3. NA, *Report, re Turkish Military Preparations and Political Intrigues*, November 10, 1914, 1–3, War Office Papers, WO 157/689.
4. Ian Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary*, vol. 1 (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), 95.



The Balkans 1912. Courtesy of Justin McCarthy.



The Balkans 1914. Courtesy of Justin McCarthy.

## Preface

### The Rise of Balkan Nationalism within the Triangle of the Ottoman, Austrian, and Russian Empires, 1800–1878

*Peter von Sivers*

Today the United Nations encompasses nearly 200 “nations,” but what these countries have in common beyond their seats in the General Assembly is difficult to determine. Among the members are city-states and monarchies as well as bona fide old nations from the eighteenth and nineteenth century and new nations, born from the demise of colonialism. Ernest Gellner, who in his 1983 book *Nations and Nationalism* gave us the maximal definition of what constitutes a nation by closely linking nation-state formation with the process of modernization, has been criticized for the sin of functionalism.<sup>1</sup> While it is undoubtedly true that the aspirations of many nationalists in their countries were and are directed toward creating nation-states for the purpose of adopting industry and urbanization as signs of their modernity, in the 1800s this was not universally so, as for example in Latin America. Nationalism and the nation-state were not necessarily vehicles for reaching industrial and urban modernity.

By contrast, Hans Kohn, who in 1944 virtually founded the field of nationalism studies with his book *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, grounded nationalism and the creation of the nation-state in the founding principles of the American, French, Haitian, and Latin American revolutions, calling these principles collectively “civic nationalism.”<sup>2</sup> For him, modernity began with what today should perhaps be more broadly called “constitutional nationalism,” as opposed to what he considered the antimodernity of the ethnic nation-state, which he labeled as “Eastern” (located in Germany, the Balkans, and the “Orient,” including what was then the Jewish Homeland). In retrospect, he can be forgiven for his Orientalism, given that he wrote under the trauma of the then still real German and Japanese extremist nationalisms. But his sharp intellectual and geographical distinction between constitutional and ethnic nationalism suffers from the same shortcoming as



Gellner's vehicle idea: it is historically inaccurate. Ethnic nationalism was indeed present, even if initially largely silent or barely articulated, in the late eighteenth-century revolutions in Western Europe and the Americas. Parisian Frenchness and Reformed Protestant white Englishness come to mind. Furthermore, the nationalists of the German and Japanese extremist nation-states in the twentieth century were enthusiastically modernist, even if their alternative routes to urban and industrial life were ultimately self-destructive.<sup>3</sup>

This brief look at the two perhaps most influential frameworks (by Gellner and Kohn) for the study of modern state-formation shows that there is neither a necessary simultaneity among nation-state formation, urbanization, and industrialization nor a dichotomy between constitutional and ethnic nationalism. Nation-states evolved on the basis of both constitutional and ethnic nationalism, even if often in unequal proportions. And they did so with or without the ingredients of modernity, although today they all aspire to their possession.

How do the Balkan states fit into the framework of constitutional-ethnic-urban-industrial nation-state formation that I have sketched above? Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, on which I focus here, is that they began their nation-state formation by breaking away from an Ottoman land empire that was under challenge by two other land empires, Austria and Russia. By contrast, the United States, Haiti, and the countries of Latin America broke away from the sea empires of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal, respectively, without lengthy entanglements with those respective European nations after achieving their independence.<sup>4</sup> The United States, furthermore, became a nation-state after decades of constitutional self-administration. As it turned out, the incipient Balkan nations were slowed in their formation process by ceaseless entanglements with the ambitions of the Austrian and Russian empires until the end of World War I; of imperial Germany and Italy until the end of World War II; and of the Soviet Empire until the end of the twentieth century. No wonder that irredentism and industrial underdevelopment still plague the Balkans at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

#### WARLORDS AND STATE-BUILDING IN GREECE

Resistance against empires and wars of liberation is as ancient as land empires themselves. The Greek *poleis* against the Achaemenid Persian Empire and the Maccabean Jews against the Seleucid Empire are the

best-known early examples. In neither case do we speak of nationalist liberation. Liberation was followed by kingdom formation—the Macedonian kingdom of Philip II and the Hasmonean kingdom of Judea, respectively. Dynasties and scribes, not citizens, were the authors of the liberation programs in these kingdoms, which are still accessible to us today in the literatures of the Greeks and the Jews. Similarly, insurgents, rebels, brigands, outlaws, and assorted followers who morphed into ruling classes were the independence leaders in Greece and Serbia. Ethnic independence programs—read back into a more or less mythical past—and citizenries as the representatives of ethnic and constitutional nationalism emerged only after a considerable lapse of time in both countries. Liberation did and does not need nationalism to function.

Liberation from Ottoman imperial rule was an idea that had its roots in the Austrian invasion of Serbia following the second Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 and in the Russian advances toward the Black Sea and Balkans beginning in 1696. As far as the Austrian invasion was concerned, imperial troops conquered Hungary and much of Serbia, holding its capital Belgrade for a short period (1683–90). Although the Ottomans succeeded in reconquering Belgrade (1690–1718), the damage was done. Austrian power was the shield under which Christian insurgents could hope for liberation from Ottoman rule. This hope was strengthened when the Ottomans conceded further territorial losses in the *uti possidetis* settlements of Carlowitz (1699) and Pessarowitz (1718). The view that the Austrian Empire was rising and the Ottoman Empire was shrinking dates from this period.

At the same time, the Russian Empire was also rising. Peter the Great (1682–1725), although greatly hampered logistically by the absence of roads and canals from Moscow to the south, was able to wrest the fortress of Azov from the Ottomans for a few years (1696–1711). After his death, Moscow replaced the not entirely successful policy of conquest on its own in the Baltic and Ukraine with allies chosen among the European players in the Westphalian game of power politics. Through a treaty of alliance with Austria in 1726, Russia acquired a partner in its efforts to compete in European politics and advance against the Ottomans.<sup>5</sup>

At first the Ottomans succeeded in holding the alliance in check. In the Russo-Austrian-Ottoman War of 1735–39 the Russians made a few gains in the Crimea, but the Austrians lost the kingdom of Serbia (1718–39), which the emperor had declared with himself as king and a Württemberg prince as governor (1720–33). But in the subsequent Ottoman-Russian War of 1768–74, Russian drill and line-formation,

adopted from Western Europe, proved to be superior to the far less disciplined Janissary infantry, Sipahi cavalry, and irregular forces (many in the services of provincial warlords), in spite of their numerical superiority. In the subsequent Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) Austria played the part of mediator, making territorial gains as a result. Russia's gains, of course, were much greater, including land, a financial indemnity, and protectorship of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Küçük Kaynarca created the beginnings of the triangular imperial power politics of the Ottomans, Austria, and Russia within which Balkan bids for autonomy or independence found encouragement or disappointment.

A first example was the Russian naval campaign to Greece during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768–74, intended to stir the Greeks of the Morea (Peloponnese) into revolt against the Ottomans. But only some 1,400 Greeks joined; and Russia did little to protect the Greek villages of the Morea when Albanian irregulars, sent in by the Ottomans, retaliated with a reign of terror lasting to 1779. In the next Ottoman-Russian War of 1787–92, in which the Ottomans tried unsuccessfully to revise the agreement of Küçük Kaynarca, a Greek officer in the Russian army organized a pirate fleet in the Aegean that harassed Ottomans even beyond 1792 when the tsar ordered him in vain to make peace. On the Greek mainland, brigands (*klefts*) regularly harassed the Ottomans from impregnable mountain redoubts. One of these brigands was Theodoros Kolokotronis (1770–1843) from the southern Morea, whose father had participated in the Russian naval campaign to Greece and who himself served during the Napoleonic wars, first in the Russian navy (1805) and later in a British-commanded infantry regiment on the Ionian islands off the west coast of Greece (1810). Napoleon Bonaparte had inherited these islands after occupying Venice, and the British recruited two Greek regiments to drive his troops off. Kolokotronis was profoundly disappointed when the British acceded to Ottoman demands in the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris (1814), which ended the Napoleonic wars, to disband these regiments. From the British he turned back to the Russians for help when he became the leading *kleft* commander in the early phase of the war of Greek independence (1821–28).<sup>6</sup>

As is well known, it was thanks to the irregular military bands of the *klefts* of Morea and the *armatoloi* (irregulars) of Rumelia (central and northern Greece), not the *heterochthones* (Greeks from the Danubian provinces with Orthodox Christian or Western secular educations), that military action even got underway. Contrary to the *klefts* of the Morea, who had never submitted to Ottoman rule, the *armatoloi* were originally

brigands who had prudently abandoned their profession and assumed the role of loyal local notables when pressed too hard by punitive Ottoman campaigns.<sup>7</sup> The *klefts* and *armatoloi*, turning into substantial warlords bent on expelling the Ottomans, were initially successful in their uprising, defeating troops sent against them, massacring Muslim civilians, and driving the survivors out of a number of villages and towns (1821–24). A spiral of violence followed, with religious leaders in Istanbul instigating Muslims in İzmir and on the island of Chios into massacring Christians. Eventually the modern-trained Egyptian troops under Ibrahim Paşa, called into Greece by the sultan, slowed the advances of the Greek warlords, although also at the cost of massacres in the southern Morea, which refused to submit to İbrahim (1824–27).

While the Greek massacres of Muslims were noted, the Muslim massacres of Christians caused a veritable outcry among philhellenes in Western Europe and pan-Orthodox Christians in Russia. The European Concert acted when the intervention of the Egyptians shifted the power balance against the Greeks.<sup>8</sup> After failed negotiations with the sultan, it forced the Egyptians out (1828) and made Ioannis Kapodistrias (1776–1831) the governor of Greece under European (primarily French) protection. Kapodistrias, born on the Ionian island of Corfu and educated in Italy, was co-minister of foreign affairs in the Russian Empire (1815–22), where he resisted the entreaties of the Filiki Eteria, the then still secret Greek society of *heterochthone* Greeks (businessmen, professionals, intellectuals, and a few dissident Orthodox churchmen from the Danubian provinces or outside the Ottoman Empire). As a faithful Restoration power politician, he did not think much of the Filiki Eteria's enthusiasm for the Enlightenment and French revolutionary constitutional-ethnic nationalism.<sup>9</sup> He joined the cause of independence (minus revolutionary nationalism) only when he received the Russian backing that had previously been withheld from him.

During the three years of his autocratic rule (1828–31) Kapodistrias presided over a rudimentary Greek state in which the *klefts* and *armatoloi*, now substantial warlords at the head of private armies, repeatedly clashed with each other and with the government in violent conflicts over pay and territorial control. His first order of business was the reconquest of central Greece (Rumelia), where a number of *armatoloi* had resumed employment as Ottoman local commanders. Next he had to reduce and transform the irregulars into a professional army loyal to the state. Cut from 25,000 to 8,000, the irregulars were regrouped into units of 1,000, with their warlords appointed either as officers or as “advisors.” The final

step was their standardization as “light battalions,” although out of these only about 3,500 regularly paid and provisioned professional soldiers became the eventual praetorian pillar on which the state relied for suppressing *kleft* and *armatoloi* revolts. This saved the state when two members of the most unruly *kleft* clan of the southern Morea, that of Petros Mavromichaelis, avenged his arrest by assassinating Kapodistrias. Otto of Bavaria (1833–62), also imposed by the European Concert on a now officially independent Greece (1832), continued his predecessor’s autocratic state-building, with little attention to constitutional and ethnic nationalism until the revolution of 1843. Only then were the descendants of the Filiki Eteria generation finally numerous and influential enough to extract a constitution from the regime.<sup>10</sup>

#### REBELLION, AUTONOMY, AND STATE-BUILDING IN SERBIA

Constitutional and ethnic nationalism, marginal in the Greek war of independence, was even less evident in the two Serbian uprisings (1804–13 and 1815–17), which led to autonomy and de facto independent state-building (confirmed with independence in 1878). In contrast to the thousands of Danubian Greeks privileged by the Ottomans as administrators and merchants, only a handful of Orthodox Serbs represented what was known in Germany during the prerevolutionary half-century of 1750–1800 as “cultural nationalism” (*Kulturnationalismus*). True, there were more clerical and secular cultural nationalists among Orthodox Serbs in the southern Austrian Empire. They were familiar with the pre-1750 Catholic-Serbian literary tradition that had grown from Italian Humanist and Baroque roots as well as the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment. But their impact followed rather than preceded the autonomous state carved from the Ottoman Empire in 1817. In the absence of a Serb equivalent of a Filiki Eteria that could dip into cultural nationalism, the Orthodox Serbs who founded the Serbian state did not manifest even incipient constitutional and ethnic nationalist impulses.

The main carrier of the Orthodox cultural heritage in the Ottoman Empire was the Serb Orthodox Church, mostly through educational contacts with Russia and the copying of manuscripts. In the early Ottoman Empire this church was under the tutelage of the Greek Orthodox Church, but in the period 1557–1766—thanks to Ottoman support—it was again autocephalic. In contrast to the Greek Church, which the Ottomans privileged throughout their rule and which played only a minor role in the Greek war of independence, imperial power politics

pushed the Serb clergy into an anti-Ottoman stance early on. On two occasions, in 1690 and 1739, patriarchs led several tens of thousands of families north to settle in Austrian borderlands and escape the effects of warfare between Austria and the Ottomans. Distrustful of the patriarchs, the Ottomans ended Serb autocephaly in 1755. The sultan was obviously not interested in having a church-led insurrection, possibly in conjunction with Serb village notables (the aristocracy had all but disappeared in the previous centuries) on his hands.

According to tradition, the patriarch of the first migration took along the remains of King Lazar, slain by the Ottomans in the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, thereby inaugurating the cult that eventually (in the later 1800s) defined the nationalist Serb identity independently from Christianity. In the 1700s Serbness was still identical with Serb Orthodox Christianity, as evidenced by a catechism written in 1772 in which a priest in the Austrian borderlands asked the faithful to answer the questions “who are you?” and “why do you call yourself a Serb?” with “I am a human being, a Serb, a Christian” and “I call myself a Serb because of my birth and my language, which is that of the people from whom I originate and who call themselves Serbs.”<sup>11</sup> Of course, in the absence of a patriarch, this church Serbness (which should not be confused with the German or *heterochthone* Greek type of cultural nationalism) was leaderless after 1776 and hence politically irrelevant.

As in Greece, the leadership of the Serb revolt of 1804 came from the intermediate indigenous authorities. Until the later 1700s, they had been village headmen (*knez*, pl. *knezovi*, a medieval title with the original meaning of “prince” or “duke”) at the apex of village assemblies. In their position, they were responsible for the collection and remittance of their taxes to the representatives of their town-based absentee cavalry landlords (*sipahiler*) and the *paşa* in Belgrade who commanded the Janissaries for the defense of the province of Serbia as well as the empire as a whole. The regime changes in Serbia and migrations of Serbs to the Austrian Empire had increased cross-border contacts, commerce, and gun-running, all resulting in the ability of a number of *knezovi* to transform themselves into heads of local patronage groups engaged in the breeding of livestock for sale to Austria.

As mentioned above, the two Ottoman-Russian and Ottoman-Russian-Austrian Wars of 1768–74 and 1787–91/92 exposed the advanced degree of Ottoman decentralization and the uselessness of the Janissaries as a fighting force. With his Nizam-ı Cedid reforms, Sultan Selim III (1789–1807) sought to recentralize the empire and reform the

military. In Serbia this meant the appointment of a reform-minded *paşa*, Hacı Mustafa (1791–1802), the permission for the *knezovi* to bear arms, and the expulsion of the most unruly Janissaries from Serbia. But when Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798, a militarily shorthanded *paşa* could no longer enforce the expulsion order; the Janissaries trickled back into the province, sworn to revenge. After murdering the *paşa*, the Janissaries, many of whom were Serb-born, swept through the villages, seeking to disarm the peasants and massacring them by the hundreds in the process. In 1804 escaped *knezovi* in the forests responded with armed resistance, which quickly became a peasant uprising against the regime of the Janissaries garrisoned in the towns and cities. Under the leadership of Karageorge Petrović (1752–1817), a pig farmer who had become a rich patron through trade with Austria, they formed the nucleus of what evolved into the so-called First Serb Uprising (1804–13).

Karageorge, some *knezovi*, and a number of followers had some military experience as fighters in the Austrian border defense units and were relentless in their pursuit of their insurrection. After overcoming the Janissaries relatively easily in 1804, they functioned less effectively as local defense forces against the New Order troops that Hacı Mustafa sent against them. Russian support during the Napoleonic wars was sporadic. As internal disputes grew, Karageorge eventually gave up what had become a hopeless fight against Ottoman superiority. After he and others decamped in 1813 to Austria, his successor, Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860), at first submitted to Ottoman rule but then renewed military action in the Second Serb Uprising (1815–17). Obrenović, from peasant stock in Montenegro, was also a successful merchant who sold pigs to Austria and a patron of men in his service. This time the Serbs were militarily more unified. Obrenović, diplomatically more skilled than Karageorge, negotiated a status of autonomy in return for an annual tribute and Ottoman garrisons (1816–17).<sup>12</sup>

Inside Serbia Obrenović was ruthless. He had Karageorge assassinated as soon as the latter returned to Serbia in 1817 and repressed more than half a dozen rebellions against him with similar violence. Nevertheless, during his reign as an autocratic ruler Obrenović was more successful than his counterparts Kapodistrias and Otto in Greece in transforming Serbia from an unruly coalition of patronage leaders into a robust centralized state with a rapidly expanding civil bureaucracy and a police force loyal to the regime. It was this state that provided the frame for the rise of ethnic nationalism, replete with the elevation of the dialect of Herzegovina into the national language and the celebration of the

epic folk poetry of the outlaw hero as the prototype Serb (both by Vuk Karadžić). At the same time Serb nationalism also became irredentist, with its program of adding Vojvodina, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Albania to the existing Serbia (Iliya Garašanin). The idea of “cleansing” (*čistiti*) the land of Muslims became a part of irredentism at this time.<sup>13</sup>

Constitutional nationalism sprouted as well, with the introduction of the so-called Sretenje Constitution in 1835. Its precocious liberalism, however, was so odious to the three empires still powerfully devoted to the Restoration (as again in the Europe-wide liberal revolts of 1848) that the Serb regime squashed it after two weeks. As overlords of Serbia, the Ottomans replaced this constitution in 1838 with an autocratic one of their own, which anticipated the Hatt-ı Şerif Edict of the following year. Overall, apart from a flourishing ethnic nationalism among intellectuals, bureaucrats, and professionals, the Serb state was still minimally unified by the middle of the nineteenth century, with no national bank, factory, railroad, or town with more than 30,000 inhabitants and only about 700 miles of paved roads.<sup>14</sup>

#### OTTOMAN CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM AND STATE-BUILDING IN BULGARIA

The Tanzimat reform effort (1839–77) in the Ottoman Empire, which began with the constitution for Serbia and the Hatt-ı Şerif Edict, was a response both to the growing political challenge by the two imperial neighbors Austria and Russia and to the Western challenge in general. The challenge by Austria and Russia was guided by the perception of an Ottoman Empire in the process of losing its Balkan provinces and, in the case of Russia, the increasingly concrete policy goal of regaining the once Byzantine Constantinople.<sup>15</sup> The Western challenge during most of the century was, first, the constitutional nationalism pioneered by the American and French Revolutions. Continental Restoration politicians in the European Concert, of course, did their best to suppress the spread of this form of nationalism and were generally successful until World War I; hence this challenge remained weak. More threatening was the second Western challenge, emanating from the beginning Industrial Revolution. This challenge was also muted, because Great Britain for most of the 1800s was the only mature industrial power with worldwide export interests for its cheap, factory-produced textiles. The Long Depression of 1872–96 retarded the rise of other industrial powers capable of competition with Great Britain on the world market.



The real, indirectly industrial Western challenge came from the new, increasingly industrially manufactured artillery and firearms as well as the iron-clad, steam-powered navies, beginning around 1830. These military innovations added to the traditional Ottoman woes—dating to the war with Russia in 1768–74—of having to rely on untrained and undisciplined Janissaries as well as irregulars, some under the command of provincial warlords. After 1826, with the disbanding of the Janissaries, acute financial shortfalls made it extremely difficult to build an effective modern army. The expanding empires of Austria and Russia, although also not industrialized and short of funds for their military modernization efforts, were nevertheless always a step ahead of the Ottomans with their shrinking empire. They were not decisively superior yet in their military potential (hence the surprising ease with which sultans declared wars throughout most of the 1800s) but were able to inflict decisive defeats if they were allied with Balkan insurgents.

This Western military challenge that the Ottomans encountered can be seen as accounting for the otherwise surprising pursuit of the Tanzimat decrees not only early on but also with relative success for most of the 1800s. On their face these reforms were nothing less than the attempt to reconstruct the empire on the basis of Western constitutional nationalism, step by cautious step from 1839 to 1877, at a time when the continental European Concert for the most part was frozen in its Restoration of Absolutism. The steps with which the bureaucrats, imbued with the ideology of “Ottomanism” (*osmanlılık*), articulated the constitutional program in a remarkably full sense are well known and do not need analysis here. They included equality before the law and eventually a constitution; the abolition of the slave trade and head tax; citizenship and military conscription (the latter with important exemptions); new civil, criminal, commercial, and land codes; consultative and eventually parliamentary bodies; a census, identity card, national anthem, and flag; public health institutions, primary schools, and a university; and a central bank and the end to tax farming (although only in theory). Ottomanism, in the sense of a constitutional and not ethnic nationalism, was remarkably successful in much of the empire and would have continued to be so beyond 1909 (in spite of Abdülhamid II’s autocratic disruption) had the Young Turks not reconstituted it expressly as the Turkish ethnic nationalism that it implicitly had been all along.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a major problem in nationalism studies is the mistaken categorical distinction between constitutional and ethnic nationalism. Historically, one always contained the

other, even if only implicitly. For a full understanding of Tanzimat Ottomanism it is necessary to be aware that Balkan inhabitants could not but experience the reforms and underlying ideology as measures imposed by a Muslim, primarily Turkish-speaking ruling class of administrators and soldiers. The tangible Tanzimat improvements in agriculture and commerce, as they often benefited Christians in some areas of the Balkans more than Muslims, evidently reduced the push for independence after Serbia and Greece. No large insurgencies took place for half a century, between 1804–21 and 1876. The Bosnian uprising of 1876 continued the traditional pattern of Christian warlords at the head of clan and patronage groups opposed to Ottoman overlordship, which I identified above as the points of departure for Greek and Serb independence or autonomy. But the Bosnian uprising triggered a Bulgarian insurrection a year later (1877) that was considerably different in character and clearly presupposed the Tanzimat. The entanglement of Bulgarian independence with the power politics of Austria, Russia, and other members of the European Concert, furthermore, made Bulgaria the point of departure for the intensification of ethnic nationalisms and, ultimately, the end of Ottoman rule in virtually all of the Balkans shortly before World War I. Bulgaria represented the beginning of fully evolved ethnic nationalism in Europe, with its programs of national glorification, invention of mythical pasts, utopian irredentisms, and intensified mass warfare.

As the hinterland of Istanbul, Bulgaria was always far more important than Greece and Serbia for the well-being of the empire. Many more Ottoman Turks and Muslims had settled there, and a larger percentage of the population was Muslim than in Greece and Serbia. Bulgarian Orthodox Christianity shared much of its institutional history with Serbia. During its autocephalous status from 1557 to 1767 the clergy and monks were the main carriers of the cultural heritage, as authors or copyists of liturgical, hagiographical, and historical texts as well as communicators with Russia. But after the abolition of autocephaly Bulgaria was much more firmly under Greek Orthodox influence, both clerical and secular. Phanariot Greeks (originally from the Fener neighborhood of Istanbul) formed a large community of administrators, tax farmers, estate owners, and merchants in Bulgaria. The Filiki Eteria of early constitutional and ethnic Greek nationalists was recruited among Phanariot intellectuals and professionals. In the mid-1800s tensions between Greek and Bulgarian Orthodox clergy intensified to such a degree that the Tanzimat authorities reestablished the independence of the Bulgarian clergy in 1870. Thus, in contrast to Serbia, where the pre-Tanzimat administration was

hostile to the Serb Church, in Bulgaria the Ottomans favored the Bulgarian Church over the Greek Church. The character of Bulgarian culture, however, was just as strongly religious as that of Serbia, with little secular cultural nationalism present even in the mid-1800s.

One result of the Tanzimat in Bulgaria was the abolition of the absentee landlord system of the *sipahiler* (discussed above in the context of Serbia in the late 1700s). In most parts of Bulgaria, farmers became owners of the plots they worked, mostly for self-sufficiency. Although their taxes remained high or even increased, ownership of the land went a long way toward stabilizing a prosperous village society. In a parallel development, urban and rural textile weaving and leather workshops multiplied substantially, for the production of military cloth, braids, belts, and footwear for the New Ottoman Army. In turn, these workshops spawned the enlargement of subsidiary craft guilds, such as tailors and cobblers. Communal councils broadened their memberships, from wealthy notables dating to the decentralization period of the later 1700s (so-called *khorbadjii* or tax farmers, owners of flocks of sheep, and livestock merchants) to craftsmen and traders. Council functions, apart from tax allocation, included money lending, upkeep of churches, appointment of teachers, and sending gifted pupils abroad. From about 1850 a majority of the schools (for boys as well as girls) abandoned the Greek language and taught in Bulgarian. Following the expansion of education, the Gabrovo dialect of central Bulgaria became the standard for the literary language and helped in the proliferation of newspapers and books, all part of what later Bulgarian nationalists called the "Revival" (*vuzrazhdane*) of the mid-century. In short, a growing, upwardly mobile, and mostly urban-centered Bulgarian Christian social stratum made the most of the Tanzimat and subscribed in its majority to the constitutional-nationalist ideology of *osmanlılık*.<sup>16</sup>

The children of this stratum, born between 1820 and 1850, typically received primary and advanced education at Greek or Bulgarian schools and at colleges and military academies in Istanbul, Russia, and Serbia. They returned to Bulgaria as teachers, librarians, journalists, authors, state employees (railroad, telegraph), monks, and priests. At school and abroad they became aware of Russian liberalism, the Italian Risorgimento, and Serb state-building, as well as the implicit Turkishness of Ottomanism. They translated their observations and experiences into plans for the liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule. Older figures in the stratum, such as Georgi Rakovski (1821–67), Dimitar Obshti (1835–73), and Vasil Levski (1837–73), were the pioneers of first efforts to organize military groups or bands abroad and secret organizations

inside Bulgaria. Obshti and Levski paid for a premature operation in 1873 with their lives. A few attempts at incursions from abroad and internal uprisings in the 1860s and early 1870s failed, as a result of inadequate preparations.

The eventual insurrection of April 1876, intended to become a general war of independence, was also a feeble undertaking that was doomed from the beginning and lasted barely five weeks. Although it was led in four regions by men with military training, irregular or guerrilla warfare was a new experience for them and their small bands of about 200–300 men. Among both leaders and followers were outlaws or rebels (*haiduts*, *voivodes*) who had taken to the mountain forests—here we find a parallel to Greece and Serbia, attesting to the centuries-old, enduring presence of traditional resistance leaders as patrons but without state-building ambitions. Peasants were recruited as well, although in disappointingly small numbers. Leaders knew very well that they had to arouse the teacher, mayor, and priest of each community in order to reach the generally well-off peasants, whose enthusiasm remained tepid. There was, furthermore, little coordination among the four regions, and the insurgents lacked weapons. While the insurrection assembled perhaps some one thousand to two thousand ethnic nationalists, most urban and rural Christians (a little more numerous than Muslims) were clearly not yet nationalistic enough to risk their lives.

Given all these shortcomings, it was not difficult for the Ottomans to repress the uprisings quickly, with a mixture of a few disciplined troops and large numbers of irregulars (*bashi-bazouks*) from among the Muslim Bulgarian population, the so-called Pomaks.<sup>17</sup> The repression was far worse than the Muslim victimization in the insurrection and aroused a vociferous but short-lived outcry in Western European public opinion. When the Bulgarians embarked on their own even more outsized revenge a little later under Russian protection and drove a majority of Muslims from the country, there was no outcry. Western European humanitarian aid for the refugees remained insufficient.<sup>18</sup> As Edward W. Gladstone remarked in 1876, at the time in opposition in Great Britain: “It is in the nature of the wild beast, which cannot be driven out of him [the Turk], even if you dress him up in tight-fitting clothes and teach him to talk French.”<sup>19</sup> Humanitarian intervention during the nineteenth century was in the name of Western Civilization, not human rights.

The April 1876 insurrection of Bulgaria is nevertheless important as an event that was definitely no longer of the type displayed by Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria was the case of a revolutionary ethnic nationalist

movement led by urban-educated professionals and meeting secretly for several years in smaller and larger groups to prepare for day X, only to fail in its efforts at mass recruitment when the uprising got underway. While the Greeks and Serbs exploited still existing traditional forms of political organization, only later transformed into modern ones, Bulgaria foreshadowed the concept of urban ethnic nationalists recruiting peasants as foot soldiers for national liberation wars. Communist China against Japan, Communist Vietnam against France and the United States, and the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) against France were the most prominent examples in the twentieth century.

As for the uprising of 1876, Russia's conquest of Bulgaria and advance to within a short distance of Istanbul was of course too blatant an imperial power play to be acceptable to the Concert. Austria, now the ally of Germany, was not to be thwarted in its Balkan ambitions. France, defeated in 1871 by Germany, retreated to mere diplomatic support for Balkan independence. Great Britain was still committed to the defense of the Ottoman Empire. Despairing of the empire's ability to defend itself, however, Britain occupied Ottoman Cyprus in 1878 to prevent Russia from conquering Istanbul. It then used Cyprus to help itself unabashedly to the conquest of Ottoman Egypt and Sudan in 1881.

Regardless of their differences in the Congress of Berlin (1878) that settled the territorial ambitions of the powers, Germany, Austria, and Russia—united in the Three Emperors League (1873–78, 1881–87)—continued their fierce opposition to the constitutional and ethnic nationalisms that had threatened to destroy their land empires since the French Revolution of 1789. In 1815 they were strong enough to repress these nationalisms. Shaken in 1848 in central Europe, they retreated to manipulation.<sup>20</sup> And in 1881 they extended this manipulation to Eastern Europe, riding the nationalist tigers until the bitter end in 1914.

## NOTES

1. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2nd ed., with an important foreword by John Breuilly.
2. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, new edition, with a wide-ranging introduction by Craig J. Calhoun.
3. An expanded discussion of the ideas in this paragraph can be found in Peter von Sivers, Charles A. Desnoyers, and George B. Stow, *Patterns of World History*, chs. 22 and 28.
4. The episodes of the American-British War of 1812–15, Brazilian coregency with Portugal from 1816 to 1822, and Maximilian's reign in Mexico from 1864 to

1867 were too short to qualify as entanglements of the type that the Balkans experienced.

5. On this decision to enter European power politics and engage in concerted action against the Ottomans, see E. V. Anisimov, "The Imperial Heritage of Peter the Great in the Foreign Policy of His Early Successors."
6. On the rising involvement of Austria and Russia in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire and the increased interest of rebels and insurrectionists in seeking support from the two empires, see Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821–1833*, 26–40.
7. The role of these intermediate power wielders shifting between submission and autonomy under conditions of Ottoman decentralization in the late 1700s and early 1800s is analyzed by Achilles Batalas, "Send a Thief to Catch a Thief."
8. Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, 78–84.
9. On the impact of Enlightenment and nationalism on Balkan intellectuals, see Victor Roudometof, "From Rum Millet to Greek Nation." In my judgment, as argued in this chapter, Roudometof overestimates the impact.
10. My arguments in this paragraph are based on Stephanos P. Papageorgiou, "The Army as an Instrument for Territorial Expansion and for Repression by the State."
11. Cited in Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia: The History of an Idea*, 23.
12. This summary of the two Serb uprisings is largely based on Misha Glenny, *The Balkans*, 1–39; and Cox, *The History of Serbia*, 39–49.
13. Branumir Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia*, 52, 189.
14. Siniša Malešević, "Wars That Make States and Wars that Make Nations," 39, citing Victor Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization and Orthodoxy*, without a page number. The author, like this chapter, emphasizes the lateness of Balkan nationalisms.
15. This concept was based on the (apocryphal) Testament of Peter the Great, a "document" that gradually gained shape in the nineteenth century. See Laurence Lockart, "The 'Political Testament' of Peter the Great."
16. This summary is based on Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria*, ch. 3.
17. A detailed but unsystematically composed history of the April Uprising can be found in Assen Nicoloff, *The Bulgarian Resurgence*, ch. 10. A fascinating overview of the many interpretations of the April Uprising by Bulgarian authors is Roumen Daskaloff, *The Making of a Nation in the Balkans*. See also Duncan Perry, *Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870–1895*, ch. 1.
18. Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, 166–67.
19. *Ibid.*, 159.
20. In Eastern Europe, the Russian tsar escaped 1848 unchallenged and aided Austria in suppressing the uprisings in 1849. For the repercussions of Russia's aid on the Ottoman Empire, see David M. Goldfrank, "Policy Traditions and the Menshikov Mission of 1853," 122–23.



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# Introduction

## Lasting Consequences of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913)

*Isa Blumi and M. Hakan Yavuz*

It has become second nature in the Euro-American academy to identify war as the principal engine for change in the modern world. Be it the overthrow of a dynasty or a colonial overlord or a heroic struggle against capitalist exploitation, war is universally accepted as the crucial transitory exercise for modern agents of history. Historians of southeastern Europe have asserted similarly functionalist roles for the so-called Balkan Wars of 1912–13. As with the Napoleonic wars, the American Revolution, the Franco-German War, and World Wars I and II, the battles across the fields of the southern Balkan peninsula serve as the fodder for modern historians to cultivate the national myths requisite for all twentieth-century nation-states. Trapped in cliché, for much of the last century historians have rarely questioned primordialist assertions of the inevitability of the modern nation-state in the region—Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Greece, Turkey. As a result professional scholars consistently surrender the study of the Balkan Wars to the methods of state propaganda. Rarely have these wars been studied using the instruments of critical inquiry increasingly adopted by social scientists skeptical about the entire modern state story.

As the editors of this volume, we felt that after almost a century of manipulative historiography it was high time to begin to adopt a more interdisciplinary approach that would finally revisit the Balkan Wars, especially in the context of the traumas of the 1990s, as something other than a nationalist watershed. After all, the proverbial collapse of the socialist regimes once dominating the Balkans in the early 1990s, and especially the often bloody process of disaggregating Yugoslavia, led a new generation of indigenous scholars to fight over the space in which

the critical reanalysis of the entire state apparatus had once hijacked the events leading up to 1912. As a reflection of this recent reorientation of the scholarly agendas of many from the region, this volume constitutes the first conscious effort by over four dozen scholars to exploit this window of opportunity collectively and offer space to those wishing to join those revisionist Balkan colleagues keen on forever liberating the region's past from the twentieth century state.

On May 4–7, 2012, we called more than four dozen scholars to join us in Utah to reconsider the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 in a manner that treats the events as not only interconnected but also distinctive processes of social, economic, and political exchange. In order to get the most out of this exchange, we asked the participants to answer the following set of questions while writing about their findings for this volume. What were the specific and systemic causes of the Balkan Wars? What was the connection between nationalism and war-making in the Balkans? To what extent were the wars related to efforts at imposing ethno-religious homogenization on previously “mixed” societies, as is often attributed to post-Ottoman states? What were the short- and long-term consequences of the Balkan Wars for the way these once “tolerant” communities navigated the development of post-Ottoman states? That is to say, in what manner did these wars set a pattern for ethnic and/or religious state-led homogenization (ethnic cleansing) in the region? Finally, should we approach the violence visited upon the inhabitants of the region as responsible for shaping the collective memory and the subsequent nation-state building projects in the Balkans?

It is inevitable that we have received very different kinds of responses from our esteemed contributors. In their totality, however, the contributions to this project should be read as sincere attempts to answer these questions from diverse academic perspectives. Indeed many of these chapters will prove to be cutting edge, mobilizing the best of international relations, history, political science, and sociology in order to provide a unique alternative set of interpretive perspectives.

From the first chapter in this volume, it is clear that our contributors examine both the local and international origins of the actual military conflict and its lasting consequences. While individually some chapters may seem to follow a conventional analytical path, if read closely and in succession, these disparate chapters actually all contribute to disputing the well-worn assertions that conflict in the Balkans was endemic and caused by ancient ethno-religious tensions. Instead, our colleagues offer a more nuanced understanding of the sociopolitical roots of conflict

and new ways to interpret the consequences of the wars. This in turn has allowed some to reconsider how notions of nationalism, popular sovereignty, the nation-state, and the principle of self-determination arrived in the Balkans, thus encouraging the reader to realize that the modern narrative of the nation-state in the Balkans is based on alien models. That is to say, by tracing the journey that these concepts have made from their Euro-American contexts and appreciating how they have been carelessly abstracted from their social and historical origins, some of these chapters help us understand how diverse groups experiencing very different conditions opportunistically imitated and over time actually internalized them.

As noted in several contributions in this volume, the subsequent new social groups that used these foundational myths evolved out of major economic transformations characteristic of the nineteenth century throughout much of the Mediterranean world. Many of those “ethnic entrepreneurs” directly affected by these changes attempted to emulate the new ideas circulating in the larger region and engineered new social groups, politics, and institutions as a result. An even larger number of inhabitants of the Balkans experimented with new social formations and concepts at the height of finance capitalism’s influence over governments administering the region. In this process many “reformers” actively challenged the very same forces that, in other contexts, were known to be the engines of Euro-American colonialism. Clearly these geopolitical pressures focused on a highly contested region of Europe affected all segments of society. Thus the formation of the Balkan nation-state and its incremental consolidation must be seen as intersecting with the rival interests of the major powers, including the Ottoman Empire, which was itself in the throes of institutional reform during the period under analysis.

Many contributors to this volume sought to locate the local stories within these larger competing power struggles without denying various, often contradictory manifestations of human agency. Considering this, in the process inspecting the following case studies and weighing their findings, the reader may conclude that the universal ideas of nationalism, constitutionalism, and popular sovereignty unambiguously served as instruments for the consolidation of the Balkan state system targeted by an emergent post-Ottoman political and economic elite. Indeed the apparent prevalence of nationalism is treated in most cases as a necessary means to strengthen the state at a time when it was crucial to homogenize society in order to empower the emergent ethno-national elite.

On the surface, at least, this does not seem to deviate much from the dominant narrative of the last century, when the Balkans actually served as the quintessential example in standardized narratives about the way modern nation-states were instrumental in realizing a common people's collective ambitions. Fortunately, more recent scholarship, often transmitted through alternative media such as the blogosphere, has gone beyond these conventional explanations in order to present a more complicated story of the region. Yet these new narratives still position institutions, nation-states, and political parties, and the people themselves, in the larger historical processes associated with the advent and spread of modernity in Europe. Conventional wisdom is thus simply reiterated in the frame adopted recently by scholars of the Third World who offered "alternative" modernities.<sup>1</sup>

The Balkans, in this scholarly current, provide a contrasting case study for "modernization" in the context of a still recognized story of twentieth-century European ascendancy that reinforces the tried and true claims about the modern world. As increasingly argued by frustrated critics, however, the work of scholars engaged in these "new" approaches actually inspires conservative entrenchment in some corners of the academic establishment that unintentionally reinforces the underlying claims of the Euro-American academic tradition.<sup>2</sup>

Until recently studies about the Balkans required the reader to assume certain characteristics of the region and its peoples. At the center of these essentialist tropes has long been Balkan violence, a natural consequence, we were long told, of a messy socioeconomic and ethnic mix, which has often been derided for its "premodern," "Oriental" quality. Invariably, this violence was manifested in crucial moments of history such as the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and treated as a necessary evil to "liberate" Europe from Ottoman (Islamic) occupation.

When it comes to ethno-national identities in the Balkans, the twentieth century can only be understood through a logic that recognizes "difference" as the source of the Balkans' notorious violent antagonisms among groups. As such, the ethno-national "reading" of events in the Balkans has been the way to assert, by way of erasure, the story of the primordial nation struggling endlessly to shed an "Ottoman legacy" of cultural hybridity and social heterogeneity not permissible in the modern world. What these often conflicting stories of disaggregation ultimately imply is that any attempt to study what leads to, and results from, the Balkan Wars necessarily suffers from a fundamental flaw: narratives that attempt to tell the story of "the war" (frequently attempted in monographs

on the Balkan Wars) misrepresent the reality of disparate and geographically dispersed events that were contributing to very different processes taking place in scattered locales. In other words, works on the wars that transformed this region from an Ottoman space to ethno-national success stories narrow the analysis of events to a “Bulgarian,” “Turkish,” or “Albanian” perspective while directing the relevance of the “war” toward these isolated ethno-national stories. What goes missing is the possibility to interpret events as fluid, often intersecting at multiple points simultaneously and thus with vastly different consequences and results.

Perhaps, after reading the contributions in this volume, scholars will finally concede that it is an impossible task to reconstitute these diverse perspectives into a coherent single narrative that tells the story of the Balkan Wars, their origins, and their multiple processes and long-term consequences in a new way. In our case, the goal of this volume was never to tell a linear story but to offer, for the first time, a confluence of such conflicting perspectives in a way that highlights these diverse narratives. In other words, this volume is ultimately being used to demonstrate that such confining themes as “the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913” actually demand complex and varied approaches.<sup>3</sup>

The editors thus ask readers (and those instructors who may elect to use this volume as a teaching tool) not to approach these individual chapters as distinctive, autonomous contributions to one aspect or one view of the Balkan Wars. Rather, these chapters, organized as such, are meant to contribute to sharpening an overall, if ultimately confusing, vision. A single theme like the Balkan Wars actually constitutes a wide-ranging set of processes and events that can never be engaged in a single narrative. In light of this we have organized these chapters to offer the reader the chance to engage with vastly different phenomena analyzed using different methodologies. In this respect, this volume of thirty-one scholars’ contributions not only individually but collectively challenges varying explanations for the sociopolitical roots of conflicts that eventually developed into hostility between states.

As can be discerned after reading the chapters in this volume, these states actually constituted a large number of groups who were organized, often spontaneously, into politically active assemblages that disaggregated state power and thus the constituencies pressing for war. These groups all experienced domestic conditions that rarely fit a unitary model. As a result, their interactions with other actors found scattered in the larger region often affected the course of events retrospectively interpreted as exclusively ethno-national in import. Put differently, the

diversity of experiences and conditions under which actors interacted ultimately challenged those administrations claiming authority over them at crucial moments leading up to and then prosecuting the wars. This challenge was especially felt by the military hierarchy of these states. Violence was one of many ways in which all these groups interacted, explaining why internal stability was often lacking. This volatility therefore is crucial for the reader to remember when contemplating the way in which contributors to this volume categorize group interactions and these groups' attitudes toward the state often seeking to return "law and order" to the area.

This complication is perhaps best appreciated with the example of the *çetas/cetes* or *komitadjis* (rebel units) long associated in the literature with the ethno-national ambitions of Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian, or Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire. A number of contributors have treated these amorphous groups as much more complicated, with their actions affected by shifting and politically fragile temporary alliances. As the reader will learn, such alliances often crossed the misleadingly fixed ethno-national categories long used in the scholarship. In other words, how we interpret the actions of such actors cannot be simply fit into an analytical model using, for example, ethno-national identity politics as the primary source of motivation. Garabet Moumdjian in the first section of the book, for example, aptly explains how Ottoman-Armenian activism in Macedonia may explain how and why people acted the way they did in the region prior to the actual wars. This sensitivity to a multiplicity of interests and causal factors extends to any number of chapters in part I of the book in regard to the origins of the wars.

As already suggested, by focusing too much on specific administrative zones—the mountainous borderlands of Kosova, İşkodra, Serbia, and Montenegro known in the volume as the Malësi e Madhe, Macedonia, larger Bulgaria, or Anatolia—without fully engaging events beyond the locale, we are deprived of a fuller analysis of the disparate events contributing to the Balkan Wars and their long-term consequences for postwar societies. Again, as we learn in a number of chapters in part I, many of the events that contributed to the Balkan Wars actually have origins outside the Balkan region itself. Francesco Caccamo's chapter, for instance, suggests that the war between the Ottoman Empire and Italy in North Africa (and to a lesser extent in the Red Sea) in 1911 had important, often forgotten, implications for the Balkans that surely contributed to the wars of 1912 and 1913.<sup>4</sup> Adding to the complexity of these issues is the way the unfolding events in the Balkans were perceived in much of the

eastern Mediterranean, a theme explored by Eyal Ginio in part III, which accounts for some long-neglected factors that can help us reintroduce the larger Ottoman context that includes the Arabic-speaking regions to the Balkan Wars. Such focus directly addresses the concern that Ottoman historiography has consistently studied the empire as a single unit (with a heavy emphasis on events in Istanbul) or as a story consisting of mutually exclusive subregions that are studied separately—the Balkans, Anatolia, the Arab world. Again, several contributions in this volume specifically challenge this approach.<sup>5</sup>

What the reader gains from appreciating these new integrative angles draws from the broader scholarship on studying how the non-Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire—Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Arabia—inform our understanding of how Ottoman outlooks were shaped and entrenched well beyond the 1912 traumas. Indeed, for Arab subjects, the lingering Ottoman memory after 1912 shaped conflicting responses to the actual disintegration of the empire itself.<sup>6</sup> Taking this lesson to heart, it is clear that we need to abandon the assertion that the Balkan Wars were inevitable as a natural conclusion to resolving the Eastern Question and that different ethno-national groups had to separate from each other as well as from the alien Habsburg and Ottoman forms of government. A number of chapters in this volume stress this intersection of interests that conjoined Armenians, Arabs, Christians, and Muslims in a common project, manifested most famously in Manastır in 1908.

In direct relation to this major problem with identifying the reasons for the outbreak of war in late 1912 between the Ottoman Empire and a loosely formed coalition of regional states—Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia—is the fact that no single narrative can hope to capture the variables at play. Indeed, if simply considering the numerous contributing factors in order to answer why some Ottoman factions reacted with hostility toward the foreign policies of Greece, Serbia, or Bulgaria before the winter of 1912, it is clear that the prevailing scholarship has neglected the complicated exchanges and competing interests within even the ever-changing political arenas now studied as individual states. In many ways the literature is trapped by the formal categories used to understand the Balkan Wars, again largely a product of post-World War I approaches that privilege the undifferentiated nation-state and its essentialist ethno-national character over the many different possible sociopolitical, economic, and intercultural orientations still at play in each country.

To navigate around these methodological pitfalls, some contributors chose to engage the larger scholarship on the productive uses of



memory and the impact of war specifically on collective memory. Here it could prove productive to compare and contrast the speculations of Erik Jan Zürcher, Doğan Akyaz, Çağdaş Sumer, and Mehmet Arısan in this volume with the theories of memory that have been generated by the study of the Balkans completed elsewhere. As highlighted in several of the contributions here, because of the war individuals and the communities in which they live often invested in new forms of association that directly conflicted with evolving state-building projects.<sup>7</sup> In the case of the western Balkans, the very process of occupying Ottoman lands by late 1912, often by regimes composed of political and commercial elites who had strong residual associations with the Ottoman state, suggests an intimacy with the enemy that often is neglected in the scholarship. For example, as discussed in Isa Blumi's chapter, the almost personalized way in which Montenegrin troops prosecuted the war against the Catholic inhabitants of the Malësi borderlands between the 1880s and the 1930s suggests a long-term strategic concern that is only partially linked to the ambitions of Italy and Austria-Hungary, Christian fanaticism, or ethno-national expansion. A similar interpretive range is possible when considering the detailed analysis of a Bulgarian forced conversion campaign directed at the region's Muslims, as studied in Fatme Myuhtar-May's chapter. How ultimately to explain these violent policies as products of central state administrative agendas is of less concern in the present volume. Rather, contributions as varied as the ones offered by Gül Tokay, Tetsuya Sahara, Richard Hall, and Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu invest in detailed studies of how various groups (especially in Macedonia/Bulgaria) developed interesting collaborative linkages over the years leading up to the Balkan Wars, thus disentangling the institutions of prewar states and the numerous, often contradictory, interests transforming these states.

Indeed, as we learn from the chapters in part I, for much of the period leading up to the Balkan Wars Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian strategies included collaborating with elements of the local Ottoman populations who were later to become victims of some of the more brutal forms of persecution that make the Balkans notorious today.<sup>8</sup> In other words, we cannot rely on the clichés that leave an ethno-national imprint on the way we write about these events.

Therefore, beyond the concerns with neighboring states' sociopolitical interests in these same regions, we should consider economic explanations. For example, the appropriation of wealth by the victors, especially land, deserves our attention. The notion that commercial interests were intimately involved in the process of how land was taken from

the previous inhabitants may help provide depth to the perception of the manner in which postconflict administrations approached incorporating the territories and the populations that were torn away from the Ottoman Balkans in 1912–13.

To navigate how our diverse contributions deal with all these issues, we would now like to outline each part of the book individually. In the process, it will become even clearer that this volume is best approached by actually following in sequence the scheme that we arranged to present this revisionist set of studies on the Balkan Wars, their origins, and the long-term impact on post-Ottoman societies.

#### PART I: THE ORIGINS OF THE BALKAN WARS

A recently released volume on the events of 1877–78, culminating in the Berlin Congress of 1878, offers us new ways of interpreting the events leading to the Balkan Wars of 1912–13.<sup>9</sup> As discussed in this earlier volume, one of the most traumatic consequences of the 1877–78 crisis was the imposition of boundaries, which were meant to formalize a new world order to be managed by the dominant powers of Europe. The problem for the inhabitants of these newly delimited lands was that the borderlands, in turn, initiated a number of social, economic, and political reactions and counter-reactions that ultimately undermined the “modern” geographies imagined at the time by the Great Powers. Put differently, modern European borders could not yet define the inhabitants of these lands by simply separating them from one another. Rather, the imposition of borders transformed peoples’ relationship with the states that had introduced new administrations to manage these now strategic territories.

Crucially, the nature of the subsequent friction proved far less amenable to modern coercive state power than had been initially hoped. As a result, local conditions often demanded measures of cooperation and negotiation—that is to say: *politics*—which most post-Ottoman studies that are fixated on the image of primordial ethnic and sectarian divides fail to acknowledge. Borders, in other words, created new possibilities for complex forms of politics rather than for modern government, a set of institutions mobilizing coercive technologies in an attempt to subordinate, rather than to negotiate with, indigenous subjects.<sup>10</sup>

What this all suggests is a far more dynamic domestic and regional set of conditions that cannot be universally subsumed under “Macedonia,” “Albania,” “Serbia,” or a more general ethno-national template. Although

individual contributions in this volume still mobilize these conditions, what some argue are anachronistic affiliations, collectively these chapters offer a fine example of the diversity that we were ultimately seeking to glean from this conference.

As highlighted by a number of contributions in the first part of this volume, especially Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu's chapter, the Balkan states were alarmed by developments surrounding the events in Macedonia that initiated the takeover of power in Istanbul by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) under the banner of "Freedom," "Unity," and "Progress." Their course of action would appear to depend on what the major European powers would do in response to the "Young Turk" revolution. On October 3, 1908, the Great Powers declared that they would demand the halt of all operations previously introduced to implement "reforms" in Macedonia.<sup>11</sup> The special status of Macedonia was abolished, in other words, and the administrative and military agents of the Great Powers left the region, thus creating a new set of opportunities for both the incoming CUP-led administration in Istanbul and the various indigenous groups later identified as crucial to the post-Ottoman Balkans. Such a situation explains to a great extent the early successes for the CUP at the beginning of its rule as the Balkan states competing over Macedonia lost all of the strategic advantages and privileges won in the Ottoman Balkan territories during the thirty years since the Congress of Berlin of 1878. Such conditions helped create the kind of immediate shift in strategies by a number of state and community-level actors, a reaction covered in interesting ways by a number of contributors in part I of this volume.

Garabet Mouldjian's chapter, for example, discusses the dissemination of ideas, strategies, and norms among different nationalist movements. As he aptly argues, the Balkan nationalists' struggle and their tactics were quite possibly inspired by a group of Armenian inhabitants in the Macedonia region. As iterated by Mouldjian, it was an Armenian revolutionary organization that may have motivated irredentist Balkan nationalist networks in the crucial period from 1895 to 1913. As Mouldjian suggests, the Balkans, especially Macedonia, became the political laboratory for testing different strategies, reform programs, and ideas. It was a place in which diverse nationalist groups socialized with each other and collaborated against the Ottoman state. It is crucial to note that, while Balkan revolutionary committees were emulating the Armenian one, the Young Turks charged with assuring "union" and "progress" were also being socialized within this framework. Mouldjian thus offers a detailed study of the political culture of revolutionary

organizations in general and their shifting strategies to expand political space vis-à-vis the Ottoman state in a Balkan context. That is to say that the ongoing cross-fertilization of ideas, networks, and strategies played an important role in the consolidation of what would later be homogenized nation-states.

This ongoing process of reconfiguring both external and internal forces created an opportunity for the irredentist governments in the Balkans to consolidate their nation-building by expanding their territories to wherever their co-nationals lived and ethnically cleansing those who resisted assimilation. In this context, some contributors in part I marshal two competing, at times complementary, approaches to explain the cause of the Balkan Wars. Hakan Yavuz and Sevtap Demirci (in part III) adopt a more structural explanation. Their analysis reveals that the configuration of the legacies of the Treaty of Berlin, the exposure of Ottoman weakness during the Tripoli War, the failure of the Ottoman reforms in Macedonia, and the irredentist forms of Balkan nationalism all proved crucial to explaining the origins of the Balkan Wars. Yavuz in particular analyzes the corollary between war-making and nation-building (homogenization) to explain the origins of the Balkan Wars. Specifically, he accounts for policies leading to war by focusing on the Greek example of nation-building, the internal Ottoman debates between Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks, and the Ottoman adoption of a form of civic patriotism in response to the ethnic-nation-state model. As duly noted, however, the legacy of the Balkan Wars was not productive for everyone and led to the destruction of the new Ottoman dream of a civic constitutionalism, leading in the end to the ultimate adoption of the Balkan model of nation-building in Anatolia with terrible consequences for that highly heterogeneous region.

It must be stressed that this was not inevitable. In the nineteenth century most Balkan people did not know “what nation they belonged to, or even that they belonged to one at all.”<sup>12</sup> It was the nation-state structure, created as a solution to the Eastern Question, that would ultimately construct the nation in such exclusivist terms. In the case of parts of central and Western Europe, the state existed before the nation, meaning that strategies of nation-building developed over several centuries. In the Balkans, however, the state system was created as part of a means to balance competing major European powers seeking to create their own proxy states at Ottoman (and Russian) expense. The state structure in the Balkans, in other words, was introduced as a possible solution to the increasingly problematic Ottoman presence in southeastern Europe and

as such can be seen as a by-product of rivalries between major European powers.

The new Balkan states all suffered from limited resources and legitimacy. In response, Yavuz explains, the constituencies who claimed ownership of these weak states sought to build their own ethno-religious nation through war-making, education, and the nationalization of religion. In short, unlike in other parts of Europe, nation-building in the Balkans was time-compressed, and the state elite used oppressive means to create citizens with a national consciousness. Furthermore, Yavuz argues that by 1912 the Balkan elite regarded war as an opportunity to fuse nation and state, enhance the state's legitimacy, and homogenize the populace. War-making, in other words, became the necessary process of nation-building and the consolidation of the state.

For his part, by examining the dominant Orientalist discourse of the period, Demirci asserts that the origins of the Balkan Wars rest with the interstate rivalries in Europe, all translating into projects that sought the partition of the Ottoman provinces. In this context Richard Hall, Gül Tokay, and Francesco Caccamo insist on the role of political actors directly involved in these interstate rivalries, be they within Bulgaria as covered by Hall, in the Ottoman state administration as explained by Tokay, or within Italian circles of power as highlighted by Caccamo. These contributions take an agency-based approach to explain the Balkan Wars.

It is widely known that the Italian invasion of Libya, as Caccamo argues, exposed the weakness of the Ottoman state. Added to this was Italian public support for Albanian independence, which meant that the extenuated threat of Ottoman destabilization was exploited by a number of the empire's Balkan neighbors, including Bulgaria. Richard Hall, who has written one of the best treatments of the Balkan Wars, convincingly argues that indeed the most important actor responsible for the Balkan Wars was Bulgaria. As Hall explains, Bulgaria clearly played a formative role in the construction of the Balkan League that directly led to the outbreak of the wars. The main motive behind this Bulgarian policy was irredentist nationalism and the attempt by Sofia-based elites to create a homogeneous nation-state by encompassing all of their co-nationals and ethnically cleansing non-Bulgars from Macedonia and Thrace. This ambition, according to Hall, dated to the ephemeral San Stefano peace settlement of March 1878, which ended the Russo-Turkish War and established a large Bulgarian state encompassing the maximum ambitions of Bulgarian nationalists. The origins of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 thus go back to 1878. As elaborated by Hall, the subsequent Berlin settlement

of July of that same year trisected the large independent Bulgarian state established at San Stefano into a small Bulgarian principality remaining under Ottoman sovereignty, an autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia, and Macedonia returned to direct Ottoman rule. The policy of the Bulgarian Principality thereafter aimed at the re-creation of San Stefano Bulgaria. Unification with Eastern Rumelia occurred in 1885, but Bulgarian attempts to obtain Macedonia, contested by the Greeks and Serbs and resisted by the Ottomans, remained elusive. The Sofia government attempted various policies aimed at the unification of Macedonia, including attempts at *détente* with the Ottomans, support for armed bands in Macedonia, and accommodations with Balkan neighbors. None produced the desired result.

The seizure of power in Constantinople by the Young Turks convinced the Bulgarians that war with the Ottomans over Macedonia was inevitable. After 1908 the Sofia government began to plan for this conflict and to seek support from Russia and from the other Balkan states. Bulgaria's strategic position and proximity to the Ottoman capital at Constantinople, its Russian Great Power patron, and its well-trained and well-equipped army all made it particularly important in establishing the conditions for the First Balkan War.

In contrast, by comparing the dominant Turkish and Balkan historiographies on the causes of the Balkan wars, Hacısalihoglu criticizes both historiographies and offers a more nuanced explanation for the outbreak of the wars. The Balkan historiography generally blames the Young Turks for being zealous Turkish nationalists and presents the Balkan Wars as a liberation war against the Turkification policies of the CUP. For its part, the Islamically tainted interpretation of the Young Turk period in Turkish historiography usually points the finger at the CUP and its policies as the cause for losing the Ottoman territories in the Balkans. More specifically the CUP is accused of adventurism and of ignoring the sound policies of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Within these parameters Hacısalihoglu identifies four distinctive periods in the development of the CUP and its evolving relations with other active groups in Macedonia. While this narrative may seem instrumental, he identifies how the success of the CUP and its popularity galvanized the Balkan state to stop the Ottoman consolidation of power.

Some contributors also suggest that it is helpful to acknowledge how the influence of external actors animated the peoples of the Ottoman Balkans to stand behind temporary coalitions of local and imperial actors and collaborations that often led to bloody confrontations linked to the

Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Indeed a critical inspection of a wide range of primary sources makes it apparent that the nature of Ottoman rule over the 1878–1912 period involved a constant negotiation of power through local channels and the associations that shaped daily life. Such negotiations sometimes took the form of exchanges across the battlefield, such as the struggle in the highlands between Montenegrin state operatives, Ottoman soldiers, and locals. Similarly, exchanges among Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks led to protracted conflicts that undermined previously useful alliances.<sup>13</sup> Such cases force us to realize that human actions may not always lead to results in line with a nationalist modernity. The local people did have a role in a history that was not animated by ethno-national interests alone. A number of chapters in this volume help flesh out this claim by discussing at length the paradoxical role of often misinterpreted rebel activities in the expansion of certain expressions of state power and individual or group ambition.

As a possible reflection of the relative success (and failure) of Ottoman efforts to integrate the Balkans, Gül Tokay stresses four factors in the origins of the Balkan Wars: the change of regime in Istanbul; the lack of Ottoman will to implement the reform in Macedonia; the new assertive Austrian policy against Serbia; and the collapse of triangular diplomatic relations among the Balkan states, the major European powers, and the Ottoman state. Tokay also highlights the formative role of the crisis of October 1908, caused by the Bulgarian declaration of independence and the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the critical factor in the formation of the Balkan alliance in 1912.

Austria-Hungary's colonial project in the Balkans is explored by Tamara Scheer. According to her research, Austrian-Hungarian policymakers sought to reawaken in Bosnia (recently acquired diplomatically) the cultural potential of its varied inhabitants that had supposedly languished under Ottoman rule. Whether the Habsburg project intended to create subjects *ex nihilo* or aimed to resuscitate a cultural potential long dormant under the weight of Ottoman "occupation," the administered populations in both Bosnia and elsewhere in the region were constructed as newly acquired Austro-Hungarian subjects in desperate need (unbeknownst to them) of instruction on the ways of civilized life. Importantly, this idea of a "mission" for those responsible for administering the Sanjak/Sandjak/Sancak of Novi Pazar can also be observed among the Ottoman intelligentsia throughout the nineteenth century, suggesting that a prevailing set of stereotypes and myths about the Balkans may

have informed policies toward the region that ultimately led to war between competing “state-building” projects.<sup>14</sup>

In this respect both Gül Tokay and Tamara Scheer’s chapters offer an interesting story of Austria-Hungarian activities in the Balkans as the Dual Empire sought to expand its sphere of influence, often in direct response to Serbian expansionism. To realize these goals, authorities aimed to win over the public through a series of economic, educational, and political strategies. These strategies at times had the opposite effect.

As specifically argued in Scheer’s chapter, the Sanjak experience had a major impact on Austro-Hungarian policies during the Balkan Wars and may have informed irredentists in Belgrade on what best worked in the region. One of the fundamental goals of the Dual Monarchy was to prevent the expansion of Serbia as a means to maintain its economic interest in the Balkans, so pursuing one goal did not necessarily translate into a successful realization in the other.

The Sanjak was also regarded as an economic gateway to the southern Balkans, especially to the Ottoman port of Salonika. In this respect, it was of strategic value to the Austro-Hungarian administration in occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina because it could enhance the economic potential of the ongoing reforms taking place there. In such terms the Sanjak was a coveted territory that gave some strategic leverage to the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire during a period in which the Ottomans were losing their European provinces to surrogate states of Russia, especially Serbia.<sup>15</sup> By filling in a void left behind by the Ottomans, Austro-Hungarian capitalists hoped to gain ascendancy in the larger Mediterranean context, still openly coveted by all the major European powers. The result of this often ignored struggle with Russia (through the proxy of Serbia and Montenegro) for regional ascendancy was often dangerous schemes to contain future conflicts by way of diplomatic innovations, first introduced in 1878.

As in the case of the Berlin Congress of 1878, perhaps the most important and lasting consequence of the 1912–13 conflict was the redefinition of the region’s borders. As a member of the Triple Alliance, while still on good terms with the rival Triple Entente, Italy was able to play a relevant but also ambiguous role. Specifically, Italy influenced the creation of an Albanian state with ethnic borders along the Adriatic but devoid of substantial Albanian regions in the interior, such as Kosova or northwestern Macedonia. In a similar way Italy contributed to the political-administrative organization of this Albanian state but then



became entangled in its destabilization because of its rivalry with the Habsburg Empire.

In this respect Caccamo's work indicates that the partition of the Ottoman territories was a common theme before and during the Balkan Wars. After the Libyan War of 1911–12 the Ottoman Muslims were depicted as "Asians" and "barbarians," and public opinion in Italy remained very anti-Ottoman. Public opinion, just as in the rest of Europe, supported Balkan nationalist demands against the Ottomans. Italy was not ready to get the "lion's share" from the partition of the Ottoman territories, so it wanted to delay and also sought an orderly partition of the empire. The Libyan War displayed the Ottoman military and political weakness, however, which in turn encouraged the Balkan states to attack the Ottoman state. Caccamo's chapter highlights the increasing role of Italian-Albanians in the making of Italian policy toward the Albanian question.

These accounts of the origin of the wars offer some much-needed depth to the ways in which scholars can think about the multiplicity of interests informing what has long been treated as strictly state policies toward the Ottoman Empire's administration of the Balkans. This diverse analytical perspective is complemented by the way other contributors in part II seek to explain how various agents of history experienced war, thereby beginning to account for the manner in which the violence forever transformed the region. These attempts to analyze the experiences of war include detailed studies that account for why the Ottoman state, through its military or elements of its society aiming to assist in the struggle, was directly transformed—often in a catastrophic sense—by the very ways in which the Ottoman Empire and soon to be former Ottoman subjects in the Balkans adapted to its consequences.

## PART II. WAR AS EXPERIENCE AND THE PERSECUTION OF CHANGE

Feroze Yasamee attempts to account for the Ottoman army's defeat in the Balkans by listing a number of factors that contributed to the military's lack of proper mobilization and planning. Supporting this impression is Oya Dağlar Macar's chapter on the lack of proper sanitation and a preventive health-care system, which concludes that "the total loss of Ottoman lives during the Balkan Wars was approximately 100,000–120,000. Among these war dead, approximately 75,000 died of epidemic diseases."

War affected Ottoman society on other levels, often behind the front lines. Back in the imperial capital, for instance, efforts by various groups to contribute to the war effort led to new sensibilities that had long-term effects after the actual end of formal hostilities. Exploring the traumas of war through the study of the way in which many Ottoman subjects engage in the instrumentalism of culture and historiography and how others sought to appropriate symbols of nationhood offers a complicated intellectual as well as institutional context for a study of the consequences of the Balkan Wars. This is true whether speaking about the products of competing imperial projects or the composition of a postwar polity that would provide the foundations for the Republic of Turkey. Indeed, reading Serpil Atamaz's chapter (and the chapters of Isa Blumi, Melis Hafez, and Mehmet Arısan later in the volume) provides an even greater appreciation of the ramifications of the intersecting interests of Ottoman subjects living in the Balkans. As they all argue, these are often manifested in a postwar context as very specific efforts to reconstitute communities that aimed to reflect the new power configurations between men and women, between rural and urban communities, and between regions.

Serpil Atamaz focuses on the mobilization of Ottoman women to help the war effort and contribute to the salvation of the nation. This mobilization, which occurred in direct response to the Balkan Wars, was not a simple act of patriotism but a noteworthy event that enabled Turkish women both to participate in the construction of the Turkish nation and to generate a new platform to voice their demands for equal rights. This signified the encroachment of Turkish women into what had been traditionally considered male-only spheres and their desire to put gender equality on the public agenda was a visible sign of one of the most important yet previously neglected effects of the Balkan Wars on late Ottoman society. Shifting the focus from the government, the military, and male ideologues to female activists, this chapter considers the Balkan Wars for the first time from the perspective of Turkish women.

Studying women's writings and activities in the context of the social and economic changes that took place between 1912 and 1913, the chapter examines the various ways in which the Balkan Wars influenced women's lives and gender relations in the early twentieth century. Based on various examples, mostly from Turkish women's newspapers, Atamaz argues that the Balkan Wars not only played a vital role in advancing gender equality in the late Ottoman Empire but also influenced the way in which the newly emerging Turkish women's movement evolved. This

chapter demonstrates that the Balkan Wars both transformed Turkish women's lives and helped shape the principles and goals of the incipient women's movement. The wars provided the justification and impetus for women to mobilize and organize, encouraged their participation in national affairs, led to their incorporation into work life, expanded their living space, and extended their sphere of influence.

While sections of Ottoman society were directly aiming to engage in the war effort on behalf of the state, others in the Balkans experienced the events as agents of opposition, ultimately seeking dramatically to change the structure of power in the region. This effort often entailed mobilizing the most violent of means to achieve often vague strategic ends. At times this occurred away from the actual battlefield, with Serbian subjects in Austro-Hungarian-administered Bosnia and Herzegovina reconstituting their sense of possibilities as events elsewhere unfolded. Amir Duranović argues that the defeat of the Ottoman Empire on the European continent meant for the Bosniaks a definitive disappearance of a political entity to whose existence they had been connected for centuries. The illusion about the return of the Ottoman Empire vanished as the Bosniaks became aware that they must accept the European cultural sphere—a new social reality. After the beginning of the First Balkan War the gap between Serb and Bosniak politics grew, because the war operations influenced the behavior of the Serb and Bosniak populations. The Bosniaks expressed their solidarity with the Ottoman Empire through celebratory manifestations and sending off military conscripts who joined the Ottoman army in Sarajevo in 1912 as well as through protests against Serb politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Studies of the political, social, and economic conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and more specifically Serb-Bosniak political relations, show how the sharpening of internal social relations, the temporary abolition of certain constitutional regulations, and the implementation of exceptional measures in May of 1913 affected the way in which Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced the Balkan Wars, even though they did not participate in them. The aggressiveness of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Serbs in the public discourse was a consequence of military results achieved in the Balkan Wars.

In much of “greater Bulgaria,” in contrast, the very presence of the battlefield meant that violence took on forms that seemed to reaffirm the beliefs of observers (as much as disgust them), who would later be charged with finding lasting solutions to the Balkan imbroglio.

European policy circles and the European public remained very anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish when dealing with the Ottoman Empire. Thus

the ethnic cleansing and mass murder of Muslims did not generate much reaction.<sup>16</sup> This proved to be an enabling factor for some theaters of the war. As explored in many chapters in this volume, throughout the Balkan Wars public opinion in European countries remained in favor of the Balkan League and ignored the atrocities of these states. This may have been seen as a “green light” for certain kinds of policies to be adopted.

Fatme Myuhtar-May, Neriman Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu, and Tetsuya Sahara specifically discuss Bulgarian policies of ethnic cleansing, mass killing, and the forced conversion of the Pomak Muslims. As suggested, the war—and perhaps how the war was being covered in some corners of Europe—may have been seen as offering an opportune space for the Balkan states to eliminate “alien” elements while expanding their territories. Indeed Sahara argues that the Balkan Wars brought a drastic change in the region as a result of massive ethnic cleansing campaigns and the efforts to redraw borders. The atrocities that accompanied these agendas were carried out in the name of national liberation, a discourse found in European newspapers and in postwar analytical reports of the war. Soldiers and irregulars who participated in these vicious atrocities were typically seen as national heroes. Though to an unbiased observer their actions would seem like despicable war crimes, Sahara notes that these agents of Bulgarian irredentism are presented in some textbooks as role models for heroic self-sacrifice in the name of national liberation. By examining several specific groups involved in persecuting Bulgarian strategies, this chapter reconstructs the cognitive maps of what were ostensibly volunteers, often labeled in the literature as guerrilla bands (*komitadjis*). Sahara asserts that the war was articulated in these groups as a “modern crusade” to expel the “Muslim barbarians” from Europe. The chapter also examines how these volunteer military units were frequently attached to the regular armies and assigned the task of sabotaging Ottoman supply lines as well as mobilizing local populations against the Ottoman army and cleansing the territories of the Muslim population. In this regard these guerrilla bands contributed greatly to shaping the demographic composition of the region.

Sahara’s chapter offers excellent insight into the formation, recruitment, and ideologies of these bands. Although some of these war crimes were examined by the Carnegie Report (discussed in detail by Adamiak and Schmitt in part III), Sahara argues that the report was lenient when it came to the massacres against the Muslims. In the end the report tries to present the massacres against Muslims as isolated incidents or acts motivated by the feeling of revenge against the oppressive Ottoman policies.

In contrast, by utilizing memoirs of key leaders of the bands, Sahara sheds light on the main motivations behind the mass killings of the Muslim population, revealing a hateful intention that went beyond the “liberation of Bulgarians” to assuring that the Ottoman Empire was wiped off the European map.

### PART III: ASSESSING LOCAL, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE WAR

Such readings of intent led to an entirely new set of discourses about the Balkans, which also shaped the manner in which members of the Ottoman Empire adapted to the new realities presented by defeat. To those international actors reacting to the war, as both a pretext for new intrusive policies and a critical reordering of the epistemological compass of European hegemony, new formulas of engagement with the Ottoman object took on forms familiar to those studying colonial racism in other parts of the world.

Pamela Dorn Sezgin provides a nuanced picture of public opinion in the British media as one way to appreciate the internationalization of Ottoman defeat, as an empire and as a constituent mass of non-Western peoples. The London Peace Conference and Ambassadors Conference of December 17, 1912, and its ensuing peace initiatives in 1913, provided a vehicle for Britain to demonstrate leadership in world politics and assert its hegemony over the other European powers. Drawing on representations in the press to construct a fuller historiography, this chapter attempts to answer the following questions. How did educated, politically aware people interpret the events and the results of the accords? How were the players in these conflicts viewed by the British? How did British writers interpret the Balkan crisis in terms of their own problems in maintaining the British Empire? By examining the works of newspaper writers, European diplomats, and British politicians, Sezgin analyzes both their Oriental and Balkan stereotypes as well as their nonstereotypical representations of the nations involved in the conflict and their ambivalent and even positive representations of both the Balkan states and the Ottomans. As aptly exposed by a number of chapters in this volume, the persecution of Pomaks, Torbes, and other Muslim autochthonous communities did not arouse the kind of indignation in Europe that might have offered a different end to the Balkans story. The chapters by Patrick Adamiak and Jonathan Schmitt present the intellectual roots and political processes of the kind of “othering” of indigenous populations that

allowed such “diplomatic” interventions to be justified. The subsequent production of knowledge is indicative of long-endured traumas for the victims of these Balkan Wars in a number of ways. Blumi’s chapter examines the sociopolitical implications of this hesitance to speculate about what drives these conflicts through an analysis of how “drawing borders” within coexisting communities on the basis of ethnic or religious identities changed the region forever.

Adamiak explores the Carnegie Endowment Balkan Wars Inquiry report in order to help identify where these final solutions to the Ottoman Balkans materialized in Western-based diplomacy. Despite the overall anti-Muslim and anti-Ottoman public opinion, the commission’s report covered the carnage from a fairly neutral point of view, as he observes. If we read the 1914 report from the perspective of current terminology, the description of events fits in with genocidal strategies. It was the first total war that the Ottoman state had engaged in. The report also indicates that all the Balkan states justified their attacks on the basis of the liberation of their co-nationals and historic territory from the Ottomans. They construed the Muslims and the Orthodox in the Second Balkan War as savage, primitive, and cowardly. Some crucial unintended points emerge as we study the various reactions to the war.

In contrast, Jonathan Schmitt, who focuses on the Carnegie Report as a document emblematic of a greater Euro-American racist epistemology, reveals the underlying consequences of the war as a source for a new kind of relationship between “us” and the “other,” which became both within the Balkans and in the larger “Muslim” world a crucial juxtaposition that reflected new configurations of global power. Concerning the Eastern Question, the Carnegie Report provides a narrative of war that is, in Schmitt’s words, “beleaguered by an uncertain, ambivalent, and always potentially destabilizing relationship with the Balkan subject, the Balkan ‘other.’” The questions, then, are what exactly constituted Western European conceptions of their Balkan neighbors at this time and what similarities and differences relative to the West were attributed to the Balkan peoples in the minds of the Great Powers. Crucially, as explored in greater detail in Blumi’s chapter, such issues would really only prove essential after the powers began to impose a set of fixed territories on the region as a means of “final” resolution of the Ottoman legacy of cultural hybridity and “ambiguous” sociopolitical affiliations. In time it would become necessary forcefully to move “different” peoples to their “proper” ethno-national homelands: the dreaded regime of modern ethnic cleansing via exchanges had begun.

Isa Blumi's chapter offers a theoretically guided and empirically rooted narrative about the evolution of these processes that culminated in but did not end with the Balkan Wars. Blumi stresses that human agency and contingency contributed more to the way events transpired than reference to structural conditions of the machinations of outside powers. History is neither linear nor determined by the structure evident to some who study empire. Human agency and contingency are the two forces of the narrative. The local elite's desire to control land, especially in areas owned by Ottoman Muslim families, helped those who are developed in his narrative to become "ethnic entrepreneurs" to use ethnicity and nationalism as a vehicle to grab more territories and expel Muslims. Put differently, by focusing on local elite competition over essentially economic resources, Blumi offers a deeper analysis of the web of interactions among the local elite, Balkan states, and the Ottoman bureaucracy that anticipates and then exploits the emerging Western epistemologies discussed in Schmitt's chapter.

Sevtap Demirci stresses the role of hegemonic discourse in the form of a so-called Eastern Question, an expression used to emphasize the problems created by the decline and gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire due to an increasing conviction (as suggested by Schmitt's reading of the Carnegie Report) that crucial "differences" exist between peoples of the Ottoman world and Europe. In most interpretations this question remained the most intractable of all diplomatic issues for a century and a half and can be attributed to forcing various players to find a final solution to the Ottoman/Muslim presence in the Balkans.

Clearly these wars served as pretexts for often traumatic change. Such traumas reflected not only how the increasingly self-identified "West" conceived of strict divides in social order (race/civilization) and whether people could continue to live in their Balkan homeland but also within other parts of the remaining Ottoman constituent whole. Revealingly, Melis Hafez's chapter investigates how some members of the Ottoman elite sought to cope with the defeat in the wars through an introspection of the relative fragility of the Ottoman body. The defeat, in other words, needed explaining by way of identifying the sources of a perceived collective Ottoman weakness. Hafez's original work introduces the work of an Ottoman author who argued in 1913 that the Ottomans lost the First Balkan War because of the essential weakness of Ottoman soldiers. They collectively displayed a lack of swiftness and were hindered by a physical infirmity that originated in the inherent backwardness of a civilization gone astray. After the Balkan Wars many Ottoman intellectuals

attempted to rectify these asserted collective weaknesses by advocating new forms of physical development to compensate for a perceived frailty of the Ottoman body. Reformers stressed the need to organize the youth in a manner that consciously targeted this physical shortcoming, ultimately advocating the introduction of athletic activities into the lives of Ottoman citizens. Hafez demonstrates the evolution of this new discourse focusing specifically on the Ottoman body, extending from the need for exercise to maintaining hygiene and the adaptation of a new set of ethics.

By utilizing the works of Stephen Heydemann, Hafez argues that the Balkan Wars were less an event and more a social process, allowing us to see how war-making and nation-building were interdependent and ultimately transformed postconflict societies. This chapter thus shows that the transformation of the conceptualizations of the body was ultimately tied to the project of nation-formation in a post-Balkan Wars Ottoman space. The shift that occurred with the Balkan defeat was built on a century-long practice that not only made the body part of the nationalist discourse but also created a narrative that became prominent on the national level, thus ushering in a new stage.

In contrast, the defeat was perceived in the empire's Arab regions with a different set of filters. Eyal Ginio argues that the Balkan Wars, together, can be regarded as the first "total war" of the Ottoman state, a military confrontation that brought about the fracture of long-established boundaries and dichotomies within Ottoman society. Moreover, the ensuing defeat proved the frailty of a secular Ottoman identity and spelled the end of the imagined secular "Ottoman nation" for many Arab publicists. These conflicts marked a watershed in their views on the Ottoman state and on the meaning of Ottoman identity, leading to the kind of recalibrations among many key actors in the empire's Arab territories that made the long-term survival of the CUP regime unlikely.

#### PART IV: THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND REPUBLICAN INTROSPECTION

Most of the founding fathers of the Republic of Turkey came from the Balkans as refugees. Both the Italian and the Balkan Wars left major scars on their identities, which in turn shaped their understanding of politics. Nedim İpek's chapter provides a broad survey of the history of the period from the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1877–78 to the Balkan Wars, with a specific emphasis on migrations, demographic patterns, and policies



of resettlement. Providing a wide-ranging but solid account, İpek supports his conclusion by recourse to primary source material from the Ottoman archives as well as Western sources and frames his discussion of population movements within the larger context of the processes of nation-building.

Erik Jan Zürcher offers a sociologically rooted and theoretically guided narrative of the first generation of the Republic's leadership. Indeed, after the catastrophic defeat in the Balkans, the Young Turks called for revenge and also self-examination to explain the reasons for this defeat. Zürcher argues, however, that the Young Turks took their revenge not in the Balkans but in Anatolia against the Greek and Armenian communities.

Funda Selçuk Şirin's chapter indicates how the intellectuals and writers used the burgeoning novel and short essay to express this accumulating angst and anger. This in turn encouraged the intellectuals to imitate the nationalist discourses of the Balkans to construct a national (Turkish) culture. The trauma of the war contributed to the search for a national identity and identification with Anatolia as the homeland of the Turks. In fact the Balkan Wars contributed to the creation of a new mode of heroism, ethics of national duty, and self-sacrifice as a virtue to protect the nation against future wars. The postwar Ottoman literature was dominated by the debate over the causes of defeat and attempted to create a new identity. In short the young generations gradually internalized the new language of Turkism as a solution to the problems of the Ottoman Empire.

Mehmet Arısan's chapter presents the notion of "loss" as a significant political factor in the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic. In particular he elaborates on the influence of the loss of most of the Balkan lands as a result of the Balkan Wars, on the formation of a new identity, and on the political perception of the modernizing elite (particularly the Young Turks), some of whom would later become the founders of the modern Turkish Republic. Indeed the Balkans, particularly Macedonia and Thessaloniki, were of significant importance to the Western-oriented, modernist elite of the time. Most elites originated from that region, and both the military and intellectual mobilization of the Young Turks initiated there. When we pursue the traces of the Balkan Wars in the new Turkish Republic, it becomes impossible to reach that far because of the predominance of the literature on the Turkish War of Independence, which certainly constitutes a discourse of a glorious victory rather than a frustrating defeat and loss.

Albanian independence raised questions about the role of Islam as the glue to keep ethnic groups together within the same state. The Balkan Wars not only raised questions about Islamic solidarity but shook Ottomanism as well. As a result of the disintegration in the Balkans, Turkish nationalism became more popular among intellectuals as well as in some policy circles.

Çağdaş Sümer provides a view of the important debate over the Albanian Question in Ottoman public discourse. Indeed it was Albanian independence that crushed the pan-Islamic dream. Furthermore, attitudes of the Albanians during and after the wars and the proclamation of an independent Albania caused fierce disputes in Ottoman politics. Debates about whether the Albanians betrayed the empire transitioned into questions regarding the viability of Ottomanism as a political project.

This mirrors Arısan's invaluable consideration of the ideological foundations of the CUP, which over time was crystallized by a set of contradictory reactions to events leading up to and transpiring after the Balkan Wars. His painstaking analysis reveals the paradoxical relationship that the CUP elite felt: a deep sense of revenge because of the loss of their homes in the Balkans and also admiration of the successful Balkan nationalist movement, which shaped the cognitive map of the CUP. Zürcher further explores this shared origin to reveal a lasting legacy: the Balkans were identifiably the homeland of those later to form the elite of Turkish Republic; according to Sümer, this helped some members appropriate blame for the loss. This question of loss becomes more dynamic through Arısan's psychoanalytical angle as well as Nazan Çiçek's careful explanation of how these narratives translated in both education and the larger discursive spaces of the Turkish Republic.

Doğan Akyaz and Preston Hughes examine the impact of the Balkan Wars on the Turkish military. Akyaz shows the pedagogical and political use of the defeat by the Turkish military to "stay out" of politics. He contends that the deterministic link between defeat and politics, as established after the Balkan Wars, is used in Turkey as a major reference point to separate the military from politics today. Akyaz first charts the psychological makeup of the Turkish officer in relation to the Balkan Wars by examining the conditions under which the Balkan Wars were fought and how the soldier was utilized by the military. He examines the paradoxical use of the Balkan Wars: while the Turkish military did everything it could to free each individual officer regardless of rank from politics, why has the Turkish military been the most influential actor in Turkish politics as an institution?

Hughes examines the impact that the Second Balkan War in mid-1913 had on the evolving personalities and relationships of the men who would become the founding fathers of the Republic of Turkey. He examines six army officers who participated—some directly and others less so—in the Balkan Wars and who, with one exception, also played key roles in the political development of modern Turkey: Fevzi (Çakmak), Enver, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), Kazım (Karabekir), Ali Fuat (Cebe-soy), and İsmet (İnönü).

Nazan Çiçek's chapter provides an interesting argument about the way in which the Balkan Wars have been covered in Turkish textbooks and how this has evolved as a result of sociopolitical changes in Turkey. The topic of the Balkan Wars as part of Ottoman-Republican Turkish historiography has been covered in civics classes as well as in the history textbooks of the Republic at the primary, secondary, and high school levels.

## CONCLUSION

This edited volume offers a rich narrative about the causes and consequences of the Balkan Wars and their lasting impact on the current map of the Balkans and Anatolia. Moreover, this background is necessary to understand the Ottoman decision to enter World War I and some of the radical strategies of the CUP. The next edited volume will deal with World War I, which ended the Ottoman Empire and led to the emergence of new sub-Balkan and Middle Eastern systems. But neither subsystem succeeded in creating its own normative order that is based on peaceful norms and economic development.

## NOTES

1. Bruce M. Knauft, ed. *Critically Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies*.
2. Among others who have challenged Balkan epistemologies that appropriate Euro-American models, see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*; and Sabrina P. Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia*.
3. Even the better attempts at outlining a general narrative still fail to identify major contributing factors outside "core" areas like Bulgaria, especially those taking place along the Ottoman/Serbian/Montenegrin borderlands covered in Isa Blumi's chapter in this volume.
4. "Imperial" interests in Africa translated in the Balkans to Italy's delicate balancing of its immediate strategic interests and long-term concerns with expanding Greek, Serbian/Russian, and Austro-Hungarian influence in the region. Such issues are highlighted in Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 151–73.

5. This concern with integrating what traditionally were treated as very different areas of expertise has started to attract scholars of the Ottoman Empire, with some purposefully attempting “comparative” studies of two different regions to produce new perspectives of the last century of Ottoman rule. See, for instance, Isa Blumi, *Foundations of Modernity*.
6. See, among others, Benjamin Thomas White and Seda Altuğ, “Frontières et pouvoir d’État”; and James L. Gelvin, “The Social Origins of Popular Nationalism in Syria.”
7. The reorientation toward the Arab lands after the catastrophe in the Balkans is evident in the studies of the city elites of Aleppo, Beirut, and Palestine by Keith Watenpugh, Jens Hanssen, Hasan Kayalı, and Khaled Fahmy, among others. While Erik Jan Zürcher offers in this volume a necessary analysis of how such postwar forces contributed to an emergent political, military, and commercial elite in Anatolia, events immediately after World War I involving tens of thousands of refugees from the Balkans may also suggest that the origins of some of the Turkish Republican elite stem from this violence. See Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores*.
8. The brutal mutilation of the bodies of native Muslims and Catholics throughout the wars—specifically the policy of cutting off the noses and lips of both dead and captured highland Albanians (Malësorë)—represents a much more complicated interaction between victims and perpetrators than the simple expression of religious intolerance synonymous with the popular reputation of the Balkans today. Events are documented in Zekeria Cana, *Gjenocidi i Malit të Zi mbi Popullin Shqiptar, 1912–1913*.
9. See Peter Sluglett and Hakan Yavuz, eds., *War and Diplomacy*.
10. The list of those who chart the coercive evolution of the state is long, Charles Tilly and James C. Scott being the most useful. Our question is whether such claims necessarily reflect conditions on the ground in the late Ottoman Balkans.
11. G. Todorovski, *Makedonskoto Prašanje i Reformite vo Makedonija*, 241–255.
12. Andrew Baruch Wachtel, *The Balkans in World History*, 76.
13. While not studied in this volume in detail, the violent race for ascendancy in areas that more than one ally coveted, such as Macedonia/Salonika, and the dynamics around settling the distribution of the spoils of war led to new outbursts of war between former allies.
14. Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.”
15. Emil Palotás, *Machtspolitik und Wirtschaftsinteressen*, 26, 67–68. See also Arnold Suppan, “Zur Frage eines österreichisch-ungarischen Imperialismus in Südosteuropa,” 131.
16. Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre*.



## PART I

# The Origins of the Balkan Wars



## Warfare and Nationalism

### The Balkan Wars as a Catalyst for Homogenization

*M. Hakan Yavuz*

If the 1877–78 Russo-Ottoman War was the beginning of the end of Ottoman Europe, the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 were the tragic grand finale of the centuries-long Ottoman presence there. The sociopolitical developments leading up to the Balkan Wars, which unleashed catastrophic consequences for the entire region, provided an essential political laboratory for the Young Turks to rethink their worldviews and formulate radically new ideologies and policies for the future. This period, and one decade in particular (1908 to 1918), was a flurry of social and political experimentation and innovation, in which the Ottoman state and its Muslim society confronted a series of existential questions. It was, to a great extent, this period's events, polemics, and inertia that provided the foundation for the development of the Republic of Turkey. The future of the state and society was the subject of intense and constant debate by all manner of groups and individuals. Prominent among these discussions was the debate between supporters of constitutional patriotism and the champions of an ethno-religious nationalism.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the founding of a new political discourse within the dynamic context of this period by analyzing the major events of the day and the way in which they encoded fundamentally new forms and paradigms in Turkish political discourse. The major challenge confronting leaders and thinkers of the period was how to transform a multiethnic empire into a modern, centralized, yet not necessarily national state, all the while enhancing the ideological and cultural legitimacy of state institutions. While European powers were doing their best to dismantle the Ottoman state and partition its territories, the Young Turks still believed that they could save the state and maintain its



territorial integrity through legal reforms, a constitution, and the creation of an Ottoman nation not based upon a specific ethnicity or religion. After the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman state was finally compelled to cast off its multicultural character and to begin a slide to “Islamic Ottomanism” and then to ethno-nationalism.<sup>1</sup>

With defeat, the Ottoman state stepped onto a stage of history that had already been ushered in with Greek independence and became seemingly the only legitimate way to organize a state and society in the international system at the time: nationalism based in and on ethno-religious homogenization.<sup>2</sup> The Ottoman elite initially reacted to this new modern form of nationalism with a more ecumenical Ottoman patriotism (1839–1913). The conditions of the Balkan defeat forced the Young Turks to stop giving credence to the resilience of a multireligious state. Their will to continue the fight to preserve the Ottoman state as it was finally had been exhausted, yet a new willingness to apply force in order to transform Anatolia into a Muslim Turkish homeland on the same pattern of the Balkan nation-state was born. This chapter seeks to retrace the metamorphosis that transformed the multiethnic and cosmopolitan Young Turks imbued with the ideal of constitutional nationalism into vindictive ethnic nationalists determined to create a Turkish homeland.

The Balkan Wars were a creative destruction in which the new political order made its phoenix-like rebirth out of the ashes of the multiethnic and multireligious empire. The events of this period not only infused the new political language with nationalist vim and purpose but also reset Ottoman society on new bearings. The war and its upshot raised new questions about identity, legitimacy, loyalty, the sources of sovereignty, the definition of society, the limits of the public sphere, and, most importantly, the very future of the Ottoman state (with what would ultimately be negative consequence for the Christian minorities). Moreover, the war also caused a spectacular revamping of the political language of the period. While the physical boundaries of the empire were redrawn, a new cognitive map of the Ottoman elite came into being. In order to gain a true understanding of the impact of the Balkan Wars and their destructive capacity, a consideration of the background of nationalism and its implications in the Balkans is essential, for the war went hand in glove with the nation-building project in the Balkans.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter thus examines: (1) the corollary between war-making and nation-building (homogenization) by focusing on the Greek example of nation-building; (2) the internal Ottoman debates between Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks and the Ottoman adoption of a

civic patriotism in response to the ethnic-nation-state model; and (3) the causes and consequences of the Balkan Wars, the destruction of the Ottoman dream of a civic constitutionalism, and the ultimate adoption of the Balkan model of nation-building.<sup>4</sup> Although the Ottoman elite had held the Balkan model in severe disdain and had been appalled by its negative consequences, they were finally compelled to adopt it in order to prevent their own annihilation. In short, I argue that the conflict between the constitutional and ethno-religious nationalisms was first resolved in favor of the former, which only served to deepen the communal conflict. It should be kept in mind that the Balkan Wars were a direct function of the nation-building process and a window of opportunity for ethno-religious homogenization. With great reluctance the Ottoman elite imitated the causes of years of vexation. Indeed, the Young Turks were reluctant “Turkish” nationalists, given that this was the option of last resort for coping with the calamitous loss of territories, resources, population, and self-confidence. “*Muslim-Ottoman* Turkish” identity was transmuted into the new glue to redefine and cohere Muslim Anatolian communities. The irredentist and secessionist movements in the Balkans and Anatolia buttressed the argument for Turkism, although without totally obliterating faith in the more inclusive Ottomanism and Islamism.

#### WAR-MAKING AS NATION-BUILDING

Nationalism, as an idea of creating a new society and polity, presupposes the homogenization of society. Ernest Gellner was a pioneering scholar of nationalism in the way that he examined homogenization as the outcome of industrialization.<sup>5</sup> Industrialization, for Gellner, required cultural homogenization—this was especially the case with regard to language. Moreover, this can only be achieved via state-sponsored education. Homogenization therefore becomes the sociopolitical product of industrialization, and the state is the only institution that can promote this process and expect to benefit from it. That is to say, the state expands its legitimacy on the back of industrialization. Based on my reading of theories of nationalism and the content and evolution of Balkan nationalisms, however, I have come to two integrated conclusions. First, homogenization, the aim of nationalism, has been realized not through industrialization but rather through wars, at least in the case of the Balkans; indeed war-making was by far the most powerful tool for state-building in the Balkans.<sup>6</sup> Charles Tilly’s two modes of nationalism

supply us with an approach for scrutinizing the role of war-making in the Balkans: state-seeking nationalism and state-led nationalism.<sup>7</sup> In the Balkans we find that the dominant pattern is the state-led nationalism. The Balkan states implemented a series of strategies to create their own nations and to subordinate “other interests to those of the state.”<sup>8</sup> The states sought a shortcut to homogeneity through war.

Indeed, war-making serves multiple purposes, such as (1) the extraction of resources and the expansion of the state’s capacity; (2) the assertion of the state’s control over culture by insisting on a single language, a uniform historical narrative, a state religion, and even national artistic styles; (3) the shaping of the perception of the “self” and “other” via conscription; and (4) the enhancement of the state’s legitimacy and the demand for the political loyalties of its populace. In short the state requires an organized army, and an army requires mobilizing nationalist ideology and a cohesive society. Preparing for wars and fighting them are important instruments for homogenization and nation-building, not only because of the role they play in strengthening social cohesion but, as shown later, also in the destruction or forced exile of those who are difficult or impossible to assimilate. Rogers Brubaker argues that “war was central to the mass unmixing of Balkan peoples. Beginning with the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, intensifying in the Balkan wars of 1912–13, and culminating in the aftermath of the First World War, almost all of the large-scale migrations occurred in direct or indirect connection with military campaign.”<sup>9</sup> In fact wars may be the most effective means to homogenize the population and thus consolidate state authority. These conflicts serve to harden group loyalty and engender feelings of enmity against the out-group. To summarize, through wars the states create conditions that help to construct and mobilize nationalistic sentiment and enhance in-group cohesion.

The elite of the newly established Balkan states, which all confronted legitimacy deficits, successfully manipulated the sentiments of their societies against enemies both real and imagined. State-led nationalism often requires war, even more so in those states that are nondemocratic and have some external support. States that are lacking in legitimacy are more war-prone than those democratic states. In the nineteenth century the Balkan states were all hybrid absolutist entities.<sup>10</sup> While they were not necessarily traditional, they were by no means modern.<sup>11</sup> Essentially they were organized as garrison-states in order to regiment their diverse societies through a series of top-down projects, with the aim of attributing increased legitimacy to the state.<sup>12</sup> Indeed nationalism offers the

necessary motivational background for the army to maintain discipline and orient the actions of the soldiers. Nicos Mouzelis aptly argues that “it is military rather than economic technologies that primarily explain the spectacular development of state bureaucracies and their unprecedented penetration of the societal periphery.”<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, we see that homogenization became one of the primary intentional goals of war in the nation-state era. In the Balkans the marriage between war-making and homogenization actually preceded industrialization.

*A Model of Religious Cleansing: The Independence of Greece*

The Balkan region was one of the world’s most linguistically, ethnically, and religiously mixed zones, and this heterogeneous structure was preserved and prolonged under the Ottoman Empire, which was first and foremost a Balkan empire. Its evolution and the consolidation of its power took place in the Balkans well before its expansion in Anatolia. The Ottoman system of tolerance via autonomy was one of the reasons why the Balkan region was more hospitable to initial Ottoman expansion. Before the arrival of the Ottomans a major power struggle occurred between the Latin Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church following the Fourth Crusade in 1204. The destruction, pillage, and killing carried out by the commanders and soldiers of the Fourth Crusade in the Byzantine capital was a major spur in turning the Eastern Orthodox population against the Catholic Church. In fact the local population, along with the Orthodox churches, supported Ottoman rule against the Latin threat for quite some time.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, it was under Ottoman rule that the Orthodox churches first achieved a cohesive unity. Multireligious coexistence was a, if not the, defining feature of the Ottoman state. It should be noted that religion was the signifier of the “other” in the Ottoman system, however, so Muslims and non-Muslims were always unequal and the relations were based on a fixed hierarchy, with Muslims always at the top.

As part of the Ottoman commitment to and centeredness in the Balkans, a great number of cities were founded there. Among the first of these Ottoman-created cities we find Çorlu, Lüleburgaz, Tekirdağ, and Ipsala. In addition, the Ottomans captured Edirne in 1361, which became the new capital of the fast-expanding Ottoman state in 1365. Under the Ottoman system, the heterogeneous structure of the region was preserved and even perpetuated as the *millet* system allowed internal autonomy to each religious community. Under the stability of Pax Ottomana, the Balkan communities developed much closer ties with different parts of the world, especially with Western Europe. These communities, in

particular the Greek Orthodox families, maintained and even increased their specialty in international commerce as interaction among different parts of Europe, the Black Sea ports, and Balkan cities deepened. This heterogeneous structure suffered its first major shock with the independence of Greece in 1832. The shock was not so much the independence of Greece itself but rather the new ideas introduced to the region: ethnic sovereignty and ethnic nationalism.

The radical restructuring in the Balkans got its impetus from the new and powerful idea that ethnicity could and should be the basis of sovereignty.<sup>15</sup> This idea, imported from Western Europe and imposed upon the Ottoman provinces, in my opinion has been the most destructive force in the Balkans and Anatolia in the modern age. Whether in Serbian, Greek, Bulgarian, Turkish, or Armenian form, this idea portended a maelstrom, because it was based on three destructive assumptions, à la Elie Kedourie: having faith in the abstract idea that society can be transformed according to an idea (such as popular sovereignty); the stress on popular will and principle over skills and interest; and faith in linguistic or territorial ties as supreme over all other ties.<sup>16</sup> Nationalism as a political doctrine sought to define sovereignty on the basis of the will of ethnic solidarity and also redefined legitimacy on the basis of nationalism. When this Western idea of nationalism meandered through the Ottoman territories, deportation, killing, and massive ethnic cleansing followed in its wake. After analyzing the destruction begat by nationalism in the Ottoman territories, Kedourie offers a sharp criticism of nationalism by characterizing it as a sheer perversity and a harmful doctrine of instability and conflict. In fact, compared with what they would have later under homogenizing nation-states, different ethnic and religious groups had much greater breathing room under multiethnic empires, such as the Ottoman Empire. When the only criterion accepted as legitimate for a state becomes the formation of a homogeneous nation in a homogeneous territory, then destruction becomes its logical result. When nationalism, as a homogenizing project, was transplanted in the Balkans after Greek independence, it unleashed a series of just wars among self-righteous ethnic and religious groups.

Nationalism in general and the Balkan version of it in particular assumes that because all ethnic groups share a particular culture they therefore must also share an identity. This political identity becomes the defining basis for political loyalty and sovereignty.<sup>17</sup> The nationalism we see in the Balkans is derivative and modular, derived from Western Europe and transplanted in the different sociopolitical context of the

Balkans.<sup>18</sup> Indeed the Greek pattern of nation-building would be pirated by other Balkan states in order to create their own nation-states. Conjectural factors would shape the discourse of nationalism in different ways in various Balkan countries. The common characteristics of Balkan nationalisms, however, were their ethnic and irredentist natures. That is, in the Balkans nationalism insisted on a redrawing of state borders by stretching the boundaries wherever their co-nationals were living. Furthermore, Balkan nationalisms introduced the masses into politics by denying them any decision-making role. Ethnic homogenization and changing borders, inspired and encouraged by European powers, were to open a Pandora's box throughout Ottoman Europe and eventually Anatolia.

The importation of nationalism was the turning point in modern Balkan history.<sup>19</sup> As a result, Benjamin Lieberman argues that the "early form of ethnic cleansing" was first developed "on the southern borders of Russian Empire and on the western borders of the Ottoman Empire."<sup>20</sup> The first test case for the creation of a homogeneous ethnic state was Greece in the Peloponnese.<sup>21</sup> Most Greeks lived outside this newly established state, however, thus sowing the seeds for future irredentist movements that would ultimately bring about constant warring and conflict. The Greek model of homogenization gradually emerged in the rest of the Balkans by the late nineteenth century and subsequently in Anatolia during World War I. Indeed Serbs, Bulgarian, Montenegrins, Albanians, and eventually Turks all emulated the Greek model of ethnic cleansing in their own nation-building projects.

It is very important for us to understand the genocidal tactics in the Greek nation-state formation in order to comprehend the formation of the Balkan nation-state. The idea that ethnicity is the only source of sovereignty required the homogenization of the new established states. This in turn militarized the states: war-making became the shortcut to creating a homogenized nation-state. Nation-building and war-making led to the securitization of the entire state and society; thus the Balkan states became nations through war. Based on the need for security and victory in war, this right to collect and distribute resources was justified. In other words, nationalism promoted insecurity, and insecurity offered a necessary environment for mass mobilization, which then further radicalized and militarized state and society. The war-making processes enhanced national unity and helped the authoritarian states to silence the opposition and prevent the development of civil society. Politics in the Balkans was also militarized: the oppression of minorities, with the connivance or leadership of the state, was done in the name of nation-building.

Assimilation, deportation, mass killing, and forced conversion became the common strategies of homogenization in Balkan nation-state building. These strategies were developed and first put into practice with Greek independence. The new Greek government used all means available to create an exclusively Greek territory by wiping out the local Muslim population. These policies of ethnic cleansing were, in fact, not condoned by the major European powers. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the nation-state building in the Balkans involved genocidal policies of mass killing, ethnic cleansing, and forced assimilation against local Muslim populations and eventually other ethnic minorities like Slavophone Christians in Greek Macedonia as well. Thus the connection between nation-building (homogenization) and genocidal policies against an "Oriental other" became an acceptable norm.

The very term "cleansing" (*očistiti*), referring to forcible ethnic homogenization, was first used by Vuk Karadžić (1787–1864) to describe the treatment and deportation of the Muslims in Belgrade when the Serbs captured the city in 1806.<sup>22</sup> By utilizing the demographic figures of Justin McCarthy, today's most prominent Ottoman demographer, social historian Michael Mann argues that the idea of nation-state building in the Balkans resulted in murderous ethnic cleansing of the Muslims "on a stupendous scale not previously seen in Europe."<sup>23</sup> In fact the hundred years between 1821 and 1921 were a century of ethnic cleansing and mass killing, and even genocide, in the Balkans. When Greece achieved its independence and identified Greekness only on the basis of belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church (there were many Greek-speaking Muslims), it portrayed the Muslims as an alien "fifth column," debris from the Ottoman period, and used various strategies to eliminate them. This pattern of nation-building became the template for subsequent Balkan nation-building projects.<sup>24</sup>

In short, the independence war of Greece introduced three things: the creation of a national church as the repository of national myths and symbols; the ethnic cleansing of Muslims and the assimilation of other Christian communities in order to homogenize society; and territorial expansion (the *megali* idea), to incorporate all Greek Orthodox under the banner of a Greek ethnic nation-state. James Edward Miller argues that "Greeks drove out or killed the Muslim population of their new state, seized their property, and proclaimed as a national goal the integration of all Greek-speaking Orthodox people into the new state by a process of territorial expansion."<sup>25</sup> George Finlay's early history of the Greek revolution described the mass killing of the Muslims:

Women, wounded with musketballs and sabre-cuts, rushed to the sea, seeking to escape, and were deliberately shot. Mothers robbed of their clothes, with infants in their arms plunged into the sea to conceal themselves from shame, and they were then made a mark for inhuman riflemen. Greeks seized infants from their mothers' breasts and dashed them against rocks. Children, three and four years old, were hurled living into the sea and left to drown. When the massacre was ended, the dead bodies washed ashore, or piled on the beach, threatened to cause a pestilence.<sup>26</sup>

Alison W. Phillips, a prominent historian of the Victorian era at Trinity College in Dublin, also described the mass killing:

For three days the miserable inhabitants were given over to lust and cruelty of a mob of savages. Neither sex nor age was spared. Women and children were tortured before being put to death. So great was the slaughter that Kolokotronis himself says that, when he entered the town, from the gate to the citadel his horse's hoofs never touched the ground. His path of triumph was carpeted with corpses. At the end of two days, the wretched remnants of the Mussulmans were deliberately collected, to the number of some two thousand souls, of every age and sex, but principally women and children, were led out to a ravine in the neighbouring mountains and there butchered like cattle.<sup>27</sup>

The pattern of cleansing in the region was set by the Greeks and would become the rule for subsequent nation-building projects in the Balkans as well as in Anatolia and even the Caucasus. William St. Clair, a leading expert on Greek independence, also sums up the fate of the Muslims:

The Turks of Greece left few traces. They disappeared suddenly and finally in the spring of 1821 unmourned and unnoticed by the rest of the world.... It was hard to believe then that Greece once contained a large population of Turkish descent, living in small communities all over the country, prosperous farmers, merchants, and officials, whose families had known no other home for hundreds of years.... Upwards of twenty thousand Turkish men, women, and children were murdered by their Greek neighbours in a few weeks of slaughter. They were killed deliberately,



without qualm or scruple, and there were no regrets either then or later.<sup>28</sup>

Lieberman narrates the destruction of the Muslims from a volunteer perspective in the central Morea:

A French volunteer described how the Greeks uttered a ululating cry, the “cry of human tiger, of the man devouring man.” Thomas Gordon, an English Philhellene, reported that the victories, “mad with vindictive rage, spared neither age nor sex—the streets and houses were inundated with blood, and obstructed with heaps of dead bodies.”<sup>29</sup>

Gordon, indeed, was so horrified by this level of killing that he abandoned the “Greek cause.”<sup>30</sup>

Lieberman concludes that after the capture of the main cities the Greek revolutionaries cleansed the Peloponnese (Morea) of all traces of Muslims.<sup>31</sup> This had a chilling impact on the Ottoman state and society. The innocent Greeks of Istanbul became the target of indiscriminate revenge killings. In fact, Greek nationalism with its *megali* idea (unification of all Greek-inhabited territories) ironically securitized Greek minorities and eventually led to the destruction of Greek communities in the Balkans and Anatolia. The Balkans, a highly mixed region of the world, was beginning to be purged in ardent fits of violence. The European powers tried to expand and influence the political development in the Balkans, a region that lay at Europe’s nineteenth-century periphery, in order to position themselves in European balance-of-power politics. The three major empires (Britain, Russia, and Austria-Hungary) clashed repeatedly over the Ottoman territories. Thus the politics of nation-building also was in fact intertwined with the ruthless politics of Europe’s major powers. This ruthlessness, the rural economy of the region, and the desire to unify all co-nationals under a single state (known as irredentism) were the major factors in these nation-building politics.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIC PATRIOTISM (OTTOMANISM) VERSUS ETHNO-RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

The Young Ottomans, a group of Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals and precursors to the Young Turks, sought to formulate a response to ethno-religious nationalism in the Balkans by offering Ottoman civic

patriotism as a way of cementing solidarity toward the state while maintaining the cosmopolitan nature of the empire.<sup>32</sup> Patriotism, as a response to devastating ethno-religious nationalism, was hindered at times by a debilitating breakdown in trust between different ethnic and religious groups due to the ongoing wars in the Balkans. In order to unpack the concept and practice of Ottomanism, it is necessary to examine the difference between nationalism and civic patriotism.

While on its face civic patriotism may seem to be synonymous with ethno-religious nationalism, it differs significantly. The main difference between the two terms is that patriotism focuses on the *patria* (country), while the subject of nationalism is the nation (ethnic group). Lord Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton offers the most nuanced difference between these two “isms” by indicating that nationalism is about affection, emotion, and blind loyalty to one’s group, while patriotism is a moral and contractual relationship with one’s country and the state.<sup>33</sup> It is a political awareness of civil and moral duties to one’s country. Nationalism assumes ethnic unity and cultural homogenization and requires the ruler to have the same identity as the ruled.<sup>34</sup> Patriotism is about a devotion to the state that is based on the rule of law and seeks to protect liberties. It allows each group to develop its culture by remaining loyal to the state. Patriotism, just like Michael Oakeshott’s “civitas,” is based on the recognition of the authenticity of the law and law-based gatherings, which allow groups (or even individuals) to develop their own way of life.<sup>35</sup> Nationalism imposes a single and supposedly superior way of life on the people and “leads to a distinctive style of politics” that is “dangerously disruptive” of a source of disorder.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, patriotism is not about resentment or envy. Instead it is based on respect for the state and an agreement to live together under the same state because it treats all groups equally. George Orwell makes a sharp distinction between nationalism and patriotism:

*Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism.* By “patriotism” I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, *not* for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality.<sup>37</sup>

Walker Connor, a leading scholar of nationalism, also differentiates between nationalism and patriotism and argues that ethno-nationalism is more or less derived from psychological ties to an ancestral connection and from kinship sentiments such as those of the Flemish in Belgium or the Catalans in Spain.<sup>38</sup> Connor considers Belgium and Spanish patriotism in terms of loyalty to the country and the constitutional system. Indeed nationalism is more about resentment and the feeling of being superior. Patriotism is more defensive and is free of this resentment and vindictiveness. Moreover, patriotism is pride in the success of one's country and not pride in ethnicity or religion.

The Young Ottomans gravitated more toward civic patriotism than the Young Turks because they still thought that they could preserve the state through constitutional reforms. Ottomanism was an effort to develop pride in the Ottoman constitution and promote a sense of belonging to the Ottoman state. It was about the love of country and its way of life (mixed groups interacting and contributing to a unique blend that was the Ottoman way of life), not about ethnic or religious grouping. Ottomanism was not an act of social engineering to create a homogeneous society through assimilation, deportation, or mass killings. It was more about the future of the Ottoman state and how it should develop in order to win the loyalty of its citizens. The Ottomanists therefore aimed to create a constitutional state by supporting equality of all groups and allowing these groups to develop their cultures. Ottomanism entailed loyalty to the state and not to an ethnic or religious nation, and that state was expected to protect freedom and provide justice for all.

In order to combat this new idea of nationalism that defined the legitimacy of the sovereign on the basis of ethnicity and also to prevent European intervention in the name of protecting the Christian populations, the Ottoman bureaucrats, who were influenced by French constitutionalism, introduced a number of reforms to stress the equality of all religious groups. Moreover, they even attempted to construct a concept of Ottoman citizenship on the basis of law. The modernizing reforms of 1839 and 1856, known as the Tanzimat, aimed to bring constitutional (civic) good governance as an alternative to ethno-religious nationalism. However, the reforms lacked widespread support among the masses (both Christian and Muslim). Given the failure of the Tanzimat to stave off the development of alternative sources of loyalty, the main challenge for the Young Ottomans became how to deal with the fissiparous social and political forces within the Ottoman society and state. With

few resources and faced with European major powers' insinuation in Ottoman affairs, they had few options to reverse the process of fragmentation and advance social integration in a multiethnic polity such as the Ottoman state.

We must devote some time to differentiating the various Ottoman policies directed at social integration, which were undertaken in order to forestall further fragmentation of the empire. The Ottoman reforms, which aimed at superposing an Ottoman identity above all ethnic and religious loyalties, had little chance for success given that the Ottoman state itself was always the most active promoter of Islamic superiority vis-à-vis other religions. Ottomanism never developed a capacity to fully recognize the rights of the competing layers of a heterogeneous public that would be tied to the center. The early architects of Ottomanism such as Fuat Paşa and Ali Paşa never tried to create a participatory political system, and their conception of Ottomanism was free from the concept of individual political rights as citizens. The state lacked the capacity and will needed to build a new society centered around the ideals of constitutionalism and representative government due to its historical legacy of being a sultanate, a pittance of resources, and an appetite among major European powers for partitioning Ottoman territories. Moreover, some influential conservative Muslims rejected the idea of equality with Christians and remained fierce critics of Ottomanism.

In the 1860s the Young Ottomans advocated a constitutional system to limit the powers of the sultan and also to bring the diverse amalgam of Ottoman communities together on the basis of the law and equality. Influenced by the developments in Europe, they were adept at utilizing the press and became involved in major political debates. These debates eventually gave way to the declaration of a constitution, in part to deal with the new waves of ethno-religious movements in the Balkans. During the widespread riots in the Balkans in 1875–76, the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II finally acquiesced in the constitution.<sup>39</sup> This late Ottoman response proved unsuccessful, however, and Russia declared a war against the Ottoman state in 1877. While Ottoman defenses crumbled, the Russians moved to the gates of Istanbul, just ahead of a massive flood of Muslim refugees fleeing from the massacres against civilians. This defeat not only legitimized and popularized the principle of nation-state formation but also justified religious cleansing. The Ottoman mosaic in the Balkans was irreparably shattered, and the Treaty of Berlin would only broadcast seeds of further destruction.<sup>40</sup>

*The Womb of the Young Turks: The Macedonian Question*

The Ottoman state lost two-thirds of the Ottoman territories in Europe and Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent, and Bulgaria became autonomous.<sup>41</sup> Bosnia-Herzegovina was de facto ceded under Austrian administration.<sup>42</sup> When the newly elected deputies started to criticize the government and sultan over the defeat, he simply dismissed the parliament and abrogated the constitution in February 1878.<sup>43</sup> Abdülhamid II would later use all necessary means against ethno-religious claims in Macedonia that were promoted by the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs. The second major challenge stemmed from the Armenian revolutionary movements. The sultan, never one to shy from using force, established Kurdish tribal units to maintain control.<sup>44</sup> The last challenge came from the Greek irredentist movement in Crete. The Ottoman state was strong-armed by the major European powers to agree to the union of Crete with Greece in 1897. These irredentist movements and constant territorial losses undermined the legitimacy of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The newly educated elite, known as the Young Turks, asked for the restoration of the constitution and the end of the sultan's autocratic rule. Macedonia became the fulcrum of the movement against the sultan and in favor of the concepts of constitutionalism, freedom, and equality.<sup>45</sup> This, they believed, was the only way to prevent further disintegration of the Ottoman state.

The Ottoman freedom committees were established and nurtured by the state of constant territorial losses and the oppressive policies of Abdülhamid II. In light of this it is important to examine the case of Macedonia to understand not only the connection between violence and nation-building but also the sociopolitical context within which the dictatorial Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) leadership emerged. It would not be erroneous to treat Macedonia as the epicenter of this Balkan political laboratory for the future of the Ottoman state and even the intellectual origin of the elite that established the Republic of Turkey.

One of the main conflict areas in the nineteenth century in the Balkans was Macedonia, which consisted of the Ottoman provinces of Salonika, Monastir/Manastır (Bitola), and Üsküp (Skopje).<sup>46</sup> In the nineteenth century the Muslim population slightly outnumbered the Christians. The Muslims of the region consisted of Albanians, Turks, and Gorans along with large numbers of Slavic Muslims, known as Torbes and Pomaks. Macedonia was the typical Ottoman space, with mixed groups living side by side expressing identity based on religion. Macedonia was a usual Ottoman model, with diverse ethnic and religious groups

living together by living apart. The mixed nature of Macedonia was a notion that appealed to European menus, which featured *une salade Macédoine* or *una Macedonia di frutta*. During the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, no such thing as a Macedonian identity yet existed. Regional states all claimed that the inhabitants of Macedonia were Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian, respectively.<sup>47</sup>

For the Bulgarian state, Macedonia was its natural room for expansion. It advanced the argument that Macedonian Christians were Bulgarian, because they spoke a Slavic dialect that resembled Bulgarian. The Serbs, however, rejected the Bulgarian claims about Macedonians, saying that they were in fact Serbian, because their folk customs were most similar to those of the Serbs. Greece rejected both claims and argued that they should be regarded as Slavic-speaking Greeks, because they were Orthodox Christian and under the Greek Orthodox Church. The region suffered heavily from underdevelopment, heavy taxation, and the lack of basic security. This environment provided fertile soil for the emergence of revolutionary committees, which engaged in brutal violence against other groups and also against the Ottoman officials. Countries in the region started to support one committee against the other in order to advance their own claims. The Ottoman state, however, due to either the lack of resources or lack of will, failed to implement meaningful reforms. The inhabitants, in turn, allied themselves with regional states against the Ottomans. The most prominent members of the Young Turk elite were trained and shaped by the social and political conditions of Macedonia. It was the breeding ground of the more nationalistic members of the movement. They learned important lessons about the role of nationalism, religion, violence, and power in the midst of the Macedonian conflict. Macedonia became the school and laboratory of ideas, practices, and organizational structures through which the Young Turks rethought Ottomanism and the future of the state.

### *The Young Turks: Devoted Ottomanists and Reluctant Nationalists*

The opposition groups against Sultan Abdülhamid II would coalesce in different times and places to create the CUP.<sup>48</sup> The question that brought these diverse groups together was the preservation of the state and Ottoman territory. The main objectives of the groups constituting the CUP were the opposition to the autocracy of Abdülhamid II, the restoration of the constitution, and the protection of the homeland.<sup>49</sup> Interestingly, the founders of the CUP, İbrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, Mehmet Reşit, Hüseyinzade Ali, and İshak Sükuti, belonged to different

Muslim ethnic groups. The CUP would eventually include a collection of diverse individuals. Kazim Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Fethi Okyar, Celal Bayar, and Said Nursi were all İttihadists. Both Cavit Bey and Celal Bayar favored a liberal economy; Mehmet Akif Ersoy was pro-Islamic like Said Nursi; the İttihadists also included some agnostics and atheists. Thus we must ask: what was the true identity of the CUP? It was neither a faith nor a well-integrated ideology but rather a cocktail of ideologies and people. Its identity was informed by fear that the Ottoman state would collapse and the Muslims would be colonized by major European powers. So these different people, with diverse identities and ideological outlooks, all came together for the service of a mutual imperative: the preservation of their state and homeland. The anxiety over the possibility of subordination or annihilation helped to bring together a collective response, which included pious, agnostic, nationalist, liberal, and military strains. It was a coalition of groups, a *mélange* of ideas and coordinated efforts by Muslims to preserve the Ottoman state and later Anatolia as a homeland. In other words, the CUP was composed of different groups unified by their common fear and concern about the future of the state.

The main turning point in the organizational evolution of the CUP was its fusion with the Salonika (Selanik)-based Ottoman Freedom Society (OFS), established in 1906 by a small group of military officers and some civilian bureaucrats.<sup>50</sup> The OFS, under the leadership of Dr. Nazım of Salonika, would unite with the Paris-based İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti on April 21, 1906. After the merger the Salonika society would become the brains of the CUP. The CUP became more prominent in Manastır, Ohri, Üsküp/Skopje, Geyveli, Serez, and Edirne and established new branches in Anatolia. It was organized in a cell structure and created a powerful network among the anti-Abdülhamid II activists. Yet the CUP continued to develop and established itself within Masonic lodges, the military clubs, and Melami Sufi orders.<sup>51</sup>

The worsening economic and social conditions and governance contributed to the dissemination of the ideas of CUP, because of a general anti-Abdülhamid II mood in most of Anatolia. An attempt to introduce new taxes on animals, such as Hayvanat-ı Ehli Rüşumu (animal tax), generated a public outcry against the government. With the support of CUP members, farmers, ulema, and small merchants all came together and organized demonstrations.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, winter conditions were severe in 1907, and shortages of coal, wood, and food led to an increase in food prices. Hunger and poverty were widespread, as social unrest and demonstrations became increasingly visible. This aggravated situation had a

major impact on the military as well. Many officers either did not receive their regular salary or received it a month or two late. Anatolia was punctuated by several rebellions, such as in Erzurum in 1907 and 1908. These two years were critical for the maturation of social unrest and disapproval of the government. Nader Sohrabi's and Aykut Kansu's books differ from most of the works on the 1908 revolution by stressing the social forces at play and the role of ordinary people in the realization of events.<sup>53</sup> The 1908 coup, for Kansu, was a social revolution in terms of its popular origins and social and political transformation. The year 1908 introduced a new form of governance and an era of relatively liberal thinking.

In addition to this widespread social unrest and anarchy, the military also demanded better living conditions, proper food rations, and increased salaries. In general the officers gave their support to the societal demonstrations. By 1908 the state had almost entirely lost its legitimacy and came under harsh opprobrium from all corners of society. This societal unrest offered a fertile ground for the organization of the CUP, and its networks spread to different parts of the country. In these deteriorating conditions, the peasants, low-ranking officers, students, and ulema demanded the end of Abdülhamid II's autocracy and the restoration of the constitution. While they were mobilized against the regime of the sultan, however, they lacked a plan to fix the multitude of problems. The only solution that could be agreed on was the restoration of the constitution and the re-opening of the parliament to bring all the various communities together around the idea of Ottomanism.

While the domestic turmoil continued, the state was also under siege by European powers. The most contentious issues of the period were the violence in Macedonia and the political demands of the Armenian population. For their part, the major European powers (Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Great Britain) were unable to agree on the partition of the territories. Russia was worried about the expansion of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and approached Great Britain to get its support to block Austro-Hungarian expansion. When King Edward VII and Tsar Nicholas II met in Reval to discuss the situation in Macedonia, the media reported that they agreed to ask the Ottoman state to carry out reforms under a Christian governor. The CUP accused the government of sitting on its hands and aptly perceived this as a step toward surrendering Macedonia. In protest, it organized a series of letter campaigns. Ultimately, although the decisions of Reval were not implemented due to the 1908 revolution, they did serve to mobilize the CUP networks.<sup>54</sup> In reaction to this news, Resneli Niyazi Bey rebelled against the state and formed



his band with local Muslim villagers. Enver Bey, who was in Salonika, joined the mutiny, which completely demoralized the army. Although this rebellion was organized by the CUP leadership, it was the Reval meeting that triggered the rebellion.<sup>55</sup> Military officers, not necessarily the soldiers and villagers, supported the challenge against the central authority. The young officers at the time were dissatisfied and complained that the promotions were determined by loyalty, not by merit.<sup>56</sup> They were desperate for an opportunity to bring an end to nepotism and favoritism in the ranks. Moreover, the villagers also supported the rebellion, because they were under heavy taxation without proper security. Fear that the region could be lost to Christian powers had already created resentment among the Muslim population. When the civilian population in Firzovik resisted the extra taxation from Istanbul, the CUP Salonika branch framed this as pro-constitutional rebellion and asked Abdülhamid II to restore the constitution or face further European intervention and chaos.<sup>57</sup> Under these pressures, the sultan restored the constitution and agreed to reopen parliament on July 24, 1908.

*The Division within the Young Turk Movement: The CUP vs. the LUP*  
We can decipher the CUP's ideology through its policies in government and in its positions of influence. The CUP was a patriotic organization that promoted the French ideas of freedom, justice, and equality. It sought to create a citizen-based system and saw education as a critical tool to mold a new Ottoman consciousness. On October 6, 1908, the CUP declared its political platform by asking for a major change in the constitution. The official language in the 1876 constitution was Turkish, so it asked that all communication at the state level be in Turkish. The CUP also insisted on equality before the law and declared its position in favor of mandatory conscription; furthermore, it called for the establishment of technical schools to train workers with the requisite skills for economic development. The CUP also tried to empower provincial governors. In short, it sought to consolidate the state and promote economic development at the same time by insisting on a "national economy." Freedom and independence, for the CUP, required a powerful (legitimate) state that would bring about guided economic development and also protect the homeland against the dismembering of Ottoman territories.

Religious groups, including the Greek Orthodox Church, were unhappy with the CUP's move to enhance state authority and finally centralize and monitor the education system. Moreover, the minorities were against mandatory conscription because they did not want to serve in

the demoralized and poverty-striven Ottoman army, which was the lot of the Muslims. Rather, they wanted to make money instead of losing years of their lives thanklessly stuck in some border skirmish; the minorities thus favored a policy of decentralization. The first reaction to the CUP policies came from the secessionist Macedonian communities along with some Albanian communities. The CUP insisted on teaching Turkish in schools. This was perceived as a Turkification policy, and the Greek Orthodox Church vehemently reacted against this education initiative. The CUP policies stressed Turkish as an official language, yet they were beset by the problem of creating social cohesion among the diverse groups without arousing the ire of the minority groups in reaction to the state bias toward the language of the dominant group. For the minorities, this was an act of assimilation. Simply put, it was not possible to modernize and enhance the power of the state without shaping the identity of its citizens. The Greek newspapers in Istanbul, *Proodos* (Progress) and *Neologos* (New Word), constantly criticized the CUP platform.<sup>58</sup> Thus before the elections a group of intellectuals formed the Ottoman Liberal Union Party (LUP), also known as *Ahrar Fırkası*.<sup>59</sup> They stressed liberal economic policies, favored British intervention, and supported decentralization to the extent that each group was to have its own internal autonomy. Naturally, most of the minorities supported the LUP against the CUP. The CUP opposed the capitulations regime and wanted to enhance the independence of the state. Thus the foreign press, especially the British media, attacked the CUP for seeking to create a dictatorial system, being Turkish nationalists, and attempting to Turkify the state at the expense of other cultures and languages.

Before the elections, a series of international events hijacked the domestic debate and ruined the liberal openings in the society. European powers, worried about the centralization and empowerment of the Ottoman state, rushed to dash the hopes of the Ottoman public about the future of the parliamentary system. International events, such as the annexation of Bosnia on October 5, 1908,<sup>60</sup> the declaration of independence of Bulgaria, and the annexation of Crete, forced the CUP and the Ottoman public to focus on foreign relations at the expense of domestic affairs.<sup>61</sup> These events further politicized the public debate in terms of demonstrations, letter campaigns, and attacks on some foreign embassies.<sup>62</sup>

Furthermore, Hüseyin Cahit, the chief-editor of *Tanin* (the mouthpiece of the CUP), called for a boycott of Austrian goods. The boycott helped to create a debate over the connection between independence and

a “national economy.”<sup>63</sup> This debate would eventually constitute an economic aspect of the growing Turkish nationalism. The radicalized and politicized public helped the CUP to display its power and also to enhance its networks. For instance, the debate over the national economy would open a larger discussion on who controls the economic structures of the state, which in turn would further alienate the Muslim public against the Christian minorities who were protected by European business networks and controlled the bulk of the empire’s trade. In fact, most of the Christian groups, except the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and the Jews, allied with the liberal and decentralization-oriented LUP.<sup>64</sup>

The parliament opened on December 17, 1908, amid much fanfare, but the CUP remained outside the government. The restoration of the constitution and opening of the parliament created high expectations among all Ottoman communities. New political opportunities led to the establishment of new newspapers, magazines, associations, and clubs to promote different notions, including ethnic secessionism.<sup>65</sup> This new-found freedom allowed ethnic nationalist groups to ask for autonomy and eventually a gradual independence. In other words, the new political spaces led to a burgeoning nationalistic associational life, which created factionalism and fragmentation of the Ottoman “public.” These separatist movements and open attempts of certain groups to promote separatism raised deep security concerns, which would eventually result in the banning of associations with ethnic names, the empowerment of local security officials to disarm the public, and the enforcement of state control over education. These policies further alienated certain minorities and radicalized their resistance. Some of these movements looked for an opportunity to solicit European intervention in order to gain a more favorable position from the state. Although the CUP was sympathetic to these associations to overthrow Abdülhamid II, it insisted on the centralization and unification of all groups under common Ottoman citizenship.

Bernard Lewis argues that, “whatever the intentions of the Young Turks, they were almost at once subjected to a series of blows, from inside and outside the Empire, that threw them into a mood of anger, bitterness, and frustration.”<sup>66</sup> In short, these events were making it increasingly clear that a multiethnic and multireligious empire was simply no longer functional. While the public was unhappy with the internal and external developments, some anti-CUP groups, including those supportive of the old system, sought to exploit this public discontent. Mutineers from different units in Istanbul called for a demonstration and demanded

the restoration of the Shari'a law on April 13, 1909, an event known as the March 31 incident. The movement was not only limited to Istanbul: the bloodiest reactionary attack took place in Adana. It resulted in the massacres of thousands of innocent Armenians in Adana, which in turn marred cooperation between the CUP and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. When the CUP realized the danger, it called upon the military from Macedonia to intervene in favor of the CUP. Sultan Abdülhamid II was deposed; his brother Mehmet Reşad became the new sultan.

In order to stop these separatist movements, the government banned all associations and clubs with ethnic names on May 16, 1909. Moreover, to disarm the societies, the government also passed a law against guerrillas and committee-based armed struggle on September 27, 1909. The mandatory conscription law on July 3, 1909, angered many Christian communities, which refused to serve in the army. They also interpreted this as a sign of the CUP's Turkification policy and united against the government. Although the CUP aimed to restore the constitution and the parliamentary system, along with basic rights of the people, the European interventions and external events prevented their implementation. The vague ideology of the CUP evolved in response to the events.<sup>67</sup>

#### THE BALKAN WARS AND NATION-BUILDING

There are competing narratives about the causes of the Balkan Wars.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, we find various dynamics at play in different regions and locales: the legacies of the Treaty of Berlin; exposure of Ottoman weakness during the Tripoli War; the failure of the Ottoman reforms in Macedonia; and the irredentist form of Balkan nationalism.

In addition to the Albanian rebellion in 1910, the major event that also undermined Ottoman prestige the Arab provinces was the Ottoman-Italian War over Libya.<sup>69</sup> In order to prove that Italy was a Great Power, the Italian military attacked Tripoli on April 28, 1911. Italy would face fierce resistance to subdue the local armed resistance that was organized by Mustafa Kemal and Enver Bey. But Italy would control Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica, which would eventually constitute today's Libya. The Ottoman defeat in Libya had major indirect consequences: Italy occupied the Ottoman Aegean Islands; it exposed the Ottoman military weakness to war-mongering Balkan states; and it weakened the Ottoman military positions in Macedonia, because some prominent military commanders were sent to Tripoli to organize the local resistance. These factors, in turn, contributed to the Balkan Wars.

In order to build a nation-state in the Balkans, homogenization and war became prerequisites for the consolidation of ethnic state sovereignty. Moreover, the Treaty of Berlin had left indefensible borders and planted further seeds of ethnic rebellions with its article 23 on Macedonia. The treaty raised hopes among Christian groups in their struggle for independence by stressing ethnic nation-state formation and by requiring a set of reforms both in Macedonia and in Anatolia. In fact, the legacy of the 1877–78 War was that it paved the way for the Balkan Wars and the final expulsion of the Ottoman presence from the Balkans. The San Stefano Treaty drew the dream map for Bulgarian nationalists and became the building block for an expansionist Bulgarian state. Indeed, this “greater Bulgaria,” which was cut down with the Treaty of Berlin, spurred on the incipient Bulgarian state to dream of reattaining the San Stefano boundaries, which included almost all of Macedonia and even Edirne. After the Treaty of Berlin, the motivating force behind Bulgarian nationalism was the restoration of the borders drawn by the San Stefano Treaty. This Bulgarian irredentism unified all Bulgarian-inhabited lands, but in the process it also played an important destabilizing role in the Balkans. The dream of unifying all Bulgarians and their territory under one nation-state became the main motive of Bulgarian foreign policy. Bulgarian irredentism would play an important role in the 1908 crisis and would also capitalize on the Ottoman defeat in Libya to declare war against the Ottoman state in order to incorporate the “Bulgarians” of Macedonia. The pro-Bulgarian associations in Macedonia were not pleased with the 1908 Young Turk revolution and thus used all means to invoke European intervention.

While the Bulgarian state wanted to expand toward Macedonia, Serbian nationalism pursued its own irredentist policies in Bosnia and the western Balkans to incorporate all territories wherever any Serbs could be found. The borders of these new Balkan states were not yet fixed, and they all harbored ambitions to redraw their frontiers via war. With the annexation of Bosnia, Serbia became increasingly worried about Austrian designs and sought to seize Albanian- and Bosniak-inhabited lands. The early twentieth century was a period of major economic and demographic expansion in the Balkans. This was in part facilitated by the introduction of new technologies in the rural areas, which in turn released a large number of peasants to relocate to urban centers. Once in these urban areas, they sought jobs and housing. The states, meanwhile, were using nationalism to control and domesticate the population for their own purpose; political parties were hypernationalistic, favoring expansionism and deportation of the “internal others.”

At the national level we see more specifically that:

1. Montenegro wanted to homogenize its population and also occupy more territories inhabited by Albanians;
2. Greece wanted to deport more Muslims and also incorporate a chunk of southern Macedonia;
3. Serbia was worried by the expansion of the Austrian economic sphere in Bosnia and the Sanjak region and wanted to carve out and incorporate northern Macedonia;
4. Bulgaria's national movement focused on full integration of Macedonia and the realization of an ethnically homogeneous Bulgarian state.

Russia did not wish to see Austria become a major player in the Balkans, and Russia also sought to exploit irredentist claims in the Balkan area with the aim of weakening the Ottoman state and eventually swallowing the Straits. Bulgarian political discourse in Sofia was based on the liberation of the inhabitants of Macedonia as a part of the Bulgarian nation who should be freed from the Ottoman yoke. In order to control Bulgarian nationalism and policies, Russia played an important role in the formation of a series of alliances between Bulgaria and Serbia (March 13, 1912), Bulgaria and Greece (March 29, 1912), and Montenegro with other powers. While these alliances were being formed, Albanian Muslims were quite worried about their fate under a weak and collapsing Ottoman state. The Albanian local elite was much more astute than the elite in Istanbul in its reading of events in the Balkans and worked closely with Austria and Italy to counter Serbian expansionist ambitions.<sup>70</sup> The Albanians thus came to the conclusion that the Ottoman demise was inevitable and that their lands would become the primary target of the irredentist policies of Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro. The last source of discontent was the CUP's centralizing policies, along with education in Turkish, perceived by many as an attempt to deny Albanian identity.

In October 1912 the Balkan states attacked Ottoman positions in order to grab as much land as quickly as they could. The Ottoman army was routed within weeks, and the half-millennium of Turkish Muslim presence in the Balkans came to an end. The Ottoman army lost the battles on all its fronts and retreated to the Çatalca defense line, a mere sixty kilometers from Istanbul. Only Russian warnings stopped the Bulgarian troops from marching into Istanbul itself.<sup>71</sup> Russia wanted the Straits for itself and did not want any other country to have direct control over Istanbul.<sup>72</sup> The actual fighting halted shortly afterward. The armistice treaty was signed on December 3, 1912.

Aram Andonyan's book *Balkan Wars* offers excellent insights on certain sentiments among Armenian intellectuals and also on the dominant mood in Istanbul. According to Andonyan, while the Balkan armies were much better prepared and more motivated by nationalism, the Ottoman army was lacking in both preparation and a unified identity.<sup>73</sup> He also contends that the Ottomans did not have the necessary battle equipment and that the transportation conditions were woeful. Moreover, the Balkan troops were much better educated than the Ottomans. Starvation and disease were accompanied by rape and degradation. Andonyan provides a vivid picture of the conditions under which Serbian and Bulgarian troops dehumanized Ottomans: "many Muslims were murdered and girls were raped and even children were choked to death."

The major reasons for the Ottoman army's quick defeat were the lack of morale among the soldiers, epidemic diseases, poor discipline due to the politicization of the army, and the defection of Christian soldiers during the war.<sup>74</sup> For the first time non-Muslims were conscripted and sent to war in the Balkans; except for the Armenians, they not only refused to fight but even deserted and joined the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian armies and thus demoralized the Muslim troops.<sup>75</sup>

By recruiting Christian soldiers, the linkage between Islam and war-making was interrupted. Battle had always been justified in the name of serving Islamic ideals. With Christians in the same unit, the soldiers were no longer able to understand why they were fighting, as the internalized and sacred notion of the Islamic homeland was no longer apparent. The army was thus in an existential and ideological crisis. Fevzi Çakmak sums up the lack of cohesion:

A nation in order to sacrifice itself has to have a unifying idea. Unfortunately, there was no shared idea during the war. The idea of Turkism was not there. We recruited soldiers from diverse ethnicities. Since we incorporated non-Muslims among the troops, we could not justify and mobilize the soldiers in the name of Islam as we used to do. Ottomanism was bound to fail; each nation that constituted the Ottoman mixture had rival religions and ideas of homeland.<sup>76</sup>

One of the most critical impacts of the Balkan Wars was the heightened suspicion over the loyalty and commitment of the non-Muslim troops and citizens. Not only did most of the non-Muslim Ottoman troops switch sides during the war, but the local Christian population

provided logistical support for the occupying Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian armies. On the basis of the military reports and memoirs, Fikret Adanır, the leading historian of the Balkans, argues that the non-Muslim recruits' shift to the side of their co-nationals demoralized the Ottoman army and left major fears about the loyalty of non-Muslim troops in future wars.<sup>77</sup> Thus the Ottoman high command concluded that the army could not rely on non-Muslims to fight against their co-nationals.<sup>78</sup> The cooperation of Ottoman Bulgarian and Greek villagers with the occupying armies especially disturbed the Ottoman military command. Hence the war destroyed not only the hope of a multireligious empire but also of a multireligious army. This distrust would play an important role in the treatment of Ottoman Christians during the period of uncertainty and wars.

Not only the lack of esprit de corps but also hunger and disease became the major enemy of the Ottoman army. According to Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, "Had the Turkish soldier been supplied with even one biscuit a day he might have held his ground against the invader, and I am convinced that he has been defeated more by sheer starvation than any other single factor."<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, the commanders of the army were divided on ideological grounds. The civilian political debate over the future of the state and how to save it also penetrated the army. The commanders were not even on speaking terms. The military was neither prepared nor determined to fight. Transportation and logistics were pitiful, and the Aegean Sea was closed to Ottoman shipping due to the conflict with Italy. A month before, the government in Istanbul had sent 20,000 troops to Yemen. The Ottoman state was under siege by Italians in Libya, by Greeks in Rhodes and other islands, by Bulgarians and Serbs in Macedonia, and by Russians in Anatolia.

### *The Consequences of the War: The Politics of Anxiety*

In the aftermath of defeat, two conferences convened in London. The first included the Ottoman state and a delegation from the Balkan states. Due to the intransigent positions of the Balkan states, the negotiations ended without result. The second conference included the ambassadors of major European powers, who in effect endorsed the consequences of the land grab and mass ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and asked the Ottoman state to surrender besieged Edirne to the Bulgarian troops.<sup>80</sup> The Treaty of London, after the first Balkan War on May 30, 1913, practically ended the Muslim Turkish presence in Europe, conceding that the future of Albania and its borders would be determined by the major



European powers; Serbia would annex more lands in Macedonia; and Greece would have Salonika, Crete, and southern Macedonia. Bulgaria, for its part, conquered Kavala, Dedeağaç, Edirne, and all of Rumelia. When the newspapers and journals in Istanbul began to write about the surrender of Edirne, the CUP leaders used this public outcry to depose the government. They organized a series of demonstrations against the surrender of the besieged city.<sup>81</sup> "Freedom for Edirne" became the chant and poster for the mobilization of the Ottoman public. In this uproar Enver Bey and his colleagues stormed the Ministry of War and killed the minister on January 23, 1913. The new government's main rallying point became the expulsion of Bulgaria from this historic capital of the Ottoman state. The city eventually fell into the hands of Bulgarian troops on March 26, 1913. The conflict among the Balkan states over the partition of the Ottoman territories, however, provided the expected opportunity for the CUP leadership. In fact the government took full advantage of the war among the Balkan states and was able to recapture Edirne, along with Kırklareli, on July 20, 1913. This military victory garnered the CUP government political points. It used this newly acquired legitimacy to purge opposition officials and silence dissent. (The fifth congress of the CUP, after the Balkan Wars, took place in Istanbul. There the CUP transformed itself from a committee to a political party with a clear platform on national education and the national economy.)

### **Territorial and Demographic Loss**

The Ottoman state lost most of its major remaining Balkan urban centers, such as Salonika (Thessaloniki), Manastır, Priştine/Priština, and Üsküp/Skopje. The loss of Salonika, which was the center of the Young Turk movement, proved to be the most painful. Moreover, Salonika was the most critical commercial and transportation hub for the rest of the Balkans. Its port was significant for reaching the hinterland of southern Europe. After all its glories, and the legacy left in terms of architecture, music, food, thought, and politics, the Ottoman presence had definitively perished in the Balkans.

Paul Mojzes, a leading scholar of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, sums up the "single goal" of the Balkan Wars: to "drive out the Turks from the Balkans."<sup>82</sup> W. H. Crawford Price also argues that the Balkan Wars were a "systematic attempt to exterminate the Moslems."<sup>83</sup> The war brought about not only a mass killing of Muslims but also "a universal exodus...from Turkish villages."<sup>84</sup> Michael Reynolds aptly argues that "ethnic cleansing sent hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees,

or *muhacirler*, streaming into the empire, adding yet another economic burden and straining the social fabric.”<sup>85</sup> Price provides more vivid stories of the inhuman conditions of Muslim refugees and how they begged him for bread.<sup>86</sup> Leon Trotsky, who would later have a strong impact on Russian politics, concluded while serving as a war correspondent in the Balkan Wars that “the Bulgars in Macedonia, the Serbs in Old Serbia, in their national endeavor to correct data in the ethnographical statistics that are not quite favourable to them, are engaged quite simply in systematic extermination of the Muslim population in the villages, towns, and district.”<sup>87</sup> Thus Mojzes’s description of the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans as an “an unrecognized first genocide” in Europe is not totally wrong.<sup>88</sup> Indeed the destruction of the Muslim population in the Balkans was carried out because of the hatred against their identity more than because of what the Muslim population did to the new emerging Balkan states. Mojzes further argues that

the defeated and disarmed Turkish soldiers who surrendered were slaughtered, as were civilian Turks; Turks whose ancestors settled in these regions centuries ago were ethnically cleansed, often after torture and mutilation. Not only were ethnic Turks targeted; vengeance was directed toward all Muslims, who were frequently regarded by the Balkan population as *poturice* (those who became Turks by conversion to Islam).<sup>89</sup>

The Balkan Wars also introduced mass rape as a new weapon to scare the Muslims away and also force Muslim women to live in shame. The Carnegie Endowment reports the cases of rape in detail:

Outrages were committed against Greek, Jewish and even Armenian women, despite the Armenians’ devotion to the Bulgarian cause. Naturally the worst violence was devoted to the Turkish women. Respect was shown neither rank nor age. Among the women violated there were as many girls of tender years as aged women. Many of these girls are now actually with children. All those who could afford to do so have gone to hide their shame in remote regions. Many have lost reason. Most keep silent about their misfortune, for reasons easy to understand.<sup>90</sup>

Ottoman Muslim sovereignty ended in the Balkans. Muslim communities were deported; those who had means moved to Anatolia. Ebru

TABLE 1.1. Before and after the Balkan Wars: Territory and Population Change

	TERRITORY		POPULATION	
	BEFORE	AFTER	BEFORE	AFTER
Bulgaria	33,647	43,310	4,337,516	4,476,006
Greece	25,014	41,933	2,666,000	4,363,000
Serbia	18,650	33,891	2,911,701	4,527,992
Montenegro	3,474	5,603	250,000	500,000
Turkey in Europe	65,350	10,882	6,130,200	1,891,000

Source: Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, 453.

Boyar's book offers the most detailed study of the psychological trauma suffered by the Ottoman elites with the defeat of the Balkan Wars, which not only resulted in the loss of the Balkan provinces of the empire but also reduced the state to an Asiatic country: Anatolia, the least-developed part of the empire.<sup>91</sup>

As a result of this devastating war, the Ottoman population was drastically reduced.<sup>92</sup> The socio-religious mosaic of the Balkans was almost completely destroyed, and homogenization took on a new velocity and meaning. The Ottoman state lost 83 percent of its European land, 69 percent of its population, and most of its arable land to the Balkan states. Justin McCarthy argues that there were 2,315,000 Muslim in the European parts of the Ottoman Empire before the Balkan Wars. He contends that 600,000 Muslims were killed during the war and about 400,000 were forced out of their ancestral lands.<sup>93</sup> Reynolds describes the impact of the refugee problem:

The refugees had their blood shed, homes burned, and families expelled from their birthplaces because as Muslims they were judged to be without legitimate claims to their birthlands in an age of nation-state. When, destitute and embittered, they arrived in what was supposed to be their land, Anatolia, they encountered in Istanbul and along the Aegean coast prosperous communities of Christians, especially Greeks, causing their resentment to burn more intensely.<sup>94</sup>

The defeat and persecution at the hands of the Balkan states led to profound pessimism and feelings of humiliation, anger, and exclusion. This psychological situation led the refugees to withdraw to their primordial Islamic identity with a vengeance.<sup>95</sup>

Moreover, the majority of the CUP's prominent members hailed from the Balkans, where they had been socialized within its sociopolitical context.<sup>96</sup> Indeed the CUP was basically a Balkan phenomenon in terms of its leadership, identity, and strategies. The organization learned about politics while in the Balkans and had limited information about the sociopolitical conditions of Anatolia. Thus the loss of the Balkans had a searing psychological impact on the CUP leadership. In his private letters Enver Paşa displays his anger against the killing of innocent children, women, and the elderly because they were Muslims. He defines the Balkan Wars as the "latest Crusade" and calls for "revenge."<sup>97</sup> Not only the elite but also the masses were in a panicked frenzy over the future of the Ottoman state. Talat Paşa's memoirs are highly revealing about the profound effect of the Balkan Wars. He was deeply shocked by the loss of Salonika and the deportation from their ancestral homes and mass killings of the Muslim population.<sup>98</sup> He not only lost his faith in international norms and the European system but also developed an adherence to the tenets of social Darwinism or *Realpolitik* through his own experiences.<sup>99</sup> Indeed Talat Paşa did not get his education on survival through ruthlessness just by reading books. Given the long-established double standards of European powers that dominated the international system, the leaders of the CUP came to the conclusion that what matters most is not international norms and rules but rather brute force. The defeat and subsequent European indifference to the suffering of the Muslim population deeply scarred the mentality of the CUP leadership in particular and the Ottoman Muslim elite in general. This humiliation and resentment would shape their future decisions. We thus can state that the post-1913 policies were indicative of the despair and moral outrage provoked by what happened to the Ottoman Muslims in the Balkans. Not only Europeans and Russians but also the CUP came to the conclusion that the Balkan jackals had exposed the weaknesses of the ailing Ottoman state and turned it into a target for the colonial powers. In fact the Ottoman state was a wounded lion surrounded by scavenging hyenas that were just waiting for the moment to devour its carcass. The ailing lion was in desperate conditions and in search of an ally for survival but also capable of savage retaliation itself.

The deep sense of victimhood after the Balkan Wars shaped the thinking and actions of the CUP. This victimhood would be utilized to justify the ruthless survival policies of the CUP, above all in terms of the Armenian Question in Anatolia. Underlying this sense of victimhood was also some grudging admiration for the success of the Balkan states.

It was an epiphany for the Muslim Turks that the Balkan armies could succeed because they had connected with the society via the idea of nationalism; modern education helped them to prepare a powerful society; public opinion was important to mobilize the masses for the war efforts; and the struggle for survival was conditioned on a powerful army. After the defeat in the Balkans, the CUP became increasingly oppressive and never allowed in-group or out-group dissent due to constant, highly stressful external threats, the failures in the Balkans, and the lack of resources. In short the CUP was dominated by group-think: the core group members sometimes made faulty decisions because they were all pressured and informed by an insular group.<sup>100</sup> They felt a deep psychological drive for consensus under war conditions and fear of being partitioned by opposition forces. This translated into a cohesive solidarity and identity (*esprit de corps*) among the CUP members, who sought to make decisions unanimously. These internal and external threats were crucial to understanding how the CUP leaders made decisions under these threats. They believed in the morality of their decisions, which they thought were in service of the collective good: the saving of the state and nation. The decisions of the CUP after the Balkan Wars were structured by a deeply felt anxiety and the existing distribution of power between the Ottoman state and the Entente countries. Thus, although the CUP made the decisions, options were limited by the prevailing political and military conditions. Lieberman aptly concludes that “the catastrophic defeats in Europe [Balkans] made victimization a key component of nascent Turkish national identity. Anger, desire for retribution, fear of further territorial losses, and a search for scapegoats helped make ethnic cleansing and genocide not just possible but likely during World War I.”<sup>101</sup>

### **Impact on the CUP**

After the Balkan defeat, we can see the CUP movement (also known as Unionists) not only as a political party but also as a disposition and praxis—as action informed by anxiety about the future.<sup>102</sup> The CUP emerged as the most effective social movement, with its organizational structure and branches stretching all over Anatolia. Profound pessimism and anxiety as well as constant Russian intervention on behalf of carving out autonomy for Armenians highlighted the security concerns of the time. Youths, along with merchants and some notables, started to join the CUP in large numbers. Its membership increased exponentially from 2,250 to 850,000 and its branches from 83 to 360. In the eyes of the humiliated Muslims, the CUP was the only organization to lead the country and protect it against imminent partition by the European

powers. In short, the conditions of war helped to convert the CUP into a mass movement and a political party. The Muslim groups all coalesced around the CUP with the goal of saving the state. The external and internal challenges forced the CUP to reinvent itself as an oppressive institution that the state needed. The ideals of democracy and equality were defeated by the intractable mess, humiliation, lack of economic independence, and expulsion of large numbers of the Muslim population from their ancestral lands. All these converted the CUP to an authoritarian party.<sup>103</sup> The CUP's identity would become distilled and purified after the defeat. Thus the CUP became a vehicle for coping with the devastating consequences of the Ottoman Muslim annihilation in the Balkans and preventing its repetition in Anatolia. The fear of genocide, tearing the homeland apart, and the needs of the state informed and shaped the CUP leaders' definition of the collective good: the Ottoman Muslim nation was now greater than the state.

Mustafa Aksakal, a diplomatic historian of the CUP period, fittingly argues that the Balkan losses and the persecution of the Muslims provided a fertile ground for the formation of feelings of resentment and the desire to restructure society and the state in *toto*.<sup>104</sup> Indeed the humiliation of defeat, which motivated the desire for revenge among the Ottoman elite, led to thinking that a new war was inevitable. The main question following their drubbing in the Balkan Wars was how to cope with this tectonic shift of confidence and the erosion of the legitimacy of the state institutions. The defeat had exposed the structural problems in governance, military capacity, fighting capabilities, and the lack of social cohesion in society to mobilize around the shared ideals. Many concluded that rebirth and restoration of self-confidence could not be achieved without another war, in which the Ottomans could prove their true mettle once and for all. A new political discourse would gain currency to address some of the problems. Feroz Ahmad sums up the impact of the Balkan Wars on the CUP:

It is not possible to understand Unionist policy and behaviour after 1913 without realizing what a traumatic effect the disaster of the Balkan Wars had on the Turkish psyche. The Turks had lost the very lands that had provided the life-blood of the Empire for centuries. Moreover, the capital had come within an ace of falling to the enemy, spelling the end of their Empire. Throughout this entire catastrophe the Great Powers had stood by, even though at the outbreak of hostilities they had declared that they would not permit a change in the status quo.<sup>105</sup>

### Political Discourse

The CUP leaders closely identified themselves as Ottomans. Their main goal was to save the Ottoman state, the Ottoman *vatan* (motherland), and the Ottoman *millet* (people or nation). From a pragmatic perspective, the CUP had very few options besides defending Ottomanism, because it was the only available glue to keep the diverse ethnic and religious groups together. The CUP thus championed Ottomanism for the time being. This would gradually change after the Balkan Wars. Şükrü Hanioglu argues that “the available CUP documents reveal that only towards the very end of 1917 did the CUP come to the decision to totally abandon Ottomanism and pursue a Turkist policy.”<sup>106</sup> However, this shift in discourse actually began after the Balkan Wars. In fact some Young Turks developed a more rational understanding of nationalism after the Balkan defeat, suggesting that nationalism goes hand in hand with progress, education, and the mobilization of the masses for a public good. But the envy of Balkan successes as explained by their commitment to nationalism gradually translated into state policy. In other words, the project of nationalism gradually started to supplant Ottomanism as patriotism. In fact, the Ottoman elite was forced to adopt the Greek model of homogenizing nation-building. The state institutions, along with the majority of the elite, understood Turkism within the context of Islamic nationalism. Indeed, except for a brief period, the Islamic layer of identity regularly emerged as the most comprehensive explanatory variable in the past and present politics of Turkey. Nationalism as a political doctrine only became a force when national consciousness was transformed into institutions and policies. The wars and defeats helped to create an “us” as Muslims versus “them” as Christians mentality, which remained more effective than nationalism or ethnicity. Thus we might argue that wars more than print-capitalism or the emergence of a bourgeoisie played a formative role in the politicization of cultural identities. In point of fact, Anatolia as a *national* (*milli*) homeland was discussed for the first time during and after the Balkan Wars.<sup>107</sup>

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir offered a summary of the widespread feeling of despair among the Muslim population following the Balkan debacle: “Finally, the Balkan War started. When the Ottoman army retreated with the loss of all the Ottoman territories in Europe, the truth became clear. The collapse was not just the defeat of the army.... It was a total collapse of a collective spirit and worldview. An imperial story was dissolving.”<sup>108</sup>

In fact the Balkan Wars were not solely a military defeat but the end of an era and the beginning of an unknown dark future. The defeat was

a social, political, and psychological calamity or, as Halide Edip (1884–1964) described it, a “national disaster.”<sup>109</sup> She called upon mothers to instill “hatred against enemies” and called upon the Turkish people to destroy Bulgaria. Fuat Köprülü summoned the youth to prepare to avenge the loss of territories. He wrote an article entitled “Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism” in *Türk Yurdu* in which he advanced the idea that “the awakening of [the Turkish language] was necessary for the realization of Ottomanism and Islamism.” He also argued that the Turkish nationality should be based on a national history and national language. In addition, Köprülü claimed that the “Ottoman state lost most of [the] homeland because of the weakness of the Turkish core.”<sup>110</sup> Among other thinkers, Ziya Gökalp, who believed in Ottomanism, changed his view after the Balkan Wars. He wrote a piece titled “Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization” during the war, published in *Türk Yurdu* on March 20, 1913. Gökalp did not examine Ottomanism as a viable option. He defended the idea that Turkishness should be dominant over Islamism and Ottomanism. The goal, for Gökalp, was to create a “modern and Islamic Turkishness.” Fevzi Çakmak, who was a commander in Kosova during the Balkan Wars, wrote in his memoirs that “Turkism as an ideal did not exist during the Balkan Wars.” He explained the defeat by the lack of a single unified national ideal and argued that the fighting force had different conceptions of religion, homeland, and ideals.<sup>111</sup>

After the war a debate arose among the Young Turks over the likelihood of the survival of the state either as a multiethnic state or as a homogenized nation-state. This debate would eventually and definitively be decided during the war in 1918. While some of the Young Turks argued for a multiethnic and multireligious Ottomanism as the only option for the survivability of the state, others rejected the idea and insisted that being multireligious (not multiethnic) is a recipe for foreign intervention and a persistent cause of weakness. The war further highlighted key existential questions. Could the state, along with the Muslim (for some Turkish) nation, survive? How could Muslims turn Anatolia into their homeland? Indeed the Ottoman elite was deeply immersed in the debate over the survival of the state and homeland.

In this environment of intellectual debate over the future of the state and society, social conditions and the emotions of the masses played an important role. The triumphant ideas would have to take these conditions into account in order to mobilize the public in their favor. The CUP's main dilemma was how to govern a multiethnic empire (Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, and Turks) after the defeat in the Balkans. Some



members of the CUP began to promote the notion of the nation-state around the *millet-i hakime* (Turkish core) and the expansion of its legitimacy among the people. However, Turkism was just like the temporary cosmetic of Islamism and Ottomanism. This attempt never fully succeeded. Even today, if we excavate the contents of Turkism in its Anatolian soil, we find Islamism as the primary constitutive core, along with the imagined legacies of Ottomanism. Thus I would argue that the rise of *political* nationalism immediately after the Balkan Wars should not be exaggerated. A hefty debate in and between some journals and writers of the period indeed took place. The circulation of these publications was limited to the elite, however, and these debates hardly became a mass movement or a source of widespread legitimacy for the political authority.

The CUP's ethnic Turkism was not a fully developed form of nationalism but rather an amorphous idea and an intellectual attempt to redefine Turkishness within the frameworks of Islamism and Ottomanism. Turkism became more appealing among the elite in Istanbul, because they usually originated in the Balkans, where the dominant discourse was ethno-religious nationalism. Some Ottoman intellectuals also explained the success of the Balkan states in terms of the power of nationalism. Although the Ottoman officials regarded ethno-religious nationalism as detrimental to the survivability of the multireligious state, they also realized that the nation-state model was more successful in modernizing state and society. The issue, though, was how to adopt this model without risking the unity of the empire, especially between Arabs and Turks. The CUP leaders stressed Islamic unity more than ever and also treated Islam as the *sine qua non* of being a Turk. They sought to redefine Ottomanism, however, not as a *mélange* of diverse groups linked to the state through citizenship. Their Ottomanism aimed to create a cohesive society around religion and language. They sought to transform the Ottoman state into an entity like a nation-state by insisting on a single official language: Turkish. While the CUP asked Arabs and other groups to learn Turkish, it failed to offer any concrete benefits associated with learning the language. The state lacked resources, and learning Turkish did not improve the lives of ordinary Arabs, Armenians, or Greeks. Thus it was ultimately rejected and labeled as Turkification.

### Christian (Armenian) Minorities

In the post-Balkan War period state-society relations were shaped by (1) weakened state resources and the ineptitude of state authorities in improving the deteriorating social and political situation in Anatolia;

(2) increased suspicion over the loyalties of Christian minorities (especially the Armenians) given the major European power rivalries and their activities, in particular those of the Russians, to divvy up the Ottoman possessions; and (3) the radicalization of the Muslims (specifically the Kurds) against the partition of Anatolia. It is clear that Russia was the most prominent actor in the eastern provinces following the Balkan Wars period.

In reviewing this period, Fuat Dündar, Taner Akçam, Uğur Ümit Üngör, Richard Hovannisian, and Vahakn Dadrian all argue that the CUP was a nationalistic movement, thus putting the onus for ethnic provocation on the Ottoman elites. According to such scholarship, the CUP, upon taking power, immediately started pursuing a policy of ethnic social engineering: expelling and killing non-Muslim minorities.<sup>112</sup> Turkish nationalism is therefore seen as the motivating factor in the ethnic cleansing of the minorities and the homogenization of Anatolia. This ahistorical and decontextualized thesis not only is too rigid but also fails to understand the critical dynamic of human agency in the real-life interactions that occurred in a sociopolitical context.

The ideas and strategies of the CUP were significantly shaped by the actual historical events, especially the traumatizing Balkan Wars and the evident desire of the European powers to hasten the demise of the Ottoman state and partition Anatolia. During the war, collaboration between local Ottoman citizens who belonged to Bulgarian and Greek ethnicities against the desires of the Ottoman state raised questions about the loyalty of the Ottoman citizenry and soldiers. Indeed, in the midst of combat, Ottoman citizens of Greek origin supported the Greek side in the war, and a series of activities among the Greek Orthodox communities also demonstrated their support for the Greek army.<sup>113</sup> This had a devastating impact on the relationship between Christian minorities and the Ottoman state. In effect these non-Muslim minorities became securitized in the eyes of the Ottoman state. This securitization was particularly clear in the Ottomans' acts after the Second Balkan War, when they took several measures such as removing the "suspect" Greeks and Bulgarian populations from strategic regions. The CUP henceforth considered the Greek and Slavic populations unreliable.

A further complicating factor was the reality on the ground. The catastrophic defeat in the Balkans deepened the ethno-religious tensions in Anatolia between the newly resettled refugees and the autochthonous Christian communities. Those Muslims who were forced out of their lands and resettled in Anatolia started to have disputes with Greeks,

Armenians, and other Christian communities. The conflict over limited arable land between previous waves of migrants and the Greeks and Armenians was intensified with the arrival of new Muslim refugees.

Even before the Balkan Wars began, relations between Muslims (especially the Kurds) and Armenians had already been worsening. The widening economic disparity between the prosperous Christian communities and the poverty-stricken Muslim periphery and rural population further undermined interfaith relations, a deterioration that was bolstered by the misbehavior of the corrupt state elite and increased feelings of insecurity about personal property. This helped to create widespread anger and discontent. In general terms we can say that the main issues were the insecurity of Armenians and regular land grabs by the Kurdish tribes, with the support of local officials.<sup>114</sup> The progressive arm of the CUP (Talat, Enver, and Cemal, who came to power only through a coup in January 1913), with whom the ARF was meeting regularly between 1909 and 1911, gave assurances that it would take action regarding these issues. One of the main items in the meetings between the ARF and the CUP and between the patriarch and the CUP had always been the issue of reform. Although the CUP had promised major reforms to improve the security situation and also to address the land issue, which had simmered since 1908, it lacked either the resources or the will to implement them. In fact, in some parts of eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman state, rather than implementing the promised reforms to provide basic security for Armenian life and property, encouraged the Kurds to dispossess the Armenians of their land. Thus many Armenians start to question the sincerity of the CUP in regard to the reform agenda.

Prior to the Balkan Wars violence, poverty, and illiteracy had dominated eastern Anatolia. Violence against settled Armenian villagers by Kurdish tribal groups was the order of the day. Innocent Armenians who were the most prosperous denizens of the region became regular targets for humiliation at the hands of outlawed Kurdish bands, who were acting in cahoots with the Russians (the Russian consulates in Van and Bitlis were quite active). Yet the war-weakened Ottoman state was both powerless and inept at defending them. For instance, when the notorious Musa Bey (the leader of a major Kurdish tribe who had seized tracts of Armenian land under Abdülhamid II) attacked Armenian villages in the Muş region and terrorized the population, the Ottoman state changed the governors of Bitlis and Van and ordered the military to punish the criminals. Although some criminal elements were punished, the state failed to address the structural problems, especially the land tenure issue,

which continued to generate violence. In response to pressure from the patriarchate, the government planned to allocate 100,000 Ottoman liras to settle the land issue. Due to the lack of resources, however, none of these proposals were implemented. The state, facing a European offensive in Libya and the Balkans, was simply too weak to cope with Kurdish tribal violence and maintain security in eastern Anatolia. It was under these already worsening conditions that the Armenian political and religious elite solicited Russian intervention in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman state and called for radical reforms in six provinces, with the hope of following the Macedonian or Lebanese path.

While the Balkan countries were busy forming alliances among themselves in March 1912, Russia replaced its ambassador, Count N. V. Charykov, with M. N. Giers, who had been a harsh critic of Ottoman policies and had developed much closer ties with the Armenian Patriarchate.<sup>115</sup> After the Ottoman defeat in Libya, Russia became acutely aware of Ottoman military frailty and began discussions regarding the partition of the remaining Ottoman territories. Russian policy was to use Kurds and Armenians in eastern Anatolia to counter the penetration of other European powers into Anatolia. However, the Armenian religious and political elite also enticed direct Russian intervention into the affairs of the Ottoman state. By realizing the articulated reform agenda among the Armenian political elite, Russian foreign minister Serge Sazonov gave a speech calling for a new regime in the six Armenian-inhabited provinces in order to improve the security conditions and cope with lawlessness. The CUP became very worried about Sazonov's speech and tried to preempt Russian intervention by asking Great Britain to send the necessary personnel to prepare and implement a reform program in eastern Anatolia.<sup>116</sup>

Russia also pressed the Armenian reform issue in 1912, when the Balkan Wars were not yet over, precisely in order to (1) gain the goodwill and support of the Armenian communities both in the Ottoman Empire and outside; (2) avoid the domination of any power in eastern Anatolia and plant the seeds of a pro-Russian Armenian protectorate; and (3) stop further German penetration into the region.<sup>117</sup> Russia armed the Kurds so that the Armenian organizations would seek Russian intervention and Russia could control the Armenian nationalist movements on both sides of the frontier.<sup>118</sup>

The Armenian population was divided during the Balkan Wars. The patriarchate and Istanbul-based business groups fully supported the government. They were largely backed by the Anatolian Armenians, and

the multireligious Ottoman army even had several thousand Armenian troops and fifteen chaplains. But some Armenians supported Gen. Antranik Ozanyan and Gen. Karekin Nzhdeh (the commander of Armenian auxiliary troops), who were fighting on the side of the Bulgarian army.<sup>119</sup> But the swift Ottoman defeat changed the perceptions and expectations about the future of the Ottoman state.

After suffering a calamitous defeat, the Ottoman state was completely enfeebled and lacking in the requisite personnel and resources to begin restoring security in Anatolia. Due to the worsening security situation and the lack of desire to serve in the Ottoman army, many Armenians, along with other Christians, migrated either to Russia or to America. Moreover, after the Balkan Wars some Armenians came to the conclusion that the collapse of the Ottoman state was imminent and wanted to follow the Balkan Christian example of carving out their own state from Anatolia. During this fateful moment of the wounded Ottoman state, the Armenians sought all means to bring about foreign intervention to pressure the Ottomans to address the reform issue with the hope of gaining territorial autonomy.<sup>120</sup> Indeed Adanır argues: "Impressed by the Ottoman collapse in the Balkan Wars, the opinion among Armenians favoured once again seeking Great Power intervention, as this seemed to promise a better chance of solving the Armenian Question."<sup>121</sup> In fact, after the loss of Edirne, the Armenian leaders in Istanbul began to challenge the CUP administration by openly calling for international intervention that would realize the implementation of reforms in six provinces. Thus it was the Ottoman military defeat in the Balkan Wars and the ensuing political chaos in Istanbul that provided a window of opportunity for the Armenians. The defeat enticed Russia and the Armenian leadership in Istanbul to collaborate and concentrate on the eventual collapse of the Ottoman state. During the war the Armenian Patriarch established intimate relations with Giers, and almost all developments would pass through the Russian embassy. The secularist CUP leadership was deeply concerned with the patriarch's engagement with foreign powers, especially Russia.

As the situation in Istanbul worsened, Patriarch Hovannes Arsharuni (1854–1929) asked the Ottoman government immediately to carry out the demanded reforms and provide basic security for Armenian citizens. When these calls did not receive a proper response, the patriarch came to a decisive conclusion in May 1913: because the CUP had no will or resources to address Armenian insecurity in Anatolia, the only option was to ask for intervention from the European powers and Russia.<sup>122</sup> This

greatly increased the suspicion and hostility of the CUP leadership concerning the loyalty of the patriarch.

Not only the patriarchate but also the Armenian political elite wanted to take advantage of this great moment of weakness of the Ottoman state by allying themselves with Russia. Accordingly, the Armenian National Assembly called for the internationalization of the Armenian Question.<sup>123</sup> Krikor Zohrab and Vahan Papazyan were also aware of the enormous implications of the Ottoman defeat and wanted to utilize this to bring international pressure upon the Ottomans to make the state cave in to the reform project.<sup>124</sup> In his memoirs Zohrab stated:

The current international political environment is against the Turks. That is why this is the most opportune time to talk with the Turks. We cannot find this opportune moment again since the Turks in one way or another would free themselves from pressure by giving concessions to this or that state. Once free from pressure, the Armenian demand would be much more difficult to be fulfilled.<sup>125</sup>

Papazyan also regarded the Ottoman defeat as the most opportune time, arguing:

The Ottoman state, which is defeated in Africa and the Balkans, is not in the position to resist our reform initiatives. The political situation both within and outside the country is very bad. The Ottoman state is looking for a loan in foreign capitals regardless of the cost. Moreover, religious fanatics inside the country are also waiting for a favorable moment to rebel.<sup>126</sup>

The ARF also changed its accommodationist policy, starting to arm itself while organizing a series of fund-raising activities.<sup>127</sup> In fact fund-raising for these goals became the major activity of the ARF. The Armenian business establishment in Istanbul, however, refused to support these activities, being anxious about a premature uprising and also realizing that the government would be capable of responding ruthlessly.<sup>128</sup> The patriarchate and some Armenian revolutionary organizations searched for new strategies to bring about direct European intervention in order to realize their autonomy and eventual independence.<sup>129</sup> But some Armenian elites decided that in the face of the imminent collapse of the Ottoman state they should start to prepare militarily by establishing

semimilitary units and also smuggling weapons from the Caucasus.<sup>130</sup> The Ottoman intelligence services would regularly report these activities back to Istanbul.<sup>131</sup> These military preparations and the Russian pressures heightened the security concerns of the Ottoman state. In short, under these conditions of humiliating defeat and the sense that the Entente powers were planning the partition of the empire, the CUP government became much more intolerant and security-oriented.

With state capacity withering after the Balkan Wars, Kurdish tribes engaged in predation in the eastern provinces. Armenian insecurity reached a crisis point. Further complicating the realities on the ground, Russia was openly arming the Kurds, which also aroused the suspicions of many Armenians.<sup>132</sup> The German ambassador in Istanbul reached the conclusion that Russia was deliberately seeking to provoke violence in Anatolia by arming the Kurds and Armenians in order to justify intervention.<sup>133</sup> According to Cemal Paşa, Russia was planting the seeds of ethnic and religious violence in Anatolia.<sup>134</sup>

In the broader political picture, the Russian stance after the Balkan Wars was that the collapse of the Ottoman state was looming. It therefore tried to bring up the issue of reform in eastern Anatolia "to gain leverage over other powers in the event of partition and to prevent instability over into its Caucasus provinces should the Ottoman state implode."<sup>135</sup> In November 1912 Giers pointed out to the Russian minister of foreign affairs that reform was needed in the eastern Anatolian provinces because the security situation was becoming unbearable. He argued that the reforms should be monitored by Russia or by European officials. Giers even threatened the Ottoman state by arguing that if the reforms were not implemented Russia might take the matter into its own hands and enter the region. In reaction to these activities, the Ottoman state prepared a reform project in March 1913 for all provinces that would give more self-government and encourage decentralization. In order to thwart a possible Russian intervention in the region, the Ottoman state asked Britain to provide the necessary military and civilian personnel for the implementation of the reform project. Due to Russian interference, however, Britain turned down the Ottoman proposal. Britain hesitated because it did not want to alienate Russia, which was a vital potential ally in balancing German power on the continent.

Ambassador Giers, with the support of the Armenian political parties and the patriarch, in June 1913 proposed his reform program that called for the unification of six provinces under a Christian governor, clearly a prelude to partition. This plan was rejected not only by the CUP

government but also by the other European powers. On the basis of the pattern of European-imposed “reforms” in the Balkans and also in Lebanon, we could argue that any so-called “reform plans” usually ended with the dismemberment of the Ottoman territories and the ethnic cleansing of the native Muslim inhabitants. Russia’s encouragement of a reform project encompassing the six provinces was highly controversial and led to the defensive stance of the CUP. It claimed that the Armenian nationalists’ territorial demands were greedy, because they were in fact a minority in all of the six provinces. Some European powers, like the CUP, saw the Russian project for what it was—an attempt to detach a large chunk of the Ottoman territories to create a pro-Russian outpost. This was the common suspicion among most ambassadors in Istanbul. During the same period Russia revealed a plan to build a railroad to the Caucasus but vehemently refused the Ottoman attempt to build a railroad system in northeast Anatolia. This indicated the Russian long-term plan to prepare for a major strike against the Ottoman territories. Germany also interpreted the Russian reform project as the beginning of the partition of the Ottoman state.

On June 30, 1913, an international conference of ambassadors of major European powers convened in Istanbul as a result of Russian and Armenian diplomatic lobbying (Bogos Nubar Paşa, as the representative of the Armenian Catholicos, was traveling from one European capital to the next). Giers, the Russian ambassador to Istanbul, submitted the reform proposal prepared by Andrei Mandelstam, a Russian diplomat in Istanbul. The major powers rejected the Ottoman representation at the meeting. Said Halim Paşa submitted his counterproposal via Germany in July 1913. After long discussions among and between the major powers and the Ottoman state, the reform agreement was eventually signed in February 1914. In order to prevent possible Russian occupation, the Ottoman state caved in to outside pressure and agreed to a reform that would be the beginning of the division of seven major provinces (including Trabzon), in all of which Armenians were a minority. The agreement suggested the appointment of two Christian inspectors-general to carry out the reforms. Russian pressure and the worsening security situation in eastern Anatolia played an important role. The proposal divided the seven provinces into two separate zones under the governance of an inspector-general for each zone, who would supervise the judiciary, civil administration, and gendarmerie. In three provinces half the local council seats would be allocated to Christians and the other half to Muslims; in four provinces representation would be proportional, based on census



data. In all provinces the Armenian language also would be used in public documents.

With this agreement Ottoman sovereignty was curtailed: the provinces would henceforth gradually move out of Ottoman control. A major reaction to the reform project came not only from the Ottoman local officials but also from the Kurds. In fact the Russian reform project was itself a ploy to increase the enmity between Armenians and the majority of the population in these same provinces. Many intellectuals, including the CUP leaders, regarded this radical reform plan as the prelude to the dismemberment of Anatolia.<sup>136</sup> The CUP regarded the Armenian determination to bring about foreign intervention (especially from Russia, the worst enemy of the Ottomans) as treacherous. This in turn influenced the Ottoman attitude toward the Armenian population in general. After the agreement the Armenian Patriarch Zaven sent a telegram of thanks to the Russian ambassador, Giers. Giers asked Patriarch Zaven to send emissaries to Europe in order to meet with the inspectors-general and to win them over to the Armenian cause.<sup>137</sup> Indeed, Zaven sent two emissaries who met with future inspector-generals.

This fear about Russian and Armenian intentions mixed with general anxiety about the state of the empire to become the main basis of thinking in terms of the future of the Ottoman state and the Anatolian rump. This heightened the angst over the future presence of the Armenians and Greeks in Anatolia.

The Kurdish tribes vehemently rejected the proposal, as was illustrated by the local responses. Şeyh Molla Selim of Hizan rebelled against the government in April 1914.<sup>138</sup> When the Ottoman troops failed to suppress the rebellion in Bitlis, the government provided weapons to the Armenian population to fight against the Kurdish rebellion. After the government troops reached Bitlis, the *şeyh* took refuge in the Russian consulate. This rebellion, and the ineptitude of the government in trying to control it, exposed its weakness and its lack of resources. The major concern of the CUP was that Russia would take advantage of this chaos to move its troops into the region. Indeed the government reluctantly started to implement the reforms by appointing Louis Constant Westenck from Holland and Major Hoff from Norway as inspectors-general for the seven provinces, including Trabzon, to implement the reform package. The Armenian claims over the six eastern provinces where Muslims were actually a majority fed into Anatolian Muslim fears that they would be the next victims of ethnic cleansing. Anatolia was, after all, the only place left for ethnically cleansed and persecuted Ottoman Muslims

to live in security in a homeland of their own.<sup>139</sup> After complaining about European indifference to the killing of Muslims, Halide Edip came to the conclusion that “they also aroused the feeling that in order to avoid being exterminated the Turks must exterminate others.”<sup>140</sup> In this climate the anxieties on both sides nurtured each other. The postdefeat discussions and the fear that a new war was inevitable intensified ethnic tensions in Anatolia. Under these conditions the Ottoman state was desperate to find an international ally in order to save Anatolia as a homeland for the Muslims from the Russian and Armenian threat. One of the critical lessons that the CUP leaders drew from the war was that “diplomatic isolation was too costly. They would not want to face another war without allies.”<sup>141</sup>

### **The Search for an Ally and World War I**

The European powers’ policies and intentions to vivisection the Ottoman territories in Anatolia and the Fertile Crescent kept the state and society in a condition of perpetual fear that war was on its way. The fate and survival of the Muslim Turks in Anatolia would be the primary issue. Thus the Ottoman elite searched for an alliance with a major European power to balance other regional countries. Mustafa Aksakal’s detailed study reveals how the Ottoman territorial losses in the Balkans had substantially shaped the mode of thinking and strategies of the CUP elite and also the plans of its close military ally, Germany. The German Foreign Ministry became more and more skeptical about the future of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state and concluded that the liquidation of the Ottoman territories was inevitable. Thus Berlin wanted to be at the table when the Ottoman territories were to be divided in order to get its own helping. Aksakal’s book gives us the best analysis of the intellectual and emotional environment after the Balkan Wars and the way in which it compelled the Ottoman elite to enter World War I.<sup>142</sup> War became an opportunity for the Ottoman state to restore its political and economic sovereignty and consolidate its territories. Both the Ottoman elite and the public were in favor of a “rebirth” through war.<sup>143</sup> It was widely understood that otherwise, during the next regional war, the Ottoman state would be partitioned between Russia and Britain.

The Balkan Wars directly sparked World War I by further exacerbating the Bosnian crisis and the deteriorating relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. While Austria was trying to expand its influence in the Balkans, Serbia was seeking to incorporate all territories wherever Serbs lived. In fact, Serbian irredentist nationalism was in direct conflict

with the expansionism of Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary decided to promote the Albanian and Bosniak nationalism to contain and counter Serbian irredentist policies. With the defeat of the Ottoman state, Serbia and Austria directly confronted each other. In other words, the Balkan Wars created a space for an enduring rivalry between these two expansionist states. This rivalry would play a seminal role in the outbreak of World War I.

Following defeat, two futures were facing the CUP leadership: the imaginable and the unimaginable. In the first future, the past (the humiliating defeat) disguised itself as the future in the present: what happened to Ottoman Muslims in Rumelia could happen again in Anatolia. The destruction of the state, along with the Turkish Muslim nation, loomed as a very real possibility. This imagined future of the Ottoman state and society in which the fate of Anatolia would be the same as the fate of the Balkans radicalized the CUP leaders' ideology and decision-making. For them, this was an existential moment as a state and as a Muslim community. Thus the CUP would act with determination to save Anatolia and prevent its appropriation by major European powers no matter what the cost.

The second future is a lost book, which remains unknown: it was never published, never even written. We cannot know it, because we cannot imagine it. Its contours only become visible to us through our walk into the future. Thus the CUP acted on this imaginable future that was informed by the past traumatic experiences of genocidal ethnic cleansing faced by Ottoman Muslims in both the Balkans and the Caucasus. The Christian communities of Anatolia also constructed their future on the basis of the Balkan experiences: with foreign intervention, especially with the support of Russia, they could build their independent state, even though they were not a majority in any single province. Herein lies the source of the terrible tragedy that would fall upon the Armenians of central and eastern Anatolia in 1915.

## CONCLUSION

By endorsing the principle of ethnic sovereignty and ignoring the complex mosaic of the Balkans, the Treaty of Berlin unleashed the expansionist and irredentist ambitions of the Balkan states. This brought the competing interests of the states into a head-on collision. The opposition against Abdülhamid II regarded the restoration of the constitution and

the consolidation of the state as a solution to protect and preserve the existing Ottoman provinces in the Balkans. In fact, the 1908 revolution aimed to assure the equality of all citizens, not nationalities, to protect the territorial integrity of the state. But the Italian campaign to occupy Tripoli (1911); the rivalry between major European powers in the region, especially the increasingly activist role of Russia to bring the Slavic states together to contain both Austria and Germany in the Balkans; European public opinion in favor of driving the Turks out of Europe; and competition between the Balkan states over the division of Macedonia prevented the implementation of the reformist agenda of the CUP.

The ideology of the CUP evolved in response to sociopolitical challenges and the trauma of war. It first stressed Ottomanism and equality and then Islamism and centralization. After the Balkan Wars it patched up its tattered Ottomanism and Islamism into the quilt that we today call Turkism. From 1908 to 1923 the ruling political and intellectual elite in Turkey oscillated between Islamism, Ottomanism, and Turkism in order to save the Ottoman state and society from annihilation. In other words, these three identities were mutually inclusive. The elite constantly moved in and out of these identities with a rhythmic motion that did not create a major rupture. The CUP elite carefully mobilized these identities around the central goal of saving the remainder of the state in Anatolia. Thus it was only in 1913 that the Fifth CUP Congress highlighted the significance of Turkism as a way of addressing educational and economic conditions. Yusuf Akçura, a supporter of Turkism, welcomed this reluctant shift to the nationalist stance. During World War I, however, the CUP elite would not hesitate to mobilize Islamism against the European powers. Said Halim Paşa became the prime minister and fully supported Islamism as a way of keeping Arabs loyal to the state.<sup>144</sup>

Although most Young Turks remained devoted to Ottomanism until 1913, they would ultimately and reluctantly become “part-time” Turkish nationalists. Their Turkism, however, was culturally embedded in Ottoman history and politically shaped by Islamic symbols and idioms. Especially after the loss of Ottoman Europe and the contentious debate over the causes of their military defeat, the Young Turks pushed Islam to the fore as the most effective glue for social cohesion and as the political idiom for mass mobilization. Although no concerted effort to invoke Islam had been made before the Balkan Wars, when the Balkan states all framed the war as a crusade against Muslims, the Ottoman state reciprocated by declaring jihad (holy war) during World War I. They also sought

to advance the Muslim claim to liberation from brutal Western imperial rule in Asia and Africa, as Western Christian nations had done on behalf of Ottoman Christian populations.

The Balkan Wars ate up most of the financial and human resources of the beleaguered empire; it became ever more difficult to preserve Anatolia as the only homeland. The loss and defeat in the Balkans reduced the Ottoman state's image of itself to that of a "European state," resulting in the development of its understanding of "Anatolia as the new homeland." We might also argue that this loss of Ottoman Europe was compensated for by a more rigid Westernizing policy under the Kemalists in order to be accepted as a truly European society at last. Not only Balkan nationalism but also the Ottoman revolutionary committees that emerged in its wake deeply shaped the organizational structure of the CUP and even the current political culture in modern Turkey. In fact modern Turkey was crafted on the basis of the Balkan model. The Turkish elite became what they had hated most: a homogenized nation-state willing to carry out programs of assimilation and/or cleansing against ethnic and religious minorities.

## NOTES

I am indebted to the Turkish Coalition of America for its generous support, which allowed me to take a semester off to write this chapter. I would like to thank Zafer Toprak, Hasan Kayalı, Nader Sohrabi, Feroz Ahmad, Garabet K. Moudjian, and Isa Blumi for helping me to understand this period; my colleagues Edin Radusić, Amir Duranović, and Senadin Musabegović at the University of Sarajevo for their aid in grasping the social history of the Balkans; and Payam Foroqui, William Holt, Tal Buenos, Serhun Al, Ramazan Öztan, Erman Sahin, Sevin Elekdag, and Mujeeb R. Khan for their keen theoretical insights.

1. On the causes of the Balkan Wars, see Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*; Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*.
2. H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanlar'ın Makûs Tarihi, Göç*, 63–64.
3. Mujeeb R. Khan, "The Ottoman Eastern Question."
4. Eyal Ginio, "Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913)." Ginio argues that the Ottoman state did not frame the war as religious, while the Balkan states presented the war as a religious war to mobilize their rural population. The defeat revealed the weakness of secular Ottomanism, however, and the Young Turks stressed an Islamically informed Ottomanism. Hasan Kayalı insists that during the policies of the CUP and even the early Republican period Islamism remained the most dominant identity: Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*.
5. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 8–18.
6. John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern, "New Perspectives on Nationalism and War."

The Balkan type of nationalism has five major characteristics: it entails a state-led and top-down search for building a nation; war-making is the major instrument of homogenization; religion is the co-determinant of ethnic identity and the main instrument of mass mobilization; it is irredentist and always seeking to restore "Greater" Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, or Montenegro; and it seeks recognition from Western European countries by constructing an image of the "Muslim enemy."

7. Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492–1992"; Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime."
8. Ibid., 190.
9. Rogers Brubaker, "Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples," 158.
10. I would like to thank Professor Senadin Musabegović of Sarajevo University, who introduced the idea of the "hybrid absolutist character" of the Balkan states.
11. Gale Stokes, *Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, 24, 32.
12. Harold Dwight Lasswell, "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today."
13. Nicos Mouzelis, "Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism," 159.
14. Jonathan Phillips, *The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople*.
15. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, xiii–xvi.
16. Ibid., 1–11, 24–43.
17. Peter Sugar, *East European Nationalism, Politics and Religion*.
18. Stokes, *Three Eras of Political Change*, 24.
19. Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920*.
20. Benjamin Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 4.
21. Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821–1833*.
22. Aleksandar Pavković, "The Serb National Idea," 444; Vuk Karadžić, "Serbi sve i svuda," 29. I would like to thank Amir Duranović for his translation. Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 75.
23. Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile*; Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 112–13.
24. Cathie Carmichael, *Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans*, 21–22.
25. James Edward Miller, *The United States and Making of the Modern Greece*, 13.
26. George Finlay, *History of the Greek Revolution*, 263.
27. Alison W. Phillips, *The War of Greek Independence, 1821 to 1833*, 61.
28. William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free*, 43.
29. Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 9; quoting Thomas Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution*, 244.
30. Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 9.
31. For one of the best books based on the Ottoman documents about the fate of the Muslims in Peloponnesus, see Ali Fuat Örenç, *Balkanlarda İlk Dram*, 97–116. Robin W. Winks and Joan Neuberger argue that "when the Turks surrendered at Tripolitsa in 1821 after the first major Greek victory, twelve thousand captives were massacred, hanged, impaled, even crucified": *Europe and the Making of Modernity (1815–1914)*, 24.
32. Ottomanism is not a form of ethnic nationalism but rather a form of civic patriotism. Ottomanism did not seek to define sovereignty on the basis of ethnic or religious loyalty but sought to develop a loyalty to the state. It was an attempt to

keep the state together by stressing citizenship and the equality of its members. However, just like other ideologies, Ottomanism also metamorphosed into a nationalism-like idea after the Balkan Wars. Between 1898 and 1908 Ottomanism was a surrogate identity for non-Turkish groups who defined Ottomanism in opposition to Turkism. Many Albanians, Arabs, and Armenians regarded Ottomanism as an instrument to develop their own separate identities.

Ottomanism had at least three major modes. The two prominent thinkers Abdullah Cevdet and Prince Sebahattin developed a more nuanced understanding of Ottomanism. For Cevdet, Ottomanism consisted of three integrated ideas: a legal term that stresses the equality of all the different communities before the law; an opportunity space for different communities to develop their local identities and cultures; and a glue that binds this *mélange* of communities based on the “interest” of all groups. His definition of Ottomanism did not include an emotional or primordial aspect but rather a form of loyalty that is in the interest of each group. Prince Sebahattin’s conception of Ottomanism was shaped with the ideas of the free market, decentralization, and individual initiative. His decentralization principle did not seek to promote ethnic or religious autonomy, however, but rather administrative autonomy to cope with local problems. The third conception of Ottomanism was defended by Ahmet Rıza, the intellectual father of the CUP. Rıza treated Ottomanism as a form of a cohesive society. More than any other thinker, he was under the influence of the French sociologist Auguste Comte. Unlike the previous Ottomanists, he defended the role of Islam as a source of morality and the most powerful glue to mold a cohesive society. During the Second Constitutional period (1908–13), the opposition party positioned itself against Turkism and defended Ottomanism. In fact most of the minorities, except the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Jews, allied with the opposition party against the CUP. The opposition party was deeply influenced by the ideas of Prince Sebahattin. Although the CUP policies all aimed to promote Ottomanism, Ottomanism took on a very different meaning for the CUP after the traumatic Balkan defeat.

Ottomanism was as much an ideology as a policy to keep the citizens together in order to preserve the state. A Greek deputy during the discussion on Ottomanism said: “I am as Ottoman as the Ottoman bank.” On the other hand, most of the minorities regarded Ottomanism as an instrument of the state to deny their ethnic identities. Unlike the Ottoman Muslims, most Christians remained skeptical of appeals to Ottomanism.

33. Lord Acton, “Nationality.”
34. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1, 55.
35. Michael Oakeshott develops two different “modes of association” on the basis of different conditions: “civitas” (civil relationships) and “universitas” (enterprise relationships). Civitas allows each group to pursue its own way of life, while universitas is a purpose-gathering. People are bound together for the purpose of creating a new society. Civitas, unlike universitas, is inclusive, stresses equality and civility, and is based on the active recognition of others. Nationalism, for Oakeshott, is a product of “political rationalism” and “political romanticism”: Oakeshott, *On the Human Condition*, 108–84.

36. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 68, 112.
37. George Orwell, "Notes on Nationalism."
38. Walker Connor, *Ethno-Nationalism*, 102, 202.
39. M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Sluglett, eds., *War and Diplomacy*.
40. M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Transformation of 'Empire' through Wars and Reforms."
41. Justin McCarthy, "Ignoring the People."
42. Edin Radušić, "The Ottoman Wrong Horse?"
43. Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period*.
44. Bayram Kodaman, "The Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments"; Garabet K. Moum-djian, "From Millet-i Sadıka to Millet-i Asiya."
45. Gül Tokay, "A Reassessment of the Macedonian Question, 1878–1908."
46. After the Treaty of Berlin, Macedonia was plagued by a series of dirty little wars. They had no front lines, no clear war zone, and especially no distinction between combatant and civilian. These self-contained warring committees, known as *komitadjis* (*komiteci* in Turkish), framed themselves as "freedom fighters" of their own imagined ethnic group. The CUP leadership evolved out of these conditions.
47. One of the best studies of Ottoman Macedonia is Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu, *Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu (1890–1918)*.
48. Nader Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran*; Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*; İhsan Güneş, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi*; Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *İnkılap Tarihimiz ve İttihat ve Terakki*; Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*; M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük (1889–1902)*. The most important newspapers and prominent intellectuals of the coalition against Abdülhamid II were Ahmet Rıza (*Meşveret*), Murat Bey (*Mizan*), Abdullah Cevdet (*İçtihat*), the *Osmanlı* newspaper, *Şuray-yı Ümmet*, and Prince Sebahattin. See Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, Vol. II*, 56.
49. Ahmet Rıza, *Ahmet Rıza Bey'in Anıları*; İbrahim Temo, *İbrahim Temo'nun İttihat ve Terakki Anıları*.
50. Kazım Karabekir, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 33. Karabekir defines this merger as the "re-birth of the İttihat ve Terakki."
51. Angelo Iacovella, *Gönye ve Hilal-İttihat-Terakki ve Masonluk*, 32–56.
52. Güneş, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi*, 67–69.
53. Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, 84; Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*.
54. The critics of the İttihatçıs argue that the CUP instrumentally used the Reval meeting by exaggerating it. See Tahsin Ünal, *Türk Siyasi Tarihi (1700–1958)*, 480–81; Mehmet Selahattin Bey, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Kuruluşu ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin Yıkılışı Hakkında Bildiklerim*, 20–21.
55. Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 26–40.
56. Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, 66.
57. Güneş, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi*, 236; Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 10.
58. Vehibe Savaş, "II. Mesrutiyetin Balkanlardaki Osmanlı İdaresine Etkileri," 122.
59. The Ottoman Liberal Union Party (LUP) was established in 1908 by Rıza Nur, a fierce critic of the CUP. The party's platform was informed by the ideas of Prince Sebahattin. It won only one seat against 288 seats of the CUP in the 1908 election.



The LUP transfused into the Party of Freedom and Accord (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası), along with other CUP opponents, in 1911 and won the by-election in Istanbul against the CUP. However, it was defeated in the 1912 national election. It only gained power with the help of some anti-CUP military officers in the summer of 1912 and ruled the country until the defeat of the Balkan Wars. Because of the rumor that the LUP government would surrender besieged Edirne, the pro-CUP officers forced pro-LUP prime minister Kamil Paşa, who was also called the English Kamil Paşa because of his pro-British attitude, to resign and also killed the minister of defense. The CUP formed the new government under the leadership of Mahmut Şevket Paşa and became a dictatorial entity when he was assassinated in 1913.

60. The best source on the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–9 is Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908–1909*.
61. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 334.
62. E. Doğan Cetinkaya, *1908 Osmanlı Boykotu*, 133.
63. Zafer Toprak, *Milli İktisat–Milli Burjuvazi*, 101–24.
64. ARF and the Reformed Hunchaks went with the CUP, while the Hunchakian Party (Social Democratic Hunchakian Party: SDHP) went with Sebahattin. The famous Armenian jurist, orator and writer, and Ottoman member of parliament Krikor Zohrab was a founding member of the Ahrar Party until its demise in 1909.
65. After the restoration of the constitution, new newspapers were established: *Yeni Gazete*, *Millet*, *Hürriyet*, *Şark*, *Metin*, *Serbesti*, *Protesto*, and *Boşboğaz*. *Tanin* became the official newspaper of the CUP.
66. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 214.
67. Interview with Zafer Toprak, December 12, 2011, Istanbul.
68. An “alternative” (Islamic) reading of the past is becoming more dominant, so several books and articles in the last decade examine the defeat of the Balkan Wars as the outcome of the overly Westernized CUP policies. Islamist historians, who look at history in terms of the ruthless expansion of Westernization and the emergence of Westernized elite as an alien process and tend to elevate Abdülhamid II as the last great and perfect Muslim caliph, also tend to accuse the CUP of all the sins of the period and the ultimate collapse of the empire. This blind loyalty to Abdülhamid II and attempt to re-create the “golden Islamic order” is reflected in their accusation that the CUP was the cause of the Balkan Wars because it passed the Church Law (Rumeli’de kain munazaun-fih kilise ve mektepler hakkındaki kanun, July 3, 1910). The law tried to overcome the disadvantaged position of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and recognized the equality of churches in the Balkans. By passing the law, which allowed each Orthodox Church to claim ownership of the religious institutions and schools in places where it was the majority, they claimed that the Ottoman state created the political conditions for the alliance of these Orthodox nations by removing the key source of dissent. Sultan Reşad signed the law to stop the conflict among the diverse Orthodox churches in the Balkans.
69. Timothy W. Childs, *Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya, 1911–1912*; Richard J. B. Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers*.

70. Bilgin Çelik, *İttihatçılar ve Arnavutlar II*.
71. Ronald Bobroff, "Behind the Balkan Wars." Bobroff's well-documented article indicates that the key Russian policy was to preserve the status quo of the Straits until Russia could take them over itself.
72. Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*, 36.
73. Aram Andonyan, *Balkan Savası*, 217. This book was originally published in Armenian in 1913 and in Turkish in 1975. It was translated into Turkish by Zaven Biberyan. Andonyan believed that this destruction was rather the doing of the Ottoman state, however, because the state refused to reform itself and accept the genuine equality between Turks and other groups. After dividing Ottoman history into the periods of tolerance and intolerance, Andonyan argues that the Ottoman state entered into a period of intolerance with Greek independence by using force to suppress the popular demands of the people. He blames the Ottoman state and not any secessionist movements in Crete, Bulgaria, Lebanon, or Anatolia. From his perspective, the state itself was the cause of its own decline and demise, which was inevitable.
74. Oya Dağlar Macar, *Balkan Savaşları'nda Salgın Hastalıklar ve Sağlık Hizmetleri*. See also chapter 9 in this volume.
75. Fikret Adanır, "Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–1913."
76. Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak, *Batı Rumeli*, 2.
77. Adanır, "Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army," 123.
78. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 18.
79. Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, *With the Turks in Thrace*, 179. Ashmead-Bartlett was in Istanbul and then in the battlefields as a war correspondent. He offers a vivid picture of the frightening conditions of the Ottoman soldiers. Although the Balkan states claimed that their objective was the freedom of Macedonia, Ashmead-Bartlett argues that their "real intention of proclaiming a twentieth century crusade" was to kick "Turks once and for all out of Europe," 8.
80. Syed Tanvir Wasti, "The 1912–1913 Balkan Wars and the Siege of Edirne."
81. Yücel Aktar, "1912 Yılı Harp Mitingleri ve Balkan Harbine Etkileri."
82. Paul Mojzes, *Balkan Genocides*, 27.
83. W. H. Crawford Price, *Balkan Cockpit*, 181.
84. Mojzes, *Balkan Genocides*, 64.
85. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*, 38.
86. Price, *Balkan Cockpit*, 97.
87. Leon Trotsky, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, 286.
88. Mojzes, *Balkan Genocides*, 25–44. This excellent book examines the hatred against Muslims in the Balkans. Although Mojzes does not examine the connection between the Balkan Wars and the killing of Armenians in Anatolia, he calls upon researchers to analyze the link between the two events. Halide Edip argues that the massacres of the Muslims aroused very little indignation in Europe. Thus, she argues, many people in Turkey came to the conclusion that "in order to avoid being exterminated, the Turks must exterminate others": Halide Edip Adıvar, *Memoirs of Halide Edib*, 333. This book was originally published in 1924.
89. Mojzes, *Balkan Genocides*, 31.

90. International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, *The Other Balkan Wars*, 327.
91. Ebru Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans*.
92. For one of the best books on the migration, see Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri (1912–1913)*.
93. Justin McCarthy, *Forced Migration and Mortality in the Ottoman Empire*, 2.
94. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*, 38.
95. Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, chapter 1.
96. Hüsamettin Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*; Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy*, 95–109.
97. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, ed., *Kendi mektuplarında Enver Paşa*, 240–42; Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*, 39.
98. Talat Paşa, *Hatıralarım ve Müdafaaım*, 28–30.
99. *Ibid.*, 28.
100. Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink*.
101. Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 79.
102. Zafer Toprak argues that the CUP identity, or what is commonly called İttihatçılık, evolved in relation to new challenges and opportunities. Thus we cannot talk about a fixed identity or ideology of the CUP. Toprak claims that “İttihatçılık bir ideolojiden çok bir eylem ve duruşdur” (The Young Turk movement is more an action and disposition than an ideology). Interview with Zafer Toprak, December 12, 2011.
103. Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, 72.
104. Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road*. Aksakal’s nuanced discussion provides the best analysis of the post–Balkan War anger (chapter 1).
105. Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire,” 15.
106. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 299. One of the shortcomings of Hanioglu’s approach to this topic is that he does not examine his conclusions with reference to broader theories of nationalism that are crucial for understanding the debate on Ottomanism and Turkism. Thus his conclusions are somewhat decontextualized from broader theoretical insights and social and economic life. The best studies on the Young Turks are those by Feroz Ahmad, Zafer Toprak, Erik Jan Zürcher, Hasan Kayalı, and Nader Sohrabi.
107. The idea of *vatan* as a national homeland was first discussed by an Albanian Ottoman intellectual, Şemsettin Sami, a member of the CUP. Sami differentiated special homeland (*vatan-ı hususi*) from general homeland (*vatan-ı umumi*) in 1878. On the basis of this distinction, Sami also separated two mutually inclusive loyalties, being Ottoman and Albanian at the same time. Hasan Kaleşi, “Şemsettin Sami Fraşeri’nin Siyasi Görüşleri,” 647. After defining *vatan* in *Sıyrı Arayan Adam* as “all the territories in which the nation lives” (58), Şevket Süreyya Aydemir then defines *vatan* as “Turan.” He says that the Ottoman *vatan* is collapsing, while the other *vatan* is here. The *vatan* of Turks, for Aydemir, includes all those lands where Turks live regardless of whose flag they live under. It was Halide Edip (Adivar)’s novel *Yeni Turan* (1912) that popularized the idea of Anatolia as the national homeland of the Turks. She stressed the territorial aspect of nationalism. During World War I, Ziya Gökalp proposed to rename the Ottoman state the “Turk-Arab state”: Ziya Gökalp, “Millet ve Vatan,” *Türk Yurdu* 3, no. 67 (1914): 303. *Vatan* as a national territory and an internal aspect of nationalism was popularized after

- the establishment of the Republic. The debate continued among Ömer Seyfettin, Halide Edip, and Ziya Gökalp. During World War I, Halide Edip pushed for a territorial nationalism in her article "Evimize Bakalım: Türkçülüğün Faaliyet Alanı," *Vakit*, June 30, 1918. She was criticized by Gökalp, who argued that there was a distinction between Turkism and Turkeyism by comparing Turkeyism to Prussia and Turkism to German nationalism. He contended that Turkeyism was a territorial patriotism of all these groups who live in Anatolia. Turkism, for Gökalp, cannot be limited to Anatolia: it was "composed of Turkish-speaking Muslim people": Ziya Gökalp, "Türkçülük ve Türkiyecilik," *Yeni Mecmua* 2, no. 51 (1918): 482.
108. Aydemir, *Suytu Arayan Adam*, 48–49. This book offers the best analysis of the shifting intellectual debates in the late Ottoman period.
  109. İnci Enginün, *Halide Edib Adivar'ın Eserlerinde Doğu ve Batı Meslesi*, 434. Adivar's speech "Felaketlerden Sonra Milletler" was first published in *Türk Yurdu* on May 29, 1913.
  110. Mehmet Fuad Köprülüzade, "Türklük, İslamlık, Osmanlılık," *Türk Yurdu* 2, no. 45 (1913): 373–75.
  111. Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak, *Batı Rumeliyi Neden Kaybettik? Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı ve Balkan Harbinde Garp Cephesi*, revised by Ahmet Tetik, 2.
  112. Fuat Dündar believes that the CUP was a Turkish nationalistic organization and sought to cleanse Greek Orthodox and Bulgarian Christians before World War I. He reaches this conclusion by ignoring the collaboration of Christian minorities with the enemy forces during the Balkan Wars. Zafer Toprak, Ayhan Aktar and Abdulhamid Kırmızı, and Ahmet Efiloğlu demonstrate Dündar's manipulation of the Ottoman documents in order to advance his thesis. Efiloğlu's review essay raises a number of ethical questions about Dündar's use of the Ottoman documents. Either Dündar does not know Ottoman or he deliberately reconstructs the sources. Ahmet Efiloğlu, "Fuat Dündar'ın 'Tehcire Gereken ve Hak Ettiği Anlamı Veren Kitabı'"; Zafer Toprak, "Bir hayal ürünü"; Ayhan Aktar and Abdulhamid Kırmızı, "*Bon pour L'Orient*." For more on the connection between Turkish nationalism and the Armenian issue, see M. Hakan Yavuz, "Contours of Scholarship on Armenian-Turkish Relations."
  113. For the best detailed study on the activism of the Greek communities in Thrace and Anatolia, see Ahmet Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı Rumları: Göç ve Tehcir, 1912–1918*. This book is based on the Ottoman police and intelligence reports, including communal events, which clearly demonstrate the disloyalty of the Greek Orthodox community. That community also thought that the collapse of the Ottoman state was imminent and engaged in sabotage activities against the Ottoman army. After the Balkan Wars the first security question was the role of the Greek Orthodox minority during the possible war. The CUP decided to exchange populations between Greece and the Ottoman state.
  114. Dikran M. Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology under Ottoman Rule, 1908–1914*, 147–48.
  115. Andrei D. Kalmykov, a Russian diplomat who served under Giers, indicated that Giers was working on the assumption that the Ottoman Empire would be parceled out by the Great Powers sooner or later. Thus Russia not only was seeking to manipulate Armenian demands for political autonomy but was also arming the Kurds. Andrei Kalmykov, *Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat*, 250.

116. Serge Sazonov, *Fateful Years, 1909–1916*, 133–48.
117. Although Garabet Moumdjian argues that the Russian intent with the reform project was to create enmity between Armenians and Muslims, especially to undermine the close ARF-CUP relations, I think that relations were already very tense in late 1912 and in 1913. My interview with Moumdjian, August 7, 2012.
118. For a detailed study of Russian policies, see Sean McMeekin, *The Russian Origins of the First World War*, 141–74.
119. Trotsky, *The Balkan Wars*, 251–56; Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology*, 148.
120. Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology*, 150.
121. Adanır, “Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army,” 113.
122. McCarthy et al., *The Armenian Rebellion at Van*, 146; Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*, 73.
123. In 1863 the Ottoman state granted the Armenians a national constitution with a National Assembly in Istanbul. This assembly played an important role in terms of weakening the authority of the patriarch and also lobbying for the rights of Armenians.
124. Koptaş, “Zohrab, Papazyan ve Pastırmacıyan’ın Kaleminden.”
125. Krikor Zohrab, *Orakrutyun* (Günce, 8/21 Aralık 1912), in *Yerger (Eserleri)*, Cilt IV (Erivan, 2003), 348; cited in Koptaş, “Zohrab,” 178.
126. Vahan Papazyan, *Im Huseru* (Beirut, 1952), 189; cited in Koptaş, “Zohrab,” 179.
127. McCarthy et al., *The Armenian Rebellion at Van*, 163.
128. Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology*, 188–90.
129. Zekeriya Türkmen, *Vilayet-ı Şarkıye (Doğu Anadolu Vilayetleri) Islahat Müfettişliği 1913–1914*.
130. Kaligian argues that “most of the party’s [ARF’s] work in the first half of 1913 was arms related”: *Armenian Organization and Ideology*, 188.
131. Talat Paşa, *Hatıralarım ve Müdafaaım*, 58–59.
132. Ibid., 182.
133. Roderic H. Davison, “The Armenian Crisis, 1912–1914,” 489; see Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology*, 181.
134. Ahmed Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919*, 98.
135. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*, 41.
136. Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in the World War*, 58.
137. Zaven Der Yeghiayan, *My Patriarchal Memoirs*, 28–29.
138. McCarthy et al., *The Armenian Rebellion at Van*, 149.
139. Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, “Balkan Harbi Hezimetı,” 46.
140. Adıvar, *Memoirs of Halide Edib*, 333.
141. Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 207.
142. Ibid., 19–41.
143. Not only the Ottoman elite but also the Habsburg Empire regarded World War I as an opportunity to restore its status as a Great Power and also remove the Serbian obstacle. See Solomon Wank, “The Habsburg Empire,” 45–72.
144. Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 130–41.

## Bulgaria and the Origins of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913

*Richard C. Hall*

The origins of Bulgaria's role in the Balkan Wars lie in the settlement of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. The Treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878, imposed by the victorious Russians on the vanquished Ottomans, established a large Bulgarian state. This state embraced most of the Ottoman territories south of the Danube River. It encompassed many of the directly ruled Ottoman territories south of the Danube, including Dobrudzha/Dobrudja, western Thrace, and above all Macedonia. The chief Russian delegate in San Stefano, Count Nikolai P. Ignatiev, created these borders. Russian geopolitical interests played a large role in their determination. This new client Bulgarian state would give Russia a commanding position in the Balkan Peninsula that could pose a serious threat to Constantinople (and, judging from the reaction of other European powers, Vienna/Budapest, Rome, and Berlin).

Russian interests, however, were not the only consideration in drawing the frontiers of the new Bulgarian state. These borders conformed closely to the limits of the Bulgarian Exarchate reestablished by the Ottoman sultan Abdülaziz in 1870 after its abolition in 1767. They included those bishoprics recognized by the sultan as Bulgarian, with provisions for plebiscites in disputed regions.<sup>1</sup> The restored Bulgarian Exarchate included most Slavic-speaking Orthodox Christians living in the southeastern part of the Balkan Peninsula. It is in the context of this newly added dynamic that Bulgarian nationalists viewed the discussions by Great Power ambassadors in Constantinople in 1877 over possible frontiers for a new Bulgarian state roughly corresponding to those of the exarchate as validation of the San Stefano frontiers.<sup>2</sup> Bulgarian nationalists were ecstatic about the new state. This was the first occasion in

southeastern Europe when a national movement had realized its maximum territorial expectations. The Bulgarians took satisfaction that their new borders had seemingly received Great Power recognition of Bulgarian nationalism.

Bulgarian euphoria over the San Stefano Treaty was short-lived, however. Austria-Hungary and Great Britain in particular objected to Russian control of southeastern Europe, even if only through a Bulgarian surrogate. Other Balkan peoples such as the Albanians, Greeks, Montenegrins, and Serbs also resented the settlement because it favored the Bulgarians at the expense of their own nationalist claims. London and St. Petersburg threatened war. In order to avoid a larger European conflict, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck offered his services as an "honest broker." The subsequent Congress of Berlin revised the borders established at San Stefano. Over the course of the summer negotiations, Bulgaria was reduced to a principality with its own ruler while remaining under the sovereignty of the Ottoman sultan. In other words, in what had briefly been designated as a "greater Bulgarian kingdom," the region south of the Balkan Mountains now became the autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia with an Orthodox Christian governor. Macedonia, the most contested region of the Balkans at the time, returned to direct Ottoman rule.

By the end of July the dreams of Bulgarian nationalists were in ruins. Ivan Evstratiev Geshov, a future prime minister of Bulgaria, later wrote: "When in the ominous month of July 1878, we in Plovdiv read in the [London] *Times* the first published text of the [Berlin] agreement, in which a short-sighted diplomacy partitioned our homeland, we were left crushed and thunderstruck. Was such an injustice possible? Could such an injustice be reversed?"<sup>3</sup> Every Bulgarian government thereafter sought to overturn the Berlin settlement and "unify" the Bulgarian lands on the basis of the San Stefano settlement. The question was how to accomplish this. Most Bulgarians accepted the importance of Russia in their policy.<sup>4</sup> To emphasize the importance of national unification, the Bulgarians established their capital not in the center of their territory but in the extreme west at Sofia in the expectation that it would occupy a central location upon the restoration of the San Stefano frontiers.<sup>5</sup> Two main factions emerged in the politics of the principality. Conservatives advocated national policy under the direction of Russia, while Liberals, no less Russophile, sought more immediate national unification.

Fundamental to the issue of national unity was Bulgaria's relationship with Russia. As the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Sofia noted

with some hyperbole in 1913, "In this land there are no russophobes."<sup>6</sup> The largest Slavic state exercised a strong influence in Bulgaria because of claimed ancient cultural ties, because of its role in the short-lived liberation of Bulgaria from five centuries of Ottoman rule, and because of an often inarticulate sense of Slavic solidarity.<sup>7</sup> The Russian role in the liberation of Bulgaria, in particular, demonstrated to the Bulgarians that they could not attain their national objectives without the support of a Great Power, preferably Russia. In April 1879 the nephew of Tsar Alexander II, Alexander Battenberg, became the first prince of Bulgaria.

While Bulgarians in the principality and in Rumelia were set upon unification, the means to accomplish this remained unclear. A coup led by the Bulgarian Secret Revolutionary Committee, which was essentially a nonpolitical organization carrying on the work of the pre-1877 nationalist groups, proclaimed the unity of Eastern Rumelia and the Bulgarian principality in Plovdiv on September 6. While the objections of the Great Powers to this alteration of the Berlin Settlement soon abated, the other Balkan states perceived in the Bulgarian action a threat to their own interests. Aggrieved by the Bulgarian success, the Serbs attacked their eastern neighbor. The Bulgarians successfully defended themselves. The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 ended with the Treaty of Bucharest of February 9, 1886.<sup>8</sup> The personal disapproval of the Russian tsar, Alexander III, however, forced his cousin, Alexander Battenberg, off the Bulgarian throne.

An Austrian princeling, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, replaced Battenberg in 1887. Ferdinand was the youngest son of one of the numerous German noble families stemming from the nobility of the defunct Holy Roman Empire.<sup>9</sup> On his father's side he was a second cousin of Queen Victoria; on his mother's side the grandson of Louis Philippe, king of the French. Ferdinand was eager to find a place for himself among his crowned relatives. His Roman Catholic faith and refined sensibilities, however, did not endear him to his Bulgarian subjects. The baptism of his son and heir in the Bulgarian Orthodox faith with the name Boris, recalling the medieval Bulgarian Empire, helped to overcome some difficulties.

Ferdinand inherited the Macedonian and Russian imperatives from his predecessor and adjusted himself accordingly, finally reconciling with St. Petersburg in 1896. Yet Ferdinand was never comfortable with this relationship with Russia. He constantly feared that he might suffer the fate of his predecessor and always suspected Russian motives. Ferdinand maintained a "personal regime" that enabled him to maneuver among the Bulgarian political factions.<sup>10</sup>



Adding urgency to the Bulgarian efforts were the actions of active groups in Macedonia, many proclaiming/pursuing revolutionary agendas. Two Bulgarian-Macedonian organizations emerged by the end of the nineteenth century. The first, the Supreme Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Committee (Supremists), was more or less under the control of Sofia. The other, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), largely operated independently of Sofia's authority. At the core of the tensions was the perception that IMRO threatened to usurp the ability of the Sofia government to control Macedonian policy.<sup>11</sup>

As discussed in greater detail in other chapters of this volume, Bulgarian claims to Macedonia during the last decade of the nineteenth century increasingly conflicted with Greek and Serbian pretensions. All of these Balkan peoples sought to emulate Western European models, especially those of Italy and Germany, by establishing national states with borders that included maximum numbers of their "co-nationals." According to conventional wisdom, this was the path to "modernity" that the model Western European nation-states had already trodden.<sup>12</sup> The population of the three Ottoman *vilayets* that compromised Macedonian territory (Kosova, Manastır, and Selanik) was mixed.<sup>13</sup> Figures varied according to their Bulgarian, Greek, Ottoman, Albanian, Romanian/Vlach, or Serbian source. The Balkan Christian rivals gave little consideration to the Macedonian populations outside their preferred ethnic groups. As conflict ensued, *vae victus* became the fate of many unfortunate Macedonians, whatever their language or religion.

Bulgarian claims differed from those of the Serbs and the Greeks in one important aspect. The Serbs and Greeks based their aspirations to some degree on historical associations. Constantinople and Peć (Ipek/Peja) were once centers of medieval Greek and Serbian states, even though the actual Greek and Serbian populations of these regions/districts were small by the end of the nineteenth century. The Bulgarians, however, aspired to unify the areas of the Balkans inhabited by members of their religion as determined by the sultan's edict of 1870 and nationality as recognized by the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878.

Obviously these conflicting aspirations of the Balkan peoples hindered a united Balkan effort against the Ottomans and perpetuated Ottoman rule in Europe. Given the tangled and overlapping ethnic and historical claims in the Balkans, no absolute settlement was possible. An inherent instability because of clashing national goals dominated this region from the 1870s until well after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. This was

especially the case in respect to Bulgarians, who would not permit a comprehensive settlement without a general recognition of their nationalist claims.

After the Bulgarian unification with Eastern Rumelia, the Sofia governments attempted various stratagems to achieve the national goal of restoration of the San Stefano borders. The government of Stefan Stambulov undertook a Turkophile policy in 1890, the government of Konstantin Stoilov pursued détente with Serbia in 1897, and Stoyan Danev in 1902 sought an overt alliance with Russia.<sup>14</sup> All of these diplomatic initiatives were intended to increase Bulgaria's ability to achieve national unity and to strengthen the domestic position of any particular government currently in power.

Crucial to understanding Bulgarian domestic politics, these policies vis-à-vis Macedonia were not bound to any strong preconceptions. Leon Trotsky noted that among the political parties in Bulgaria, "Foreign policy has furnished the line of demarcation to a much more serious extent than any internal question. In internal policy everything has remained vague and unstable. In foreign policy, however, the parties have formed traditions, though these are not very firm either."<sup>15</sup> The unification with the Macedonian lands was the one constant in Bulgarian policy. All Bulgarian governments recognized that if they did not proceed toward national unity, Macedonian extremists could seize the initiative and attempt to unify Macedonia with Bulgaria on a basis uncontrolled by the Sofia government or even establish an independent Macedonia.<sup>16</sup>

As discussed elsewhere in this volume, after the turn of the twentieth century the Bulgarian effort in Macedonia intensified. In August 1903, for example, the Ilinden (St. Elias Day) revolt erupted in Macedonia. The leadership for this revolt came from IMRO, not from the Bulgarian government.<sup>17</sup> Such lack of official support proved problematic. As was always the case, a number of conflicting sets of domestic, regional, and international elements influenced each faction's calculations. For its part, the Bulgarian government of the time refused to provide effective assistance to prevent Ottoman authorities from suppressing the revolt. Stoyan Danev, a former and future prime minister, later explained: "For public opinion at that time, Bulgarian foreign policy revolved only around the Macedonian question."<sup>18</sup> As a result of the successful (and often brutal) suppression of the 1903 uprising, a wave of Macedonian refugees flooded into Bulgaria. In face of such a spectacle, demands for unification increased. To many of Bulgaria's political and cultural elite,

the Macedonian revolt of 1903 emphasized the urgency of the larger regional problem and the strength of the internal Macedonian bands. Even though the uprising failed, the bands continued to operate afterward.

In the aftermath of the failed revolt, the Bulgarians continued to express their interests in Macedonia. The Bulgarian pavilion in the St. Louis World's Fair in 1904 contained an exhibit depicting a fight between an Ottoman irregular and a Macedonian rebel.<sup>19</sup> For those seeking to harness a growing foreign interest in the region, highlighting the conflicts between the generic "Turk" and native "Christian" peoples was a means of publicizing Bulgaria's case for Macedonia before the entire world.

Still regretting its failure to intervene in the Ilinden Uprising, the Sofia government attempted to reach an accommodation with neighboring Serbia in 1904. This rapprochement included cultural, economic, and political issues and resulted in two treaties signed on April 12. One dealt with civil issues, while the other was essentially a military alliance, a precursor to things to come in respect to the Balkan Wars of 1912. In its early stages, however, this Bulgarian-Serbian rapprochement proved to be ephemeral. By 1906 it was a dead issue, mainly due to the disinclination on the part of both parties to confront the Macedonian issue as well as Austro-Hungarian obstruction.<sup>20</sup>

In 1908 the seizure of power in Constantinople by the Committee for Union and Progress (Young Turks) caused alarm throughout south-eastern Europe. Clearly the goals of the Young Turks in revitalizing the Ottoman Empire were antithetical to the nationalist aims of the Balkan Christian states. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Sofia. On August 1, 1908, the Bulgarian diplomatic agent in Constantinople, Ivan Stefanov Geshov, wrote to foreign minister Stefan Paprikov that, "in the final analysis, we as a state lose from the Turkish Revolution, since it displaces the Macedonian question and significantly weakens our position on it."<sup>21</sup> In response, important elements within the current Bulgarian government sought to make use of the opportunity that the change in power had produced. It colluded with Austria-Hungary, for example, to throw off the last vestiges of Ottoman rule, when the Austro-Hungarians formally annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina. The result was the formal declaration of Bulgarian independence from the Ottoman Empire on October 5, 1908.<sup>22</sup>

Independence enhanced Bulgaria's international position and facilitated Bulgarian demands regarding Macedonia. It also increased Great Power tensions and overturned the Berlin settlement, causing the Balkan states to renew their efforts to seek alliances among themselves.<sup>23</sup> Perhaps

more importantly, however, Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and the disruptions of the Russian Revolution of 1905 caused some Bulgarian military circles to recognize the necessity of alliances with the other Balkan states in order to achieve the national objective.<sup>24</sup> The subsequent increased tensions among the Great Powers over this crucial period from 1903 to 1908 afforded the Balkan states a means to advance toward their national aspirations.

The aftermath of the Bosnian crisis accelerated nationalist efforts in southeastern Europe to achieve their aims. The most important of these was the renewed attempt of the Bulgarians and the Serbs to reach an accommodation. Contacts between Belgrade and Sofia increased in 1909.<sup>25</sup> These centered on the issue of Macedonia. As Bulgarian Foreign Minister Paprikov noted in 1909: "It will be clear that, if not today then tomorrow, the most important issue will again be the Macedonian question. And this question, whatever happens, cannot be decided without more or less direct participation of the Balkan states."<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, difficulties remained between Belgrade and Sofia. The most important of these was still the resolution of the mutual claims to Macedonia. Neither the Bulgarian nor the Serbian government was willing or able to appear to concede the Macedonian issue.<sup>27</sup>

In 1911 a new government came to power in Sofia. Upon assuming office, the Nationalist Party leader, Ivan Evstratiev Geshov, attended to the problem of national unity. "Summoned on March 24, 1911, to fill the post of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, my first task as leader of the Bulgarian policy was to deal with the unfortunate problem of Macedonia and Thrace, which had been tormenting Bulgaria ever since the Congress of Berlin."<sup>28</sup> In this context, Geshov initially attempted a policy of conciliation with the Ottoman Empire in an effort to improve conditions for the Bulgarian population there. In doing so he also sought an advantage over Greece and Serbia in Macedonia. In an interview with an Ottoman journalist soon after assuming office, Geshov stressed: "Our policy is and always will be peaceful. We always have been advocates of friendly relations with Turkey. We desire and will follow a policy of peace. This, however, does not entirely depend on us. Turkey for its part must assist us in reaching our goal."<sup>29</sup> He emphasized that some concessions were necessary if Bulgaria was to maintain its peaceful policy.

Geshov maintained this policy in the face of overtures from Belgrade for an arrangement directed against the Ottoman Empire. He deflected these indications of interest from the Serbs.<sup>30</sup> At that time the possibility of an agreement with the Ottomans appeared more promising.

If Bulgaria could reach such an agreement, its position in Macedonia, weakened by the failed 1903 uprising, could revive.

The Bulgarian prime minister, however, was unable to achieve any significant results from an approach to the Ottomans. By the summer of 1911 his policy obviously had failed. He later wrote:

No Bulgarian statesman, responsible for the future of the Bulgarian nation could remain indifferent to such a condition of things, or ignore the open threats of the Turks to aggravate the measures aiming at the annihilation of the Bulgarians in Macedonia. My manifest duty was to examine how Bulgaria could best be enabled to stop these excesses. Among the various methods that suggested themselves, the most important consisted in an understanding, not with Turkey, who had rejected our advances, but with our neighbors.<sup>31</sup>

In July 1911 the Bulgarian government justified constitutional changes in terms of the national ideal. Prime Minister Geshov advocated constitutional reforms that would enhance the ability of the monarch and the government to conduct foreign policy without having to subject such issues to public scrutiny in the *sŭbranie* (parliament).<sup>32</sup> In a speech to the Grand National Sŭbranie in Veliko Tŭrnovo, he indicated the ultimate direction of governmental policy: "I think it is sufficient that you remember the example of Piedmont."<sup>33</sup> He was referring to the unification of Italy around the Piedmontese state fifty years earlier. The goal, of course, was the unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria. Before leaving for vacation at the French resort of Vichy, Geshov indicated that upon his return he planned to discuss a Bulgarian-Serbian alliance with the Serbian minister in Sofia.<sup>34</sup> Geshov intended to achieve unification with Macedonia by allying with Serbia against the Ottoman Empire.

Now the process of a Bulgarian-Serbian agreement accelerated. As discussed at length by Francesco Caccamo (chapter 7 in this volume), on September 29, 1911, Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire and invaded Tripoli, significantly changing the calculations of each state in the region. The Bulgarians, for one, sought an arrangement with Italy. The overtures of the Italian-educated chief of staff, Gen. Ivan Fichev, to the Italian military attaché in Sofia, however, came to nothing.<sup>35</sup> The Italians claimed that their Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) obligations precluded any arrangement with the Bulgarians.

Nevertheless, the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War energized the Sofia government. One immediate beneficiary was the faction within

the government that advocated greater ties with Serbia. The acting prime minister in Geshov's absence, finance minister Teodor Teodorov, explained the new situation to the Russian minister in Sofia, Anatoli Neklyudov: "We have come to the conclusion...that if we truly desire to improve the lot of our kinsmen in Turkey, we must as far as possible make our national and economic policy one with that of Serbia."<sup>36</sup> This was a means of obtaining Russian support for the project. On October 2, 1911, Teodorov told the Serbian minister in Sofia, Milan Milojević: "We do not need to fight over what is debatable, but we must consider what is definitely due us and what we are prepared to give up to each other voluntarily. We shall cede Skopje [Üsküp] to you, and you Salonika, Bitola [Manastir], and also Veles to us."<sup>37</sup> Teodorov's actions lacked the full force of the government because of Geshov's absence. Nevertheless, they were demonstrative of the general sense within the entire country of the need to utilize the opportunity to achieve national unification once and for all. They also indicated that for the first time the Bulgarians were willing to consider territorial compromises concerning Macedonia.

Meanwhile, the Bulgarian minister in Rome, Dimităr Rizov, stopped off in Belgrade while returning to his post after a visit to Sofia. With the concurrence of Geshov and Teodorov, he opened talks with two leading Serbian politicians, prime minister Milovan Milovanović and former prime minister Nikola Pašić. The Bulgarian and Serbian leaders discussed the question of borders. According to Rizov, Macedonia was the major problem in these talks.<sup>38</sup> No agreement ensued, but Rizov did arrange a meeting between the Serbs and Geshov, as the Bulgarian prime minister returned to his country from France. After meeting with Bulgaria's Tsar Ferdinand on the train between Vienna and Oderberg, Geshov arrived in Belgrade on October 11. Milovanović joined him in his coach at the Belgrade train station. The Serbian prime minister proposed that any action against the Ottomans wait until the conclusion of the Italian war. He also suggested that they leave the problem of Macedonia to the mediation of the Russian tsar.<sup>39</sup> This way neither the Bulgarian nor the Serb leaders would have to bear the political onus of concessions in Macedonia. Geshov accepted this adroit proposal before returning to Sofia. The general idea of a Bulgarian-Serbian alliance was thus established, while specifics remained to be developed.

Because they wanted to act on the issue of national unification before Young Turk reforms strengthened the Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarians were prepared for the first time since San Stefano to make territorial concessions in Macedonia.<sup>40</sup> Any possible concessions, however, were somewhat offset by the insistence of the Bulgarians on the principle of

Macedonian autonomy. The Sofia government was convinced that an autonomous Macedonia would naturally gravitate to Bulgaria. A Serbian proposal for the division of Macedonia into an indisputably Bulgarian zone and a contested zone reserved for the arbitration of the Russian tsar arrived in Sofia in early November.<sup>41</sup> At first the Bulgarians rejected the idea because they were unwilling to contemplate a divided Macedonia.

The actions of a Macedonian revolutionary organization then intruded into the process. An IMRO-inspired terrorist bombing in the Macedonian town of Shtip (Štip) on December 4, 1911, provoked massacres of Bulgarians by Ottoman loyalists and aroused Bulgarian nationalist sentiment against the Ottoman Empire. For his part, Geshov was determined to prevent the Macedonian terrorists from leading Bulgarian policy. The Bulgarian government at the time perceived itself as the leader of Bulgarian unification and considered any IMRO action to threaten such claims. Adding to the tensions between IMRO and Sofia was the failure of the competing Macedonian groups to articulate their ultimate goals. Some in the left faction of IMRO, for instance, led by Dame Gruev and Pere Toshev, had vague ideas of a Balkan federation or an independent Macedonia.<sup>42</sup>

Because of these considerations, Geshov decided to intensify the talks with Serbia in order to unify Bulgaria. He later insisted that he was “[d]eeply concerned...that the Macedonian question ought to be taken out of the hands of the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee, as Cavour took the question of Italian unity out of the hands of the Italian revolutionists, I hastened to open negotiations.”<sup>43</sup> As scholars have established, however, negotiations were already underway.

After the Shtip incident, Geshov accepted the parameters of Serbia's November proposal. Through the remainder of 1911 and on into 1912 the pace of the negotiations slowed. The main problem on the Bulgarian side was the degree of any concessions to be made to Serbia. Yet another Serbian proposal that enlarged the extent of the contested zone but accepted the Bulgarian concept of Macedonian autonomy arrived in Sofia at the end of December.<sup>44</sup> At this point the Bulgarians were becoming frustrated. The Macedonian town of Struga near Lake Ohrid became a point of contention.

In order not to lose momentum, Geshov requested Russian intervention in the talks. With the help of the Russian military attaché in Sofia, Col. Georgi D. Romanovski, the Bulgarians were able to arrive at an acceptable proposal. After a few minor Serbian concessions, plus Colonel Romanovski's assurance that the eastern part of Struga would become

Bulgarian, the Bulgarians accepted the deal.<sup>45</sup> Key personalities pushing the alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria were the Russian minister in Belgrade, Nicholas Hartwig, and the Russian minister in Sofia, Anatoli Neklyudov. For them, a Balkan League based upon the Orthodox Slavic states offered a means to restore Russia's position in the Balkans after the Annexation Crisis. Bulgarian-Serbian cooperation could also block further Habsburg advance into the region.<sup>46</sup>

Geshov and Tsar Ferdinand signed the alliance on March 13, 1912, in Sofia. Their approval of the treaty indicated that the exact meaning of the term "arbitration" was flexible for Bulgaria. The alliance with Serbia contained an open and a secret component. The open portion was a formal alliance.<sup>47</sup> The secret portion contained the more problematic parts of the agreement. It provided a basis for a *casus belli*, a definition of the contested zone in Macedonia, and a provision for its arbitration by the Russian tsar. In the secret portion the Serbs also recognized Bulgarian claims to Thrace, and the Bulgarians recognized Serbian claims to Albania. While the treaty primarily was directed against the Ottoman Empire, it also provided for common action against Austria-Hungary. This was to promise Serbian-Bulgarian support in case of complications with the Habsburgs.<sup>48</sup>

The Bulgarians had every reason to be pleased with the results of the agreement. They had gained an alliance with Serbia to act against the Ottoman Empire. They had achieved a settlement of the vexing Macedonian Question. And they also thought that they had gained the favor of Russian tsar Nicholas II for their policy.<sup>49</sup> This boded well in case the tsar would have to exercise his power of arbitration over the division of Macedonia. The Bulgarian reliance on Russia would prove to be misplaced, however.

With the Serbian alliance in hand, the Bulgarians then turned to deal with the Greeks. Indications of Greek interest in an arrangement with Bulgaria had appeared in Sofia in early 1911.<sup>50</sup> Most key Bulgarians perceived the relationship with Serbia to be more important to their policy, however, so they did not respond to the Greek overture until they felt secure with Serbia. Central to their hesitance was the lack of confidence in the Greek army, which had performed poorly in the brief 1897 war against the Ottomans.<sup>51</sup> But the Bulgarians did value the Greek navy, because it could prevent the Ottomans from reinforcing their European troops with those from Anatolia by sea.<sup>52</sup> The Bulgarians' contradictory use of an alliance with the Greek military had an effect on negotiations. Because they did not think the Greek army was capable of significant



offensive action, they refused to accept a specific division of territory in Macedonia that conceded to any Greek demands, which included obtaining the major port city of Salonika (Solun, Selanik, Thessaloniki).

The Bulgarians, however, also wanted Salonika as an outlet for the Macedonian hinterland.<sup>53</sup> The impasse over Salonika ensured that the Bulgarian-Greek arrangement lacked territorial specifics. Again, based on past performances, the Bulgarians were confident that their army could reach Salonika before the Greeks did.<sup>54</sup> As a result the Bulgarian-Greek treaty ultimately signed in Sofia on May 29, 1912, while containing provisions for mutual defense and mutual assistance, did not have any territorial provisions.<sup>55</sup>

This Bulgarian refusal to deal with the territorial issue with the Greeks did not bode well for the fate of the Balkan alliance. Bulgarian-Greek disputes over the division of Macedonia and the disposition of Salonika were major factors in the collapse of the Balkan alliance and the outbreak of the Second Balkan War at the end of June 1913. Another factor was that the Greeks made no written agreements with Montenegro or Serbia.<sup>56</sup> Their sole connection to the Balkan Alliance was through Bulgaria.

Geshov did not want war to begin prematurely. In April, with the agreement with Serbia in place and negotiations ongoing with Greece, he hoped that the Italo-Turkish War would not conclude soon. He wrote the Bulgarian minister in London, Mihail Madzharov: "In order that it [the Italo-Turkish War] not end, we must shout as loud as we can that we want peace."<sup>57</sup> The role of the other Balkan states in the pending conflict with the Ottoman Empire remained to be determined.

During the summer the Bulgarians also made arrangements with the smallest Balkan power, Montenegro. This was done on an oral basis. As a part of the deal the Bulgarians promised to subsidize Montenegro.<sup>58</sup> The Serbs concluded a separate agreement with Montenegro.<sup>59</sup> With the Montenegrin arrangements, the Balkan League was complete.

On August 1 an IMRO-connected bomb exploded in the Macedonian town of Kochane/Kočani, provoking vengeful Ottoman loyalists to massacres like those in Shtip the previous December. The outrage of Bulgarian nationalists threatened to force a premature opening of the war. Geshov responded with a comparatively mild protest to Constantinople.<sup>60</sup> At this point he was unwilling to start the war prematurely.

In the early autumn of 1912 preparations for a confrontation with Turkey were finalized. The Balkan allies presented demands for autonomy for the Ottoman European provinces to the Constantinople government.

Geshov later insisted that he had not determined upon war even at this late date:

We unquestionably did not want to declare war on Turkey. If an agreement with Turkey could have given us what we wanted, we would not have declared war. But the Turks did not give us what we wanted, and answered us with a declaration of war. We were prepared for war, no doubt, because as soon as one man is mobilized, keep in mind, war can result. We did not think that the mobilization of the four allied states would impress Turkey and force it to give us what we wanted.<sup>61</sup>

He was being disingenuous here. The Bulgarians realized that there would be no Ottoman concessions at this point. By the autumn of 1912 war was certain.

After the disappointment of Berlin in 1878, the Sofia government strove to unify the Bulgarian people on the basis of the San Stefano borders. At the beginning of the twentieth century all of the Ottoman Empire's Balkan neighbors had aspirations toward all of its European territories. Bulgaria's location and size made it necessary for it to be part of any viable Balkan coalition directed against the Ottomans. The Bulgarians flirted with the Serbs and resisted the Greeks. Two factors compelled the Bulgarians to seek a pan-Balkan military solution to the problem of the Ottoman presence in Europe. One of these was the Young Turk assumption of power in Constantinople in 1908. Even then the government of Ivan E. Geshov attempted to reach an accommodation with the Ottomans in Macedonia. This effort was purely tactical. It was intended to give the Bulgarians an advantage in Macedonia over the Greeks and Serbs but in no way diminished the fundamental goal of national unity. When the Ottoman government failed to make concessions to Sofia, Geshov sought to construct a Balkan alliance. Had the Constantinople government made the desired concessions, a conflict over Macedonia between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire might have been at least temporarily postponed or even avoided.

The other factor was the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War in 1911. The Sofia government perceived in these events an opportunity to realize its nationalist aspirations. With Russian encouragement, the Bulgarians acted to draw the other Balkan states into an alliance directed against the Ottomans. As Ernst Christian Helmreich wrote in his study of the Balkan Wars, "the hub of the whole was Sofia, and as the hub turns, so turns

the wheel. Sofia pressed for a war with Turkey.”<sup>62</sup> In October 1912, due in great part to the policies of the Bulgarian government, war came to the Balkans. It would persist for another six years.

#### NOTES

1. Martin V. Pundeff, “Bulgarian Nationalism,” 115.
2. *Ibid.*, 119.
3. Ivan E. Geshov, *Spomeni iz Godini na Borbi i Pobedi*, 94.
4. Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, 37.
5. Pundeff, “Bulgarian Nationalism,” 122–23.
6. Count Adam Tarnowski in Ludwig Bittner et al., eds., *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise bis zum Kreigsausbruch 1914*.
7. See, for instance, Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, 37.
8. On the Serbo-Bulgarian War, see Yono Mitev, ed., *Istoriya na Srŭbsko-Bŭlgarskata Voina, 1885*; Hristo Hristov, ed., *Srŭbsko-Bŭlgarskata Voina, 1885*.
9. The standard work in English on Ferdinand is Stephen Constant, *Foxy Ferdinand, Tsar of Bulgaria*.
10. See, for instance, Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, 285–86.
11. *Ibid.*, 236.
12. Mark Biondich, *The Balkans, Revolution, War, and Political Violence since 1878*, 62–63.
13. There is a good discussion of this issue in the seminal study of the Balkan Wars, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, 21–31.
14. See Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, 233–34, 280.
15. Leon Trotsky, *The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky*, 50.
16. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, 237–38.
17. On the Ilinden Uprising, see Duncan M. Perry, *The Politics of Terror*, 133–40.
18. St. Danev, “Kabinetŭt Dr. St. Danev 1901–1903 Godina,” *Rodina* 3, no. 4 (1941): 70.
19. Mary Neuburger, “Fair Encounters,” 566–67.
20. Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, 5–10.
21. Petŭr Gorankov, “Tŭrnovskiyat Akt of 5 Oktomvri 1908 G.,” 15. All dates are given in new style, except those designated old style (“os”), even though Bulgaria did not adopt the Gregorian calendar until April 14, 1916.
22. Tsvetana Todorova, “Evropeiskata Diplojatsiya i Obyavyavaneto na Nezamvichnostta na Bŭlgariya,” 41.
23. See Radoslav Popov, “Balkanskite Dŭrzhavi i Krayat na Krizata ot 1908–1909 G.,” 262–63.
24. Ministerstvo na Voinata, *Shtab na Armiyata Voinno Istoricheska Komisiya, Voinata mezhdu Bŭlgariya i Turtsiya 1912–1913 God.*, 1:15 (hereafter *Voinata*).
25. Elena Statelova, “Za Bŭlgaro-Sŭrbskite Otnosheniya v Period 1909–1911,” 22–37; *Voinata*, 1:36–39.
26. *Voinata*, 1:37.
27. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, 24.

28. Ivan Gueshoff (Geshov), *The Balkan League*, 2. Ivan Evstratiev Geshov was the first cousin of Ivan Stefanov Geshov.
29. *Mir* (Sofia) no. 3237, March 27, 1911.
30. Richard C. Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, 17–19.
31. Gueshoff, *The Balkan League*, 9–10.
32. See Plamen S. Tzvetkov, *A History of the Balkans*, 2:95–96; Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, 320.
33. Ivan E. Geshov, *Dnevniitsi (Stenografski) na Petato Veliko Narodno Sùbranie v Gr. Veliko Tùrnovo*, speech of I. E. Geshov, July 17, 1911 (os), 230.
34. *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, vol. 9, book 1, no. 517.
35. Ivan Fichev, *Balkanskata Voina 1912–1913*, 41–42.
36. A. Nekludoff (Neklyudov), *Diplomatic Reminiscences before and during the World War, 1911–1917*, 38.
37. M. Boghitschewitsch, ed., *Die auswärtige Politik Serbiens (1903–1914)*, I, no. 152.
38. *Prilozhenie Kùm Tom Pùrvi ot Doklada na Parlamentarnata Izpitatelna Komisiya* (Sofia: Dùrzhavna Pechatnitsa, 1918), I (Testimony of Dimitùr Rizov), 371 (hereafter *Prilozhenie*).
39. Gueshoff, *The Balkan League*, 17.
40. Elena Statelova, *Ivan Evstratiev Geshov, ili Trùnliviyat Pùt na Sùzidaniето*, 206.
41. Gueshoff, *The Balkan League*, 21–23; *Prilozhenie I* (Testimony of Ivan E. Geshov), 114–16. This was a modification of an early proposal.
42. On the issue of IMRO and Macedonian autonomy before the Balkan Wars, see Andrew Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians*, 120–25.
43. Gueshoff, *The Balkan League*, 10.
44. *Ibid.*, 33; A. L. Popov, ed., “Diplomaticheskaya Podgotovka Balkanskoi Voiny 1912 g.”
45. Vladimir Dedijer et al., eds., *Dokumenti o Spolnoj Politisi Kraljevina Srbije 1903–1914*, vol. 1, no. 64; Andrew Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, 42–44.
46. Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans*, 13–15.
47. The text of the agreement has been published in many places. See, for instance, Gueshoff, *The Balkan League*, 112–17.
48. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, 56.
49. Ivan E. Geshov, *Lichni Korespondentsiya*, no. 98, April 8, 1912 (os), 228.
50. Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, 15–17.
51. Ronald L. Tarnstrom, *Balkan Battles*, 190–91.
52. *Prilozhenie I* (Testimony of Ivan E. Geshov), 122.
53. *Ibid.*, I (Testimony of Stoyan Danev), 15, 17.
54. *Ibid.*, I (Testimony of Ivan E. Geshov), 122.
55. For the text of the treaty, see Gueshoff, *The Balkan League*, 127–30.
56. Hellenic Army General Staff, *A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, 7.
57. Geshov, *Lichni Korespondentsiya*, no. 100, April 10, 1912 (os), 233.
58. See Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, 79.
59. Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, 13.
60. Hall, *Bulgaria's Road to the First World War*, 73.
61. *Prilozhenie I* (Testimony of Ivan E. Geshov), 127.
62. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, 89.

# The Young Turk Policy in Macedonia

## Cause of the Balkan Wars?

*Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu*

Historians in the Balkans have different and controversial views regarding the reasons for the Balkan Wars. They all have one thing in common, however: they see the Macedonia policy of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) as one of the most important factors behind the Balkan Wars. This chapter summarizes these claims and describes the policy of the CUP in Macedonia in particular over an extended period prior to the wars. It attempts to answer the question of whether or not Young Turk policy in Macedonia can be called a definitive “source” of the Balkan Wars.

In a large part of Turkish historiography, the members of the CUP in general, particularly its leaders Talat, Enver, and Cemal, have been portrayed as adventurers and untalented politicians who caused the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>1</sup> Compared to those leaders, Kemalist-Republican historiography tries to emphasize the uniqueness of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.<sup>2</sup> In contrast, conservative Islamist historiography in Turkey tries to emphasize the extraordinary political and diplomatic talents of Sultan Abdülhamid II vis-à-vis the Young Turks.<sup>3</sup> The Young Turks in opposition accused the sultan of being incompetent when dealing with the religious and national challenges and conflicts of the empire, while seeing him as particularly despotic and suppressive in his internal policy. In order to underline the despotic character of his regime, he was even called the “Red Sultan.”<sup>4</sup> Hence the CUP came to power in order to establish a better government than the regime of the sultan. Today pro-Abdülhamid historians resort to characterizing the Young Turks as *komitadjis* (bandits; thus a negative term). In general, Turkish



FIGURE 3.1. The Ottoman Empire in the West Balkans ca. 1900.

historiography holds the *komitadji* habits of the CUP responsible for the collapse of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans.<sup>5</sup> In particular it emphasizes a certain law on churches and schools in 1910 that had been intended to stop the conflict between the Greeks and the Bulgarians. According to the pro-Abdülhamid view, the “Great Ruler” (Ulu Hakan) Abdülhamid Han followed a policy of divide and rule, preventing a Greek-Bulgarian alliance against the Ottoman Empire in the process.<sup>6</sup> But the untalented Young Turks acted against this policy and caused the alliance of the Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire.

The arguments in the Balkan historiographies are not identical with those of Turkish historiography. They do not portray the Young Turks as untalented politicians. Instead they claim that the Young Turks in reality were malicious, pure Turkish nationalists who presented themselves as liberals.<sup>7</sup> According to this position, the CUP before and during the Revolution of 1908, which is evaluated as a coup d'état, promised a liberal government and liberal rights for all nationalities. But shortly after the beginning of its rule, it tried to eliminate or "Turkify" all non-Turkish ethnic groups. This policy of persecution and Turkification provoked competing groups in the Balkans: the Greeks and Bulgarians both

calculated that a war against the Ottoman Empire was the only way to protect their respective compatriots (*sănarodnitsi/sympatriotes*) in Macedonia.

These views also exist in the general European historiography on the Ottoman Empire. Josef Matuz, a German historian, writes that "such a rigid Turkification policy had to have destructive consequences for a multiethnic empire like the Ottomans. This policy caused the hostility not only of the Christians but also of the non-Turkish Muslims."<sup>8</sup>

On the basis of this short overview we can detect a serious difference of opinion in the scholarship. Some important methodological inconsistencies lead to misleading conclusions in these approaches. Thus these views need to be reevaluated. To begin this process, in order to discuss the policy of the Young Turks in Macedonia, we will first examine the context out of which the Young Turk movement emerged.

#### THE SITUATION IN MACEDONIA AND THE YOUNG TURK MOVEMENT

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire were the most important issue of the "Eastern Question." Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia and national committees and organizations within the Ottoman borders competed over Ottoman territories, particularly the "three *vilayets*": Selanik, Manastır, and Kosova. The national and revolutionary committees within the empire fought to gain the upper hand in the region. Contributing to this competitive tension was a lack of security, ultimately exploited by a growing number of "armed committees." The presence of these committees and the occasional violent clashes and revolts that they instigated with Ottoman state forces served as a pretext for foreign states to intervene. This is particularly the case with the Bulgarian-Macedonian committees, the Internal Macedonian Adrianople Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and Upper Macedonian Committee. These groups became notorious, attracting the attention of the Great Powers to Macedonia, for example, by kidnapping the American missionary Ellen Maria Stone, instigating an insurrection in Cuma-i Bala in 1902 and the Ilinden Uprising in 1903, and even planting bombs in Salonika (by Gemidjii).

These actions and the accompanying widespread use of propaganda caused the intervention of Austria-Hungary and Russia and resulted in preparation of the programs "Wiener Punktationen" and "Mürzsteg Reforms" in 1903. The Great Powers, particularly Russia and the Habsburg Empire, had direct interests in the Balkans and dictated reform projects

to Sultan Abdülhamid II. After the introduction of the Mürzsteg Reforms in 1903, Macedonia gained a special status with an extraordinary governor–inspector general (*müfettiş-i umumi*), Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa. He was assisted by European military and administrative agents.<sup>9</sup> While implementing administrative reforms, the Ottoman government also tried to make the military force in Macedonia more effective.<sup>10</sup> Through this military reform the Ottoman special troops became more successful in suppressing armed movements and revolts of the committees in the following years. Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa was a talented administrator and diplomat who could manage the Ottoman administration and the European interventions in Macedonia. But despite these efforts, the extraordinary status of Macedonia was consolidated and extended.

As an oppositional movement, the Young Turks criticized the policy of Abdülhamid in every sense. The most important accusation levied against the sultan, however, was that his passive foreign policy failed to protect the empire from outsider interventions. According to the Young Turks, only a constitutional government formed by representatives of “all Ottomans” could solve the empire’s problems. With the existing government controlled by the sultan, the empire would soon collapse. Therefore the Young Turks invited all oppositional movements and groups to join their movement to prevent such a disaster. The members of the CUP believed that the European intervention could be prevented and the collapse reversed if a unified opposition worked together to instill a new constitution that was approved by an elected parliament and guaranteed equal citizenship to all of the empire’s subjects.<sup>11</sup>

From this point of view the CUP attempted to establish relations with almost all political organizations, most of which were ethno-national committees. In particular the CUP based in Salonika had direct links to the developments in Macedonia and was even possibly directly affected by them. In this respect the political aims of the Unionists were not secret, as is often claimed in the historiography.<sup>12</sup> Since the emergence of published CUP statements toward the end of the nineteenth century, and especially during the revolution of 1908, leaflets and manifestos clearly outlined a desire to prevent the dissolution of the empire.<sup>13</sup> With regard to Macedonia in particular, the CUP claimed that it aimed to end the region’s status as a joint European protectorate and return it to the direct control of the central government. In this respect the introduction of the constitution promised to put an end to ethnic conflict and stop the separatist national movements in this region, thus unifying the population as an “Ottoman nation” based on the concept of equal citizenship.<sup>14</sup>



The politically active organizations, revolutionary organizations, and established post-Ottoman state governments were well informed about the aims of the Unionists. For the most part, their attitude toward the Young Turk movement and its revolutionary agenda remained critical. We can observe this negative attitude with the first important Young Turk appeal to these different organizations during a congress held in Paris between February 4 and 9, 1902. As noted by Garabet Moumdjian (chapter 4 in this volume), the key opposition Armenian organizations as well as some representatives of different ethnic groups participated in this important meeting. A glaring exception was the lack of participation by any Macedonian organization.<sup>15</sup> The systematic contacts between the Young Turks and active Macedonian organizations only began after the establishment of a Young Turk committee named the Ottoman Freedoms Committee (*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*) in Salonika in 1906.<sup>16</sup> After this committee's decision to join forces with the centralist CUP in Paris in September 1907, it became the inner core of the CUP and started to organize in Macedonia itself.

From the beginning of its existence, this Salonika-based committee contacted different groups operating in larger Macedonia, establishing especially good relations with the Greek Macedonian Committee.<sup>17</sup> The Greek movement challenged the Macedonian-Bulgarian organizations operating in the region—a confrontational agenda tolerated by the local Ottoman authorities and especially the local Muslim population (for example, by Rahmi Bey, who was later one of the founders of the Young Turk committee in Salonika and an influential member of the CUP). In this light we can interpret the relationship between the Young Turks in Salonika and the Greek Committee as an alliance against the Bulgarian-Macedonian movements. This began to change, however, when the Committee of Union and Progress extended its organization in Macedonia and became a very important factor in this region near the end of 1907 and in the beginning of 1908.

These shifting local alliances in the very specific Macedonian context animated the political orientations of most of the region's activists until the key period of 1907, when a second Young Turkish Congress (held in Paris from December 27 to 29, 1907) again resulted in no representative from Macedonia attending the meetings. The IMRO, long seen as the strongest organization in Macedonia, began to split up after the Ilinden Uprising in 1903. The right wing of the IMRO pushed a Bulgarian nationalist policy, while the left wing, under Yane Sandanski, advocated the creation of a Balkan federation, thus acting against national Bulgarian aspirations.<sup>18</sup> The disagreement between these groups resulted in a

bloody battle among them from late 1903 until the Young Turk revolution. The Young Turks decided to invite the IMRO to its congress in Paris in 1907. The Armenian organization Dashnaksutyun taking part in the congress invited the IMRO's embattled right wing, working under the leadership of Hristo Matov, to send representatives to Paris. The faction refused the Young Turk invitation, however: Matov declared that they sought autonomy while the Young Turks' aim was a "re-vitalization of Turkey," clashing with their own nationalist agenda.<sup>19</sup> The left wing of the IMRO, in contrast, proved ready to negotiate with the Young Turks. Negotiations could only take place after the successful end of the Young Turk revolution in July 1908. It is not possible, therefore, to speak seriously of common actions among the Macedonian organizations and the Young Turks before 1908. When the Young Turks started the uprising, they appealed to all Macedonian organizations to join the constitutional movement, a call for unity that ultimately was ignored.<sup>20</sup> The left wing of the IMRO under the leadership of Yane Sandanski,<sup>21</sup> the Albanian committee, and the Aromunian (an Orthodox Christian Romanian-speaking ethnic group living dispersed in the Balkans) committee reacted positively to the revolution but gave no practical support, with the exception of various Albanian groups.

The Greek organizations did not participate in the congress of 1907 either. The Greek Macedonian Committee, which was in direct contact with the Greek government, would reject appeals for solidarity by the Young Turks during the revolution, continuing its own armed operations until the end of the revolution. Pointing to Greek national interests, the government in Athens advised the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire through its consuls not to support the Young Turkish movement.<sup>22</sup> This policy was also supported by the Greek patriarch of Constantinople. In the course of the uprising, the Unionist committee energetically tried to secure the neutrality of the Macedonian Greeks.<sup>23</sup> While all other revolutionary organizations stopped their fighting in response to the appeals of the Unionists, the Greek Macedonian Committee continued its armed operations and attacked the Slavic villages Kibarca and Neveska, challenging the claim of the Unionist committee that their movement had brought peace and freedom to Macedonia. Against this background, the Unionist committee changed its policy toward the Greeks. In two memoranda of July 9/22, 1908, the Unionists demanded that the Greek community, the Greek Macedonian Committee, and the government in Athens remain neutral if they refused to support the revolution. Otherwise "they will be entirely responsible for the discord and the blood that will be shed and will be convicted by the court...of humanity."<sup>24</sup>

The threatening tone of these memoranda and the Unionists' imminent victory compelled the Greek organizations and institutions to follow the appeal of the Unionist committee. They joined the other population groups in the proclamation of "Hürriyet" (Freedom) in many Macedonian cities a day later, on July 10/23.<sup>25</sup> Although the Greeks accepted the order of the day, they did not support the Young Turk movement over the course of the autumn attempts at consolidating control of the empire. Around the middle of August the Greeks submitted a memorandum to the CUP leadership with the following demands:

The sole and main condition for the successful implementation and establishment of the new regime is that the religious, ecclesiastical, and educational rights of each people be acknowledged on the basis of previously accorded rights and privileges. As for the Greek element, whose true views and opinions we represent, it desires its acknowledged rights to be respected and defended; it desires them to be carried out freely in the entire religious jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate; and it desires the restoration of the rescinded ecclesiastical educational privileges.

There is no doubt that this is the opinion of the entire Greek element without exception. The patriarch has expressed the same sentiment in a letter submitted to the Sultan on the occasion of the proclamation of the constitution and has declared that the extraordinary and special rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Rum *milleti* must not be forgotten, as these have always been acknowledged and protected by the state up to now. Consequently, the development of this people within the sphere of their heretofore acknowledged rights should not be obstructed.<sup>26</sup>

Thanks to the privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Greeks were in a better position in the Macedonian Question than the Bulgarians. The retention of the *millet* system was a great advantage for national Greek interests: the patriarchate was now the owner of the churches and schools in large parts of Macedonia, so the Greeks could claim that these regions were Greek lands. Meanwhile, the Bulgarians and Aromunians or Vlachs had to fight in every village for the right to change the ownership claims of the churches.<sup>27</sup> Greeks linked to the church therefore saw the Young Turk revolution, which fought against the traditional Ottoman system, as a threat to their narrowly defined "national" interests. Like any other party, the Greek representatives in the Ottoman Empire tried to

improve their position during the negotiations with the Unionists and formulated new, far-reaching demands.<sup>28</sup> The fulfillment of Greek demands regarding the churches and schools would have meant a consolidation and extension of the *millet* system and would also have entailed the abolishment of the privileges that the Orthodox Bulgarians and Aromunians had acquired after a difficult and drawn-out struggle against the Ecumenical Patriarchate.<sup>29</sup> In their own ways the leaders of the right wing of the IMRO tried to resist the revolution. Nevertheless, by the successful end of the revolution, all groups and organizations accepted the new status quo as a *fait accompli*. They all took part in the Hürriyet (Freedom) celebrations on July 10, 1908 (Julian calendar: Jc): it was clear that there was no turning back to the old system. At the same time it is clear that each group critically evaluated the new situation according to its political aims.

The negotiations in the aftermath of the revolution showed that the CUP was not able to reach an agreement even with the parties in favor of the Young Turkish revolution. Contrary to the wishes of the centralist Unionists, all groups in Macedonia demanded decentralization of the Ottoman administration in the region, in direct conflict with the administrative ambitions of the new regime. This resulted in an insurmountable gap between them and the Unionists. One might even say that a solution to the Macedonian Question acceptable to the Unionists, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Albanians, and Aromunians had already become impossible by the time the Unionists established their government toward the end of 1908.<sup>30</sup>

The Macedonian armed committees formed new political organizations named constitution clubs, and some revolutionary committees were transformed into political parties to reflect the new administrative/governmental context. The "Struggle in Macedonia" could not be continued with revolutionary actions; these groups now had to act as political parties.

#### THE FIRST REACTIONS TO THE ABOLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL STATUS OF MACEDONIA

As noted, the CUP was planning to abolish the special status of Macedonia. Only a week after the revolution, on July 16 (Jc), Enver Bey, the hero of the revolution, held a speech on the "Place of Liberty" in Salonika and demanded that the European powers withdraw their military and civil agents who had been acting in Macedonia since 1903. He declared: "Now

arbitrariness has disappeared, bad government does not exist anymore. We are all brothers: there are no longer Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, Jews, Muslims. Under the same blue heaven we are all equal, we are proud to be *Ottomans*." He concluded his speech with the famous words: "Vive la Nation Ottomane!" (Long live the Ottoman Nation!)<sup>31</sup>

The Balkan states were alarmed and waited for the inevitable reaction from the Great Powers. On October 3, 1908, the Great Powers halted all operations to implement reforms in Macedonia.<sup>32</sup> The special status of Macedonia was abolished, and the administrative and military agents of the Great Powers left the empire. This result was a very important early success for the CUP at the beginning of its rule. This new situation meant that the Balkan states competing over Macedonia began to lose their strategic advantages and privileges won in the Ottoman Balkan territories during the thirty years since the Congress of Berlin in 1878, particularly since the reforms beginning in 1902.

In its declaration of new programs on August 5 (18), 1908, the CUP promised all Ottoman citizens equal rights and a share in the same duties without any distinction as to origin or religion. Consequently, non-Muslim citizens were also expected to perform military service, a reform that proved far more controversial than initially hoped. Turkish was also promulgated as the only official language allowed in general correspondence and official consultations. The CUP planned to centralize education: according to the thirteenth point of the program, all schools were placed under state control. Although it emphasized that learning both the mother tongue of the individual citizen and Turkish would be obligatory in primary education, Turkish was to be the only language of instruction in the mixed secondary and high schools.<sup>33</sup>

The leader of the right wing of the IMRO, Hristo Matov, criticized this regulation of the Unionists' program and declared in a public speech in Salonika that "the privileges given by a despotic regime cannot be abolished by a free constitutional regime." He claimed that on this point the opinions of the Greeks were surely the same.<sup>34</sup>

Matov's declaration gives evidence of a rapprochement among the competing Greek and Bulgarian parties in order to defend their existing rights and privileges in Macedonia. I argue that the Turkification and church and school policy of the CUP government, which are the dominant arguments in the historiography of the region, did *not* cause the Balkan Wars. The reasons for the wars can be detected in the Young Turk Revolution itself, which deeply changed the status quo in Macedonia and the balance of power in the region. Increasing implementation of the

centralization measures and the fear of losing more and more privileges resulted in a growing alliance of the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian parties and the Balkan states, which finally resulted in the First Balkan War.

It is necessary to follow the following years in detail, distinguishing them as different periods of CUP policy in Macedonia in order to capture the complex processes leading to the war in 1912. Each period—the Short Democratic Period, Ottoman Union by Force of Law, Ottoman Union by Military Force, Rise of Opposition and Fall of the CUP Government, and Balkan Wars—marks a distinct phase of political maneuvering by the principals involved.

#### SHORT DEMOCRATIC PERIOD (1908–APRIL 1909)

The first period of the Young Turks' government ended with the counter-revolution in April 1909. I characterize this as a period of negotiations, because the CUP began to contact the political and revolutionary organizations in Macedonia and tried to win their support for the CUP program. Attempts to initiate collaborative work actually began with a formal invitation of the Macedonian committees to the CUP congress in Paris in 1907 and continued with the distribution of leaflets, negotiations during the revolution in June and July 1908, and finally the direct negotiations after the introduction of the constitution between July and September. The general elections in the Ottoman Empire in October/November 1908 and the beginning of the discussions on the Macedonian Question in the Ottoman parliament in January 1909 can also be interpreted as part of this first period. In this context we should evaluate the first months after the revolution as a relatively democratic period. We can also analyze this era based on the large number of groups that established newspapers and created cultural organizations.<sup>35</sup>

After the revolution the CUP continued to negotiate with the revolutionary and political organizations emerging in the period by attempting to accommodate their disparate interests to the party's own. At first different organizations sent their political programs to the CUP. The CUP analyzed their compatibility with its own interests and prepared a formal party program that assured these other organizations that it was adopting a "compromise program." Large gaps between the CUP's so-called compromise program and those of the other organizations became evident early in the process. Almost every Macedonia-based organization demanded some form of self-administration (decentralization of the administration in Macedonia). This call for autonomy did not involve only

the Ottoman state. The organization under Sandanski and the Aromunians, for instance, demanded the elimination of the privileges enjoyed by the patriarchate. Contrary to the Sandanists and Aromunians, the representatives of the Greek community in Macedonia declared that the privileges of the patriarchate should be saved and even extended. If this demand was not fulfilled in the face of calls for autonomy from Bulgarians and Romanians, the Greek groups in question would refuse to participate in the new political system that was still at the early stages of development under CUP leadership.

The “compromise program” that CUP proclaimed in August 1908 inspired strong opposition from most of the Macedonian organizations for very different reasons. Because the CUP refused to decentralize the administration in Macedonia and declared in the thirteenth point that all schools were to be taken under state control, the strongest reactions came from both the patriarchate and exarchate, which had developed their own school systems in the Ottoman Empire over the course of the nineteenth century.

After the introduction of the constitution, which seemed to please none of the powerful Orthodox Christian groups in the Balkans, the next important step was general elections, planned for the entire Ottoman Empire. The elections took place in October/November 1908 on the basis of an indirect election system. Despite their objections to parts of the CUP’s “compromise” constitution, all groups from Macedonia nevertheless took part in the elections. As is now well established in the scholarship, the CUP tried to influence the elections, leading to complaints from a variety of Macedonian organizations. The majority of Greek groups complained about the CUP’s intervention in the elections to the disadvantage of the Greeks. In response, these groups organized a demonstration in Istanbul against the CUP in November 1908.<sup>36</sup>

The Bulgarian Constitution Clubs also complained that the CUP was supporting the party of Sandanski in the elections.<sup>37</sup> Dimitar Vlahov, a deputy from Sandanski’s party, countered that the Greeks and Serbs were numerically smaller than the Macedonians (i.e., Bulgarian-Macedonians) but nevertheless had more deputies representing them in parliament because of the help of the CUP.<sup>38</sup> The official results both contradict and support these complaints, depending on how we count the results.

At the end of the elections 142 to 147 Turk/Muslims (6 from Macedonia), 25–27 Albanians (8 from Macedonia), 24–26 Greeks (6–7 from Macedonia), 4 Bulgarian-Macedonians (2 from the Bulgarian

Constitution Clubs and 2 from the party of Sandanski), 3 Serbs (2 from Macedonia), 5 Jews (1 from Macedonia), 1 Aromunian from Macedonia, 60 Arabs, and 12–14 Armenians were elected. In this way almost all of the Macedonian groups had a representative in the Ottoman parliament.<sup>39</sup> The Ottoman parliament was constituted on December 4, 1908 (Jc), in Istanbul. A new era of relationships between the CUP and the oppositional groups began.

The Ottoman parliament became an important forum of discussions both for the conflicting parties from Macedonia and for the CUP. The first debate over the Macedonian Question began in January 1909. Representatives of the Macedonian parties attacked each other in these discussions while defending their individual claims for greater governmental compensation. At the forefront remained the demands of the Aromunians and Bulgarians regarding the abolishment of the privileges of the patriarchate and the granting (or in some cases extension) of church autonomy under the constitutional principle of “freedom of religion and conscience.” As was the case prior to the elections, most Greek deputies strongly opposed such concessions. The focus of Greek attacks was the Aromunian deputy Filip Miše Efendi, who was referred to as a “Romanized” Greek who wished to steal away existing privileges of the patriarchate.

In this context it must be remembered that the Bulgarian-Macedonians and Aromunians were supported by some Armenian deputies, but the Greeks were stronger in number and had more influence in the Ottoman parliament. This leverage existed largely due to the presence of prominent individuals such as the influential Ottoman statesman Aristidi Paşa. The CUP members in the parliament supported the Bulgarian and Aromunian deputies against the Greeks. The support for autonomous “ethno-national” churches in the Balkans marked the beginning of a more permanent Greek opposition to the CUP government.<sup>40</sup>

#### COUNTERREVOLUTION

The Young Turk movement faced its first major challenge in April 1909 (March 31 incident). Fittingly, it was not a “minority” Christian group that initiated an attempted coup. Rather, in response to the influence that the CUP wielded over the government, conservative Muslim groups attempted to turn back the revolution. Many Albanians, privileged by the former government, were especially opposed to the CUP, playing an



important role in the counterrevolution.<sup>41</sup> The decentralists (supporters of Prince Sebahattin and other liberal groups) also gave their support to this action.

The Greeks had an important place among the oppositional groups. Although they were not directly involved in the counterrevolution, they hoped for its success. When the CUP began to form an army of volunteers, the Greek Patriarchate ordered the metropolitans not to join the volunteer groups used against the counterrevolution. Moreover, a secret Greek "Organization of Constantinople" had been in direct contact with important counterrevolutionaries since the early stages.<sup>42</sup>

At the start of the counterrevolution, the Bulgarian Constitution Clubs did not react. This hedging ended in favor of the current government, declaring a readiness to take part in the volunteers' army. Some groups, like Sandanski's, reacted immediately to the news of an attempted counterrevolution and formed volunteer troops. They joined the "Action Army" under the command of Mahmut Şevket Paşa, playing an important role in the suppression of the counterrevolution.<sup>43</sup> After the successful defeat of the "traitors of the revolution," the CUP rewarded those who supported its government, especially Sandanski and his friends.<sup>44</sup> It was in this period that the CUP dethroned Sultan Abdülhamid II and brought his brother, Mehmed Reşad, to the throne as Mehmed V. This set of events marks the ending of the first period and beginning of a second phase of the CUP government.

#### A NEW COURSE IN THE CUP POLICY AND THE OPPOSITION: OTTOMAN UNION BY FORCE OF LAW

The second period started with the suppression of the counterrevolution in 1909 and ended in the spring of 1910, which is referred to here as the period of legislative measures. Over the course of one year the CUP realized that it could not create "Ottoman unity" among different ethnic and religious groups by negotiations alone. It became clear that many political groups in Macedonia did not support the Young Turk revolution, sympathizing instead with the counterrevolution. At the same time, these groups continued their national programs, often openly opposing the CUP's attempts to consolidate government authority in the Balkans. This clash of interests affected the attitude of the CUP toward these groups. The Ottoman parliament passed several laws in 1909 that sought to suppress these national separatist movements.

Not only in the Macedonian context but in general the counterrevolution was a turning point for the CUP policy. It became clear that

the permanent threat of a counterrevolution was a danger for the constitutional order. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the fear of a conservative reaction and the separatist campaigns of different ethnic groups began to determine the policy of the CUP after April 1909. The CUP felt a stronger necessity to control the government more efficiently.

The government was confronted with different political questions after the revolution, including the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, the declaration of independence by Bulgaria, and the question of Crete.<sup>45</sup> The CUP considered these developments equally serious threats that influenced future domestic policies.

Importantly, international crises were interlinked with the problems specific to Macedonia. When the question of Crete came on the agenda in May/June 1909, for instance, the Panhellenistic Organization in Athens began to form new armed units and sent them to the region of Monastir (Manastir/Bitola).<sup>46</sup> At the same time, some Serbian armed units were also active in the region. Attempts by the CUP to win over Macedonian organizations for the cause of "Ottoman unity" through negotiations were thus complicated to the point of inevitable failure. Most of those organizations in negotiation with Istanbul maintained direct links to national states. For example, the Bulgarian Constitution Clubs became extensions of the newly independent Bulgarian government.

In this setting it became clear that evoking an outdated sense of "fraternity" was no longer a viable solution to the Macedonian Question. Opposition and prominent Ottoman subjects put added pressure on the CUP to take more effective measures to stem the fragmentation of the empire. In an open letter sent to *Tanin* at the beginning of June 1909, the Ottoman military attaché in Vienna, İsmail Hakkı Bey, demanded that the government impose strict measures against the movements of illegally armed citizens in Macedonia and Epirus. According to him, the government should hold the Macedonian organizations responsible for the violence occurring in the region, because it was clear that nothing took place in Macedonia without their knowledge. Moreover, İsmail Hakkı Bey called for the village directors to take more responsibility in policing their communities, while demanding that the families of those persons involved in such violent actions against the stability of the Ottoman Balkans be deported to Anatolia. In the end prominent Ottoman figures like İsmail Hakkı Bey called for the government to take any and all measures necessary, including war, in order to stop foreign intervention in Macedonia.<sup>47</sup> In this heightened rhetorical context, the CUP began to follow a more active policy regarding the internal affairs in the empire's Balkan provinces.

The first step was the introduction of new laws. On April 26, 1909, the Ottoman government passed a law on “vagabonds and suspicious persons.”<sup>48</sup> This law became a very effective instrument to control all individual activities. The government could control members of committees and propagandists.<sup>49</sup> The next step was the implementation of the law on “public meetings,” which made it difficult to organize protest meetings.<sup>50</sup>

On July 10, which the Ottoman parliament declared a national holiday under the name “Day of Freedom” (*Hürriyet Bayramı*, the first national holiday in Ottoman history),<sup>51</sup> citizens all over the empire celebrated the first anniversary of the revolution. The political organizations of different groups also took part in these celebrations (for example, in Salonika, Bitola, and Istanbul).<sup>52</sup> Despite this open display of continued support for the empire’s multiethnic composition, armed movements continued their activities throughout 1909.

One of the most important issues continuing to plague Macedonia was the church and school question that pitted the Greek Patriarchate against the Bulgarian Exarchate. In the first general discussion on the Macedonian Question in the Ottoman parliament, no solution to this issue could be found. The parliament asked the former inspector-general of Macedonia, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, who became minister of interior affairs after the revolution, to prepare a law to resolve this question. He presented a draft to the parliament in June 1909. Its core function would preserve the status quo: a change in church authority would take place only when the population of a religious community within a settlement constituted a two-thirds majority. Discussions in the Ottoman parliament continued through most of 1909, with both the Greek and Bulgarian deputies refusing to embrace Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa’s compromise suggestions. After harsh discussions in the parliament, the solution of this question was accepted into law in mid-1910. This delay proved especially damaging to the stability of the CUP government; indeed, as an issue dominating Turkish historiography since the 1930s, the postponement of one of the most important issues of the Macedonian Question provoked the opposition of both the Greeks and Bulgarians to the point that reconciliation was impossible. The newly independent Bulgarian government, for instance, used the delay as evidence that the constitution did not bring any change to the troubling situation of the Bulgarians in Macedonia.<sup>53</sup>

Beyond the tensions surrounding the new government’s policies toward the “ownership” of Orthodox Christian communal authority, the new Ottoman government enacted two laws on the press and publishing

houses.<sup>54</sup> Passed a week after the anniversary of the national holiday, these laws regulated the publication of newspapers and affected the management of the many publishing houses operating in the empire at the time. According to these new regulations, newspapers and publishing houses were threatened with closure if they published articles that insulted religious or ethnic groups or the sultan, parliament, army, or other institutions. Those responsible for such defamatory material also could be sentenced to imprisonment or fined. Such regulations had the immediate consequence of limiting press freedoms, targeting in particular the national propaganda and intercommunal bickering that became a hallmark of the late Ottoman press. The Macedonian political organizations reacted particularly strongly to these laws. The organ of the Federal People's Party (*Narodna Volya*), for instance, responded with the headline "Down with the Constitutional Parliament!" According to this paper, the parliament began to play the role of "reaction" in order to misuse the power of the regulation to impose a "draconic law against the press."<sup>55</sup>

Similarly, the law "On Military Service for Non-Muslims," passed on July 25, 1325/August 7, 1909, which abolished the military exemption tax on all non-Muslims who avoided military service, ignited widespread opposition among Balkan Orthodox Christian groups.<sup>56</sup> While the non-Muslim members of the Ottoman parliament supported the law by voting for it, the implementation of general conscription nevertheless provoked widespread resistance in the empire. Among the most vocal opponents were powerful Greek organizations that demanded the formation of separate units based on religious denominations.<sup>57</sup> These demands were in line with a Greek memorandum written immediately after the Young Turk Revolution, which addressed the Committee of Union and Progress and proposed that the formation of separate units would secure the discipline in the army and enable soldiers to attend to their religious duties such as prayers.<sup>58</sup> By extending the law to all non-Muslims in 1909, these Greek groups asserted that the modification constituted a discriminatory measure specifically aiming to "Turkify" the population.<sup>59</sup> Bulgarian reactions to the new law also proved hostile. Bulgaria vindicated its rejection of general conscription vis-à-vis the imperial powers by referring to the vehement protests against recruitment of Christians from the "Turkish population."<sup>60</sup>

Greek members of the parliament issued a memorandum on August 12, 1910 (Jc), complaining about legislative loopholes for the non-Muslim soldiers. They demanded that Christian priests should be allowed to organize religious services for Christian soldiers. The Greek population

on the Aegean isles also fiercely resisted conscription by emigrating to the United States, a dramatic measure adopted by many Ottoman subjects in this period. A survey undertaken in October 1910, for instance, revealed that in Istanbul alone one-third of all non-Muslims eligible for conscription had fled to the United States.<sup>61</sup> Such organized hostility to CUP attempts at administrative reform extended to education as well.

At the end of 1910 the Greek patriarch issued two petitions regarding school education and military service. In an additional petition in February 1911, he claimed that the concept of the "Ottoman nation" essentially implied the adoption of Islam and the Turkish language.<sup>62</sup> In time the patriarch formed an alliance with other Orthodox Christian leaders to initiate a devastating campaign against the CUP government. For example, the spiritual leaders of the major Christian groups—the Greek-Orthodox patriarch, the Armenian-Gregorian patriarch, and the Bulgarian exarch—issued a joint memorandum in May 1911 deploring the current state of school education and military service and urging the government to participate in negotiations that would aim for major improvements. These so-called improvements were granted in November 1911, when the position of the CUP government weakened.<sup>63</sup>

Attempts to regulate labor affairs faced similar organized resistance. For instance, the Ottoman parliament adopted on July 27, 1909 (Jc), the law on trade unions and strikes. It regulated strikes, thereby limiting the freedom to strike within narrowly defined, government-imposed parameters. The organ of the left-oriented Federal People's Party commented that such a law constituted an abolishment of the right to strike of the "most oppressed economic mass."<sup>64</sup>

Another crucial legal measure adopted by the CUP government was the prohibition of political parties organized on a national basis. An extension of this law aimed specifically to suppress armed movements (bands) in Macedonia. According to the law on associations, as of August 3, 1909, all political parties organized on a purely ethnic basis (and characterized with an ethnic name) were forbidden. This meant that all existing constitution clubs and associations had to be registered within two months after the introduction of this law in order to prove that they were not organized on exclusively "ethnic" terms.<sup>65</sup>

The logic behind this law is clear. The Unionists were aware that the political parties of ethnic groups in Macedonia were connected with the governments of the Balkan states. In particular they were convinced that the constitution clubs and organizations were responsible for ongoing atrocities in Macedonia. In this respect the CUP specifically

demanding that the Bulgarian government stop the financing of the Bulgarian Constitution Clubs, claiming that "they were against freedom in the country."<sup>66</sup> The debate on this law in the Ottoman parliament before its introduction led to bitter discussions on the national question in the Ottoman Empire. The Unionists argued that the armed movements continued in Macedonia, linking the existing national organizations with operations against the Ottoman union. In this context Ottoman loyalists demanded that such national associations be forbidden.

In opposition to such regulations, the non-Muslim deputies underlined that the ban of ethnic political parties would cause the formation of illegal organizations, which would be much more detrimental to the state in the long term. The Macedonian-Bulgarian deputy Hristo Dalčev, for instance, argued that there was no example anywhere in the world of a law imposing a harmonious union among different groups. The Greek deputy Georgios Busios added that the Ottoman union could only be reached in people's minds: "If you believe that I will be Osmanlı by changing my name, you are mistaken!" he said. Another Greek deputy, Pavlos Karolidis, claimed that the existence of Greek, Bulgarian, Armenian, and other organizations was not a danger for an Ottoman consciousness (*osmanlılık*) but actually constituted the foundation of a viable multiethnic society: "In my opinion, anyone who is not a real Greek cannot be Osmanlı!... *Osmanlılık* is a sun. Around it there are stars!"<sup>67</sup> But these arguments of non-Muslim deputies were not enough to hinder the acceptance of this law in the parliament.

As a consequence, a number of groups adopted a fatalistic tone. *Otečestvo*, the organ of the Bulgarian Constitution Clubs, for instance, called the ban of national political organizations "Burial of the Names of the Peoples."<sup>68</sup> Narodna Volya argued that with this "assassination attempt" against the "people's sovereignty" the majority of the parliament failed to distinguish "the monarchic reaction" from "enlightened monarchism" and thus initiated a process that would render Turkey nothing but a "barbarian monarchism."<sup>69</sup>

The next measure of the Unionist government aimed at the elimination of those so-called illegal bands or armed units (*çeteler/çeti*) by way of centralizing violence into the hands of the government. With the introduction of the law on bands on September 27, 1909, every kind of armed movement not sanctioned by the state was forbidden under penalty of death. The rural population had to help to eliminate these bands; those who did not collaborate with the state would also be punished as "helpers and harborers" (*muin ve yatak*) of the bands. All illegal weapons in the

hands of the population had to be turned over to the state within a specific period set by the government.<sup>70</sup> The Bulgarian government called this law a measure aimed at suppressing former revolutionaries, many of whom began a legal life after the introduction of the constitution.<sup>71</sup> For his part, the Albanian deputy İsmail Kemal Bey characterized the law as the first attempt by the Unionist government to legitimize its “criminal attacks” against Albanians.<sup>72</sup>

Clearly these measures provoked serious reactions by the political groups in Macedonia and the governments of the Balkan states. One of the most important results was the rise of Western European propaganda of the Balkan states against the Unionist government and another wave of armed movements and revolts in Macedonia. The centralization policy of the Ottoman government, for example, provoked the revolts of the Albanians. In other words, a new kind of armed insurrection among the Macedonian committees began in the first half of 1910: the use of bombs in Macedonian cities, justified in the Orthodox group press as resistance to the “absolutist and barbarian” Unionist government. With this shift to the use of what we would characterize today as “terrorism” by Ottoman groups resisting the CUP government, a third period in Macedonia began.

#### THE THIRD PERIOD OF CUP POLICY IN MACEDONIA: OTTOMAN UNION BY MILITARY FORCE

The third period of CUP rule in Macedonia was characterized by violent military measures that were adopted by the first half of 1910 and ended in the middle of 1911. The breakdown of the legislative measures and a new campaign of state violence marked the beginning of the Albanian revolts and “terroristic” activities in Macedonia. In this period the CUP government decided to disarm the population in Albania and Macedonia in order to eliminate the potential threats of these armed movements. The disarming process in early 1910 in particular provoked a much more severe reaction, preparing the ground for an eventual alliance between Greeks and Bulgarians, who until then had been bitter enemies in Macedonia. Before these attempts to disarm the local population, the CUP had been negotiating with the Bulgarian government through the general consul of Salonika, Atanas Shopov. Shopov advocated reconciliation between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire and tried to convince his government that such efforts between the two countries would secure Bulgarian interests in Macedonia and thus improve its position there. In

the process of arguing for a formal alliance, Shopov criticized the anti-Turkish attitude of his government, which advocated war as a means to occupy Macedonia and Adrianople by military force. In face of this attitude, Shopov argued that the Bulgarian position had worsened since 1908, losing one-fourth of what Bulgarians had gained in the previous fifteen years in Macedonia. As long as Bulgaria's aggressive policy continued, according to him, the losses for Macedonia's Bulgarian party would only grow. In such a situation, Shopov argued, the government in Sofia either should immediately begin a war to occupy Macedonia (because in a few years it would no longer have a chance to occupy the region if the situation continued as it did) or should follow through with a policy of reconciliation with the CUP government.<sup>73</sup>

Shopov's strong support for reconciliation provides the foundation for the underlying thesis of this chapter: Bulgarians advocating war with the Ottoman Empire based their policy on the fundamental fear of losing Macedonia to a rapidly changing set of conditions well beyond the control of any one government or political group. Importantly, this underlying fear had already manifested itself during the Young Turk revolution, well before what most historians writing on the subject argue was a reaction to CUP "Turkish" policies after 1908.

When the Bulgarian tsar Ferdinand visited the Ottoman capital in the early 1910, the CUP began to negotiate more intensively with his government's representatives for reconciliation. Much as Shopov had, the CUP realized that the problems in Macedonia could not be resolved without reconciliation. At the same time a question of trust remained. The CUP feared an unexpected military attack led by Bulgaria against the empire. Moreover, the Bulgarian delegation continued to demand concessions on education for Slav Orthodox Ottoman subjects and authority over the church, in direct conflict with similar claims made by other groups in Macedonia. As noted, the CUP could not meet these demands. Instead it continued to promise to strive for a lasting, just solution to these questions.

CUP's attempts to find a way to reconcile a number of clashing interests and demands were recognized and ultimately supported by Bulgarian politicians like Grigor Nachovich, Atanas Shopov, and others. But the Bulgarian government did not take these negotiations seriously. For example, Bulgaria's influential minister, Andrey Lyapchev, wrote to Shopov that negotiations with the CUP government were not necessary. If the Ottoman government could solve the problems of the Bulgarian population, such as the *muhacir* issue (resettlement of Muslim refugees



in Macedonia), reconciliation would automatically follow.<sup>74</sup> Such an attitude from one of the top members of the Bulgarian government meant that those who advocated capturing Macedonia through war before it was too late gained the upper hand.

Even the leadership of Bulgaria's opposition Liberal Party, Vasil Radoslavov, advocated pursuing a similar irredentist policy. Questions from an Ottoman journalist regarding Bulgaria's continued support of armed groups in Macedonia, despite attempts at reconciliation between Istanbul and Sofia, provoked Radoslavov openly to declare: "Be sure that we are also against the *cheti*. When the time comes, what must be done will be done with our military, not with *cheti*."<sup>75</sup>

As an almost lone voice in Bulgaria, Shopov continued to criticize this "self-destructive" policy, which he claimed only provoked the CUP's hostility against the Bulgarians in Macedonia. In time, as Shopov pointed out, frustration over continued hostilities from Bulgarian parties would lead to the Ottoman government's adoption of policies in the Balkans that serve the interests of Greek and Serb groups at the expense of local Bulgarians. When in the end the Law on Disputed Churches and Schools was accepted in the Ottoman parliament, Shopov commented it as a radical change in the CUP policy toward Bulgaria. According to him, the law proved that the CUP had given up all hopes of reaching an agreement with Bulgaria.

#### LAW ON CHURCHES AND SCHOOLS, JUNE 20/JULY 3, 1910 (THE MAIN ARGUMENT OF TURKISH HISTORIOGRAPHY)

After long discussions the Ottoman parliament accepted the Law on Disputed Churches and Schools,<sup>76</sup> the main source of conflict between competing Orthodox groups in Macedonia. According to article 2 of this law, churches and schools of a district or a village belong to the community (Greek Patriarchate or Bulgarian Exarchate) that has the absolute majority of the population. If one part of the population belongs to the patriarchate and the other part to the exarchate, the churches and schools belong to the party in whose name they were originally constructed. If the community that built a presently standing school or church currently forms less than one-third of the general population, however, the church and the school must be transferred to the larger community. Under the law the government was expected to assist minority communities to construct new churches and schools in order to assure that they had ample resources to practice independently. Permission to construct new

churches was not required to come from the sultan but from a provincial council (article 3 and article 10). To fund such efforts at reconciling conflicting demands and claims, parliament passed a supplementary law on July 14/27, 1910, that provided 4 million piasters (*guruş*) in 1910 for the construction of these new churches and schools.<sup>77</sup>

As already noted, Turkish historiography emphasizes this law as the main misstep by the CUP government, a mistake that resulted in an alliance forming between Greek and Bulgarian parties against the Ottomans.<sup>78</sup> Although direct negotiations between Greek and Bulgarian politicians in Macedonia for an alliance against the CUP government started after the introduction of this law in October 1910, the basis for a Greek-Bulgarian alliance had already been created through the revolution itself. The solution of the church and school question, however, did facilitate this alliance.<sup>79</sup>

This period not only inaugurated the rise of Macedonian opposition parties but also witnessed the emergence of opposition against the Unionist government throughout the entire empire. Balkan historians throughout the twentieth century have explained this shift toward open hostility by the rise of a policy of Turkification pursued by the CUP. The following section explores how such a charge reads against the record.

#### BEGINNING OF TURKIFICATION POLICY (THE MAIN ARGUMENT OF THE BALKAN HISTORIOGRAPHIES)

The main arguments for the initiation of a Turkification policy of the CUP are as follows.

First, Balkan historians regard the previously discussed law, On Military Service for Non-Muslims passed on July 25, 1325/August 7, 1909, as one of the most important Turkification measures. The scholarship generally points to the requirement that all conscripts after 1909, Muslim or non-Muslim, were expected to co-habit in common caserns and train together in a common Ottoman Turkish language as proof that the CUP sought to Turkify non-Muslims. In response to the actual law, a number of non-Muslim Ottoman citizens demanded that the government build separate military units along confessional lines. The CUP government refused.

Second, another important indicator to Balkan historians was school education, which had traditionally been in the hands of the clergy. Every *millet* had its own educational system (Greek, Bulgarian, and others). The Unionist government tried to change this by introducing a law on

primary school education that compelled all Ottoman children to attend the same school system, without success. Not until after the Balkan Wars was the government able to introduce the law that finally made all Ottoman children the subjects of a common education system. Until 1912 the government tried to control the religious schools with some regulations that have been cited in Greek studies as evidence of a Turkification policy. Among those regulations imposed by the Young Turk government the following stand out:

1. Public schools would be established in villages and financial support provided by the state (December 22, 1909 [Jc], which could not be implemented).
2. The provision of financial support for confessional schools could only be given to those with a receipt (March 4, 1910 [Jc]).
3. Teachers only could work in private schools if religious authorities approved their diploma. If these teachers wanted exemption from the military service, however, their diploma had to be confirmed by the Ministry of Education or by the local representatives of the ministry (March 23, 1910 [Jc]).
4. All teachers working in religious schools who were not Ottoman citizens had to be replaced by Ottoman citizens (March 24, 1910 [Jc]).
5. Religious schools had to send statistical information to the Ministry of Education (May 23, 1910 [Jc]).
6. The employment of non-Ottomans was prohibited (June 28, 1910 [Jc]).
7. The inspection of these religious schools should not be impeded, and anyone who sought to impede it would be punished. Directors and teachers of the religious schools refused to allow ministry officials to inspect their schools by declaring that these officials had to apply to the ecclesiastical administrators (the schools were under the administration of the metropolitans) (September 30, 1910 [Jc]).
8. Diplomas issued by religious schools not yet receiving permission from the ministry would not be recognized (October 13, 1910 [Jc]).<sup>80</sup>

The Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Aromunian schools regularly imported teachers and schoolbooks from neighboring national states. As a consequence, these school systems propagated Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, and other kinds of nationalism among Ottoman citizens. Clearly the Ottoman government could not control these schools without the above-mentioned regulations. By imposing these regulations, the CUP

government hoped to bring the religious schools under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and to limit the influence of the neighboring Balkan states on the education of the respective religious communities. In this regard it is difficult to speak of a Turkification policy on the basis of the regulations mentioned here: it is clear that the primary concern of the government was control, not cultural assimilation.

The patriarchate and the exarchate wanted to preserve their monopoly of education and considered any effort by the government to intervene in this system an attempt to destroy their religious school system. In this respect the government ultimately caved in to the demands of the patriarchate and exarchate regarding the autonomy of the educational matters in November 1911.<sup>81</sup>

Third, other important legal measures adopted by the Unionist government were the ban on ethnic associations and parties and previously mentioned introduction of the law against illegal armed committees operating in Macedonia.<sup>82</sup>

Fourth, the settlement of the Muslim refugees in Macedonia (the so-called *muhacir* question) is included in the list of "evidence" of a Turkification policy used by Balkan historians today. The question of emigrants rose in Macedonia after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the Bulgarian declaration of independence in October 1908. A large number of Muslims, particularly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, began to flee to the Ottoman Empire. The question of the Muslim refugees became an important source of conflict between the Unionist government and the Balkan states. The Unionist government was accused of facilitating and encouraging this migration because it wanted to change the ethnic structure of Macedonia and to Turkify this region.<sup>83</sup>

But a report by the Bulgarian foreign minister from the middle of 1910 shows that the number of the Muslim refugees settling in Macedonia was actually not very high. According to this report, the government helped settle 913 Muslim families in the *vilayet* of Kosova, while 1,500 persons settled in the *vilayet* of Salonika. No refugees settled in Manastir, however, because the government had no state estates (*çiftliks*) to grant them.<sup>84</sup> The Muslim emigrants were mostly settled in other *vilayets* of the empire. It is thus inaccurate to claim that the CUP tried to "Turkify" Macedonia through a policy of settling Muslim refugees in this period.<sup>85</sup> It was only during and after the Balkan Wars that the CUP began to follow a settlement policy akin to Turkification or, perhaps more accurately, Islamification of certain regions.<sup>86</sup>

RISE OF OPPOSITION AND FALL OF THE CUP GOVERNMENT  
(MIDDLE OF 1911 AND 1912) AND THE BALKAN WARS

Considering these attempts by the CUP to address lingering problems in the empire's Balkan provinces, it may be helpful to mark these laws and military measures as a distinct era, ended by what we can call the fourth period of the CUP rule in Macedonia, which began approximately in the middle of 1911 and ended with the loss of the Balkan territories in the First Balkan War in 1912–13. The CUP lost its predominance in parliament during this period, and its active policy in Macedonia was seriously weakened. In particular the beginning of the Ottoman-Italian war over Tripoli (Libya) in October 1911 and the establishment of a joint oppositional party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası/Party of Freedom and Accord) in November fundamentally undermined the position of the Unionist government.<sup>87</sup> Under the pressure of a growing opposition and war with Italy, the CUP had to retract its political agenda regarding "Ottoman unity" and eventually compromised its centralization policy. As already mentioned, for example, in November 1911 the CUP had to accept some demands of the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate regarding the autonomy of the confessional/religious schools and the conditions of non-Muslim military service. All of this resulted in adopting increasingly repressive policies, including during the general elections held in early 1912. While the elections secured a considerable majority for the CUP in the new Ottoman parliament, it finally severed previous alliances with key partners in the Balkans. A large number of Albanian communities, for example, revolted against the CUP's policy shifts, including the emergence of military opposition in the Ottoman army (Halaskar Zabitan [Liberator Officers]), which led to the dissolution of the new parliament. The ensuing chaos ultimately weakened the Ottoman state and offered neighboring Balkan states a window of opportunity long sought by advocates of Bulgarian irredentism. In face of open hostility, the Unionist government resigned before the beginning of the First Balkan War. The new cabinet was established under Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa (July 22–October 29, 1912) under the increasing influence of the opposition. The collapse of the CUP government encouraged the Balkan states to declare war against the Ottoman Empire. The CUP was no longer in the government during the outbreak of the war, which also gives evidence that the First Balkan War was not a simple opposition of the Balkan states against the CUP government in the Ottoman Empire. Even the following cabinet under Mehmed Kamil Paşa (October 29,

1912–January 23, 1913) was under the influence of the opposition. The CUP came to power only after a coup d'état in January 1913 and took in hand the fate of the Ottoman Empire. As is well known, the First Balkan War ended with catastrophic results for the Ottoman Empire, which lost most of its territories in the Balkans (including Edirne/Adrianople), with hundreds of thousands of victims and refugees.<sup>88</sup> The Balkan Wars also dashed the hopes of the Young Turks for an "Ottoman union" that would include the Balkan Christians. Ottomanism proved to be an illusion for the Young Turks, who increasingly began to regard the Christians of the empire as traitors.

### CONCLUSION

I would argue that the CUP government was one of the factors leading to the Balkan Wars, rather than the only explanation for the outbreak, as Balkan and Turkish historiography contend. The 1908 revolution and the takeover of the government by the Young Turks itself was an important cause of the war because it radically changed the special status of Macedonia, removing the influence of the competing Balkan states in the region. The declaration of war was only a question of time. Therefore the Greek and Bulgarian governments and parties in Macedonia were against the revolution, although the Balkan historiographies speak of an enthusiastic acceptance. The claim of a general enthusiasm of Greeks or Bulgarians concerning the Young Turk revolution is only a fiction in order to legitimize their role in the Balkan Wars. The Law on Disputed Churches and Schools, which Turkish historiography has regarded as the main key to the Balkan Alliance, was only one step accelerating the preparation for war.

Regarding the Bulgarian-Greek alliance we must ask whether or not a war led by Bulgaria against the Ottomans would have been possible without an alliance with Serbia and Greece. It seems impossible to prove. Bulgaria could declare war against the empire only when it secured the neutrality of these states, because neither Greece nor Serbia would allow Bulgaria to occupy Macedonia alone. Hence an alliance of the Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire was inevitable and was achieved with Russian help.

In my opinion the question that should be discussed is not whether the Young Turk policy was the reason for the Balkan Wars. The exact question is: how could the Young Turks prevent the war? Was it possible to do so? My answer would be that the Young Turks had no chance to

prevent the Balkan Wars. Before the war, however, some experienced bureaucrats from the Abdülhamid era advocated an alliance with Greece against a Bulgarian threat. Because of the insurmountable gap between the expectations of the Greeks (the retention of the *millet* system and church privileges) and those of the CUP (whose aim was the abolishment of the *millet* system), the CUP did not want any alliance with Greece. Finally, the war was not a decision of the Young Turks but of the Balkan states. They had the chance to prevent the war by giving up their irredentist aims in Macedonia. But all Balkan states sought expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and each other and therefore did not seek to prevent the war. Specifically, the political circles in Bulgaria talked continuously of a war to acquire all of the Macedonia and Adrianople areas.

This brings us to another conclusion. After the Balkan Wars, key elements within the CUP realized that only the total destruction of all the hopes of the empire's enemies in the Balkan territories would secure Ottoman rule in the region. That could be achieved only by an expulsion of the "national brothers" of the enemies from the Ottoman territories. This is exactly what they did after the Balkan Wars. They began to follow a policy of expulsion of the Christians from the Ottoman territories, beginning in 1913 with Bulgarians and Greeks in Thrace.

#### NOTES

1. See the introduction in Osman Selim Kocahasanoğlu, *İttihat-Terakki'nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması (1918-1919)*, 17-45.
2. See, for example, the comments of Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi*, vol. 3, part 4, xiii-xv.
3. For the development of the historiography on Sultan Abdülhamid II, see Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Abdülhamid'i Anlamak"; Nadir Özbek, "Modernite, Tarih ve İdeoloji."
4. Ali Kemal Balkanlı, *Şarki Rumeli ve Buradaki Türkler*, 267.
5. Even the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan uses these stereotypes in his political statements representing pro-Abdülhamid views. He characterizes all coup d'état attempts in Turkish politics as a result of the CUP mentality: "İttihat ve Terakki zihniyeti, Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in de şiddetle karşı çıktığı bir zihniyettir. Bu zihniyet, Osmanlı Devletinin çok hızlı ve acı bir şekilde dağılmasını sağlamış. Atatürk'ün müsamaha göstermediği İttihat ve Terakki zihniyeti, ne yazık ki vefatının ardından yeniden iktidar fırsatı bulmuş ve Türkiye'ye ağır faturalar ödemeye devam etmiştir. İşte Dersim.... 27 Mayıs darbesi, 12 Mart, 12 Eylül, 28 Şubat, bu zihniyetin eseridir. Kürt meselesinden tutunuz, faili meçhullere; edilgen dış politikadan tutunuz, kötü ekonomiye; derin yapılardan, çetelerden tutunuz, bürokratik oligarşiye kadar bu ülkenin birçok meselesinin altında, işte bu köhne,

- bu çarpık zihniyet yatmaktadır” (“İttihat ve Terakki’nin Uzantısı Olan Zihniyetle Savaşıyoruz,” *Star Politika*, February 2, 2012, <http://www.stargazete.com/politika/ittihat-ve-terakki-nin-uzantisi-olan-zihniyetle-savasiyoruz-haber-421097.htm> [accessed February 2, 2012]). He declares that the CUP caused the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and that its *komitadji* mentality continued during the Republican period. “If Turkey can not be saved from this propaganda, the *komitadji* mentality, it can not establish an advanced democracy,” he says in his speech on February 8, 2012 ([http://trabzonhaberajansi.com/haber\\_detay.asp?haberID=1764](http://trabzonhaberajansi.com/haber_detay.asp?haberID=1764) [accessed February 8, 2012]). In another speech he characterized the oppositional social democrat and nationalist parties as followers of the CUP and their policy as a *komitadji* policy, “Beyler... Biz burada, 150 yıllık köhne bir zihniyetle mücadele ediyoruz. İliklerimize kadar işlemiş, devletin bütün kılcal damarlarına kadar ilişmiş bir zihniyetle mücadele ediyoruz. Biz, İttihat ve Terakki zihniyetindeki CHP’ye, İttihat ve Terakki’nin izindeki MHP’ye, Doğu ve Güneydoğu’nun CHP’si olmaya özenen bir BDP’ye rağmen bu mücadeleyi yürütüyoruz” (“Gazi’nin müsaade etmediği zihniyettir bu!” *Sabah*, February 1, 2012, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/02/01/basbakan-erdogan-konusuyor?paging=4> [accessed February 1, 2012]).
6. See, for example, Mehmet Aydın, *Yöneticiler İçin Yeni Bir Bakış*, 186–87. For another example of a positive presentation of the sultan’s policy, see İhsan Süreyya Sırma, *II. Abdülhamid’in İslam Birliği Siyaseti*.
  7. See, for example, the dominant Greek presentation in *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, 225–27.
  8. Josef Matuz, *Das Osmanische Reich*, 254.
  9. Numerous studies on the Macedonian Question exist, particularly in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Greece, although they diverge significantly in their interpretations. In my opinion, the most reliable study on this question is the dissertation by Fikret Adanır, published as *Die Makedonische Frage*; Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu, *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage, 1890–1918* (also translated into Turkish, published in 2008); for a detailed and relatively solid study in Bulgarian, see Hristo Silyanov, *Osvoboditelnite Borbi na Makedoniya*; Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897–1913*; Konstantinos A. Vakalopoulos, *Neoturkoi kai Makedonia, 1908–1912*; Manol Pandevski, *Makedonskoto Osloboditelno Delo vo XIX i XX Vek*.
  10. For the reform of the Ottoman military in Macedonia, see Gül Tokay, “The Macedonian Question and the Origins of the Young Turk Revolution, 1903–1908.” A shorter version of this thesis is in Turkish: Gül Tokay, *Makedonya Sorunu*.
  11. Ahmed Rıza Bey, “İcmal-ı Ahval”; [Mizanji] Murad, “Çare-i Selamet,” *Mizan*, 20 Ramadan 1313; quoted in Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895–1908*, 91–92; for the speech of Prince Sebahattin in the Young Turks congress in Paris in 1902, see “Parisde Osmanlı Hürriyetperveran Kongresi,” *Osmanlı* 104, April 16, 1902, 1–7. For more details, see Hacısalıhoğlu, *Die Jungtürken*, 73–100.
  12. See, for example, the already mentioned presentation in *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, 225–27.
  13. See, for example, the leaflet of Ahmed Niyazi Bey directed to the Bulgarian-Macedonian population during the revolution, Central State Historical Archive



- (TsDIA) (Sofia), Fond 331, Op. 1, a.e. 233, 196; and the leaflet of the CUP of Manastır, TsDIA, Fond 771, Op. 6, a.e. 72, 1–4.
14. For example, the speech of Enver Bey on the Place of Freedom in Salonika on July 16/29 1908, TsDIA, Fond 331, Op. 8, a.e. 1256, 27–28.
  15. Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 95.
  16. For the founder of this committee, see the memoirs of Halil Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları*, 121.
  17. Mithat Şükrü Bleda, *İmparatorluğun Çöküşü*, 24; Konstantinos Ioannu Mazarakis-Ainian, *O Makedonikos Agon*, 19; Alexandros D. Zannas, *O Makedonikos Agon*, 35–37.
  18. Mehmet Hacısalihoglu, “Yane Sandanski as a Political Leader in the Era of the Young Turks.”
  19. Hristo Matov, *Hristo Matov za Svojata Revolyutsionna Deynost: Lični Beležki* (n.p., 1928), 53.
  20. “Those of our Christian citizens who have an idea of real freedom, equality, and fraternity will without doubt join our demands and requirements and give their hand to our movement against the common enemy—tyranny” (leaflet of the CUP of Manastır to the Christians, TsDIA, Fond 771, Op. 6, a.e. 72, 1–4). For more details, see Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 169–75.
  21. Hacısalihoglu, “Yane Sandanski as a Political Leader in the Era of the Young Turks.”
  22. Georgios Mpaltatzis to the consuls in the Ottoman Empire: A. J. Panayotopoulos, “Early Relations between the Greeks and the Young Turks,” 93; Vakalopoulos, *Neotourkoi kai Makedonia*, 195.
  23. Vakalopoulos, *Neotourkoi kai Makedonia*, 194.
  24. “Manastırda Rum cema’ati re’isi ruhanisiyle Rum komitesine virilan muhtıra suretidir” [copy of the memorandum handed to the director of the Greek religious community and to the Greek committee], TsDIA, Fond 331, Op. 1, a.e. 234, 101. For the memorandum to the Greek consuls, in which the Greek government was addressed, see TsDIA, Fond 331, Op. 1, a.e. 234, 102r–v.
  25. For celebrations, see, for example, Vladimir Burilkov, *V Makedonija i Odrinsko (1908–1912)*, 125.
  26. See the Bulgarian translation of the Greek memorandum appended to the report of the Bulgarian representative in Salonika to the foreign minister, no. 768, August 13, 1908, TsDIA, Fond 334, Op. 1, a.e. 293, 139–44.
  27. M. D. Peyfuss, *Die Aromunische Frage*.
  28. TsDIA, Fond 334, Op. 1, a.e. 293, report no. 768, 141, 112; Vakalopoulos, *Neotourkoi kai Makedonia*, 214–16.
  29. TsDIA, Fond 334, Op. 1, a.e. 293, report no. 768, 141–44, and 112–15.
  30. Mehmet Hacısalihoglu, “The Young Turk Revolution and the Negotiations for the Solution of the Macedonian Question.”
  31. “Aujourd’hui, l’arbitraire est [d]isparu, le mauvais gouvernement n’existe plus. Nous sommes tous frères: il n’y a plus des bulgares, des grecs, des serbes, des roumains, des juifs, des musulmans; sous le même horizon bleu, nous sommes tous égaux, nous nous glorifions d’être des *Ottomans*.... *Vive la Nation Ottomane!*” “Discours

- d'Enver Bey," TsDIA, Fond 331, Op. 1, a.e. 234, 135r-v, 136. For the same text, see TsDIA, Fond 3, Op. 8, a.e. 1256, 27r-v, 28.
32. G. Todorovski, *Makedonskoto Prašanje i Reformite vo Makedonija*, 241-55.
33. See a Bulgarian translation of the Unionists' program: Report of the Bulgarian representative in Salonika, no. 733, August 6, 1908, *TsDIA*, Fond 331, Op. 1, a.e. 233, 89-91r-v.
34. Vladimir Burilkov, "Edna Znamenateln Reč na Hristo Matov," quoted in Vladimir Burilkov, *V Makedonija i Odrinsko (1908-1912)*.
35. Orhan Koloğlu, *1908 Basın Patlaması*.
36. Athanasios Suliotis Nikolaïdis, *Organōsis Konstantinupoleōs*, 79-80.
37. Report of the trade agent in Salonika to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, No. 1046, October 17, 1908, TsDIA, Fond 334, Op. 1, 313, 36r-v, 37r-v, 38.
38. Dimitar Vlahov, *Memoari*, 87, 93.
39. Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 253-57.
40. Ibid., 257-68.
41. Sina Akşin, *31 Mart Olayı*, 77-78; Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 271-73.
42. Suliotis Nikolaïdis, *Organōsis Kōnstantinupoleōs*, 101-2.
43. Manol Pandevski, "Razvitokot na Političkiot život vo Evropska Turcija vo Periodot na Mladoturskoto Upravuvanje (1908-1912)," 114.
44. Mersiya Makdermot, *Za Svoboda i Sāvāršenstvo*, 346, 357, 370-71.
45. Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia* (German translation: *Geschichte Bosniens*, 178-79); M. Isusov, ed., *Obyavyavane na Nezavisimostta na Bālgariya prez 1908 g.*
46. Vakalopoulos, *Neoturkoi kai Makedonia*, 11-18, 290-96.
47. Report of Bulgarian Delegate from Istanbul to the foreign minister, No. 152, June 9, 1909, TsDIA, Fond 176, Op. 2, a.e. 391, 76r-v.
48. "Serseri ve mazinne-i su-i eşhas hakkında kanun."
49. Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 61.
50. "İctimaat-ı Umumiye kanunu."
51. *Düstur*, I, 351.
52. Report of Bulgarian trade agent of Salonika to the foreign minister, No. 447, July 11, 1909, TsDIA, Fond 176, Op. 2, a.e. 399, 5r-v; Report of Bulgarian trade agent of Serres to the foreign minister, No. 383, July 11, 1909, TsDIA, Fond 176, Op. 2, a.e. 399, 12. See also the reports in the Bulgarian newspaper *Den* 1902, July 14, 1909, 2-3.
53. Letter of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Paprikov to the Bulgarian Delegates in the Great Powers and Istanbul, No. 1125, November 11, 1909, TsDIA, Fond 176, Op. 2, a.e. 392, 8-11r-v.
54. "Matbuat Kanunu" and "Matbaalar Kanunu," *Düstur*, II, vol. I, 395-406.
55. "Dolu konservativniya Parlament!" *Narodna Volya*, 33, August 1, 1909, 1.
56. *Düstur*, II, vol. I, 420-21. On July 29, 1325/August 11, 1909, the new law became effective on publication in the official organ *Takvim-i vekayi*; see Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 282. For the general development of conscription in the Ottoman Empire, see M. Hacısalihoglu, "Inclusion and Exclusion."
57. Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni*, 121-22.
58. Greek memorandum of August 12, 1908: see Report of the Bulgarian commercial

- agent of Salonika, No. 768, August 13, 1908, TsDIA, Fond 334, Op. 1, a.e. 293, 139–44; Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 234.
59. Suliotis Nikolaïdis, *Organōsis Kōnstantinupoleōs*, 86.
60. Correspondence of Bulgarian Foreign Secretary Paprikov with the “Commissioned Ministers” of the Great Powers and the Istanbul legation, No. 1125, November 11, 1909, TsDIA, Fond 176, Op. 2, a.e. 392, 8–11 (quotations on 8r–v, 9).
61. Ufuk Gülsoy, “Osmanlı Gayri Müslimlerinin Askeralma Kanunu’na Tepkileri ve Ege Adaları (1909–1912).”
62. Suliotis Nikolaïdis, *Organōsis Kōnstantinupoleōs*, 112–17; A. Ch. Chamudopulu, *Hellinismos kai Neoturkoi*, 18–24. For the text of the petitions, see Suliotis Nikolaïdis, *Organōsis Kōnstantinupoleōs*, 118–20, 125–27.
63. Nikolaïdis, *Organōsis Kōnstantinupoleōs*, 165–69; Burilkov, *V Makedoniya i Odrinsko*, 318–21.
64. “Dolu konservativniya Parlament!” *Narodna Volya* 33, August 1, 1909, 1.
65. “Cemiyetler Kanunu,” August 3, 1325, *Düstur*, II, vol. 1, 604–8.
66. Report of Shopov to the foreign minister, No. 1024, December 17, 1909, TsDIA, Fond 334, Op. 1, a.e. 325, 40–41r–v.
67. *Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi*, Period I, Year I, vol. 5, session 115 (July 17, 1325/1909) (Ankara, 1982), 448; session 114, July 6, 1325/1909, 439; session 115, 453–54.
68. “Reaksiya v Parlamenta,” *Otečestvo* 43, July 18, 1909, 1.
69. “Dolu Konservativniya Parlament!” 1. The Bulgarian newspaper *Den* (Sofia) claimed that a special kind of absolutism would dominate Turkey when freedom of the press also would be eliminated. “Zakonăt za Sdružavaniyata i kom. Edinstvo i Napredāk,” *Den* 1998, October 20, 1909, 1.
70. “Rumeli vilayetinde şekavet ve mefsedetın men’i ve mütecasirlerinin takib ve tedibi hakkında kanun-ı muvakkat, 14 Eylül 1325,” 757–65.
71. Letter of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Paprikov to the Bulgarian Delegates in the Great Powers and Istanbul, No. 1125, November 11, 1909, TsDIA, Fond 176, Op. 2, a.e. 392, 8–11r–v.
72. İsmail Kemal Bey, *The Memoirs of İsmail Kemal Bey*, 367.
73. Reports of Shopov to A. Malinov, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, no. 709, September 11, 1910, and letter of Shopov to the Bulgarian politician I. E. Geshov, October 26, 1910, Atanas Šopov, *Dnevnik, Diplomatičeski Raporti i Pisma*, 157–63.
74. Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 293–95.
75. *Ibid.*, 294.
76. *Düstur*, II, vol. 2: 1327–28 [1909–10], Dersâadet 1330 [Istanbul 1912], 431–33.
77. *Ibid.*, 640.
78. See, for example, İ. Hamid Danişmend, *İzablı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, 383.
79. Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 295–98.
80. These regulations were partly quoted in the *takrir* (petition) of the patriarch to the government: Suliotis Nikolaïdis, *Organōsis Kōnstantinupoleōs*, 121. See also Vakalopoulos, *Neoturkoi kai Makedonia*, 327–28; N. V. Vlachos, *Istoria ton Kraton tu Hersonisu tu Aimu 1908–1914*, 117–19.
81. Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 339–47.
82. Cemiyetler Kanunu, August 3, 1325, *Düstur*, II, vol. 1, 604–8. The Unionists also

- demanding that the Bulgarian government stop financing the Bulgarian Constitution Clubs, claiming that they were hostile to freedom in the country. Report of Shopov to the foreign minister, No. 1024, December 17, 1909, TsDIA, Fond 334, Op. 1, a.e. 325, 40–41r–v.
83. Already in March 1909 the Bulgarian trade agent of Salonika reported on the rumors that the Ottoman commission for emigrants was encouraging the emigration of Muslims residing in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. Through the settlement of these Muslims in Macedonia the government was reportedly aiming to resolve the Macedonian Question, which would disproportionately benefit “Turkey.” Report, No. 166, March 13, 1909, TsDIA, Fond 176, Op. 2, a.e. 425, 4r–v. See also “Muhadžirskata Politika na Nova Turtsiya,” *Den* 2001, October 23, 1909, 1; “Osmanskite Vlasti protiv Bălgarite,” *Den* 2023, November 15, 1909, 3; Dimitar Vlahov, *Memoari*, 113–14. For the same arguments made in Greek historiography, see Vakalopoulos, *Neoturkoi kai Makedonia*, 31.
  84. Letter of the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the legations abroad, No. 1090, June 26, 1910, TsDIA, Fond 176, Op. 2, a.e. 2744, 62r–v, 63.
  85. The study of Yusuf Hamza also confirms this conclusion: *Mladoturската Revolutsija vo Osmanskata Imperija*, 422.
  86. We know that particularly after the Balkan Wars the Ottoman government followed a resettlement policy for Turkification or Islamization of certain territories like eastern Thrace. The Ottoman and Greek governments negotiated in 1914 for the exchange of the Muslims and Greeks in certain areas (150,000 Greeks in eastern Thrace and Vilayet Aydın against 52,000 Muslims in Macedonia and Epirus). Eventually the negotiations were canceled because of the start of World War I. Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913–1918)*, 68–70, idem, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi*. For a discussion on some problematic arguments regarding Dündar's use of ethnic statistics, see Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu, “Borders, Maps, and Censuses.”
  87. Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*.
  88. For the Balkan Wars, see Katrin Böckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg*; for the Muslim refugees, see Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri (1912–1913)*, 29–30; Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu, *Doğu Rumeli'de Kayıp Köyler, İslimye Sancağı'nda 1878'den Günümüze Göçler, İsim Değişiklikleri ve Harabeler*, 59–61.

# Rebels with a Cause

## Armenian-Macedonian Relations and Their Bulgarian Connection, 1895–1913

*Garabet K. Moumdjian*

Armenian and Macedonian revolutionary organizations boast of mutually beneficial relationships dating back to the middle of the 1890s.<sup>1</sup> Although the two groups opted for different approaches to the Ottoman Empire—Macedonian revolutionaries fighting for outright independence while their Armenian counterparts advocated a reformist agenda in the eastern provinces of the empire<sup>2</sup>—their collaboration seemed to be a natural one. Among all Christian minorities within the empire, it was the Macedonians and the Armenians that did not achieve their respective goals as stated in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin.

### INTRODUCTION

The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (MRO) and its successor, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), were regarded as assiduously nationalistic in nature, which was apparent from the Young Turks' attempts to keep a safe distance from them. Simultaneously, Macedonian revolutionaries advocated unity with Armenian revolutionary organizations, especially the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), which also drew the ire of leaders from all the Young Turk factions. Still, it is critical to point out that the osmosis between the two Christian communities occurred in Bulgaria, which became the center of Armenian-Macedonian collaboration.<sup>3</sup> The country was indeed a safe haven for Armenian and Macedonian revolutionaries; while sizable Armenian communities existed in Sofia and Varna, the crux of this collaboration centered on Filipe (Philippopolis, currently

Plovdiv), further south and near the Macedonian border. It was in Filipe that Macedonian revolutionary leaders like Boris Sarafov, Gotse Delchev, and Slavi (Svetoslav) Merdzhanov, among others, established their first contacts with Hunchak and later with ARF revolutionaries.<sup>4</sup>

Armenian-Macedonian ties during this critical period have been dealt with sporadically in academic sources and a few studies have focused on particular aspects of the relationships, so no complete account of the entire historiography has been attempted here. The goal of this study is to remedy the situation by relying on Armenian and Ottoman archival materials, along with several memoirs written by Armenians who lived during these turbulent times and were eyewitnesses to the events. By relying on sources that illustrate how Filipe and Salonika (Selanik, Thessaloniki, situated in modern Greece) became the nexus of Armenian-Macedonian collaboration, this chapter traces the formation of Armenian revolutionary cells in Bulgaria.<sup>5</sup> It also analyzes how Balkan territories, and especially the ports on the Black Sea, were utilized for arms-smuggling operations into the Ottoman Empire. This is important: aside from the normal arms procurement routes through Russian territories in the Caucasus and the Persian border area of Salmasd near Van, the Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea presented a second uninterrupted access point for such operations. The activities attributed to Rosdom (Sdepan Zorian)—one of the founders of the ARF in Bulgaria—as well as Antranig (Toros Ozanian)—the renowned Armenian guerrilla fighter who was instrumental in the establishment of an Armenian military academy in Bulgaria—are also discussed in order to provide a better understanding of Armenian-Macedonian ties.

Finally, after a discussion of alleged Macedonian gains in the 1908 Young Turk Revolution—representation in the Ottoman parliament and the promise of equal rights in a future federative or confederative Ottoman Empire—the narrative concentrates on the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars. Macedonia's Christian neighbors, including Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, were in fact clandestinely working to annex Macedonia to their respective countries.

This chapter also deals, albeit indirectly, with the many intrigues that involved regional actors as they exploited both the Macedonian and Armenian revolutionary movements. It concludes with an appraisal of Antranig and Nzhdeh (Karekin Der Haroutiunian), who actively participated in the Balkan Wars and led an Armenian company of fighters in the war against the Ottomans, to determine the circumstances under which they operated and their effect on Armenian-Young Turk relations.

### THE GENESIS OF ARMENIAN-MACEDONIAN COLLABORATION

Only in 1885 did revolutionary agitation enter the Armenian psyche in the Ottoman Empire. The first manifestation of this was the formation of the Armenagan Party in Van, under the leadership of an Armenian teacher, Megerdich Portukalian.<sup>6</sup> However, the Armenagan Party was nothing more than a provincial society whose influence did not transcend beyond Van and its environs. Portukalian was exiled to Marseilles, France, where he continued a very abrupt relationship with his former students.<sup>7</sup>

The first full-blown Armenian revolutionary and political party formed was the Social Democratic Hunchakian Party (often referred to as Hunchakists). The party's mission envisaged a two-step action: (1) establishing a free and independent Armenia (immediate objective, hence the Socialist/Marxist influence), and (2) striving for the creation of a democratic state structure for the fledgling Armenian republic (more distant objective).<sup>8</sup> The Hunchakists masterminded the first and disastrous Sasun rebellion of 1894, which cost them dearly in terms of diminishing the party's organizational structure. Internal disagreements between the western and eastern Armenian leaders of the party caused a rift that led to the party being divided into two distinct sections.<sup>9</sup> After the abortive Sasun rebellion of 1894, the Hunchakians concentrated their efforts in Cilicia and in the capital, Istanbul.<sup>10</sup>

The Hay Heghapokhakanneri Tashnaksutyun (Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries) was invisioned by Kristabor Mikayelian, a member of the Russian revolutionary organization Narodnaya Volya (People's Will). His intent was to bring together all Armenian revolutionary societies in Western and Eastern Armenia, in order to concentrate efforts and maximize results. The federation was formed in Tbilisi in the summer of 1890. Two years later the unsuccessful federation gave way for the establishment of the Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnaksutyun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation: ARF; also known as Dashnaksutyun or Dashnakist Party).<sup>11</sup> It too adopted socialism as its ideology, although it was not fully integrated into the party program until 1907.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, unlike the Hunchakians, the ARF adopted a more nationalistic character and initiated a decentralized working environment that proved to be crucial for the success of the different bodies of the organization scattered throughout Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Europe, and the United States. Although it too was troubled by the friction between

its western and eastern leaders regarding issues pertaining to ideology and tactics, the party was able to solve its internal difficulties during its general congresses.<sup>13</sup>

The reasoning behind the formation of the Armenian revolutionary organizations is best described by Hrach Dasnabedian, the official historian of the ARF:

The growing appetite manifested by Russia in its wars against the Ottomans in 1828 and 1877 created hope and aspiration for Armenians in both empires. It led to massive Armenian migrations to the Russian-dominated parts of the Caucasus.... The renaissance of the Christian people of the Ottoman Empire (Greeks, Romanians, Serbians, Bulgarians) was a contagious stimulus that infected Armenians.... The impotence of the [Armenian] Patriarchate and its national bodies in asking for reforms for the Armenians in the interior...was enough for the creation of a revolutionary tendency within the Armenians.... Moreover, the Armenian Nationalistic Movement was a peaceful reformist attitude aiming at attaining for Armenians what already was normal for the dominant Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire. This included human dignity, equality within the social, economic, and religious spheres.... If there was even some semblance of autonomy or freedom in the minds of some [Armenians] that was not yet formulated in a bold political, ideological platform.<sup>14</sup>

The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was founded in 1893 in Salonika by a small band of anti-Ottoman Macedonian-Bulgarian revolutionaries, who considered Macedonia an indivisible territory and claimed all of its inhabitants as "Macedonians," no matter what their religion or ethnicity. In practice, most of their followers were Bulgarians.<sup>15</sup> According to some sources, they were against the neighboring states' aspirations in the area.<sup>16</sup> The secret revolutionary society operated with the goal of an autonomous Macedonia but with the ultimate desire of unification with Bulgaria.<sup>17</sup> The idea of autonomy was strictly political and did not imply secession from Bulgarian ethnicity. Even those who advocated an independent Macedonia and Thrace never doubted the predominantly Bulgarian character of the Slavic population in both areas.<sup>18</sup> The organization was founded by Hristo Tatarchev, Dame Gruev, Petar Pop-Arsov, Andon Dimitrov, Hristo Batandzhiev, and others, who were students of the Bulgarian Men's High School of Salonika.<sup>19</sup>



Although the Balkan liberation movements inspired Armenians in the Ottoman Empire just as much as they motivated some radical irredentist elements within Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, it was the Armenian revolutionary movement that served as a model worthy of emulation for the Macedonians. According to a leading ARF historian:

Even though the liberation struggles of the Balkans had been a source of inspiration for the Armenian Awakening in the Ottoman Empire, it seems that the case was reversed vis-à-vis Macedonia, because the latter was inspired by the Armenian liberation struggle. The Macedonians had to remain under Ottoman dominion until the Balkan Wars of 1912–13.<sup>20</sup>

Though few recall the exact circumstances, the genesis of Armenian-Macedonian exchanges dated back to 1895, when a specific event ushered in an era of mutual collaboration. According to Mikayel Varandian:

Macedonians were late in their awakening. They were even later than us [Armenians]. The Armenian movement inspired them greatly, especially after the Ottoman Bank takeover and the ensuing fighting in Constantinople [Samatya]. This is what the Macedonians admit to, and especially Boris Sarafov, one of the prominent Macedonian leaders.... In fact, it was after the Bank event [Ottoman Bank takeover by the ARF, 1896] that Macedonians started approaching Dashnak agents and proposed their intention to cooperate with us. It was at this time that the two decades-long Armenian-Macedonian collaboration was institutionalized.<sup>21</sup>

The first meetings between Armenian and Macedonian revolutionary cadres occurred in 1896–97 in Geneva, Switzerland, where leading Armenian Revolutionary Federation officers lived. Simeon Radev, a well-known Macedonian leader, also lived there, along with a slew of émigré activists, especially Bulgarian and Macedonian students.<sup>22</sup> Naturally, clandestine meetings were arranged in Constantinople (Istanbul), while other gatherings occurred in Bulgaria, whose government encouraged such contacts to underscore the intrinsic values of anti-Ottoman revolutionary movements.<sup>23</sup> As a matter of fact the revolutionaries were granted unhindered entry and exit privileges by the Bulgarian government, at a time when such arrangements were rare.<sup>24</sup>

The goal of the MRO, precursor of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO),<sup>25</sup> was simply to liberate Macedonia from the Ottoman yoke.<sup>26</sup> Although this objective coincided with the formation of an ARF cell in Filipe,<sup>27</sup> Armenians in Macedonia at this time totaled no more than three hundred.<sup>28</sup> Therefore Armenian-Macedonian cooperation germinated not as a result of popular pressure but because of genuine affinity for like-minded views. In 1897 MRO leader Giorche Petrov (Gyorche Petrov Nikolov) contacted a certain Leon (Levon), a Hunchakist chemist, to help him develop explosives and manufacture bombs.<sup>29</sup> Petrov visited Constantinople and met with another Armenian, Krikor, for the same purpose. The two men traveled together to Sofia, where they set up a modest bomb factory, though it was relocated to the village of Sablur in the Osogovo Mountains of Bulgaria in May 1897. This location, on the border with Macedonia, meant that bombs could be delivered far more easily. Remarkably, despite the spartan way of life that Krikor and his Macedonian apprentices endured, they were able to produce substantial quantities of small and large bombs.<sup>30</sup> Perhaps as a sign of their success, these early attempts at sabotage and insurrection attracted the attention of Ottoman authorities.

Under pressure from the Ottoman government, Sofia raided the facility and closed the “bomb factory” in 1899. This was not the only successful collaborative venture between the two sides. In 1897 Petrov made another contact with Armenians through Na’um Tiufekchiev, a prominent Sofia arms merchant. While Petrov met and subsequently befriended several Armenian revolutionaries who were members of the ARF committee in Varna, one of these men was a member of the central committee on a visit to hone revolutionary plans.<sup>31</sup>

In the spring of 1897 another prominent Macedonian, Gotse (Goce) Delchev, traveled to Odessa, where he met two Armenians from the Caucasus (probably ARF members) who allegedly were “excellent pyrotechnicians, casters of bombs, and masters of infernal machines.”<sup>32</sup>

Emboldened by various contacts and clearly learning from fellow revolutionaries, a small Bulgarian-Macedonian radical group was formed in Salonika in 1899, which catapulted Merdzhanov, a prominent member destined to become an important link between the IMRO and the ARF, to the forefront.<sup>33</sup> The group planned to assassinate the sultan and bomb the Ottoman Central Bank in Constantinople as well as its branch in Salonika.<sup>34</sup> In the face of insurmountable obstacles that literally prevented anyone from approaching the sultan, the first project was quickly abandoned, highlighting the imperatives of practicality over zeal. The

group concentrated on the second project, attacking the Central Bank and its branch. It rapidly organized surveillance stations that monitored both facilities. Kose Aristidi, an Armenian with a Greek name, assisted. Tunnels to both banks were dug from surveillance points that were completed by 1900, certainly in record time.<sup>35</sup> Explosives for both operations were carried by Armenian volunteers from Russia through the port of Batumi but failed to reach their destinations, for reasons that were never elucidated. Ottoman police authorities intercepted the Armenian volunteers, confiscated the weapons, and, following an "investigation" that most likely involved torture, captured Merdzhanov and his comrades.<sup>36</sup>

Despite this setback Armenian-Macedonian cooperation continued, especially after Rosdom (Sdepan Zorian) arrived in Philippopolis in 1899 accompanied by his wife, Lisa Melik Shahnazarian.<sup>37</sup> The couple opened a school, and Rosdom looked after the growth of the organization for several years. During this critical period the Armenians had fraternal ties with Macedonian revolutionaries, and especially Merdzhanov. Moreover, the Bulgarian government looked favorably upon both groups, as it encouraged linkages with its own officers. In fact, Bulgarian army staffers even trained revolutionaries from both Armenian and Macedonian movements, especially in target shooting and other military tactics. Although most of these exercises ceased after the Ottoman government complained, they continued under the guise of hunting expeditions.<sup>38</sup> Comical developments colored the times, as in the case of the Armenian newspaper *Sharzhum* (Movement) slated for publication in Varna. In 1898 an ARF member by the name of Varto used significant sums from the organization's coffers to set up editorial offices and start printing the newspaper but regarded the venture as a personal affair. Even though Varto believed that he had the right to make such a decision, Rosdom rebuffed him and strongly disapproved of his schemes: he insisted that such a decision could only be ratified by the ARF Central Committee of the Balkans. Under these circumstances Varto was ousted from the organization at a time when every able-bodied volunteer was sorely needed.

More seriously, various meetings with the Macedonian revolutionary movement continued unhindered in later years in Paris, London, Geneva, and Milan. These contacts were organized through the efforts of the ARF's Pro-Armenia Committee, under the leadership of Hovannes Loris Melikov (Melikian).<sup>39</sup>

Perhaps one of the most important events that characterized ARF-IMRO cooperation was the fate of ARF militants Bedros (Bedo) Seremjian and Onnig Torosian, condemned to the gallows together with

Merdzhanov and Kristo Haji. Seremjian, often referred to as “Bulgaratsi Bedo” (Bedo the Bulgarian), along with some of his Bulgarian-Armenian comrades, joined Merdzhanov and other Macedonian revolutionaries for an operation. Ottoman troops surrounded them. In the ensuing battle they fought until their ammunition was exhausted. Bedo, Onnig Torosian, Merdzhanov, and Kristo Haji were arrested and taken to prison in Adrianople. In his moving memoirs, Asadur Bedikian described the event:

The Armenian-Macedonian Brotherhood is strong and is baptized with fire. The ARF was able to carry on its revolutionary activity in Bulgaria thanks to the devoted help of Macedonian revolutionaries and the Bulgarian government.... Bedros [Seremjian] and Merdzhanov have already been sent to the gallows. Rıza Paşa, who is a native of Filipe and who later became a member of the Ottoman Parliament, went to Edirne to visit Bedo in prison and to make sure that it was the same Bedo who had participated in the battles to defend Van in 1895. When he was convinced that Bedo was the revolutionary in question, he made all the necessary arrangements with the governor of Edirne [Adrianople] to send Bedo and his friends to the gallows as soon as possible. Otherwise, if he [the *paşa*] had delayed by only several days, the matter would already have been taken care of and the preparations to free the revolutionaries from prison would have been successful.<sup>40</sup>

Simply stated, the two revolutionary movements shared too much spilled blood in common, which reinforced ties as they connived to organize their forces against an Ottoman Empire anxious to crush every last breath of freedom from its subjects.

#### THE 1899 HAGUE CONVENTION

Mizanji Murad Bey, considered the main leader of the embryonic Young Turk movement in Europe,<sup>41</sup> was one of the first Turkish émigrés in Europe to accept an offer made by Munir Bey, the Ottoman ambassador to France, to stop anti-Hamidian agitation and return home.<sup>42</sup> As soon as Mizanji Murad relocated to Constantinople, Ahmet Rıza assumed the leadership position within the Turkish émigré community in Europe.<sup>43</sup> Because Rıza expressed strong reservations on several questions that preoccupied Young Turk cadres, his control was not left unchallenged.

In fact Rıza's incessant opposition to the ideas of federalism and European interference in the internal affairs of the empire won him many enemies. Ironically, while Rıza considered Abdülhamid II "a villain and a murderer," his protective stance concerning the institution of the sultan undermined the supremacy of a future constitutional government. His adherence to philosophical pacifism and an evolutionary approach to solving problems, however, antagonized the militant factions among the Young Turks. The one idea that brought him closer to militant elements was a mutual abhorrence of any federal form of government that promised autonomy to ethnic minorities. At this stage the Young Turks already displayed tendencies toward a strong central government for the empire, perhaps emboldened by Armenian and Macedonian revolutionary movements.

Within this context Ahmet Rıza traveled to The Hague in 1899 to attend the peace conference that convened to deal with reform concerns for Armenians and Macedonians. Although he was not an official participant, he somehow wiggled himself to the podium, declaring that the Young Turks were not revolutionaries and that they needed European assistance to make "Turkey" a state based on laws.<sup>44</sup>

It must be underscored that Rıza's appearance in The Hague was neither accidental nor a mere personal initiative. Indeed, members of the Young Turk Center in Egypt, who considered it extremely important to make their voices heard at the conference, carefully organized the trip. With the assistance of Zeki Bey (Kantari), an agent of the Egyptian khedive who had labored with the Young Turks since the beginning of the 1890s, Rıza managed to secure the necessary delegate paperwork.<sup>45</sup> According to the Egyptian center's letter to Zeki Bey, the mission had some urgency: "We are in the position of telling you [Zeki Bey] confidentially," read the letter, "that it will be practical and quicker if someone [from Europe] attends the conference.... This meeting in Switzerland will bring Armenians and Macedonians together.... Our representative there must speak the absolute truth.... We must have a delegate to speak with the Armenians and Macedonians.... Please burn this letter after you read it."<sup>46</sup> This plea proved successful: Zeki Bey arranged for Ahmet Rıza to attend the congress, which was confirmed on December 9, 1900, when the Egyptian Young Turk center sent the delegate a note that expressed its satisfaction with the results.<sup>47</sup> The Turkish historian Şükrü Hanioğlu has interpreted Rıza's participation at the conference differently. Drawing from Ottoman intelligence records, he asserts that the contacts were established through Pierre Anmeghian, then a member of the editorial

board of *Meşveret*, the paper that Rıza published. While no mention of Anmeghian was available in Armenian sources, relations between Rıza and another Ottoman activist, Minas Cheraz, were frequently cited. Cheraz, a respected elderly militant who was at the forefront of Armenian issues in the Ottoman Empire and had advocated the Armenian cause long before the formation of the revolutionary parties, played a key role in Rıza's quest. Because both ARF and Hunchak Party officers respected Cheraz, Hanioglu concludes that the two may have cooperated, perhaps to iron out differences: they

organized meetings and talks against the regime of Abdülhamit II, during which the former depicted the CUP as a positivist organization. Cheraz's proposed speech against the sultan under the auspices of Christelijke Vereeniging Voor Jonge Mannen was not banned, but he was prohibited from using any pictures. Later he adopted a religious tone and focused on the perils of "Pan-Islamism," accusing the sultan of inciting the Muslims in Java against the Dutch. The sultan protested against both the Young Turks and the accusations of Cheraz, and the Ottoman administration applied heavy pressure on its Dutch counterpart to extradite them. However, they left the country before any action could be taken against them.<sup>48</sup>

Hanioglu further acknowledges:

with Ahmed Rıza's initiative, the CUP decided to join in The Hague Peace Conference in 1899. Although uninvited, Ahmed Rıza organized a joint delegation and presented a memorandum to the representatives. He convinced Minas Cheraz, a prominent figure in the Armenian movement, to join the delegation; however, Albanians to whom he had also applied spurned the offer. Besides having authorization from all branches of the CUP, he allegedly received authority from the ulema of Al-Azhar to represent them. He journeyed to The Hague with Pierre Anmeghian and met with Minas Cheraz, whose activities were being scrutinized by Ottoman diplomats.<sup>49</sup>

Whatever his motives, and no matter how he finagled his way into the conference, Rıza's attendance infuriated the ARF. The congress was supposed to concentrate solely on reforms for ethnic minorities in the

empire, so Rıza's convoluted presentation was booed. *Droshak* (the official organ of the ARF), which reported the intrusive lecture, sarcastically asked: "What kind of a person asks others to free his people? To what degree should a person be so wretched and miserable that instead of fighting an oppressor he calls on others to do the job for him?"<sup>50</sup>

Unfortunately, no meetings of the minds occurred, as revolutionary forces dug themselves into clear and nonnegotiable positions. The Armenian-Macedonian revolutionary cooperation was in abeyance and certainly was not replaced by a new entente between Armenians and Young Turk elements at this stage of the long quest for reforms. Armenian officials were chiefly concerned with conditions in the Eastern Provinces of the empire.

#### THE 1902 ANTI-HAMIDIAN CONFERENCE AND THE DILEMMA OF IMRO'S INVITATION

Such drawbacks notwithstanding, attempts to establish ARF-Young Turk relations continued, most notably after Damad Mahmut Paşa extended ARF leaders an invitation to meet.<sup>51</sup> The *paşa* fled from Istanbul with his two sons, Sebahattin and Lutfallah, in the wake of the abortive palace coup attempt (of which he was an important element) and moved to Cairo.<sup>52</sup> It can now be stated with certainty that the 1901 meeting took place at the *paşa's* residence in Egypt. Interestingly, the ARF delegation consisted of D. Enfiejian, Z. Kalfaian, and Sebuhi (Arshag Nersesian).<sup>53</sup> The *paşa's* two sons, Princes Sebahattin and Lutfallah, were also present.<sup>54</sup> What transpired during these gatherings was a mystery. The key document, which consisted of twenty-nine handwritten pages in the ARF archives, was never divulged. A careful reading of this valuable report reveals the real thinking and intentions of Damad Mahmut Paşa, who confided to the Armenian delegates and asked for secrecy regarding what he was ready to share. The *paşa* admitted that he did not include other nationalities (like the Macedonians) in his address, because he was familiar with the Armenians and placed great hopes on their revolutionary committees. Macedonian revolutionary forces, he reasoned, wanted to unite with Bulgaria, which excluded any cooperation.<sup>55</sup> Be that as it may, Damad Mahmut Paşa was skeptical and almost suspicious of Young Turk leaders, most of whom were from a non-Turkish background.<sup>56</sup> Although opposed to the sultan, the *paşa* was a member of the palace party as well as an advocate of a central government based on the tenets

of Ottomanism. For many Young Turk leaders, however, the very idea of Ottomanism was tantamount to the defense of Islam against Europe and its Christian protégés such as Greeks, Serbs, Macedonians, and Armenians.<sup>57</sup> It must be noted that Hanioglu's interpretation that the Young Turks did not develop a theory of nationalism was challenged by Feroz Ahmad, who criticized Hanioglu's use of the term *millet* as equivalent to "nation," while Ahmad believed that it denoted a religious community.<sup>58</sup>

When Abdülhamid realized that a convention of anti-Hamidian forces was to take place, his initial dismay gradually turned to panic. He turned livid when Ottoman intelligence sources reported that Young Turks, Armenians, and Macedonians planned to elect a joint committee at the convention to regulate future actions, presumably against the Sublime Porte.<sup>59</sup> Anxious to prevent such efforts, the sultan tried to exert pressure on European authorities through his embassies in Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Bern, and Geneva. Comically, Ottoman intelligence services even concocted a conspiracy according to which the Young Turk leaders who were plotting to assassinate the sultan would conveniently be unmasked. If believed by the French, for example, such a plot would lead to the arrest and extradition to Constantinople of Damad Mahmut Paşa, among others.<sup>60</sup> Paris did not fall into the trap; as a final resort the Ottoman Embassy in France called upon local authorities to disrupt the congress, allegedly because of a putative threat against Abdülhamid himself. Halfheartedly, French police officers monitored Sebahattin Bey's residence for any suspicious movements, just in case.<sup>61</sup> Paris was intrigued by the revelations of a certain Marcel Smpad, who told French parliamentary deputies that the Ottoman government "had formed a secret police organization with the sanction of the French government to track down Young Turks and Armenians." Smpad found "the idea of foreign police spying in France intolerable," which was bad enough, but soon events confirmed his suspicions.<sup>62</sup> As a response, the French government first tried to forbid the conference, though it reluctantly acquiesced under political pressure that emanated from parliament. Paris wished to be kept privy as to its decisions before these were made public, but even that preference was not achieved.<sup>63</sup> In fact, leading members of the assembly sternly objected to any interference.

One such figure, Louis Lépine, seems to have been instrumental in preparing the groundwork for the congress, even if he was not particularly fond of the Young Turks.<sup>64</sup> Others may have voiced objections, though it was not Lépine but the French government that gave the final



green light for the conference, provided that it convened at a private residence.<sup>65</sup>

An equally important reason why Armenians hesitated to attend the congress was that no formal invitation was forwarded to IMRO. In light of close Armenian-Macedonian cooperation that had genuinely flourished during the previous decade (as seen above), both groups stood in solidarity. Moreover, and this must be acknowledged, Armenian and Macedonian revolutionaries felt more at ease with each other than with the Young Turks.<sup>66</sup> Even though Sebahattin acknowledged that the IMRO oversight was an honest mistake on his part, he implored the ARF to invite Macedonian representatives through *Droshak*, even if such a “mechanism” was outlandish at best. Moreover, when Armenian delegates in Paris contacted *Droshak* headquarters in Geneva just prior to the congress to arrange an invitation for the Macedonians, an unnamed IMRO leader forwarded a letter that stated:

It is important that you keep me informed in a timely fashion about all the details of the congress. If it so happens that the elections [for a joint committee] during the congress are not to our benefit, you must cease your participation and take the necessary steps to secure our cause. Something persuades me that it is better not to take any action until the election.<sup>67</sup>

ARF officers quickly understood that the “honest mistake” was intentional, as most Young Turks considered IMRO to be a devious separatist movement.<sup>68</sup> In any case the Armenian insistence on inviting IMRO delegates was eminently logical, spurred by the notion that the congress was supposed to be a gathering of all forces opposed to the Abdülhamid regime. Still, *Droshak* invited Macedonian revolutionaries, though IMRO failed to reply.<sup>69</sup>

Despite their absence from the congress, Macedonian revolutionary movements were not spared Rıza's ire: his verbal assaults on the Armenians and Macedonians alike entertained many. Even though Prince Sebahattin tried to remedy the situation by presenting a new resolution favorable to Armenians, it was Ahmet Rıza who rebuffed him by stating that “the Armenians are offering their right hand to the revolutionary Bulgaro-Macedonian Committee [IMRO] and their left hand to the Young Turks.” An enraged and obviously irritated Rıza saw no possible accord with Armenians, which surprised attendees.<sup>70</sup>

BEHAETTIN ŞAKIR AND CUP'S EMULATION  
OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE MACEDONIAN MOVEMENT

In 1902 the Macedonian revolutionary organizations operated within a specific structure in Bulgaria, led by and known as the External Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (EMRO). A sister group inside Macedonia was the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). IMRO inspired Dr. Behaettin Şakir to reorganize the CUP along the same lines in 1906.<sup>71</sup>

Şakir showed profound organizational abilities after reaching Paris in 1904. In a matter of months he was able to take the initiative and become the leader of the Young Turk coalition, to the detriment of Ahmet Rıza. Together with Nazım Bey—who had transferred from London, where he was a university instructor of the Turkish language—and others, Şakir was able to reorganize the CUP into a fully functional apparatus with two commanding bodies: external (Paris) and internal (Salonika).<sup>72</sup> Each had its own central committee and decentralized, almost autonomous cells in different European countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Crete, Cyprus, and Bosnia) and throughout the Ottoman Empire (Constantinople, İzmir, Syria, Egypt).<sup>73</sup> Şakir also tried to woo Sebahattin Bey into his camp. When the prince answered by sending him his league's program and writing that he would join only if his program became the working agenda for the movement, Şakir started attacking Sebahattin and his decentralization policies.<sup>74</sup>

Şakir's organizational scheme in European countries and especially in the Ottoman Empire was inspired by the Iranian *anjomans* (revolutionary committees), which played an important role in the constitutional revolution in Iran.<sup>75</sup> The Russian revolution of 1905 and its impact in the Caucasus was also a source of much needed agitation. Ottoman authorities were unable to stop the barrage of revolutionary propaganda emanating from Russia and Iran from entering the eastern provinces of the empire. Şakir and Sebahattin capitalized on this state of heightened popular awareness to prepare for a similar revolution in the empire.

Moreover, as noted above, the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization's structure (internal and external committees) was also inspirational for Şakir:

What kinds of tools are to be used? In order to answer this [question] we had to examine the policies of the committees that could

provide us with examples to follow. We spent quite a long time carrying out this examination. Upon completing it we perceived that we need organization more than anything else.

An article written two or three years ago by Sarafov, who wants to separate Macedonia from our fatherland...could give us a modest idea about organization. Sarafov's article is very useful to us in all aspects.... Look what this person says in his article: "You Young Turks do not possess an organization worthy of Europe's acclamation. To achieve that you must make many sacrifices. The accomplishment of this mission depends on great efforts over a long period. Everything starts with the education of minds. Therefore it is necessary to carry out extensive written and oral propaganda. Minds educated by the same ideas secretly assemble under the same banner. In this way they establish branches throughout the country. These branches have recourse to various methods to multiply their members. In this field each branch should be granted a certain degree of freedom. This would also greatly assist in increasing the number of individuals favoring special action."<sup>76</sup>

Şakir utilized his Armenian contact, Diran (Dikran) Kelekian, to obtain an alliance with Armenian committees and especially with the ARF.<sup>77</sup> This meant that he would face the wrath of Rıza. At this juncture Şakir had a wild card in his hand. Ahmed Celalettin Paşa, the former chief of Ottoman intelligence, had himself deserted the sultan and defected to the Young Turk cause in Paris. Şakir had cultivated him since his days in Constantinople, so he persuaded Celalettin Paşa to become the *de facto* financier of the movement. This gave Şakir the upper hand in dealing with Rıza. Moreover, Kelekian was feeding Şakir ideas about either starting a new organization or taking control of the existing one. Celalettin Paşa, however, insisted on the inclusion of the ARF and Hunchakian parties in the new organization. He further demanded that Rıza be demoted to the status of a regular member with no leadership qualifications. It was clear that Celalettin Paşa was not only stipulating that he must become the leader of the new organization but giving Şakir the position of second in command. The ambitious Şakir was not ready to be dealt with in such a manner. Therefore the whole program was dropped. Şakir, however, was able to maneuver and assume the leadership of the existing coalition.<sup>78</sup>

It must be noted, however, that Şakir's dealings showed that he was using double standards in approaching different constituencies. While

he was praising Armenians for their revolutionary zeal, his writings to Ottoman constituents revealed an anti-Armenian sentiment. Moreover, while he was advocating a coalition of all anti-Hamidian forces, he was belittling Balkan Christians as nothing more than parasites weakening the body of the Ottoman state. Şakir's maneuvers could easily be considered the epitome of opportunism and deceit. The Young Turk movement had never seen their like since the early days of its existence.<sup>79</sup>

#### THE 1903 MACEDONIAN REBELLION AND ITS AFTERMATH

If the 1902 anti-Hamidian conference failed to produce concrete results and the IMRO invitation oversight created a dilemma, the Macedonian rebellion a few months later caught everyone's attention. While few assessed the implications of fresh clashes, many anticipated serious problems, which materialized before long.

Despite this division of labor, however, the Macedonian revolutionary organizations were not operating smoothly. In fact several critical issues were producing friction among various factions, the most important of which was the EMRO cadres' firm belief that the future of Macedonia would be secured if it was annexed to Bulgaria.<sup>80</sup> According to Rosdom, a person with firsthand knowledge of the matter, after the liberation of Rumelia and its annexation to Bulgaria the idea of Western Macedonia's annexation became a valid principle for the EMRO, even if the idea was rejected by the IMRO. Rosdom compared these frictions to similar problems within the Hunchak Party, which eventually led to a division, followed by several assassinations. He lamented how both cases significantly weakened the two respective organizations and wrote why he supported ARF-IMRO collaboration, all for the sake of progress. Frustrated by re-criminations, he even added that Sarafov, Toma Davidov, Georgi Liapov, and others would join Gotse Delchev and comrades inside Macedonia to fight the Ottoman enemy. For Rosdom, it was vital that the ARF and IMRO work together, to send sorely needed partisans from the Caucasus into the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Not surprisingly, this was vehemently opposed by the IMRO, whose quest for autonomy and even outright independence was well known. As if these complications were not sufficient, Macedonia became a point of friction among the three Balkan states of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, each aspiring to secure a part or the whole province for itself.<sup>81</sup> No wonder that the French, in their keen observation of events taking place in the Balkans, concocted

the appellation *macédoine* (mixed salad) for what turned out to be one of the most critical arenas for regional conflict.<sup>82</sup>

In spite of the French epithet, Macedonian revolutionaries embarked on a very active campaign starting in April 1903, which would dramatically alter conditions on the ground. On the night of April 28 an IMRO operative, Pavel Shatev, blew up the French ship *Guadalquivir*, which had just left Salonika harbor. Ottoman police units caught the bomber as he boarded a train to Skopje (Üsküp). That same night another group of operatives composed of Dimitar Mecheva, Iliya Trachkov, and Milan Arsov bombed the Salonika-Constantinople railway. No casualties occurred. Yet another militant, Kostadin Kirkovo, used explosive devices to cut off the electricity and water supply to Salonika. This action was the signal for a series of events. On April 29 Jordan Popjordanov (Orcet) blew up the Salonika branch of the Ottoman Bank, utilizing a tunnel that had been dug in preparation for the bombing.<sup>83</sup> The building, which was opened in 1863, was completely destroyed. That same night Kostadin Kirkovo, Vladimir Bogdanov, and Iliya Pingov detonated bombs in different parts of the city. Other activists, Dimitar Mecheva and Iliya Trachkov in particular, failed to destroy the gas plant and its reservoirs. Both were later killed in a gunfight with the army and police forces, during which some sixty bombs were detonated. There was even an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Ottoman governor of Salonika.<sup>84</sup>

A few days later the Ottoman army ambushed Gotse Delchev and several of his comrades near the village of Banitsa. Their deaths on May 4, 1903, sparked a new wave of rebellion against Ottoman forces in August of the same year. Some nine hundred IMRO guerrillas and four thousand inhabitants of affected areas (Bulgarian-speaking Orthodox Christians) perished as a result of what came to be known as the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising.

According to H. N. Brailsford, a British historian, diplomat, and political activist specializing in Balkan history: "The moment for which the Bulgarian population had been preparing for ten years arrived on the day of the festival devoted to Prophet Elijah—the evening of Sunday, August the 2nd, 1903."<sup>85</sup> The Internal Macedonia-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization (IMARO) assumed the leadership of the abortive act. It was clear that the local forces were not enough to sustain a long-term rebellion. All eyes were centered on Bulgaria, expecting weapons and troops filtering in from there to save the day. But Bulgaria was unable to send arms, troops, and much-needed supplies to rescue fellow Bulgarian rebels. When IMARO representatives met the Bulgarian prime minister,

Racho Petrov, he showed them the ultimatums that he had received from Serbia, Greece, and Romania, which informed him of those countries' support for the Ottoman Empire in the event Bulgaria intervened to support the rebels.<sup>86</sup> At a meeting in early October the general staff of the rebel forces decided to cease all revolutionary activities and to disband irregular militias.<sup>87</sup>

Thus the Krushevo Republic, which IMRO proclaimed at the beginning of the rebellion, was a short-lived accomplishment.<sup>88</sup>

Interestingly, the 1903 events in Macedonia corresponded with an elevated cadence of revolutionary activities in the eastern *vilayets* of the Ottoman Empire. This shows that the reciprocal events were no coincidence but rather a previously decided, concerted effort. Although fighting for "the welfare and protection of their people" against regular Ottoman troops and Hamidiyye regiments earned the ARF fedayeen various epithets, most were dubbed troublemakers for instigating tensions. Relying on a report produced by an Armenian informant, British vice-consul Edward B. Freeman asserted that about forty revolutionaries were organized into three bands in Sasun and that "their plan [wa]s to act according to events in Macedonia." Moreover, "the fixed purpose of the revolutionists this time [was] to provoke such a slaughter of their race that the Powers will be compelled to intervene once [and] for all."<sup>89</sup>

Although this whole operation was abandoned after the British Embassy presented formal complaints to the sultan, hostilities did not end until Armenian revolutionaries retreated beyond the Russian border after armed encounters with Ottoman troops stationed there. Moreover, as the British vice-consul stated:

Signs have not been wanting lately of some kind of concerted movement between the Committees in Macedonia and the Armenian revolutionaries; but any such agreement has entirely failed to be effective in these parts, so far, owing to the feeble action of the latter and the want of sympathy with them among the Christian population here.<sup>90</sup>

The events on the Armenian Plateau led to the Second Rebellion of Sasun, in 1904, which was in itself a bloody episode that cost the lives of several thousand Armenians.<sup>91</sup>

Meanwhile the ARF held its third general congress in Sofia, where delegates reached a formal decision to work jointly with the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement and especially the IMRO after 1904.<sup>92</sup>

The decision to assassinate Sultan Abdülhamid II was also made during this meeting, which was controversial because of yet another key choice: to demand substantial financial contributions from wealthy Armenian merchants dwelling in Bulgaria.<sup>93</sup> It is important to recall that the ARF raised significant funds in the Balkans in the aftermath of the 1904 Sasun massacres, in order to rush desperately required aid to destitute refugees. Naturally complaints abounded. When one merchant grumbled, a special inspector was dispatched from Sofia to look into the matter. Sarafov solved the dilemma by suggesting to the ARF leadership to blame the “extortion” on two Russian Armenians, who had already been smuggled out of the country by the time a hearing was held to determine culpability.<sup>94</sup> It was unbecoming conduct but entirely congruent with battlefield conditions. Though few discussed such matters, their occurrences were not negligible, because they besmirched the reputation of all those involved.

As stated above, the decision to assassinate Sultan Abdülhamid II, a task entrusted to Kristabor Mikayelian by the third ARF General Congress, proved to engender its own controversy. Though Mikayelian was killed near Mount Vitosh when a bomb he was testing for the assassination of Abdülhamid II exploded prematurely, his funeral produced yet another chapter in the annals of Armeno-Bulgarian and Armeno-Macedonian cooperation.<sup>95</sup> Asadur Bedikian, whose reports elucidated obscure points, described the emotional gathering:

Aknuni [Khachatur Malumian], who had arrived from Geneva, represented the [ARF] Western Bureau. Hamo Ohanchanian had arrived from Tiflis as the representative of the [ARF] Eastern Bureau. He was keeping a low profile and meeting only with ARF members and Macedonian revolutionary leaders.... The best and most expensive coffin was bought. All of Sofia's carriages (almost 150 in number) were rented. Kristabor's funeral was a singular event in Sofia. It attracted much attention and interest. The main boulevards were full with people. The Maria-Luisa Boulevard was cordoned off by Macedonian revolutionaries. Boris Sarafov sent the best flower bouquet. On the ribbon was written: To the father of Armenians and the elder brother of Macedonians.... Aknuni was the main speaker at the cemetery. He called Kristabor a man-maker.... Aknuni then addressed the Macedonians present by saying: We are leaving Kristabor's body as a relic with you until the day arrives when we put him to rest in his beloved Armenia.... S. Kirov spoke on behalf of the Macedonian organization. Sarafov

was unable to speak.... The Turkish Ambassador had requested from the Bulgarian government not to allow an eye-striking funeral. Nevertheless, the government neglected the ambassador's request. It only informed Sarafov that it would be better if he did not speak at the procession.<sup>96</sup>

Whether such outpouring of political emotion was conducive to fostering even closer ties was impossible to determine, even if its intrinsic value could not be dismissed. In any case the ARF strengthened its presence in the Balkans and established a biweekly organ in 1905. The first issue of *Razmig* (Warrior), the organ of the ARF Balkan's Central Committee, appeared on October 15, 1905. Interestingly, the required capital to launch the newspaper was secured locally, through the sale of shares whose face value was to be paid by the paper over time. When the enterprise barely managed to cover costs, investors simply ignored the inconvenience, further confirming the notion that Macedonian as well as Bulgarian-Armenian support was amply sufficient to overcome such concerns.<sup>97</sup> It was another, though perhaps clearer, illustration of how the ARF managed its contacts in Bulgaria, as it extended useful bridges of cooperation with Macedonian revolutionary movements.

This is well illustrated in the Congress of Armenian, Macedonian, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Bosnia-Herzegovinian Representatives held in The Hague, which would mobilize the leadership (see the discussion below). Although the Young Turks were not present, allegedly because they could not spare the time to send a representative, the Hague Congress was a success in terms of having antagonistic representatives talking to each other for the first time. This led them to meet again in Geneva.<sup>98</sup>

The 1906 gathering of Armenian and Balkan revolutionary forces in Geneva created intense frictions between ARF and Young Turk leaders even if this coalition of anti-Hamidian forces—considered by some an unattainable dream—culminated in positive results:

Geneva, the meeting place of all rebels from the east, became the center of this meeting that was organized by the editorial board of "Droshak." Greek, Macedonian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Bosnian, Herzegovinian, and Armenian elements participated. Turks were absent, because they could not provide a representative to participate in the meeting. This was the first effective meeting that brought together elements who in the past had divergent and sometimes contradicting agendas. The main objective was



to create some sort of *modus vivendi* among the forces struggling against the regime of the sultan. The meeting also dealt with the means by which to topple the oppressive regime.<sup>99</sup>

After much deliberation, participants formulated a united resolution that called for:

1. Putting aside any and all infighting and animosity toward each other;
2. Fighting against the sultan's regime in a united front;
3. Granting self-rule for Macedonia, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as a federation of all the small nationalities of the Balkans;
4. Introducing radical changes and constitutional applications within the government of the Ottoman Empire;
5. Struggling to attain the above objectives with a united front until the existing regime was toppled.<sup>100</sup>

#### ANTRANIG'S MISSION TO BULGARIA

Of all the contacts established between the two communities, the May visit of Antranig (Toros Ozanian) stood out. When he arrived in Filipe, a visit that was kept secret for some time by order of the Bulgarian government, ARF members were elated. Most could finally meet their hero, who, it must be acknowledged, was not simply on a relaxing trip.

Antranig's visit to Bulgaria was a result of the ARF Eastern Bureau's decision to lay low in the eastern *vilayets*, especially because the beleaguered fedayeen's move to regain popular support had backfired. This led British consul Heathcote Smith to opine:

Unless the ultimate organizers of the Armenian revolutionary movement are misled by the analogy of Macedonia, where the conditions are totally different, if only on account of the propinquity of independent nations allied by race to the various parties hostile to Turkish rule, it is not easy to see what they hope to gain from a policy of isolated attacks on the Imperial forces.<sup>101</sup>

From his hideout in the village of Sadovo near Filipe, Antranig cultivated relationships with Macedonian revolutionaries, especially after Rosdom had left the Balkans for the Caucasus.<sup>102</sup> Antranig was anxious to assess intrinsic capabilities firsthand and wished to meet with Bulgarian officials to determine whether mutually beneficial steps were possible. In a letter addressed to Khachatur Malumian (Aknuni),<sup>103</sup> Antranig

wrote that EMRO leader Boris Sarafov suggested that he meet with the minister of war of Bulgaria, to acquaint himself with the higher circles of the Bulgarian government.

General Sazov, the minister of war, was already aware of Antranig's arrival and was probably briefed by a senior EMRO leader, Liapov. The coveted meeting occurred on May 30, 1906, in the presence of Liapov as well as Yervant Alajajian, a member of the ARF Balkans Central Committee. According to Antranig, the minister asked pertinent questions regarding Armenian revolutionary movements and the difficulties encountered within the Ottoman Empire, especially in its eastern provinces. He stressed that his diplomatic answers satisfied the minister, though he was careful not to reveal details. Moreover, when Sazov asked about the ARF's arming tactics and whether the organization was financially solvent to carry on with the endeavor, Antranig managed to put his interlocutor at ease.<sup>104</sup>

During the three-hour meeting Sazov proposed an accord with the ARF, along the following main lines:

1. ARF arms shipments from Vienna or elsewhere could be brought through Bulgaria without paying any taxes, as merchandise destined for Macedonian revolutionaries. The government would then take care of transporting the weapons to a port of the ARF's choosing.<sup>105</sup>
2. The Bulgarian government proposed to accept and train gratis twenty students per year in the Bulgarian Reserve Forces Academy. The Bulgarian government was ready to train at least four hundred Armenian youths (the number could grow to much more than that) in military combat and assign special officers to them.
3. The Bulgarian government wanted the ARF to have more cordial relations with the Macedonian revolutionaries and expressed readiness to do so. It would provide the ARF with explosives as well as training cadres in using new machine guns and deliver them to the ARF.

Whether these points illustrated exclusive support for Armenian revolutionary movements or whether Sazov was preparing for a Bulgarian-Turkish debacle was difficult to determine. Suffice it to say that the Ministry of War was simultaneously preparing for an imminent confrontation, which Sofia concluded might happen in no more than two to three years.<sup>106</sup>

Expected skepticism aside, the nonconformist Antranig was impressed by the Bulgarian minister's overtures, as he quoted verbatim

comments that he must probably have received from Sazov. According to Antranig, Sazov declared: "I am extremely happy that I had the pleasure of meeting the most illustrious Armenian hero and freedom fighter of the Armenian revolutionary movement. In the name of the Bulgarian intelligentsia and the highest state authorities, I promise to do whatever I can to lend a helping hand to your endeavors." Antranig's letter then offered the following commentary on these remarks: "It was clear from the minister's utterances that he was not conveying a personal message.... Rather he was passing on an official statement, since we later knew that he had already met and had consulted with the Prince [Ferdinand] before meeting me."<sup>107</sup>

It must be stressed that Antranig was eager to persuade the ARF Western Bureau, then headed by Aknuni (Khachatur Malumian), who was reserved about the venture and perhaps partially motivated by his own interactions with İttihadist elements in Europe. After all, Aknuni was the chief ARF negotiator with both Prince Sebahattin and Behaettin Şakir and seldom appreciated being upstaged, even by a national hero like Antranig.

Beyond personal interpretations, it was also important to keep in mind that the Second Conference of Anti-Hamidian Forces was to convene in December 1907, just after the ARF's Fourth General (World) Congress. The congress was scheduled to vote on whether to embark on bona fide full cooperation with the Young Turks, which may have colored the Aknuni-Antranig clash. As a matter of fact, the ARF Fourth General (World) Congress, held in Vienna a few months later, became a point of friction for Antranig to the extent that he presented his resignation from the party at one point. The problematic issue was the congress's adoption of a socialist ideology for the party as well as the institution of a "Caucasian Program," which was to enmesh the organization in the myriad intricacies of the Russian and Persian revolutionary movements. For Antranig and many other nationalist elements within the party, these moves were tantamount to "deviations" from the real ARF program that concentrated all the party's struggle and efforts for the betterment of life for Armenians in the eastern *vilayets* of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the congress also adopted a resolution of open-ended kinship with other anti-Hamidian revolutionary movements (Macedonians, Albanians, Young Turks), which proposed joint ventures in assassinating Ottoman officials.<sup>108</sup>

Moreover, Antranig was also enraged when the Western Bureau refused to lend the Macedonian revolutionary leader Boris Sarafov a sum

of 50,000 francs, which Sarafov had asked for through Antranig as a debt to be paid later. Instead the Western Bureau decided to present him a sum of only 5,000 francs as a grant. When Sarafov was assassinated several months later, in December 1907, the Western Bureau sent a bouquet to his funeral as well as telegrams of condolence to his father and sister. It was decided that Antranig, Rupen Zartarian, and Mardiros Haroutiunian (from Berlin) should be present at Sarafov's funeral to represent the party.<sup>109</sup>

As a consequence of the decisions of the ARF Congress, Antranig felt alienated from the party and tendered his resignation, which was of course deemed unacceptable and returned to him. Moreover, the Western Bureau sent several prominent ARF members to appease Antranig and to calm him down.<sup>110</sup> Regardless of the remedy sought for Antranig's case, the rift between him and the ARF, which started between late 1907 and early 1908, was not to be closed. Antranig's future movements would show that he preferred to work on his own and without party supervision of his actions.

It is not clear whether Antranig was able to procure any weapons shipments through his Bulgarian connection. In any case the ensuing 1908 revolution in Constantinople, along with the declaration of the second constitutional congress in the Ottoman Empire, made any such cooperation between the ARF and Bulgaria meaningless. The Balkan states, seizing the opportunity of the Young Turk revolution and the consequent power vacuum in the Ottoman capital, joined a new rampage to annex parts of Ottoman Macedonia, which further complicated matters. Antranig, who remained in Bulgaria and maintained strong ties with his hosts, eventually headed an Armenian company under Bulgarian command in the 1912 offensive against the Ottoman army.<sup>111</sup> His contributions proved valuable, especially when Armenian and Balkan revolutionary forces who gathered in Geneva failed to agree on the best options to pursue the Young Turks. Antranig's actions in Bulgaria bolstered the ARF's resolve at the December 1907 Paris assembly,<sup>112</sup> as the anti-Hamidian coalition—sometimes considered an unattainable dream—gradually mustered the necessary energy to move forward. Geneva, opined an astute editorialist, assembled rebels from the East.

The congress also decided to organize another general assembly during December 1906, to invite two prominent French activists, Jean Jaorès and Francis de Pressensè, for guidance and to accommodate them in case they could not attend. Neither militant made it. Consequently, the proposed meeting withered on the proverbial vine.<sup>113</sup>

## THE ARF MILITARY ACADEMY IN TUPNITSA, BULGARIA

Deliberations in Geneva seldom prevented Antranig from setting markers. Indeed his most important accomplishment was the establishment of the ARF Military Academy, which necessitated great sacrifices. While politicians haggled, Antranig acted, mindful of what was needed on the ground. His astute venture was considered of utmost importance to prepare educated military cadres, though ARF committees in the United States subsidized the project.

As in every such venture in need of financial and political backing, ARF officials engaged in intensive negotiations. Several letters were exchanged among the ARF Western Bureau (Geneva), the ARF United States Central Committee (Boston), the ARF Balkans Central Committee, and the ARF Eastern Bureau (Tbilisi). All were keen to see the project through, aware that an ARF Military Academy in Bulgaria would add value in terms of preparing necessary cadres to be sent to the eastern *vilayets* of the Ottoman Empire. While the ARF United States Central Committee sponsored the finances, it also proposed to send several young activists to train at the nascent academy, with the bulk of the cadets drawn from Tbilisi. Local candidates from Filipe as well as several from Egypt also were to participate.

Regrettably, the venture encountered difficulties. The ARF Eastern Bureau was not enthusiastic and refused to allocate the promised personnel. The combined number of potential cadets from the United States and the Caucasus reached fifteen, not a particularly positive figure given what Antranig wished to produce. Following political haggling that illustrated the pettiness of so-called sophisticated cadres, the venture finally took off in late 1906 and completed one ten-month cycle by July 1907. When the ARF United States Central Committee failed to fulfill its financial obligations, the vital ARF Military Academy in Bulgaria was abandoned, a victim of shortsightedness par excellence.<sup>114</sup>

It must be noted, nevertheless, that the Bulgarian government gave the green light for the project only after the ARF promised to keep utmost secrecy. A property in the village of Tupnitsa within the remote Rila Mountains area was secured for the project, and the academy actually operated for a single year under miraculous circumstances. It graduated eighty officers who assumed leadership positions within the ARF's military apparatus.<sup>115</sup>

Moreover, it must be recognized that the academy functioned rather well because of the leadership of Col. Boghos Boghosian of the

Bulgarian army, who had been the critical go-between since 1901. Several Armenians were active in the ranks of the Bulgarian army, so Bedros Seremjian, himself a graduate of the Bulgarian Military Academy with an officer's rank, played a useful role. Simply stated, the Bulgarian government secretly approved the scheme of Armenian and even Bulgarian officers to lend their expertise in training Armenian cadets. Alongside local elements, young men from the Caucasus, the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and even as far away as the United States all responded to Antranig's calls. One of the most prominent cadet-officers was Karekin Nzhdeh (Karekin Der Haroutiunian), who became Antranig's second in command during the 1912–13 Balkan Wars.<sup>116</sup>

According to Ottoman sources, fifty graduates from the military academy formed a company under the leadership of Col. Boghos Boghosian of the Bulgarian army. Not surprisingly, they were dressed in regular Bulgarian army uniforms and transported to the Rila Monastery area, where they continued their military training. Several of the promising cadets were later accepted into the Bulgarian Officers' Academy and continued their education in Radomir.<sup>117</sup> It is equally interesting that not only the Ottoman government but Russian authorities were distressed by this endeavor. Accordingly, Russian officers agreed with their Bulgarian counterparts to keep the Armenians within Bulgarian territories, to prevent them from reaching the Caucasus.<sup>118</sup> Ottoman sources claimed that a second school of an entirely different nature operated in Bulgaria, which raised serious concerns. This venture allegedly specialized in the manufacture of explosives and bombs, which also preoccupied Ottoman authorities.<sup>119</sup>

#### THE 1907 SECOND ANTI-HAMIDIAN CONGRESS AND THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

As noted above, the Fourth ARF General Congress, which was held in Vienna in 1907, decreed that:

being well aware of the fact that the government tries everything in its power to put one revolutionary faction against another in order to secure its position, the congress calls upon all not to fall in such traps. Fights, such as those between Greek and Bulgarian factions in Macedonia, should be stopped. All means should be directed against our common enemy, the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II.<sup>120</sup>

Although such a conclusion was elementary, the mere necessity to reiterate it illustrated significant gaps among protagonists, which were cleverly exploited by Constantinople. The Fourth ARF World Congress decided that the Party's Constantinople Responsible Body would henceforth oversee future relations with the Young Turks, hoping that proximity might favorably influence Ottoman decision-makers.<sup>121</sup>

Parallel to the ARF assembly, the Second Anti-Hamidian Congress convened in Vienna between December 27 and 29, 1907.<sup>122</sup> To no one's surprise, the most important resolution passed by the attending delegates was to call on Abdülhamid II to abdicate, although an equally valuable initiative was debated to usher in a new constitutional government. The rebellion within the Ottoman army, which started in June 1908 in Manastir, ultimately compelled the sultan to accept the reinstitution of the constitutional monarchy that was suspended in 1877.<sup>123</sup> Regardless of the new situation, and contrary to the stance of their Armenian counterparts, IMRO leaders viewed the Young Turk revolution with suspicion and tried to resist it, because they still aimed for the total separation of Macedonia from the empire. Disputes among the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek factions within the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement(s), however, worked against the creation of a united front. In the end Macedonians went with the flow, as they tried to campaign for political goals that could only be accomplished within the Ottoman parliament. Like Armenians, Macedonians participated in the elections even though they were maligned by ethnic and religious divisions. Armenians secured almost fourteen seats versus twenty-two for the Macedonians, distributed as follows: eight Albanians, seven Greeks, four Bulgarians, and three Serbians.<sup>124</sup>

Notwithstanding this electoral victory, divisions surfaced as soon as the parliamentary elections ended. As early as September 12, 1908, Bulgaria took over the Eastern Rumelia railways because of a work stoppage and, even more ominously, announced its complete independence from the Ottoman Empire on September 22, 1908. On October 5 a new "monarchy" was proclaimed, according to which southern Bulgaria—which until then was under nominal Ottoman suzerainty—was annexed to Bulgaria. On October 6 the Austrian Empire broadcast its annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Greece seized Crete. This brought forth a full-fledged Balkan Crisis, though none of the Great Powers responded favorably. In the face of such nonchalance, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece started military preparations to reinforce political decisions, to secure by

sheer military force what officials eager to distance themselves from the Ottoman Empire craved most. As it turned out, preparations were not in vain: the 1912–13 Balkan Wars affirmed what most suspected.<sup>125</sup>

As soon as the Young Turk revolution occurred, Macedonian revolutionaries operating from within both Bulgaria and Macedonia sided with Bulgaria. Militant leaders gathered in Filipe, where it became clear that war preparations were urgently needed. Close associations were activated between Macedonian and Armenian revolutionaries in Bulgaria to plan subversive acts in Constantinople.<sup>126</sup> When Ottoman spies learned that such preparations were underway, a trained officer was dispatched to Sofia, ostensibly to investigate and if possible disrupt any concrete plans.<sup>127</sup> This was yet another example of how prescient Armenian and Macedonian revolutionary officers were: every single decision, measure, or plan elicited a sustained Ottoman response.

#### THE ARF BALKANS ORGANIZATION, 1909–1911

The ARF Balkans organization held its ninth regional congress in April 1909. The minutes of the congress show that nine ARF bodies existed in the Balkans at the time: Filipe, Sliven, Burgaz, Varna, Ruschuk, Konstanza, Sulina, Galas, and Brayla. The ARF Balkans Central Committee was operating out of Ruschuk.<sup>128</sup> In its report to the congress and the ARF Western Bureau, the ARF Balkan Central Committee stated that fifty rifles from the military academy project together with ten thousand to twelve thousand bullets had been transferred to Yergir (literally meaning country, but in this case denoting the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire). The report explained that the transfer had been problematic and that some ten thousand bullets and other military equipment still remained in the Balkans awaiting shipment.<sup>129</sup>

The report also portrayed the ARF organization in the Balkans as rendered weak after the 1908 Constitutional Movement in Constantinople:

our region became ineffective due to lack of interest by members.... Most of the bodies in cities mentioned above were non-existent.... Many of our important cadres are now members in the Bulgarian and Rumanian Socialist parties, and the ARF does not exist for them anymore.... Most of the ARF leader cadres left the Balkans after 1908.... We are now in need of some such cadres to return.<sup>130</sup>



## ANTRANIG AND THE BALKAN WARS

One of the most interesting—albeit puzzling—events of the 1912–13 Balkan Wars was the participation of an Armenian company alongside the Bulgarian army. We have no evidence that the ARF Western Bureau or the Constantinople Responsible Body of the organization, led by none other than Aknuni, sanctioned such a venture. According to Dasnabedian, “the final rupture between the ARF and the CUP took place in June or July of 1912. The Dashnak Party was once again transformed into an underground organization.”<sup>131</sup> Antranig, who construed this rupture as a green light for his units to join the Bulgarian army, filled a small yet critical leadership vacuum against Ottoman forces. Though unconventional by every stretch of the imagination because of his spirited personality, Antranig nevertheless informed the ARF Balkan Central Committee of the formation of the Armenian company, his planned activities, and, most important, his liaison efforts with Macedonian revolutionary groups.<sup>132</sup> Still, the wars that ensued imposed considerable constraints.

The 1912–13 wars consisted of two successive military conflicts that deprived the Ottoman Empire of almost all of its remaining territories in Europe. The First Balkan War was fought between members of the Balkan League—Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro—against the Ottoman Empire, whereas the Second Balkan War began when Serbia, Greece, and Romania quarreled with Bulgaria over the division of their joint conquests in Macedonia. The Armenian company to fight alongside the Bulgarians would be part of the Makedono-Odrinsko Opalchenie (Macedonia-Adrianople Volunteer Unit), which also included several Macedonian companies. According to Armen Suni, a medical doctor and the noncommissioned health and sanitation officer of the Armenian company, “The Armenian Company numbered no more than 230 men, the officers included.... The company underwent intensive training under the leadership of Karekin Nzhdeh, an Armenian Captain [*sic*] in the Bulgarian Army.... Within two weeks it had its first victory in the Kircaali sector against General Mehmet Yaver Paşa’s Third Turkish Army Corps, which was later forced to surrender.”<sup>133</sup> This eyewitness account confirmed that Armenians were fully engaged in battle even if their relatively small numbers were not decisive. Moreover, rumors surfaced that Armenian volunteers serving in the Bulgarian army had massacred Turkish troops while engaging with them near Kavala. The ARF in Constantinople feared that these rumors might feed a frenzy of retaliatory actions against Armenians in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The

issue was somewhat settled when telegrams from the Balkans confirmed that survivors of the Ottoman army unit in question had reported that it was a Bulgarian regiment that had inflicted the massacre. It is critical to note that some eight thousand Armenians were conscripted within the different Ottoman armies deployed throughout the theaters of operations. Ironically, and no matter how reluctant most of these conscripts were, they fought better than others. Indeed, in the words of a leading historian of the period, who quoted a battlefield Ottoman commander, Gen. Yaver Paşa, the Armenian soldiers provided “valiant service in the Balkans.”<sup>134</sup> *Azadamard*, the ARF organ in Constantinople, prominently published the statement of the Ottoman minister of war, Nazım Paşa, to the effect that Armenian soldiers serving in the Ottoman army in the Balkans should be commended for their conduct and bravery.<sup>135</sup>

On either side of the conflict, Armenians were dedicated, even if Antranig’s troops were far more motivated: led by a gutsy officer who shared with his men a long-term salutary vision for the nation.

What actually occurred on various battlefields earned Antranig his well-deserved reputation, but it is useful to revisit the key development that crowned his fame. After capturing Dedeagaç and entering the village of Osmancik, Armenians were stationed near Merhamlu village on the banks of the Maritsa (Merich) River.<sup>136</sup>

Leon Trotsky—who at the time was a correspondent for *Kievskaya Mysl’* (Kiev Thought) working under the pen name Andit Odon—interviewed Antranig: “Andranik, a hero of song and legend, stood at the head of the Armenian volunteer troops formed in Sofia. He is of middle height, wears a peaked cap and high boots, is lean, with graying hair and wrinkles, fierce mustaches, and a shaved chin, and has the air of a man who, after an over-long historical interval, has found himself once more.” When Trotsky pressed Antranig to explain his motivation, he replied: “I never engaged in hostile acts against the peaceful Turkish population; I only fought against the beys and against the government. I am not a nationalist. I recognize only one nation: the nation of the oppressed.”<sup>137</sup>

This was enlightening in more ways than one. It partially explained the war hero’s differences with the ARF as well as his ideological ease with Macedonian revolutionary movements. While the Bulgarian government granted Antranig Bulgarian citizenship at the end of the war and he settled in Varna (where he lived with his sister, Nazeli, until the beginning of World War I), he never felt beholden to a particular government.

Contrary to the wishes of the Bulgarian government,<sup>138</sup> Antranig abandoned his relatively comfortable zone and traveled to Tbilisi by way

of Costanzia-Batumi, finally arriving in Transcaucasian Armenia. If this is true, "the call of the oppressed" seemed to mobilize him once again as he assumed command of the First Armenian Volunteer Unit serving within the Russian army in the Caucasus.<sup>139</sup> It must be stated that Antranig was accompanied by Karekin Nzhdeh, Krikor Amirian, and several of the ranked Armenian cadres of the Bulgarian army.<sup>140</sup>

### CONCLUSION

Armenian-Macedonian relations were part of the revolutionary zeal of the period: both peoples harbored legitimate grievances overlooked by the 1878 Berlin pact. Moreover, it was obvious that the relationship was blessed and even nurtured by the Bulgarian government, which tried to use it as a trump card against Constantinople. In fact, and regardless of intentions, Armenian-Macedonian relations were predicated on the policies of the Bulgarian government, which seldom wasted a chance to take advantage of an opportunity. Sofia's readiness to corral anti-Ottoman forces within its territories was entirely understandable and eminently logical. Likewise, Ottoman awareness of secretive activities perpetrated by Armenian and Macedonian revolutionaries in Macedonia and even within Bulgaria proper indicated the amateurish character of both revolutionary groups, which was also comprehensible under the circumstances. Even Antranig's activities, which created serious problems for the fledgling Armenian revolution, fit into this overall pattern. Antranig could not pursue his long-term strategies independently, which necessitated close cooperation with various Macedonian revolutionary movements for basic survival. The legendary Armenian hero, a maverick par excellence, was fascinated by his own accomplishments rather than managing the task at hand as envisaged by the ARF. He was enthralled by Bulgarian intrigues to the detriment of the Armenian cause, which limited his independence and perhaps reduced his potential.

Moreover, the ARF Balkans Central Committee's public flyer, published at the end of the war in 1913, was yet another example of how the glorification of the Armenian Company and its travails during the First and Second Balkan Wars—to the detriment of the ARF Western Bureau and the Constantinople Responsible Body—was, to say the least, harmful to already damaged Armenian-Young Turk relations:

Compatriots, Volunteers: There will come a beautiful day, when darkness and the long night of repression is destroyed and

replaced with the sun of a new life. At that time, the Armenian nation will remember its sons who fought and fell in Macedonia, since their souls will then be united with the souls of those who fought and fell for the creation of a beautiful Armenian sunrise.... Hurrah for those Armenian volunteers who participated in the battle for the liberation of Macedonia.... Hurrah for the leaders of the Armenian Company, Antranig and Nzhdeh.

ARF Balkans Central Committee  
November 8, 1913<sup>141</sup>

Antranig's symbolic participation in the Balkan Wars on Bulgaria's side occurred at a time when some eight thousand Armenian soldiers were serving in the Ottoman army in the Balkan theaters. Regrettably, the whole debacle failed to protect or serve Armenian interests, as it further alienated the ARF from the Young Turks. This in turn left a negative impact on the Armenian Reforms Project within the eastern *vilayets* of the Ottoman Empire that was already in the works.

#### NOTES

1. Please refer to Garabet K. Moundjian, "From Millet-i Sadika to Millet-i Asiya." Reading this essay is important in terms of having the requisite background for a thorough understanding of this chapter.
2. The Armenian struggle and the subsequent cooperation between the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and the Young Turks—between 1902 and 1907 and beyond—was materialized in December 1907 in Vienna, by the signing of a joint agreement and declaration. As can be inferred from the essay cited in note 1, this agreement shows that the Young Turks were more than willing to cooperate with the ARF but not with the MRO and its subsidiaries, IMRO, EMRO (External Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), and MARO (Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization), which adhered to a program of total separation from the Ottoman Empire.
3. Hrach Dasnabedian, *Badmutyun Hay Heghapokhagan Sharzhman u Hay Heghapokhagan Tashmagtsutyan*. In fact Dasnabedian devotes many pages for this subject.
4. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Rumeli Mufettişliği Tasnıfı, Manastır Evraki (TFR.İ.MN) (1322–23, 1904–5, Cild II), 2222–46–126, *Petrof gunlerinde hudud tecavuz etmek üzere Kostendilde Makedonya Cemiyyeti fesadiye tarafından açılan deftere bazı kişilerin kaydedilmeleri* (1899).
5. The city of Ruschuk was the center of Armenian agitation as early as the 1880s. The Rusjuk activities are explained well in Bülent Yıldırım, "Bulgaristan'daki Ermeni Komitelerinin Osmanlı Devleti Aleyhine Faaliyetleri."
6. Portukalian was one of the first young, educated Armenians to hear the call of the

- “country” (Yergir, meaning the eastern provinces of the empire). He had settled in Van as early as 1878. Portukalian was later arrested and exiled as an agitator. He settled in Marseilles and started editing the journal *Armenia*. His students—who received the volatile essays he penned in *Armenia*—formed the Armenagan Party in Van in 1885.
7. The party membership later dissolved within the Hunchakian Party and the ARF, while its remnants were later absorbed within the Ramgavar Azadagan Gusagtsutyun (Populist Freedom Party, Ramgavar), which was formed in Constantinople in 1908.
  8. *Dzrakir Hunchakian Gusagtsutyun*, 2nd ed., abridged (London: n.p., 1897).
  9. This happened in 1896. The western Armenian leaders of the party adamantly wanted a purely nationalistic party with no socialist ideology, while their eastern Armenian counterparts remained unyielding in this matter. This polarization within the party continued until 1907, when the party’s General Meeting in Vienna assumed both eastern and western Armenian demands within its general strategy. This action led many members from both factions to leave the party for good.
  10. The Zeytun rebellion of 1895 was in conjunction with the Sasun rebellion of 1894. Both led to further Armenian bloodshed throughout 1895 and 1896.
  11. Dasnabedian, *Badmutyün*, 109–122, 123–27.
  12. *Ibid.*, 128–50. The party program was finally formulated and adopted during the Fourth ARF General Congress held in Vienna in 1907.
  13. Dasnabedian, *Badmutyün*, 52–87.
  14. *Ibid.*, 20–22, 28–29.
  15. *Ibid.*
  16. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 209.
  17. Mercia MacDermott, *Freedom or Death: The Life of Gotse Delchev* (London: Journeyman Press, 1978), 322. *Times* (London), September 16, 1924, 9: an interview with Todor Alexandrov titled “How Gotse Delchev Explained the Aim of the Struggle against the Ottomans in 1901” (such as “We have to fight for autonomy of Macedonia and Adrianople regions as a stage for their future unification with our common fatherland, Bulgaria”).
  18. Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 64.
  19. The complete name of the school is Sts. Cyril and Methodius Bulgarian Men’s High School of Thessaloniki. It was one of the most influential Bulgarian educational centers in Macedonia and southern Thrace (founded in autumn 1880 in Salonika and closed in 1913). See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian\\_Men%27s\\_High\\_School\\_of\\_Thessaloniki](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_Men%27s_High_School_of_Thessaloniki) (accessed December 20, 2011).
  20. Dasnabedian, *Badmutyün*, 248.
  21. Mikayel Varandian, *Ho.Hi. Tashnaktsutyun Patmutiun*, 1:259.
  22. Simeon Traychev Radev was a Bulgarophile Macedonian journalist, diplomat, and ardent advocate for a united Macedonian state. See Public Records Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/16651.
  23. BOA, Rumeli Mufettişliği Tasnıfı, Manastır Evrakı (TFR.İMN) (1322–23, 1904–5, Cild II), 327–50–45, *Makedonya komiteleri Manastır civarında hareket ve mazbata* (1896); BOA, Hariciye Siyasi Evrakı (HR.SYS) (1791–1918, 173–219 Dosyeler),

- 3362-88-13, *Cenevrede neşrolan Taruşak hakkında Memduh Paşanın arzı* (1896); BOA, Hariciye Siyasi Evrakı (HR.SYS) (1791-1918, 173-219 Dosyalar), 2709-50-77, *Sofyadaki Makedonya Komitesi reislerinden İdama mahkum Gotse Delçef İstibaleceğine dair haber alındığı* (1900). See also BOA, Rumeli Mufettişliği Tasnıfı, Manastır Evrakı (TFR.İ.MN) (1322-23, 1904-5, Cild II), 3039-53-65, *Arnavut ve Bulgar Komitelerinin muzır faaliyetleri karşı alınması gereken tedbirlere da'ir şifre ve telegraflar* (1900).
24. Dasnabedian, *Badmutyun*, 249; BOA, 1128-517-60, *Tahariyye haber: Troşak [Droshak] hey'etinden mektub Bulgar fesad Komiteye*.
  25. IMRO is sometimes referred to as the Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization (IMARO).
  26. Perry M. Duncan, "The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization's Armenian Connection," 63.
  27. Armen, "H. H. Tashnaksutyune Balkanneru Mech," 99-110.
  28. Duncan, "The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization's Armenian Connection," 67. It must be noted that Bulgaria had a sizable Armenian community of around 35,000. The community had grown especially after 1895, when hundreds and even thousands of Armenian deportees from Sasun immigrated there. The same thing happened after 1904-5 as a result of the deportations due to the Second Sasun Rebellion.
  29. Ibid., 64. See also BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evrakı, Umum Vilayetler Tahrirâtı (Y.PR.M.UM), 2288-507-143, *Hincak Ermeni fesad cemiyyetin Pazarcık ve Varnadan bazı Ermeni fesadcuların geldiği (Nalcacıyan, Nahabetyan)*; BOA, Rumeli Mufettişliği Tasnıfı, Manastır Evrakı (TFR.İ.MN) (1322-23, 1904-5, Cild II), 2222-46-126, *Petrof gunlerinde budud tecavuz etmek uzere Kostendilde Makedonya Cemiyyeti fesadiye tarafından açılan deftere bazi kişilerin kaydedilmeleri* (1899).
  30. Duncan, "The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization's Armenian Connection," 64.
  31. Ibid., 64-65. Duncan does not supply the name of the high-ranking ARF operative. No such ARF body as the "Central Committee of Geneva" existed. The body in question was the ARF Western Bureau.
  32. Armen, "H. H. Tashnaksutyune Balkanneru Mech," 65.
  33. Ibid., 155-59.
  34. Duncan, "The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization's Armenian Connection," 66. The ARF later tried to assassinate Abdülhamid in 1905; see Moumdjian, "From Millet-i Sadika."
  35. Ibid., 66. Duncan is confused regarding the bombing of the Ottoman Bank Center in Constantinople. That event had taken place in 1896. See Moumdjian, "From Millet-i Sadika." As to the bombing of the Salonika branch of the Ottoman Bank, IMRO operatives accomplished that in 1903. See the section on the 1903 Macedonian Rebellion.
  36. Ibid., 66-67; BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evrakı, Umum Vilayetler Tahrirâtı (Y.PR.K.UM) (Cild II) (28-54 Numaralı Dosyalar), 2222-46-126. Merdzhanov was arrested in Constantinople. He was extradited to Bulgaria, however, where he was later released, only to be caught and hanged in 1901.
  37. Armen, "H. H. Tashnaksutyune Balkanneru Mech," 99-110.

38. Duncan, "The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization's Armenian Connection," 66–67.
39. Dasnabedian, *Badmutyun*, 249.
40. Armen, "Ho. Hi. Dashnaktsutiune Balkanneru Mech," 105–6. See also Hagop Manjikian, ed., *H. H. T. Albom-Atlas, Tutsaznamard, 1890–1914*, 39, 43, 45, 53. See also BOA, Rumeli Mufettişliği Tasnıfı, Manastır Evrakı (TFR.İ.MN) (1322–23, 1904–5, Cild II), 3134–54–32, *Makedonya erbabi fesad, Siroz, Hristo, ve Anfokolonun Edirne'de tutulduğu (1901)*; BOA, Rumeli Mufettişliği Tasnıfı, Manastır Evrakı (TFR.İ.MN) (1322–23, 1904–5, Cild II), 1746–503–128, *Selanık Ermeni fesadcıların yakalanması için tedbirlerin alınması*.
41. Mizanji Murad Bey was a proponent of a palace coup d'état and hence a close associate of Damad Mahmud Paşa. He was one of the first reformists to escape Abdülhamid's wrath and relocate to Paris, where he started publishing his periodical *Mizan* (Balance) and calling upon all anti-Hamidian elements to unite. He was co-opted by Abdülhamid and accepted a pension. Thus he returned to Constantinople and lived comfortably. Murad Bey restarted the publication of *Mizan* after the 1908 revolution and aligned himself with the anti-CUP camp during the anti-revolutionary movement of March–April 1909. He was subsequently apprehended and incarcerated and died while in prison.
42. See PRO, FO 424.192.95, August 26 (1897), Therapia, Currie to Salisbury: "Murad Bey [Mizanji Murat Bey], however, editor of the 'Mizan' and a former official of the Public Dept [Department] at Constantinople, who shared with Ali [Ahmet] Rıza the leadership of the party in Paris, was induced to join the group of penitents and to throw himself upon the mercy of his Sovereign. He arrived at Constantinople a fortnight ago. It was given out that he had extorted ample promises of reform as the price of his return, including a general amnesty, freedom of the press, Ministerial responsibility, and independent Tribunals. It is even said that he has been placed upon a Commission of Reform, under whose auspices the new era is to be inaugurated.... By the general voice of the party, however, Murad is considered as a traitor, and the list of the promises is evidently mythical." See also BOA, Hariciye Siyasi Evrakı (HR.SYS) (1791–1918, 173–219 Dosyeler), 2713–219–53, *Cenevrede Mizancı Murad Beyin tarafından yayınlanan bir resalenin özetinin Nouvelle Presse gazetesinde çıkması (1897-06-11)*.
43. Ahmet Rıza Bey was an important leader of the émigré Young Turks movement. He completed his education in Galatasaray College and worked in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a translator. In 1884 he went to France to continue his education. While in Paris Rıza became fond of positivism. His periodical *Meşveret* (Consultation) became the mouthpiece of the Young Turk movement. He opposed Prince Sebahattin's local autonomy principle and advocated a central Ottoman government instead. After the 1908 revolution he was elected president of the Ottoman parliament, a post that he kept until 1918.
44. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 128–29.
45. ARF Archives (Boston), Section A (1895–1901), Box 218, documents 57 and 58. The original ARF Archives, which are housed at the Hayrenik (Fatherland) Building in Watertown, Massachusetts, are not yet open to researchers (with a few exceptions, including this author).
46. ARF Archives, Box 218, document 26.

47. ARF Archives, Box 872, document a-5.
48. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 128–29.
49. Ibid. On Minas Cheraz's ties with the ARF and the Hunchak Party, see the content of a letter addressed to him from the ARF Geneva Center, which pleaded with the elderly activist to intervene on ARF's behalf so that it could establish relations with the Anglo-Armenian Association (established in 1893). The ARF Center asked Cheraz if it was possible that the aforementioned association would want to start relations and cooperate with a revolutionary society. ARF Archives, Section A (1895–1901), Box 37, document No. 2.
50. *Droshak* 7:98 (August 1899): 105–7.
51. Damad Mahmut Paşa was a brother-in-law of Sultan Abdülhamid II. He was a member of Midhat Paşa's Young Ottomans (Neo-Ottomans), who were the initiators of the First Ottoman Constitution in 1876. Although Abdülhamid prosecuted the members of this movement and ordered the killing of its leader, Midhat Paşa, many (such as Mahmut) remained at heart Neo-Ottomans. He also was a member of the Palace Party, which was aiming at overthrowing Abdülhamid. After his party's coup attempt was uncovered by the sultan, Mahmud and his two sons swiftly escaped from Constantinople and arrived in Cairo to be under the protection of Egypt's khedive.
52. Behaettin was to assume his father's role after his death and become the leader of the League of Decentralization (Adami Merkeziyyet) faction of the Young Turks in Paris, which advocated local autonomy for the different ethnic elements in the Ottoman Empire. After 1908 Sebahattin formed the Ahrar Fırkası (Freedom-Lover's Party) and became a strong opponent of the CUP in the parliament. This short-lived political party (also in the context of issues relating to İsmail Kemal Bey, who was Sebahattin's most trusted ally) was utterly destroyed by Şevket Paşa's army after the March 31 events, which it adhered to in spite of the movement's association with religious and reactionary elements.
53. Arshag Nersesian (aka Sebuḥ, 1872–1940) was born in Trabzon/Trebizond. He was first a member of the Hunchakian Party, which he left to join the ARF in 1894. He assumed leadership position within the organization. Sebuḥ participated in the ARF Fourth General Congress in Vienna and was involved in the Armenian Volunteer Units formed in the Caucasus in late 1914 as second in command of Antranig's Volunteer Unit, which was the first to enter the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire with the Russian army to aid the Armenians in Van (April–May 1915). He was also involved in the Defense of Baku in 1919. General Sebuḥ became the first Armenian officer to come to the United States (1920) and to obtain a U.S. loan to rehabilitate the Armenian army. General Sebuḥ was involved in the financing of "Operation Nemesis" in Boston, which the ARF had organized after World War I to assassinate CUP leaders accountable for the massacres and deportation of Armenians. Not much is known about Enfiġian and Kalfaian, except that they were part of the local (Egyptian) leadership of the ARF.
54. *Droshak* 7:98 (August 1899): 105–7. For the real name of Sebuḥ (Arshag Nersesian), see Yervant Khatanassian, "Two Glossaries for the Assistance of Researchers in the History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation," *Armenian Review* 3:127 (September 1979): 267–79. Concerning the meeting between the ARF representatives and Damad Mahmut Paşa, see ARF Archives, section A (1895–1901),



- Box 218, document 58. The *paşa* sent his invitation to the ARF branch in Cairo while he was being detained there by the khedive. The ARF Egyptian branch consulted the Geneva center, which gave the green light for the meeting to take place. ARF members conveyed to the *paşa* that they would report the results of the meeting to the ARF center in Geneva, which would then decide if and how to cooperate with him and his sons. Damad Mahmut Paşa was able to meet the ARF representatives while in Egypt, which shows how loosely he was held under house arrest. Although the khedive of Egypt had to save face with the sultan, who was still his superior, he did not hinder the *paşa's* activities.
55. ARF Archives, Section I (1895–1901), Box 218, document 22.
  56. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 128–29, 168–69. Hanioglu writes: “We observe an interesting fact. None of the founders of the CUP was of Turkish origin, and they represented the important Muslim groups in which a strong sense of nationalism was yet to develop—Albanians, Kurds, and Circassians. These ethnic groups also relied on Ottoman protection against Christian groups promoted by the Great Powers’ diplomacy—Greeks, Serbs, Armenians. The participation in the CUP of Turks in large numbers and a sizeable constituency of pro-Ottoman Arabs established the committee as the defender of the Muslims of the empire.”
  57. Ibid.
  58. Ibid., 202. For more regarding the Hanioglu-Ahmad debate regarding Young Turks and their idea of nationalism, see the December 1996 and October 1997 issues of the *American Historical Review*. See also Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 366–70.
  59. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 171.
  60. Ibid. See also BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evrakı, Hariciye Siyasi Evrakı (HR.SYS), 2755-219-95, *Vienna Tagblatt gazetesinin [Damad] Mahmut Paşanın kötü bir beyanatını yayınlaması (1901-01-25)*.
  61. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 176.
  62. Ibid., 128–29, 178.
  63. *Droshak* 2:122 (February 1902): 23–26.
  64. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 179–80.
  65. “Osmantsi Azatakanneri Hamazhoghove,” *Droshak* 12:2 (February 1902): 23; Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 179–80.
  66. Duncan, “The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization’s Armenian Connection,” 61–70.
  67. ARF Archives, Section A (1895–1901), Box 37, document 62. The letter is dated November 1907.
  68. Prince Sebahattin was influenced in not inviting the Macedonians by none other than his most trusted comrade, İsmail Kemal Bey (Vlora). When the abortive mutiny of April 1909 was crushed in Constantinople, it became clear that İsmail Kemal had been in the employ of Abdülhamid since the beginning. In other words, he was one of “The Eyes and Ears” of the sultan in the midst of the Young Turk movement in exile and was feeding the sovereign with journals on a regular basis. More than a hundred journals written by İsmail Kemal were discovered by the special committee tasked with going through Abdülhamid’s journals in the War Office building at the entrance of the Sublime Porte. For more regarding

İsmail Kemal Bey and his workings, see Francis McCullagh, *The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*, 15–19, 293. But the issue of İsmail Kemal needs some elucidation. İsmail Kemal (Qemali in Albanian) was a member of the Liberal Party and often made overtures/retained contacts with Greek, Serb, and Bulgarian activists who supported a Balkan union. By 1910, when McCullagh wrote his book, Kemal was in the middle of a power struggle that pitted British agents against Italians, Serbs, Greeks, and Habsburgs, which may be why Kemal did not support collaboration with IMRO. Therefore McCullagh's suggestion that he was "clearly" an agent of Abdülhamid may be CUP propaganda fed to the British journalist to damage Kemal's chances of forging alliances in the western Balkans. These in time would allow him to challenge Esad Paşa Toptani and eventually be declared the chosen candidate for the European powers after the Balkan Wars. This suggests that attempts were made to position principal actors in the region during the Balkan Wars. In this regard, for example, see Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 118ff.; and Francesco Caccamo, *Il Montenegro negli Anni della Prima Guerra Mondiale* (Rome: Aracne, 2008).

69. ARF Archives, Section A (1895–1901), Box 37, document 62.

70. Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 194.

71. Dr. Behaettin Şakir (1874–1922) was a founding member of the CUP. The committee was founded as a secret society, Committee of Ottoman Union (İttihadi Osmanî Cemiyeti), in 1889 by students from the Medical University in Constantinople (*Tıbbiye*): İbrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, İshak Sükuti, and Ali Hüseyinzade. It must be noted that the Committee of Union and Progress was an umbrella name for different underground factions, some of which were generically referred to as the "Young Turks." Behaettin Şakir transformed these factions into a united political organization by aligning it with the émigré Young Turk movement in Paris in 1906. Şakir assumed important governmental positions after the 1908 Ottoman Constitutional Revolution. He was claimed to be the central figure in the formation of the Teskilat-i Mahsusa, which assumed the role of implementing the Armenian massacres and deportations during 1915–16. The ARF considers Şakir one of the leaders of the Armenian-Azerbaijani War in 1918–20. He was later detained with other members of the CUP, first by a local court-martial and then by the British government. He was sent to Malta pending military trials for "Crimes against Humanity" (vis-à-vis the Armenian massacres and deportations during World War I). Şakir was subsequently exchanged by the British for Allied military prisoners held by the Kemalist forces. Şakir was assassinated on April 17, 1922, through the ARF's "Nemesis" operation.

Because of the fraternal relations between Aknuni, the ARF Western Bureau member, and Behaettin Şakir, which culminated in the two leaders' frequent meetings and exchange of letters, some argue that Şakir was also influenced by the ARF and its internal structure in terms of his reorganization of the CUP in 1906. If we consider that the MRO and later IMRO were themselves influenced by the ARF, it becomes quite apparent that both the IMRO and the CUP were greatly affected by this cross-fertilization of revolutionary ideas, tactics, skills, and networks that took place during these formative years.

72. This was identical to the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization's structure (external [Bulgaria] and internal [Macedonia] committees).

73. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 132, 136–41, 143–57, 161–72.
74. Ibid., 89.
75. Hourı Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911*, 2–3.
76. Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 137.
77. Dikran Kelekian (aka Diran Kelegian) was born in 1862 in Kayseri. He studied in Constantinople and Marseille (the French Academy of Sciences). He was an Ottoman Armenian journalist and a professor at the university in Constantinople, where he influenced many of the future Young Turk leaders. Kelekian was editor of *Cihan* (1883) and *Sabah* (1908). He was killed in Çankırı in 1915.
78. Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 134–36, 139–40.
79. Ibid., 173–75.
80. Hrach Dasnabedian, ed., *Rosdom: Mahvan Vatsunamyagin Artiv*, 79. This volume contains the most publicized writings of one of ARF's founding members, Rosdom (Sdepan Zorian). The article on 76–81 is about the Macedonian revolutionary movement. It is written in Russian and is unfinished. See also Hrach Dasnabedian, ed., *Rosdom: Namagani*, 284–86. Letter 179 is addressed to the Western Bureau (Droshak Headquarters, Geneva).
81. John Macdonald, *Turkey and the Eastern Question* (New York: Dodge Publishing Co., 1913), 34–39, 45–47. As a British reporter, Macdonald was well acquainted with Macedonia and its revolutionary organization. His book was the result of years of experience in covering events in Macedonia for the British media.
82. Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 57.
83. Hrach Dasnabedian, *Badmutyun*, 248. It could be assumed—although we have no firm proof—that the preparation referred to was to coincide with the Bank Ottoman takeover by the ARF in 1896, which could mean that the tunnel was dug as early as that year.
84. G. Megas, *The Boatmen of Thessaloniki: The Bulgarian Anarchist Group and the Bomb Attacks of 1903* (n.p.: Troxalia Publishing, 1994), 52–72.
85. H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future*, 148.
86. Dimitar Gotsev, “The Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising of 1903,” presented at a conference dedicated to the 105th anniversary of the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising at the Macedonian Scientific Institute, 2008.
87. Georgi Khadziev, *Natsionalno Osvobozhdeniye i Bezvlastniyat Federalizum* (Sofia: ARTIZDAT-5, 1992), 99–148.
88. Ibid., 61. In fact the whole uprising was quashed in a mere two months. See also BOA, Rumeli Mufettişliği Tasnifi, Manastır Evraki (TFR.İMN) (1322–23, 1904–5, Cild II), 843–515–127, *Vangelo, Yorgiyef Eşkiya hakkında*.
89. PRO, FO 424.205.4. Freeman to O'Connor, Bitlis, January 10, 1903, No. 1 Confidential, enclosure to Whitehead to Lansdowne, Constantinople, January 27, 1903, No. 42 Confidential.
90. PRO, FO 424.205.107. Hampson to O'Connor, Erzerum, September 2, 1903, No. 28, enclosure in O'Connor to Lansdowne, Therapia, September 17, 1903, No. 571. The project of collecting money from well-to-do Armenians, code-named “Potorig” (Tempest), was the idea of Kristabor Mikayelian, one of the founders of the ARF. The project was initiated in 1903 in Filipe, where it was sanctioned by

a special secretive ARF body known as Dashnaksutyun Gamke Nergayatsnogh Marmin (The Body Representing the Will of the Dashnak Party). When the ARF Third General Congress, held in Varna, Bulgaria, adopted and legitimized the initiative, Mikayelian traveled to the Caucasus, where the project was duplicated in Tiflis and then in Constantinople.

91. Sasun was a mountainous Armenian stronghold in the *vilayet* of Bitlis. The first rebellion there took place in 1894–95 and led to a European reform project for all the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire known as the May Reform Project. For more details regarding the two rebellions in Sasun, see Garabet K. Moumdjian, “From Millet-i Sadika to Millet-i Asiya.”
92. Hrach Dasnabedian, *Nyuter H. H. Tashnagsutyun Badmutyan Hamar* (Beirut: Vahe Setian Publishing), 2:118–19. Eight of these volumes have been printed thus far. The first four volumes were printed under the editorship of Hrach Dasnabedian, while the rest were printed under the editorship of Yervant Pambukian. A word regarding the difference in editorship is in place. When Dasnabedian edited volumes 1 through 4, the archival materials were not yet classified. Hence these documents are cited by page number(s) in the volumes. From volume 5 on, Pambukian used a reference system started in the 1980s, whereby each document had a separate archival referral number attached to it. These are presented here with their reference numbers as well as the page number for the volume that they are in.
93. Armen, “H. H. Tashnaksutyun Balkanneru Mech,” 105.
94. Ibid. See also BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evrakı, Mufettişlikler ve komiserlikler Tahrirâtı (Y.PRK.MK), 1293–1326, 1876–1909 (1–22 Numaralı Dosyalar), 1027–1040, *Rusyadan Bulgaristana gecen Ermeni fesat komitelerimin Rusçuk tüccarlarını sıkıştırdığı* (1901).
95. For a full account of the 1905 futile assassination attempt, see Moumdjian, “From Millet-i Sadika to Millet-i Asiya.” For the ARF internal judicial proceeding on the assassination affair, see the documents regarding the assassination, which make up a huge file within the dossier of the ARF Fourth General (World) Congress, which was held in Vienna, Austrian Empire, in 1907: Armenian Revolutionary Federation Archives, *Nyuter Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagsutyun Badmutyan Hamar*, 5:399–515. The highlight of the Third ARF World Congress, which was convened in Sofia, Bulgaria, in 1904, was its decision to assassinate Sultan Abdülhamid. The highly secretive project was entrusted to Kristabor Mikayelian, one of the founders of the party, who left Geneva for Bulgaria to start preparations. See Hrach Dasnabedian, *H[ay] H[eghapokhagan] Tashnagsutyun Ir Gazmutenen Minchev 1924* (Beirut: Hamazkaine V Setian Press [1980s]), 75–76. The sultan’s assassination project was code-named “Nzhuiki Kordzoghutun” (Operation: The Mare). In the fifth volume of the ARF documents series, however, a second code name, “Vishab” (Dragon), is being used to denote the assassination attempt. See Armenian Revolutionary Federation Archives, *Nyuter H. H. Tashnagsutyun Badmutyan Hamar*, vol. 5, edited by Yervant Pambukian (Beirut: ARF Publications, 2007), 103, which is a letter by Gosti Hambartsumian, one of the members of the ARF central committee in İzmir, who at the time was a fugitive in the city. My assessment is that “The Mare” was the code name for the assassination, while “Vishab” was the code name for the events planned to take place in İzmir.
96. Armen, “H. H. Tashnaksutyun Balkanneru Mech,” 106–7.

97. Ibid., 108.
98. "Dzhghoh Tarreri Hamakhmpumn," *Droshak* 12:178 (December 1906): 178–79.
99. Ibid. Hanioglu maintains that the CUP was not invited to this congress. This is not the case, because its absence was a direct result of its unwillingness to attend and to sit down with Macedonian, Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Bosnian, and Herzegovinian revolutionaries, whom the CUP considered to be separatist elements.
100. "Dzhghoh Tarreri Hamakhembum," 178–79.
101. PRO, FO 424.208.49. Heathcote to O'Connor, Bitlis, May 14, 1905, No. 16, enclosure in O'Connor to Lansdowne, Constantinople, May 30, 1905, No. 372. See also BOA, 1576-199-41, Yıldız Esas Evrakı, Analetik İnvanteri (Y.PRM.UM), *Vi-yenna gazetelerinin Muş ve Bitlis'deki Ermenilerin abvaline da'ir Londra'dan gelen urkutucu telegraflarin tezkibi, 1907-03-30*; BOA, Hariciye Siyasi Evrakı (HR.SYS) (1791–1918, 173–219 Dosyeler), 2714-53-18, Yıldız perakende Evrakı, Arzuhal ve Jurnallar, *1-Rus-Bulgar ve Serbistan, 2-Vanda Ermenilere Zulüm İçin Filippede Mit-ing, 1907*.
102. Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) Archives, Document 1148–54, *Nyuter Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagsutyan Badmutyan Hamar*, 5:368.
103. The letter is dated June 2 (15 per the Gregorian calendar adopted later), and Antranig probably wrote it after returning to Filipe.
104. ARF Archives, Document 1148–58, *Nyuter*, 5:369–71.
105. It seems that Antranig had shopped around and become somewhat fond of the Bulgarian Männlicher rifle, which was cheaper than its Austrian counterpart and of equal quality if not better. Besides, these rifles could be bought (or freely given) by the Bulgarian government with accompanying ammunition.
106. ARF Archives, Document 1148–58, *Nyuter*, 5:369–71.
107. Ibid., 370.
108. The congress also adopted a resolution to bolster the smuggling of revolutionary literature into the Ottoman Empire and even to publish such literature in places like Van and Erzurum (*Sabah Ul Heyr* [Good Morning] was one such a publication emanating from Van). ARF Archives, Document 44. This is a registry of all decisions by the ARF Western Bureau between 1907 and 1908. Especially important are decisions in Sub-Documents: 12 (October 18, 1907), 13 (October 29, 1907), 15 (November 7, 1907), 17 (November 19, 1907), 18 (November 30, 1907), 22 (December 14, 1907), 25 (January 20, 1908), 29 (February 13, 1908), and 30 (February 20, 1908): *Nyuter*, 7:5–40.
109. ARF Archives, General Document 44, Sub-Document 21 (December 12, 1907), *Nyuter*, 7:44.
110. ARF Archives, General Document 44, Sub-Document 34 (24 March, 1908), *Nyuter*, 7:56.
111. See the section on Antranig and the Balkan Wars below.
112. BOA, Hariciye Siyasi Evrakı (HR.SYS) (1791–1918, 173–219 Dosyeler), 2705-52-29, Yıldız perakende Evrakı, Arzuhal ve Jurnallar, *Jön Türkler, Ermeni Komiteçileri ve Bulgar Komiteçilerinin Toplantralile Aldıkları Tedbirler (1907)*.
113. Turhan Bey's report to the central government makes it evident that Ottoman authorities were closely following ARF activities at The Hague. See BOA, Yıldız

- Perakende Evraki, Komisyonlar Maruzatı (Y.PRK.KOM) 1294-1341, 1877-1923, (1-16 Numaralı dosyalar), 1652-15-58-6, *Labey Konferasında Ermenilerin Nelidof ve Baron Marsaliyle yaptıkları görüşmelerin akım kaldığı hususunda Turhan Paşadan gelen haber (1907)*; BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evraki, Mufettişlikler ve komiserlikler Tahriratı (Y.PRK.MK), 1293-1326, 1876-1909 (1-22 Numaralı Dosyalar), 1621-15-36, *Sofya Ermenilerinden Labey konferansına telegraf gönderildiği ve benzeri fesatların önlenmesine çalışıldığı (1907)*.
114. ARF Archives, Document 1148-61, *Nyuter*, 5:373-79.
  115. BOA, Yıldız Mutenevî'i Maruzat Evraki, Analitik Envanteri (Y.MTVİ), 6090-311-86, *Bulgaristan dabilinde Ermenilerin gizli bir mektep bulunduğu ve bu hususta tahkikat yapılması (1907)*. The information contained in this document shows that Ottoman intelligence was aware of the military school and was meticulously collecting information about its activities and reporting it to Ottoman authorities in Constantinople.
  116. In fact Nzhdeh had problems with some of the cadets while attending the academy. He asked and was transferred to the Bulgarian Reserve Forces Academy and graduated from there with the rank of second lieutenant. In 1912, when the Armenian company was made part of the regular Bulgarian army, Nzhdeh was appointed its commander, while Antranig was given the honorific title of *volvod* (commander of partisan forces). It was only at the end of 1912, and in honor of his actions during the war, that Antranig was given the rank of second lieutenant. See Avo, *Nzhdeh*, 21-22, 36-51; Armen, "H. H. Tashnagsutyune, Balkanneru Mech," 109-110; Manjikian, *H. H. T. Albom-Atlas*, 182-86. All indications show that Boris Sarafov was instrumental in securing the Bulgarian government's approval for the opening of the military academy. Macedonian revolutionaries were educated there too. After the liquidation of the academy on orders from the Bulgarian government (under extreme diplomatic pressure from the Ottoman government), the rifles and other instructional materials were taken by the Bulgarian (Balkan) Central Committees of the ARF and were used to train members under the pretext of hunting expeditions: Dasnabedian, *Badmutyun*, 60-61. During the ARF Forth General Congress, Antranig presented a detailed memorandum regarding the military school. It is apparent that he tried to secure the Western Bureau's blessing for the venture, but Khachatur Malumian (Aknuni) did not encourage it. This indicates friction between the two regarding the academy. Antranig went ahead with the project, however, because he had assurances from the highest authorities within the Bulgarian government. The course was designed on the basis of ten months of instruction.
  117. BOA, Yıldız Mutenevvi Maruzat Evrakı (Y.MTV.), No. 297/78, *Bulgaristan Komiseri Ferik Sadık Paşanın mabeyn'i Hümayun ve Cenebi'i Mülûkhane Baş Kitaberi'i Celilesi Aliyesine, 30 Nisan (1907)*.
  118. *Ibid.*, No. 311/185, Leff. 2. See also Roderic H. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis: 1912-1914," 486.
  119. BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evraki, Mufettişlikler ve Komiserlikler Tahriratı (Y.PRK.MK), 1293-1326, 1876-1909 (1-22 Numaralı Dosyalar), 2474-22-36, *Filibede bir Ermeni mektebinde dinamit ve bomba i'mal edildiği istihbaratın Bulgar Emaratince Araştırılması (1907)*.

120. "Miyatsyal Ashkhatanki Koch," *Droshak* 1:189 (January 1908): 1-5.
121. Dikran M. Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology under Ottoman Rule, 1908-1914*, 5.
122. Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mucadele* (İstanbul: Çeltüt Printing, 1959), 443-49.
123. Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology*, 2; BOA, Rumeli Mufettişliği Tasnifi, Manastır Evraki (TFR.İ.MN) (1322-23, 1904-5, Cild II), 1907-71-51, *Manastır mantakası kumandanlığın vekilinin arz ettiği İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyetin Meşrutîyyetin İ'lanını istyen arzıası* (1908).
124. The proportion of Macedonian deputies to their Armenian counterparts in the Ottoman parliament was almost two to one. This means that the Macedonians could muster a more sizable vote in the parliament. In fact, while the ARF coalesced with the CUP, the Macedonians chose to throw in their lot with Prince Sebahattin and his League of Decentralization, which had also secured the coalition of other minority elements such as the Greek and Armenian (Hunchak) deputies.
125. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılap Tarihi*, vol. 1, 429-79.
126. BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evraki, Mufettişlikler ve komiserlikler Tahrirâtı (Y.PRK.MK), 1293-1326, 1876-1909 (1-22 Numaralı Dosyalar), 2510-22-72, *Bulgarların Filipede yaptıkları miting* (1908); BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evraki, Mufettişlikler ve komiserlikler Tahrirâtı (Y.PRK.MK), 1293-1326, 1876-1909 (1-22 Numaralı Dosyalar), 2511-2-73, *Bulgar komite Kongresinde aldığı kararların esasını Bulgar halkını harbe hazırlama konusunun teşkil ettiği ve bu konudaki düşüncüler* (1908).
127. BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evraki, Mufettişlikler ve komiserlikler Tahrirâtı (Y.PRK.MK), 1293-1326, 1876-1909 (1-22 Numaralı Dosyalar), 2562-2-124, *Bulgar çetelerin Osmanlı vilayetlerine muzir evrak soktukları ve bazı şekavet faaliyetlerinde bulundukları* (1908); BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evraki, Mufettişlikler ve komiserlikler Tahrirâtı (Y.PRK.MK), 1293-1326, 1876-1909 (1-22 Numaralı Dosyalar), 2533-22-95, *Balkan-Ermeni İttihad Komitesinin Darsaadette cinayet işleyeceği ve Sofyaya bir zabıt gönderilmesinin geraktığının bildirilmesi* (1908).
128. ARF Archives, Document 1153-80, *Nyuter*, 8:419-30.
129. ARF Archives, Document 1153-1, *Nyuter*, 8:415-18.
130. ARF Archives, Document 1154-139, *Nyuter*, 8:431-35.
131. Hrach Dasnabedian, *H. H. Tashnagsutyanyan Gazmagerbagan Garuytsee Holovuyte Yev Ayl Usumnasirutyunner*, edited by Yervant Pampukian (Beirut: Hamazkayin Vahe Setian Press, 2009), 374.
132. Avo, *Nzhdeh*, 36-48.
133. Armen Suni, *Haygagan Vashde Antranigee Arachnortutyamp 1912-1913 Tva-gannerum Balkanian Baderazmnerum*, 38. See also Arsen Marmarian (Vahan Totovents), *Zoravare Yev Eer Baderazmnere*, 226; Vahakn Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide*, 108.
134. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis," 491.
135. ARF Archives, Section C (1908-14), Box 117, document 8; ARF Self-Defense Body to Samsun Central Committee, November 26, 1912; cited in Kaligian, *Armenian Organization and Ideology*, 160.
136. Dadrian, *Warant for Genocide*, 109.

137. L. D. Trotsky, "Balkany i balkanskaya voina: Andranik i ego otryad," *Kievskaya Mysl'* 197 (July 19, 1913).
138. Bulgaria later joined the war on the side of Germany and the Austrian and Ottoman empires (1915).
139. Although the full history of the Armenian Volunteer Units is beyond the scope of this chapter, suffice it to say that these units, also known the Armenian Volunteer Corps, were the Armenian battalions serving within the Russian army during World War I. General Antranig was the commander of one of these units between 1914 and 1916. The ARF Eighth General Congress, held in Erzurum in June–July 1914, had a very difficult task at hand: what should it do in case of war between the Ottoman and Russian empires? The issue was extremely volatile, because the eastern Armenian delegates pushed for a pro-Russian orientation, while the western Armenian leadership was more reserved, due to the alarming consequences that such an orientation could entail for them. After much deliberation the congress decided by a majority vote that, due to circumstances, the Armenians living on both sides of the border should provide civil and military assistance to their respective countries. A CUP delegation arrived in Erzurum just after the congress had adjourned to cajole the ARF to throw in its lot with the Ottoman Empire and thus be part of a total rebellion of ethnic elements in the Caucasus (including Tatars, Lazes, Georgians, and others) against the Russians. In return the CUP promised the ARF the formation of an autonomous Armenian state encompassing parts of eastern as well as western Armenian territories at the end of the war. The ARF leadership pleaded with the CUP to remain neutral in case of an international conflagration but also added that Ottoman Armenians would serve the interests of the Ottoman state if such a stance could not be assumed. In October 1914 the Armenian National Union in the Caucasus gave the decision for the formation of the Armenian units. Their operation on the side of the Russian army created a controversy that besmirched ARF-CUP relations and gave them a final blow, thus enhancing the case for "Armenian betrayal" for Turkish historiography. For more details regarding the ARF decision in 1914 and the subsequent ARF-CUP negotiations, see the primary material from the Ottoman Archives and ARF leaders' memoirs in my blog titled "Decision of ARF 8th General Congress, Garin (Erzurum), Pertaining to the War," at <http://arfdecision1914.blogspot.com/> (accessed December 20, 2011).
140. Avo, *Nzhdeh*, 53.
141. *Ibid.*, 50–51.



# The Origins of the Balkan Wars

## A Reinterpretation

*Gül Tokay*

Upon signing the Berlin Treaty following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, the European powers established a new status quo in the Balkans that lasted nearly thirty-five years. The treaty left many regional issues unresolved, however, such as border disputes, Christian reforms, and the occupation of local communities in provinces. Under these circumstances the Ottomans quickly learned that the new status quo brought with it new threats. They knew, for example, that Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the existence of a garrison in Novi Pazar, as stipulated under article 25 of the treaty, was part of a far-reaching Austrian plan for the region. This would soon foment discontent and inflame the large Muslim and Christian populations in the area. While Tamara Scheer's essay (chapter 6 in this volume) reveals that such fears about Austro-Hungarian aggression would not stop both powers from recognizing their mutual concerns with South Slav nationalism, the perception that the Ottoman Balkans was under constant threat did shape many of the strategic calculations of officials for years to come.

Likewise, the establishment of a Bulgarian Principality under Ottoman suzerainty in the middle of the Balkans was read as a serious threat to long-term Ottoman stability. Similar concerns existed about the still unresolved case of Eastern Rumelia. Furthermore, reforms for Christians in the Macedonian provinces under European supervision (as stated under article 23) eventually created problems of authority during their implementation, ultimately encouraging various Christian communities still living in the area to adopt strategies to separate their "ethno-national" and/or "sectarian" communities from Ottoman rule (see chapter 3 by Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu and chapter 19 by Sevtap Demirci in this volume).<sup>1</sup>

Still, the mutual efforts of European and regional powers, including the Ottomans, preserved the Berlin settlement until 1908—with the exception of Eastern Rumelia's unification with Bulgaria in 1885. However, the uncertainties of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and, to a greater extent, the shift in the priorities of the European powers were the cause behind two major developments. The first was the crisis of October 1908, caused by the Bulgarian declaration of independence and the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second was the overcoming of differences between the Balkan states that opened the door to forming a military alliance that by 1912 would embolden them to seek out long-lasting objectives in the peninsula.<sup>2</sup>

While the Balkan Wars would not take place until 1912 (as is made clear by a number of contributions in this volume), by the 1908 October crisis it was already certain that a regional war was now unavoidable. The Berlin Treaty of 1878 had become obsolete, and any last vestiges of the Austrian-Russian Entente of 1897 had long since disappeared. Aware of their differences, the signatories of the Berlin Treaty eschewed the conference table and tried to solve the crisis via mediation and bilateral agreements.<sup>3</sup>

Although the October crisis was solved by the spring of 1909, "reformist" policies of the Young Turks, on the one hand, and the differences between the conservative and the liberal powers, on the other, rendered any meaningful cooperation over the affairs of the peninsula impossible. Furthermore, any reform efforts that might have helped to prevent the escalation of the turmoil in the Balkans reached an impasse. Ultimately, all the powers concerned (the Balkan states, the European powers, and the Ottomans) resigned themselves to war as the sole alternative, with the hope that any conflict would remain localized.

Within this framework, this chapter reassesses the origins of the Balkan Wars using the Foreign Ministerial Archives in the Başbakanlık Arşivi/Prime Ministerial Archives, Istanbul (BBA) in a new light and attempts to raise questions for further explorations.<sup>4</sup>

### THE 1908 OCTOBER CRISES

With the restoration of the 1876 constitution after the Young Turk revolution of July 1908 came a brief period of tranquillity in the Balkans. European reforms were set aside; all foreign officials were given unlimited leave, with the exception of the international financial commission, which continued to function until May 1909. The uncertainties that

arose following the 1908 Young Turk revolution, however, provided a new impetus for change in the region. On October 5 the Bulgarians declared independence; Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina the following day.<sup>5</sup>

By late September rumors were already circulating both locally and beyond that the Austrians and Bulgarians had coordinated their policies, thus fully supporting each other's decision to pull Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina away from the Ottoman Empire.<sup>6</sup>

Despite these rumors, the declaration of Bulgarian independence came as a surprise to the Ottomans, giving rise to serious concerns over the possibility of war between the two states. The crisis lasted over five months, culminating in independence for Bulgaria and financial compensation for the Ottomans. It was a long process of negotiations; Russian mediation and British diplomatic maneuvering eventually resolved the crisis. Due to their domestic upheavals, the Ottomans adopted a more passive role, hoping that the British would assist in their standoff with the Bulgarians, who ultimately had the upper hand. As a consequence, with Russian support, Bulgaria gained full independence at the cost of a loan, which consisted of fairly reasonable repayment arrangements.<sup>7</sup>

Prince Ferdinand had been waiting since the beginning of his reign for an opportune moment to declare Bulgarian independence and thus end Bulgaria's vassal status. Ironically, it was the arrival of the new Istanbul regime, under the call for unity and progress, that presented the prince with the necessary circumstances for a declaration of independence.<sup>8</sup> Under no circumstances would Ferdinand have reversed his decision or accepted any form of compensation. For the Ottomans the declaration of independence was a clear violation of the Treaty of Berlin and thus international law. In this regard they expected European assistance in reestablishing the status quo. Kamil Paşa's government sought to organize a conference with the participation of the signatories of the Berlin Treaty, including the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria.<sup>9</sup>

Unfortunately for the new government, the majority of the Great Powers, although skeptical of the Bulgarians' unilateral action, did not express absolute opposition and wished to solve the crisis through a form of compensation (a financial payoff). In this context, as discussions over the idea of a conference continued, the British, under Sir Edward Grey, feared that any conference would not be restricted to the independence crisis and that a revision of some of the articles of the Berlin Treaty could exacerbate already existing differences, which would give rise to far graver consequences. Under these circumstances the British suggested that, in

order to prevent further crises, a direct agreement between the Bulgarians and the Ottomans was a more suitable solution.

Regionally, Kamil Paşa tried to form an alliance with other Balkan states against the Bulgarian threat. He proposed a defensive alliance with the Serbs and the Montenegrins, for example, which was welcomed by the Serbs more as a bulwark against the Austrian presence in the peninsula. The proposals were withdrawn, however, because Grey strongly opposed an alliance pitting Bulgaria against the Serbs, with whom the British enjoyed cordial relations at the time.<sup>10</sup>

During the months following Bulgaria's declaration of independence, the Ottoman government under Kamil Paşa tried to garner support from other Balkan states, but tensions between regional and European states thwarted any joint efforts to solve the Bulgarian Crisis.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, neither the Ottomans nor the Bulgarians were willing to make any compromises, thus bringing the crisis to a deadlock. It was under these circumstances that the Russians decided to intervene in December 1908 in order to counter the possibility of direct Austrian involvement.<sup>12</sup>

Soon after Russian intervention, the situation changed rapidly; by April 1909 the Ottomans had no other choice but to accept the independence of Bulgaria and the proposed financial compensation. On May 19, 1909, the Sublime Porte formally recognized Bulgarian independence, thus ending a tension present in the region since the Treaty of Berlin. While Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire could finally reach an agreement through Russian mediation, the negotiations and the formal ending of the crisis might not have been possible without first British pressure and then support for Russia. Throughout the negotiations the British safeguarded Ottoman interests by insisting on financial compensation for the "loss" of Bulgaria. Britain did not consider reversing either independence for Bulgaria or any discussions pertaining to the 1878 Berlin settlement, however, thus imposing the diplomatic parameters for Russia's diplomatic push regarding the Bulgarian issue.<sup>13</sup>

By the summer of 1909 the resolution of the crisis over Bulgarian independence increased Bulgaria's international prestige. With their new status as a strategically crucial state in the Balkans, the Bulgarians stepped up their activities in the Macedonian lands. As noted in other chapters in this volume, Bulgaria's ambition of annexing the Macedonian provinces no doubt became one of the core problems in the peninsula all the way to the Balkan Wars.<sup>14</sup> Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908 constituted the second crisis in the Balkans that shaped the contours of the future Balkan Wars.<sup>15</sup>

## THE SECOND BALKAN CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1908

The Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been under the occupation of Austria-Hungary since the Treaty of Berlin (1878), as stipulated by article 25. After more than thirty years of *de facto* rule over the provinces, it was not expected that a formal annexation of the territories would cause such a crisis in larger Europe. Indeed the Austrian foreign minister, Count Alois von Aehrenthal, apparently did not even foresee Ottoman resistance.<sup>16</sup> At the core of Vienna's decision to annex the territories was the possibility that the new regime in Istanbul, emboldened by the successes of the recent revolution, could demand a new set of arrangements regarding the status quo in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Aehrenthal decided to annex the provinces, he renounced any claims to the Sandjak/Sanjak/Sancak of Novi Pazar as compensation to the new government in Istanbul.<sup>17</sup>

Instead of being a mere formality, however, this unilateral action by the Austrian foreign minister created a dual crisis. It enraged the Ottomans but also aggravated Serbian circles, which had increasingly viewed Austro-Hungarian centralization as a threat to the long-term goal of consolidating Southern Slav cultural, economic, and political union. Moreover, Aehrenthal's gambit was viewed with skepticism further afield, especially by the Russians, marking the final gasp of an already crumbling Austro-Russian Entente of 1897.<sup>18</sup>

The first signs of a crisis appeared when the CUP government mobilized its population to boycott Austrian goods in order to pressure Aehrenthal to agree to some form of financial compensation for the annexation of the provinces. Although Aehrenthal at first firmly rejected the idea, the length of the boycott eventually forced the Austrian foreign minister to relent and agree on a financial compensation package. Such a concession accompanied the withdrawal of Austrian forces from Novi Pazar in February 1909.<sup>19</sup> Shortly afterward, the crisis between the two states came to an end and relations normalized.<sup>20</sup>

As suggested above, a second set of reactions to Austro-Hungarian expansionism in the Balkans involved Serbian nationalism. The October 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a region inhabited by Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic Slavs, immediately clashed with the growing ambitions of Serbian nationalists, who imagined themselves being the natural beneficiaries of an emerging South Slav consciousness. In this context Serbian hard-liners refused to step back from their vocal opposition, leading to what Amir Duranović explains (chapter 13 of this

volume) as a set of openly hostile measures that included mobilizing Serb (and occasionally Croat) anti-Habsburg operations within the regions in question. Not only the Serbian nationalists but all Serbian circles opposed the annexation and refused to step back before territorial and financial compensation could be made.<sup>21</sup>

Hostilities between Austria and Serbia escalated during the annexation crisis and generated a serious threat to larger European peace. Only the last-minute intervention of the Great Powers prevented the militarization of these hostilities.<sup>22</sup>

When the annexation finally took place, it was strongly opposed by the Serbian government, which demanded compensation in the face of the challenge to the status quo. The Serbs were convinced that Aehrenthal's Sandjak railway project—granted by the sultan at the end of 1907—and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were part of Austrian expansionist policies in the Balkans, which they viewed as a serious challenge to other South Slav communities in the peninsula.<sup>23</sup> Throughout the crisis the Serbs hoped that the Europeans would intervene and bargain for some sort of territorial compensation for them and the Montenegrins. For the Serbs the Bosnian Question was a European one, requiring a new conference involving all the Great Powers in order to find a solution. Only after such a conference where a solution was approved by all the major powers would Serbia accept the annexation and the abrogation of article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin.<sup>24</sup>

Instead the Great Powers, fearing the likely consequences of any escalation of hostilities, decided to intervene by applying pressure on the Serbs. Such pressure came primarily from Britain, which formally asked the Serbs to renounce their claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This pressure from the other European powers forced the Serbs to accept the annexation by the end of March 1909, when Aehrenthal agreed to withdraw his forces from the Sandjak as well. Despite the seeming “end” of the debate, Serbian-Austrian tensions continued to escalate over the years, making it one of the major factors leading to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars.<sup>25</sup>

Internationally the crisis between the Austrians and the Serbs threatened not only to pit these two states against each other but also to involve the rest of the Great Powers,<sup>26</sup> a scenario that was only averted by the last-minute intervention of the powers, Britain in particular. In this respect, although the Serbs did not gain any concessions and had to accept the Austrian annexation of the two provinces, they nevertheless succeeded diplomatically by playing an international role in the Bosnian

crisis. In important ways their opposition highlighted to the other Great Powers the dangers of Austro-Hungarian expansion in the Balkans. This would serve Serbia's long-term goal of convincing other powers, especially France, to identify a mutual enemy in the Vienna regime.<sup>27</sup>

The Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria's declaration of independence in early October 1908 challenged the status quo in the Balkans and ended European collaboration in Balkan affairs. More importantly, it showed the extent to which the powers had drifted away from the Berlin settlement of 1878. The conflicting priorities between the liberal and conservative powers now meant that any attempt at cooperation would serve only to widen the gaps that had opened up between the major powers. The area where such conflicted interests clashed the most proved to be the Ottoman territories of "Macedonia."

#### EUROPE, THE OTTOMANS, AND THE FORMATION OF BALKAN ALLIANCES, 1909–1912

The crisis of Bulgarian independence ended in the spring of 1909, but this did not bring the expected peace to the Macedonian provinces. By the first half of 1909, for example, the activities of local insurgents again brought chaos to the Macedonian provinces.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, most Bulgarian officials, especially King Ferdinand himself, were in favor of Bulgarian unification with the provinces. In this respect key actors within now independent Bulgaria waited for the right moment and set of circumstances in Macedonia to intervene directly.

Equally explosive was the question of refugees. In this regard both the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria had concerns and expressed their sincere desire to maintain cordial relations in order to address the issue of these refugees. But the situation was equally grim for those who wished to emigrate and for those who insisted on repatriation. Although the situation did not develop into a major crisis as a result of the mutual understanding between the two governments, the issue remained unresolved and no doubt contributed to the tensions existing between the two states.<sup>29</sup>

Serbian-Ottoman relations following the annexation crises were generally peaceful. This changed, however, when the Serbs became more and more discontented by what they reported as Albanian excesses in the Rumelian provinces, especially in Kosovo. The Serbs complained that local authorities in Kosovo openly favored the Albanians at the expense of local Serbs, especially when considering many privileges that they had enjoyed under the previous regimes.

Serbs were particularly incensed at the new policy of prohibiting Serbian teachers from teaching in Kosovo. CUP officials saw that this new policy as aimed at assuring that all ethnic groups—Greek, Bulgarian, and Albanian—were to be treated equally: none, including Serbs, would be able to monopolize the education of local Serbs to the detriment of other communities.<sup>30</sup>

At the same time, Serbian officials claimed that regular waves of refugees were coming from the *vilayets* of Rumelia to mainland Serbia. The refugees fled what Belgrade claimed to be “Albanian excesses,” which no doubt contributed to negative public opinion in Serbia proper. It is well documented that the real shift among the different communities of European Turkey emerged in 1909. The new regime began implementing stricter policies at that time under “constitutional reforms” that made the Christian communities, as well as Muslim Albanians, lose many of the privileges that they had previously enjoyed.

Under such circumstances neighboring Balkan states, especially Serbia and Bulgaria, tried to overcome their differences on the governmental level and look for paths to rapprochement, while the subsequent increase in insurgent activities attracted European public opinion. It is crucial to point out that the resulting media campaign was not only directed against the Turkish regime. Rumors started to circulate about a union between the Serbs and Bulgarians against the threat of Austrians in the peninsula as well.<sup>31</sup>

When the news of possible alliances between the local Balkan states started coming in from the Balkan capitals, Ottoman and European officials did not believe that such unions would occur. Not only was there a schism between the patriarchate and exarchate, but Russia also expressed its opposition to such alliances. By the summer of 1910, however, outsider concerns failed to stem the tide. Rumors of an alliance between the Greeks and Bulgarians soon proved true. Soon afterward, word of an official entente among the Balkan states of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria animated the region. According to most contemporary explanations for this progression toward union, it was the aggressive policies of the Young Turks and Austrians that contributed to the Balkan states’ agreement to overcome their differences. It soon became clear that these states hoped to gain at least some European support with such an alliance against a common dual threat of the continued Ottoman presence and expansionist Austro-Hungarian ambitions.

Rapprochement between the Serbs and the Greeks was not very difficult, because traditional sympathy between the two nations had existed



for a long time. Added to this long history of goodwill was a persistent British policy of encouraging the two states to formalize their cooperative relations.<sup>32</sup> The thorniest of the problems facing the post-Ottoman states in the Balkans was the relationship between the Bulgarians and the Serbians. At the heart of their problems was what to do with the Ottoman Balkan territories. Serbia wanted to be included in any agreement that led to the partitioning of European Turkey, whereas the Bulgarians wished to preserve their unique claim to these contested areas (namely Macedonia).<sup>33</sup>

Despite such trying circumstances, with Russian pressure on the one hand and Serbian concerns regarding Austrian expansionism on the other, a Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was signed in March 1912. The Balkan alliance was more or less finalized in the ensuing months with the May 1912 signing of the Bulgarian-Greek Treaty. In contrast to the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, Bulgarian prime minister Ivan Gueshov and Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos both insisted that the treaty was a purely defensive alliance and did not contain any aggressive designs, despite being inherently anti-Ottoman in nature.<sup>34</sup>

At the beginning the formation of alliances did not cause any major anxieties in Ottoman circles. Many believed that these alliances were mainly signed to preserve the status quo in the Balkans.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, Ottoman documents concerning the Balkan Wars do not focus on the formation of these alliances. The primary concern of Ottoman envoys at the time was the Turco-Italian War, discussed in greater length in Francesco Caccamo's contribution to this volume (chapter 7).<sup>36</sup> Yet the existing materials reveal that after the formation of the Balkan alliances the Ottomans stepped up their bilateral peace talks with Italians, instead of waiting for the mediation of a third party. Furthermore, recent research also indicates that the threat of war with the Balkan states all but forced the Ottomans into accepting the Italians' peace proposals without much bargaining.<sup>37</sup>

Meanwhile, when the alliances were completed in the summer of 1912, the Bulgarians were ready for war. King Ferdinand hoped to exploit the right moment to declare war in order to fulfill his aim of annexing Macedonia. The Bulgarian premier Ivan Gueshov, however, considered war the last option and preferred diplomatic channels as a means of solving the issue.<sup>38</sup>

The Russians no doubt played an important role in the consolidation of these alliances. Nevertheless, the Russian foreign minister, Sergei

Sazonov, insisted that his role was confined to serving as a mediator between the Serbs and the Bulgarians and not the other powers.<sup>39</sup> Sazonov claimed that Serbian-Bulgarian cooperation was vital to the Macedonian issue, which he believed urgently needed to be solved. He always insisted that war should be the last resort; it was his influence on Bulgaria that led the Bulgarians to attempt diplomatic means once more, thus making Ferdinand wait a little longer before going to war.<sup>40</sup>

As the power with the greatest interests and presence in the region, the Austrians were not troubled by the Bulgarian-Serbian rapprochement; they were more concerned with the Russian role in the alliance's finalization.<sup>41</sup> Although the Russians and Austrians cooperated as they attempted to ease tensions in the peninsula, the Russians had viewed the Austrians with some mistrust since the annexation crises of 1908. Indeed it was Sergei Sazonov's belief that the deadlock in the Balkans was the result of Austrian machinations in the region. Furthermore, any cooperation with the Russians independent of the British was very difficult since the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Moreover, Austrian circles had a major concern with the pan-Slavist movement championed by the Russians. In Vienna's eyes, Russia's support of this potentially separatist movement within the large South Slav subject population in the region only contributed to the animosities of the small Balkan states against the Austrians.<sup>42</sup>

The French took a very different stance once news broke out on the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. The French prime minister at the time, Raymond Poincaré, argued that war in the region would be inevitable once the Serbs and the Bulgarians overcame their differences.<sup>43</sup> In this regard they were not ready to embrace the alliances.

In the meantime the British Foreign Office under Sir Edward Grey followed a noninterventionist approach to the developments. The British insisted on reforms in the Ottoman Empire to improve the existing situation, not only for the Christians but also for the Muslim Albanians.<sup>44</sup>

The differences between the powers no doubt sharpened over the years. Yet in their official declarations and correspondence with Ottoman envoys all the powers agreed that pressure had to be put on the Ottoman government for reforms. Thus they were careful not to exceed the boundaries stipulated by the original texts of the Berlin Treaty, especially article 23.

The liberals, particularly the British, took a very pessimistic view regarding the reforms in the Ottoman Empire. The British saw the existing

disturbances as escalating in the European provinces and expected little progress for the Christians and Muslim Albanians under the new Young Turk government.

The conservative powers, despite their criticism of developments, maintained a more cordial approach toward the Ottomans. This is in direct contrast to the liberal powers, especially the British, who distanced themselves from the Ottoman Empire.<sup>45</sup> The Germans had a friendlier attitude toward Turkey. During the period of crises the Germans promoted a mostly pro-Turkish policy. Yet they adopted a noninterventionist policy that left the Ottomans vulnerable. When Alfred von Kiderlen Waechter, known for his pro-Turkish stance, was appointed German foreign minister in 1910, he believed in the continuation of the status quo in the Balkans and left the reform project to others, as it had been earlier in the century.

One of the major shifts in the international arena prior to the Balkan Wars was the appointment of Count Leopold von Berchtold as Austro-Hungarian foreign minister in February 1912.<sup>46</sup> For Berchtold, traditional Austrian policy was to maintain friendly relations with the Ottomans and support the status quo in the Balkans. In his official declarations, however, Berchtold stated that the aspirations of different nationals within Ottoman territories had to be satisfied. In this regard, he made sure that Austria and the rest of the powers were to maintain a policy of strict neutrality in the event of a Balkan war.<sup>47</sup>

At the beginning Alexandre Mavroyeni, the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, had some reservations about Berchtold's appointment, because the recently deceased Aehrenthal had considered finalizing an entente with the Ottomans. Mavroyeni did not believe that Berchtold was interested in continuing discussions on this matter. For the Ottoman ambassador, the new Austrian minister was a Russophile but an Italianophobe as well.<sup>48</sup> Therefore the animosity that existed between Alexander Isvolsky and Alois von Aehrenthal would no longer be there between Berchtold and Sazonov. But Mavroyeni expected no drastic change at the early stages of his Foreign Ministry.<sup>49</sup>

Despite these early reservations, a period of increased cordiality between Ottoman-Austrian diplomats began soon after Berchtold's appointment. This change was mainly due to the foreign minister's close working relationship with Mavroyeni Bey.<sup>50</sup>

On the eve of the Balkan Wars, Mavroyeni had some intimate conversations with Berchtold, which he then reported to Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, the new Ottoman foreign minister (July 22, 1912–January 23, 1913). Ottoman documents in the period preceding the outbreak of the

war demonstrate the significant impact that this triangular relationship may have had on Ottoman diplomacy at the time.<sup>51</sup> This deserves closer attention.

#### ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, JUNE–OCTOBER 1912

By 1912 news of the deteriorating situation in the Balkans was reaching the Ottoman Foreign Ministry.<sup>52</sup> No doubt the so-called Albanian Uprisings and the war with Italy were mere adjuncts to the escalation of regional turmoil. Most of the Great Powers hoped to prevent a worsening of the situation through some sort of reform and conciliation agreement. But the Austro-Germans and the Slavs had conflicting interests.<sup>53</sup> While the Austrians were in favor of keeping the status quo for their future ambitions in Kosovo and Novi Pazar, the Russians were in favor of expanding the territories of Slav polities. Therefore any cooperation or intervention by the European powers was out of the question, as it had been during the Hamidian period.<sup>54</sup>

Furthermore, by midsummer Austrian influence in the Balkans under Foreign Minister Berchtold was becoming more and more pronounced. This rising influence was no doubt creating anxieties among not only the Great Powers but also the local Balkan states, especially the Serbs. As discussed in greater detail by Tamara Scheer (chapter 6) and Amir Duranović (chapter 13) in this volume, there was constant tension between the Serbs and Austrians regarding Sandjak Novi Pazar and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbs were convinced that the Austrians had yet to renounce their ambitions on the Sandjak and would thus block any other powers' presence in the province. For their part, the Austrians feared that Serbia would eventually venture into the Sandjak in collaboration with their Montenegrin allies. Such an expansion would leave the Austro-Hungarian Empire little alternative to taking military action against Serbia in order to safeguard its interests.<sup>55</sup>

Not only the Serbs but Russian foreign minister Sazonov too believed that the major threat in the peninsula was not the Balkan states but Austria-Hungary.<sup>56</sup> Sazonov was well aware that an Austrian withdrawal from the Sandjak would mean little, as Austrian ambitions in the province remained. He was convinced that Austrian withdrawal from the Sandjak was only a strategic move by Aehrenthal, designed to reduce the tension between Serbia and Austria, albeit temporarily.

For the Russian minister, the power that occupied the Sandjak would thus also occupy Serbia: such a set of affairs would mean European war over time.<sup>57</sup>

Indeed another source of diplomatic anxiety emerged on the eve of the Balkan Wars in the same mountainous regions bordering the Sandjak. Foreign Minister Berchtold attempted to secure an autonomous Albania in order to halt expansionist efforts in Serbia and Montenegro. Although they were denied by the Ottoman and Austrian officials on several occasions, the rumors were that the Albanians in the *vilayets* of Kosovo, Monastir/Manastır, Scutari, and Janina received concessions, whereas the rest of the communities had to be content with vague promises—a situation viewed with some alarm by most of the European powers. All were of the opinion that the Albanian proposals of August 1912 were ill timed and ill considered.<sup>58</sup>

On top of all of this Berchtold had become more pro-Turkish over the months regarding the kinds of reforms that the Ottoman state should pursue. The Austrian minister stated that reforms should cover all the communities, even going so far as to omit the word “Christians” from the original text of reforms for Macedonia. Hence the text was given a more general tone and left to convey a sense of reforms for the whole population of Ottoman Europe.<sup>59</sup> This unilateral behavior by Berchtold put any hope of reforms into deadlock, contributing to the already existing pressures in the peninsula.

According to the available material, the Austrians did not want war, despite official declarations, and cooperated with the rest of the powers in promoting reforms in Macedonia. Berchtold, however, wanted to keep the region unstable so that he could intervene when the time was right.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, Mavroyeni wrote several times to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry that deep down Berchtold believed that the Serbian issue would be finally resolved if the Ottomans would win a local war.

Under the prevailing circumstances it would not be wrong to argue that the Austrian foreign minister preferred to have a localized war in the region, which would serve the Austrians’ future ambitions.

As the other most interested power, Russia (under Sazonov’s Foreign Ministry) may still have nurtured its traditional ambitions for Ottoman lands; but under the circumstances the Russians deemed it prudent to follow a conservative, pro-status quo policy.<sup>61</sup> Sazonov believed that the implementation of article 23 of the Berlin Treaty was the only option given the prevailing circumstances. Over time Sazonov, aware of Berchtold’s intentions, viewed the situation with increasing pessimism and concern.<sup>62</sup> By the late summer of 1912 Sazonov believed that war in the Balkans was unavoidable; but, as he was later to write in his memoirs, whether or not it would remain local depended on the Austrians.<sup>63</sup>

Despite their anxieties, the remaining powers followed a policy of nonintervention. Though not directly involved in the Balkan crises, the French were increasingly worried about the alliances among the small Balkan states, especially between Serbia and Bulgaria. Poincaré suggested that the powers give a free hand to the Austrians and Russians, as they had done previously, to come up with a reform scheme to prevent the worst from happening.<sup>64</sup>

Despite public opinion, British foreign minister Grey followed less a policy of nonintervention than of indifference. Grey stated that they would like to apply pressure for a decentralized administration in the Macedonian provinces, yet he was worried that such measures would seriously affect stability, inflame the prejudices of the Turkish army, and thereby provoke the very sentiments that would lead to war in the region.<sup>65</sup> The British therefore opted for caution regarding the reform efforts and insisted on the implementation of article 23 and the reform edict of 1880. When Sazonov went on a European tour in the late summer of 1912, he realized that cooperation among the powers was difficult. The main factor was British disinterest toward the crisis.<sup>66</sup>

By September the reluctance of the powers to take any further steps and the failure of the Ottomans to display any tangible progress on the implementation of reforms meant that the diplomatic situation had reached a deadlock.<sup>67</sup> Meanwhile the situation further deteriorated as the Christian communities in Macedonia became restless regarding recent developments, in particular privileges granted to the Kosovar Albanians.<sup>68</sup>

The European powers now began to see war as a valid alternative and officially stated that if a worsening of the situation could not be prevented then efforts would be made to keep the war localized, while their push for reforms in Ottoman lands would remain.

Under the circumstances the Europeans had to give their consent to the war in the hope that it would remain localized.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, if war was to be declared, the powers jointly stated that they would not permit any changes in territorial status of the Balkan states or allow any intervention affecting the sovereign rights of the sultan. Finally, the powers would put further pressure on the Ottoman Empire to implement the reforms based on article 23.<sup>70</sup>

While the Europeans discussed the option of war in the late summer, most of the Balkan governments were still indecisive. Only the Romanians, due to their friendly relations with Austrians, insisted that war should be avoided.<sup>71</sup>

By mid-August public opinion in Serbia was not hostile toward the Ottoman state, remaining ambivalent toward a possible war. Due to the developments in Albania and the frontier districts, however, uncertainties about the future were creating serious anxieties among the population.<sup>72</sup> Among the Serbs' major concerns were the Austrian policy toward the Albanians in Kosovo, its future ambitions in the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, and the proposed Trans-Adriatic railway project.<sup>73</sup>

On the Albanian Question, the Serbs were convinced that the Austrians were promoting the disturbances with promises to intervene on behalf of the non-Slav population in the region.<sup>74</sup> For the Serbs, the Albanian situation brought further complications for the Slavic population in the peninsula; the Albanians had rebelled and consequently received concessions from the Ottoman state, under the watchful eye of the Austrians. In the meantime Slavs received no concessions.<sup>75</sup>

The Serbs in the Macedonian provinces, in contrast to some of the other Orthodox Christian communities, had not expected any radical changes to their situation. In this respect they had always wished for a peaceful solution, preferably along the lines of local autonomy under a Christian governor. The Serbs would be satisfied with some tangible reforms and desired only to be treated equally before the law, like the rest of the Ottoman subjects.<sup>76</sup> However, a privileged status for Albanians in the provinces of Kosovo and Monastir, as suggested in the Austrians' proposals, was out of the question for the Serbian officials. In both official and public circles these proposals were interpreted as leading to autonomy for a large Albania in the near future under the influence of Austrians and depriving the rest of the Balkans of any of their aspirations in the peninsula.<sup>77</sup>

By mid-September a shift occurred in Serbian public opinion: due to the concessions granted to the Albanians and the absence of any tangible improvements, war increasingly began to be seen as the only alternative.<sup>78</sup>

On the eve of the war Serbian prime minister Nikola Pašić was convinced that the Ottomans did not keep any of their promises. The Austrian proposals were far too "pro-Turkish," and in thirty-five years nothing had been achieved in terms of article 23. For the Serbs, the situation for their co-nationals in the provinces was becoming unbearable, a circumstance that was all too similar for the rest of the Christian population, with only a few substantial reforms being implemented by the Ottomans. Nevertheless, Pašić expressed his concerns at the gravity of the situation; he went on to state that—although the specter of war did not center solely around Serbia—they would take part if war broke out.<sup>79</sup>

In the meantime the situation in Bulgaria was more severe, and war was seen as the only alternative by many. By late September public opinion in Bulgaria was so grim that Bulgaria could have declared war without the support of the rest of the Balkan states. Tension between the Bulgarians and the Ottomans had always existed over the Macedonian Question; now the Bulgarians were incensed that the Muslim Albanians were the beneficiaries of concessions, while nothing was being done for the Christians in Macedonia. The least the Bulgarian public insisted on in Macedonia was the application of article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, which had remained only on paper since 1908.<sup>80</sup>

Still, we also should not overlook the contention that the Bulgarians were the major cause behind the disturbances in the Balkans, as often stated in the Ottoman sources. Even as late as August Gueshov still considered reforms and any sort of decentralization to be an option and was trying to come up with a scheme to satisfy all the nationalities involved and thus avoid war.<sup>81</sup> He repeatedly stated that mobilizations at the borders did not reflect belligerent intentions.<sup>82</sup> But the outrages committed by both Muslims and Christians in Monastir and the privileges granted to Albanians made Gueshov give the final ultimatum to the Porte regarding a series of reforms on September 30.<sup>83</sup>

Gueshov's proposals included the immediate execution of administrative reforms in the Macedonian provinces under a Christian governor-general, preferably of Swiss or Belgian nationality, nominated with the approval of the Great Powers. The proposals were nothing radical and were based on article 23 of the Berlin Treaty. Gueshov's ultimatum, however, stated that the reforms had to be implemented jointly by the ambassadors of Great Powers and the representatives of the four Balkan states in Istanbul. According to the powers, the Ottoman officials would never accept participation of the Balkan states in the implementation of the reforms; but they might give assurances to the powers in the introduction of reforms based on article 23 of the treaty.

It was during these discussions that Gabriel Effendi reported to the Ottoman embassies on the mobilizations in early October. He stated that these troop movements resembled more a spontaneous action than a concerted plan.<sup>84</sup> In a way the mobilizations gave the Ottomans the excuse to rescind any reform; the Ottoman ambassador in London, Tevfik Paşa, stated that there was "too much effervescence" at the moment. Furthermore, he reported secretly to Gabriel Effendi that he had reservations concerning the reforms that would be implemented by the Ottomans because he was convinced that the type and degree all depended on the



success of the Ottoman forces. This was more or less the situation by the time the Balkan Wars broke out in the autumn of 1912.<sup>85</sup>

### CONCLUSION

Four major issues made the war more or less inevitable by the autumn of 1912. First, the change in the Istanbul regime after the Young Turk revolution encouraged the Christian and Muslim communities, as well as the neighboring Balkan states, to fulfill their longtime ambitions in the peninsula. Second, the absence of the proposed reforms upset the communities concerned and contributed to the escalation of the existing tension. Third, Austrian involvement in the Balkan affairs became far more pronounced under Berchtold. Austrian ambitions in the peninsula and their support of the Albanians in particular riled the Serbs, who consequently saw war as the only alternative. Finally, by late September the triangular relationship of Europeans, Ottomans, and the Balkan states reached a deadlock regarding the reforms. Under the circumstances they saw war as the only alternative, though hoping for a limited and localized conflict.<sup>86</sup>

### NOTES

1. The reforms were promised in the provinces of Selanik, Monastir, and Kosovo and two independent *sandjaks*, Drama and Serez/Serres. The Ottoman administration never used the term “Macedonia” and referred to the provinces as *vilayet-i selase* (three provinces). The provinces were composed mainly of Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Vlachs, Albanians, and Turks and had 2.5 million inhabitants. Gül Tokay, “Macedonian Reforms and Muslim Opposition during the Hamidian Era: 1878–1908,” 52.
2. See Tamara Scheer’s essay in this volume (chapter 6).
3. For an interpretation by the grand vizier of the period, see Hilmi K. Bayur, *Sadrâzam Kamil Paşa, Siyasi Hayatı*, 253–86.
4. Unfortunately, we have no recent study on the anatomy of the Balkan Wars in Turkish, except studies of the military aspect. Scholars still refer to Yusuf Hikmet Bayur’s *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi*, vol. 2, part 3, as the main source for the subject matter. Bayur’s study is no doubt a very important contribution, but the subject needs further exploration with new materials and reasoning. Therefore this study has limited secondary sources and was completed mainly on the basis of Ottoman primary documents.
5. For the full collection of Ottoman documents on Bulgarian independence and the Bosnian annexation crisis, see Sinan Kuneralp and Gül Tokay, eds., *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One*, vols. 1 and 2, *The Road to Bulgarian Independence September 1908–May 1909* (Istanbul: Isis, 2008), and *The Bosnian Annexation Crisis, September 1908–May 1908* (Istanbul: Isis, 2009).

6. National Archives of the United Kingdom, Foreign Office Archives (FO) 421/259, Bulgaria Annual Report 1908, Buchanan to Grey, Sofia, December 23, 1908; Gül Tokay, "Bulgarian Independence and Its Immediate Aftermath," in *The Independence of Bulgaria in 1908—A Glimpse from the 21st Century* [the title of the book is in Bulgarian, but the article is in English] (Sofia: University of Sofia Press, 2010), 82–97.
7. Tokay, "Bulgarian Independence."
8. Elena Statelova, *The Rough Road to Statecraft: The Life of Bulgaria's Ivan E. Gue-shoff* (Sofia, 1994), translated by Matt Brown, original version by Marin Drinov (Glen Echo, Md.: Bethesda Press/New Publishing Partners, 2010), 226–27.
9. For Kamil Paşa's efforts during the crisis, see Hilmi K. Bayur, *Sadrizam Kamil Paşa*, 265–86; Hasan Ünal, "An Example of Ottoman Diplomacy: Ottoman Foreign Policy during the Bulgarian Independence Crisis, 1908–1909," in *Balkans: A Mirror of a New International Order*, ed. Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşı (Istanbul: Eren, 1995), 37–54.
10. Bayur, *Sadrizam Kamil Paşa*, 278–79.
11. Başbakanlık Arşivi/Prime Ministerial Archives—Istanbul (BBA), HR.SYS (Ottoman Foreign Ministerial Archives, Political Section) 334/3, Rifaat to Tevfik, London, December 7, 1908.
12. For an interesting report by Turkhan Paşa on the Russians' intervention, see BBA, HR.SYS 336/1, Turkhan to Tevfik, St. Petersburg, January 5, 1909. For the Russian policy, see Friedrich Stieve, ed., *Isvolski und der Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924), 5–9.
13. Tokay, "Bulgarian Independence," 88–96.
14. Ibid.
15. See F. Roy Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*; Bernadotte Schmitt, *The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908–1909*; John D. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*; Hasan Ünal, "Ottoman Foreign Policy during the Bosnian Annexation Crisis, 1908–1909."
16. For the Austrian documents on the annexation crises, see BBA, HR.SYS 274/29, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend Bosnien und die Herzegovina, Oktober 1908 bis Juni 1909," 2–141; Legationssekretär Franz zu Aehrenthal, Belgrade, October 8, 1908, 11–12; Francis Roy Bridge, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Empire," in *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 1976), 37–38.
17. BBA, HR.SYS 274/29, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," Aehrenthal to Pallavicini, Vienna, October 3, 1908, 1–3.
18. For the details, see Kuneralp and Tokay, *The Bosnian Annexation Crisis*; Francis Roy Bridge, "Izvolsky, Aehrenthal, and the End of the Austro-Russian Entente," *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs* 29 (1976): 316–62.
19. For the Austrian perspective, see BBA, HR.SYS 274/29, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," 3–82.
20. Kuneralp and Tokay, *The Bosnian Annexation Crisis*, 11.
21. Similarly, the Montenegrin government saw it as a violation and asked for a revision of article 29 of the Berlin Treaty. BBA, HR.SYS 274/29, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," Kuhn to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, October 8, 1908, 12–13; Aehrenthal to Kuhn, Vienna, October 14, 1908, 24. On Montenegro and the Bosnian crisis, see Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*, 19–52.

22. For some interesting correspondence between Aehrenthal and the Austrian minister in Serbia (Count Johann von Forgach) during March, see BBA, HR.SYS 274/29, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," 90–94.
23. For the "Bosnian Question" during the occupation and its immediate aftermath, see Robert Donia and John Fine, *Bosnia Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994), 90–105; Robert Donia, *Sarajevo: A Biography* (Ann Harbor: Michigan University Press, 2004), 50–109; and Aydin Babuna, "The Berlin Treaty, Bosnian Muslims and Nationalism."
24. For the discussions between Azarian Effendi from Belgrade and Hariciye (the Ottoman Foreign Ministry), see Kuneralp and Tokay, *The Bosnian Annexation Crisis*, 159–277.
25. For the details, see BBA, HR.SYS 274/29, "Diplomatische Aktenstücke," 83–142.
26. Bridge, "Izvolsky, Aehrenthal." For more recent studies, see Jonathan Mercer, *Rep-utation and International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 110–54; Fiona Tomaszewski, *A Great Russia*, 7–10.
27. See Violeta Manojlović, "Defense of National Interest and Sovereignty: Serbian Government Policy in the Bosnian Crisis: 1906–9" (MA thesis: Simon Fraser University, 1997); Ünal, "An Example of Ottoman Diplomacy," 53–54.
28. For the Macedonian Question after 1908, see Mehmet Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jung Türken und die Mazedonische Frage, 1890–1918*; Sinan Kuneralp and Gül Tokay, eds., *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One*, vol. 4, 362–475.
29. Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One*, vol. 4, 20–21.
30. Ibid., Hikmet to Rifaat, Belgrade, March 1, 1910, 410–11.
31. BBA, HR.SYS 345/2, Nizami to Rifaat, Berlin, December 14, 1909.
32. For an interesting report on the British encouragement of the Serbo-Greek rapprochement, see BBA, HR.SYS 1480/10, Tevfik to Assim, London, March 6, 1912.
33. For a personal account on the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, see Ivan E. Gueshoff, *L'Alliance balkanique*, 15–63; BBA, HR.SYS 1492/55, Aristarchi to Rifaat, La Haye, August 12, 1910.
34. Gueshoff, *L'Alliance balkanique*, 63–69. Bulgaria also concluded a verbal accord with Montenegro in August 1912.
35. BBA, HR.SYS 345/2, Naby to Assim, Sofia, May 31, 1912.
36. BBA, HR.SYS 1263/1, is the collection related to Russia and covers mostly the correspondence between Turkhan Paşa and Assim Bey. For an interesting interview with Sazonov and Turkhan, see BBA, HR.SYS 1263/1, Turkhan to Assim, St. Petersburg, May 1, 1912.
37. For the details on the Turco-Italian War, see Sinan Kuneralp, ed., *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One*, vol. 5, *The Turco Italian War 1911–1912* (Isis: Istanbul, 2011); and Francesco Caccamo's essay in this volume (chapter 7).
38. See Mehmet Hacısalihoglu's essay in this volume (chapter 3) for further details.
39. For personal details, see Sergei Sazonov, *Les années fatales: Souvenirs de S. Sazonov* (Paris: Payot, 1927).

40. The Russians were concerned about the financial and military difficulties that the Bulgarians would face in case of war: Gueshoff, *L'Alliance balkanique*, 72–80.
41. FO 371/304, Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 5, 1912.
42. BBA, HR.SYS 171/38, Mavroyeni to Gabriel Effendi, Vienna, October 14, 1912.
43. Sazonov, *Les années fatales*, 56–58.
44. Many valuable studies on the Albanian Question exist. On the Albanian Muslims, see Peter Bartl, *Die Albanischen Muslime zur Zeit der Nationalen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung, 1878–1912*. For more recent studies using local archives, see Bilgin Çelik, *İttihatçılar ve Arnavutlar II*; and Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*.
45. Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One*, vol. 4, 21–22. Grand Vizier Hakkı Paşa (January 1910–September 1911), however, made it no secret that he leaned toward Germany and strongly opposed the increase of British influence in the Near East.
46. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 340–50.
47. BBA, HR.SYS 1096/82, Mavroyeni to Gabriel Effendi, Vienna, September 28, 1912.
48. Berchtold served as the Austrian ambassador to Russia between 1906 and 1911.
49. BBA, HR.SYS 170/80, Mavroyeni to Asim, Vienna, February 19, 1912.
50. For the collection of documents between Mavroyeni and the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, see Sinan Kuneralp, ed., *Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History III*.
51. For the full collection on the origins of the Balkan Wars, see BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1.
52. It goes without saying that the best available source on the diplomacy of the Balkan Wars is still Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*.
53. BBA, HR.SYS 1957, Turkhan to Gabriel Effendi, St. Petersburg, September 30, 1912.
54. At that time none of the powers were economically and militarily ready for a European war, so mutual peace efforts were welcomed.
55. BBA, HR.SYS, 1096/82, Mavroyeni to Gabriel Effendi, Vienna, September 28, 1912.
56. FO 881/10224, Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, August 30, 1912.
57. Ibid.
58. FO 881/10224, Marlin to Grey, Constantinople, August 20, 1912; FO 881/10224, Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, August 21, 1912. It was not only the proposals but also the sympathy shown to the Muslim Albanians after the Kosovo uprisings that provoked the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. For the discussions on different Albanian demands, including the “Prishtina proposals” of August 1912, see Bartl, *Die Albanischen Muslime*, 180–82. Despite the official declarations, however, northern Albanians, including the Kosovars, received regular aid from the neighboring Balkan states: Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 113, 143–50; FO 881/1028, Paget to Grey, annual report on Serbia, 1912, Belgrade, June 6, 1913.
59. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Mavroyeni to Gabriel Effendi, Vienna, October 9, 1912.
60. FO 881/10224, Vaughan to Grey, Bucharest, September 29, 1912.
61. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Mavroyeni to Gabriel Effendi, Vienna, October 13, 1912.
62. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Mouhiddin to Gabriel Effendi, St. Petersburg, September 20, 1912.
63. Ibid.; Sazonov, *Les années fatales*, 62–70.

64. Sazonov, *Les années fatales*, 63–73.
65. FO 881/10224, Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, August 21, 1912.
66. Sazonov, *Les années fatales*, 61–67.
67. Ibid.; FO 881/10224, Bertie to Grey, Paris, September 22, 1912.
68. The proposals included the use of the Albanian language in schools and official circles; establishment of new schools that instructed in Albanian; military service in Albania and Macedonia; return of arms; and amnesties for political prisoners. Although the question of decentralization was brought up, it was not included in these final proposals. Bartl, *Die Albanischen Muslime*, 182–83; FO 8881/10343, Marling to Grey, August 27, 1912.
69. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Gabriel Effendi to Ottoman Embassies, Hariciye, September 21, 1912.
70. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Mavroyeni to Gabriel Effendi, Vienna, October 8, 1912.
71. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Sefa Bey to Gabriel, Bucarest, October 4, 1912.
72. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Fuad to Gabriel Effendi, Belgrade, August 10, 1912.
73. BBA, HR.SYS 1492/82, Fuad to Gabriel, Belgrade, August 30, 1912. Despite these official declarations and the idea of protecting their co-nationals, we should not forget that for the Serbs this was mainly a war of aggression undertaken for the purpose of territorial expansion: FO 881/1028, annual report on Serbia, 1912, Belgrade, June 6, 1913, 8.
74. FO 881/10281, Paget to Grey, Belgrade, June 6, 1912. Behind these semiofficial claims, the Serbs and Montenegrins constantly assisted the Albanians, mostly the northerners (Gegs), to prevent Austrian intervention. Bartl, *Die Albanischen Muslime*, 174–78; Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 132–50.
75. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Fuad to Gabriel Effendi, Belgrade, September 25, 1912.
76. BBA, HR.SYS 1492/82, Fuad to Gabriel Effendi, Belgrade, August 30, 1912. This view reflected only the Serbian officials, while nationalists continued with their irredentist ambitions.
77. FO 881/10281, Servia, annual report, 1912.
78. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Fuad to Gabriel Effendi, Belgrade, September 11, 1912. The concessions granted to the Albanians were somewhat vague, but the Ottoman officials always denied that they were in the direction of political autonomy or decentralization.
79. BBA, HR.SYS, 1957/1, Fuad to Gabriel Effendi, Belgrade, September 21, 1912.
80. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Nizami to Gabriel Effendi, Berlin, September 29, 1912.
81. FO 881/10224, Granville to Grey, Sofia, August 20, 1912.
82. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Mavroyeni to Gabriel Effendi, Vienna, September 21, 1912.
83. Gueshoff, *L'Alliance balkanique*, 92–99; BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Fuad to Gabriel Effendi, Belgrade, October 5, 1912. The proposals only reached the Ottoman Foreign Ministry dated October 5. By then the mobilizations had already started. Soon afterward the war began, forever changing the region; for details, see the other chapters in this volume.
84. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Gabriel Effendi to Ottoman Missions, *Hariciye*, October 2, 1912.
85. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Tevfik to Gabriel Effendi, London, October 5, 1912.
86. BBA, HR.SYS 1957/1, Mavroyeni to Gabriel Effendi, Vienna, October 13, 1912.

## A Micro-Historical Experience in the Late Ottoman Balkans

The Case of Austria-Hungary  
in Sanjak Novi Pazar (1879–1908)

*Tamara Scheer*

Prior to the 1878 Berlin Conference, in fact from the beginning of the decade onward, discussions within the Danube Monarchy about the state's evolving interests in the Balkans proved to be a source of tension. The one common goal that all the major actors in the newly constituted Austro-Hungarian Empire shared was the need to gain more influence on the peninsula. How to realize this shared ambition strategically varied, from outright occupation and annexation of desired territories to the use of diplomatic pressure to secure political and economic influence. Others advocated the use of cultural development "aid" and the signing of economic treaties with the new states emerging from Ottoman direct rule as the most useful way to secure greater regional influence.

As discussed in greater detail by Amir Duranović (chapter 13 in this volume), Austria-Hungary fulfilled the ambition of many of the state's political and economic elite, by occupying Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 1878. Rather than annexing the territory outright, extenuating circumstances made it more expedient to adhere to the guidelines for administering the region under a set of rules established by the Berlin Congress for more than thirty years.<sup>1</sup> While often forgotten in the literature today, in addition to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Berlin Treaty granted Austria-Hungary the right to maintain garrisons and to build communication lines in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar (Sancak in Turkish and Sandžak in Serbo-Croatian; henceforth Sanjak). The thinking in 1878 was that direct Austro-Hungarian management of

the Sanjak, in partnership with the still sovereign Ottoman state, would ensure peace in the larger region that often pitted competing Ottoman and Russian interests against each other through local proxies living in Herzegovina, Montenegro, İškodra, Kosova, and Serbia. By April 1879 the detailed questions of where this military presence could be based and how many soldiers were to be sent were being formally discussed between the Ottoman Empire and the Danube Monarchy. Austro-Hungarian troops finally entered the Sanjak in autumn 1879.

This experience in the Sanjak offers a unique set of perspectives on the study of the larger Balkans and the specific story of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. This chapter argues that a study of the vast amount of archival and scholarly material produced from this more than thirty-year experience in the Sanjak can help us begin to appreciate a number of often-ignored forces at play during the outbreak of war that formally ended the Ottoman Empire's presence in the western Balkans. As a unique case in the modern history of the Balkans, the Sanjak is an extraordinary case study of Balkan nationalism. The unique composition of inhabitants permitted Austro-Hungarian representatives to engage directly with so-called Bosnian Muslims, Turks, Albanians, Serbs, and Montenegrins, an opportunity not available to any ambassador or military liaison officer based in Belgrade, Cetinje, or Constantinople.

In the course of performing their duties, the Austro-Hungarian Empire's civil servants and officers worked in circumstances outside their own country during the last thirty years of Ottoman administration and military power. The opportunity to interact with the Ottoman Empire extended beyond formal exchanges with state officials to direct interaction with the rich culturally diverse population. When buying food, going out for a walk, or having a beer or coffee in the afternoon, soldiers as well as officers and civil servants shared almost the same infrastructure with locals and Ottoman troops in the Sanjak's small towns and villages. As such the Sanjak allowed the Austria-Hungarian Empire's Balkan specialists to conduct their ethnographic, linguistic, and geographic research in the region, leaving behind invaluable scholarship in the form of published studies and diaries.

From the autumn of 1879 to October 1908 more than one generation of Austro-Hungarian politicians, officers, and military men experienced firsthand the dramatic political changes of the region.<sup>2</sup> Their observations led to the production of "knowledge" in the form of official reports that marked the transformation of the empire's Balkan (military) policy and evolving administrative ambitions. When combined with the

massive amount of scholarship produced by Austro-Hungarian scholars working in the region, this offers perhaps a unique set of tools for historians to appreciate how, as Isa Blumi suggests, the peoples of the western Balkans “navigated their complex worlds by using different strategies and articulations of group solidarity at different times.”<sup>3</sup>

In addition to offering these tools to study the region and its peoples, the Austro-Hungarian sources covering the Dual Monarchy’s direct involvement in Balkan affairs also provide an invaluable resource to understand the nature of political, social, and economic life within the Habsburg Empire as well. Recall that many subjects of the Dual Monarchy traveled to Sanjak during this thirty-year period. The manner in which they reported their experiences reflects not only an administrative tendency with governance as the central interest but insightful observations about the transformations taking place in these tumultuous times. Moreover, in reporting on events that intersected with the rising ambitions of ethno-nationalist movements, multinational members of the Austro-Hungarian army and diplomatic corps placed their own nationalist concerns center stage. Some officers, sons of families from the former military border, reacted extremely against any disloyal behavior inspired by the insurgent pan-Slavist movement also active within the territories of the empire. At the same time, a few officers reporting on events in the region may have held more sympathetic views of the South Slav independence movement. While no violent clashes had occurred within the army contingents based in the Sanjak, all those soldiers leaving a record behind clearly brought in their nationalist prejudices, openly supporting one side against others in the domestic political struggles of the region.<sup>4</sup>

Tensions were building throughout the period from 1879 to 1908, even if it predates the “Brutalisierung” (brutalization) of society that took place after the outbreak of the First Balkan War,<sup>5</sup> ultimately providing the foundations for the future Balkan Wars studied in detail throughout this volume. In this context, rather than telling another “exclusively ‘national’ story,” this chapter’s goal of “foregrounding the local” relies on utilizing the vast documentation provided by those long-term Austro-Hungarian visitors to the Sanjak.<sup>6</sup> Their varied experiences with the events in the Sanjak (1878–1908) will prove invaluable in finding a different set of explanations for the kinds of structural, economic, and social changes that contributed to the outbreak of the First Balkan War in 1912. The Sanjak, a microcosm of the larger western Balkan region, offers a unique perspective to study the competing national and cultural interests of the region’s heterogeneous population. All this material produced by



subjects of the Austro-Hungarian administration, of course, should be critically read. Clearly the events leading to the formal departure of the Austro-Hungarian contingent from the Sanjak in 1908 cannot fully account for later events. The records left behind by the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy and related scholarship do contribute to a rereading of crucial processes, however, including the evolving stability of the Ottoman administration in the region, the Serbian and Montenegrin nationalist propaganda that inspired many, the changes of identity taking place in the process, the evolving loyalties of local communities, the impact of occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina on Serbian identity politics, and how refugees became a political question. Last but not least, the conflict between Montenegrin and Serbian political elites was especially evident in the Sanjak; it was ultimately repressed by 1912 but is nevertheless a largely ignored factor in the scholarship that needs further study. While the Sanjak may have only been a small issue in respect to Austro-Hungarian policies in the Balkans, it cannot be ignored because of the role that it played in informing the division between Montenegro and Serbia. In this respect the Sanjak was relevant to Austria-Hungary's domestic politics: the public assessed the withdrawal as a mistake and referred to the strategic importance of keeping Serbia and Montenegro divided as a key benefit of the Dual Monarchy's presence there.

From the start, we should consider who reported from the Sanjak and where they gathered information. After investigating the quality of the sources, this chapter deals with relationship of the major stakeholder in the region, the Ottoman Empire, with the Danube Monarchy and how the local governor, Suleiman Hakkı Paşa, interacted with his Austro-Hungarian counterparts. It also explores the politics of Serbia and Montenegro and the behavior of the Orthodox population in the Sanjak, as seen through the eyes of the Austro-Hungarian informants. This clarifies how Habsburg policies in Bosnia-Herzegovina influenced the situation in the Sanjak (and vice versa). Thus this chapter links the Austro-Hungarian experience in the Sanjak to the larger history of south-eastern Europe before, during, and after the Balkan Wars.

#### ESTABLISHING AN ADMINISTRATION IN THE SANJAK

At first the central fear of Austro-Hungarian policy makers who were eager to establish a foothold in the Sanjak was that troops sent to the region would face the kind of fierce resistance that their compatriots experienced in Bosnia-Herzegovina one year earlier. Almost immediately,



FIGURE 6.1. Map showing the borders of the Sanjak Plevlje, where Austro-Hungarian troops garrisoned until 1908. Source: *Detailbeschreibung des Sandžaks Plevlje und des Vilajets Kosovo* (Vienna: k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1899).

however, it became clear that locals obeyed a call of the Ottoman administration to cooperate and remain calm. For the next thirty years most of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers were based in and around the main towns of the Lim Valley (in the north of the Sanjak at the southern Bosnian border), in Plevlje (the main garrison), Priboj, and Prijepolje.<sup>7</sup> In addition Austria-Hungary held small sentinel posts in Jabuka, Boljanić, and Gotovuša and at the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina in Metalka. The Ottoman Empire and the Dual Monarchy agreed that the foreign presence would not extend beyond four thousand to five thousand soldiers; in actual fact the Austro-Hungarian contingency rarely ever reached these numbers.

The Dual Monarchy remained in the Sanjak until 1908; in 1909, after the Bosnian annexation crisis ended, the Austro-Hungarian Empire abandoned its mandate in the Sanjak, first initiated in Berlin thirty years earlier.

The opinions of Austro-Hungarian politicians and officers of the military services concerning which elements on the Balkan Peninsula the Dual Monarchy should align with often changed. In spite of these contradicting positions, three basic aims shared by all major policy makers remained consistent throughout this period. The most important one was to keep Serbia and Montenegro from forging a union. It has long been assumed that the principal Austro-Hungarian strategic concern during this period was a territorially expanded Serbia that gained access to the Adriatic Sea. In this regard, maintaining a direct military presence in the Sanjak and supporting the Ottomans to maintain a viable counterforce to an independent Serbia not only complemented policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina discussed in chapter 13 in this volume but fully realized the long-term strategy of suppressing Serbia's potential influence inside the Habsburg Empire proper.

The Sanjak was also regarded as an economic gateway to the southern Balkans, however, especially to the Ottoman port of Salonika. In this respect the Sanjak was of strategic value to the Austro-Hungarian administration in occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina because it could enhance the economic potential of the ongoing reforms there. In such terms the Sanjak was a coveted territory that gave some strategic leverage to the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire during a period in which the Ottomans were losing their European provinces.<sup>8</sup>

After the Bosnian *vilayet* had ceased to exist in 1878, the Ottoman Empire reorganized the region in 1880. The Sanjak of Novi Pazar, as detailed in the Berlin Treaty, was divided into four parts and formally assigned to the Kosova *vilayet* and the province's administration based in the capital Üsküp (spelled Üsküb in Austrian documents). The north of Sanjak, where the Austro-Hungarian troops were stationed, became the Sanjak (administrative district) of Plevlje, which shared common borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. The civil administration and military power in Plevlje was given to a governor appointed by the Ottomans. From the Ottoman Empire's standpoint, the Berlin Treaty did not grant the right for Austro-Hungarian troops to cross the borders of the newly formed Sanjak Plevlje without their formal approval.<sup>9</sup> For this reason almost no Austro-Hungarian representative actually operated within the borders of the old Sanjak Novi Pazar, with some exceptions such as traveling officers or diplomats on their way to other territories in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the Habsburg intelligence agencies did maintain an active presence in the whole of the Kosova *vilayet* throughout this period.

Besides performing the tasks laid out by the Berlin Treaty, the majority of work done by the Austro-Hungarian civil and military administration in the Sanjak focused on self-organization, including caring for the growing Austrian colony, repairing roads and bridges, organizing postal services, and last but not least creating a widespread intelligence network deemed crucial in such a volatile and contested part of the western Balkans. Although rarely directly clashing with the Ottoman administration and troops, the Austro-Hungarians found themselves confronted with regular forms of passive resistance, especially from officials. The main task of securing peace and order together with the Ottoman army was thus persistently undermined by Ottoman officers who had no interest in supporting what were seen as occupying Austro-Hungarian troops.

Before evaluating the content of this invaluable source material, however, we must ask who wrote these reports, when, and for what purpose. It is equally important to identify the source of the information. Moreover, it seems relevant to ask who read those reports. Military sources were systematically collected and sent to Vienna, but not filed in archives, especially in peacetime. This raises the question of what immediately impacted policy makers in Sarajevo or Vienna. One particular source regularly made it from the Sanjak and was available to officials in Austro-Hungary for the whole period.<sup>10</sup> The first of these “Vorfällenheitsberichte” or “incident reports” dates back to February 1880, a few months after the first Austro-Hungarian troops arrived in the region and shortly before the implementation of the Sanjak Plevlje. From February 1880 onward officials in the Sanjak submitted an incident report at least twice a month to the superior command based in Bosnia. From there official aggregated data were included in more comprehensive reports addressed to various Viennese ministries. Most of these reports were written by the civil commissioner in cooperation with the brigade’s commander. The information came from reports provided by troops dispersed throughout the Sanjak region, spies who traveled throughout the Kosova *vilayet*, and summaries of conversations between officials and Ottoman state representatives and local notables. When compared with strategic, diplomatic, or scientific overviews providing background, these reports offer a valuable record of the “real time” events taking place throughout the region.

The civil commissioner and political consultant of the brigade (“Zivilkommissär und politischer Referent des Brigadekommandos”) in Plevlje had a wide range of duties.<sup>11</sup> Among his most sensitive roles was assuring regular communication between the highest-ranking members of the Austro-Hungarian military command in Plevlje and the highest-ranking

officials in the local Ottoman administration. In addition to this diplomatic role, the commissioner had to make sure that other high-ranking officials maintained an open communication link with the local population. In addition he was responsible for the organization of intelligence gathering in the region ("politischer Informationsdienst"). In this capacity the Austro-Hungarian authorities expected the civil commissioner and political consultant to be well informed about local affairs, especially in the Sanjak of Plevlje and ideally in the whole Kosova *vilayet*.<sup>12</sup>

Only rarely (and then only for a short time) was this job filled by actual military officers. Civilian diplomats (sometimes ranked as reserve officers) usually worked as civil commissioners. This meant that a civilian was responsible for the gathering of intelligence used by both political and military branches of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Each officer was given wide autonomy to process his reports, revealing that the Austro-Hungarian government appreciated that such information was largely dependent on conditions on the ground. Some reports reflect a heavy reliance on correspondence with the Ottoman governor, while others seem to suggest that the author spent most of his time working in his office. The quality of coverage was also dependent on the qualifications of each official, including language skills. Oskar Melzer, a brigade staff officer (a substitute for a diplomat who arrived in 1883), proved especially productive and creatively added a wide range of information. Similarly, Theodor Ippen (civil commissioner from December 1887 to April 1891) wrote extensive ethnographic reports, due to his knowledge of local languages and willingness to travel widely in the region. All in all the reports provide a unique picture of the situation in the Sanjak, with special focus on nationalist movements and their propaganda work as well as local reactions by the Ottoman administration, including legislative changes imposed by the *vilayet* governor or by Constantinople (recruitment, tax collection, or statistical data). Equally valuable were detailed reports on the living conditions of the local population. These reports also offer insight into how the Austro-Hungarian officials organized operations in the Sanjak.

Longer official reports offer insight into this administration; the last one includes a valuable historical overview of the thirty-year Austro-Hungarian presence there. The oldest report was compiled in 1883, four years after the implementation of the garrison.<sup>13</sup> Oskar Melzer, its author, was a staff officer in the brigade's command who had Turkish language skills. During the absence of the civil commissioner he had become responsible for these duties. Melzer's handbook went well beyond the

formulaic reports of the past, including detailed information on the Ottoman administration and its officials as well as details on streets, post and telegraph offices, schools, the inhabitants in general and their religion, and available mineral resources. Melzer reminded his readers that a refugee problem existed in the area. Some of the locally produced sources that he used to write his invaluable report included detailed evaluations of Ottoman official bulletins. He also obtained a great deal of information by actually traveling throughout the region. Melzer expected those who followed to supplement this report and update it regularly, advising that it was necessary for those writing such handbooks to avoid "being shy,...when providing the reports requested by superiors and higher commands," suggesting that previous reports lacked the kind of energetic coverage required to understand the region.<sup>14</sup> Indeed Melzer highlighted that the only report available on the region before his sixty-page study ("Das Vilajet Kosovo") dated back to the 1840s.

Following Melzer's lead, a series of future reports adopted a similar focus on detailing local events. The last of such detailed reports was published in 1900, drafted on behalf of the Foreign Ministry by Simon von Joannovics, consul and reserve officer.<sup>15</sup> All these reports dealt with the kind of information on local affairs that may have interested Vienna- or Sarajevo-based authorities, in particular concern with possible threats to Austro-Hungarian interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina increasingly posed by regional nationalisms and their radical proponents. The extent to which such reports were taken into consideration by politicians and higher-ranking military leaders when making policy is not clear.

In addition to these reports, short and long reports on the situation in the Sanjak were regularly produced, many of them written by (former) Austro-Hungarian officials. But they were not written under an official mandate. In contrast to the "Vorfällenheitsberichte" for the Sarajevo command, these ex-officials published their work for a broader reading audience, contributing to the formation of public opinion in respect to Habsburg policies in the Balkans. Although a great deal was published after 1908 on the Sanjak, this chapter considers only reports published prior to 1908 written by official representatives (officers or diplomats) or researchers with an official mandate. The work of Theodor Ippen stands out among these. Even his contemporaries recognized Ippen's extraordinary knowledge of the Balkans. His book *Novibazar und Kossovo (Das alte Rascien)*, an ethnographic, historical, and political survey of the region, was published a year after the end of his duty in the Sanjak as the civil commissioner.<sup>16</sup> The work of Wolfgang Heller, who was chief

of staff of the brigade (1904–7), was of a more military nature. He published a few articles and lectured about his experience throughout the German-speaking world.<sup>17</sup>

Considering this bureaucratic and information-gathering apparatus working for the Austro-Hungarian state at the time, a brief analysis of how this administration and the larger Habsburg Empire engaged with the Ottoman Empire, their partner in the Sanjak, is in order. Rather than repeating an account of relations between the two states, however, it is necessary to lay the foundations for our larger concern: the importance of the province in the eyes of both administrations. Both regimes considered the Sanjak strategically vital as they faced a growing threat of pan-South Slavic nationalism, ultimately the source of the 1912 Balkan Wars discussed throughout this volume.

#### RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRES

In 2010 I characterized the political and administrative situation of the Sanjak Plevlje between 1879 and 1908 as “Two Crumbling Empires—One Balkan Region.”<sup>18</sup> One of my main theses was that the two “old” empires, Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans, recognized that they shared strategic concerns in the Sanjak with the threat of nationalist unrest caused by mobilizing local political movements in neighboring countries.

At the same time, authorities in the Austro-Hungarian state realized they were dealing with a complicated bureaucracy in its Ottoman counterpart. Despite the reforms implemented throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was still a “complex” and “multi-layered” “state bureaucracy,” according to Isa Blumi. The same can be said about the Dual Monarchy.<sup>19</sup> For the Austro-Hungarian representatives in the field, it was evident that the Ottoman Empire was struggling with symptoms of decay, a process that important members of the local population believed would ultimately lead to its collapse. Austro-Hungarian officials based in the Sanjak constantly reported a combination of fear and opportunity as a result of the growing evidence of internal decay.<sup>20</sup>

For a while (1878–79, 1908/9) many politicians in Vienna directed their attention toward the Sanjak. This focus did not last long, however.<sup>21</sup> For the Ottoman Empire, the Sanjak was just one of many hot spots.<sup>22</sup>

In this respect describing the relationship between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in a few sentences is almost impossible. Policies changed regularly and often contradicted each other. For instance, after

1878 Vienna had adopted a policy promoting the status quo and an adherence to the Berlin Treaty. At the same time, however, elements of the diplomatic corps promoted the independence of the Balkan countries.<sup>23</sup> Anyone who reads the debates of the time must come to the conclusion that sticking to the status quo was certainly the cheapest solution (although not the best one) and was useful to avoid debates with Hungarian politicians about interventions in the Balkans.

From the start it was clear that the Habsburgs would not rush to help the Ottoman Empire in respect to its often violent interactions with Montenegro and Serbia. At the same time authorities in Vienna and Budapest feared Serbian expansion at Ottoman expense. Any gains made by Serb nationalists in the Ottoman Balkans always threatened to inspire the Serbs living within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. All these discussions influenced policy in respect to the Sanjak.

From 1879 onward Austro-Hungarian politicians proclaimed the right to protect Christians from harsh Ottoman (Muslim) administration. But it soon became clear to the local representatives that the Muslim population could rapidly become of minor importance. They were no longer in the superior position they had held before the 1870s. Instead the continued weakening of the Ottoman position in the western Balkans threatened to cut off large numbers of Muslims from the core regions of the empire. This became known as the refugee crisis, which shaped many Austro-Hungarian calculations.

The reports of the civil commissioner speak of impoverished refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina (living almost without help from the local Muslim families or the government) in the Sanjak.<sup>24</sup> As 1908 approached, fear that the future of the Muslim population was threatened by Serbs and Montenegrins increased.

The Sanjak, bordering Serbia and Montenegro, was also an ideal location to observe Ottoman administrative reactions to the rising issue of nationalism. It was not only the South Slav activities that attracted Austro-Hungarian attention, however. Bulgarian, Greek, and Albanian movements also played a role in the Sanjak, as evidenced by events during the Turkish-Greek War (1896/97). Plevlje sent about 350 volunteers, including many Bosnian immigrants.<sup>25</sup>

In addition to the reaction of the Ottoman Empire, the interactions between Austro-Hungarian officials and local officials prove invaluable in reconsidering the roots of the Balkan Wars of 1912. This relationship between Austro-Hungarian authorities and the local Ottoman administration can be divided into three phases. Initially the Ottoman local



administration refused to cooperate with its Austro-Hungarian counterparts. For this reason the Austro-Hungarian representatives found it difficult to influence local affairs, in the early period of their presence in the Sanjak. This phase lasted less than a year, however, followed by a period in which both entities recognized that they shared a number of common concerns. This phase lasted until shortly before the end of the Austro-Hungarian presence in the Sanjak. The final phase was marked by the decision of Austro-Hungarian representatives to withdraw their close cooperation with their Ottoman counterparts.

A crucial agent throughout all three phases was long-standing Ottoman governor Suleiman Hakkı Paşa (1880–1907). He influenced the extent to which the two administrations cooperated or clashed. As noted, in the first phase the Ottomans showed considerable hostility toward the newly arrived Austro-Hungarian delegation. Hakkı Paşa was instrumental in this short period: he banned any contact between his soldiers and officers and the newcomers. This proved significant because the Austro-Hungarian troops would find lodging with these locally based officers.<sup>26</sup> In the first days and months the k.u.k. (*kaiserlich und königlich*: imperial and royal) troops were confronted with all forms of resistance. Ottoman armed soldiers often stood in the way of k.u.k. soldiers, for example, in order to prevent them from crossing the bridge into town. Hakkı also imposed a ban on building permanent accommodations during the first winter, clearly making life for the first generation of Austro-Hungarian troops miserable. Although some of these early confrontations were deemed dangerous in reports, no violent clashes occurred.<sup>27</sup>

The incident reports of the period mention several reasons for this resistant behavior. Rather than blaming the larger political situation, all focus was directed at the governor. He was accused of being especially influenced by prominent locals who opposed the Austro-Hungarian presence. At first Austro-Hungarian representatives tried to correct these challenges by bribing Hakkı Paşa, who declined the money. Yet by February his attitude had changed. Austro-Hungarian authorities noted this, characterizing the governor as particularly suitable for contacts with foreign authorities.<sup>28</sup>

Hakkı Paşa, who preferred to drink a good glass of wine in the k.u.k. Officers' Club, developed an intimate relationship with the leading representatives of the Dual Monarchy. He spoke French fluently, which helped him win the confidence of his Austro-Hungarian counterparts. Over the years he became increasingly valuable as a partner because he

rose within the Ottoman hierarchy.<sup>29</sup> His gradual rise suggests that the government approved his friendly relationship with Austro-Hungarian officials, which often included mutual awarding of medals.<sup>30</sup>

Besides Hakkı Paşa, influential local families collaborated with the newcomers.<sup>31</sup> Such interactions did not come easily, however: some of the most important families were also initially the most hostile to the newly arrived Austro-Hungarian administration. Among the most important was the family of Mahmud Aga Bajrović, which had immigrated from Nikšić after the area fell to Montenegro in 1877. Reports reveal that there were also well-established families who were friendly. Thus both men (especially Bajrović) became an ideal target for Austro-Hungarian local diplomacy.<sup>32</sup> In an attempt to recruit Mahmud Aga Bajrović, Austrian-Hungarian officials offered the patriarch lucrative financial support that over the next few decades became an inseparable relationship of mutual dependency. In short the Bajrović family became the main supplier of the needs of the Austro-Hungarian troops.

This profitable relationship did not mean absolute loyalty. In the coming years spies reported that Bajrović (an ethnic Malësor Albanian) maintained connections with anti-Austrian activists, including his fellow Malësorë, the “mufti of Taslidža” (Tashlica) and Ali Paşa Gusinjac (Gusi), who continued a violent resistance campaign against Montenegro, which had occupied their homeland since late 1877.

Bajrović was also repeatedly described as very loyal to his religion, but less out of conviction than for strategic calculations. Reports say that many local families maintained a less ambiguously friendly relationship with Austria, but Bajrović was the most crucial to long-term Austro-Hungarian interests. He was often reported as being publicly outspoken and frequently spread rumors about Austria-Hungary’s intentions in the region, including plans to invade the whole of Sanjak Novi Pazar. Often Bajrović’s public campaigns led to riots, resulting in deaths. Hakkı Paşa himself spread such rumors several times in public.<sup>33</sup> In sum, a simultaneous distrust and growing cooperation since the spring 1880 characterizes relations between the Austro-Hungarian officials in the Sanjak and the Ottomans.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities and the Ottoman administration most often cooperated when attempting to suppress troublemakers, especially in the face of orthodox Christian propaganda coming from neighboring countries. Starting in spring 1880, Hakkı Paşa sought to interview Austro-Hungarian representatives, especially the civil commissioner, to find out how they would react to various scenarios. This form of

cooperative exchanges extended to his providing “under the table” information about policies and plans of the Ottoman government in respect to the *vilayet*.<sup>34</sup> As a valuable point of access to larger Ottoman government policies, local Austro-Hungarian officials tried to reciprocate by helping Hakkı Paşa in times of need. In 1895, for instance, he requested that the Austro-Hungarian authorities ban the distribution of newspapers coming from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The k.u.k. Ministry of War approved the request, which concerned mainly Serbian-national newspapers read by locals.<sup>35</sup> In similar fashion the Austro-Hungarian government could expect assistance from Ottoman authorities. When k.u.k. authorities were chasing down a suspected Serbian nationalist who was active throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, Suleiman Hakkı Paşa promised to keep those traveling through the Sanjak under close surveillance.<sup>36</sup>

Other forms of cooperation are important in appreciating the rapidly changing relations between Serbs and the Ottoman state. Beginning in 1891, Serbian newspapers repeatedly wrote about plans to establish a Serbian consulate in Plevlje. These messages led the brigade representatives to request assistance from Suleiman Paşa. Austro-Hungarian authorities offered a number of reasons for suppressing the reported consulate. Suleiman Paşa clearly understood their objections, reportedly telling his counterparts that “if only the top two officials here, the Porte and the k.u.k. government, would work with each other in harmony, the Serbian consul would have little effect.”<sup>37</sup>

When the Serbian government confirmed a fixed budget for the consulate, the k.u.k. representatives knocked at the governor’s door again. Hakkı Paşa voiced his objections directly to Said Paşa, who responded that they would wait until an official Serbian request was made before officially objecting to the consulate. The consulate never came to fruition.<sup>38</sup> We have numerous other examples of cooperation cultivated by the strong personal relationship established between Hakkı Paşa and his frequently changing Austro-Hungarian counterparts.

Hakkı Paşa had to perform a difficult balancing act. On many occasions he personally would not have any objection; but if elements of the local population wished to resist larger Austro-Hungarian policies, he had no other choice than to go along with them. This happened most often while the Bosnian-Ottoman border was being formally drawn, during the construction of churches, or during times of famine, when Austro-Hungarian foreigners often helped in the distribution of food to the population. Hakkı Paşa’s skills were especially evident when it came to attacks against Austro-Hungarian soldiers or citizens. In these cases



FIGURE 6.2. Souvenir photograph of a typical joint ceremony, in this case the anniversary of the accession of Abdülhamid II. Source: private collection, Professor Walter Lukan (Vienna), postcard.

the brigade commander and the civil commissioner demanded an investigation, often pitting the governor's wish to maintain good relations with the Austro-Hungarian authorities against the population. When the people threatened violence, he relented on their behalf.<sup>39</sup>

This state of peaceful coexistence lasted only until the turn of the century. Although Austria-Hungary supported efforts by the Ottoman Empire to reform its administration, the reformists' movement changed the relatively stable situation in the Sanjak and threatened the previously good cooperation between the two empires. Along with reform came anti-Western attitudes, as reformist officials complained openly about "paternalism."<sup>40</sup> In this context the Austro-Hungarian authorities realized that Suleiman Hakkı Paşa represented the old order and thus became the subject of considerable criticism from other Ottoman officials.

Such changes within the Ottoman Empire compelled the Austro-Hungarian state to reconsider its loyalty to the Berlin Congress. As seen more clearly in respect to Macedonia elsewhere in this volume, Austro-Hungarian military policy changed in respect to how troops should react to local unrest. The old policy, formulated in 1886, ordered: "If the Turkish Local Government solicits the cooperation of our troops in the face of a revolt, the brigade command has to comply strictly."<sup>41</sup> In 1904

the policy changed 180 degrees: "First and foremost, the local Turkish government has to provide for the guarantee of order and tranquillity and the k.k. troops must remain strictly neutral."<sup>42</sup> Wolfgang Heller, staff officer in Plevlje in 1904, had highlighted the contradiction of these two orders, in order to stress that policy changed dramatically at a time when the chance of violence in the Sanjak was great. After 1904 it became quiet again, but only for a short period.

News from the Sanjak became dramatic again in 1908. The CUP-led revolt in July was blamed for this. The report of August 20, 1908, written by civil commissioner Count Ludwig Draškovic von Trakostyan (based in Plevlje since 1905) and the brigade's commander, Adolf Rhemen von Barenfeld (in Plevlje since 1907), described the situation: "a heat of passion has developed in the Sanjak, whose focus is now—as predicted—only against the Austrian occupation troops and against those who are in contact with them."<sup>43</sup>

For the first time in thirty-three years the market was not allowed to be held in Plevlje. This was ordered by the local commander of the gendarmerie, allegedly without the knowledge of the governor. On the same day a march against about forty "švapski spijuni" (Swabian [which means Austro-Hungarian] spies) took place, including Mahmud Bajrović. Bajrović, who had benefited financially from working with Austro-Hungarian officials but always challenged Austro-Hungarian influence, attacked those families allied with the garrison.

It may have been coincidence that Emperor Franz Joseph's birthday was that day (August 18); but the notables and the governor were invited to a celebration, as they were every year. This time everything was different: the notables asked for permission from the population to participate. The work of intelligence also became more difficult: "All confidants are in constant worry for their lives. In fact people that are in contact with the civil commissioner were grossly abused—this happened to Christians and Muslims equally."<sup>44</sup> The rapporteurs called those people who caused this situation Young Turks. This was not the first time that this term was used to characterize those who provoked violent clashes. An incident that took place a few years earlier in July 1905 in Prijepolje should be mentioned to underline the use of the term. For years it had been disputed whether the camp next to Prijepolje crossed the Sanjak Plevlje's borders or not. That summer naked soldiers bathed (as in earlier summers) in the river Lim. In the evening the camp was shelled. No one was injured. Those who fired were not identified, but it was reported to staff officer Wolfgang Heller that the attack was assumed to have been

instigated by the Young Turks.<sup>45</sup> Alongside other “troublemakers” from neighboring countries (Serbia and Montenegro), only a few clashes took place with these “Young Turks.” This situation changed in the summer of 1908. Circumstances became really hostile before the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rapporteurs had to cope with a totally unexpected situation.

Even before Franz Joseph’s birthday, residents of the Sanjak, along with members of the “Young Turk Committee,” passed the Austrian camp shouting: “Long live the sultan” in addition to their regular calls for the “recapture of Bosnia.”<sup>46</sup> The brigade’s report of August 19 spent considerable time discussing the activities of this “committee”: “There is a huge tension among the population in Plevlje, both Turks [Muslims] and Serbs. The movement is directed not only against us but also against previous authorities.” The Austro-Hungarians demanded Suleiman Hakkı Paşa’s dismissal.<sup>47</sup> Adolf Ritter Zambaur, reporting from his perspective as a consular official in Mitrovica, summed up the new situation as follows: “The Young Turks try to arrange with Serbia in Sanjak (esp. Christians) to avoid external influences.”<sup>48</sup> More than once the Austro-Hungarian representatives reported on the international and religious nature of this movement.<sup>49</sup>

In Sanjak Plevlje the claims were successful. During September Hakkı Paşa, who embodied almost thirty years of Ottoman administration and politics in Sanjak Plevlje, was “praised away.” Already in August, a few days earlier, a telegram from Thessaloniki (Salonika) reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Alfred Ritter von Rappaport reported a secret correspondence with Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, inspector-general of the Thessaloniki, Kosova, and Bitola (Macedonia) *vilayets*, who stated that the Young Turkish Committee had so far not established a foothold in Plevlje to avoid trouble. The unrest in the region was in fact caused by two officers acting independently, because of personal antipathy toward Mutessarif Suleiman Hakkı Paşa. The CUP committee had already sent two officers to Plevlje to remove (“zu entfernen”) these two officers. Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa thanked Austria-Hungary for its sympathetic attitude.<sup>50</sup>

During this time a debate began within the military about the seriousness of the situation. Suleiman Paşa announced that he was “powerless” (“machtlos”) as he “await[ed] critical conditions” (“kritischen Verhältnissen zusteuert”) but asked that “in the case of a diplomatic address his name not be mentioned” (“bei diplomatischer Aktion nicht genannt zu werden”). Rhemen von Barenfeld concluded by saying that in the event of a crisis he would secure Suleiman Paşa in the Austrian army barracks.<sup>51</sup>

For their part, the military leaders in Sarajevo doubted the seriousness of the situation. Rhemen von Barenfeld's rather dire report was forwarded to Vienna from the superior corps command in Sarajevo with the attached note assuring the relevant authorities that "we do not find the situation so bad" ("wir sehen Lage nicht so schlimm").<sup>52</sup> The chief of the General Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, shared the opinion of brigade commander Rhemen von Barenfeld. Conrad compared the situation with other regions of the Ottoman Empire and added: "Since the new Turkish era started it has become clear that, much as in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, events in the Sanjak could not be steered clear of trouble."<sup>53</sup>

While the troublemakers of the critical October days came from a number of different national and religious communities, the situation was burdened by intercommunal hostility and the Sanjak Muslim population's primary fear of the growing influence and use of propaganda by Serbia and Montenegro shortly before the departure of the k.u.k. troops from Plevlje on October 20, 1908.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, immediately upon the departure of the Austro-Hungarian contingency in October 1908, many residents of the Sanjak Plevlje applied for "Wohlverhaltenszeugnisse" (good conduct certificates) that allowed them to emigrate to Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>55</sup>

#### THE INFLUENCE OF THE SANJAK'S NEIGHBORS

This section explores how the Austro-Hungarian regime in Sanjak responded to the influence of the region's neighbors on local affairs. Events in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina directly affected the situation of the population of Christian faith in ways that influenced how the Dual Monarchy operated in the Sanjak. Recall that for centuries the leaders of the Austrian Empire, especially its Habsburg emperors, had seen themselves as protectors of the Christian population under the Muslim Ottoman regime. During the nineteenth century those former "victims" of Ottoman rule had struggled successfully against their "occupiers" and had become independent states in the Danube Monarchy's neighborhood. Austro-Hungarian politicians had to cope with a new situation in which these nation-states, especially Serbia, became a growing force of attraction to co-national citizens of the Dual Monarchy and later subjects of occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of central concern was that Serbia increasingly coveted territories administered by both the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians. When discussing the future

of nation-states in the Balkans on an international level, or even within the Austro-Hungarian and Austrian/Hungarian governments, the Dual Monarchy consistently reiterated that it would faithfully adhere to the Treaty of Berlin. As a countermeasure to the growing threat of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism, Austro-Hungarian authorities frequently discussed how to make Serbia and Montenegro economically and politically dependent on Vienna as a means to suppress their expansionist demands. At the same time the personal friendship with their respective kings, whether the Serbian king Milan I Obrenović or the Montenegrin king Nikola I Petrović Njegoš, played a significant role.<sup>56</sup> As noted elsewhere in this volume, the rivalry of Serbia, Montenegro, and its neighbors over control of these areas was one of the consequences of the First Balkan War. In order to appreciate how these tensions matured over time, this section explains how both countries influenced the behavior of the Orthodox population in Sanjak Plevlje, as reported from the k.u.k. presence.

In autumn of 1879, when k.u.k. troops marched into the Sanjak, the protection of Christians was still a justification. The Orthodox population was roughly half the population of the Lim Valley; although it included richer and more educated families, the majority of the Orthodox were landless peasants.<sup>57</sup> Early reports speak of these peasants' indifferent attitude toward their "new protectors." This unfriendly mood deteriorated to the extent that soon the Muslims were considered more sympathetic to the Dual Monarchy than the Christians were. During this period of deteriorating relations with local Orthodox Slavs, Montenegro and Serbia stepped up their direct engagement with the region. Melzer reported that a part of the problem was the large numbers of people from Montenegro passing through the Sanjak. Largely due to the unstable economic situation (and political persecution) in Montenegro, many people used the Sanjak as a means to migrate to Serbia. Most ended up remaining in the Sanjak for long periods, so this influx of Slav Orthodox families threatened the future stability of the region: as Melzer stated, "there is no shortage of dissatisfied Christians."<sup>58</sup>

Over the years it was the policy of the local administration to make the settlement of Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Orthodox Christian Montenegrins difficult. It should be noted that the migration from Montenegro also consisted of Muslims. Many reports called them the "Nikšičaner."<sup>59</sup> Fifty to sixty families in Plevlje lived in the so-called Nikšić Mahalla.<sup>60</sup> In addition most Muslim-populated areas farther east became the frontier between newly established Serbia and Bulgaria.





FIGURE 6.3. Typical picture postcard with a cross section of the population in Plevlje. Source: private collection, Professor Walter Lukan (Vienna), postcard, October 8, 1906.

These people were thus compelled to seek refuge in the Ottoman Empire. After many had died of disease, the survivors often returned to their homelands, now under an alien administration. The theme of refugees and migration in general was a recurring issue in reports: “The really dangerous element in Plevlje are the refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Nikšić who challenge what was recently only an academic patriotism expressed by original Plevliots.”<sup>61</sup>

For the Austro-Hungarian administration in the Sanjak, the regular intelligence reports were vital to maintaining some oversight of the region’s residents. Among the most important sources were Orthodox Slav spies who worked for the Danube Monarchy. These informants were especially important in respect to tapping into the nature of the propaganda coming from outside. From the subsequent reports we can characterize the tactics used by Montenegro and Serbia in two ways: propaganda with a more long-term ambition (such as teachers’ training) and propaganda that sought to have a more immediate impact (press releases). The press releases proved particularly troublesome because their reverberations went far beyond the region. The allegations ranged from accusations that the Austro-Hungarian troops set fire to a Serbian school in Plevlje to a Belgrade newspaper describing the negative influence that an Austrian brothel had on the “Turkish” youth and the “Turkish” officers.<sup>62</sup> The newspaper article was entitled “Die Prostitution im Dienste

des Okkupators" (Prostitution in the Service of the Occupier).<sup>63</sup> A similar tactic adopted by Orthodox living in the Sanjak was to articulate their friendship with Austro-Hungarian officials.<sup>64</sup> The intelligence arm of the Austro-Hungarian administration assessed that the Serbian national propaganda aimed to divide Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian representatives, making them mutually suspicious rather than cooperative.<sup>65</sup>

The propaganda campaign in the Sanjak can be summed up strategically as seeking the following objectives: to support anti-Austrian and anti-Ottoman sentiments (playing the two against each other) and to arouse national feelings. To counter these efforts, the Austro-Hungarian officials worked closely with the Ottoman administration as well as with the Bosnian government and the Fifteenth Corps command in Sarajevo, an area in which many actions took place and many persons moved. The consulate and civil commissioner's office in Plevlje was also recruited for those activities. It had been proved immensely helpful.

The civil commissioner, for example, kept a list not only of Austrian and Hungarian citizens and Bosnian subjects residing in the Sanjak but of the work they did in the region, including serving as teachers at the Orthodox schools. The civil commissioner also approved visas and passports, crucial to control the influx of migrants,<sup>66</sup> and headed the gathering of intelligence. It is clear that they had a particular bias against traveling Serbs, who were all suspect. Plevlje reported to Sarajevo: "Andrija Radulović, a porter from Plevlje, travels today from here via Vardište to Serbia, allegedly to visit his son Mihailo in Kotroman Mokra Gora and to get grain. He is suspected to be an agent of the Serbian Radicals and to transmit secret correspondences."<sup>67</sup> Even if it was normal for individuals to travel because of their profession and family ties crossed previously nonexistent borders, local authorities remained suspicious. Hardly any male or female Serb took a step in the Sanjak or Bosnia without having been watched.

Even tourists from Western European countries who traveled through the Sanjak reported a continuous and sometimes burdensome surveillance by the k.u.k. army. It could start with a casual conversation in the coffeehouse, perhaps about the political situation in the region or more often on the Austro-Hungarian activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the worst case the Serbian guide of these tourists would be arrested and the tourists politely but firmly escorted with a guard back to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Omer Hadžiselimović explained this behavior as the "xenophobia of the Austrian administration and its paranoid officers and police" following the uprising in Herzegovina 1882.<sup>68</sup>

Two local orthodox institutions very often attracted the attention of the Austro-Hungarian presence in the Sanjak (but both were also influenced from outside): the monastery of Sveti Troica and the "Serbian" middle school (gymnasium) in Plevlje. The representatives of both institutions were on the top of a list of "suspected" persons. Sveti Troica's importance went beyond the Sanjak boundaries but was of central concern because it was such a religious attraction due to its Holy Sava relics, the library, and the school.<sup>69</sup> To almost every tourist, the history and thus significance of the monastery perhaps warranted that they publish stories of their travels there. Edith Durham considered it important to point out that thousands of pilgrims from Montenegro, Serbia, and even from Herzegovina visited the monastery at Pentecost, including a number of teachers, heads of "propaganda schools" in the area. When they met there, she "learned about what was going on." The teachers were almost all Montenegrins and assessed the Sanjak as their property.<sup>70</sup> The Viennese prehistorian Moritz Hoernes wrote about his experience when visiting the monastery: "The few monks supported firmly the Serbian National Party and were faced with enduring hardship on the part of the Plevljaner Turks. Pop Risto presented us vivid accounts of the distress they suffered...during his speech he showed us the south wall of his house riddled by the Turkish bullets like a sieve."<sup>71</sup> Austria-Hungary was consequently faced with the problem of Serbian nationalist propaganda and anti-Austrian sentiments in this religiously sensitive location.

The few Orthodox or Serbian schools in the region were another source of unrest in the eyes of the Danube Monarchy. Unless Vienna could begin to infiltrate the region with its own teachers, the children of the Ottoman Slav population might become enemies of the Austro-Hungarian state. Already in 1883 the staff officer Melzer had suggested in his report on the Kosova *vilayet* that the state could invest in building schools for the Slavs in the region. "Could our powerful state, which has on the Balkan Peninsula such important interests, perhaps implement in a city at the former border, where the living is cheap, an institute to train such people as teachers?"<sup>72</sup>

How had Melzer come to a point where he demanded something without equal in the rest of his (statistical) report? He had already offered the background for his demand: "It is the schoolteacher, [who is] in continual direct contact with the great mass of the people, and he gets to know their ideas, sufferings and joys, desires and needs. He is therefore particularly suited to influence them."<sup>73</sup> Most of the teachers in the Sanjak were educated in Belgrade and were not indigenous to the region.<sup>74</sup>

As Melzer reported, these foreign teachers brought “a way of thinking that does not fit our goals here.”<sup>75</sup> For most students from the Sanjak region, the easiest and cheapest possibility to study abroad was in Belgrade. Speculations over who paid for their costly tuition and living expenses were of particular relevance: church congregations in the Sanjak, as the military command in Prijeopolje observed, would not be able to pay these sums.<sup>76</sup>

Although foreign travelers reported the same phenomena, they offered other theories about the role of education in the region. Edith Durham wrote about propaganda in Orthodox schools: “I rode from Plevlje to Prijeopolje.... There were only 100 Christian houses there. Nevertheless, there was a teacher, eagerly teaching his students about Greater Serbia and patriotism. The Turkish government could not prevent this revolutionary activity, because any intervention would have provoked the opposition of [European] powers because of ‘Christians’ persecution.”<sup>77</sup>

What Durham did not mention (or recognize) was that the Austrians were equally threatened by this propaganda; in fact they worked closely with the local Ottoman administration to address this common threat. Again and again teachers (and priests) were arrested and/or deported. The Austro-Hungarian presence intervened only in very few cases to protect their “fellow” Christians.<sup>78</sup>

For thirty years a lot of the information collected by the k.u.k. administration was based only on rumors or stories that often lacked basic evidence or names of the people involved (it was always “a” girl, “a” teacher). But rumors helped to poison the situation. For example, a Serbian teacher who was allegedly ordered by the Ottoman administration to pay a fine for the possession of Serbian textbooks was refunded this fine by the Serbian king. In another case a teacher at the girls’ school who came from Austria-Hungary reportedly received a payment of forty d’or napoleons from the Serbian government.<sup>79</sup> Even if rumors had been proved false, they had an impact on the relations between locals and government authorities. Over time the growing suspicions made it more and more impossible for people of “different” faiths or nationalities to live together.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities writing these reports asked again and again where the border should be drawn in respect to their focus on cultural and nationalistic propaganda. Melzer, who already in 1883 had participated in family gatherings, concluded that the daily existence of every Serb living in the region fused advocacy with practical things. “First they ate as during our house balls, then the national dance Kolo

was performed; by far the largest part of the evening was filled with singing Serbian national songs, sometimes by men—sometimes by a women's choir. In it lies a good piece of revolutionary spirit."<sup>80</sup> Even if most of Orthodox Slavs in the region identified themselves with the area in which they lived or with their families and not with an "abstract nation,"<sup>81</sup> in the eyes of an outsider such songs and dances had a national character and thus posed a potential threat.

Almost ten years later Theodor Ippen summed up the cultural interests of the population: "The Muslims...hold strictly against foreign influences and innovations, but among the Christians a cultural-friendly flow can gradually be asserted: they want progressive reforms and are more open to the influence of the West."<sup>82</sup> Thirty years later, in 1908, this statement could be interpreted to mean that the "Orthodox" were interested in Western ideas of a nation-state but rejected any Austro-Hungarian influence. Although the "Muslims" living in the Sanjak did not embrace Western culture, they too demanded modern administrative reforms and pursued interests similar to those of the Danube Monarchy. Nevertheless all the reports claimed that the impulse for a negative modern national impact (which threatened Austria-Hungary) always came from outside the borders of the Ottoman Empire.

The k.u.k. reports constantly explored how to suppress the influences of outside nationalist agitators. Due to the absence of indigenous Catholics, no protectorate as for the "Albanians" was pursued.<sup>83</sup> In Bosnia-Herzegovina, of course, much more intervention in the schools and education was possible.<sup>84</sup> Therefore the few countermeasures taken by the k.u.k. administration usually had been initiated by local officers. Most of the time they were used as a reason for receiving funding only from the ministries, so they argued to rouse the pro-Austrian feelings in the Sanjak. For example, scholarships for students to study in the monarchy or in occupied territory were awarded. The list of scholars suggested that children who were granted scholarships often had parents who worked for k.u.k. troops. Andromache Morait and Morait Gjorgjo were supported financially to study at the high school in Sarajevo.<sup>85</sup> From 1903 to 1908 Perikles Morait worked for the command station in Prijepolje as an interpreter.<sup>86</sup> In one year the administration awarded twenty-two fellowships. Among the recipients were two Roman Catholics; the rest were Orthodox Christians. Although in this case only Christians were funded, it was stipulated early on that Muslims and Orthodox had to be treated alike. In addition, members of the richer local families (for example, Baić: Austrian-hostile; and Šećerović: Austrian-friendly) received a scholarship.<sup>87</sup>

## CONCLUSION:

### CONNECTIONS WITH FUTURE EVENTS IN THE BALKANS

The experiences of more than one generation of Austro-Hungarian representatives during their duty in the Sanjak link them directly with the events in the Balkans starting in 1912. Recent studies have characterized the Serbian mobilization during the First Balkan War as successful. Out of around three million people, four hundred thousand enlisted to join the army. Such successes reflect the efforts of mobilization by nationalist propaganda not only within Serbia but in regions populated by South Slavs like the Sanjak.<sup>88</sup> This experience fits into what Isa Blumi explained as “the modernization process open[ing] the doors for external intervention and internal chaos that made defeat in the 1912–13 Balkan Wars possible.”<sup>89</sup> Austro-Hungarian representatives, many of whom eventually became influential players from 1908 until 1918, learned that something different happened than what they had expected in the Sanjak. During daily contact with the Orthodox population it was hard to draw the line between national propaganda and cultural life. They experienced teachers, students, and clergy as the carriers of Serbian nationalism, which could also threaten their own country, especially the occupation regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In addition to the experience with the Slavic population, this was also the case with the local Ottoman administration. When the administration of the Sanjak started in 1879, the Ottoman Empire was far from being a political ally, while the protection of Christians was still on the strategic agenda. Many of the Austro-Hungarian administrators learned after thirty years in the Sanjak that the Ottoman Empire could in fact be a much more reliable diplomatic partner in the future than Serbia or Montenegro. In the eyes of the Austro-Hungarian representatives in the Sanjak, the cooperation was indeed some sort of constant rivalry but was usually accompanied by strong support for each other's interests and the knowledge that each faced similar challenges to its integrity. Some sort of “apocalyptic mood,” believing that the end for the state's system was near, can be traced in both empires.

The “internal chaos” that accompanied the CUP movement of 1908, as mentioned by Blumi, confused the Austro-Hungarian politicians. But the one route to a strong relationship had been laid during the Sanjak period, leading to the Austro-Hungarian Empire's friendly attitude toward the Ottomans during the First Balkan War. These officials knew that they shared comparable internal challenges, especially in respect to (South) Slavs.

In this regard it is necessary to consider what Isa Blumi meant by the “myth of socio-cultural cohesion” in the Balkans.<sup>90</sup> As noted, official reports produced by Austro-Hungarian authorities in the Sanjak showed no cohesion based on pure ethno-national or sectarian loyalties. Rather, different interest groups formed beyond any single element. The Sanjak was a personal and regional experience. Those who had lived in the area themselves had to deal politically or militarily with the region again during the Balkan Wars. They wrote about the region as so-called experts in newspapers and magazines or held public lectures. Thus they significantly influenced both political decision making and public opinion. Theodor Ippen worked in the Foreign Ministry as well as in Constantinople, like other former commissioners such as Gottlieb Pára and Felix Parcher. During World War I, when Plevlje, Prijepolje, and Priboj were occupied, well-known people met again (for example, the last brigade’s commander, Adolf Rhemen von Barenfeld, became governor of Serbia). Their sympathies rested solely with the Turkish and Muslim population.<sup>91</sup> Austria-Hungary experienced not only “chaos” but thirty years of cooperation with the Ottomans in order to struggle against national propaganda work, especially from Serbia and Montenegro.<sup>92</sup>

The reminiscence influenced k.u.k. representatives. Methods and tactics of propaganda had an empirical value. The harsh military and legal actions against Serbs in the Dual Monarchy shortly before World War I thus can have roots not only in Bosnian but in Sanjak experience. The people learned their lesson that a coming war would include not only soldiers but the whole population of a country, which is then mobilized by propaganda. In addition a war not only of state systems but of peoples and nations was foreseeable for Austro-Hungarian representatives.

On the other side were the intercultural exchange and getting to know other cultures in an unusual way: thirty years of arranging spare-time activities and daily life in small towns without friction. Ultimately, the tendency of Muslim families to drink little or no alcohol and not inviting their wives had less influence than the national aspirations of Orthodox families, who tended to oppose common activities. On the personal level it soon became clear that the “Serbs” and, in the future, “Serbia” would not become a friendly state. For k.u.k. representatives it was equally interesting and confusing to see how the former leading figures, the “Muslims” in the Ottoman Empire, would be of minor importance in this region.

Discussions started on the results of the First Balkan War in 1912 resulted from wild speculation in Austria-Hungary. Even those who knew

the region well, like Gustav Hubka, who was military attaché in Cetinje, said: "For the Balkan chaos it would probably have been different if we were still present in the Sanjak or had advanced to Mitrovica."<sup>93</sup> Although the Austro-Hungarian politicians were confronted with a rejection of any territorial expansion in public opinion since 1879, this mood changed rapidly when they left the Sanjak. The loss of the assets invested in the Sanjak was lamented as well as the loss of prestige of Austria-Hungary as a great power: "The bad news went from valley to valley: The Austrians have to leave the Sanjak."<sup>94</sup> Accusations appeared for the first time that Austria-Hungary had left the Sanjak Muslims alone in foreseeable circumstances, soon to be overrun by neighboring countries.

## NOTES

1. An overview of the foreign policy, with particular reference to the occupied territory and the Sanjak, can be found in Emil Palotás, *Machtpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteressen* (e.g., 4). See also Franz-Josef Kos, *Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interessen Österreich-Ungarns und Deutschlands in Südosteuropa 1912/13*; as well as Michael Behnen, "Deutscher und österreichischer Informeller Imperialismus auf dem Balkan," 223–26. The foreign affairs documents of the European states also give insight: Johannes Lepsius et al., eds., *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914*. See also Miloš Boghitschewitsch, ed., *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens (1903–1914)*. Foreign affairs ministerial documents of the Ottoman Prime Ministerial Archives in Istanbul can be found in Sinan Kuneralp and Gül Tokay, eds., *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One*.
2. Konrad Clewing, "Sandžak von Novi Pazar," 347.
3. Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 5.
4. The topic of this chapter is part of a bigger research project on the Austro-Hungarian presence in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar (1879–1908), which includes Balkan politics, structures, and tasks as well as daily life of the Austrian colony. The monograph is going to be published in 2013.
5. Elçin Kürsat-Ahlers, "Die Brutalisierung von Gesellschaft und Kriegsführung im osmanischen Reich während der Balkankriege (1903–1914)."
6. Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 7.
7. The Ottoman administration called these cities Taşlıca, Priboj, and Akova. Today the main town is called Pljevlja. I decided to use terms in this chapter in the version used by the Austro-Hungarian administration, although they differed (e.g., Prepolje and Prjepolje) depending on the respective language. I used Plevlje because it means a city with a Austro-Hungarian presence, which was inhabited half by Christians and half by Muslims still under Ottoman rule.
8. Palotás, *Machtpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteressen*, 26, 67–68. See also Arnold Suppan, "Zur Frage eines österreichisch-ungarischen Imperialismus in Südosteuropa," 131.
9. Other portions of the 1878 Sanjak of Novi Pazar became parts of the Sanjaks of Novi Pazar, Priština, and Ipek. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA)/Haus-,



- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA)/Politisches Archiv (PA), XII. Türkei (1848–1918), Kt. 177, Konv. Varia 1901, Bericht Konsul Joannovics, 1907, II. Kapitel, “Die politische Einteilung des Sandschaks von Novipazar,” 2–4 (hereafter Joannovics, Bericht, 1907).
10. Those reports have been preserved in the Austrian State Archives, mostly titled “Vorfällenheitsberichte” (incident reports). Some of the reports were called “Situationsberichte” (situation reports). ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Plevlje (later “Konsulat Plevlje”), in a total of three boxes.
  11. ÖStA/Kriegsarchiv (KA)/Reichskriegsministerium (RKM), 4. Abt., 18-20/2, RKM to the Brigade’s Command, 11.1.1900.
  12. The same tasks were valid in 1902. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Konsulat Plevlje, Kt. 1 (Zivilkommissariat Plevlje 1880–88), Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1888, Instructions for the Civil Commissioner and political advisor of the troop’s command in the Lim region, ed. by the Reichskriegsministerium, 22.4.1881.
  13. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Konsulat Plevlje, Kt. 3, Konv. “Das Vilajet Kosovo,” written by Col. Oskar Melzer, Plevlje, 15.11.1883, around sixty pages (hereafter Melzer, “Das Vilajet Kosovo”).
  14. “[U]m nicht in Verlegenheit zu kommen, ... wenn die unmittelbar Vorgesetzten, sowie die höheren Stellen über dies und jenes sofortige Berichterstattung fordern würden.” Melzer, “Das Vilajet Kosovo.”
  15. ÖStA/HHStA/PA, XII. Türkei, Kt. 177, Konv. “Geschichte des Sandschaks von Novibazar und der angrenzenden Gebiete vom Einmarsche der k.u.k. Truppen (September 1879) angefangen bis auf die Gegenwart [1900/1901],” 13f. (hereafter k.u.k. Ministerium des Äußern, “Geschichte des Sandschaks von Novibazar”). See also Joannovics, Bericht, 1907, 12f. The “ethnic Serb” Simon von Joannovics from Transleithania became the head of the consulate in Belgrade between 1901 and 1905. William D. Godsey, *Aristocratic Redoubt*, 159–60.
  16. Theodor Ippen, *Novibazar und Kossovo (Das alte Rascien)*, 46f. The manuscript was at first submitted to the War Ministry for a review; after it raised no objections, the manuscript was published: Anneliese Wernicke, *Theodor Anton Ippen*, 12.
  17. As only one example of a newspaper article, see ÖStA/KA/Nachlasssammlung (NL), B/92, Heller, Konv. Archiv, Aufsätze und Vorträge, article from the *Neue Freie Presse*, titled “Bilder aus dem Sandschak” (September 1904). As an example of a lecture, see ÖStA/KA/NL, B/92, Heller, lecture titled “Die Unruhen im Herbst 1905 nächst Plevlje und im Frühjahr Sommer 1906 in Donji Kolašin,” held in the “Militärwissenschaftlicher Verein in Plevlje im März 1907.”
  18. Tamara Scheer, “Two Crumbling Empires—One Balkan Region.”
  19. Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 2.
  20. ÖStA/HHStA/PA, XII. Türkei (1848–1918), Liasse VI/3, Kt. 260, Vice-Consul Müller report from Plevlje, 31.5.1880.
  21. ÖStA/KA/NL, B/92, Heller, Konv. Zeitungsberichte, article titled “Die Vedette,” 24.09.1904.
  22. Feroze A. K. Yasamee, *Ottoman Diplomacy*, 60.
  23. Palotás, *Machtpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteressen*, 318.
  24. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 1, Konv. pro 1886, Brigade’s Command to Corps Command, “Vorfällenheitsbericht,” 27.1.1886.

25. Detailed reports about the reactions to the Serbian-Bulgarian War (1885) (ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1885, Brigade's Command to the 15th Corps Command in Sarajevo, "Situationsbericht," 24.II.1885) are also available, as on the Greek-Ottoman War (1896) (k.u.k. Ministerium des Äußern, "Geschichte des Sandschaks von Novibazar," 141) or on actions of the Albanian League.
26. k.u.k. Ministerium des Äußern, "Geschichte des Sandschaks von Novibazar," 12 and 21.
27. See Melzer, "Das Vilajet Kosovo."
28. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Plevlje, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1880, Cdr. Killić to the commanding general in Sarajevo, 17.2.1880.
29. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Plevlje, Kt. 2, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1893, Brigade's Command to the 15th Corps Command, 29.II.1893. It was surely helpful that Hakkı Paşa was a Toske from Yanya (Janina) and that his son held a high position at the Porte. On Toskes, see Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 23–25.
30. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Plevlje, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1880, Civil Commissioner to Brigade's Command and Command in Sarajevo, 7.5.1880. For an example fifteen years later, see ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 5-31/1, Brigade's Command to 15th Corps Command, 12.1.1896.
31. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Plevlje, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1880, Civil Commissioner to the Brigade's Command, Plevlje, 15.5.1880.
32. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Plevlje, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1880, Civil Commissioner to the Brigade's Command, Plevlje, 15.5.1880.
33. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1885, Brigade's Command to Corps Command, 7.10.1885.
34. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Plevlje, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1880 (e.g., Civil Commissioners' report, end of September 1880).
35. ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 82-2/10, 15th Corps Command to War Ministry, 14.II.1895. The ministry's answer: ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs, 82-2/10, War Ministry to 15th Corps Command, 21.II.1895.
36. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 2, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1890, Brigade's Command to Corps Command, 10.8.1890.
37. Original German: "Er meinte übrigens, dass wenn nur die beiden höchsten hier anwesenden Funktionäre der Hohen Pforte und der k.u.k. Regierung miteinander harmonieren, auch der serbische Konsul kaum Wirkung haben würde." ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 2, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1891, Brigade's Command to 15th Corps Command, 26.3.1891.
38. Ibid.
39. For example, during a land boundary survey: ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 51-35/18, telegraph to the War Ministry, 30.9.1905.
40. Kürsat-Ahlers, "Die Brutalisierung von Gesellschaft und Kriegsführung im osmanischen Reich während der Balkankriege," 63.
41. Original German: "Wenn seitens der türkischen Lokalregierung eine Aufforderung

zu kooperativen Vorgehen gegen die Banden gestellt würde, so hat das Brigadekommando einer solchen unbedingt zu entsprechen." ÖStA/KA/NL, B/92, Heller, Konv. Zusammenstellung von 1904, document written by the War Ministry dated 28.12.1886, "Betreffend: Durchzug etc. montenegrinischer Banden durch Sandschak nach Serbien."

42. Original German: "In erster Linie hat für die Aufrechterhaltung der Ordnung und Ruhe die türkische Lokalregierung selbst zu sorgen, und haben die k.k. Truppen strenge Neutralität zu beobachten." ÖStA/KA/NL, B/92, Heller, Konv. Zusammenstellung von 1904, Brigade's order dated 2.1.1904 (Suleiman Paşa reports that he is expecting Serbian riots in spring and asks if the Austro-Hungarians are willing to help).
43. Original German: "hat sich eine Erhitzung der Leidenschaften im Sandžak entwickelt, deren Spitze sich nunmehr—wie dies vorausgesehen wurde—ausschließlich gegen die österreichische Besatzungstruppen und die mit diesen in Beziehung stehenden Persönlichkeiten richtet." ÖStA/HHStA/, PA, XII. Türkei (1848–1918), Kt. 260, "Situationsbericht," 20.8.1908.
44. Original German: "da alle Konfidenten in steter Sorge um ihr Leben sind. Tatsächlich wurden schon Personen, die im Verkehr mit dem Zivilkommissär [*sic*] stehen, gröblichst misshandelt—es betrifft dies in gleicher Weise Christen und Mohammedaner." Ibid.
45. ÖStA/KA/NL, B/92, Heller, Konv. Brdarevo, letter to Heller, 21.7.1905.
46. ÖStA/HHStA/PA, XII. Türkei (1848–1918), Kt. 348, Konv. div. einzelne Schreiben und Berichte, report, 6.8.1908.
47. Original German: "Die Gärung unter Bevölkerung in Plevlje ist sehr groß, die Türken und Serben halten zusammen. Die Bewegung richtet sich nicht nur gegen uns, sondern auch gegen die bisher maßgebenden Persönlichkeiten." ÖStA/HHStA, PA, XII. Türkei (1848–1918), Kt. 348, Konv. div. einzelne Schreiben und Berichte, report of the Brigade, 19.8.1908.
48. Original German: "Jungtürken versuchen sich mit Serbien im Sandschak (bzw. Christen) zu arrangieren, um außerstaatliche Einflüsse abzuwürgen." ÖStA/HHStA, PA, XII. Türkei (1848–1918), Kt. 348, Konv. div. einzelne Schreiben und Berichte, Zambaur (27.8.1908).
49. Also illustrated in Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*.
50. ÖStA/HHStA, PA, XII. Türkei (1848–1918), Kt. 348, Konv. div. einzelne Schreiben und Berichte, telegram from Rappaport, Saloniki, to the Foreign Ministry, 26.8.1908.
51. ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs, 81-5/54, telegram, Brigade's Command to War Ministry, Common Finance Ministry, General Staff, and 15th Corps Command, 24.8.1908.
52. ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs, 81-5/54, telegram, 15th Corps Command to War Ministry, 24.8.1908.
53. Original German: "Seit Eintritt der neuen türkischen Ära zeigen deutlich, dass die Bewegung im Sandschakegebiete nicht in jenes ruhige Fahrwasser geleitet werden konnte, wie dies sonst innerhalb des ottomanischen Reiches zu konstatieren ist." ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs, 81-5/54-2, note by the Chief of General Staff, 21.8.1908.
54. ÖStA/HHStA/PA, XII. Türkei (1848–1918), Kt. 348, Konv. div. einzelne Schreiben und Berichte, report, 20.10.1908.

55. ÖStA/HHStA/PA, XII. Türkei (1848–1918), Kt. 348, Konv. div. einzelne Schreiben und Berichte, report, 20.10.1908.
56. Palotás, *Machtpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteressen*.
57. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1887, Brigade's Command to 15th Corps Command, "Vorfällenheitsbericht," 4.11.1887. The Plevlje district had 4,269 male "Mohammedaner" (Muslims) and 4,263 male "serbische Einwohner" (Serbian residents), Prijepolje 3,573 and 5,335, and Priboj 608 and 726.
58. Melzer, "Das Vilajet Kosovo," chapter 4: "Die Bevölkerungsverhältnisse im Vilajet Kosovo."
59. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 2, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1889, Brigade's Command to 15th Corps Command, "Vorfällenheitsbericht," 27.8.1889.
60. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 1, Konv. pro 1886, Brigade's Command to 15th Corps Command, "Vorfällenheitsbericht," 27.1.1886.
61. Original German: "Das eigentlich gefährliche Element Pevljes bilden die Flüchtlinge aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina und aus Nikšić, diese sind über den rein akademischen Patriotismus der Pevlioten nicht sehr erbaut und geben ihrem Spotte darüber Ausdruck." ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1885, Brigade's Command to 15th Corps Command, 11.10.1885.
62. ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 84-1/2, Foreign Ministry to War Ministry, 21.1.1905, together with an article from *Pester Lloyd*, 18.1.1905.
63. ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 59–29, article from *Večernje Novosti*, Belgrade, 23.5.1905.
64. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 2, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1891, Civil Commissioner Müller, undated.
65. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Kt. 1, Konv. pro 1886, Brigade's Command to Corps Command, "Vorfällenheitsbericht," 27.1.1886.
66. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Pevlje, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1884, Station Command Pevlje to Civil Commissioner, 1.1.1884.
67. Original German: "Andrija Radulović, Frächter aus Pevlje, reist heute von hier über Vardište [Bosnian town] nach Serbien, angeblich um seinen Sohn Mihailo in Kotroman bei Mokra Gora [next to the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina] zu besuchen, und Korn zu holen, steht im Verdacht ein Agent der serbischen Radikalen zu sein und geheime Correspondenzen zu vermitteln." ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Pevlje, Kt. 1, Konv. pro 1886, Brigade's Command to 15th Corps Command, "Vorfällenheitsbericht," 22.6.1886.
68. ["Two Travellers from Britain"], "Adventures among the Austrians in Bosnia," *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, 1883.
69. Sreten Petković, *Manastir Sveta Trojica u Pljevljima*.
70. Edith Durham, *Die Slawische Gefahr*, 156.
71. Original German: "Die wenigen Mönche halten fest zur serbischen Nationalpartei und hatten deshalb von den Pevljaner Türken viel Ungemach auszustehen. Pop Risto gab uns anschauliche Schilderungen von der erlittenen Bedrängnis...wenn er davon sprach und uns die von türkischen Kugeln siebartig durchlöchernte Südwand seines Hauses zeigte." Moritz Hoernes, *Dinarische Wanderungen*, 224. In 1894 Hoernes became a lecturer in prehistoric archaeology at the University of Vienna.
72. Original German: "Könnte unser mächtiger Staat, der auf der Balkanhalbinsel so

- wichtige Interessen verfolgt, nicht vielleicht in irgend einer Stadt in der ehemaligen Grenze, wo der Lebensunterhalt billig ist, ein Institut zur Ausbildung von derart wissbegierigen Individuen zu Lehrern erreichen?" Melzer, "Das Vilajet Kosovo."
73. Original German: "Der Schullehrer ist, [der] mit der großen Masse des Volkes in fortwährenden directen Contact [ist], und lernt so dessen Ideen, Leiden und Freuden, Wünsche und Bedürfnisse kennen. Er ist deshalb besonders geeignet auf diese einzuwirken." Ibid.
  74. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Plevlje, Kt. 1, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1887, Brigade's Command to 15th Corps Command, "Vorfalleberichtsbericht," 4.11.1887.
  75. Melzer, "Das Vilajet Kosovo."
  76. ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs 81-5/13, correspondence concerning "Serbian schools," k.u.k. Ministry of Finance, Brigade's Command, Station Command in Prijepolje, Chief of Staff of the 15th Corps Command, March to April 1908.
  77. Original German: "Von Plevlje ritt ich nach Prijepolje.... Es befanden sich nur 100 christliche Häuser dort. Trotzdem war ein Lehrer da, der eifrig Großserbien und Vaterlandsliebe lehrte. Die türkische Regierung vermochte diese revolutionäre Tätigkeit nicht zu verhindern, da jede Einmischung den Einspruch der Mächte wegen 'Christen-Verfolgung' hervorgerufen hätte." Durham, *Die Slawische Gefahr*, 156–57.
  78. ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs 81-5/13, correspondence concerning "Serbian schools," k.u.k. Ministry of Finance, Brigade's Command, Station Command in Prijepolje, Chief of Staff of the 15th Corps Command, March to April 1908.
  79. ÖStA/HHStA/Konsulatsarchiv, Zivilkommissariat Plevlje, Kt. 2, Konv. Reservat Exhibiten pro 1889, Station Command Prijepolje to Brigade's Command, 18.3.1889.
  80. Original German: "Zuerst wurde wie bei unseren Hausbällen gegessen, dann gelangte der Nationaltanz Kolo zur Aufführung, den weitaus größten Teil des Abends füllte aber das Singen von serbischen Nationalliedern, bald von Männern—bald von Frauenchors [sic]. Es liegt darin ein gutes Stück revolutionären Geistes." Melzer, "Das Vilajet Kosovo."
  81. Blumi, *Reinstating Ottomans*, 18.
  82. Original German: "Die Mohammedaner...schließen sich dementsprechend gegen Neuerungen und fremde Einflüsse streng ab, unter den Christen macht sich jedoch allmählich eine kulturfreundliche Strömung geltend, sie wünschen fortschrittliche Reformen und sind dem Einflusse des Westens zugänglicher." Ippen, *Novibazar und Kossovo*, 13.
  83. For an overview of activities, see Engelbert Deusch, *Das k.(u.)k. Kultusprotektorat im albanischen Siedlungsgebiet in seinem kulturellen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Umfeld*.
  84. See, for example, Robin Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*.
  85. Državni Arhiv, Narodna Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (ABiH)/k.u.k. gem. Ministerium (Büro für die Angelegenheiten Bosniens und der Herzegowina) (ZMF), Sign. 9400, Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to k.u.k. Ministry of Finance, 14.8.1900.
  86. ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs. 81-31/1, 15th Corps Command to War Ministry, 10.11.1908.

87. ABiH/ZMF, Sign. 9400, Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to k.u.k. Ministry of Finance, 14.8.1900.
88. John Paul Newman, *The First Balkan War and the Mobilization of Serbian Society*.
89. Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 148.
90. Ibid., 178.
91. Tamara Scheer, *Zwischen Front und Heimat*, 166–67.
92. Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 14.
93. Original German: “Denn die Balkanwirren wären voraussichtlich anders verlaufen, wenn wir noch im Sandschak gestanden oder gar bis Mitrovica vormarschiert wären.” Gustav Hubka, “Wenn Kriegsgefahr droht: Rückblicke auf ein kritisches Jahr in der Geschichte Österreichs,” (1954) (ÖStA/KA/Nachlasssammlung, B/61:23-33, No. 25), 25.
94. Original German: “Die Hiobspost ging von Tal zu Tal: Die Österreicher haben aus dem Sandschak hinausmüssen.” D. Klementi, *Ein Beitrag zur albanischen Frage*, 16.

## The Balkan Wars in the Italian Perspective

*Francesco Caccamo*

In one of the first essays about the Balkan Wars published in the most authoritative Italian journal of the era, the *Nuova Antologia*, the outbreak of conflict in southeastern Europe was described in the following manner:

The bellicose events that have been underway for some weeks in the Balkan Peninsula allow us to hope that the eternal Eastern Question may soon find a natural and equitable solution by those nations that are truly entitled to it.... It is high time that the Porte—no longer Sublime—ceases to exist in Europe. It has been a disgrace to civility that many nations...have collaborated in propping up the “Sick Man of Europe,” a State that considered its mission to be to massacre the Armenians, to insult, torture, and inflict the more refined cruelties on the defenseless in Europe, displaying no pity either for the elderly, or for women, or for children.<sup>1</sup>

The author of these words was Guido Cora, one of the few Italian geographers and explorers who had some experience in the territories beyond the Adriatic. His words expressed the feelings then prevalent within Italian popular opinion, or at least within the circles that were interested in international policies. The Italian public tended to interpret the conflict over the remaining Ottoman domains in Europe in light of its own historical experience, in particular the Risorgimento and the struggle to create an independent and united Italian state—a struggle in which the multinational and dynastic Habsburg Empire had been the principal

antagonist. With these premises, Italian sympathies naturally gravitated toward the small and mid-sized powers that were allied within the Balkan League in order, as it was believed, to achieve complete liberation from Turkish dominion and fully implement the principle of nationality.<sup>2</sup>

Within this interpretive scheme, at least some observers displayed a more articulate vision. In the same issue of the *Nuova Antologia* that published Cora's piece, the geologist Carlo De Stefani, a member of the prestigious Accademia dei Lincei, argued that the situation in southeastern Europe was far more complex than it appeared at first glance. Without a doubt the Balkan populations shared a hostility toward the Ottoman Empire, but they were equally divided among themselves. De Stefani was in agreement about the need for an immediate end to Ottoman dominion in Europe and the idea that "the Turk should return to his cradle in Asia," but he also believed that it would be necessary to devise solutions to respect the needs of all Balkan peoples, not only of some of them. In this perspective the authentic problem was Albania, which should not be discriminated against solely because it had remained faithful to the Ottoman Empire for a longer time than the Greeks or the Southern Slavs. As De Stefani warned, the partition of lands inhabited by Albanians among the members of the Balkan coalition would do nothing but perpetuate the elements of injustice and instability that people hoped to overcome with the end of Ottoman power.<sup>3</sup>

These two articles anticipated the terms in which the debate would develop within the Italian press between 1912 and 1913. On one side were supporters of the complete partition of the Ottoman territories in southeastern Europe and their subsequent distribution among the members of the Balkan League. On the other side were those who stressed the need to take into account the rights of the Albanians. Within this debate it would be fruitless to seek out some glimmer of comprehension of the Ottoman Empire. By the beginning of the twentieth century Italian public opinion had grown deeply skeptical about the capability of Istanbul to introduce reforms that would modernize the empire and allow the peaceful coexistence of its different national and religious elements. After the Libyan War of 1911–12, condemnation of the Ottomans or the Turks more specifically became virtually unanimous. They were generally depicted as Muslims, "Orientals," Asians—in other words, according to the stereotypes of the era, as barbarians. At most discussion centered around those who believed that the Turks should return to Asia and those who thought that even the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire sooner or later should be placed under firm European control.<sup>4</sup>



Compared to the debate taking place within Italian public opinion, the line followed by the Italian authorities was inevitably more complex, nuanced, and even hesitant. Diplomats and policy makers were certainly influenced by the widespread sympathies in favor of the principle of nationality and of the Balkan countries, but they were not indifferent to the advantages offered by the presence of a relatively weak and inoffensive entity like the Ottoman Empire in the eastern Mediterranean. As demonstrated by the chain of events put in motion by the Berlin Congress of 1878 (the transfer of the administration over Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary, the establishment of British control over Cyprus and Egypt, the creation of the French protectorate in Tunisia), the erosion of the Ottoman Empire was likely to benefit more consolidated Great Powers rather than a relative newcomer such as Italy.<sup>5</sup> As a historian stated, "Italy, as a second-rate power, was fundamentally conservative and would have found a reversal of the *status quo* inopportune, because she would not have been able to take advantage of any collapse of the Ottoman Empire."<sup>6</sup> On the contrary, the development of friendly, or at least cordial, ties with Istanbul could help in promoting economic and political penetration in areas of fundamental interest for Italy, such as the eastern shore of the Adriatic or the North African provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

With these parameters, by the end of the nineteenth century one of the more serious concerns for Italian diplomacy was how to position itself in the not unlikely event of a new Balkan crisis. In various secret agreements and public statements Italian officials attempted to devise a solution combining the maintenance of the status quo in southeastern Europe for the present with the autonomous development of the Balkan nationalities in the indeterminate future.

This approach was highly problematic, however, because the national aspirations of the Balkan populations were squarely in opposition to any conservation of the status quo. These aspirations could hardly be contained within the realm of autonomy but were much more likely to develop toward full independence. Further complicating the issue were the stipulations of the Triple Alliance that since 1882 had tied Italy not only to Germany but also to Austria-Hungary. At the time of the first renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1887, Rome and Vienna had agreed that any eventual expansion in the Balkans by Austria-Hungary would require territorial concessions favoring Italy and vice versa. This was the so-called Compensation Clause, through which the Italian authorities hoped one day to obtain—in exchange for Austrian expansion in the Balkans—all

or at least part of the *terre irredente*, the unredeemed lands of Trento and Trieste. As also argued in other chapters in this volume, however, it was clear that a shift eastward for Austria, its *inorientamento*, would necessarily take place to the detriment either of the Ottoman Empire or of the Balkan peoples, if not both.<sup>7</sup>

These contradictions threatened to surface when Italy, following the outbreak of the second Moroccan crisis in July 1911, decided to abandon the policy of “peaceful penetration” in the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and to proceed to their outright conquest.<sup>8</sup> With this initiative Italy itself assumed the responsibility of delivering a devastating new blow to the survival of the Ottoman Empire, thereby contributing to the further destabilization of the Balkan Peninsula and encouraging the small and medium-sized powers in the region to accelerate their diplomatic and military preparations against Istanbul.

The men at the helm of Italian foreign policy were not unaware of these implications. Not by chance, when the foreign minister, Antonino di San Giuliano, advocated the opening of hostilities in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica with King Vittorio Emanuele III and with the president of the Council, Giovanni Giolitti, he highlighted “the probability...that the blow caused by...such an expedition to the prestige of the Ottoman Empire might turn the Balkan populations against it..., which today are irritated more than ever by the madly centralist regime of the Young Turks. This might hasten a crisis that could induce and almost force Austria to act in the Balkans.”<sup>9</sup>

Clearly these considerations did not dissuade Italy from launching the Libyan War at the end of September 1911, but they most certainly conditioned the way in which it was carried out. In order to avoid an extension of the conflict and to avert a reaction by the Austrian ally/rival, Giolitti and San Giuliano tried to ensure that the military operations were concentrated in the Mediterranean and did not involve the Balkans. Rome confidentially communicated these intentions to Vienna and to the Balkan capitals on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities and reiterated them with a note from the official press agency, the Agenzia Stefani.<sup>10</sup>

The effect of these declarations was almost ruined in the very first days of the conflict, however, after the Italian navy bombed the Ottoman ports of Prevesa/Preveza and San Giovanni di Medua/Shengjin, between the Adriatic and the Ionian seas. Faced with the extremely harsh protests of his Austro-Hungarian colleague Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, San Giuliano had to explain formally that the actions against Prevesa and Medua were motivated by “exceptional circumstances” (that is, by

the need to avoid the risk of an Ottoman expedition against the national territory).

In general, however, Italy remained “absolutely determined to maintain the status quo in the Balkan peninsula” and was “more interested than ever in avoiding complications” in the region. In the same context, the Consulta sent repeated invitations to all of the Balkan powers to remain prudent and brushed off the overtures that practically all of them made in order to undertake joint anti-Ottoman action.<sup>11</sup>

This line of conduct did not prevent rumors from spreading about Italian maneuvering in the Balkans. Not only Istanbul but also Vienna suspected that Italian agents were plotting in the region to weaken the Ottoman Empire in order to force it to abandon its resistance in Libya. At the end of 1911, for example, the Ballplatz was alarmed by Turkish allegations that the Italians were causing trouble in Montenegro, stirring up unrest among the largely Catholic Malësorë tribes of northern Albania and even delivering the financial means for the accomplishment of terrorist attacks in Macedonia.<sup>12</sup>

Asked for an explanation, San Giuliano denied any involvement by Italian official representatives and repeated that the only interest of his government in the Balkan Peninsula was that “tranquillity and the status quo be maintained.” Given the vast amount of adventurers and *gens sans aveu* trafficking in the whole Orient, he could not categorically exclude that some Italian citizens, “out of sheer criminal sense or political fanaticism,” had gotten involved in the above-mentioned plots. Nonetheless, he believed that it was much more likely to find those responsible among Montenegrin, Albanian, and Bulgarian activists, if not among Young Turk provocateurs.<sup>13</sup>

Italian sources do indeed seem to support San Giuliano’s statements. To date no evidence has emerged giving credit to rumors about Italian involvement in Balkan troubles during the Libyan War. On the contrary, everything seems to confirm that Rome was seriously trying to avoid complications in the region. For instance, the suggestions by the entrepreneur Giuseppe Volpi and less influential agitators aimed at supporting a rebellion in Albania, with the possible help of Montenegro, were not taken into consideration.<sup>14</sup> At the beginning of 1912 Giolitti himself intervened to put an end to these speculations, making it clear that “in this moment a movement in Albania could create very serious damage for Italy.”<sup>15</sup>

Nonetheless, this moderate policy was not implemented with the same coherence in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, which were less

susceptible to causing a wider conflict. It is certainly worth noticing that the Italians actively intervened in the Arab Peninsula from their bases in Eritrea, bombing various localities on the Red Sea coastline and lending support to the anti-Ottoman rebellion led by Sheikh Mohammed Idrisi from the Asir.<sup>16</sup> In the spring of 1912 the Italian government launched naval operations in the direction of the Straits and occupied the islands of the Dodecanese in an attempt to break the stalemate in the Libyan War and force the Ottomans to the negotiating table. Despite initial protests, this time even the Austrians accepted the Italian initiative in the hope that the prompt opening of peace talks would interrupt the increasingly evident preparations for war of the Balkan countries.<sup>17</sup>

In retrospect this was wishful thinking. The Italian initiatives succeeded in ending the Libyan conflict through the signature of the Treaty of Ouchy in October 1912 but had no stabilizing effects in southeastern Europe. At the beginning of October Montenegro opened hostilities against the Ottoman Empire, to be joined a few days afterward by Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece.<sup>18</sup> The outbreak of the Balkan War created a very delicate situation for Italy, which was exhausted by the prolonged military effort in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. At the moment when the Italian government wished to concentrate on the peace negotiations that had begun in Switzerland with its Ottoman counterpart, it had to confront a new international crisis with potentially devastating effects. Under these circumstances the initial concern was to clarify that Italy was not involved in the outbreak of the new crisis. As San Giuliano was quick to recall, "we had done everything possible to impede Balkan complications, and therefore not only did we abstain from military operations that would have hastened the end of our war, but all of our diplomatic actions were undertaken with the express desire to avoid opening up the Balkan question."<sup>19</sup>

In the same context the head of the Consulta expressed his conviction that territorial gains by the members of the Balkan League should be as limited as possible. Such territorial expansion, he remarked, would disturb the interests of the Great Powers and increase the possibility of their intervention, which was a clear reference to Austria. The Ottoman Empire would still be able to retain a substantial part of its European domains, provided that it would implement a project of reforms under international control.<sup>20</sup>

Once again these statements did not stop allegations of Italian maneuvering in the Balkans from circulating. The suspicions were echoed by the British ambassador in Saint Petersburg, who contended: "The

Italians have much more luck than they deserve. They are really the cause of all these troubles, and now the Balkan states have pulled the chestnuts out of the fire for them." The British diplomat also reported rumors that "it was they [the Italians] who egged the King of Montenegro on to begin the war," adding maliciously that "they are certainly the only Great Power to benefit of His action."<sup>21</sup>

The efforts of the Rome government to prove that it was not involved in the developments in southeastern Europe were further complicated by the initiatives undertaken by the Italian far left, which aimed at continuing the struggle of the *Risorgimento* in the name of the principle of nationality. At the beginning of the Balkan War many radical and republican militants immediately volunteered to fight against the Ottoman Empire. An expedition force to Greece was organized under the leadership of Ricciotti Garibaldi, one of the sons of the iconic Giuseppe Garibaldi. Considering the widespread sympathy in Italy for the Balkan nationalities, the Rome government chose not to oppose the departure of these volunteers, provided that they left as private citizens and not as members of a military force. In this way an Italian-Greek legion of some hundreds of men was formed in November 1912. With the consent of Athens the following month, it was sent to Epirus, where it contributed to the Greek advance against the Ottomans.<sup>22</sup>

In actuality Italian authorities seem to have abandoned the hope of preserving the status quo only after the unexpected successes of the armies of the Balkan League, which in just a month and a half managed to reduce the Ottoman forces to a few fortresses (Scutari/Shkodra/İşkodra in northern Albania, Janina/Ioannina/Yanya in Epirus, and Adrianopolis/Edirne in eastern Thrace). The pace of events rendered those concerns about maintaining the old order anachronistic; instead it became crucial to initiate reflection on a new Balkan settlement.

The government led by Giolitti was certainly under strong public pressure to support the claims of the members of the Balkan League. Even the Savoy dynasty seemed to lean in this direction, given the ties established with the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty following the marriage of Vittorio Emanuele III with Elena of Montenegro. For San Giuliano, however, priorities were different. Faced with the possibility of the end of the Ottoman presence in Europe, or even complete dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the head of the Consulta realized that the Triple Alliance was the only instrument able to protect the Italian interests in the Adriatic and in the eastern Mediterranean. For him, the Triple Alliance could be used to contrast the ambitions of the Anglo-French-Russian Entente while also keeping Austrian initiatives under control.<sup>23</sup>

The main problem was clearly how to balance the territorial aspirations of the Balkan League with the creation of an Albanian entity, either autonomous or independent—the same problem, it must be noted, at the center of the discussions within the Italian press. In order not to disrupt the Triple Alliance, San Giuliano tended to adapt to the Austro-Hungarian projects aimed at containing the demands of the members of the Balkan League to the Adriatic and at creating a vital Albania built along mostly ethnic borders. Above all, he backed Aerenthal's successor at the head of the Ballplatz, Leopold von Berchtold, in opposing a Serbian attempt to obtain an outlet to the Adriatic through the coastal center of Durazzo/Dürres. According to the instructions that he sent to the Italian representative in Belgrade, Italy was favorably disposed toward Serbia and sympathetic to its enlargement but could not support its ambition to reach the Adriatic Sea through the conquest of an essential part of northern Albania. As he pointed out, "This pretense—we cannot hide it—would hardly be compatible with the Italian interests in that sea and would be certainly in contradiction not only with the principle of Albanian autonomy and integrity, which we constantly proclaimed and supported, but also with the principle of nationality, to which both Italy and Serbia owe their own existence."<sup>24</sup>

Despite this, the original Italian projects differed in notable ways from those of Austria. In order to reach a compromise with the countries of the Balkan League and with their supporters from the Entente, San Giuliano was willing to accept relevant exceptions to the principle of Albanian ethnic integrity. He had no objections to Serbian and Montenegrin expansion in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, in Kosova/Kosovo, and in western Macedonia, with the mainly Albanian (Catholic and Muslim) centers of Ipek/Peja, Prizrend/Prizren, Djakova/Jakova, and Dibra/Diber. He was also favorably disposed toward Montenegrin aspirations for Scutari, the main Albanian city of the time, with the adjoining plain and the centers of Alessio/Lesh and San Giovanni di Medua/Shengjin. Farther south San Giuliano at first concentrated mainly on the port of Valona/Vlorë, which he believed should be not assigned to Greece because of its fundamental strategic position at the entrance of the Adriatic. For the rest, he considered it possible to leave Athens nearly all of what the Greeks called northern Epirus, which the Albanians regarded as southern Albania or Toskëria.<sup>25</sup> These opinions were reflected in the instructions that he sent to the Italian representatives in the main European capitals on the eve of the opening of the Conference of the Ambassadors in London. According to these instructions, Italian diplomacy must rigidly defend Albanian integrity in the area between Durazzo and Valona but could take

a less intransigent attitude in the regions north of Durazzo and south of Valona.<sup>26</sup>

With the beginning of the Conference of London at the end of 1912 Italy substantially modified its positions. San Giuliano was still willing to use Kosova and western Macedonia to appease Serbia but became more hesitant about Montenegrin expansion into Scutari. Symptomatically this evolution was not really due to a deeper concern for Albanian vitality but rather to fear that, in exchange for Scutari, Montenegro might agree to leave Austria Mount Lovćen or other elevated areas dominating the Bay of Kotor in exchange for Scutari. Most importantly, Italian diplomacy became increasingly interested in the problem of southern Albania. It was considered crucial that the Strait of Corfu would not remain under the exclusive control of Greece and therefore would not be transformed into a nearly impregnable naval base near the Adriatic. Subsequently the Italians started to support a demarcation line that—while granting Janina and a large part of northern Epirus to Greece—still left Albania a substantial segment of the Corfu Channel (up to Cape Stylos) and Korytsa/Korça in the interior.<sup>27</sup> In this way a sort of a division of roles gradually took shape in the Albanian issue. While Vienna was the main supporter of Albanian integrity in the north, Rome was more active in the defense of Albanian interests in the south.<sup>28</sup>

Austrian-Italian cooperation had its most serious test with the mounting of Montenegrin pressure on Scutari and the occupation of the northern Albanian city by the troops of King Nicholas of Montenegro at the end of April 1913. When Berchtold stated his unwillingness to tolerate the Montenegrin *fait accompli* and threatened to react with military intervention, San Giuliano found himself in an extremely embarrassing position. Had he refused to cooperate, Italy would have inflicted a severe blow to the Triple Alliance and would have handed the nascent state of Albania over to the exclusive influence of Vienna. Yet, if Italy acted with Austria against Montenegro, it would have alienated wide sectors of public opinion and perhaps the Savoy family itself; moreover, it would have run the risk of becoming engaged in a broader conflict, considering the possibility that Russia might intervene to aid Montenegro. In a characteristic manner San Giuliano eventually found a way to bypass these two unattractive alternatives. According to his plans, if Austria truly intervened against Montenegro in northern Albania, Italy would have undertaken a parallel operation in southern Albania with the pretext of preventing a Greek advance on Valona.<sup>29</sup>

Fortunately the decision of King Nicholas to bend to international pressure and abandon Scutari in mid-May managed to deflect the

realization of this Machiavellian project, which could have led to the division of Albania into two zones of influence (Austrian in the north and Italian in the south).<sup>30</sup> The end of the Scutari crisis allowed the renewal of the Italian-Austrian collaboration on the Albanian issue for the rest of the London Conference. Although this policy was hardly inspired by ideal considerations and by the desire to implement the principle of nationality, it provided a major contribution to the creation of an independent Albania. The new state was deprived of the mainly Albanian regions of Kosova and western Macedonia but was built mostly along ethnic lines at least along the Adriatic coast.

Even if Italy was focused on the Albanian Question, by now it was also turning its attention to other aspects of the new Balkan settlement. Faced with the apparent military collapse of the Ottoman Empire, San Giuliano believed that Bulgaria should be the main beneficiary of the conflict: "among the Balkan States, it is the most solid and the most able to resist lasting influences of the Great Powers."<sup>31</sup> In this perspective the Italian foreign minister thought that Bulgaria should receive not only the port of Salonika—the natural Macedonian outlet to the sea—but also most of Thrace, including Adrianople. As he hoped, Bulgarian expansion would also offer the opportunity to satisfy the requests of Romania, which had remained neutral until then but manifested growing unrest at not being taken into consideration in the redrawing of the southeastern European map. According to San Giuliano, in exchange for Salonika and Adrianople, the Bulgarians should accept Romanian demands for a change of the border in southern Dobrudja/Dobrudzha, specifically in the area of Silistra.<sup>32</sup>

Italian diplomacy had a much colder attitude toward Greece. Difficulties with Athens had started during the Libyan War (with the Italian occupation of the Dodecanese, with its purely Greek inhabitants) but had greatly increased because of the Italians' negative attitude toward the Greek claims in southern Albania. Under these premises it was believed that Greece should be satisfied with the acquisition of Janina and the island of Crete, but no more.<sup>33</sup>

In this context the future of the Ottoman Empire represented a major cause of concern. By early 1913 San Giuliano began to fear that the Balkan conflict might anticipate not simply the partition of the European domains of the Ottoman Empire but its complete dissolution. For him, this was an extremely dangerous scenario. With Italy still weakened by the Libyan War and still engaged in the repression of the local Arab populations, it would be more difficult than ever to compete with the other Great Powers. Under these circumstances San Giuliano thought



that Italy should try to delay as much as possible the final breakup of the Ottoman Empire but should also articulate a strategy in order to obtain a "fair share" of its spoils. As he wrote, "The policy of the Italian Government, in agreement with our allies, aims at the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Asian Turkey. Nonetheless, considering the presence of so many internal and external threats, one should protect oneself from the possibility of its future partition among the Great Powers." In concrete terms this meant not simply prolonging the occupation of the Dodecanese Islands but also developing an act of economic and political penetration on the Anatolian coast of the Ottoman Empire. In this frame of mind, the Italian foreign minister anticipated that "we would be interested in settling in some region touched by the Mediterranean in order to maintain or to re-create the balance in that sea. From this perspective we should immediately intensify or develop our interests in a region touched by that sea."<sup>34</sup>

In spring 1913 the implosion of the Balkan League and the outbreak of the second Balkan conflict drastically changed the situation. In a few weeks the total defeat of Bulgaria frustrated Sofia's ambition toward most of Macedonia and Thrace. Greece and Serbia emerged as the main beneficiaries of the war, while Romania conquered southern Dobrudja and Turkey recovered eastern Thrace with Adrianople. In many aspects these developments contradicted the calculations and expectations of Italian diplomacy about future Bulgarian primacy in southeastern Europe, about the possibility of a Bulgarian-Romanian rapprochement, and about Greek containment. For Rome, however, what really mattered was the Albanian settlement, which had already been outlined in coordination with Vienna in the previous months and was formalized at the London Conference in the summer of 1913. In the same context Italy maintained its hold on the Dodecanese and started to implement the projects for the creation of a sphere of interest in southwestern Anatolia.

As an addendum to this discussion we might examine the specific issue of the stance assumed by the Italian-Albanian minority during the Balkan Wars. The so-called *arbëreshë* were the descendants of the Albanian communities that had taken refuge in southern Italy following the Ottoman conquest of the Balkan Peninsula. Throughout the nineteenth century they actively participated in the Italian movement for national unification, distinguishing themselves during various anti-Bourbon uprisings and during Garibaldi's "expedition of the Thousand." At the same time, under the influence of Romanticism and of the Risorgimento,

they also displayed a growing interest in what they called the Albanian homeland.<sup>35</sup>

By the end of the century two trends had emerged. The most authoritative *arbëreshë*, like the illustrious poet Girolamo De Rada and the lawyer Anselmo Lorecchio, were willing to follow exponents of the Albanian Rilindja like Pashko Vasa/Wasa Effendi and Sami Frashëri in advocating a gradualist process of emancipation. As Lorecchio and his journal *La Nazione Albanese* forcefully stated, the Albanians should not aspire to complete independence but rather to autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. Lorecchio argued that this approach would help to bridge regional and religious differences and would put in motion a process of cultural development and national consolidation while at the same time resisting the expansionist aims of Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, and Greeks.<sup>36</sup>

Alongside this moderate or evolutionary approach a more radical one advocated complete independence for the Albanians from the Ottomans. In this context, a prominent role was assumed at first by Manlio Bennici, who in the early years of the twentieth century collaborated with Ricciotti Garibaldi in the creation of a Committee for Albania. With the passing of time, however, Terenzio Tocci, a young publicist with close ties to the republican far left, affiliated with Freemasonry and in touch with Albanian patriots such as Nikolla Ivanaj/Ivanaj Bey, became the leading personality. Tocci's fame was consolidated by his participation in the Albanian uprising in 1911, his appointment to the helm of an ephemeral Provisional Government of Albania, and his elaboration of a short-lived Declaration of Albanian Independence.<sup>37</sup>

With the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, the *arbëreshë* from both wings reacted with desperation to the advance of the armies of the Balkan League in Albanian territories, the tightening of the Serbian and Montenegrin siege of Scutari and the siege of Janina by the Greeks, and the expulsion of sizable Albanian communities from their native lands. They were also dismayed by Italian public opinion, which welcomed the struggle for liberation led by the Balkan League but, at least according to them, did not show enough interest in the plight of the Albanians. In the *Nazione Albanese* Lorecchio denounced in apocalyptic terms the occurrence of "events so infamous and tragic as never recorded for any other nation, ancient or modern," and raised the specter of *Finis Albaniae*: the complete partition of the Albanian lands.<sup>38</sup> Equally harsh were Tocci's statements in the *Rivista dei Balcani*, a short-lived journal that he had founded just a few months earlier to support Albanian independence:

“to stir up the voraciousness of the Balkan governments is an undertaking against the rights of man, against civilization, and is equally abhorrent as a defense of the Turks. We stand for the brotherhood of the Balkan peoples, but it must be based on the Principle of Nationality, on reciprocal love, and not on the criminal greed of the delinquent Nicola Petrovich and of other leaders who are ready to tear into pieces poor Albania!”<sup>39</sup>

As the Italian-Albanians were on the verge of losing all hopes, news spread of the proclamation of independence issued on November 28 in Valona/Vlorë by İsmail Kemal Bey and other Albanian notables. All of the *arbëreshë* celebrated this event, in the hope that it would signal the beginning of a process of national rebirth. Lorecchio quickly abandoned his evolutionist program, convinced that the Ottoman Empire had outlived its historical mission and that the Albanian issue could no longer be confronted in the framework of autonomy. From this moment on, he and his journal would promote Albanian unity and independence, denouncing the persecutions inflicted upon the Albanians and contesting the expansionist aspirations of the members of the Balkan League. In a complementary manner, Lorecchio attempted to influence Italian public opinion, arguing that the principle of nationality could not be applied to the sole advantage of Southern Slavs and Greeks and that Albanian independence was the only solution consistent with Italian interests in the Adriatic.<sup>40</sup>

Following the declaration of independence of November 28, Tocci suspended the publication of the *Rivista dei Balcani* in order to try to organize new expeditions on the other side of the Adriatic, to stir up Albanian resistance against the occupiers, and to support Prince Fuad of Egypt as a candidate for the Albanian throne. In mid-1913 Tocci would go even further, moving with his family to Scutari and establishing what may be considered the first Albanian-language daily paper in the Albanian territory, the *Taraboshi*. In this way he became the only representative of the *arbëresh* minority to involve himself directly in the building of the Albanian state—a choice that would repeatedly put him in conflict with Italian authorities in the following years.<sup>41</sup>

As we have seen, the Italians generally interpreted the conflict of 1912–13 as a war of liberation fought by the Balkan nationalities against oppressive Ottoman rule. Substantial differences existed, however, between public opinion and the views of official authorities. While the natural reaction of the Italian public was to support the Balkan populations, for the government the main problem was to defend what it regarded as the

national interest and to elevate the country's status in comparison with other Great Powers. In this context Giolitti and San Giuliano abandoned the defense of the status quo and accepted the discussion of a radically new settlement for southeastern Europe only with reluctance and only after military developments in the region. At this point they found themselves confronted with the same dilemma faced by public opinion (and at the very heart of the concerns of the Italian-Albanian minority): whether the Albanian lands were to be divided among the members of the Balkan League or whether the Albanians were entitled to create an independent country of their own and, if so, within what borders. In the end the Rome government agreed to a compromise that would leave the newly created Albania most of its ethnic territories on the Adriatic coastline while giving up internal regions such as Kosova and western Macedonia. This partial amputation has represented a major cause of resentment for the Albanians ever since, but for the moment it seemed to provide the only concrete chance to create an independent and relatively viable Albanian state.

The Italians were certainly less concerned by the developments in other parts of the Balkan region. San Giuliano, the man at the helm of Italian diplomacy, tried to formulate a program valid for the whole post-war settlement, envisaging the enlargement of Serbia and Montenegro in the western Balkans, the strengthening of Bulgaria through expansion to Macedonia and Thrace, the compensation of neutral Romania with southern Dobrudja, and the relative containment of Greece. Most of these views, however, did not pass the test of the second Balkan War. In general the lesson taught by the conflict of 1912–13 was that Balkan events could no longer be interpreted according to the paradigm of the *Risorgimento*. The Balkan nationalities were not simply fighting for the liberation of their kin from external domination but were equally divided among themselves about the division of the Ottoman spoils.

All of this did not affect the widespread negative vision of the Ottoman Empire. Even after the Eastern Question had turned out to be much more complex than imagined and the Balkan countries had revealed their expansionist appetites, the Ottomans did not find much sympathy. Not only was the Italian public perception of the Ottoman Empire extremely negative, but the Rome government manifested doubts and prejudices. It is true that San Giuliano tried at first to avoid major changes in the Balkan status quo, but this program had already been endangered by his own government with the decision to launch the Libyan War. Moreover, as soon as the Balkan War progressed, the Italian

foreign minister elaborated another of his ambiguous formulas, declaring that the Italians should try to preserve the remains of the Ottoman Empire but should also begin penetration of the Anatolian coasts. Despite the Italian authorities' appreciation for the short-term stabilizing role that the Ottoman Empire could play, in the long run they shared the tendency to consider the Ottoman presence an element alien to the Balkans and, even more, to Europe. In other words, they regarded it as a less efficient and less organized incarnation of the "prison of nationalities" that the Austrian Empire had represented during the Risorgimento. A change in opinion and the beginning of a sympathetic movement toward the Turks would come about only after World War I, with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of the Republic of Mustafa Kemal—that is, with the transformation of the multinational and dynastic empire into what the Italians perceived as a national state.

#### NOTES

1. Guido Cora, "La penisola balcanica nel momento attuale."
2. Criticism of the Ottoman Empire and sympathy for the Balkan nationalities had deep roots in Italy. During the Risorgimento the radicals under the lead of Giuseppe Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi openly advocated the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the Balkan nations. Instead moderates such as Cesaro Balbo and Vincenzo Gioberti envisaged an expansion of the Habsburg Empire in southeastern Europe, hoping that, in exchange, Vienna would abandon some Italian territories. Following Italian unification, the idea that the Ottoman domains in Europe were destined to disappear gained further ground: Atilio Brunialti, *Gli eredi della Turchia*; Ruggero Bonghi, *La crisi d'Oriente e il congresso di Berlino*; Giovanni Amadori-Virgilj, *La questione rumeliota (Macedonia—Vecchia Serbia—Albania—Epiro) e la politica italiana*. In the aftermath of the revolt of the Young Turks in 1908, some observers harbored hopes that the Ottoman Empire could reform and regenerate, but they were quickly disappointed by the new regime in Istanbul and reverted to Italy's traditional Balkanophile stand. This was the case of the journalist, political commentator, and businessman Vico Mantegazza: Vico Mantegazza, *La Turchia liberale e le Questioni Balcaniche*; idem, *La Grande Bulgaria*.
3. Carlo De Stefani, "L'assetramento dei Balcani e l'Italia." Among the writings on the Albanian issue published in Italy on the eve of the Balkan Wars, see Francesco Guicciardini, "Impressioni d'Albania"; Ugo Ojetti, *L'Albania*; Antonino di San Giuliano, *Lettere sull'Albania*; and Vico Mantegazza, *L'Albania*.
4. For the continuation of the debate over the Balkan conflict within Italian public opinion, see the other articles published in the *Nuova Antologia* between 1912 and 1913: [anonymous], "Questioni albanesi," 983, December 1, 1912, 492–96; [anonymous], "Note e commenti"; Francesco Guicciardini, "Serbia e Grecia in Albania"; Elleno [pseudonym of an Italian diplomat], "Epiro e Albania"; Guido

Cora, "Albania ed Albanesi"; and Victor [pseudonym of a commentator on issues of international politics], "Montenegro ed Austria-Ungheria," 989, March 16, 1913, 159–63. The stereotypes then prevailing within Italian public discourse were expressed in a virulent way by the journalist Vico Mantegazza. In a speech given after the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, Mantegazza saluted "the movement in favor of the populations oppressed until today, the admiration for the liberating victories of the young Balkan kingdoms and the auspices that these Mongolian hordes, who leave nothing behind them apart from towers of skulls and bones whitening under the sun—the milestones of six centuries of barbarity—might be pushed sooner or later beyond the Bosphorus, to where they once came from!": Vico Mantegazza, *La guerra balcanica*, 52.

5. For an updated and stimulating overview of the Balkan crisis of 1875–78 and the Berlin Congress, see M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Sluglett, eds., *War and Diplomacy*.
6. Timothy W. Childs, *Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya, 1911–1912*, 9.
7. We have no general studies on the attitude of Italian diplomacy toward the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Question. See the references in Rinaldo Petri-gnani, *Neutralità e alleanza*; Richard J. B. Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers*; Daniel Grange, *L'Italie et la Méditerranée (1896–1911)*; and Holger Afflerbach, *Die Dreibund*. On the first decade of the twentieth century, see Francesco Tommasini, *L'Italia alla vigilia della Grande Guerra*. Interesting observations also can be found in Pietro Pastorelli, "Il principio di nazionalità nella politica estera italiana." Among the most recent and stimulating publications, see Luciano Monzali, *The Italians of Dalmatia*; and Giampaolo Ferraioli, *Politica e diplomazia in Italia tra XIX e XX secolo* (for a synthesis by the same author, see "Considerazioni sulla politica estera dell'Italia giolittiana").
8. On the Libyan War, see William C. Askew, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya, 1911–1912*; Gioacchino Volpe, *L'impresa di Tripoli 1911–12*; Francesco Malgeri, *La guerra libica (1911–1912)*; Childs, *Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya*; Sergio Romano, *La quarta sponda*; Angelo Del Boca, *Gli italiani in Libia*, 3–202; Stefano Trinchese, *Mare nostrum*; and Ferraioli, *Politica e diplomazia in Italia tra XIX e XX secolo*, 377–502.
9. *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (DDI)*, series IV, vols. 7–8, doc. 108, San Giuliano to Vittorio Emanuele III and Giolitti, July 28, 1911.
10. *DDI*, series IV, vols. 7–8, docs. 228, 229, 234, 240, 246, 260, 264, 265, 269; *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914 (ÖUA)*, vol. 3, docs. 2644, 2654, 2670; Sinan Kuneralp and Gül Tokay, eds., *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One (ODD)*, vol. 1, doc. 211.
11. *DDI*, series IV, vols. 7–8, docs. 275, 280, 281, 282, 293, 308, 316, 324; *ÖUA*, vol. 3, docs. 2683, 2691, 2692, 2693, 2706, 2713; *ODD*, vol. 1, docs. 224, 226, 253, 257, 306, 308, 312, 327, 330. As a matter of fact, the Italian action against Prevesa and Medua took place due to mistakes made within the chain of command and the personal initiatives undertaken by local commanders. Such failures in military discipline caused an extremely harsh exchange of letters among Giolitti; San Giuliano; the minister of the navy, Pasquale Leonardi Cattolica; and the king himself. Giolitti called it "an outrageous action against formal orders," which was "on the verge of

- betrayal": *Giovanni Giolitti, Il carteggio*, vol. 2, docs. 240, 241, 246, 247, 248, 249, 251, 252, 254, 255.
12. *ODD*, vol. 1, docs. 287, 309, 909, 962; *ÖUA*, vol. 3, docs. 2961, 2984, 3048, 3054, 3061, 3062.
  13. *ÖUA*, vol. 3, doc. 3082, Mérey to Aehrenthal, December 9, 1911. See also doc. 2964, November 21, 1911.
  14. *Giovanni Giolitti, Il carteggio*, vol. 2, doc. 285, Volpi to Giolitti, January 26, 1912; doc. 287, Facchinetti to Giolitti, February 6, 1912.
  15. *Ibid.*, doc. 289, Giolitti to Panizzardi, February 8, 1912. The instructions given by the Italian premier seem to have been effectively implemented. For instance, some months afterward Volpi would recall that the Albanian movement had been extinguished "for the desire of the major interested Powers, Italy included": doc. 325, Volpi to Giolitti, June 20, 1912. Some months later San Giuliano confirmed: "Not only are we not helping the Albanian uprising, but our representative in Cettigne...advised King Nikola to respect the peace": doc. 347, San Giuliano to Giolitti, August 17, 1912.
  16. Marco Lenci, "La campagna italiana nel mar Rosso durante la guerra di Libia e la rivolta antiturca di al-Idrisi nell'Asir"; *idem, Eritrea e Yemen*; for a broader perspective, see Isa Blumi, *Chaos in Yemen*, 72–73, 77; and *ODD*, vol. 1, doc. 997. New documents on the Italian initiatives in the Red Sea have become available with the publication of Giolitti's papers. Interestingly enough, since autumn 1911 the Italian premier had shown his willingness to negotiate not only with Idrisi but also with the Imam Yahya from the Zaydi sect in Yemen, offering weapons, money, and naval support. As he stressed: "The war that we undertook against Turkey is not a war of religion, but a war to preserve our dignity and to defend our compatriots and their interests. Nothing more. For our part, we do not plan on inquiring into the reasons that induced the Sheikh [Idrisi] and the Imam [Yahya] to rebel, but we would be pleased with a single thing: the replacement of Turkish misgovernment in Arabia with Arab governments and governors": *Giovanni Giolitti, Il Carteggio*, vol. 2, doc. 277, Giolitti to Cerrina-Feroni, November 28, 1911. The following month he would add: "The Arab revolt against the Turks would be of capital importance to us": doc. 279, Giolitti to Rubiolo, December 27, 1911. As we know, the cooperation with Imam Yahya did not materialize, but it did with Idrisi: docs. 280, 282, 320, 331, 333, 390.
  17. On the Italian intervention in the Dodecanese, see the numerous references in *DDI*, series IV, vols. 7–8; *ÖUA*, vol. 3; and *ODD*, vol. 2.
  18. On the 1912–13 conflict, see Ernst C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913*; Arben Puto, *L'indépendance albanaise et la diplomatie des grandes puissances 1912–1914*; Antonello Biagini, *L'Italia e le guerre balcaniche*; Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913*; and John D. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle*; for an Italian synthesis, see Egidio Ivetić, *Le guerre balcaniche*. On the Ottoman situation on the eve of the Balkan Wars, see the stimulating considerations of Isa Blumi both in *Reinstating the Ottomans* and in his contribution in this volume (chapter 18).
  19. *DDI*, series IV, vols. 7–8, doc. 1046, San Giuliano to Imperiali, Tittoni, Melegari, and Avarna, October 10, 1912.

20. Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE), RT, vol. 343, San Giuliano to Pansa, Imperiali, Tittoni, Melegari, and Avarna, October 28 and 29, 1912, tels. gab. 1689 and 1696.
21. *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 (BD)*, vol. 9, doc. 43, Buchanan to Nicholson, October 17, 1912.
22. Ricciotti Garibaldi, *La camicia rossa nella guerra balcanica*; Camillo Marabini, *Dietro la chimera garibaldina*. See also Francesco Guida's essays, "Ricciotti Garibaldi e il movimento nazionale albanese"; and "Ettore Ferrari e il volontarismo garibaldino nei paesi del sud-est europeo (1897–1912)."
23. On the complex policy developed by San Giuliano during the Balkan Wars, see the biography by Ferraioli, *Politica e diplomazia in Italia tra XIX e XX secolo*, 543–669.
24. ASMAE, RT, vol. 343, San Giuliano to Rinella, November 11, 1912, tel. gab. 1847; see also ASMAE, RT, vol. 342, San Giuliano to Bollati, November 6 and 7, 1912, tels. gab. 1862/10 and 1881/15.
25. ASMAE, RT, vol. 345, San Giuliano to Avarna and Pansa, November 26, 1911, tel. gab. 2068; San Giuliano to Avarna, November 27, 1912, tel. gab. 2077; San Giuliano to Pansa, Tittoni, and Avarna, December 2, 1912, tel. gab. 2162.
26. ASMAE, RT, vol. 345, San Giuliano to Pansa, Imperiali, Tittoni, Melegari, and Avarna, December 4, 1912, tel. gab. 2184.
27. ASMAE, RT, vol. 347, San Giuliano to Avarna, Imperiali, Melegari, Pansa, and Tittoni, January 2, 1913, tel. 33; San Giuliano to Imperiali, January 3, 1913, tel. 56; San Giuliano to Squitti, January 5, 1913, tel. 99; ASMAE, RT, vol. 369, San Giuliano to Carlotti, April 3, 1913, tel. gab. 134; San Giuliano to Avarna and Pansa, April 3, 1913, tel. gab. 136.
28. For further discussion on Austro-Hungarian support for northern Albania's independence from expansionist South Slav neighbors, see chapter 26 in this volume.
29. ASMAE, RT, vol. 369, San Giuliano to Pansa, Imperiali, Tittoni, Melegari, and Avarna, April 28 and 30, 1912, tel. gab. 150 and 154; San Giuliano to Pansa and Avarna, May 1, 1912, tel. gab. 161; San Giuliano to Pansa, May 2, 1913, tel. gab. 165. The tension caused by the Scutari crisis between Rome and Vienna was reflected by the statement "If Austria will act in the north [of Albania] we will act in the south, with or without its consent": San Giuliano to Avarna, May 4, 1913, tel. gab. 179. For the correspondence exchanged between San Giuliano and Giolitti during the crisis, compare Claudio Pavone, ed., *Quarant'anni di politica italiana*, vol. 3, with Giovanni Giolitti, *Il carteggio*, vol. 2.
30. According to San Giuliano's biographer, the Scutari crisis represented the apex of "a period of profound uncertainty," characterized by "convoluted reasoning," "deceptive policies," and "exasperating Realpolitik," in summary, a period in which San Giuliano "had worked for Italy's interests, for its interests as a great Mediterranean power, but not for the stability of Eastern Europe": Ferraioli, *Politica e diplomazia in Italia tra XIX e XX secolo*, 570, 597, 618, 630, 631. For Ferraioli, this period was overcome by the summer of 1913, but it could be argued that ambiguities and uncertainties lasted until the outbreak of World War I and the Italian decision to enter the conflict. For clarification of this reading of events, see Francesco Caccamo, *Il Montenegro negli anni della prima guerra mondiale*.
31. ASMAE, RT, vol. 345, San Giuliano to Imperiali, December 14, 1912, tel. gab. 2327.



32. ASMAE, RT, vol. 369, San Giuliano to Melegari, March 1, 1913, tel. gab. 107 and 108; March 8, 1913, tel. gab. 119.
33. ASMAE, RT, vol. 369, San Giuliano to Imperiali, December 28, 1912, tel. gab. 2566; San Giuliano to Carlotti, April 3, 1912, tel. gab. 134; San Giuliano to Pansa and Avarna, April 3, 1912, tel. gab. 135.
34. ASMAE, RT, vol. 369, San Giuliano to Constantinople, January 23, 1913, tel. gab. 38.
35. For references to the Italian-Albanians, see Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878–1912*; and Nathalie Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*.
36. Francesco Caccamo, “L’Adriatico degli *arbëreshë*,” 133.
37. Francesco Caccamo, *Terenzio Tocci, una vita tra Italia e Albania*.
38. Caccamo, “L’Adriatico degli *arbëreshë*,” 150–51.
39. Caccamo, *Terenzio Tocci*.
40. Caccamo, “L’Adriatico degli *arbëreshë*,” 151–52.
41. Caccamo, *Terenzio Tocci*.

PART II

War as Experience  
and the Persecution of Change



## Armies Defeated before They Took the Field?

The Ottoman Mobilization of October 1912

*Feroze Yasamee*

The officers of the Ottoman general staff were familiar with Helmut von Moltke's warning that errors in an army's initial deployment could rarely be put right in the course of the subsequent campaign.<sup>1</sup> In the event, the Ottoman mobilization and deployment of October 1912 proved to be a catalogue of errors, amounting to a self-inflicted defeat before a shot had been fired, except against Montenegro. Poor planning was partly to blame, as were unlucky circumstances and various inefficiencies; but so was a hastily improvised strategy, which aggravated the effects of all these failings and placed the Ottoman army in a false position from the start.

### I

The Ottoman War Ministry issued the order for mobilization against Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro at noon on October 1, 1912. The order specified that forces would mobilize in accordance with Project 5 and that 25 percent of the reservists to be called up would be non-Muslims (this was later reduced to 10 percent).<sup>2</sup> Project 5 envisaged the deployment of a 335,000-strong Western Army in Macedonia and Albania and a 480,000-strong Eastern Army in Thrace. The Western Army would assemble within fifteen days from the start of mobilization, as would nearly three-quarters of the Eastern Army. The remainder of its forces would arrive over the following three weeks. The mobilization would not be general: all active (*nizam*), territorial (*redif*), and home

guard (*mustahfiz*) units in the empire's Balkan provinces would be called up, together with all active and territorial units in western and central Anatolia. But only a portion of forces in eastern Anatolia and Syria would be mobilized, and none in Iraq or Arabia.<sup>3</sup> Command of the Western Army was conferred upon Marshal Ali Rıza Paşa, a former war minister, and that of the Eastern Army upon Lt. Gen. Abdullah Paşa, the newly appointed head of the First Army Inspectorate. Both were subordinate to a general headquarters under the war minister, Lt. Gen. Nazım Paşa, who assumed supreme authority over all the empire's armed forces with the title of "deputy commander-in-chief."<sup>4</sup>

Difficulties arose immediately. No one had any experience of a planned mobilization, and the War Ministry was promptly deluged with requests for clarification of the project. As a result the Eastern Army's mobilization timetable had to be set back by twenty-four hours and the Western Army's by forty-eight.<sup>5</sup> Numerous changes of corps and divisional commanders occurred. Some were doubtless prompted by considerations of competence and experience but others, it was alleged, were caused by personal and political favoritism. Whatever the case, many senior officers were new to their commands and unfamiliar with their tasks and their troops. A further contentious issue was the role to be assigned to the army's German instructors. Most were eager to participate in the campaign, but Nazım's antipathy to the Germans was notorious; other senior officers, it seems, feared that the Germans might steal their glory. In the end a handful of German officers were permitted to transfer to Ottoman service and attached to the Eastern Army, though none was given a command.<sup>6</sup>

The more fundamental problem was a lack of troops. The project had assumed that the active army was at its peacetime "budget strength" and that its units were in their normal garrisons. Neither assumption was true, thanks to the recent demobilization of the class of 1908–9 and substantial dispersals, particularly from Thrace, resulting from the Italian war and the revolts in Albania and the Yemen. Not all of the dispersed units could be recalled, and those that could mobilized late. The project had similarly overestimated the numbers of available reservists on the basis of theoretical maxima, which made insufficient allowance for infirmity, ordinary absence, reserved occupations, and plain reluctance to serve. The project had foreseen that there would be insufficient trained active reservists and stipulated that active units should make up their numbers with trained *redif*. In practice, however, the response to the call-up of *redif* was markedly uneven: some units were fully mobilized and ready to

depart for their assembly areas on or ahead of schedule; many mobilized late or under-strength; some failed to mobilize at all, notably in those parts of Albania that had been affected by the recent revolt.<sup>7</sup>

Transport proved to be a further headache, particularly for the Eastern Army, most of whose forces would be drawn from Asia. The project had overestimated the capacities of the empire's railways and the availability of shipping. The Anatolian railway, generally deemed efficient, was expected to run ten troop trains per day; it managed an average of eight. The Oriental Railway in Thrace was expected to run nineteen, a gross overestimate, made even more unrealistic by the effects of a recent earthquake that had damaged water tanks, leaving locomotives to be replenished by bucket. It managed an average of six to eight trains daily; these ran according to no known timetable and with massive delays. Only the railways in Macedonia and the newly opened Bandırma-Soma line in Anatolia ran as anticipated. Shipping was simply inadequate, despite the commandeering of Greek-flagged vessels. The War Ministry initially had only four steamers in the Sea of Marmara and none at all, it seems, in the Black Sea. Dockside loading and unloading times had also been underestimated. The consequence was that tens of thousands of troops were left waiting at stations and harbors for days and sometimes weeks. By the time they reached their destinations they were exhausted and occasionally hungry, and demoralization was setting in.<sup>8</sup>

These shortages and delays necessitated radical changes in the prescribed order of battle. Belatedly it was decided to mobilize additional forces in eastern Anatolia and Syria. Meanwhile units assigned to the Western Army were reassigned to the Eastern Army and vice versa. Whole corps were dissolved, and their divisions were used to bring other corps up to strength. Divisions were broken up and reformed and in the process became "composite": improvised assemblies of strangers. Just as importantly, it proved impossible to maintain distinctions between *nizam* and *redif* troops, the trained and untrained, and the three branches of the military. Units had to be made up with whatever lay at hand, and active divisions were heavily diluted with untrained reservists. A rumor circulated that naval ratings had been placed in the cavalry.<sup>9</sup>

Men were not the only scarce resource. There was also a serious shortage of draft animals, essential for mobility and supply in the field. The project had estimated that the Eastern Army would require an additional 64,000 mounts, draft horses, and pack animals, and the Western Army 70,000. It assumed that these numbers could be made up at mobilization through purchase and requisitioning. Most would have to be found

in Anatolia: the Balkan provinces were comparatively horse-poor. In the event, insufficient numbers could be procured, while those that were acquired were held up for want of rail and shipping space, forcing the Eastern and Western Armies to look to inferior local substitutes: the horses of the Constantinople and Salonika tramways, oxen, and water buffalo. The resulting problems were exacerbated by a shortage of carts; here, too, the assumption that sufficient numbers could be procured and transported at mobilization proved false. The result was a sharp reduction in the Eastern and Western Armies' capacity for maneuver and, once they began retreating, considerable losses of guns, munitions, and supplies in the field.<sup>10</sup>

This shortage of field transport contributed to a supply crisis, which grew steadily more acute as more units reached their assembly areas. The armies were expected to commence operations with enough supplies to sustain them for two months. In principle there should have been no shortage of munitions, uniforms, tents, and foodstuffs: stocks had been accumulated in depots in peacetime and the harvest was newly in. In reality some of the stocks proved to be inadequate, but the real problems were organization and distribution. The supply organization was new and untested and largely entrusted to retired officers, many with no particular expertise in supply matters. On paper each corps was expected to establish its own supply line, but the shortage of field transport meant that almost none were able to do so. Instead they threw responsibility onto the commands of the Eastern and Western Armies, which in turn passed it on to the War Ministry, which they bombarded with demands for supplies. This availed them little: supplies forwarded from the capital were all too often left waiting at harbors and railheads for want of field transport to forward them to the troops. Small-arms ammunition proved adequate, as did artillery munitions initially, but there was a severe lack of other supplies—above all, food. Some units attempted to procure food locally, through purchase or requisitioning, but the results were hardly adequate. The upshot was that many troops, lacking tents, were left to spend the increasingly cold and wet autumn nights in the open and driven to supplement their erratic rations by scavenging the countryside, with predictable consequences for morale and discipline.

Another major failure was intelligence. The general staff was naturally anxious to ascertain the enemy's deployment and in particular that of the Bulgarian army, the strongest opponent. Hitherto the working assumption had been that the Bulgarian army could mobilize and deploy within fifteen days (by October 15) or even sooner and that it would deploy most and perhaps all of its forces in Thrace against the Eastern Army. This

in turn implied that the Western Army's main opponent would be the Serbs. It was also assumed that the Bulgarians would launch their main attack in Thrace from east of the river Tundzha, on the Turks' right, thus enabling them to bypass the fortress of Adrianople and take the shortest route to the Ottoman capital. The question was complicated by a rumor that the Bulgarian army might have used its September maneuvers as cover for a partial mobilization and consequently would be able to initiate hostilities even earlier than anticipated, perhaps through a surprise attack on Adrianople.

In practice, however, none of these hypotheses could be verified. Direct reconnaissance was impossible. The Bulgarians had taken effective steps to seal their frontiers at the start of mobilization, while diplomatic and press sources produced a welter of conflicting and doubtful claims. Arguably, the general staff should have foreseen this and stood by its original assumptions. They were accurate enough, except in respect to the speed of the Bulgarian deployment, which required all of eighteen days, not fifteen. As it was, the vacuum of information was filled by speculation: initial alarm at the prospect of a surprise attack gave way to growing confidence when this threat failed to materialize and then to overconfidence and wishful thinking when the Bulgarians failed to attack on October 15 as anticipated. All these speculations would lead the Turks to complicate and distort their own deployment and also confirm their commitment to an unsound plan of campaign.

## II

Project 5 envisaged the formation of an Eastern Army with thirty-six infantry divisions, of which fifteen would be active, twenty territorial, and one formed of home guards. These divisions would be supplemented by corps cavalry, artillery and infantry units, and an independent cavalry division. Most of the active divisions would be drawn from the First Army Inspectorate in Thrace, the capital, and western Anatolia; most of the territorial divisions would be drawn from Anatolia, and three from Syria. The single home guard division would be formed of Pomak volunteers from the Rodop Mountains and be deployed in that region. Further battalions of Thracian home guards would be employed on more usual rear tasks, such as railway protection. The army's forces would be divided into two main groups. The Maritsa line would be held by four divisions placed in the fortress of Adrianople, a corps of two divisions at Dimetoka, and two divisions forming the Kircaali detachment in the



Rodop Mountains. The army's mobile force would assemble farther to the east and north, on and behind the Havsa-Kırkkilise line, with the active divisions of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Corps to the fore and the predominantly territorial forces of the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-fourth Corps immediately to the rear. Further back, the Sixteenth Corps would assemble on the right flank at Vize, and the Twenty-third Corps at the harbor of Tekirdağ. In addition, two territorial divisions drawn from the capital would be held there in reserve. All forces on the Maritsa line would assemble by the fifteenth day of mobilization, as would the mobile force's First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Seventeenth Corps and the cavalry division. The Sixteenth and Eighteenth Corps would assemble by day twenty-two; the Twenty-third Corps from Syria and Twenty-fourth Corps from eastern Anatolia would arrive by day thirty-eight or thereabouts. Total ration strength would be 480,120 men, consisting of 368 infantry battalions, 57 cavalry squadrons, and 129 artillery batteries.<sup>11</sup>

It was quickly apparent that they had no prospect of assembling an army of this size within the time specified. The active forces of the First Army Inspectorate were exceptionally weak, with no more than 17,000 men present in their garrisons out of a nominal peacetime complement of 80,000. Only half of the class of 1908–9 had thus far been discharged, but the Italian war and the various provincial revolts had resulted in substantial dispersals. Of the inspectorate's twelve divisions, two were in Albania, two had been moved to the Dardanelles, and one and parts of another were in western Anatolia and the Aegean Islands. In addition, close to two divisions' worth of troops were in the Yemen. The three divisions at the Dardanelles and in western Anatolia could be recalled, as could one of the two in Albania, but the various units in the Yemen were simply too far away.<sup>12</sup> Even in normal circumstances it was accepted that the trained active reservists available to the First Army Inspectorate were insufficient to bring its units up to wartime strength and would have to be supplemented with trained territorials; now even more territorials would have to be taken in, even at the risk that many would prove to be untrained.

Shortages of men and delays in transport aside, the continuing state of war with Italy meant that some units would have to be retained at the Dardanelles and on the Anatolian coast. There were also worrying rumors that the Bulgarians might have used their September maneuvers to commence mobilization in secret and be ready to invade much earlier than anticipated, with the Turks' forces only partially assembled. Nazım

Paşa responded by amending the project. On October 5 he decided to re-constitute the Eighteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth Corps as a separate "Reserve Army" under his own direct authority and to assemble it well to the rear, at Silivri, Çatalca, and Sinekli. Orders were issued for the preparation of field fortifications at Çatalca, Bolayır, and Tekirdağ, and two spare *redif* divisions from the capital were ordered to Çatalca as a precaution. Two days later Nazım Paşa dissolved the Fifteenth Corps, leaving one of its divisions at the Dardanelles and eventually reassigning the other to the Fourth Corps. The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps gave up one division each, to the Third and Second Corps, respectively. Finally, on October 12 four Anatolian *redif* divisions assigned to the Western Army were reassigned to the Eastern Army and distributed to the First, Second, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Corps.<sup>13</sup>

On paper the effect of these changes was to strengthen the Eastern Army's front line by giving its First, Second, Third, and Fourth Corps an additional five divisions and also to form a strong reserve force guarding the western approaches to the capital. In practice neither objective could be achieved, due not least to the enormous delays in transport from Anatolia. By October 17, the sixteenth day of mobilization and two days after the Bulgarians were expected to complete their deployment, the Eastern Army's assembled strength was no more than 136,300 men, barely one-third of that envisaged in the revised order of battle. Two-fifths of these were on the Maritsa line, where the forces at Adrianople and Kırcaali, all drawn from Thrace, had more or less completed their assembly, though some way below strength, with 43,300 and 15,500 men, respectively. The army's mobile force, east of Adrianople, was at no more than one-quarter strength, with 77,500 men drawn from eight of the divisions assigned to the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Corps, most of which were not yet complete. The other ten divisions assigned to these four corps were still on their way across Anatolia and Thrace, as were the six divisions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps. The Reserve Army, for its part, had not a single man in Thrace: the three divisions of the Eighteenth Corps were in Anatolia, awaiting transport; the Twenty-third Corps had not left Syria; and the Twenty-fourth Corps was still mobilizing at Trabzon/Trebizond and Erzurum.<sup>14</sup>

Numbers aside, the quality of many of the troops was doubtful. On October 13 Abdullah Paşa estimated that fully 80 percent were *redif*, many of them untrained, and *nizam* units had been heavily diluted. A serious shortage of line officers remained: in *redif* units it was common to find no more than one officer per company.<sup>15</sup>

Supplies were grossly inadequate, and Abdullah warned that the situation would grow worse as more units arrived from the rear. Not one corps had as yet established a proper supply line, and units were dependent upon what could be procured locally. Even then the shortage of field transport rendered such supplies immobile: the Fourth Corps estimated that it could move two or three marches at most. For the time being, at least, the infantry munitions that units had brought with them were sufficient. Artillery munitions were not: most batteries were limited to what they could carry in their peacetime complement of vehicles—a standard 212 rounds per gun, sufficient for a day's battle, but no more. Many units had insufficient tents; some men lacked uniforms or proper footwear; a few lacked rifles. Above all, food and fuel for cooking were in short supply in treeless Thrace. Almost no field bakeries had been organized, so bread had to be obtained from civilian ovens, where available.<sup>16</sup>

Thus far the Eastern Army had obtained no worthwhile intelligence about the enemy, the Bulgarians having sealed the frontier and removed their Muslim population to the interior. The task of frontier reconnaissance fell chiefly upon brigadier Salih Paşa's independent cavalry division, whose main force was to cover the sector running east from the Tundzha to Devletliagaç, while a light brigade covered the sector between the Tundzha and the Maritsa. The initial assumption was that the Bulgarians would place the bulk of their forces east of the Tundzha, from where they might strike toward Kırkkilise and the Eastern Army's flank. For this reason, the cavalry division was particularly instructed to count the enemy columns east of the Tundzha and ascertain the direction of the column forming the enemy's extreme left. In actuality the division assembled late, at Sülüoğlu, and at barely half strength. Its few weak patrols gathered little information, particularly on the crucial eastern flank around Devletliagaç. Meanwhile intelligence from diplomatic and other sources was pointing to a strong enemy presence in the Maritsa valley, toward Târnovo-Seymen. Nazım's headquarters and some of Abdullah's own staff were beginning to wonder whether the Bulgarians might not be planning to attack in the west, toward the Arda and Dimetoka. This idea was dangerous: as will be seen, the original estimate was the correct one.

### III

Project 5 assigned a total of twenty-nine infantry divisions to the Western Army, of which twelve would be *nizam* and seventeen *redif*. These would be supplemented by corps cavalry, artillery and infantry units, and a cavalry division. In addition, 109 battalions of *mustahfiz* would

be employed in defense of their home districts. Anatolia would furnish roughly one-third of the reservists required by the active units and four of the territorial divisions; all other forces would be local. The army would be divided into a number of groups, in rough proportion to the strengths of the four enemy armies facing it. Eighteen divisions would be deployed against Bulgaria and Serbia. Sixteen of these would form the Army of the Vardar, whose Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and composite Second Corps would assemble in the Kumanovo-Köprülü-Monastir/Manastır triangle, with the Firzovik detachment, of divisional strength, to their north in Kosova/Kosovo, and the Taşlıca/Taslidža detachment, consisting of two regiments, in the Sandjak/Sanjak of Novi Pazar. A further two divisions forming the Struma corps would deploy against the southern Bulgarian frontier on the Serres/Serez-Nevrekop line. Six divisions would deploy against Greece, three forming the composite Eighth Corps in Thessaly, two the Janina corps in Epirus, and one the Karaburun detachment, guarding the seaward approaches to Salonika. The remaining five divisions would deploy against Montenegro, three forming a corps at Scutari and two a detachment at Peć. All these forces would assemble within fifteen days of the start of mobilization.<sup>17</sup>

In practice the troops to implement the project were lacking. As in Thrace, the peacetime *nizam* garrison was abnormally weak, due largely to the recent demobilization of 70,000 reservists and conscripts from the class of 1908–9. Few units had been transferred out of the region. But the recent Albanian revolt and the state of undeclared war on the Montenegrin frontier had led to significant internal dispersals, and many were several days from their depots. Against this, the summer's disturbances had led to the drafting in of two *nizam* divisions from Thrace: most of the Eleventh Division was already on its way home, but the Western Army successfully insisted on retaining the bulk of the First Division, though this remained at peacetime strength. A further weakness was the reliance on Anatolian active reservists. Officially they were to total 59,000 and be given priority in transport; but in practice the shortage of shipping and the problems on the Anatolian and Thracian railways meant that perhaps as few as 10 percent actually arrived.<sup>18</sup>

The mobilization of *redif* and *mustahfiz* was badly affected by the recent revolt in Albania, where much of the population remained deeply mistrustful of the government and army and reluctant to heed the call-up. The wildest rumors were circulating, perhaps encouraged by the Serbs and Montenegrins: the European powers were resolved to separate Macedonia and Albania from the empire, the government had sold out to the Balkan states, and it was pointless to fight.<sup>19</sup> The authorities

were besieged with requests for arms, and 80,000 rifles were distributed in Kosova alone. Most were taken for purposes of trade. The numbers of those reporting as reservists or volunteers were considerably smaller. Large parts of the Scutari, Elbasan, Mitrovica, Priština, Prizren, Manastir, and Janina *redif* divisions failed to mobilize. The men of Prizren at first refused to serve at all; those of Peć and Djakova would serve only under their own leaders; those of Mitrovica and Priština would serve only in their home districts; those of Debar reported to claim their rifles and promptly disappeared. Only the Drama, Serres, Salonika, Štip, Skopje, and Nasliç divisions mobilized more or less as planned.<sup>20</sup>

A further complication was Montenegro's early declaration of war on October 8. This immediately halted the withdrawal of units from the Montenegrin frontier and, given the unreliability of the local Albanian *redif*, created an urgent need for further reinforcement. The Western Army responded by assigning twelve additional battalions to the Scutari corps and eighteen to the Peć detachment, together with extra artillery. Most of these additional units were already on the Montenegrin frontier. But at the same time, in order to secure the rear of the Peć detachment against Serbia, the Taşlica detachment was replaced by four new detachments, with a single battalion at Pljevlja, five at Sjenica, five at Novi Pazar, and one at Mitrovica. This amounted to a substantial diversion of forces to a secondary theater. The principal loser was the Western Army's main force, the Army of the Vardar. Its Firzovik detachment (renamed the "Priština detachment") was reduced from thirteen battalions to eight, and its Sixth and Seventh Corps were obliged to give up twelve and eleven battalions, respectively, together with some of their artillery units.

The final blow was Nazım's decision to reassign the four Anatolian *redif* divisions to the Eastern Army. At a stroke this deprived the Army of the Vardar of its entire composite Second Corps and the Eighth Corps in Thessaly of one of its three divisions. To make matters worse, the decision was never clearly communicated, and the Western Army continued to hope that at least the Denizli and Aydın divisions might yet arrive. As a result it failed to implement Nazım's suggestion that forces should be transferred from Epirus and Salonika to Thessaly. Instead, as a temporary measure, it diverted the Drama division of the Sixth Corps to Manastir. In any case, neither the Denizli nor the Aydın division had arrived by the time hostilities broke out, but by then it was too late to make alternative arrangements. The Sixth Corps was obliged to send both its Drama and Eighteenth Divisions to Thessaly, thereby depriving the already weakened Army of the Vardar of a further two divisions.<sup>21</sup>

In the end the Western Army completed its assembly more or less on schedule but at barely half-strength and with no prospect of further reinforcement. On October 19, as hostilities began with Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, it estimated its total force at 175,000 men, as against the 343,479 envisaged by the project. The Army of the Vardar counted 91,700; the Struma corps, 21,650; forces on the Greek front, 29,250; forces on the Montenegrin front, 25,200; and the Karaburun detachment, 7,200.<sup>22</sup> Forces were weak everywhere and seriously unbalanced. The Army of the Vardar, facing the two strongest opponents, the Bulgarians and the Serbs, had been reduced from four corps to three. Of these only the Fifth Corps, at Štip, had preserved its original order of battle, consisting of four divisions. The Seventh Corps, at Kumanovo, had been reduced from three divisions to two, while the Sixth Corps, on its way forward from Prilep, had been reduced from four divisions to two, both weak. In contrast, the Struma corps, on a secondary front, had retained both its divisions and was not far short of planned strength. On the Greek frontier, similarly, the Eighth Corps, holding the main front in Thessaly, had only two under-strength divisions, while the Janina corps, placed in strong defensive terrain and supported by a fortress, also possessed two divisions, of somewhat greater strength. Meanwhile the remote Montenegrin theater had absorbed more than double the number of *nizam* units originally assigned to it and also additional *redif*.

#### IV

Project 5 had proved unworkable. But in one key respect Nazım Paşa had upheld it rigidly: its stipulation that the main forces of the Eastern and Western Armies should deploy forward and close to the enemy's frontiers. Adherence to this stipulation had made a difficult situation worse. In Thrace it had precipitated a rush to strengthen the Eastern Army's front line, at the price of disrupting existing corps and divisional structures and diluting active units with territorial reservists. In Macedonia and Albania it had left the Western Army's forces scattered and weak everywhere. Alternatives were canvassed but rejected on the grounds that they would jeopardize Nazım's preferred strategy, which envisaged early offensives in both theaters. To this extent the flawed mobilization was also the product of flawed strategy.

In principle the strategy to be followed by the Eastern and Western Armies had been laid down in advance by Plan 5, the plan of operations corresponding to Project 5. Nazım Paşa was apparently unfamiliar

with this plan. He was shown a resume on October 3, glanced through it, and observed that it need not be followed to the letter.<sup>23</sup> In fact the plan was dropped altogether: the next day the Eastern Army was issued Plan 1, which covered the case of hostilities with Bulgaria alone, and the Western Army received Plan 4, which covered the case of hostilities with Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro but not Greece.<sup>24</sup> The reasons for this last-minute substitution remain undocumented, but there is a strong suspicion that Nazım objected to Plan 5's discussion of the options of an initial defensive and a strategic withdrawal. From the start Nazım was determined to open the campaign on the offensive in both theaters. He was supported in this view not only by key members of his own staff but also by the navy minister and brigadier Mahmud Muhtar Paşa. Their cabinet colleagues deferred to their advice. It remains unclear why Nazım and Mahmud Muhtar insisted upon abandoning a prepared plan and running the risks of an improvised strategy. They may simply have succumbed to "offensive spirit" or may have regarded the situation as so dire that only a desperate gamble might retrieve it. Political and diplomatic calculations may possibly have been involved. The opposition Unionists had commenced a vigorous pro-war campaign of meetings and demonstrations, which some feared was designed to pave the way for a coup. In addition the Great Powers' diplomatic efforts to avert war, and their warnings to the Balkan states, appear to have encouraged speculation that any conflict would be of short duration and be brought to an early end by international intervention. For both these reasons the cabinet may well have been reluctant to commence military operations with a retreat. Be all that as it may, the decision to seek an early offensive would oblige the Ottoman army to play to its weaknesses (its slow mobilization and lack of preparation) rather than to its strengths (its opportunities for reinforcement and defense in depth).

Not all senior officers favored an early offensive. The acting chief of the general staff, Hadi Paşa, and the commander of the Eastern Army, Abdullah Paşa, were both deeply pessimistic. Hadi held that it would be five years before the army was fit for a major campaign, and Abdullah told the cabinet that Ottoman forces would be hard-pressed to hold the Bulgarians, let alone an alliance of four Balkan states.<sup>25</sup> Abdullah was particularly perturbed by the rumors of an early Bulgarian mobilization and an impending surprise attack. On October 5 he wrote to Nazım, warning that the Eastern Army's forces were in danger of being overwhelmed at the start. He suggested that the safer alternative would be to move their assembly some seventy to eighty kilometers back to the Ergene line

between Muradlı and Çerkezköy, thereby gaining an additional six to ten days for reinforcement.<sup>26</sup> His intention, he explained to Hadi's second deputy, Colonel Pertev (later Pertev Demirhan Paşa), was to remain on the defensive in the Ergene line and meet the Bulgarians there.<sup>27</sup> This was not a new idea: it had formed the basis for the army maneuvers of 1910 and was an option canvassed by Plans 4 and 5. Hadi supported the proposal. Nazım simply ignored it and on October 11 told Hadi categorically that the army must assume the offensive at the earliest opportunity and therefore assemble as far forward as possible.<sup>28</sup> Thereupon Colonel Pertev drafted a directive to the Eastern Army, announcing that the danger of a surprise Bulgarian attack had passed and ordering the army's assembly moved farther forward to the Kabaç-Yenice-Kırkkilise line to facilitate an early "counteroffensive." Abdullah protested that this was gross interference; Nazım excused himself, claiming that he had signed the directive without reading it, and promised that there would be no repetition. Abdullah accepted the explanation but tacitly conceded the point of substance. Nothing further was heard of the Ergene line, and the Eastern Army's forces continued to concentrate forward, on the Hasköy-Yenice-Kırkkilise line.<sup>29</sup>

Nazım accepted that the Eastern Army would need more time. On October 12 he was informed by the cabinet that Mahmud Muhtar Paşa had suggested that the Eastern Army's forces were already strong enough to launch an offensive: the sooner this was done, the greater the chance of success. Nazım consulted Abdullah, who replied that the army must first complete its assembly and that it would take at least a week to move its forces to the frontier. Nazım's staff endorsed this opinion and informed the cabinet that the Eastern Army would be ready to commence its offensive on October 19 and cross the Bulgarian frontier four days later.<sup>30</sup> On October 15 Abdullah Paşa left the capital for Thrace. Immediately before his departure he had a private meeting with Nazım. They apparently agreed that the Eastern Army would launch an early offensive, but not until its mobile force (east of Adrianople) was at least equal to those that the Bulgarians would place east of the Tundzha and, in particular, until it had gathered in an additional four territorial divisions from Anatolia. The dispute over strategy was seemingly resolved on this basis.<sup>31</sup> In reality it was not. Abdullah's insistence on at least equaling the Bulgarian forces east of the Tundzha had reflected the established view that the Bulgarians would launch their main attack on the Turks' right. Thus far, however, intelligence had failed to confirm this, and Nazım's headquarters was already giving some credence to unconfirmed reports that the Bulgarians



would attack on the left, west of Adrianople toward the Arda. This was wishful thinking, but it would provide fertile ground for further dispute. Already the controversy over the Ergene line had permanently poisoned Abdullah's relations with Nazım. It had also highlighted an incipient problem of dual command that was to dog the Eastern Army throughout its existence.

## V

For the Western Army, too, strategy proved a contentious issue, though for different reasons. Ali Rıza Paşa and his staff endorsed the idea of an early offensive, though not simply out of deference to Nazım. They knew that they would be heavily outnumbered and feared that remaining passively on the defensive would invite annihilation as their enemies converged. The alternative of a deep withdrawal toward Albania, as envisaged in Plan 4, was rejected on the grounds that most of the army's reservists were local and would desert if their homes and families were abandoned without a fight. The safest course, they concluded, would be to take advantage of the initial dispersal of their enemies' forces and deliver an early knock-out blow to their strongest opponent. Dispute centered on whether that opponent would be the Bulgarians or the Serbs.

The Western Army had been instructed to follow Plan 4, but this was obviously impractical: the plan made no provision for hostilities with Greece. An alternative plan was drawn up on October 9, the day after Montenegro declared war and Ali Rıza Paşa established his headquarters at Salonika.<sup>32</sup> The new plan confirmed that the army's main forces would deploy in the north, against Bulgaria and Serbia, rather than in the south, against Greece. It proposed to deploy the Army of the Vardar forward, on the Kumanovo-Štip line, covering the invasion routes from Serbia via the Morava valley and from Bulgaria via the Bregalnica valley and the Kyustendil gap. The alternative of a defensive concentration behind the Vardar, which would gain additional time, was rejected on the grounds that it would facilitate the junction of the Serbian and Bulgarian armies, sacrifice the Skopje-Salonika railway, disillusion local reservists, touch off civilian flight, and impede an eventual Turkish offensive. For the time being, at least, the Bulgarians would pose the main threat. The reports of a secret mobilization suggested that they might be ready to attack in strength as early as October 10, well before the Serbs could complete their deployment. In that case the Bulgarians would probably launch their main attack via the Bregalnica valley and Kočani, supported

by a lesser attack from Kyustendil via Kriva Palanka, and could reach the Kumanovo-Štip line on October 14. The Army of the Vardar, with only its Fifth and Seventh Corps in place, would then face a critical situation, particularly if the Serbs launched a supporting attack toward Kumanovo. The Struma corps might assist by assuming the offensive toward Dupnitsa; but only as of October 18, when the Sixth Corps arrived, could the defense of the Kumanovo-Štip line be assured. Once the composite Second Corps arrived from Anatolia, the Turks could contemplate an offensive. It followed that the outbreak of hostilities must be postponed for at least four days—a task for diplomacy.

The plan saw the Montenegrin theater as a sideshow, noting that the Montenegrin army lacked mobility and that it was likely to send its main forces south against Scutari rather than east in a bid to link up with the Serbs. The Scutari corps would have to defend as best it could, but the Peć detachment should assist by launching offensives westward from the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, in the hope of drawing some Montenegrin forces away from Scutari. The Western Army's weakest point, the plan acknowledged, would be the Greek front: its length, and the weakness of the forces thus far assembled there, could imperil the Army of the Vardar's rear. The Greeks could be expected to deploy the bulk of their army in Thessaly, against the under-strength Eighth Corps, whose current forces were no more than a single division of 8,000 men. This corps would have to assume the defensive on the Glykoz-Vlacholivadi line, with a single regiment placed forward at Elasona. It might eventually have to withdraw toward Verroia, covering the approaches to Salonika. In the meantime, however, the corps at the fortress of Janina must not remain passive but should maintain close contact with the enemy and, if possible, attack across the frontier in Epirus.

The plan had anticipated an early Bulgarian attack. This failed to materialize; as the days passed, attention began to shift to the Serbs. By October 16 intelligence was indicating that the Serbs had concentrated a force of five divisions around Vranje, in the upper Morava valley facing Kumanovo, with smaller concentrations farther north, around Raška and Kuršumlija, facing Kosova and the Sandjak of Novi Pazar. In contrast Bulgarian forces facing the Bregalnica valley and Kočani were reported to be weak and composed in good part of irregulars. The Western Army's staff concluded that the Bulgarians must be planning to launch their main attack from Kyustendil toward Kriva Palanka, in a bid to link up with the Serbs at Kumanovo. Accordingly they issued a fresh plan, which instructed the Army of the Vardar to move from the Kumanovo-Štip line

to the Kumanovo–Sveti Nikole line. From there it might cover the directions of Vranje and Kyustendil and assume the offensive or defensive as required. The Struma corps should assist by assuming the offensive, with a view to drawing off some part of the Bulgarian force at Kyustendil. The Army of the Vardar, in turn, should also send one division to the Bulgarian frontier via Kočani.<sup>33</sup>

The Army of the Vardar's commander, Lt.-Gen. Zeki Paşa, wished to go farther. By now he and his staff were convinced that the Serbs would be their main opponent and that it was possible to defeat them. They noted that the Serbs had divided their forces into various groups and that mountainous terrain would separate the Serbs' main force, around Vranje, from other Serb forces to the north and from any Bulgarian force advancing from Kyustendil. Furthermore, the narrow Morava valley would oblige the Serbs' main force to advance in deep echelon, with no more than two divisions in the front line. The Army of the Vardar, in contrast, could advance on a broad front and throw its full weight against the Serbs as they emerged onto the more open terrain north and east of Kumanovo. Their numbers would be roughly equal, but the Turks would enjoy the initial advantage. The maximum concentration of force was essential: a single division might be left at Kočani, to secure the army's flank and rear against the Bulgarians, but all other units must be directed against the Serbs.<sup>34</sup>

The Western Army was not convinced. On the evening of October 16 Ali Rıza Paşa issued fresh orders, envisaging offensives by the Priština detachment against the Serbs at Kuršumlija and by the Struma corps against the Bulgarians from Cuma-ı Bala and the Ropçoz region. The Army of the Vardar was given a double task: on the one hand, it was to repel, not simply resist, any Bulgarian thrust toward Kočani (Kochane); on the other, it was to assume a position on the Kumanovo–Sveti Nikole line, to forestall the effects of the Bulgarian and Serbian armies on Kumanovo. Though vaguely worded, the order indicated that the Western Army still hankered after an offensive against the Bulgarians rather than the Serbs. Three considerations appear to have influenced it. First, Nazım had indicated on the previous day that his main strategic priority was the defeat of the Bulgarian army. Second, an offensive against the Bulgarians might reduce the pressure on Abdullah Paşa's Eastern Army. And third, the reported weakness of the Bulgarian forces facing Kočani gave hope of a speedy success. Critics have rightly dismissed this reasoning as flawed. The defeat of the Bulgarians was primarily a task for the Eastern Army; any assistance that the Western Army might furnish in this respect would

be at best indirect; and a local victory in eastern Macedonia would be worthless if the Army of the Vardar was defeated at Kumanovo.<sup>35</sup>

The question of operations against Greece was reconsidered on October 18. With no Anatolian reinforcement in sight, the Eighth Corps, in Thessaly, could muster no more than twenty-four battalions and six batteries. The Western Army conceded that "it is manifest that defense will be weak." If forced out of the Glykoz-Vlacholivadi line, the corps should attempt to establish a second line of defense at Ciciler, some thirty kilometers to the rear, behind Serbia. Nazım had intervened to remind the Western Army that it was essential that Salonika be defended at all costs. But the army's staff, while acknowledging the political importance of Salonika, was wary of exposing the rear of the Army of the Vardar. If forced out of the Ciciler position, the Eighth Corps should withdraw toward Manastır. Efforts should also be made to destroy a portion of the road to Manastır. Only if the promised forces from Anatolia arrived should a portion of the Eighth Corps forces withdraw eastward toward Salonika.<sup>36</sup>

All in all, the Western Army's planners envisaged a strategy of "active defense": the Greeks and Montenegrins would be held at bay for as long as possible, while the Army of the Vardar would attempt an early knockout blow against the Bulgarians or the Serbs. In the circumstances this may well have seemed the least bad alternative, but the plan was risky. In the first place, it amounted to a "single shot" strategy: a failure to disable the Serbs or the Bulgarians at the start would be decisive. In the second, far from concentrating its forces for the decisive blow, the Western Army had dispersed part of the Army of the Vardar to the Montenegrin front and held another part in reserve against Greece. Finally, the uncertainty as to whether the Bulgarians or the Serbs would be the main opponent carried the risk of a further division of the Army of the Vardar's forces—as proved to be the case.

## VI

The Ottoman mobilization had been a disaster, a self-inflicted defeat suffered before a shot had been fired, except against Montenegro. The mobilization project had seriously overestimated the numbers of available troops and the speed with which they could be deployed. In the first place, the dispersal of many Nizam units had meant that the situation at the start of mobilization was abnormal, but the planners had proceeded on untested, "best case" assumptions and failed to reckon with

less propitious possibilities. In the second place, the Eastern and Western Armies had both been deployed forward and committed to early offensives with grossly inadequate forces. This may have been the least bad alternative in the case of the Western Army. But the Eastern Army had little to lose and potentially much to gain from a rearward deployment on the Ergene line, an option that had been canvassed within the general staff at least since 1910. Third, events had falsified the planners' assumption that the enemy's strength and dispositions might be accurately estimated before hostilities began. The Western Army was unsure whether its principal opponent in Macedonia would be the Bulgarians, advancing via the Bregalnica toward Štip, or the Serbs, advancing from the Morava toward Kumanovo. The Eastern Army and Nazım Paşa's headquarters in Thrace were already in danger of being lured into the mistaken belief that the Bulgarians' main attack would be delivered in and west of the Maritsa valley, rather than from east of the Tundzha.

Could it have been done better? More ruthless minds might have concluded that Project 5 was beyond salvaging and should be scrapped, not patched up. Postwar commentators were unanimous in endorsing Abdullah Paşa's preference for assembly behind the Ergene and Nazım Paşa's decision to concentrate all Anatolian forces in Thrace. Some members of the general staff advocated similar views at the time, as did Colmar von der Goltz in correspondence from Germany.<sup>37</sup> Nazım Paşa would not heed any such suggestions. He was utterly committed to an early offensive and convinced that it must succeed. "I'll see you in Sofia," he told an acquaintance who was leaving for the front.<sup>38</sup> This gross overconfidence led to a final error. Since the beginning of October the European Great Powers had been making frantic efforts to restrain the Balkan states and warned that they would tolerate no attempts to alter the status quo by force. The Russians had taken a particularly strong line, warning Bulgaria and Serbia to count upon no support should they in turn expose themselves to attack by Rumania and Austria-Hungary. Meanwhile the powers pressed the Ottoman government to introduce reforms on behalf of its Christian subjects in the Balkans as a matter of urgency. Ahmed Muhtar Paşa's cabinet refused to accept any dictation, but at the beginning of October it announced a program of reforms of its own.<sup>39</sup> In reality there was little chance of averting war. But it was nonetheless important for the Ottoman Empire to place itself in the right in the eyes of the powers, and it remained possible that diplomatic action might at least postpone hostilities and thereby gain additional time for the deployment of its armies. The Balkan states knew this and determined to

bring matters to an immediate head. On October 13 Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece presented the Ottoman government with identical notes, deliberately designed to be unacceptable: it demanded an immediate Ottoman demobilization and sweeping reforms on behalf of their co-nationals within the Ottoman Empire, to be implemented under the supervision of the powers and the Balkan states themselves. The Ottoman legation in Athens refused to accept the note, thereby inadvertently misleading its superiors into believing that Greece might yet be detached from its allies.<sup>40</sup> The Ottoman cabinet discussed the note on October 15. By his own account the foreign minister, Gabriel Noradounghian, attempted to argue for a diplomatic response, suggesting that this might gain additional time. Nazım Paşa, in contrast, assured his colleagues that the Eastern Army had 150,000 men and was ready to assume the offensive immediately. The figure was a gross overestimate, achieved by counting ration rather than fighting strength and including troops that had not yet reached their assembly areas. Even so, the cabinet deferred to Nazım's advice. The Bulgarian and Serbian legations were given their passports, and that evening Nazım instructed the Eastern and Western Armies to commence offensive operations against Bulgaria and Serbia at once.<sup>41</sup> Neither army was ready. "Has war been declared?" inquired a bemused Abdullah Paşa.<sup>42</sup> The Balkan states kept the initiative: on October 18 Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece declared war. Operations began immediately.

To sum up, by October 18 the Eastern and Western Armies had been placed in a dangerously false position. Both were grossly under-strength yet committed to early offensives. And both had deployed in accordance with a project whose fundamental assumptions about numbers, speed of mobilization and deployment, and the availability of supplies had proved wildly overoptimistic.

#### NOTES

1. Bursalı Mehmed Nihad, *1328-1329 Balkan Harbi, Trakya Seferi*, 1:107; Hafız Hakkı Paşa, *Şanlı Asker*, 153.
2. Mehmed Nihad, *1328-1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:153; Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı ve Balkan Harbinde Garp Cephesi hakkında Konferansla* 21; Pertev Demirhan, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargah-ı Umumi*, 2-3.
3. Nihad, *1328-1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:104-7, 2:152; Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı*, 69-70.
4. Demirhan, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargah-ı Umumi*, 2-3.
5. Nihad, *1328-1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:153-54; Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı*, 69.

6. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 2:42; Demirhan, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargâh-ı Umumi*, 59–60, NL Goltz 15, Stempel to Goltz, October 10, 1912.
7. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:50–53, 154–55; Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı*, 70–71.
8. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:42–44, 46–47, 157–58; Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 18–20, 47–49; cf. Lossow, "Kriegsbericht der Denisl-Division," 1–14.
9. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:166–68; Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 16–19.
10. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:37–38, 156–57.
11. Ibid., 1:104–6.
12. Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 14–16.
13. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:166–68.
14. Ibid., 1:182–99 (see Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 49–53 for transport problems in the assembly).
15. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:134.
16. Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 61–63.
17. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:104–6; Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı*, table 2; Reşat Hallı, *Balkan Harbi*, 185–86.
18. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:33–34, gives a table showing a total of 59,268 Anatolian troops assigned to the Western Army's active forces. Only 33,762 of these would be active reservists; 25,506 would be territorials, presumably trained.
19. The return of one regiment from the neighborhood of Bijelopolje provoked panic among the local Muslim population and rumors of treachery, adroitly encouraged by the Montenegrins; another regiment was attacked by Albanians near Peć.
20. Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı*, 70–71; Zeki Paşa, *1912 Balkan Harbine Ait Hatıratım*, 5–6.
21. In fact four battalions from the Denizli division were dispatched to Salonika from the capital by train on October 19 and 21; but only one arrived, the others being diverted en route: Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı*, 76; Lossow, "Kriegsbericht der Denisl-Division," 14–17.
22. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi*, 133; Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı*, 77, gives a lower estimate of 173,000.
23. Demirhan, *Harbi'nde Büyük Karargâh-ı Umumi*, 10.
24. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*.
25. Hallı, *Balkan Harbi*, 272; Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 11–13.
26. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:159–60; Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 31–35.
27. Demirhan, *Harbi'nde Büyük Karargâh-ı Umumi*, 14.
28. Ibid., 18–22, 33–34.
29. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*, 1:161–66; Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 36–42; Demirhan, *Harbi'nde Büyük Karargâh-ı Umumi*, 35–43.

30. Demirhan, *Harbi'nde Büyük Karargâh-ı Umumi*, 44–46.
31. Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 55–56.
32. Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı*, 31–40.
33. *Ibid.*, 45–7.
34. *Ibid.*, 113–17; Zeki Paşa, *1912 Balkan Harbine Ait Hatıratım*.
35. Çakmak, *Garb-ı Rumelinin Suret-i Ziya-ı*, 117–19.
36. *Ibid.*, 49–51.
37. The deputy head of the First Operations Section, a Major Asım (later Asım Gündüz Paşa), had submitted a memorandum to this effect to Hadi Paşa on October 4; Demirhan, *Harbi'nde Büyük Karargâh-ı Umumi*, 23–25. Major Asım has been identified as the author of the two anonymous pamphlets already cited, *Balkan Harbinde Neden Münhezim Olduk?* and *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı*.
38. Handan Nezir Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey*.
39. Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi*; Andrew Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians*; Edward Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance*, 1912.
40. Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi*.
41. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*; Demirhan, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargâh-ı Umumi*; Asım Gündüz, *Balkan Harbinde Neden Münhezim Olduk?*
42. Nihad, *1328–1329 Balkan Harbi*; Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı*.



## Epidemic Diseases on the Thracian Front of the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars

*Oya Dağlar Macar*

The defeat in the Balkan Wars is regarded as one of the greatest catastrophes in the history of the Ottoman Empire, resulting in significant territorial losses. At the beginning of the Balkan Wars the total area of Ottoman territory in Europe was 169,300 square kilometers, with the Balkan inhabitants numbering 6,130,000.<sup>1</sup> After the war the Ottoman Empire lost 83 percent of its territory in Europe and 69 percent of its European inhabitants. In addition the Dodecanese Islands and Crete were also lost.<sup>2</sup> The total loss of Ottoman lives during the Balkan Wars was approximately 100,000–120,000.<sup>3</sup> Among these war dead, approximately 75,000 died of epidemic diseases.<sup>4</sup> The official figure regarding the losses of the Bulgarian army in the same period was 53,825. As with the Ottoman figures, 60 percent of the Bulgarian deaths during the Balkan Wars were caused not by the attacks of the enemy but by disease. Cholera proved the most deadly. The first outbreak took place on the Çatalca front during the winter of 1912–13 and devastated the war zones around Çatalca, Vidin, Vraçe, and Plevne.<sup>5</sup> It appears that Serbia was affected the most during the second phase of the Balkan Wars.

In this period Bulgaria, Greece, and even Romania, which entered the war at a later stage, endured severe losses because of cholera. During the Second Balkan War the Ottoman army could not escape the disease. The Ottoman soldiers who participated in the counteroffensive to recapture Adrianople caught cholera in Dimetoka: 495 soldiers were diagnosed with the disease, and 167 of them died as a result. Strict measures were taken in order to prevent the spreading of cholera, reflecting the official fear of the outbreak turning into an epidemic.<sup>6</sup>

As discussed throughout this volume, the war dramatically transformed the Balkans. The changes did not only take place on the map of the region but, crucially, also in the demographic makeup of the Balkans. While all the postwar states suffered incredible human losses, the Ottoman Empire endured the greatest casualties. And while military and political miscalculations are most often seen as the causes of such a disaster, they tell only one part of the story behind the Ottoman losses. In order to understand the reasons underlying such a catastrophic collapse of the Ottoman Balkans, we must consider social traumas caused by hunger, disease, and the subsequent massive flight of Ottoman subjects.

The focus of this chapter is on the outbreak of epidemic diseases on the Thracian front during the Balkan Wars. It is on these barren battlefields where the diseases caused the greatest death and destruction among both the armed forces and civilians. Of all other epidemic diseases, cholera should be given special attention as the disease responsible for the heaviest losses among both the soldiers and civilians. Diseases like smallpox, syphilis, typhus, dysentery, and typhoid fever also wreaked havoc during the Balkan Wars, although they were far less destructive than cholera. To help us fully appreciate the devastation that health issues such as these caused during and immediately after the war, this chapter focuses on cholera, smallpox, and syphilis, which turned into serious epidemics all along this Thracian front.

Thrace is important as the base of Ottoman operations, where the Eastern Army was positioned—a region in close proximity to the Ottoman capital city. The battles fought here would determine whether the Ottomans would be victorious or not. Thus the Thracian front played a key role in the outcomes of both the First and the Second Balkan Wars.

#### PREPARATIONS FOR MOBILIZATION AND WAR

As we know from other studies, the Ottoman Empire's military was poorly administered by the end of 1911. Logistics was a particularly weak area, as acknowledged by the administration. This led to the General Staff's introduction of a regulation entitled *Menzil Hidemat-ı Nizamnamesi* (Regulation of Logistic Provisioning Services) in 1911.<sup>7</sup> This regulation was publicly announced and enacted on the same date when other regulations were issued, all with the aim of providing health, veterinary, and transportation services. In preparation for a likely war in the Balkans, this regulation proposed that the Ottoman military would establish "base hospitals" and "logistic provisioning and war hospitals" for the sick

and wounded servicemen in predetermined areas during the outbreak of war in the Balkans. Base hospitals would be established with capacities of 15,000 beds in Hadımköy and Çatalca; 3,000 beds in Tekirdağ (Rodos), Gallipoli, and Çanakkale; 1,000 beds in Dimetoka; 2,000 beds in Dedeoğlu (Aleksandroupoli), Gümülline (Komotini), and İskeçe (Ksanthi); and 2,000 beds in İzmir (Smyrna), with a total capacity of 23,000 beds. Logistic provisioning and war hospitals with capacities of 10,000 beds would operate behind the zones of conflict. Sixty railway cars and two ships would be made available for the sick as well as for transportation purposes.<sup>8</sup>

As witnessed over the course of the next few years, these regulations, prepared entirely in accordance with German management principles, were ultimately applied during the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the War of Independence. But we cannot say that the application of the regulation during Balkan Wars was successful. The modern principles were not in harmony with the organizational structure of the Ottoman army. The calculations made for the logistical support in the plan were not in line with the needs of the country based on statistics: these guidelines and statutes were translated from German into Turkish, without any further attempt at localizing their content.<sup>9</sup>

As a result, even though the health services of the army were planned, they were not properly prepared or implemented during the Balkan Wars. Because of the staff and medical equipment deficiencies, field hospitals opened at the depots of Selimiye, Haydarpaşa, and Gümüşsuyu hospitals. These attempts did not result in success because the procedures were not properly followed up. Appointments were made in a disorderly fashion; it became necessary to employ the practitioner-physicians in order to make up for the lack of physicians in the units, and it was even decided that physicians could be brought from Hungary when necessary. The confusions in the appointments made by the Medical Office could not be corrected. In some places the number of staff exceeded the needs, while in other places the numbers were insufficient. It is possible to see the same chaos with regard to health equipment.<sup>10</sup>

Nazım Paşa was appointed as the Ottoman minister of war during the Balkan Wars. According to the war plan, the Ottoman Army was divided into two units, known as the Eastern Army and the Western Army.<sup>11</sup> The Eastern Army was to fight against the Bulgarians in Thrace. The Western Army was to fight in Macedonia and Albania and the rest of Rumelia against the Serbs, Greeks, and Montenegrins.<sup>12</sup> These plans proved inadequate: the Eastern Army was quickly defeated after the war began with the Bulgarian invasion toward Kırklareli (Kırkilise) on

October 22, 1912. As a result of its defeat in Kırklareli, the Eastern Army retreated to the lines of Lüleburgaz. The soldiers withdrew in a disorderly fashion, leaving everything they had in the hands of the enemy. Weapons, military supplies, and a considerable amount of provisions were left at the front.<sup>13</sup> This withdrawal by the Ottoman army, which was unable to complete its preparations within the short mobilization period, drove the unit, formed as a nucleus, into a state of chaos, thus causing the chain of command to fail and bringing the logistic services to a state of collapse. The single most important consequence of this confusion was the failure to implement a viable system of health services.

A similar situation arose in Lüleburgaz. The Battle of Pınarhisar-Lüleburgaz, which began on October 27, 1912, ended with the defeat of the Ottoman army on November 2, 1912. The army scattered in panic, just as it had in Kırklareli. Almost immediately one of the difficulties that the soldiers faced was starvation. The tons of food left to the enemy in Kırklareli made the situation even worse. Aid that might have been supplied to the army could not be received from the interior because of the cold and rainy weather in October and November, making the roads impassable. The implementation of a general logistical plan, and in particular health services, was thus impossible. This proved devastating for the soldiers, who faced starvation while deprived of proper clothes or weapons. Amid the chaos of a general retreat ordered on November 5 came the first signs of disease at the Çatalca Post (the line between Terkos and Büyük Çekmece), which was only thirty-five to forty kilometers west of Istanbul.

#### THE DEADLIEST DISEASE: CHOLERA

Epidemic diseases (including dysentery) surfaced among the Ottoman soldiers who came to Çatalca Post almost immediately. Cholera was at the top of the list of officials' concerns. The poor physical conditions played a major role in the outbreak of cholera. Soldiers, exhausted and scattered, retreated in rainy weather, with no regular provision of food or clean water and under chaotic accommodation conditions. The infected soldiers defecated in the least appropriate places, which in turn polluted the water accumulated after heavy rains. Cholera broke out when the scattered soldiers crowded in, drank and used the infected waters, and in turn spread the disease wherever they passed.<sup>14</sup>

One source has argued that some privates called up for duty were the other reason for the outbreak of cholera. According to Dr. Abdülkadir Noyan, this epidemic disease was precipitated by some soldiers of the

detachment from southeastern Anatolia and Syria, the primary source of the cholera. It should be noted that cholera had not been present in provinces like Adrianople, Kırklareli, or Çatalca before the war. Similarly, no cholera cases had been seen on the coasts of the Black Sea or in Istanbul. In the past cholera had come to the Ottoman provinces from Iran, Iraq, and Syria.<sup>15</sup> Muhtar Paşa, the high commander of the Third Army, was of the opinion that cholera had been brought by infected reserve battalions from Anatolia (especially Adana).<sup>16</sup> According to another source, among the reinforcements coming from Trabzon/Trebizond, Erzurum, and İzmir were soldiers who carried diseases diagnosed as cholera.<sup>17</sup> Thus the epidemic probably spread from those units transferred from Anatolia.

As the military correspondence shows, cholera was present among the troops as of October 23. But it is alleged that the Ministry of War either did not notice the situation or concealed it, therefore allowing it to turn into an epidemic. Such an epidemic also threatened Istanbul, which was in close proximity to the war zone, so it was also a source of tension between the Municipality of Istanbul and the Ministry of War.<sup>18</sup> It should be noted that in the correspondence the Municipality of Istanbul criticized the Ministry of War, which had not provided the necessary information on military issues to the authorities and had tried to deal with the affairs in "secrecy." Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, commander of the Third Corps, suggested that cholera was first detected on October 26, 1912. Indicating that he had first seen the symptoms of cholera upon his arrival at Çatalca Railway Station, the *paşa* reported about four hundred patients and a considerable number of corpses from the units affiliated with the Second Corps. Upon seeing these victims, he advised that the sick be boarded on the railway cars available, sent to the area between Yarımburgaz and Küçükçekmece, and then transferred to a planned field hospital, with tents and medical equipment being sent from Çerkesköy.

These instructions were only obeyed partially. The area after Hadımköy was under the management and control of the General Staff, so only two practitioners were sent to the area. The sick were thus left without any tents, medicine, food, or physicians.<sup>19</sup>

At this phase of the war the Bulgarian army forces also contracted the disease. Following the Ottoman forces after their retreat from Kırklareli and Lüleburgaz, the Bulgarian forces came into contact with the cholera most likely left behind by the fleeing Ottoman soldiers. Large numbers of Bulgarian troops became sick, even when they were positioned at the outskirts of Kırklareli. When they arrived at Çatalca, almost half of the Bulgarian army became victims of cholera. As with their Ottoman

adversaries, the absence of hygiene was the main reason for the rapid dissemination of the disease among the Bulgarian soldiers.

It was reported that 29,719 Bulgarian soldiers in Çatalca caught cholera between November 17 and December 3 and 4,615 of them died. After the circumstances took a turn for the worse, strict health measures were adopted at the outskirts of Çatalca. They dug septic tanks and adopted some rules on hygiene. The Bulgarian staff declared that those acting against the rules would be executed by firing squad.<sup>20</sup>

By November 1912 the health conditions in the Ottoman army could be described as disastrous. On November 17–18 alone, 2,897 cholera patients were added to the already hospitalized 3,280 soldiers.<sup>21</sup>

In the face of the seemingly unstoppable increase in the number of cholera cases at the front, the General Staff at first decided to transfer the soldiers suffering from cholera to Istanbul. Many cholera patients were transported to Istanbul via trains. Within a short time all of the hospitals and quarantine and isolation units in Istanbul were overflowing with patients. A serious hospital crisis arose in the city. Due to the aggravation of cholera as well as the failures in transferring the soldiers due to the inefficiency of the railways and lack of proper places in Istanbul, it became inevitable to treat the soldiers who could not be transferred at the front. For this purpose the Medical Office of the Army established “cholera hospitals” in Yassıviran, Hadımköy, Sancaktepe, Sazlıbosna, and Karaağaç. At the same time efforts were made to establish logistical provisioning and field hospitals in the areas of the armed forces until the Battle of Çatalca.<sup>22</sup>

By mid-November the order of the director of the Sanitary Office prohibited the transfer of cholera patients to Istanbul. It was decided that these soldiers would be transferred out of Ayastefanos (Yeşilköy). They pitched tents and erected as many huts as possible in order to facilitate the settlement of the soldiers and to meet the hospital demand at the Ayamama Farm in Ayastefanos.<sup>23</sup> Unfortunately, they did not have enough tents and public buildings to accommodate the sick in the area.

With the ongoing epidemic straining all the region’s resources, officials ordered the construction of wooden huts north of the railway station (now the airport).<sup>24</sup> Officials also decided to establish hospitals in Ayastefanos for the patients who would disembark from the trains in this area.<sup>25</sup> It was later determined that Ayastefanos had enough areas to care for the sick. Among the many buildings used to accommodate them was the Ayastefanos Greek School (Yeşilköy Rum Mektebi), converted into the Hospital for Epidemic Diseases. Thereafter tents were pitched on the

broad field between the Gramophone Record Company and railway station. A few houses near the field were hired to function as the hospital.<sup>26</sup>

The Red Crescent Society allocated hospitals for the care and treatment of soldiers suffering from cholera who could not be transferred to Istanbul, making important contributions to the struggle. Initially some hospitals with capacities of 250 beds were constructed in the form of huts at the Çatalca front. Due to the increase in the number of patients, three more hospitals were set up in tents in Hadımköy, Ayastefanos, and Ispartakule, where the disease was most prevalent. In these one- or two-floor tents, brought from Germany and Britain, service was provided in the most orderly fashion, using the latest technology. The Red Crescent Society provided the personnel of these hospitals from the mobile physicians to attendant staff. Hospitals that served especially in the struggle against cholera during its epidemic phase continued to operate as normal hospitals after the disease disappeared.<sup>27</sup>

November 17–19 was marked as the time when cholera was the severest. According to Professor Dr. Julius Wieting, the German organizer of the Ottoman Sanitary Organization, the number of patients and those suspected of carrying the disease who arrived at Ayastefanos solely on November 17 was 2,000. As of this date 1,800 privates were sent to this area every three days. But some of these patients lost their lives on the road without even having received proper treatment. It was not possible to bury the dead separately, so those who died of cholera were buried with their clothes on in deep ditches dug on empty lands near the coast.<sup>28</sup>

In short, in November 1912 Ayastefanos became a cholera camp and started to be known as the “cholera field.” Army Dr. Abdülkadir Lütfi (Noyan), who was appointed to the Hospital for Epidemic Diseases of Ayastefanos under the command of the Field Sanitary Inspectorship, narrated their unfavorable conditions as follows:

Trains came and stopped between the Gramophone Record Factory and station. The patients got off, whereas the dead were left to tumble the slope from the train line to the field; and then the trains left. We, the doctors, came to work with the dawn and worked until late hours of the night nonstop with rubber boots on our feet, in shirts made of black oil cloth and with the sign of Red Crescent on our arms. When we got up in the mornings, we usually found the patients that we had placed in the tents the day before out of the tents and the malingerer war deserters in the

tents. Most of them got what they deserved, though; they caught cholera. The majority of the 100 caregivers working in the hospital were hardworking and patriot soldiers. Unfortunately, we did not have any trained or experienced caregivers.... This epidemic could be regarded as the biggest epidemic that the Turkish army had ever faced during a war.<sup>29</sup>

Army Dr. Commander Clyde Sinclair Ford, the physician-in-chief of the American Red Cross delegation that visited this area, wrote that approximately six hundred soldiers had been present in the tents and barracks where he had worked and that almost two hundred of them had occupied the beds in a disorderly fashion despite not being sick; a further two hundred under his care had died.<sup>30</sup>

According to the official records, from the beginning of the Balkan Wars to the period including the first Çatalca battle, 219 army officers and 11,443 privates in total caught cholera in field base hospitals. Among those, 29 army officers and 3,301 regular troops died because of the disease. Furthermore, 362 army officers and 35,588 privates caught epidemic diseases from the second Çatalca battle to the signing of the peace treaty, leading to the deaths of 129 army officers and 8,769 privates due to cholera. As terrifying as these numbers are, the latest research on the subject suggests that the real number is far higher.<sup>31</sup>

#### CHOLERA, IMMIGRANTS, AND ISTANBUL

The defeat and the corresponding disorderly flight of the Eastern Army drove the public into a panic; thousands of Rumelian residents, responding to the cruelty of the Bulgarian armies and associated gangs, abandoned their homes and fled to Istanbul and further into Anatolia, often under miserable conditions. Cholera, which suddenly broke out among the soldiers, started to spread within a short time among these refugees following the soldiers from one place to another. It was especially those destitute civilians who traveled with the sick soldiers in railway cars and ships without any medical precautions who caught various epidemic diseases like cholera, dysentery, and smallpox.

According to official documents, during the Balkan Wars cholera was first seen in Istanbul on November 6, 1912. A letter sent by the Municipality of Istanbul to the Ministry of the Interior indicated that there were cases of cholera and dysentery among the servicemen and immigrants



coming from Çerkesköy after the defeat and stated that the chief of staff should be informed of the situation and be warned to take emergency measures.<sup>32</sup>

In spite of all this, transports carrying seventeen soldiers arrived at Istanbul within a short time. The Municipality of Istanbul quickly established a cholera hospital with 400 beds for the new arrivals and immigrants, who tried to survive on oxcarts under miserable conditions at the Sirkeci Station.<sup>33</sup> But this hospital did not offer a real solution to the problem.

At first the refugees were settled in houses, inns, and hotels that were hired by the municipality for the particular purpose of alleviating the accommodation problem that arose in the city due to the growing number of immigrants. Groups of refugees roamed with their animals and personal belongings throughout the city in abject poverty. Cemeteries, the yards of mosques, empty parcels of land, farms, stations, and all other locations were swarming with immigrants shortly thereafter.<sup>34</sup> They were settled in many areas of the city through the continuous efforts of the Municipality of Istanbul. Hundreds were taken to Zincirlikuyu, Atik Ali Paşa, Fetvaemini, Küçükusu, and Edirnekapi.<sup>35</sup> Some were kept outside the city. In accordance with the documents available, 3,800 immigrants were accommodated in huts outside of Yedikule. Furthermore, many others lived in cars outside of Edirnekapi.<sup>36</sup>

Upon receiving these reports, officials in the Ottoman government decided that the refugees should not be allowed to enter Istanbul but would wait in Ayastefanos and Makriköy (Bakırköy) in order to avoid further crowding and spread of disease. Thus officers were posted along the gates of Istanbul to stop any further migration into the city. Despite these efforts, refugees continued to enter the city by passing over the hills of Rami and Kağıthane, proving that all the precautions taken by officials were insufficient.<sup>37</sup>

In reaction the government tried to transfer some of the newcomers to nearby cities. As the documents show, although officials attempted to use laws and regulations to solve the problems brought about by the migration, the Ottoman government still encountered serious problems during their application. As a result it was once again compelled to develop new strategies. The endless influx of fleeing soldiers and refugees into Istanbul, in clear violation of earlier decisions, forced the Municipality of Istanbul into a deadlock. In the end, everyone's worst fears came true: cholera started to spread among the inhabitants of Istanbul, mutating into an unstoppable epidemic. As of November 10 notices declaring

a cholera outbreak in Istanbul started to be posted in the ships going to Istanbul.<sup>38</sup>

Following the spread of cholera throughout the army, the disease was carried throughout the city by soldiers and refugees; thus the overall health of the capital city was seriously endangered. Therefore the government had to implement some protective health precautions, mostly in the form of quarantines. Quarantine centers (*tahaffuzhane*) in Tuzla, Kavak, Serviburnu (Beykoz), Sinop, Manastırağzı, Klazumen, and Beirut were put into service under the administration of the High Quarantine Assembly (Meclis-i Umur-ı Sıhhiye).<sup>39</sup> It was obligatory that vessels carrying soldiers and refugees during the war be subject to the health measures taken in accordance with the regulations in the relevant quarantine units.<sup>40</sup> The disease soon spread so quickly, however, that the quarantine units became overcrowded, making it impossible to enforce the necessary health controls anymore.

A telegram sent from the Medical Office of the Field Base of Ayastefanos on November 14, 1912, attests to how serious the situation was. Having stated the grave danger facing Istanbul from the 2,500 cholera patients in Sarayburnu, the telegram reveals that the quarantine areas of Tuzla, Manastırağzı, Kavak, and Serviburnu were also full of cholera patients. In desperation an official proposed a solution to this overcrowding by evacuating one of the islands of Istanbul and placing the cholera patients there.<sup>41</sup> The key was to keep the sick out of Istanbul.

The transfer of soldiers to Istanbul was banned as of November 16, and efforts were made to keep the soldiers who had caught cholera out of Istanbul with stricter measures due to the increasing danger. The immigrants started to be sent to Anatolia (Ankara, İzmir, İzmit, Bolu, Bursa, Konya, Samsun, Adana, and Antalya) without any stop in Istanbul. Thus one of the obstacles in the struggle against the cholera in Istanbul was overcome.

Immediately after the order prohibiting the transfer of soldiers to Istanbul, the Battle of Çatalca began on November 17, 1912, with intensive Bulgarian artillery fire. The battle was taking place only thirty-five kilometers west of Istanbul, so the artillery shots could be heard inside the city. At first the Bulgarians approached the Ottoman positions within a few hundred meters; but this advance was halted by the Ottomans. After the Battle of Çatalca started, the High Quarantine Assembly held a meeting in order to discuss the sanitary conditions of Istanbul. On behalf of the foreign members Dr. Keller, the delegate of Austria-Hungary, read out an emergency program and submitted it to the assembly.<sup>42</sup>

The program included some precautions that should be taken for the sanitation of the city and its inhabitants: the isolation and treatment of cholera patients arriving in Istanbul, the burial of those who died because of cholera, and the cleanliness of the water supply. The assembly accepted this program with some amendments and decided that a Special Committee should be established in order to enforce these duties and 10,000 liras should be allocated to meet the costs. The Special Committee was made up of Ottoman and foreign members: Akil Muhtar, Hüseyin Said, Rifat Bey, Dr. Keller, Dr. Delamare, Dr. Valter, and Dr. Yanko.<sup>43</sup> The commission divided the duties among its members and conducted its studies on three issues in particular under the scope of the struggle against cholera. The first was the examination and burial of those who died, the second was the execution of works in cleaning and sanitation, and the third was providing medical services in various places of Istanbul with twenty physicians appointed by the assembly.<sup>44</sup>

In addition to the precautions taken by the assembly, the Municipality of Istanbul tried to find new solutions in order to decrease the crowding, especially in certain parts of the city. Cholera can also spread by means of contact with polluted water, so decreasing the crowding in congested areas was one of the main rules in the struggle against this disease. As suggested in the health precautions taken, it was a necessity to prevent overcrowding in rooms for singles, inns, and coffeehouses where the poor took refuge. Nevertheless these places, which had already been overcrowded, also served as shelters for Balkan refugees and the soldiers who came to Istanbul, so all efforts made in this regard were insufficient: the city had no other places of accommodation.

Another precaution taken to prevent crowding was gaining the permission of the Şeyhülislam (the chief religious official in Ottoman Empire) to stop the religious functions of some mosques, especially Hagia Sophia (Ayasofya), Blue Mosque (Sultanahmet), and Şehzadebaşı, and turn them into venues for temporary settlement.<sup>45</sup> After the decision to open the mosques for the settlement of the soldiers, all soldiers staying in the city were gathered together and sent to Hagia Sophia Mosque. Nevertheless, settling all sick soldiers in a single place would result in the aggravation of the cholera; those who were severely ill stayed in Hagia Sophia, but those who were not suffering from the epidemic were sent to other mosques. In cases where the capacity of a mosque was exceeded, some of the cholera patients or those with symptoms of the disease were sent to Maltepe Military Hospital and to Demirkapı Hospital, which had originally been reserved for the sick refugees. After these persons were

kept under quarantine for a few days, those who were thought to be improving were sent to the quarantine unit of Kavak in order to undergo a medical disinfection.<sup>46</sup> Under this plan of organization, 1,250 soldiers were treated with the support of the Red Crescent Society in Hagia Sophia, Sultanahmet, Nuruosmaniye, and Mahmutpaşa mosques until their seclusion periods expired.<sup>47</sup> Soldiers whose cleaning and disinfection were completed in Kavak were finally sent to Selimiye barracks, where they were transferred to their original barracks or hometowns.<sup>48</sup> Civilians with cholera were also kept under quarantine and received treatment in mosques. The Red Crescent Society and the Municipality of Istanbul provided the necessary food.<sup>49</sup>

### HOSPITALS IN ISTANBUL

In addition to the mosques, many new hospitals were established or expanded for the sick and wounded soldiers and civilians in the city. In financial terms the municipality was supported by the Ministry of War, the Red Crescent Society, and the High Quarantine Assembly. Hospitals were established in almost every corner of Istanbul within a short time in order to contain the disease and treat the incoming sick soldiers and refugees. The big hotels and mansions along the Bosphorus were evacuated for this purpose, and many domestic or foreign schools in the city were turned into hospitals and opened for service: Kabataş, the Greek High School, Galatasaray, the Teacher Training School for Male Students (Darülmua'llimin), the Haydarpaşa School of Medicine, the Kadırga Maternity Hospital, the University (Darülfünun—now the Faculty of Science), and the Boarding School for Orphans (Darüşşafaka).

Furthermore, a hospital with a capacity of 110 beds in huts was established by the Ministry of Health in Demirkapı. The municipality also allocated the Haseki Women's Hospital to pregnant, weak, or sick women refugees. In addition, a cholera hospital of 100 beds was established within the boundaries of the palace, and many other cholera hospitals with ninety beds were established in different parts of the city. The huts erected around the Sirkeci Railway Station were also allocated to cholera patients.<sup>50</sup>

For the treatment of sick refugees, the Red Crescent Society opened "refugee hospitals" in various parts of the city and provided health services. Taking into account that many of those who had been settled in huts outside of Yedikule were sick, the society appointed two mobile doctors for medical treatment and a midwife to attend to the pregnant

women there. These doctors visited the huts and mosques where these refugees were living every day and tried to treat the sick. All of their medical needs were being covered by the society. Nevertheless, these arrangements were not enough. Fully equipped hospitals were needed for the severely ill. Therefore the manor of Reşit Paşa, the governor of Erzurum, in Parmakkapı was hired and turned into a hospital for refugees with a capacity of 100 beds on February 8, 1913.<sup>51</sup> The Refugees Hospital, containing one unit for male patients and one for female patients, admitted 258 female and 98 male patients before the end of February. Of these, 16 female patients and 4 male patients died. The others recovered and were discharged from the hospital.<sup>52</sup>

Another refugee hospital was opened in Kandilli. Most of the refugees were ill, so buildings were needed for their treatment; with the assistance of some benefactors, Prince Celalettin Bey's palace was allocated for use as a hospital of fifty beds. All of the costs and disbursements of the Kandilli Hospital, opened on November 7, 1912, were covered by the Ottoman Red Crescent Society. During the first three months 114 patients were accepted, and only 5 of them died.

Additionally, the cavalry station in Şişli and Rıza Bey Manor, situated across from the station, were turned into a hospital of forty-five beds in November under the management of Dr. G. Clemov. This capacity was increased to sixty beds soon after its commencement of services. The disbursements of the hospital were covered through the monies that Dr. Clemov received from benefactors in Istanbul, Britain, and India. The Red Crescent Society provided materials and equipment to this hospital. In three months it treated 155 sick and wounded patients.<sup>53</sup> Besides the refugee hospitals, the Red Crescent Society also opened hospitals for the sick and wounded soldiers who were transferred to Istanbul. Five military hospitals were put into service in October and November, treating hundreds of soldiers.<sup>54</sup>

#### OTHER EPIDEMIC DISEASES

Epidemic diseases like dysentery, typhoid fever, typhus, smallpox, and syphilis were seen among both the soldiers and the civilians during the Balkan Wars. Smallpox and syphilis were prominent in terms of their dissemination area and level of destruction. Smallpox was especially seen among the immigrants and spread to several cities of Anatolia, based on the accommodation provided to the immigrants. The disease was eradicated in Istanbul with the strict precautions applied by the Municipality

of Istanbul, the Red Crescent Society, and the Ministry of the Interior. Syphilis, however, which turned into an epidemic during the Balkan Wars, was most frequently seen among the soldiers. The disease became an epidemic during the transfer of the soldiers, but the strict measures and the legal arrangements applied helped eradicate it from Istanbul.

#### SMALLPOX

Smallpox was one of the diseases that afflicted the refugees in Istanbul. Upon recognizing this disease in the huts outside the walls of Yedikule, where the immigrants had been temporarily settled, the Red Crescent Society informed the Ministry of the Interior. A letter sent by Besim Ömer Paşa, head of the society, to the Ministry of the Interior on January 30, 1913, indicated that smallpox was seen among the immigrants dwelling in some huts outside of Yedikule and in some mosques in the last days and that the disease tended to spread within a short time due to the overcrowding. It further stated that a Panel for Sanitary Service to the Immigrants (Muhacirin Heyet-i Sıhhiyesi) had been established by the society in order to help these people. The sick were immediately secluded; in order to prevent the spread of the disease, two vaccination officers were entrusted with the duty of vaccination in accordance with the Regulation of Vaccination (Aşı Nizamnamesi). Yet some troubles emerged during its application; refugees who had never seen vaccination before opposed the procedure. Thus officials sought help from the police and gendarmerie and even considered denying bread to those without vaccination certificates.<sup>55</sup>

During the application of the measures against smallpox, serious disagreements developed between the Municipality of Istanbul and the Red Crescent Society with regard to their authority and responsibilities. According to the society, thirty-eight smallpox cases had been diagnosed with the help of the Panel for Sanitary Service founded within its body. The society had filed a demand to the Municipality of Istanbul that these patients should be transferred immediately to the Hospital for Contagious Diseases (Emraz-ı Sâriye Hastanesi) in Demirkapı. Nothing had been done in this regard despite fifteen days having passed; furthermore, the hospital concerned had been demolished for reasons unknown. The Red Crescent Society stated that the smallpox had caused terrible havoc among the refugees. If given permission, it could transfer these patients to its Immigrants Hospital with a capacity of one hundred beds in Parmakkapı.<sup>56</sup>

In an explanatory letter sent to the Ministry of the Interior, the Municipality of Istanbul first deemed the aforementioned allegations of the society to be false accusations and then declared that the municipality had been aware of the smallpox and measles seen among the refugees since their beginning phase and that the necessary precautions had been taken. Accordingly, the most effective treatment of the smallpox vaccine had been applied to all refugees without exception. All of the existing patients had been transferred to quarantine stations in Guraba Hospital and Etfal Hospital in Şişli with great effort. If one or two patients were left in the huts, it was because the families rejected their transfer, even if the municipal police were asked to help do so. These patients, who were in convalescence, continued to be treated in these places out of necessity. Furthermore, cleaning and purification had been carried out in residential areas with utmost care and diligence, and all of the huts had been disinfected.

With regard to demolition of the huts in Demirkapı, the Municipality of Istanbul stated that it had acted in accordance with an order sent by the Ministry of the Interior on February 14–15, 1913 (February 1–2, 1328) and that the hospital had been moved to Yenibahçe. It further declared that transfer of those carrying contagious diseases to the Immigrants Hospital with one hundred beds founded by the Red Crescent Society had not been appropriate due to the conditions of sanitation and that this issue was within the authority of the Municipality of Istanbul.

The Red Crescent Society, upon these declarations, conducted a new medical investigation in the relevant area with the Panel for Sanitary Assistance (Heyet-i Sıhhiye-i İmdadiye) incorporated within it and found not one or two but thirty-two smallpox patients. It noted that, because smallpox spread in convalescence, even one or two patients in convalescence could cause a major threat in overcrowded areas. Because the necessary precautions had not been taken, deaths continued to occur among these people, who suffered from extreme poverty.<sup>57</sup>

This disagreement between the Municipality of Istanbul and the Red Crescent Society was resolved through the conciliation efforts of the grand vizier. Accordingly, it was requested that the hospital founded in a hut should be demolished and that a new hospital should speedily be constructed in Yenibahçe Çayırı.<sup>58</sup>

Smallpox was also seen in İzmir during the Balkan Wars. Just as with cholera, smallpox was brought to the city by the refugees and spread to the inhabitants within a short period. The statistics show that the progress of the disease fluctuated from time to time. Nineteen persons caught

the disease on February 1913, and two of them died. No smallpox cases were seen in March. The disease continued in April with varying intensity. The quarantine records indicate that thirty-four persons lost their lives due to smallpox in July 1913; in August of the same year the intensity of the disease decreased: the number of the dead was relatively low at twenty-two. When examining the distribution of deaths per district of the city, it is clear that the incidence of smallpox was greatest in the Alaybeyi neighborhood of Karşıyaka. Nevertheless, smallpox was seen not only in the city center but also in affiliated subdistricts and villages. The government and the health institutions associated with the local government began to take emergency precautions. The vaccination program was the most remarkable among them. The administration of vaccines was made obligatory in the struggle against smallpox. Public announcements prepared and distributed with regard to the disease demanded that those who had not yet had their children vaccinated or had done so more than five years earlier should have them vaccinated immediately. It was also obligatory to inform the authorities of patients without losing any time. Legal proceedings were initiated against anyone who acted contrary to these demands by hiding their patients from the authorities or who did not give the smallpox vaccine.<sup>59</sup>

Syphilis was another disease seen in epidemic form during the Balkan Wars. The disease was seen most in the cities in the Black Sea region, so it may have spread from Russia. The increase in deaths from syphilis, inevitable due to war conditions, prompted the authorities to take emergency measures. The struggle against syphilis was incorporated into the agenda of the Cabinet. A regulation in regard to the city of Kastamonu was prepared.<sup>60</sup> It stipulated that in order to prevent the spread of the disease, mobile sanitary panels composed of three or four physicians and a pharmacist should be established by the Assembly of Civil Physicians (Meclis-i Tıbbiye-i Mülkiye) and the General Directorate of Health (Sihhiye-i Umumiye) in Konya, Ankara, Adrianople, İzmir, Sivas, and Yanya (the area including the Iraq border, Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad).<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, hospitals specializing in syphilis should be established in Sivas with a budget allocated to cover the costs of the program (December 9, 1912).<sup>62</sup>

Smyrna was one of the cities where syphilis was most rampant. Therefore the Municipality of İzmir established a hospital specialized in syphilis and tried to treat the patients in this manner. This hospital was later disaffiliated from the municipal administration and began to be managed by a special commission. Upon the increase in number of cases,



the City Council decided that fifty beds should be added to this hospital for male patients and a specialized bacteriologist should be appointed.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, they tried to prevent the spread of the disease by means of sending mobile hospitals, physicians, and medicine to the neighborhoods of İzmir where syphilis was prevalent. These measures were in line with those taken in the country as a whole.

In addition to cholera, smallpox, and syphilis, typhus was seen in Smyrna during the Balkan Wars. The statistics of the Health Office indicate that April 1913 marked the high point for cases of the disease. Typhus was seen in twenty-three persons between the dates of February 15 and 22; one of them died. Between March 1 and 7 twenty-five persons caught typhus; this figure increased to sixty in April. The disease totally disappeared in June due to the strict measures taken.<sup>64</sup>

#### EPIDEMIC DISEASES IN ADRIANOPLE

Before the Balkan Wars the Ottoman Empire ruled three regions in the European continent: Thrace, Macedonia, and Albania. The most important city of Thrace was Adrianople, which was established where the Meriç (Maritsa), Arda, and Tunca (Tundzha) rivers intersected and militarily reinforced with important defense lines. Thrace held a significant position within the theater of operations during the Balkan Wars because Adrianople was the first line of defense for Istanbul. The railway, which would facilitate the forward operation to Istanbul, could only be captured after Adrianople fell.<sup>65</sup> Having acknowledged the strategic significance of the city, the Bulgarians saw Adrianople as the key to invading Istanbul. For this reason, they seized Kırklareli and Lüleburgaz and ceased all supply and communications exchange between Adrianople and Istanbul; they blockaded the city on October 22.

During the blockade Adrianople had to cope with both the heavy Bulgarian artillery fire and hunger and diseases that started to emerge. Approximately twenty thousand refugees from Macedonia and Rumelia arrived at Adrianople before the blockade,<sup>66</sup> causing the population of the city to increase to 120,000 within a very short time.<sup>67</sup> Food supplies of the city, which the original inhabitants could rely on, were rapidly exhausted with the new tide of refugees. Almost immediately after the blockade began, hunger started to pose a real threat to Adrianople.<sup>68</sup> In the following days harsh winter conditions, coupled with overcrowding and hunger, paved the way for epidemic diseases.

By the second half of November typhoid fever, cholera, and typhus began to be seen in epidemic form among the ordinary soldiers and staff.

Upon the appearance of these epidemic diseases, the Central Hospital, known as the Greek School, started to be used for their treatment. Prisoner physicians were entrusted with the duty of attending more than 1,200 patients in this hospital. Enlarged with wooden huts attached to the center, the hospital was supported with four more German huts. The doctors disinfected all tents with slaked lime in order to control the epidemic within the military units. Despite all the efforts, 91 of the diagnosed 7,000 patients died.<sup>69</sup>

In the meantime the Ottoman Empire, which suffered from the devastating defeats on all the fronts where it had fought, declared a cease-fire with the Balkan nations on December 3, 1912. The terms were unjust, so the health care needed in Adrianople could not be provided during this period.<sup>70</sup> During the blockade Adrianople could only receive the limited health supplies brought by Dr. Derviş Bey, physician-in-chief of the Darülfünun Hospital, in accordance with the terms of the cease-fire.<sup>71</sup> Some precautions were taken during the cease-fire to eliminate diseases, especially cholera and typhoid fever. For instance, officials declared on December 15 that classes were postponed at schools. An order was sent to the commanders at the fronts: due to the outbreak of cholera and typhoid fever at the hospitals, the military units at the barracks should go to military camps by turns in order to prevent crowding. It was also ordered that the wards and toilets should be cleaned with water and lime.<sup>72</sup> The cease-fire ended in February, and the Bulgarian army started to bombard the city once again on February 13.

The blockade meant severe losses for both sides. Bulgarians and Serbians who came to help were all under difficult conditions. The weather became even harsher in February, and blizzards started to be seen in the area. Freezing cold worsened the problems of hunger, thirst, and epidemics. Describing the awful conditions under which they were struggling to survive, a Serbian soldier wrote in his journal: "The soldiers have undergone unbelievable difficulties. The area surrounding Adrianople was treeless and mostly with no water sources for about 15 km. A terrible blizzard came with February and we had to deal with typhus and with cholera for some time. Meat, bread, and later on wood should come from Serbia."<sup>73</sup> Cholera and typhus indeed turned into a nightmare for the Bulgarian soldiers. Bedbugs, fleas, and other parasites posed a serious problem for the soldiers living under unhealthy conditions with no means for cleaning or disinfection, thus helping typhus turn into an epidemic.

On March 24 the Bulgarian troops started bombing the city for two days. At the end of the bombardment the Ottoman forces under the command of Şükrü Paşa realized that they could not continue to fight

and ended the resistance. As a result the Bulgarian armies under the command of Gen. Nicola İvanof and the sixty thousand Serbian forces that provided backup for the Bulgarians seized Adrianople on March 26, 1913.<sup>74</sup> The condition of the city worsened with the invasion. The Bulgarians gathered the captive staff in the protected emplacement of Hıdırlık and sent them to Karaağaç and Sofia, while the ordinary soldiers were imprisoned on an island known as Sarayıçi on the river Tunca and abandoned to die horribly in the marshes.<sup>75</sup>

It was reported that twenty to thirty died every day from starvation or diseases and that the corpses were being piled up. The putrefaction and rotting of the uncovered bodies posed a great threat. In addition, the massacres by the Bulgarians within the city continued, and the corpses were being thrown into the streets, fields, and rivers. Some of the bodies were buried in holes dug by the prisoners in a disorderly fashion. The road to Karaağaç was full of corpses. With the appearance of cholera, the situation became even more serious.

A diary kept in French by A. Geron, headmistress of the Alliance Israélite Universelle School in Adrianople, indicates that the sanitation of the city was in a terrible state, noting that scarlet fever, cholera, and dysentery had begun to spread. Geron also noted that children were drinking the water of the Arda River, which was full of corpses, and that the administrative panel of the school had to be informed of the situation immediately in order to take the necessary precautions.<sup>76</sup> On March 1, 1913, Geron wrote:

The hospitals are swarming with the dead bodies of patients due to scarcity of medicine and proper treatment. Scurvy, pneumonia, lack of physiological strength, and cholera are widespread... hundreds might have been saved with a more prudent hospital management. Alas, physicians who were caught unprepared used ordinary cotton to dress the wounds and prepared their cotton gauzes. Disinfectants were exhausted as of the first battle, and the government had to apply to the poorly supplied private pharmacies.<sup>77</sup>

In addition, the Bulgarians denied the medical and humanitarian assistance demands of the Red Cross delegations to Adrianople during the blockade and made life difficult for medical officers after the blockade. To bring health assistance, medical supplies, and pharmaceuticals to the city, the German Red Cross delegation left for Adrianople, which was

suffering from lack of medical assistance and supplies under the Bulgarian blockade. Immediate access was denied, however, so they had to wait in Sofia for a long time. The German Red Cross delegation under the leadership of Professor Dr. Alfred Hildebrandt and Bernhard Korth was able to arrive in Adrianople immediately after the city was surrendered to the Bulgarians on March 30, 1913, to help the sick and wounded and the war prisoners.<sup>78</sup> After this delegation left the city on April 9, 1913, a second German Red Cross delegation arrived in Adrianople under the responsibility of Doctors Martin Kirschner and F. Theilhaber.<sup>79</sup> This delegation also encountered many obstacles and difficulties from the Bulgarians, although these violated the Geneva Conventions.

In June 1913 the Balkan states started to fight each other over the Ottoman land captured during the war. The Ottomans took advantage of this disagreement and marched to Adrianople, taking the city back from the Bulgarian forces on July 23. A week after the operation to regain Adrianople started, a new cholera outbreak surfaced among the units of the Ninth Corps in Dimetoka. The other units moving toward Adrianople had to avoid being infected in order to complete the operation with success. Therefore the commander of this corps, Fahri Paşa; Maj. Mustafa Kemal Bey; and chief of staff and physician-in-chief Neşet Osman Bey took emergency precautions.

First they decided that the tent quarters in Kuleliburgaz-Uzunköprü, where the units of the corps were deployed, and the river passing near Dimetoka were to be kept under cordon. All tents and toilets in the field were disinfected with lime milk. Four hundred patients who showed symptoms of cholera were sent to a mobile cholera hospital established in Dimetoka. The Directory of the Sanitary Office appointed Abdülkadir Lütü (Noyan) Bey and the deputy physician-in-chief of the corps, Tevfik İsmail (Gökçe), to this hospital in order to fight the cholera there. One of the huts was turned into a bacteriology laboratory. The bacteriological analyses showed that 134 patients out of the 400 who had been transferred to the hospital had caught the cholera and that cholera did not spread with water but with contact.<sup>80</sup>

Cholera outbreaks had occurred in the Greek and Bulgarian armies before Ottoman units entered the abandoned quarters in Dimetoka, thus coming in contact with the cholera microbe and getting infected. As a matter of fact, cholera vaccine started to be administered in the Ottoman armies after the recapture of Adrianople, which protected the units from the disease to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, the vaccine had not yet been administered in the Ninth Corps in Dimetoka. All of the soldiers in

this unit were vaccinated two or three times with the cholera vaccine prepared by Reşat Rıza Mustafa Bey, one of the bacteriologists of Gülhane, in order to prevent spread of the disease.<sup>81</sup> In this outbreak 495 persons became sick, and 167 of them lost their lives.<sup>82</sup>

After Adrianople was won back, diseases other than cholera were seen among the units of the army. In January *humma-yı racia* (relapsing fever) and spotted typhoid fever (typhus) emerged among the units of the Second Corps that had been stationed in Adrianople. The barracks were full of lice, which aggravated the outbreaks. Congestion began to be seen in the city as the soldiers crowded into the houses and the marketplace, giving rise to the threat of spreading typhus among the public. The only sterilization machine available for sanitation was circulated among the units but could not satisfy the demand. At least twenty to thirty persons allegedly caught this disease every day.<sup>83</sup> With the worsening of the outbreak of the disease, Süleyman (Numan) Bey, president of the Harbiye Nezareti Sıhhiye Dairesi (Medical Office of the Army), demanded assistance from the authorities. Help came in the person of Mayer Bey, a hygiene professor at Gülhane who had been commissioned for an inspection of the corps, and Dr. Abdülkadir Lütfi Bey, commissioned to inspect hospitals. Both were sent to Adrianople accompanied by a commission on February 17.

The examinations, which started at the beginning of March, continued until April 20, 1914. Typhus went through its most violent period in March: 445 persons caught the disease, and 104 died as a result. The number of patients decreased to 227 in April, while the deaths decreased to 67. Due to the warm weather, cleaning operations in the barracks, and improvement efforts, the disease was completely eradicated by May.<sup>84</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Epidemic diseases were the most important problem that the Ottoman Empire faced during the Balkan Wars. The government was forced to take immediate sanitary measures, because the diseases spread within a short time. Nevertheless, the lack of sufficient and specialized staff who could apply these precautions, the absence of an institutional framework necessary for implementation, and other factors such as financial difficulties in allocating funds led to serious failures in the struggle against these contagious diseases. The government had to deal with both the military problems and the deficiencies of the health organization as well as fighting against epidemic diseases during the war. In recognition of the

importance of municipalities and sanitary institutions of the provinces and the health organizations established by the state in cities and districts, new arrangements were made after the war, redefining responsibilities.

The war and the health issues around it expanded the public sphere. Some organizations that took part in the health assistance conducted successful work in the treatment of the wounded and the struggle against the diseases. The health campaigns launched and run by organizations and societies like the Society of National Defense (*Müdafaa-i Milliye*), the Society for Preparing Free Pharmaceuticals for the Poor Patients (*Fakir Hastalar İçin Meccanen İlaç Hazırlığı Beynelmilel Cemiyeti*), and the Red Crescent Society changed the borders of the public sphere. While the activities of these organizations and societies are often assumed to serve the strategies and interest of the Ottoman government/state, it is clear that they fell into disagreements and disputes with the different organs of the state from time to time. It is possible to follow these disagreements and disputes in the correspondence between the Municipality of Istanbul and the Ministry of War or between the Ministry of the Interior and some immigration organizations on the distribution of duties and responsibilities. With the help of some quasi-official organizations like the Red Crescent, however, efforts were made to balance the relationship between the state and the society.

In addition to the works of these organizations and societies, private hospitals were also established during the Balkan Wars in many places to serve soldiers and civilians. The Red Crescent's efforts in public health are noteworthy. The society defined itself in its charter as the civilian extension of the army's medical organization at war and acted in harmony with this definition during the wars, ensuring the mobilization of the public to support the activities of the army. It should be noted that all these efforts, in addition to making contributions to the development of the nongovernmental organizations and general awareness in the area of health, also affected the emergence of national feelings and ideals. Furthermore, the activities of the commissions founded by the municipalities, immigration organizations established by the government, and those of the High Quarantine Assembly (*Meclis-i Umur-ı Sıhhiye*) continued until the end of war without any interruptions. Establishment of hospitals in both Istanbul and some major cities by means of foreign embassies, commissioning and sending of foreign doctors and caregivers for treatment of many diseases, and assistance provided by the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies all around the world should be mentioned as noteworthy efforts toward proper health care during the war. These developments during

the Balkan Wars are a clear indication that a part of the population that cared about the general state of health of the society and made efforts to find solutions to health problems emerged within the country. They also showed how significant common health care was and that institutionalization in this area was absolutely necessary.

Statistical records and casualty reports were not kept properly (a pattern also observable in previous wars), so we do not know for sure how many citizens the Ottoman state lost to the diseases and unfavorable health conditions during the Balkan Wars. Most of the figures provided were taken from the notes kept by journalists or observers who reported on the war and therefore cannot be accepted as accurate or official. Retreat of the Ottoman forces in a scattered and disorderly fashion on some fronts after the defeats prevents reliable estimates on the number of the dead and the wounded. It would also be wrong to evaluate the losses merely as military: many civilians from both Ottoman Thrace and Bulgaria died because of cholera, dysentery, typhoid fever, typhus, smallpox, and intestinal diseases during the war.

Even though the real figures are not known, it is estimated that the total loss of the Ottoman population during this war was approximately 100,000–120,000.<sup>85</sup> It is claimed that 50,000 of these died due to their wounds, while 75,000 died because of disease.<sup>86</sup> This extreme loss removed one of the last remaining supports of the Ottoman Empire and accelerated the process of disintegration.

#### NOTES

1. Jacop Gould Schurman, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, 17.
2. Sacit Kutlu, *Milliyetçilik ve Emperyalizm Yüzyılında Balkanlar ve Osmanlı Devleti*, 403.
3. Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, 136.
4. Records of civilian losses were not kept properly, so we do not know the exact figure of civilian deaths. Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 329.
5. Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, 473.
6. It should be noted here that a cholera vaccine was used in the army for the first time during this period. The studies on cholera vaccine had started earlier (in 1912 in Gülhane), but the application of this vaccine in the army could only be made in 1913. Ekrem Kadri Unat, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda 1910–1913 Yıllarındaki Kolera Salgınları ve Bunlarla İlgili Olaylar,” 64, 65.
7. *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi (1908–1920)* [TSK] (Ankara: Genelkurmay Yayınları, 1971), 456.
8. *Ibid.*, 454.
9. *Balkan Harbi (1912–1913)*; TSK, 722.

10. Kemal Özbay, *Türk Asker Hekimliği Tarihi ve Asker Hastaneleri*, 92.
11. After Nazım Paşa, Ahmet İzzet Paşa was appointed as the minister of war in January 1913. Sinan Kunalalp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839–1922)*, 18.
12. Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri (1912–1913)*, 15.
13. Aram Andonyan, *Balkan Savaşı*, 470.
14. Abdülkadir Lütfi, "Harp Salgınları," 5.
15. Abdülkadir Noyan, *Son Harplerde Salgın Hastalıklarla Savaşlarım*, 8–9.
16. Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, *Mon commandement au cours de la campagne des Balkans de 1912*, 151–52.
17. Ekrem Kadri Unat, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 1910–1913 Yıllarındaki Kolera Salgınları ve Bunlarla İlgili Olaylar," 62.
18. Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive in Istanbul (BOA), M.V., D 170, G 104 (1330.Za.29—November 9, 1912).
19. Muhtar Paşa, *Mon commandement*, 151–52.
20. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 35.
21. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 136.
22. TSK, 292.
23. BOA, M.V., D 171, G 13 (1330.Z.6—November 16, 1912).
24. BOA, M.V., D 171, G 28 (1330.Z.9—November 19, 1912).
25. BOA, M.V., D 170, G 104 (1330.Za.29—November 9, 1912).
26. Noyan, *Son Harplerde*, 6.
27. Seçil Karal Akgün and Murat Uluğtekin, *Hilal-i Ahmer'den Kızılay'a*, 122.
28. Noyan, *Son Harplerde*, 7.
29. Ibid., 7.
30. Clyde Sinclair Ford, *The Balkan Wars*, 130.
31. Selda Kaya Kılıç, "Birinci Balkan Savaşı Döneminde Sağlık Hizmetleri ve Koşullar (1912)," 285.
32. BOA, DH. İD 164-2/1-2-(1331.B.16—June 21, 1913).
33. Wilhelm Feldman, *İstanbul'da Savaş Günleri, Bir Alman Gazetecinin Balkan Savaşı Hatıratı*, 61.
34. H. G. Dwight, *Constantinople Old and New*, 522–28.
35. *Ottoman Red Crescent Society 1329–1331 Year Book*, 226.
36. Ibid., 216.
37. BOA, BEO, no. 308444.
38. Feldman, *İstanbul'da Savaş Günleri*, 61.
39. The Meclis-i Umur-ı Sıhhiye was incorporated in 1838 (1254) in order to engage in duties like inspecting vehicles and vessels arriving at the Sublime Porte by means of land routes or sea lanes and their passengers and personal belongings in order to see whether they were infected with any epidemic diseases before allowing them to enter the country. It granted a certificate indicating that the bearer of the same was not infected with any of the epidemic diseases to those who would go abroad from Turkey and therefore protected both the overall health of the people and commerce. The assembly was made up of eight permanent members. In addition, thirteen physicians also attended the assembly in order to act on behalf of the ambassadors in Istanbul (Germany, Britain, Austria, Italy, Spain, America, Iran, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Russia, France, Greece). The president of the assembly



was the minister of foreign affairs. After the Lausanne Treaty, the members of the assembly were totally Turkish citizens; the assembly was renamed the Sanitary Office of Borders and Coasts (Hudud ve Sahiller Sıhhiye Müdürlüğü), which was affiliated with the Ministry of Health and Medical Assistance (Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekaleti). Osman Nuri Ergin, *Mecelle-i Umûr-ı Belediyye*, 86–94.

40. See *Kolera Karantinası Hakkında Nizamname*.
41. BOA, BEO, no. 308444 /3 (1 Teşrinisani 1328).
42. BOA, Minutes of the High Quarantine Assembly (MU. SIH) 13, no. 47, D.no. 2563.
43. MU. SIH. 13, no. 47, D.no. 2563.
44. MU. SIH. 13, no. 49, D.no. 2563.
45. Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp İştiklerim*, 70.
46. BOA, M.V., D 171, G 13 (1330.Z.6—November 16, 1912).
47. Akgün and Uluğtekin, *Hilal-i Ahmer'den Kızılây'a*, 110.
48. BOA, DH. İD 164-2/1, 90-(1331. B. 16—June 21, 1913).
49. BOA, M.V.M., D 171, G 13 (1330.Z.6).
50. "Emraz-ı Sâriyeye Karşı Mücadele," 134–35.
51. *Ottoman Red Crescent Society 1329–1331 Year Book*, 227.
52. Ibid., 138.
53. Ibid., 163.
54. *Ottoman Red Crescent Society 1329–1331 Year Book*, 123–24.
55. BOA, DH.İD., 165/13-2-(1331.Ra.18—February 25, 1913).
56. BOA, DH.İD., 165/13-4-(1331.Ra.18—February 25, 1913).
57. BOA, DH.İD., 165/14-(1331.R.4—March 13, 1913).
58. BOA, DH.İD., 165/13-9-(1331.Ra.18—February 25, 1913).
59. Tülay Alim, "Balkan Harplerinin Bitimi ile Birinci Dünya Savaşı Arasında Yerel Basına Göre İzmir," 143, 151.
60. BOA, DH.İD., 53/34-3-(1331.M.6—December 16, 1912).
61. BOA, DH.İD., 53/34-5-(1331.M.6—December 16, 1912).
62. BOA, DH.İD., 53/34-10, 16-(1331.M.6—December 16, 1912).
63. Alim, "Balkan," 152.
64. Ibid., 148–50.
65. *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Osmanlı Devri—Balkan Harbi (1912–1913)* [TSK, OD—BH], vol. 2, part 3 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Yayınları, 1980), 466–67.
66. The immigrants, who took refuge in Adrianople when running away from Rume-  
lia, especially Macedonia, had to flee one more time after the blockade of Adri-  
anople. Some of those who left Adrianople migrated to Istanbul; others went to  
Anatolia. After Adrianople was recaptured during the Second Balkan War, some  
immigrants turned back. Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 160.
67. The Ottoman government decided that immigrants from Adrianople who wanted  
to migrate should be transferred to Istanbul and entrusted Emin Bey, the former  
member of parliament of Adrianople, with this duty. Emin Bey sent many immi-  
grants to Istanbul or even to İzmir from Adrianople by ships. Halaçoğlu, *Balkan*, 50.
68. McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 143.
69. Özbay, *Türk Asker*, 108.
70. The reasons given for the Ottoman government to enter into a contract of  
such unequal conditions were that the army was in dire need of soldiers and

ammunition and that the cholera epidemic became severe and thus caused death in large numbers. The Army Headquarters declared that cannonballs that could only last for a few days were left in the Çatalca fortifications; therefore it was not possible to continue this war. Under these circumstances it was decided that the cease-fire should be signed no matter how unjust the conditions of the agreement were. After the cease-fire was signed, cannonballs kept in several places like Trabzon were brought here to Çatalca, and emergency cannonball orders were sent to German factories. Furthermore, urgent precautions were taken against the cholera epidemic, and the army was supported with reinforcements that arrived from Anatolia. Şeyhülislam Cemalettin Efendi, *Siyasi Hatıralarım, Şeyhülislam Cemalettin Efendi'nin Hatırat-ı Siyasisi*, 141, 142.

71. Akgün and Uluğtekin, *Hilal-i Ahmer'den Kızılay'a*, 109.
72. Ratip Kazancıgil, *Hafız Rakım Ertür'ün Anılarında Balkan Savaşı'nda Edirne Savunması Günleri* (Kırklareli: Sermet Matbaası, 1986), 43, 53, 56.
73. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 87–88.
74. Schurman, *The Balkan Wars*, 34.
75. Özbay, *Türk Asker*, 106–7.
76. Rıfat N. Bali, “Adrianople Muharasası Sırasında Tutulmuş Bir Günlük,” 43.
77. *Ibid.*, 29.
78. BOA, HR.SYS. 2025/4 (17.12.1912).
79. For detailed information, see Oya Dağlar, “Balkan Savaşları'nda İnsancıl Hukuk İhlallerine İki Örnek Olay.”
80. Abdülkadir Noyan, “Vibriyon Hamillerinin ve Mutrihlerinin Kolera Salgınındaki Ehemmiyeti,” 202.
81. Dr. Abdülkadir Noyan, “Kolera Aşısı tatbikatından Çıkan Netayiç,” 20.
82. Özbay, *Türk Asker*, 114.
83. *Ibid.*, 115.
84. Noyan, *Son Harplerde*, 23–26.
85. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 136.
86. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 328–29.

## Fighting on Two Fronts

### The Balkan Wars and the Struggle for Women's Rights in Ottoman Turkey

*Serpil Atamaz*

In February 1913 an Ottoman woman named Fehime Nüzhet took the floor at a lecture hall in Istanbul and addressed her female-only audience in the following way:

Becoming one body and one block, the whole of Europe has transformed into a big and sinister monster and started beating the pure and innocent existence of the East with its filthy and miserable tail.... Whenever we think about the crushing defeats of the last few months and the enemy's arrival at the doors of the capital in twenty days, we shed tears of pain. But ladies, shame and crying are signs of helplessness. We are at such an important point in our nation's history that if we want to escape this catastrophe and lead a decent life, we have to demonstrate power, not weakness. Since it is our weakness that generates the power of the enemy, we can be certain that our power will cause the enemy to manifest its weakness.<sup>1</sup>

Fehime Nüzhet's speech was part of a series of meetings, which brought together more than four thousand women from different backgrounds in the midst of the First Balkan War. Organized by Müdafaa-i Milliye Hanımlar Cemiyeti (Women's Chapter of the Society of National Defense) and led by Selma Hanım, these meetings were held under the auspices of Nimet Muhtar and Nazime Sultan to encourage and enable Ottoman women to contribute to the salvation of the nation at a time of crisis.<sup>2</sup> Among the speakers were both prominent intellectuals such

as Fatma Aliye, Halide Edip, Nigar Bint-i Osman, and İhsan Raif and young students from the newly established girls' schools in the empire.<sup>3</sup> These meetings drew a lot of attention at the time, and their proceedings were published in 1913 under the title *Darülfünun Konferans Salonunda Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* (The Meetings of Our Women at the University Lecture Hall).

In addition to giving and/or listening to patriotic speeches, women who attended these meetings donated a significant amount of jewelry, clothes, and money to help the war effort. These women also agreed to send telegrams to the army on behalf of all Ottoman women to boost the soldiers' morale. Telegrams were also sent to the Muslim women in India, Russia, and the Turkish world to request assistance with national defense. At the same time, letters were sent to the queens of European countries to protest the "atrocities" committed against the Muslims in Rumelia and to ask for their help to stop them.<sup>4</sup>

In this chapter I demonstrate that these meetings, held in direct response to the conflict in the Balkans, were not simple acts of patriotism but significant examples of women's increasing encroachment during the Balkan Wars into what traditionally had been considered male-only spheres. Shifting the focus from the government, the military, and male elite to women, I discuss some of the ways in which these wars in the Balkans contributed to women's emancipation and empowerment. I argue that one of the most important yet previously neglected effects of the Balkan Wars was the transformation that they triggered in women's lives and gender roles, which ultimately helped consolidate the newly emerging women's movement in Ottoman Turkey. Women used the political, social, and economic circumstances brought about by these wars both to increase their engagement in the public sphere and to justify their struggle for women's rights.

#### THE REVOLUTION OF 1908 AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN OTTOMAN TURKEY

Before examining the different ways in which the Balkan Wars helped change women's lives and gender roles, this section briefly discusses the emergence of the women's movement in Ottoman Turkey after the 1908 revolution.<sup>5</sup> In the postrevolutionary period women from the upper and middle classes in urban areas found it easier than ever to play active roles in society, the economy, and even politics due to an inclusive and free atmosphere encouraged by the progressive attitude and liberal policies of

the CUP toward women. These policies included but were not limited to advancing women's legal standing vis-à-vis men through new penal and civil codes,<sup>6</sup> expanding women's opportunities for higher education and professional employment,<sup>7</sup> and allowing and encouraging women's involvement in political life and public affairs.<sup>8</sup>

While some women took advantage of these new opportunities to improve their own lives, many others used them to implement broader changes in society by writing articles and giving lectures that questioned the established gender norms, opening schools to educate their counterparts, helping other women find employment, establishing their own businesses, participating in social movements, and pressuring the government to protect and advance women's rights.<sup>9</sup> Referring to constitutionalist principles of freedom, progress, and equality, these women drew attention to problems shared by the members of their sex, emphasized the disparity between their status and men's, and ultimately demanded equal rights with men in education, employment, marriage, and public life.

In their effort to assume an active role in determining the fate of both Ottoman society and womanhood, the female intellectuals and activists of the constitutional period mostly employed the women's press and women's associations, the two most effective vehicles available to them at the time.<sup>10</sup> The ethnic and religious backgrounds of women who were involved in publishing journals, founding women's organizations, and the struggle for women's rights varied greatly.<sup>11</sup> Even though it was possible to encounter Muslim and non-Muslim women working side by side, "the number of organizations with women of various ethnic backgrounds was limited."<sup>12</sup> While Christian and Jewish women often operated around their churches and synagogues, many women's organizations were divided along ethnic lines according to Kaplan, such as *Dersaadet Bulgar Kadınları* (Bulgarian Women of Istanbul), *Ermeni Kadınlar Terakki Cemiyeti* (Armenian Women's Society of Progress), *Beyoğlu Rum Cemiyeti Hayriye-i Nisvaniyesi* (Women's Charity of Beyoğlu Greek Society), *Çerkez Kadınları Teavün Cemiyeti* (Circassian Women's Aid Society), and *Kürt Kadın Cemiyetleri* (Societies of Kurdish Women).<sup>13</sup>

Foreign women visiting or living in the empire also worked either within their groups or in cooperation with their Ottoman counterparts.<sup>14</sup> Although the female intellectuals and activists of the period did not constitute a homogeneous group, this chapter is exclusively based on Ottoman Turkish sources. The discussion here is limited to the writings and activities of a more or less uniform group whose members were centered in Istanbul and Anatolia and who defined themselves as "Muslim,"

“Ottoman,” or “Turkish,” as these words were often used interchangeably at the time.

#### THE BALKAN WARS AND THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN OTTOMAN TURKEY

The Balkan Wars were different from the previous wars due to many factors, some of which are discussed in detail by other contributors to this volume, such as Patrick Adamiak, Nedim İpek, and Mehmet Arısan.<sup>15</sup> These factors included the loss of all the lands in the Balkans, which had constituted an integral part of the Ottoman Empire since the early days of its foundation; the expulsion of a majority of the Muslims from the area and the atrocities committed against them; the misery of the Muslim refugees arriving from the Balkans; the major defeat inflicted on the Ottomans by their former “inferior” subjects; the indifference of Western powers to these “horrors”; the imminent danger faced by the capital of the empire and the seat of the caliphate; the daily newspaper reports about the developments in the battlefield; and the blurring of the difference between being at the front and behind the front lines.<sup>16</sup>

Revealing the separatist tendencies among the non-Turkish and non-Muslim population as well as the political and economic vulnerability of the empire in the face of its own subjects and foreign powers in an unprecedented way, the Balkan Wars had a tremendous impact on the Ottoman elite and society and prompted both the politicians and the intellectuals to look for new, effective, and pragmatic measures to save the nation and the state. It is often argued that “the shock, the trauma and the negative impact of the Balkan defeat increased the sympathy towards Turkish nationalism at the levels of state administration, politics, culture, and among the common people” and “ended all the illusions of... the brotherhood between the elements of the empire and the quest for Ottoman unity.”<sup>17</sup>

Although it is difficult to ascertain the extent of their influence among ordinary people, an examination of the policies, the press, and the literature of the period makes it clear that the Balkan Wars caused many members of the political and intellectual elite to promote Turkish nationalism as a solution to the problems of Ottoman society, more for practical than for ideological reasons. It should be noted, however, that Turkish nationalism meant different things to different people at different times and entailed an array of attitudes, ranging from inclusive to exclusive, populist to realist, and pro-Anatolian to expansionist.<sup>18</sup>

As Erik Jan Zürcher states (chapter 23 in this volume), even though most of the Unionists came from Macedonia and the Aegean, from 1913 onward they embraced Anatolia as the Turkish fatherland. Faced with the reality of a quickly shrinking empire that was mostly reduced to Thrace and Anatolia, the CUP promoted the Turkification of education and language by making Turkish classes compulsory for all students, establishing Turkish as the obligatory language of instruction in primary and secondary schools, and deciding that all official correspondence would be conducted in Turkish.<sup>19</sup> The government also supported the development of a national economy and a national bourgeoisie by organizing boycotts of foreign products, encouraging the consumption of local manufactures, helping to establish commercial companies, fostering a Turkish entrepreneurial class, and founding the National Bank (1917).<sup>20</sup> Moreover, in order to promote a sort of “national awakening” among the Turkish population and to promote the Turkish identity, the Unionist leadership created other institutions, such as the National Library, the National Archive, the National Musical Society, and the National Geographic Society.

Meanwhile, considering the empire engaged in a life-or-death struggle and motivated by the practical needs of the empire, the intellectuals of the time tried “to direct popular energy and funds towards national causes” and to promote “patriotism as a unifying ideology.”<sup>21</sup> “Focused on mobilizing all segments of society in defense of the empire that required a comprehensive or total process that could equip the people with patriotic passion,”<sup>22</sup> they wrote a large number of books, articles, poems, and pamphlets in which they tried to foster national consciousness among Turks in particular.<sup>23</sup> Through a series of meetings, lectures, and fund-raising campaigns, the Ottoman elite “sought to mobilize as many people as possible in patriotic and nationalist causes, thus encouraging political participation at the grass roots level not only in the capital but throughout the empire.”<sup>24</sup>

As Ottoman intellectuals, both male and female, tried to answer the question “Why were we defeated?” and looked for ways to prevent a similar fate in the future, they had to tackle various issues ranging from education to economic development. They believed that the “army’s problems stemmed from those within the society itself.”<sup>25</sup> Women’s status was one of the main concerns at the time due to the vital role that women played in mobilizing society both as mothers who raised the future generations and as individuals constituting half of the population.

Accordingly, women's lives and roles underwent a significant transformation during and after the Balkan Wars, which paved the way for the foundation of many women's organizations, considerably extended women's employment opportunities, and generated a public platform through which women could extend and justify their call for equal rights under the banner of patriotism.<sup>26</sup>

#### PATRIOTIC ORGANIZATIONS

One of the most immediate effects of the Balkan Wars in the Ottoman Empire was the establishment of patriotic women's organizations that aimed to heal the wounds that these wars inflicted on society. These organizations consisted of both independent societies, established and controlled exclusively by women, and women's chapters of prominent societies dominated by men. Among the former was *Osmanlı ve Türk Hanımları Esirgeme Derneği* (Society for the Protection of Ottoman and Turkish Ladies), whose main goals were to centralize the women's workforce and to channel the energy of Turkish and Muslim women, particularly those affected by the ongoing Balkan Wars, into arts and trade.<sup>27</sup> In order to achieve these goals, the society taught women traditional Turkish arts and crafts and provided them with a place to sell their products.

An important motivation behind these efforts was the concern about the growing consumption of foreign products sold by non-Muslims, which became an even bigger threat to the national economy as Ottomans found themselves at war with their former non-Muslim subjects in the Balkans.<sup>28</sup> Teaching women the necessary skills to earn an "honest living" and enabling them to engage in economic activities, this organization aimed at helping both women and the nation gain their financial independence. Another woman's organization that emerged during the Balkan Wars was *Müdafaa-i Milliye Hanımlar Cemiyeti* (Women's Chapter of the Society of National Defense), which was established by four young Turkish women from Petersburg University, who left their school to go to Istanbul so that they could take care of soldiers and civilians wounded in the Balkan Wars.<sup>29</sup> *Müdafaa-i Milliye Hanımlar* performed the following tasks: visiting all the houses in Istanbul to collect money for the military; organizing various events to evoke patriotic feelings among women; and forming volunteer groups to go to the battlefield to look after the soldiers and even to take arms, if necessary, to provide an



example for demoralized soldiers. These women also proposed to pay a visit to the sultan and ask him to go to the battlefield to show that he was ready to sacrifice himself to protect the seat of the caliphate. In order to prove their commitment, these four women donated everything they had to the organization and volunteered to go to the battlefield before everyone else.<sup>30</sup>

It was this group that organized the meetings at the Darülfünun (University) Lecture Hall, which gave thousands of women a platform to discuss both how they could contribute to the war effort and the broader changes required to solve the empire's problems, such as improving women's position within society. The Balkan Wars also expanded the existing women's organizations, such as the Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Hanımlar Merkezi (Women's Auxiliary of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society), which became financially autonomous as it came to have a separate budget due to an increase in its activities during the wars.<sup>31</sup>

Among these activities were the founding of an orphanage in Edirne; establishing a vocational school (Hilal-i Ahmer Kadınlar Darüssınaası) for poor young female immigrants, female war orphans, and widows; opening ateliers to produce underwear for the soldiers; and encouraging women "to produce in their homes any kind of clothing that they could for the military." As Nadir Özbek notes, the Women's Auxiliary of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society not only helped mobilize large numbers of women from all sectors of the society while men were on the battlefield but also extended the war effort into the domestic sphere.<sup>32</sup>

The patriotic women's organizations, founded in response to the problems caused by the Balkan Wars, both helped the defense of the country and advanced the newly emerging women's movement in Ottoman Turkey.<sup>33</sup> Engaging women in economically productive pursuits, urging them to collect donations for the army as well as attend to the needs of the soldiers, and organizing widely attended events, these groups moved women into public places, provided a common goal for women from different backgrounds, and enabled them to become active participants in social and economic life. As these organizations mobilized women for the salvation of the nation, they advanced solidarity among women and provided them with a forum to display their willingness and their ability to solve both the nation's and women's issues. Furthermore, women who took active roles in these organizations gained new skills and experience that ultimately allowed them to assume more responsibility in public affairs and to acquire a more influential role in determining the fate of their country and their counterparts.

## EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Another effect of the Balkan Wars on late Ottoman society that ultimately helped further women's emancipation was the labor shortage created by both the human losses incurred in battle and the mobilization of the male population for the war. As a direct result of these personnel shortages the government began to hire female employees for the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire. Among the first women to be hired by the government were Feride Yaver Hanım, who sold stamps from within a covered booth for the Postal and Telegram Service,<sup>34</sup> and Nimet Hanım (Gözyaydın), who worked for the Ministry of the Economy.<sup>35</sup> Although we do not yet have much information about them, it is clear from the articles and job advertisements published in the press that many other women found employment in banks and municipal services in various cities between 1912 and 1914.<sup>36</sup>

Several women, such as Kerime Salahor, Hüseyin Elbi, and Münire İsmail, also began working at hospitals as professional nurses and nurses' aides during the Balkan Wars (1913) after completing a six-month-long training program, offered by Besim Ömer Paşa under Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti (Red Crescent Society). These women did paid and volunteer work, attended both female and male patients, and helped many wounded soldiers as well as the civilian population who got caught in the fighting.<sup>37</sup> While women in Great Britain and the United States had difficulty in being accepted as nurses during World War I, their counterparts in the Ottoman Empire were encouraged by the state to take on this task.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to employing women in government offices and increasing the number of female professionals, especially in the fields of education and health,<sup>39</sup> the Ottoman government founded an organization in 1916 called İslam Kadınlarını Çalıştırma Cemiyeti (Society for the Employment of Muslim Women) under the presidency of Enver Paşa and the auspices of his wife, Naciye Hanım. As soon as the society's headquarters opened, it was "flooded with letters of application and literally besieged by masses of women."<sup>40</sup> Receiving 14,000 applications within two and a half months, the founders of the society opened branches in different parts of Istanbul to be able to deal with all the applicants.<sup>41</sup>

Many women were quickly placed in small workshops created by the organization to produce uniforms, undergarments, and sandbags for the army. The organization could not provide enough jobs to employ all applicants, so it began serving as an employment agency and intermediary between women who were looking for jobs and those who were looking

for employees. Within a year *İslam Kadınlarını Çalıştırma Cemiyeti* helped 8,860 women to find jobs, becoming the biggest source of employment for women in the empire.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, the organization provided women in need with shelter, food, and clothes and even assisted them to find husbands through newspaper ads.

The number of women who joined the industrial labor force during and after the Balkan Wars also rose.<sup>43</sup> This increase resulted from the economic policies of the CUP, which was committed to the development of a national economy and a national bourgeoisie and was dealing with the shortage of workers as a direct result of the Balkan Wars. As the number of factories that produced local manufactures and the demand for extra labor increased after 1913, women compensated for the lack of manpower, entering into the labor market more rapidly than ever.<sup>44</sup> Accordingly, female factory workers increased from 20 percent in 1913 to 30 percent in 1915.<sup>45</sup> These women worked in factories located in Istanbul, İzmir, Bursa, Sivas, Burdur, Isparta, and Maraş, helping to produce canned food, biscuits, sugar, sesame oil, tobacco, soap, lumber, rugs, matches, ties, underwear, shirts, hats, and umbrellas.<sup>46</sup>

The necessities of wartime combined with the economic policies of the Committee of Union and Progress pushed thousands of women into the workforce in 1913. Taking advantage of the new career paths opened with the Balkan Wars as well as the growing demand to fill already existing jobs, women from all classes became more and more involved in the social and economic life of the empire. As they benefited from the new employment opportunities, women started contributing to society in different capacities and gained some freedom and control over their own lives by earning their own money and moving more freely in public places. Women's employment gradually helped erode the gender segregation in Ottoman society: it required many women to spend a considerable amount of their time outside, interacting with men on a daily basis in different circumstances. Even though the government tried to maintain segregation as much as possible, the increasing presence of women in government buildings, hospitals, factories, streets, and public transportation made it impossible for women and men to avoid contact with each other.

#### A NEW PUBLIC PLATFORM

In addition to drawing large numbers of women into social and economic life through patriotic activities and extended employment opportunities, the Balkan Wars provided the female intellectuals of the early twentieth century with a new and effective platform through which they

could both widen and justify their struggle for women's rights. Blaming the "humiliating" defeat suffered at the hands of their former subjects on ignorance, poverty, laziness, and lack of patriotic feelings and drawing attention to the role that women could play in solving these problems, the female intellectuals of the constitutional era tried to change women's subordinate role by referring to the needs of the nation. They argued that improving women's status within the family and society would ultimately help save the nation, because women constituted half of the population and raised the future generations.

Enlightened and emancipated women would not only fulfill their national duties better and serve the nation more effectively but also contribute to the mobilization of society. Accordingly, women's rights activists pushed for changes in women's lives and gender roles and explained how these changes could help the nation advance by using the Balkan Wars as an example. Discussing the importance of women's education, Aziz Haydar, who devoted her whole life to educating women, stated that Bulgarians, who harbored no patriotic feelings and had led a "miserable and animal-like life" twenty to twenty-five years back, owed the considerable progress that they had made for their women:

If women do not advance, the nation does not either.... If Bulgarians who are deprived of everything and every feeling could advance to this extent in twenty to twenty-five years, Turkey, whose foundations are strong and people are naturally smart, will surely show this progress in three to five years. And the main agent of this progress will be women.<sup>47</sup>

Similarly, in an article entitled "Why Did We Get Defeated?" Feride İzzet Selim, a columnist for *Kadınlar Dünyası* (Women's World), claimed that Bulgarians and Greeks owed their success in the Balkan Wars to their level of education and their women.<sup>48</sup> Emphasizing the role that educated mothers could play in national progress, Belkıs Şevket, who wrote for the same journal, stated:

A lasting progress can only be guaranteed by moral courage, which comes with education. The nations and societies that want to maintain and secure their existence have to have courageous and strong children and it is we, women, who will raise them.... If we, as women, don't have moral courage, I guarantee you that our houses will collapse and our vibrant cities will fall into ruins.<sup>49</sup>

Aziz Haydar likewise drew attention to the importance of women for national defense:

It is the children we will raise that will heal those old and chronic wounds in the bosom of the homeland. It is they who will awaken the happiness and prosperity in Ottoman countries and raise the lion-hearted children that will not tremble before the enemy, and the girls that we will raise will instill this sublime feeling in their own children.<sup>50</sup>

The female intellectuals also used the Balkan Wars as an opportunity to discuss the necessity of women's participation in economic life. As Melis Hafez notes (chapter 20 in this volume), a popular tendency at the time portrayed the Ottomans as lazy and considered this one of the causes of the Balkan defeat. Women's rights advocates were no exception. Ulviye Mevlan, the founder and president of Osmanlı Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Nisvan Cemiyeti (Ottoman Society for the Defense of Women's Rights), believed that laziness was one of the most important problems of the empire and that women's participation in work life could solve this problem. She complained that the Europeans were inventing and producing, whereas the Ottomans were sitting idly, consuming foreign products. By transforming a large part of the population from consumers to producers, women's employment could eliminate the laziness in Ottoman society and help the nation gain its economic independence.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, Belkıs Şevket argued that women could significantly improve the national economy by establishing their own businesses and earning their own living, which would save both themselves and the nation from misery.<sup>52</sup>

Women could also contribute to national salvation by taking part in patriotic activities, which required them to be out in public. Muhlise, a young female student, stated that the government had to enable its female citizens to be more active socially if it really cared about the interests of the country. The nation had to benefit from its female members, who would perform certain tasks more effectively and honorably than men, such as collecting money for patriotic organizations in times of crisis like the Balkan Wars. "There are so many wounds in our country that only women can heal," Muhlise stated; "men are in no way capable of doing this."<sup>53</sup>

While Muhlise appealed to the government to increase women's participation in public life, Gülsüm Kemalova incited her counterparts to

action. At the meetings organized by the Women's Chapter of the Society for National Defense in response to the Balkan Wars she asked:

Ladies, how can our consciences tolerate cloistering in our houses and spending our time in silence under these conditions? Our men are doing everything they can to save the honor of the homeland and to take the revenge of our oppressed brothers. They regard sacrificing their lives for the homeland and the nation as an honor. Then, ladies, we should not be deprived of this honor, either.... Since women constitute half the nation, if we take action it means that the whole nation will have taken an action.<sup>54</sup>

Women's rights advocates also referred to the Balkan Wars to push for changes in family life. Ulviye Mevlan believed that the Balkan Wars had caused an awakening among both leaders and ordinary people because they revealed how much the Ottomans had fallen behind. Eradicating the mentality of the Middle Ages, these wars mobilized the whole society, including women, to work for national progress. Consequently, increasing numbers of women felt the need to strengthen their position in society, which required them to strengthen their position at home as well.<sup>55</sup>

Female intellectuals and activists of the period demanded that women and men be equal partners in marriage, because this was the only way to form strong and happy families that the nation could depend on. Fatma Nesibe compared societies to machines, which consisted of various small pieces that were connected to each other and had various functions, just as families did. "The nations whose family life, family order, and family traditions deteriorate are doomed to decay."<sup>56</sup> Mükerrerem Belkis wrote that social progress could be achieved through healthy families produced by couples in stable and happy unions. The family was the essence of social life and a replica of the nation: if the families were in bad shape, it meant that the nation did not have a strong foundation. She also talked about the role that families play in bringing change:

In our country, we are [currently] undergoing a revolution. We have achieved the political revolution. But now there is a need for a social revolution. We can achieve this social revolution only by reforming family life. No one can deny that our families are in a miserable condition.<sup>57</sup>

As these examples demonstrate, the growing concern about the future of the empire and the nation, exemplified by the aforementioned policies implemented by the government and the proliferation of nationalist writings and activities after 1913, was shared by the women's rights advocates in Ottoman Turkey. They used the Balkan Wars as a platform to discuss the necessity of improving women's position in social, economic, and family life to meet the needs of the postdefeat society. These women argued that improving women's status would ultimately benefit the nation as a whole, because it was women who could cure the ills of society, such as ignorance, cowardice, indifference, poverty, and laziness, that left the nation susceptible to external threats. Linking women's progress to national progress and using the nation's urgent needs as an excuse to call for changes in women's lives and gender relations, the female intellectuals of the early twentieth century were able both to advance and to justify the struggle for women's rights.

### CONCLUSION

In this chapter I argue that one of the most significant impacts of the Balkan Wars on Ottoman Turkey was the transformation that it triggered in women's lives and gender roles by facilitating and justifying women's engagement in the public sphere, their involvement in national affairs, and their struggle for equal rights. Providing a common cause that women could mobilize for and organize around, leading to the incorporation of thousands of women into work life, and creating a new and effective platform that allowed women to push for major changes in their position, the Balkan Wars both accelerated women's emancipation and advanced the newly emerging women's movement. Women took advantage of the opportunities that arose during and after the Balkan Wars not only to claim the role of mothers of the nation, who could produce strong, brave, competent, and patriotic people who would protect the homeland, but also to join the nation's quest for civilization as educated, economically productive, and socially and politically active citizens. As they assumed new roles and responsibilities in public as founders and members of patriotic organizations, government employees, workers, entrepreneurs, artisans, writers, columnists, and lecturers, Turkish women found the chance to propagate their demands for equal rights in an effective way and to implement concrete changes in their own lives, those of their counterparts, and the nation as a whole.<sup>58</sup>

## NOTES

1. Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde Kadınlarımızın Konuşmaları*, 29–30.
2. Nimet Muhtar, the daughter of Khedive İsmail Paşa of Egypt, was married to Mahmud Muhtar Paşa; Nazime Sultan was the daughter of Sultan Abdülaziz; and Selma Hanım was the sister of Ahmed Rıza Bey, a prominent member of the CUP and the head of the parliament.
3. The names of these female students were Zehra, Firdevs, and Muzaffer. Nezihe Muhlis, Naciye Hanım, Huriye Baha, Nakiye Hanım, and Gülsüm Kemalova also gave speeches at this event (Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde Kadınlarımızın Konuşmaları*).
4. The following quotation by Halide Edip reveals what these women meant by “atrocities”: “The conduct of the Balkan states during this war is clearly shown by the reports of the Carnegie International Commission, which investigated the Balkan massacres. The slaying of prisoners of war, their mutilation and starvation, as well as the mutilation and slaughter of the civil population were practiced for the first time on a wide scale in modern warfare by the Balkan states, and mainly on the Muslim population and the Turkish army.” Halide Edip (Adivar), *Turkey Faces West*, 107. It is possible to encounter similar descriptions in the political writings and public lectures of many intellectuals, such as Dr. Besim Ömer Paşa. Dr. Besim Ömer, *Hanımefendilere Hilal-ı Ahmer’e Dair Konferans*, 121.
5. For a discussion of the 1908 revolution and Young Turks, see Ernest Ramsaur, *The Young Turks*; Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*; Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*; Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*; Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*; Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*; idem, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908–1913*; and Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*.
6. The CUP introduced the Ottoman Law of Family Rights (1917), which promoted a family model based on monogamy and mutual consent, recognized women’s right to initiate divorce, transferred the conclusion of the marriage contract to the authority of the state, increased the age of marriage to seventeen for women and eighteen for men; recognized the right of female property owners to act as guarantors (1911); allowed women to travel without permission from their husbands (1911); introduced equal punishment for female and male adulterers (1911); and secured women’s right to receive equal shares from their husbands’, fathers’, and mothers’ inheritance (1912).
7. The CUP also made primary education compulsory for girls (1913); considerably increased the number of girls’ schools in the country; provided them with the chance to receive college-level education by opening the doors of the university to women (1914); promoted vocational education; and sent several female students to Europe for education (1916). The government raised the number of female teachers to thousands; provided training for professional nurses, nurses’ aides, female teachers, and school administrators; appointed many women as mistresses and inspectors in the newly established girls’ schools; started hiring female employees at government offices (1913); facilitated the establishment of factories that allowed women to join the industrial labor force; and founded an organization



- called İslam Kadınlarını Çalıştırma Cemiyeti (Society for the Employment of Muslim Women) to find employment for Muslim women.
8. The Unionists were the first “champions” of women’s political rights, at least in principle. They not only accepted female members in their party but also put them on an equal footing with men. As the first political organization that opened its doors to women, the CUP included the following statements in its program: “Ottomans, both women and men, can become members of the organization” and “female members have the same rights and responsibilities as male members.” Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler*, 44–45. Accordingly, the first Ottoman women to be actively involved in politics were the female members of the CUP, such as Selma Rıza, Seniye Hanım, Zilşad Hanım, and Emine Semiye.
  9. For more information on the women’s movement in the late Ottoman Empire, see Aynur Demirdirek, *Osmanlı Kadınlarının Hayat Hakkı Arayışının Bir Hikayesi*; idem, “In Pursuit of the Ottoman Women’s Movement”; Serpil Çakır, *Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi*; idem, “Feminism and Feminist History-Writing in Turkey”; Şefika Kurnaz, *II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Türk Kadını*; Nicole A. N. M. Van Os, “Ottoman Muslim and Turkish Women in an International Context”; and Serpil Atamaz-Hazar, “The Hands That Rock the Cradle Will Rise.”
  10. The scholarly literature on the Ottoman women’s press includes Elizabeth Frier-son, “Unimagined Communities”; Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, “Debating Progress in a ‘Serious Newspaper for Muslim Women’”; Tülay Keskin, “Feminist/Nationalist Discourse in the First Year of the Ottoman Revolutionary Press”; Vuslat Devrim Altınöz, “The Ottoman Women’s Movement”; and Serpil Atamaz-Hazar, “Re-constructing the History of the Constitutional Era in Ottoman Turkey through Women’s Periodicals.”
  11. For more information on the lives of female intellectuals and activists of the period, see Serpil Çakır, “Kadın Tarihinden İki İsim”; Victoria Rowe, “The ‘New Armenian Woman’”; Lerna Ekmekçiöğlu, *Bir Adalet Feryadı*; Francisca De Haan, Krasimira Daskalova, and Anna Loutfi, eds., *A Biographical Dictionary of Women’s Movements and Feminisms*, 336–38; Lale Uçan and Güldane Çolak, eds., *Kadın Öncüler*; and Şefika Kurnaz, *Osmanlı Kadın Hareketinde Bir Öncü*.
  12. Van Os, “Ottoman Muslim and Turkish Women,” 462.
  13. Leyla Kaplan, “Cemiyetlerde ve Siyasal Teşkilatlarda Türk Kadını, 1908–1960,” 60.
  14. Among the most prominent European women who worked closely with Ottoman women were Grace Ellison from the *Times* and Odette Feldman from *Berliner Tageblatt*. Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti (Society for the Elevation of Women), established under Halide Edip’s leadership in 1909, had links with both the British suffragette movement and Türk Kadınları Muhibbe Cemiyeti (Society of Friends of Turkish Women) in England. Nicole Van Os also mentions the following organizations founded by foreign women within the Ottoman Empire: the German Women’s Organization, the Austrian–Hungarian Women’s Organization, and the Société des Abeilles (Society of Bees), established under the presidency of the wife of the French ambassador, Mrs. Bompard. Nicole A. N. M. Van Os, “Ottoman Women’s Organizations.”
  15. Patrick Adamiak (chapter 16) discusses the atrocities committed during these wars, as they were reported by the Carnegie Report, and the way the Ottoman

- elite reacted to them. Nedim İpek (chapter 22) examines Turkish and Muslim migration from the Balkans and the conditions of the refugees arriving in the empire. Mehmet Arısan (chapter 25) discusses the significance of the Balkans for the Ottomans.
16. Zafer Toprak, *Milli İktisat–Milli Burjuvazi*. The following passages by Halide Edip illustrate how traumatic the Balkan Wars were for the people in Istanbul: “The Turkish defeat in the Balkans was complete. To the disasters of military defeat was added the spectacle of miserable Muslim refugees—a whole civil population, including women and children—fleeing from the sword of the Balkan armies.... When the Turkish refugees flocked in panic to Constantinople to escape from massacre, when cholera broke out among the immigrants and in the army, when one saw an entire population dying in the mosque yards under the icy grip of winter, the sight of the misery in Constantinople seemed too grim to be true. The march of the Bulgarian army on Constantinople seemed more than probable.” Edip (Adivar), *Turkey Faces West*, 107–10.
  17. Erol Köroğlu, “Patriotic Agitation in the Cultural Sphere: From the Balkan War to the First World War,” in *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity*, 47. Zafer Toprak argues that the Balkan Wars were a turning point: the injustices caused and the painful memories as well as the loss of territories led to the dissolution of the *millet* system and the economic awakening of Ottoman Muslims, who effectively resisted the political and economic influence of the West. He explains that this resistance sometimes turned into anger or revenge and made Turkish nationalism popular among a massive crowd. Toprak, *Milli İktisat*. Similarly, Halide Edip states that the Balkan defeat forced the Young Turks, who had until then considered themselves successors to the Ottoman imperialists and tried to distance themselves from race ideals, to think along different lines and to realize that they could only depend on the Turkish masses. She believes that even though many of the Young Turks were Macedonian bred, they tried to turn Turkish nationalism to practical use the moment they realized its practical force. Edip (Adivar), *Turkey Faces West*, 110–26.
  18. The variety and complexity of identities in the post–Balkan War Ottoman society is illustrated in the following studies: Erik Jan Zürcher, “The Second Constitutional Period, 1908–1918,” in *Turkey: A Modern History*; Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*; Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911*; Michael Meeker, *A Nation of Empire*; and Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores*.
  19. The Alphabet Reform Society (İslah-ı Huruf), established under the auspices of the Turkish Hearth, also made efforts “to revise the old Arabic-based Turkish alphabet in order to make it more compatible with the Turkish language.” Sina Akşin, *Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic*, 111.
  20. Deniz Kandiyoti, “End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism, and Women in Turkey,” 29.
  21. *Ibid.*, 796–97.
  22. Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 19.
  23. The political and cultural writings of the day were full of references to Turkish history and often included phrases such as “being/becoming a Turk,” “the awakening of Turks,” “the nobility of Turkishness,” “making sacrifices in the name of

Turkishness,” “Turkish blood,” “to be proud of being a Turk,” “Long live Turks,” “Turkish nation,” and “Turkish women.” It is possible to find specific examples of the nationalist language employed at the time in Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road*; Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda*; Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*; and Toprak, *Milli İktisat*.

24. Nadir Özbek, “Defining the Public Sphere during the Late Ottoman Empire,” 797.
25. Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road*, 32.
26. Although no monographs provide detailed information about Ottoman women during the war years, the wartime experiences of European and American women have been the subject of many studies, including Gail Braybon, *Women Workers in the First World War*; Richard Wall and J. M. Winter, eds., *The Upheaval of War*; Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., *Great War, Total War*; Margaret H. Darrow, *French Women and the First World War*; Angela K. Smith, *The Second Battlefield*; and Kimberly Jensen, *Mobilizing Minerva*.
27. This organization had more than two hundred members, including Nezihe Muhiddin, Hamiyet Hulusi, Naciye Hurşid, Sitare Ahmed, Behire Hakkı, Saniye Muhtar, Matlube Ömer, and Saniye Rüstem. Kurnaz, *II. Meşrutiyet*, 209.
28. The consumption of foreign products, mainly associated with women, was a major concern, particularly during the Balkan Wars. In a pamphlet titled “Müslümanlara Mahsus Kurtuluş Yolu” and printed as part of the Muslim Boycott of 1913–14, women were asked to pay attention to the name of the store they shopped at as well as the language spoken by the employees so that they could avoid the stores owned by non-Muslims. Toprak, *Milli İktisat*.
29. These women were Ümmü Gülsüm Kemalova, Rukiye Hanım, Meryem Hanım, and Meryem Hanım. Kaplan, “Cemiyetlerde,” 73–74.
30. *Ibid.*, 73–74.
31. Özbek, “Defining the Public Sphere,” 805.
32. *Ibid.*, 805–6.
33. Other patriotic women’s organizations that emerged during or after the Balkan Wars include Mamulat-ı Dahiliye İstihlak-ı Milli Kadınlar Cemiyeti (Women’s Organization for the Consumption of Locally Produced Goods, 1912), founded under the presidency of Melek Hanım to encourage the consumption of local products to contribute to the development of national industry; Biçki Yurdu (Turkish Women Tailor’s Cutting Home, 1913), established by Behire Hakkı Hanım to teach women how to do needlework in order to end their dependency on others and to support the national economy; and Donanma Hanımlar Cemiyeti (Women’s Chapter of the Navy Society 1912–13). For more information on the women’s organizations founded in this period, see Kaplan, “Cemiyetlerde”; Kurnaz, *II. Meşrutiyet*; and Van Os, “Ottoman Women’s Organizations.”
34. Aziz Haydar, “Kadınların Yeni Bir Hatvesi Daha,” *Kadınlar Dünyası* 152 (July 19, 1330 [1914]): 4.
35. Kurnaz, *II. Meşrutiyet*, 124.
36. These women worked in the same buildings with their male coworkers but had separate rooms and usually left the premises after the men to maintain the gender segregation. According to an imperial decree issued in 1915, female employees

- working for the government were allowed to discard their veils during office hours. Kandiyoti, "End of Empire."
37. After attending the Red Cross Congress in Washington, Besim Ömer Paşa started a six-month-long training program for nursing under the Red Crescent in Kadırga Hospital in 1912. Those who completed the training received their certificates from Yusuf İzzeddin Efendi, the crown prince and the honorary president of the Red Crescent. Kurnaz, *II. Meşrutiyet*, 86–89.
  38. I would like to thank Professor Pamela Dorn Sezgin for bringing this work to my attention: Susan R. Grayzel, *Women and the First World War* (London: Longman-Pearson, 2002).
  39. In order to meet the personnel demands in different fields, the government promoted vocational education for women. While the Red Crescent began training professional nurses and nurses' aides (1912) and organizing seminars for them at the university on patient care (1913–14), due to the efforts of Dr. Besim Ömer Paşa, the Ministry of Education established several *darülmuallimats* (Teacher's Training Colleges) around the empire to increase the number of female teachers and school administrators. The students of these schools, whose numbers increased from 90 in 1911 to 1,005 in 1918, received government appointments upon graduation to fill the open positions at the newly opened *mektebs* (primary schools), *rüşdiyes* (secondary schools), *idadis* (high schools), and *darülmuallimats*.
  40. Alan Duben and Cem Behar, *Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880–1940*, 44.
  41. Yavuz Selim Karakışla, "Enver Paşa'nın Kourdurduğu Kadın Birinci İşçi Taburu."
  42. The society used 15 percent of women's salaries to create job opportunities for other women (ibid., 15).
  43. Gündüz Ökçün, *Osmanlı Sanayii 1913, 1915 Yılları Sanayii İstatistikleri*.
  44. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 126.
  45. Çakır, *Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi*, 264.
  46. For statistics about female factory workers in the late Ottoman Empire, see Ökçün, *Osmanlı Sanayii*.
  47. Aziz Haydar, "Kadınlar Dünyası," *Kadınlar Dünyası* 138 (April 4, 1330 [1914]): 7.
  48. Feride İzzet Selim, "Neden Mağlup Olduk?" *Kadınlar Dünyası* 141, April 25, 1914, 11.
  49. Belkıs Şevket, "Uçarken," *Kadınlar Dünyası* 120, November 30, 1913, 4.
  50. Aziz Haydar, "Mektebler ve Mekteb Muallimleri," *Kadınlar Dünyası* 123 (December 21, 1329 [1913]): 3.
  51. Ulviye Mevlan, "Zevce Zevce," *Kadınlar Dünyası* 128, January 25, 1914, 2–3.
  52. Belkıs Şevket, "Konferans," *Kadınlar Dünyası* 128, January 25, 1914, 6.
  53. Muhlise Hanım, "Kadınların Temayizi," *Kadınlar Dünyası* 7 (April 10, 1329 [1913]): 7.
  54. Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 26–28.
  55. Ulviye Mevlan, "Zevce Zevce," *Kadınlar Dünyası* 128, January 25, 1914, 2–3.
  56. B. P., "Beyaz Konferans," *Kadın-Istanbul* 4 (February 1912): 2–9.
  57. Mükerrrem Belkıs, "İnkılab-ı İctima Esasları," *Kadınlar Dünyası* 122 (December 14, 1329 [1913]): 6–7.
  58. Atamaz-Hazar, "The Hands That Rock the Cradle Will Rise."

## Pomak Christianization (*Pokrastvane*) in Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913

*Fatme Myuhtar-May*

If the history of forced assimilation is the defining aspect of Pomak heritage in Bulgaria, it was prompted by the ideology of aggressive nationalism. The young nation-state's need to affirm its sovereignty and forge a viable national identity required the rejection of the Ottoman-Islamic past. This also necessitated the purging of everything reminiscent of what was perceived as the former "oppressor's" presence in the now Bulgarian "homeland." In unison with this sentiment, the political and cultural elite of Bulgaria immediately singled out the Muslim Pomaks for conversion to Orthodox Christianity during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Bulgaria had two primary motivations for assimilating this sizable minority group. First, it enabled the fledgling nation-state's claim to all territories settled by Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) based on commonality of language. Second, it helped diffuse the freshly forged Bulgarian-Christian national identity to newly conquered populations, notably to the Pomaks. Various Bulgarian regimes—like many others—consistently and effectively exploited the ideology of nationalism to achieve political and cultural consolidation, including through the practice of violence. How this happened in the context of the first comprehensive Pomak Christianization (*pokrastvane*) of 1912–13 is the subject of analysis in this chapter.

It is important to speak about the rising discourse of Pomakness for several essential reasons. Fundamentally the Pomaks were and remain a relatively unstudied target population. Even though a number of works have been partially or exclusively written about the Pomaks, they have some major issues. First of all, the authors are usually persons external to the group who study the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims and either have

a fixed agenda in mind or fail to consider the Pomak perspective properly, often due to the lack of access to emic literature. Thus, on one side are some well-known Bulgarian nationalist writers like Stoyu Shishkov, Petar Marinov, and Nikolay Haytov, who are preoccupied with proving the “ethnic Bulgarian” origins of the Pomaks. On the opposite side are the arguably neutral Western researchers who either subsume the Pomak theme under a collective Muslim narrative or nearly essentialize elements of it, often to the point of stripping the Pomaks of agency.

For example, while Mary Neuburger effectively tells the story of forced assimilation of Muslims in Bulgaria, she unwittingly and quite understandably favors the ethnic Turks’ experience, reflective of the well-publicized attempts by the Bulgarian regime in 1984–85 to forcefully change the names of these Muslims in order to erase their distinctively non-Bulgarian heritage.<sup>1</sup> In *Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe*, on the other hand, Kristen Ghodsee is so intently focused on what she terms “orthodox Islam” in the Pomak context that she nearly essentializes it, making it appear to be the central, almost inescapable direction that Pomak life is taking in the central Rhodopes and the small town of Madan in particular, on which her research centers. Her definition of “orthodox Islam” includes the Arab-influenced religious tendencies in the Rhodopes, particularly in matters of Islamic ritual and female dress, observable in Madan and imported largely via Middle East-educated locals.

Against the backdrop of Ghodsee’s erudite analysis, however, lurks a post-9/11 melodrama dominated by photographs of mosques, rumored to be Arab-sponsored, and young headscarved women liable to attract the wrong kind of attention. The book evokes a sense of alarm that “orthodox” Islam could overtake Pomak communities across the Rhodopes, mass-producing female veiling and gender segregation—phenomena, atypical of the Pomaks, according to Ghodsee. The problem with these kinds of conjectures—quite unintentional on Ghodsee’s part, to be sure—is that they in effect deprive the Pomaks of agency to direct and control the spread of Middle-East Islamic trends in their midst. That is, they relegate the Pomaks to being uncritical recipients of foreign influences without active evaluation and decision-making.<sup>2</sup>

It is precisely the matter of agency that drives the discourse of Pomak heritage today. In fact the very question of whether there is a Pomak heritage or not is one of agency. This chapter identifies in the *pokrastvane* of 1912–13 a pivotal aspect of the Pomak cultural and historical narrative in the light of having an agency. As a community insider, I hope to offer a new approach to writing the story of a historically silent group from within. My

objective is to analyze the Christianization of the Slavic-speaking Muslims during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 from a certain Pomak perspective. By no means do I presume to talk on behalf of the Pomak community, for it includes people of diverse beliefs and thinking. What I do offer, however, is *one* insider's point of view on a fundamental episode of Pomak history.

With this purpose in mind, I present the historical picture of the *pokrastvane* based on two primary sources: (1) original documents dating back to the period, and (2) surviving *Pomak* oral history. Much of the firsthand evidence from which I draw is found in the collection of archival records published under the editorship of the Bulgarian scholars Velichko Georgiev and Stayko Trifonov as well as in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*.<sup>3</sup> Organized in chronological order, Georgiev and Trifonov's volume effectively reveals the *pokrastvane* as a premeditated and hushed affair in which ecclesiastical, state, and military authorities directly participated.<sup>4</sup> The Carnegie Report, in contrast, illuminates the broader Balkan conflict and reveals the picture of violence committed by all belligerents against civilian populations. Patrick Adamiak (chapter 16 in this volume) aptly highlights that the Carnegie commissioners (who represented the Great Powers and investigated the warring parties' conduct during the Balkan Wars) described the acts of violence and murder committed against Muslims nearly as evenhandedly as the acts against Christians, even though the commissioners were openly partial toward the newly emerging Christian nations of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro. Ironically, the commissioners' very partiality enhances the credibility of the Carnegie Report's evaluation of the atrocities perpetrated by all sides during the war. Surviving Pomak oral stories, for their part, attest to the widespread murder of Pomaks in the (Western) Rhodopes, committed mostly by insurgent Christian bands with the active support of the regular army.<sup>5</sup> Ultimately, even though direct admission of killing is conspicuously absent from the communication exchange and documented meetings of ecclesiastical authorities, religious missions, and military officials in available Bulgarian sources,<sup>6</sup> evidence to that effect could be gleaned from the Carnegie Report and from existing oral history.

### THE POMAKS

The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 were a crucial period for Bulgaria. The nascent nation-state was still in the process of intensive territorial and cultural consolidation following five centuries of Ottoman domination. The

enormous territorial expansion during the First Balkan War incorporated a new and significant Muslim population into Bulgaria, most of which spoke a Slavic language (Bulgarian). Even after the loss of the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria held on to most of the Rhodope Mountains, a territory compactly settled by Slavic-speaking Muslims (Pomaks). To legitimize its claim over the freshly acquired Ottoman territories, Bulgaria's first order of business after the conquest was to proclaim the Pomaks "Bulgarian," based on common language, and to attempt to convert them to Orthodox Christianity. The Balkan Wars' *pokrastvane*—religious conversion through Orthodox baptism and name replacement—began a sustained assimilation of Pomaks in Bulgaria.

Since the *pokrastvane* of 1912–13, the state-endorsed historiography has maintained that the Pomaks descend from Christian Bulgarians, forcibly converted to Islam by the Ottoman Turks somewhere between the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. In five centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, however, many adopted Islam voluntarily both out of personal conviction and for sociopolitical gains. Still, historians have yet to determine authoritatively and conclusively how or when the Pomaks of the Rhodope Mountains became Muslims.<sup>7</sup> This dispute over Pomak cultural identity continues to pose problems for the community. The official political discourse actively discourages the Muslim Rhodopeans from pursuing a cultural image of their own because of the presumption that, as offspring of converted Bulgarians, they are part of the Bulgarian ethnicity and hence cannot have a separate heritage. The double standard of publicly commemorating the nation's triumph over the "dark" Ottoman past while omitting the nation-state's own violence against its Muslim population has helped enhance the Pomaks' (and Turks') sense of cultural dispossession in Bulgaria. The status quo is further exacerbated by the strongly subjective and divisive language of the official historiography, describing everything Bulgarian (hence Orthodox Christian) as "sacred" and "inherently good" and most things Muslim (hence Ottoman and Turkish) as "immoral" and "backward." Consequently the academic credibility of some works treating Pomak issues, especially from the Communist era (1944–89), is seriously undermined by the high degree of politicization and nationalistic propaganda in the analysis.

Thus, for instance, the statement about the Pomaks' forced conversion to Islam is extensively grounded in the chronicle of a certain priest, Methody Draginov, who authored it sometime during the late seventeenth century, when alleged mass Islamization was taking place. But some of Bulgaria's most renowned nationalist writers such as Nikolay



Haytov, who makes references to the document, recognize that the so-called Historical Diary (*Istoricheski Belezchnik*) is long lost to history and that the only evidence of its existence is surviving passages reportedly copied by dedicated patriots.<sup>8</sup> Ulf Brunnbauer, however, directly dismisses the chronicle as “a fake” and goes on to specify that “it was a common practice [in Communist Bulgaria] not to quote original sources, but to take them uncritically from other authors[,] [whereby] [o]ne author after the other perpetuated the quotation of the source without the slightest attempt at verification.”<sup>9</sup> Maria Todorova, for her part, authoritatively argues that the chronicle is a nineteenth-century “creation” of Stefan Zakhariiev, with possible basis in some earlier works. In support of her conclusion, Todorova cites the careful authenticity analysis of the historian Iliya Todorov, who judges the chronicle to be inauthentic on the grounds of linguistic and historical discrepancies.<sup>10</sup>

In conjecturing on Stefan Zakhariiev’s motives to create a forgery, Todorova observes:

He [Zakhariiev] was working in a period when the cultural struggle for emancipation among the Bulgarians had reached a critical degree, and he was totally engrossed in this struggle. The 1860s, in particular, saw the culmination of the ecclesiastical conflict with the Greek Constantinople Patriarchate, and all intellectual efforts were directed at proving the “rights” of the Bulgarians to an independent church.... [An] independent church for the Bulgarians meant independent national existence.... It was also a time when history was the foremost legitimizer of nationhood in terms of “historic” versus “non-historic” nations. Zakhariiev himself lamented in 1860s [that] “we do not have antiquities from which we can explore our bygone deeds so as to put together a detailed and true history of our past life.”<sup>11</sup>

Whether the chronicle is a forgery or not, Bulgarian historiography still formally describes the Pomaks as “Bulgarian Mohammedans” or “Bulgarian Muslims” to reflect the institutionalized viewpoint that they are descendants of Bulgarian Christians, whom the Ottomans Islamized by force.<sup>12</sup> As the Bulgarian historian Vera Mutaſchieva posits, the violence-ridden “forced Islamization” thesis has played a prominent role in the national history and folklore, being the subject of rather emotional interpretations by generations of Bulgarian historians.<sup>13</sup> Even though many Bulgarian academics in recent years have at least conceded the

possibility of voluntary conversion, the strongly negative “forced Islamization” thesis still dominates the national narrative.

Whatever the case regarding Pomak passage into Islam, the Bulgarian authorities and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church effectively used the forced Islamization claim to impose another conversion on the community—this time to Christianity—under the cover of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Even though the proclaimed aspiration of the *pokrastvane* was to bring the Pomaks back to the religion of their ancestors, its real objective most certainly was to consolidate the fledgling Bulgarian nation both territorially and culturally, thereby affirming the state’s sovereignty and its claim over the newly acquired territories of Thrace, the Rhodopes, and eastern Macedonia—all with a sizable Pomak population.

Thus the act of *pokrastvane* was essentially a way to assert sovereignty by the forced assimilation of the Pomaks as a dichotomous minority in the fledgling nation-state of Bulgaria for two fundamental reasons:

1. Of all minority groups within the new state, the elites perceived the Pomaks to be the most closely associated with the national majority by language and ethnicity.<sup>14</sup>
2. At the same time, however, the Pomaks were also affiliated with the former Ottoman-Turkish “oppressor” by the religion of Islam.

The nation’s ruling elite therefore considered the assimilation of the Pomaks not only desirable and necessary but also possible based on shared-language claims. The young country’s resolve to act was additionally bolstered by the Romantic perception of language as the defining characteristic of national identity. Although in the multiethnic Ottoman Empire language was not essential to identity, in the Romantic era language became a major driving force in the subjugated people’s struggle to define themselves, along with ethnicity, religion, and shared history. When Romantic ideology began to take hold in the Balkans in the early nineteenth century, developing well into the twentieth century, vernacular languages indeed became a prominent factor in claiming territories and building identities among the new nations.<sup>15</sup> Through the premise of common language Bulgaria was able to validate its claim over most of the Rhodope Mountains after the Balkan Wars. In accordance with Romantic nationalism, the Slavic-speaking Pomaks were recast as “pure-blooded” Bulgarians who spoke the “purest” Bulgarian language and preserved the “truest” Bulgarian traditions. Initially Bulgaria’s Christian majority perceived the Pomaks merely as “Turks.” In confirmation of this, Maria Todorova writes:

The social context for this [the promotion of the “forced Islamization” thesis] was the process of nation-building, specifically the attempts at integration and homogenization of the population. It concerned first the Bulgarian-speaking Muslim population (Pomaks), and its place in the newly independent state which at first did not attempt to integrate it but treated it as indistinguishable from the larger Muslim group. In all censuses in the late nineteenth century (1880, 1885, 1888) the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims were entered under the heading “Turks.” It was only in the 1905 census that a separate group—Pomaks—appeared. Beginning with the 1890s but especially during the 1920s and 1930s a sustained campaign in the press urged public opinion to discriminate between religious and ethnic allegiance, and to accept the Pomaks as part of the Bulgarian nation. This idea was most intensely espoused by small educated elite among the Pomaks.<sup>16</sup>

Indeed, prior to the rise of nationalism, language and ethnicity were factors with little meaning within the Ottoman Empire. The existing *millet* system in the empire categorized all Ottoman subjects into semi-autonomous religious communities (*millets*), which were free to organize and carry out their religious, educational, and legal affairs with their own resources. This status quo enabled the *millets* to preserve their religious and/or ethnic identities under the leadership of their established religious institutions. Thus all Eastern Orthodox Christians—Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and others—were categorized as Millet-i-Rum: people belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church. The Muslim *millet* (*umma*) consisted of the totality of Muslims in the Ottoman Empire (and beyond), with no reference to defined territory, language, or ethnicity. The Muslims held a status of superiority over the non-Muslim *millets*, the *rayah* (or *raya*).<sup>17</sup>

Language was not a basis for identity in the Ottoman Empire prior to the rise of Romantic nationalism, so the young Balkan nations, freshly out of the sultan’s grip, struggled to define themselves. Similar to Johann Gottfried Herder in Germany earlier, Bulgarian patriotic literati such as Georgi Rakovski, Petko Slaveykov, Lyuben Karavelov, and the Miladinov brothers “began to study the history of the Slavic languages, to compile bibliographies, to write grammars, to collect archeological remnants and medieval manuscripts, to publish folk songs and fairy tales, to collect artifacts with ethnographic value and exhibit them in museums.” In the period 1850–1900 these intellectuals helped establish universities

where various academic disciplines were taught, including political history, “philology (the historical study of language and literature), ‘national’ folklore (its literary and linguistic history), and traditional culture (clothing, architecture, food, holidays)[.]”<sup>18</sup>

Nor were the Bulgarian patriots alone in promoting a common language as a cause for territorial and cultural consolidation. In fact their Slavic kin from already independent Serbia first immersed themselves in Herderian activism to strengthen Serbian nationalism. Like Herder in Germany, the intellectual Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1787–1864) laid the foundations of national identity in Serbia. He classified everyone who used the Štokavian dialect (spoken by the Serbs) as a Serb by applying the Romantic notion that nations were defined by language. “Because some štokavian speakers were Roman Catholic,” George White notes, “Karadžić labeled them as Roman Catholic Serbs, and because some štokavian speakers were Muslims, Karadžić classified them as Muslim Serbs [largely Bosnians]. Significantly many of these people whom Karadžić classified as Serbs did not consider themselves to be Serbs.”<sup>19</sup> Just as Karadžić in Serbia classified the Slavic-speaking Bosnians as “Serbs,” the patriotic intelligentsia in Bulgaria, including some Pomaks, promoted the community of Slavic-speaking Muslims as “forcibly Islamized Bulgarians.” Unlike the Slavic-speaking Muslims in former Yugoslavia today, however, who have clearly set themselves apart as Bosnians/Bosniaks largely following the bloody conflicts of the 1990s, the Pomak identity in Bulgaria continues to be hotly debated.

The Christianization of 1912–13 is my case study because it was the first comprehensive religious conversion of Pomaks in Bulgaria, which set the precedent for a sustained assimilation process reverberating in Bulgaria’s cultural and political discourse to this day. During the Balkan Wars and via the *pokrastvane* the Bulgarian nation asserted an identity that distinguished it from its former “Turkish oppressor” in the strongest terms possible. The language of Bulgarian nationalism described everything “Christian” and “Bulgarian” as “glorious” and “liberating,” while everything “Islamic” and “Turkish” was “barbaric” and “oppressive.” To borrow from Benedict Anderson, the Pomaks, as newly imagined Bulgarians, therefore could have nothing to do with Islam, so their conversion to Christianity became a pressing concern for the Bulgarian authorities, consolidating a nation-state amidst war.<sup>20</sup> Despite the fervent proclamations of kinship and brotherhood, though, the ruling elites continued to discriminate against the Pomaks and treat them in a way that alienated rather than integrated them into the Bulgarian nation-state.

WAR AND *POKRASTVANE* IN 1912–1913

The *pokrastvane* was one of the hardest moments for the Pomak Muslims as citizens of the new Christian state of Bulgaria. As a divergent group affiliated with the former Ottoman oppressor by religion and as a Bulgarian-speaking minority, they were immediately singled out for assimilation within the broader context of territorial, political, and cultural consolidation of the country. The Balkan Wars provided an “opportune moment,” in the words of one church official, for the brutal business of religious conversion, which the state authorities intended to explain, if postwar implicated, as a sad concomitant of war.<sup>21</sup> The multitude of available records from the 1912–13 Christianization of the Pomaks included protocols from regular and ad-hoc sessions of the Holy Synod (the highest ecclesiastical authority) of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, reports of missionaries, priests, and teachers who were part of the regular conversion missions, and letters and reports of private individuals or religious and state officials who directly enforced the *pokrastvane*.<sup>22</sup> The combination of written evidence, photographic imagery, and surviving oral histories unequivocally reveals not only that all levels of state and church authorities were implicated in the *pokrastvane* but also that insurgent bands and the army “facilitated” the conversion through abuse and killing of Pomak civilians.

According to one document, at least 150,000 Pomaks in the Rhodopes alone were affected by the Christianization.<sup>23</sup> The total number is perhaps more than double that, however, because a sizable Muslim population resided in the Rhodopes, Thrace, and Macedonia—territories that Bulgaria held between the fall of 1912 and the fall of 1913. The authorities carried out the *pokrastvane* precisely at this time.<sup>24</sup> Although the exact number of the affected population remains unknown, it is safe to conclude that about 300,000 Slavic-speaking Muslims suffered the abuse of regular troops, church authorities, and paramilitary bands for the duration of the conversion. According to records, the campaign began around October 1912, peaked in the first three months of 1913, and gradually subsided by the fall of 1913, when Bulgaria conclusively lost the Second Balkan War. The outbreak of the Balkan Wars, however, did not happen in a vacuum. The conflict came about as a direct result of historical processes taking place in the context of European nationalism and the Balkan peoples’ aspiration to emulate the nation-state example of Western powers.

## THE BALKAN WARS

Effectively influenced by the ideal of nation-state, especially after the successful unifications of Italy and Germany by the early 1870s, the Christian populations of the nineteenth-century Balkan Peninsula revolted against their imperial masters almost in common agreement. In the spirit of all-pervading agitation in the Ottoman realm, the Bulgarians rebelled in April 1876. The brutal suppression of the uprising generated international sympathy and support for the cause of Bulgarian independence. Taking advantage of the crisis, tsarist Russia declared war on Ottoman Turkey in 1877, partially in support of its Orthodox Slavic kin's struggle for independence and partially in fulfillment of its own ambitions for dominance in the Balkans. The Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878 concluded the Russian-Turkish War and created a large Bulgarian nation-state in the heart of the peninsula.

The combination of a strong Bulgaria and potent Russian presence in the region, however, did not square well with the interests of Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. This new nation-state, under profound Russian influence, incorporated territory that stretched from the Danube River in the north to the Aegean Sea in the south, dwarfing all its neighbors except Ottoman Turkey. Responding to a general sense of urgency, Otto von Bismarck, first chancellor of Germany, convened a congress in 1878 in Berlin, where the powerful of the day duly partitioned Bulgaria, reducing it to a hapless principality under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Most of southern Bulgaria, better known as Eastern Rumelia, became a semi-independent province under Ottoman authority, while Macedonia (west of Eastern Rumelia) was restored to direct sultanic rule. By partitioning the country, the Berlin Congress portended disaster for Bulgaria. So powerful was the sense of loss among the Bulgarian nation that in coming years it stimulated the emergence of an aggressive nationalism. Bulgaria's neighbors Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro felt similarly cheated by the standing Berlin Treaty.<sup>25</sup>

As the party most aggrieved by the Berlin agreement, Bulgaria was the first to act against it. In September 1885 the Bulgarian Principality unilaterally proclaimed its unification with Eastern Rumelia. Because none of the Western Great Powers took direct action to enforce the Berlin decision, they implicitly validated the unification. Unable to reverse the course of events on its own, Turkey had formally recognized united Bulgaria by 1908. Despite this development the emerging Balkan

nation-states still felt victimized by the Berlin Treaty of 1878. They all had aspirations to territories remaining within the Ottoman Empire. The Bulgarians desired Thrace; the Greeks coveted the Aegean Islands; and the Serbs and Montenegrins aspired to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of Albania, respectively. All four, however, harbored ambitions to dominate Macedonia, a fertile region in the heart of Balkan Turkey. Thus by the first decade of the twentieth century Macedonia had become the pivot of territorial ambition for the most powerful Balkan nations.<sup>26</sup>

Apart from common territorial interests, one particular political development compelled Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro to work together against their common Muslim adversary, according to Richard Hall. That spark came from the Young Turk revolution and the Ottoman Empire's own attempt at espousing the ideology of nationalism. In July 1908 a cabal of junior officers staged a coup d'état in Constantinople, seizing control of government and immediately launching political reforms. The group called itself the Committee for Unity and Progress, popularly known as the Young Turks (Jön Türkler), and their prime objective was to unify Turkey and to prevent further disintegration. In resonance with the Christian nationalists in the Balkans, the Young Turks sought to instill a sense of Ottoman identity among the various peoples of the empire. To prevent a further loss of territories to rebellious subjects, however, they set out to reform the army. The Young Turk revolution had a ripple effect in the Balkans and beyond, causing nation-states and empires to be nervous about achieving their territorial ambitions at the expense of the Ottoman realm. Whereas Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece feared their ability to withstand a potentially more powerful Ottoman military, the Habsburg and Romanov dynasties had aspirations to control Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Straits of the Bosphorus, respectively. As Hall aptly observes, "The Young Turk revolt and the celebration of Ottoman nationhood raised concerns in the Balkan capitals [and beyond] that the Balkan populations in a reformed Turkey would be less susceptible to their nationalistic blandishments."<sup>27</sup>

Both Bulgaria and Serbia felt the need to act together in defense of their shared interests before the Young Turk reforms could produce any meaningful results. Russia, for its part, desired a Balkan alliance against the Austrians and the Ottomans in order to bolster its own position on the peninsula. Thus pressured by nationalist concerns on one side and by Russia on another, Bulgaria and Serbia finally signed an agreement in March 1912. Bulgaria and Greece agreed upon a separate treaty of co-operation two months later. Whereas Bulgaria took care to formalize its

alliance with Montenegro as with Serbia and Greece, the relationship among the later nations stood largely on an oral agreement. This uncertain and complex political dealing set the foundation for the Balkan League that would fight Ottoman Turkey in the First Balkan War.<sup>28</sup>

Thus in the fall of 1912 shared interests of territorial expansion induced the four nascent Balkan nations to fight their common enemy, Turkey—the natural successor of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. On October 4 the so-called Balkan League declared war on Turkey, beginning the First Balkan War. The alliance—albeit an uneasy one—soon paid off: by the spring of 1913 Turkey was defeated. As a result most of the European territories of the former Ottoman Empire passed into the hands of the victorious foursome. Quarrels over territorial distribution, however, soon broke out among Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. Bulgaria harbored ambitions to annex the former Ottoman provinces of Macedonia and Thrace, where significant Bulgarian-speaking population lived. But this ran counter to the aspirations of the other three countries, particularly Serbia and Greece, which sought the same lands. As the territorial disagreement escalated, Bulgaria invaded Thrace, eastern Macedonia, and the Rhodopes, immediately imposing military control over them.<sup>29</sup>

By the summer of 1913 Bulgarian troops occupied the better part of the former Ottoman territories on the Balkan Peninsula. Unwilling to accept this dominion, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece declared war on Bulgaria on June 16, thus initiating the Second Balkan War. While Greece attacked from the south, Serbia and Montenegro advanced from the west. Completing the vice that squeezed Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey opened fronts to the north and southeast, respectively.

Even though Bulgaria did not hold the provinces of Macedonia and Thrace for more than a few months, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, actively assisted by the army and paramilitary formations, succeeded in launching a massive and violent conversion of the Pomak population within these territories. These provinces (Thrace and Macedonia) were home to a sizable Pomak population (see table 11.1), who soon found themselves part of a brand-new nation. The Pomak stronghold, the Rhodope Mountains, fell into Bulgarian hands too.

The Treaty of Constantinople of September 29, 1913, not only ended the Balkan Wars but also reaffirmed the annexation of the (greater part of the) Rhodope mountain range to Bulgaria. This was a turning point in the life of the prevalently Muslim Rhodopean population, the Pomaks, who changed citizenship almost overnight from Ottoman to Bulgarian.



TABLE 11.1. Pomak Population within the Provinces of Thrace and Macedonia at the Time of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1914

PROVINCE OF THRACE		
DISTRICT	NUMBER OF TOWNS, VILLAGES, AND HAMLETS	NUMBER OF PEOPLE
Ahı Çelebi	32	35,000
Dövlən	30	26,810
Egridere	24	20,000
Darıdere	26	16,990
Gümürcina	34	10,625
Xanti	6	4,500
Koşukavak	13	3,757
Soflu(?)	7	3,570
Baba Eski	5	3,385
Hayrobolu	7	3,205
Üzünküprü	11	1,200
Total	195	129,042

PROVINCE OF MACEDONIA		
DISTRICT	NUMBER OF TOWNS, VILLAGES, AND HAMLETS	NUMBER OF PEOPLE
Nevrokop	74	26,962
Drama	31	11,179
Kavala	6	2,710
Razlog	7	8,870
Petriç	3	865
Melnik	3	700
Eski Cumaya	6	3,900
Doyran	2	1,270
Total	132	56,456

Source: Stoyu Shishkov, *Balgaro-Mohamedanite (Pomatsite)*, 30–34.

They spoke Bulgarian as their native language but, unlike Bulgaria's majority, professed Islam rather than Orthodox Christianity as their religion.

#### THE POKRASTVANE

All areas with heavily concentrated Pomak populations were violent combat zones for the duration of the Balkan Wars. The civilian population, consisting mainly of women, children, and elderly men (the Turkish army had conscripted the younger males), not only bore the brunt of war

and an unusually cold winter but also suffered the abuse of religious conversion. Between October 1912 and September 1913 the advancing and retreating Bulgarian troops and paramilitary bands plundered and burned hundreds of Pomak villages, turning thousands of people into destitute refugees. Waves of Muslim civilians pressed southward, following the withdrawing Ottoman army, after having abandoned all their earthly possessions. The constant swap of territories between the warring parties, however, threw the civilian population into utter confusion and rendered it unable to decide whether to stay permanently or leave. Many of the Rhodopean Pomaks, who had originally fled, returned to their villages only to find themselves homeless and robbed of all food and livestock, in the middle of severe winter. Dispossessed, malnourished, and without basic medication, people soon succumbed to epidemics of typhoid, cholera, and scarlet fever. By January 1913 the new Bulgarian regime had launched a large-scale Christianization in the Rhodopes.

In a letter to his friend Ivan Shishmanov of January 26, 1913, Stoyu Shishkov—a patriotic writer and fervent *pokrastvane* crusader—attested to the dismal position of the Pomak population:<sup>30</sup>

It has been a week since I have been in this untamed and beautiful Tamrush region [Middle Rhodopes]. I serve on the commission for aid distribution, and while I am witnessing exceptional and glorious historical events [the *pokrastvane*], I am also faced with unspeakable misery. Semiclad, famished, and emaciated families of five to ten members live in cramped, half-destroyed shacks, with not even a tin box in sight for water and cooking. But they line up before the cross, the gospel, and the holy water *en masse*, in acceptance of Christ, which should provide them with relief from fear and torment. I took a photographer with me. As commissioners, we try to instill peace and comfort in this unfortunate population.<sup>31</sup>

In his capacity as a police commandant in the village of Ustovo (Middle Rhodopes), Shishkov stood at the core of Pomak Christianization in the Smolyan area. While his official function was to ensure that an orderly assumption of power was taking place in the region, his personal mission was to see to the successful conversion of the local Muslim population. Instead of merely applying brute force to that end, however—as usually happened—Shishkov was also concerned about the lasting impact of the conversion. Thus in a statement of December 2, 1912, he expressed anxiety that the complete devastation of the region, after Bulgarian

troops and Christian civilians swept through it, would adversely affect the *pokrastvane*. "Hungry and ragged women [refugees] are coming back to their torched villages," he wrote. "All food, livestock, and movable property have already been stolen from them.... Since war and army mobilization prevented harvest, the crops are rotting under the rains.... The winter in the mountain is harsh, and...starvation is present in all its horror, wreaking sickness and death." Quite apart from starvation, Shishkov worried that the rampant corruption and arbitrary violence against Muslim civilians would obstruct the conversion effort as well as the prospect of effectively administering control over the territory. "The whole country [here] is in a state of complete lawlessness," he lamented in the same report. "Banditry and looting have reached unprecedented levels. The need for troops and administrative authority to intercept the situation is eminent." As police commandant of Ustovo, Shishkov felt responsible for what was happening, yet he did not have the resources to prevent it. Thus the purpose of his report—just one of many—was to convince the higher authorities of the dire necessity to amend the situation in order to ensure the lasting effect of the *pokrastvane* and efficient government in the region. "The [Christian] posses and various such thugs roaming the area with the sole purpose to plunder must be disbanded, disarmed, and ordered back to their places of residence," he proposed. "All Bulgarian [Christian] villages in the vicinity must be thoroughly searched,<sup>32</sup> for even the women there have partaken in the plunder of Pomak villages.... [Also,] a doctor is urgently needed to help prevent the outbreak of disease epidemics due to the horrific famine and poverty."<sup>33</sup>

As one of the chief local executives of the *pokrastvane*, Stoyu Shishkov accounted for every development on the matter to the higher church authorities, among others. In one of his communications with Archbishop Maxim of Plovdiv, dated January 30, 1913, he reported that "out of the 33 villages [in the Smolyan region], 3,970 homes have been torched" and "several families are [now] crowding in a single room." Shishkov's biggest concern, however, continued to be that corrupt officials and marauding Christian bands could hamper "our holy mission" in the Rhodopes:

[T]he Pomak population continues to be victimized by various thugs who arrive here from different places, go from village to village, attack the population in their homes and rob them of the last piece of clothing, implement, or livestock; many engage in ugly acts of violating people's dignity and honor. The terrified population takes everything timidly with no courage to complain, and

there is no one to complain to anyway. Self-appointed tax collectors have plagued the villages of Beden, Trigrad, and some others, tormenting the population terribly. The very war government in Dövlén, on all levels, has been appallingly violating this population. I fear that after the relief commission leaves, the authorities themselves would rob the people of the little aid they've received. The state not only must stop these practices but also must order an investigation into them and punish those responsible with all the severity of the law. The state needs to appoint as regional administrators persons of moral integrity to take control of the anarchy. Without such measures *our holy mission* of bringing the Pomak population into the Christian faith is doomed to fail; the national prestige would be irreparably compromised, and the results would be devastating [emphasis added].<sup>34</sup>

Nor was Stoyu Shishkov alone in his reportage of misery, corruption, and abuse in the Rhodopes during the Balkan Wars. Orthodox Church clergy, sent to baptize the Pomak population, painted a picture in the same gloomy colors. Priest Dimitar Kutuev, a member of the conversion mission in the village of Yakoruda, delivered a particularly poignant message of children's suffering to Archbishop Maxim on May 9, 1913:

The village of Babek has been burned by the bands.... The population...is utterly poor, sick, and famished. The epidemics of disease have hit this area harder than any other. Small children are forced to walk to distant villages to beg; they come back to their sick families bringing them a meager something to eat. A number of starving and ragged children surrounded me here, one day, and with tears in their eyes, they begged, "Give us some bread, grandpa priest!" The picture of small, hungry, and tattered children with prematurely withered faces is horrible to behold. This one child told me, "Give me some bread, grandpa priest, because I am hungry from earth to heaven." Since this village was completely destroyed, no livestock and food has been left for this famished population.... In Babek, as well as in the neighboring hamlets, people die every day.<sup>35</sup>

Because of the heavy winter, lack of roads, and naturally difficult terrain, the Pomak villages in the Rhodopes were largely cut off from access by humanitarian agencies such as the Red Cross that distributed



FIGURE 11.1. Map of the Rhodope Mountains in Bulgaria. Courtesy of Michael May.

life-saving food and medical supplies. The Bulgarian authorities and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which channeled the supplies, used the aid provided by humanitarian organizations and foreign embassies in Bulgaria as a method of inducing conversion. Thus much of the initially declared “success” of the *pokrastvane* stemmed from the fact that the famished Pomak population was given food rations, some cash, and basic clothing in exchange for formal baptism.<sup>36</sup>

Whereas the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was formally in charge of the *pokrastvane*, the army, paramilitary formations, patriotic civilian organizations, local military governments, and private individuals rendered support to the conversion effort. The church dispatched special missions composed of church-appointed clergy and state-appointed educators to all the Pomak areas in the Rhodopes, Thrace, and Macedonia (fig. 11.1). Their task was twofold: (1) to turn the Pomaks into Christians and (2) to educate them in patriotism and national loyalty. Whenever and wherever eloquence failed, the “crusaders” administered brute force to achieve the desired effect. From the volume of documents published under the editorship of Velichko Georgiev and Stayko Trifonov, it is clear that the Plovdiv Diocese of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, headed by Archbishop Maxim, played a pivotal role in the *pokrastvane*. This is understandable, because the territories most densely populated

by Pomaks—the Rhodope Mountains, Thrace, and part of Macedonia—were under his jurisdiction.<sup>37</sup>

Neither did the Bulgarian military authorities delay supporting the “holy mission.” As soon as Thrace, Macedonia, and the Rhodopes came under Bulgarian control, the *pokrastvane* began. While the campaign started in the fall 1912 and continued through the summer, it peaked during the harshest winter months of January, February, and March, when the population was most vulnerable. Conversions usually took place en masse. Soldiers would round up entire village populations and huddle them together in an open space, because no buildings were sufficiently large to accommodate hundreds of people at once. Men, women, and children—by family—were forced to stand in line before one or more Orthodox priests for baptism. After receiving the sign of the cross from the priest(s), the adults of each family would have their heads immersed in water, while the children would be quickly sprinkled merely for reasons of efficiency. If their time and resources allowed, the *pokrastvane* “crusaders” would force Pomak converts—particularly elderly male heads of family—to bite into a piece of pork as a final act of denouncing Islam, following which the baptizing priest(s) would formally proclaim them Christian. The Pomaks would next be required to make verbal declaration of rejecting Islam and accepting Christianity, whereafter they received new Bulgarian-Christian names (figure 11.2). To complete the humiliation, men were forced to surrender their fezes (headdresses) and put on hats with crucifixes affixed to them as a blatant reminder of their *pokrastvane*. Women, for their part, had to substitute the *yashmak* (a type of veil) for simple headscarves.<sup>38</sup> With the population thus formally converted, each village mosque and *mekteb* (Muslim school)—provided they had survived the burning—would reopen as a church and Sunday school, respectively. These two institutions then indoctrinated “the new Christians,” from children to adults, in “Christian virtues” and patriotic loyalty.<sup>39</sup>

The *pokrastvane* was conducted in large part by Christian paramilitary formations from the Rhodopes or surrounding areas. This is abundantly clear from the lengthy “confidential” report of civilian patriots from Pazardzhik (Pazardjik) to the Holy Synod and Archbishop Maxim of Plovdiv, informing him of “the citizens’” forthcoming “initiative” to convert the Chepino Valley’s population (Middle Rhodopes; see figure 11.1). The document is particularly valuable because it sheds a detailed light on how the *pokrastvane* was carried out by civilian zealots with the blessing of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the active support of



FIGURE 11.2. *Pokrastvane* in the village of Devin, 1912–13. Priest Iliya Djodjev sprinkles water over the head of an elderly-looking Pomak man before proclaiming him “Christian.” The whole village is gathered in an open area to witness the baptism and endure the collective humiliation. Courtesy of Darzhaven Arhiv/ State (National) Archives—Plovdiv, Fond 959K, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 902, 3. Photography Collection no. 15532 (date unspecified).

high-ranking military and political officials. Thus the general pattern, as gleaned from the report, appears to be as follows. Having decided to Christianize the local Muslim population, Christian civilians from Pazardzhik and its vicinity proceeded to organize a “Committee for Assistance of the Newly Converted Christians” even before the conversion took place. This committee’s purpose “[wa]s to promulgate the idea about Christianizing the [local] Pomaks.” To implement their plan, these Bulgarian patriots organized themselves in “committees for conversion,” each assigned to a specific Pomak village in the Chepino Valley. As the document stipulates, the *pokrastvane* initiative was to be announced first to the Pomaks then publicized among the broader Christian population in the region and finally enforced, “village by [Pomak] village,” starting on an appointed date. Thus on December 29, 1912, conversion activists “marched into [the village of] Lazhene, where [they] encountered a convention of local mayors and Pomak dignitaries from neighboring villages gathered to hear [them].”<sup>40</sup>

A succession of “patriotic citizens” then took turns delivering fiery speeches about the virtues of Christianity and the decadence of Islam, occasionally interrupted by the nervous attempt at dissent of a beleaguered Pomak population. Here is a telling excerpt from the report:

Mumdjiev spoke first.... [He told the gathered Pomak elders]... that the Quran obstructs their progress, that their forefathers had been Islamized by force,... that the faith of Mohammed resembles a tattered coat that cannot warm the soul or soften the heart; that Christianity brings high moral virtues and gives freedom of conscience; that they are a compact mass of about 300,000 who speak the pure Bulgarian language so dear to us; that their folklore is ours, and so on.<sup>41</sup>

Molla Mustafa Kara-Mehmedov from Rakitovo spoke on behalf of the Pomaks—a wealthy, intelligent, sixty-year-old man who has served as a district counselor and who can read Bulgarian excellently. He literally said the following: “Gentlemen, what the people from Pazardzhik...said is just; but what can be done when there are 2,000 behind us (speaking of his village) who are simple and ignorant people and do not understand how they could change their faith? It all seems to us like an impenetrable forest: how can we find our way out of it? Anything is possible, but we ask to be allowed some time.” To that the citizens objected: “You must convert *now* [emphasis added].”<sup>42</sup>

So the *pokrastvane* of the Chepino Valley proceeded accordingly. On the appointed day gendarmerie and soldiers—“stationed in these villages from mobilization time to disarm the Pomaks”—drove together the entire population of Lazhene and Kamenitsa to facilitate the baptism. According to the document, more than 1,300 Pomak Muslims were formally converted on the same day. In the villages of Rakitovo especially recruited photographers “captured the moments when the converts were sprinkled with water, and when they were kissing the cross and the priest’s hand.” After the formal baptism, “[t]he crowd, including the new converts, saluted the *general*, the local *governor*, and shouted three times, ‘Long live the King and Great Bulgaria’ [emphasis added].” Just like that, the civilian Pazardzhik “crusaders”—with the blessing and support of the Bulgarian state and church—delivered “a population of about 150,000 [Pomak] people...to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and to the Bulgarian nation,” boasted the report.<sup>43</sup>

Even if euphemistic, the wording of the above document is clearly the language of coercion. The ultimate goal of the *pokrastvane* was not to “warm the soul” or “soften the heart” of the Pomak population, as phrased in the report, but to “deliver” to the Bulgarian nation a compact mass of “300,000” people in order to consolidate national sovereignty. The “soldiers,” “the general,” and “the local governor” were there to ensure



that full control over the newly acquired territories, a fundamental part of which was the Chepino Valley of the Rhodopes, would be achieved absolutely and definitively via the forced conversion of the local Muslims. The recurring stipulation that the Pomaks “speak the pure Bulgarian language” was, in effect, a legitimization of Bulgaria’s claim over the Rhodopes as well as over all territories settled by Pomaks.

The report’s authors, however, like the communiqués of many other *pokrastvane* enforcers, took special care to avoid direct reference to violence. But, as one might conclude from figure 11.2, the motley crowd of Pomak men, women, and children were hardly willing participants in an affair that forced them out in the bitter cold, in the middle of severe winter, to accept the faith of their wartime enemy. Were the *pokrastvane* truly “voluntary,” as alleged in much of the archival evidence, at least a portion of the Pomaks would certainly have opted out of swearing allegiance to symbols—the cross and pork—totally foreign and even repugnant to them as Muslims. In fact the Rhodopean Pomaks were just emerging as Bulgarian subjects during and after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and still perceived themselves as Ottoman Muslims. Moreover, when the Ottoman Empire broke down, the Pomaks’ Islamic religion became the sole anchor of palpable identity for them. Thus they were even more likely to adhere to their Muslimness (Arab-Turkish names, conservative attire, and Muslim traditions) in the midst of political chaos than ever before. In effect, for the first time the *pokrastvane* threatened to annihilate the deeply rooted sense of Muslim self of the Pomaks, while seeking to replace it with customs new and hostile to them.

#### THE KILLINGS IN ORAL HISTORY

Clearly the purpose of the *pokrastvane* was to consolidate state sovereignty by ensuring national and territorial unity. The Pomaks, closely related ethnically and linguistically to Bulgaria’s majority, were the most obvious candidates for assimilation. What stood between the dream of building a strong nation-state and reality was their problematic religious affiliation with Islam, the faith of the former Ottoman “oppressor.” To Bulgaria’s ruling and religious authorities this obstacle could be overcome by conversion, both religious and national. Undoubtedly the authorities intended to implement the *pokrastvane* as bloodlessly as possible, because violence would neither nurture Bulgarian patriotism among the Pomaks nor enhance Bulgaria’s international image after the war. On the unsettling road to nation-making, however, much blood was spilled.

The scores of original documents only hint at the killings that took place in many Pomak villages during the *pokrastvane*. This was a consequence of the purposeful misinformation policy applied by state and church authorities alike.<sup>44</sup> The Bulgarian government was concerned about the country's image abroad, because much of the outcome of the current war depended on the favorable disposition of the Great Powers. They would certainly condemn any atrocities committed against Muslims or other minorities.<sup>45</sup> Similarly the Bulgarian Orthodox Church did not wish to attract any criticism—in the words of Archbishop Maxim—for “resort[ing] to uncharacteristic to its nature means” in making converts.<sup>46</sup> Whereas the torture and killings were not necessarily committed by the Bulgarian ecclesiastical or military authorities, their inability or reluctance to stop the Christian bands' pogroms against the Muslims makes both parties complicit in the atrocities.

Because the surviving Bulgarian sources are at best suggestive of the cases of murder that accompanied the *pokrastvane* of 1912–13, it is all too easy to dismiss them as conjecture. But clues can still be found and verified with vernacular history, preserving vivid memories of bloodshed. For instance, a coded telegram of the Bulgarian regional governor in Drama (now in Greece), Mr. Dobrev, to Bulgaria's prime minister, Ivan E. Geshov, on November 26, 1912, reads: “With a posse of fifteen (15) people, [Hristo] Chernopeev departed for the Pomak villages to the north-northwest of Drama to Christianize the Pomaks.”<sup>47</sup>

#### THE BURNING OF VALKOSEL AND THE KILLINGS IN ABLANITSA

Posses committed the worst atrocities. Under a sycamore tree in the village of Valkosel (Western Rhodopes) is a water fountain. A marble plaque dedicates this fountain “to our ninety-five Muslim brothers who gave their lives for their faith” (see fig. 11.3). According to the story I heard from Mehmed Shehov in the summer of 2007 (a learned seventy-six-year-old retiree), on February 22, 1913, Bulgarian troops, accompanied by irregular militiamen, arrived in Valkosel after burning the neighboring village of Zhizhevo. At first they wanted the village elders, gathered in the mosque for their regular prayer, to turn over someone by the name of Salyu Mizinev, apparently considered a “troublemaker” by the Bulgarian authorities. The person in question was hiding under the floor, inside the mosque. “Tell Salyu to come out, or all of you will go up in flames!” the men were told.<sup>48</sup>




FIGURE 11.3. A simple commemorative water fountain in Valkosel. This fountain, which dries out in the hottest summer days, is dedicated to the ninety-five souls who perished on a cold February day in 1913 because they refused to convert to Christianity. A combined force of civilian militias and troops rounded up all Muslim men that they found in the mosque for prayer that day and marched them a short distance down to a house, where they butchered them with bayonets before pushing them in and torching the building. Photograph by the author, June 2007.

The very same day the Christian posse drove all village elders out of the mosque, lined them up, and marched them a short distance toward what is today the Vilev's house. While being led away, the men were calling *tekbir* (prayer). Upon reaching their destination, the posses began to stab the prisoners with bayonets. Whoever fell was quickly picked up by the hands and legs and thrown inside the house. According to Mehmed Shehov, 106 men were stabbed and pushed inside. The Christians then poured gasoline on the building and set it on fire. Ninety-five men perished in the flames, many still alive after the stabbing. Eventually, about eleven of the total, managed to crawl out of the inferno and lived. Among the survivors was Mehmed's stepmother's father, Assan Kalvichev. "One day while he and I were tending the sheep together," Mehmed recounted, "he lifted his shirt and showed me seven scars left by the bayonets. How he survived such horrific wounds, I have no idea!"<sup>49</sup> After looting

Valkossel and killing the village elders, the posses set the village ablaze and proceeded to the next Pomak settlement, Ablanitsa.

Ibrahim Imam and Senem Konedareva offer a rare glimpse of the events that took place in nearby Ablanitsa in their concise history of the village, *Ablanitsa through the Centuries*. Relying on surviving testimonies, most transmitted through the descendants of survivors, the authors provide a detailed description of what happened in mid-February 1912 and again in 1913. “[F]illing his band with volunteers from Singartiya (now Handjidimivo) and the nearby [Christian] villages,” they write, “he [Munyo Voyvoda] took the road to Ablanitsa reaching the village around 4–5 PM...on February 12, 1912[.]” Knowing beforehand that the village was Muslim, the band surrounded it. In the eve of February 13 Munyo Voyvoda’s posse rounded up forty-six of the most prominent residents of Ablanitsa, tied them together, and dragged the men in the direction of Singartiya. Among the captives was Hadjiyata, a wealthy and respected member of the community. On the way out of Ablanitsa, “one of the *chetniks* [*comitas*, the Christian militias] had a mind for spoils and told Hadjiyata to go home and bring all valuables he could find in order to ransom his life.”<sup>50</sup> After refusing to do so, however, Hadjiyata was crucified on a wild pear tree along the trek to teach the others a lesson. According to Imam and Konedareva, he was the first victim of the Balkan Wars *pokrastvane* from Ablanitsa.

One of the survivors from the same group of captives, Mehmed Konadov, later recounted that Hadjiyata was nailed alive to the pear tree, where he died. The rest of the Ablanitsa men were taken to Singartiya, where they were locked in a barn near the mill in the outskirts of the village. There the *chetniks* butchered them one by one, discarding the bodies into the open sewer by the mill. Ibrahim Havalyov and Ibrahim Kambin, however, miraculously survived the ordeal to tell the story. Despite the horrific wounds that both sustained, they managed to drag themselves out of the ditch and to crawl near the road, where a Christian man from Singartiya rescued them. This was the first attack by Christian bands on the village during the tumultuous Balkan Wars, according to the authors, but it was not going to be the last one.<sup>51</sup>

#### THE KILLINGS DOCUMENTED

Oral history is not the sole source of knowledge about the murders that occurred during Bulgaria’s attempt to convert the Pomaks. Although it is difficult to find direct confirmation of the killings in the surviving

Bulgarian records, an important and authoritative foreign source of information does exist: the *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1914. The Carnegie Report resulted from the Great Powers' postwar investigation into the conduct of the warring parties in the Balkan Wars.

The Carnegie Report is very useful in highlighting the complexities of a war that left no Balkan people unscathed, including the warring nation-states' majority groups. In the mayhem of the Balkan Wars the victims of abuse and murder initially were predominantly Muslim. The allied Christian Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians were slaughtering Muslims and ravaging their towns and villages almost in common agreement. But when the Second Balkan War began, the former allies became enemies and turned on each other. Now the Bulgarians were equally violating Muslims, Greeks, and Serbs. The Serbs were attacking Bulgarians and Muslims with the same ferocity, and the Greeks were victimizing Muslims as well as Christians of Slavic (Bulgarian) descent. Often Slavic-Christian bands of Bulgarians and Serbs operated together against the Turkish-Muslim and Greek populations, while common interests temporarily united Bulgarians and Muslims against Greeks. Ultimately, however, the Muslims remained the main target of violence due to their affiliation with the former Ottoman "oppressor" in the eyes of all Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek Christians.

Attached as appendices to the Carnegie Report under the heading "The Plight of the Macedonian Moslems during the First War" are many testimonies given to the commissioners by witnesses, direct participants, and survivors of the atrocities of diverse ethnic and religious background. Thus Rahni Effendi of Strumnitsa, a Muslim, described what took place within the former Province of Macedonia under Bulgarian and Serbian occupation:

The Bulgarian army arrived on Monday, November 4, 1912.... On entering the town, the Bulgarians disarmed the Moslem inhabitants, but behaved well and did not loot. Next day, a Bulgarian civil authority was established, but the Ser[b]ians had the military control. The Bulgarian army marched on to Doiran; on its departure looting and slaughter began. I saw an old man of eighty lying in the street with his head split open, and the dead body of a boy of thirteen. About thirty Moslems were killed that day in the streets—I believe by the Bulgarian bands. On Wednesday evening, an order was issued that no Moslem might leave his house

day or night until further notice. A commission was then formed from the Bulgarian notables of the town; the Ser[b]ian military commander presided, and the Bulgarian Civil Governor also sat upon it. A local gendarmerie was appointed and a gendarme and a soldier were told to go round from house to house, summoning the Moslems, one by one, to attend the commission. I was summoned myself with the rest.

The procedure was as follows: The Ser[b]ian commandant would inquire, "What kind of a man is this?" The answer was simply either "good" or "bad." ... if one member of the commission said "bad," that sufficed to condemn the prisoner.... I was pronounced "good," and so perhaps were one-tenth of the prisoners. Those sentenced were bound together by threes, and taken to the slaughterhouse; their ears and noses were often cut off before they were killed. This slaughter went on for a month; I believe that from three to four thousand Moslems were killed in the town and the neighboring villages.<sup>52</sup>

Rahni Effendi's testimony, according to the Carnegie Report, was confirmed by Abdul Kerim Aga (a Muslim) of Strumnitsa, who described to the commissioners how he lost his own son. His son was apparently held hostage by someone called "Toma, the chief of the Bulgarian bands," who demanded ransom from Kerim Aga. According to the report, "Toma demanded a hundred pounds; he [Kerim Aga] had previously paid on two different occasions £50 and [£]170 to save this same son. He told Toma that he had not the money ready, but would try to sell a shop if the Bulgarians would wait until evening. Toma refused to wait and his son was shot."<sup>53</sup>

As the Carnegie commissioners visited the Muslim refugee camp outside Thessaloniki (now in Greece), they learned from the refugees that the Bulgarian bands arrived in Yedna-Kuk, a village near Strumnitsa, before the regular army. They "ordered the whole male population to assemble in the mosque," shut them in, and robbed them of all their money (about £300 in total). Then they selected "[e]ighteen of the wealthier villagers," tied them up, and took them to Bossilovo, "where they were killed and buried." The commissioners recorded that the villagers could recall the names of nine of the murdered people.<sup>54</sup>

The Carnegie Commission further registered the report about the gruesome events in Kukush and its vicinity (now in Macedonia) of the Catholic priest Gustave Michel, "superior of the mission at Kukush," given to a *Le Temps* correspondent:

A Bulgarian band led by Donchev shut all the men of the place in the mosque, and gathered the women round it, in order to oblige them to witness the spectacle. The comitadjis [*comitas*, *chetniks*] then threw three bombs at the mosque but it was not blown up; they then set fire to it, and all who were shut up in it, to the number of about 700 men, were burnt alive. Those who attempted to flee were shot down by comitadjis posted round the mosque, and Pere Michel found human heads, arms, and legs lying about half burned in the streets. At Planitsa, Donchev's band...first drove all the men to the mosque and burnt them alive; it then gathered the women and burnt them in their turn in the public square. At Rayonovo a number of men and women were massacred; the Bulgarians filled a well with their corpses. At Kukush the Moslems were massacred by the Bulgarian population of the town and their mosque destroyed. All the Turkish soldiers who fled without arms and arrived in groups from Salonica [Thessaloniki] were massacred.<sup>55</sup>

It was not simply Muslims and occasional foreign observers who testified before the commissioners about the atrocities against Muslims during the Balkan Wars. Christian Bulgarians, frequently mortified by what was happening, provided their accounts as well. Vassil Smilev, a Bulgarian Christian teacher at Uskub (Üsküp), for example, stated before the Carnegie inquirers that upon entering the village the Serbian army attempted "to persuade all the Bulgarian teachers to join the bands which they were forming in order to pursue the Turkish bands." After going with the band "for twenty or thirty days," however, Smilev left because "it was continually engaged in burning, torturing and killing." Thus he "witnessed the slaughter of eighteen Turks [Muslims] who had been collected in the Bulgarian school of the Tchair quarter of the town. They were killed in the open and their bodies thrown into a well near the brickworks." He was able to name four of the murdered persons. Smilev also testified that it was the Serbian chief of police, Lazar Ilyts, who had been responsible for the massacre in Uskub and for the pillage of the village Butel. The Bulgarian teacher recounted how they met a number of Albanian villagers near Butel fleeing from the bands. "A Ser[b]ian major unveiled and kissed a young girl among them. Her father killed him on the spot. Thereupon the Ser[b]ian band massacred the whole body of fugitives, men and women, to the number of sixty." After witnessing this massacre, which he subsequently reported to the Russian consulate,

Vassil Smilev “refused to have anything further to do with the Ser[b]ian bands. He was expelled afterwards from Uskub with the other Bulgarian teachers.”<sup>56</sup>

The massacre of Muslims by Bulgarian (as well as Serbian and Greek) troops and irregulars during the Balkan Wars and *pokrastvane* undoubtedly occurred. But the question of *why* insurgent Christian bands targeted their Muslim neighbors so fanatically is important and not easy to answer. Part of the reason may be that thirty-five years earlier, in 1876–78, the Bulgarian Christian population had risen against the Ottomans in a wave of organized revolts for independence. When the uprising was quashed, however, scores of civilian Christians were killed, including in the Rhodopes. Many civilian Muslims, among them Pomaks, partook in the violence against Christian “rebels” ostensibly in defense of the “mother country.” Consequently, even as Bulgaria committed equal (and often worse) atrocities against Muslims, the official historiography proceeded to interpret these events as “proof” of Bulgarian-Christian heroism and virtue and of Islamic-Turkish cruelty and barbarism.<sup>57</sup> Undoubtedly assigning a collective guilt to all Muslims, the insurgent bands felt justified in punishing them not only for the brutal Ottoman suppression of the Bulgarian rebellion but for the five centuries of the “Turkish yoke”—to use a Bulgarian customary expression—as well.

#### THE POKRASTVANE OF MUSLIM PRISONERS OF WAR (POWS)

As the bands’ brutality yielded few results for the *pokrastvane* effort, the Bulgarian military and church authorities sought other ways to Christianize the Pomaks. One efficient way of inducing bloodless conversion was the compulsory baptism of Pomak POWs. During the Balkan Wars Turkey conscripted most able-bodied Pomak men. But as a result of the country’s defeat in May of 1913, the Bulgarian army took Muslim prisoners of war by the thousands. The Slavic-speaking Muslims were immediately separated from their Turkish-speaking comrades and transported to camps deep inside Bulgaria so that they could be converted to Orthodox Christianity and given Bulgarian names. The capture of Pomak soldiers proved very useful to the *pokrastvane*, because it allowed for the conversion not only of the POWs but also of their families. When younger Pomak men were drafted in the Ottoman army, many left behind vulnerable wives, children, young siblings, and elderly parents. In captivity the Bulgarian military gave these soldiers the choice to accept



Christianity or never see their loved ones again. At the same time the POWs' families were told that the life and speedy release of their husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers depended solely on their conversion. Thus pressured, whole households accepted Christian baptism in exchange for their family members. Before setting Pomak captives free, however, the Bulgarian authorities properly supplied them with identity papers indicating the men's new Christian names and religion.<sup>58</sup>

To obtain release, Muslim POWs petitioned the Bulgarian Orthodox Church for conversion by the hundreds. The Bulgarian government and ecclesiastical authorities insisted on the submission of formal petitions to make the conversions appear voluntary. Here is an example of an individual petition, filed by the POW Eyub Syuliev and addressed to Archbishop Maxim of Plovdiv on January 25, 1913:

Through the Commanding Officer of Second Division of Thrace  
To His Holiness the Archbishop of Plovdiv

PETITION

From Eyub Mustafov Syuliev

Your Holiness,

Bearing in mind that only the Gospel can uplift the human spirit and lead it to progress and culture, I obediently beg permission to join the [Bulgarian] Orthodox Church and, by so doing, to set an example for other Muslims to follow.

The Town of Pazardzhik

Jan. 25, 1913

Eyub Syuliev

With Reverence,

Eyub Syuliev<sup>59</sup>

Petitions of such a nature were signed by hundreds and even thousands of Muslim prisoners of war. As with the en masse baptism of villages, the collective conversion of Pomak captives saved time, effort, and resources. As a result, group petitions outnumber individual ones among the available records. The highly partisan language of these petitions, however, strongly suggests that they were neither voluntary nor authored by the POWs themselves. In all likelihood patriotic officers, priests, or civilians prepared these in advance and presented them for signatures to

the POWs. To be sure, the military staff itself initiated the conversion of Pomak captives. For example, the commandant of Panagyurishte, Sapundzhiev sent the following telegram to Archbishop Maxim on January 30, 1913, thereby arranging the conversion of hundreds of prisoners:

There are 550 prisoners of war in the town [Panagyurishte] and its vicinity. They wish to *voluntarily* pass into the midst of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, to which their forefathers belonged but were torn from in consequence of the Turkish barbarism.... Hereby I ask Your Holiness to announce their baptism [emphasis added].<sup>60</sup>

No matter how carefully the state and church authorities phrased their communiqués or how often they used the word “voluntary,” the coercive nature of the *pokrastvane* is plainly visible in the records. In a telegram to the mayor of Kaloffer, Archbishop Maxim instructed: “The valley of Chepelare has been Christianized; the valley of Rupcha—half-way. The Pomak prisoners of war in Kuklen, Perushtitsa, Brestovo, Bratsigovo, Panagyurishte, and Golyamo Konare, exceeding 1,000 in number, have accepted the faith. It is now time that you, the citizens of Kaloffer, fulfill your sacred duty to faith and fatherland.”<sup>61</sup> The “sacred duty” that Maxim conferred on the citizens of Kaloffer was nothing short of a command to convert the Muslim prisoners in town by any means necessary. Although his language is intentionally elusive, the meaning is apparent within the broader context of *pokrastvane*. In yet another telegram Maxim triumphantly announced that “[a]round 1,000 prisoners of war within the Plovdiv Diocese have been converted and set free to return to their families.”<sup>62</sup>

Formal conversion to Christianity not only shielded Muslim prisoners from torture but in most cases was the key to their release and safe return home. Converts were not only treated differently but also provided with basic clothing and food. The report of priest Pavel Dimitrov to Archbishop Maxim from February 14, 1913, describes the special attitude toward prisoners of war who had converted or petitioned for conversion. Upon arriving in Pazardzhik under convoy,

they are accommodated in a hotel specifically appropriated for that purpose, given bread, and—those who have need—shoes as well. The [*pokrastvane*] committee provides the new converts with the necessary food rations and, under the protection of the military authorities, they are sent home to their families.<sup>63</sup>

But Pomak prisoners and their families only accepted conversion out of desperation and as a last resort. On January 15, 1913, for instance, one *pokrastvane* mission informed Archbishop Maxim that the populations of Nastan, Breze, Beden, and Dövlén were only inclined to convert if “their sons, husbands, fathers, and grandsons would be released from captivity.” The missionaries pointed out that “without the prisoners’ release, their families are reluctant to accept Christianity.” Thus they implored “[His] Holiness” “to order the release of all prisoners from the district of Dövlén...; [and] to speed up the supply of material aid in the form of food and clothing, for these are the greatest incentives for conversion among this devastated population.”<sup>64</sup>

### THE TIDE IS TURNING

The official Bulgarian position on the forced Christianization of the Slavic-speaking Muslims was one of complete denial or insistence that the whole affair was voluntary. Indeed the language of available primary records tends to be euphemistic and defensive, carefully avoiding admissions of wrongdoing and suspiciously overstating the “voluntary” nature of the conversion. Bulgaria’s government was not interested in attracting foreign criticism, when a new peace treaty and another territorial redistribution in the Balkans were about to happen. Despite all efforts to keep the act of *pokrastvane* secret, however, news of the violence committed against the Muslims had begun to leak out by the spring of 1913 and to raise international concerns. Thus the London-based Balkan Committee addressed the Bulgarian prime minister, Ivan Geshov, on May 1, 1913, in the following manner:

We feel it our duty to direct your attention to certain rumours that are being spread in this country as to forcible conversion of Moslem inhabitants in the districts conquered by the Allied armies—rumours which, we have reason to know, tend to alienate sympathy from the Balkan cause and peoples, and render more difficult the task of those who, like us, are anxious to assist in healing the grievous wounds which this terrible war has inflicted upon the country.

We beg you, Sir, to believe that our sole motive in drawing your attention to this matter is solicitude for the future welfare and happiness of your nation, and we would be glad to receive

from you assurances that would enable us to contradict and refute the charges to which we have alluded [original English].<sup>65</sup>

The leaking of rumors about the conversion was due in large part to the growing resistance of Pomaks, lodging complaints of brutality to both foreign embassies and internal government institutions. Protocol 11 of the Holy Synod (the Bulgarian Church's highest authority) shows that by mid-February 1913 the frightened Muslims had begun to recuperate and to fight back. In particular the *pokrastvane* missions in Serres and Nevrokop were reporting to the ecclesiastical authorities that "Pomak villages in Nevrokop have returned to the Muslim faith" and that "instructors were going among the Pomaks to instigate them to rebel."<sup>66</sup> As the conversion violence escalated during the first three months of 1913, Pomak resistance intensified. Indeed the Bulgarian Orthodox Church expressed fear in the same protocol that "the holy mission" might fail for two reasons: (1) the bitter winter that hampered the missionaries' ability to move about; and (2) the growing defiance of the Muslims.<sup>67</sup> For the first time since the beginning of the *pokrastvane*, the church went on the defensive by denying all allegations of violence and by continuing to insist that "the conversion of the Pomaks was voluntary." As the number of complaints grew, however, it became increasingly difficult to dismiss them as rumors. Consequently Bulgaria's political and military regime began to distance itself from the religious authorities. Fending for themselves, church officials proceeded to blame the noxious rumors on Protestant jealousy of the Orthodox Church's success in gaining converts.<sup>68</sup>

Meanwhile the Muslim protests against the *pokrastvane* continued. In a telegram to the Bulgarian Legation in London of January 7, 1913, Prime Minister Geshov complained:

Today the English Consul handed me a memorandum, turning my attention to some alleged abuse against Muslims, and hoping that we would take all measures to stop it and punish the culprits. In response, I said that a month earlier I had talked to General Savov [deputy-commander in chief of the Bulgarian army] about the situation and he had authorized...an investigation of these crimes and punishment for the perpetrators.<sup>69</sup>

Further, a protocol of the Holy Synod refers to a letter of the Ministry of Denominations (the state organ in charge of religious affairs)

from January 18, 1913, which clearly points to the state's complicity in the *pokrastvane*. Apparently the letter in question was intended to alert the church officials that Pomak delegations had been complaining of "abuses and forced Christianization" not only to foreign consuls but to the ministry itself and even to King Ferdinand of Bulgaria. "His Majesty's Chief of Staff informed the King," it reports, "that the same delegation [that had complained to the Ministry of Denominations] appeared in the royal palace to complain of abuses during the Christianization of the Pomaks."<sup>70</sup>

As is evident from the communication of St. Kostov, secretary of the Holy Synod, to Stoyu Shishkov, the Muslims were taking action against the *pokrastvane* as early as December 1912. In the letter Kostov notified Shishkov, a participant in the conversion missions as noted above, that Archbishop Maxim was aware of "some Pomaks from the Peshtera district" complaining of torture and forced conversion to the Turkish mufti (regional Muslim religious leader). Joined by the mufti himself, these Pomaks even brought their case before "the Police Commandant in Plovdiv." But "[t]he Commandant issued them with a warning to produce factual evidence before complaining of torture or else they would be prosecuted for slander."<sup>71</sup>

Nor did threat and intimidation discourage the Muslims. Voicing their collective protest on February 4, 1913, the population of three Rhodopean villages anonymously addressed the chair of the Bulgarian Parliament in the following letter:

Mr. Dr. Danev,

We are Bulgarian Mohammedans from the villages of Dryanovo, Er-Küpria, and Bogutevo, Stanimaka District[.] [T]he terror, violence, and sword over our heads to become Christians has reached its highest point[.] [W]e truly believe that our sacred Constitution does not permit that we be humiliated and beaten in order to abandon our religion. We are born in it, and we want to remain in it. If you could only bear witness to the sobs and suffering of us, the defenseless, you would know that the conversions are not voluntary, but produced by violence[.] This is shown by the fact—known to the whole world—that if we wanted to convert, we would have done so 35 years ago when Russia came,<sup>72</sup> not now, when we should enjoy freedom in the embrace of Great Bulgaria.

We place our faith in you, in your ability to...put an end to our suffering, so that we, and our whole nation, may see that the

hopes we had vested in You, upon electing You to that Titanic office to work for Bulgaria's greatness, have not been betrayed.

02/04/1913

Reverentially,

The citizens of Er-Küpria, Dryanovo, and Bogutevo<sup>73</sup>

Effective Pomak protest was often enabled by sympathetic Christian Bulgarians. For instance, the teacher in the village of Oreshets, Mr. Kodjabashov, apparently loathing the whole conversion affair, encouraged the people of Er-Küpria to resist the conversion. He admitted "a Pomak deputation from Er-Küpria to his home" and advised them "how to file a complaint." This information was transmitted to the Holy Synod by Archbishop Maxim, who warned that "other teachers and clerks are telling the Bulgarian-Mohammedans not to accept baptism, advising them how to complain from abuse, submitting protest notes, and even writing those for them." In conclusion Maxim asked the Holy Synod to take measures against individuals who thus thwarted "the holy mission" and went against the interests of "the church and the fatherland."<sup>74</sup>

By the spring of 1913 the Pomak community had been actively engaged in systematic acts of defiance, both individually and collectively. Entire villages refused to attend church or further submit to Orthodox Christian baptisms, burials, and weddings. Much of this courage stemmed from the realization that the Bulgarian government, frightened by the growing publicity, was withdrawing its support for the *pokrastvane*. Thus the church was fending for itself. Also, by fall 1913 Bulgaria was already losing the Second Balkan War. With defeat came demoralization as well as waning of the national zeal to Christianize the Pomaks. The religious missions and their civilian aides carried out the *pokrastvane* for a while longer, but their efforts soon failed without the intimidating presence of the military. By September 1913 the missionaries were transmitting discouraging news to Archbishop Maxim and the Holy Synod. Priest Nikola Stamenov, a missionary in the village of Dorkovo, included the following news in his report to Maxim:

During the last three weeks—September 15, 22, and 29—everyone, men as well as women, refuse to come to church. On Sundays the men plow their fields and the women do their laundry, while you can rarely see a man plowing or a woman washing any other day. Since September 25 [1913] there is commotion among them; 5–6 new Christians from other villages come here every day under the

pretext of visiting relatives, but they gather together for counsel; they put a deliberate person on watch for when I approach; in my presence they switch to talking about other, insignificant matters. The coffee shops are full of people these days and stay open through the night[.] I've tried to tell them many times to close the shops and go home, but they don't listen to me[.] I informed the police about all that already. There are seven newborns due for baptizing[.] I've warned the parents four times already to bring them [to the church] for baptizing, but they refuse[.] I reported it to the municipal authorities, but no cooperation from there so far. Everyone is selling goats, sheep, cattle, houses, whatever property they have, saying they'll be leaving soon for Asia [Turkey], where they've purchased land already. They don't let me call them by their new names. Boys 15–16 years of age wear fezzes again, telling me they've worn out their hats already. Women started covering their face a hundred times more thoroughly than they did in Ottoman times.<sup>75</sup>

Priest B. Hristov reported nearly the same story from Er-Küprü: "For two weeks already there has been great excitement among the new converts[.]...[T]heir insubordination is growing too[.] [T]hey respect nothing related to the church anymore; and no one listens to my counsel.... Already some of them are openly saying, 'We are Turks [Muslims], and we'll remain Turks, because our rights will be restored.'" <sup>76</sup> Such tales of frustration for the missionaries and emerging hope for the Muslims abounded by the fall of 1913. In a report of October 1, Atanass Zlatkov, priest in Banya-Chepino, related to Archbishop Maxim that "[o]ne of the old Christians, Miko Akev, had said to the new convert Miladin Tumbey, 'Good evening, Miladine!' to which the latter retorted, 'Don't call me Miladine! I have a name.'" The same priest also reported how he asked the "convert Assen Trenov, 'Why aren't you coming to church?' He said he didn't have any money to light a candle in the church. I told him that...if he had money for cigarettes, he should have for candles, too.... [T]o this he replied that he is a 'European' and does not need to go to church."<sup>77</sup>

Another missionary, Toma Belchev, serving in the Pomak village of Chepelare, wrote to Archbishop Maxim on December 24, 1913:

I saw this person from Güzdünitsa wearing a fez:  
 "Where are you from?" I asked.

“From Güzdünitsa.”

“What’s your name?”

“Hassan.”

“Aren’t you baptized?”

“Yes, you baptized me, but with baptizing alone, you can’t take my faith away.”

“You must know that once you’ve been baptized, you can’t wear the fez anymore.”

“That time is over. It used to be dark, but now it’s light again,” he said to me.<sup>78</sup>

By the end of 1913 the *pokrastvane* was indeed a dead affair: the Pomak Muslims were free to restore their Muslim faith and identity. But the excesses and killing that accompanied the conversion went unpunished. Moreover, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church took steps to reward the leaders of insurgent bands who carried out some of the bloodiest pogroms against the Pomak population. For example, Protocol 44 of the Holy Synod from October 24, 1913, reads:

[During this session the Holy Synod] dealt with the matter of rewarding Tane Nikolov and his comrades for their contribution to our mission of converting the Pomaks from the Gümürcina district....

Wherever he acted on this holy mission with his 22 comrades, Tane Nikolov has shown great diligence, loyalty, tact, wisdom, and unquestionable selflessness from the moment of his arrival in Gümürcina.

Tane Nikolov and his group had been dispatched [there] by the district government and [had acted] with the consent of the Chief Army Quarters, to assist the church missions [in converting the Pomaks]....

For this the Holy Synod will plead with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Religious Denominations to award Tane Nikolov and his comrades the amount of 20,000 leva for their selfless—and very valuable to the State, Nation, and Church—contribution.<sup>79</sup>

In the course of the same session the Holy Synod formally aborted the *pokrastvane* campaign after having lost the support of the army and state authorities. Accordingly the session’s protocol reads: “It has been decided that the missions for conversion of the Pomaks are henceforth



revoked and relieved of their duties until further notice when our work could resume.”<sup>80</sup> The next forced Christianization of Pomak Muslims would not take place until three decades later.

#### WAR AND *POKRASTVANE* NO MORE

As early as July 1913 Bulgaria was losing the Second Balkan War. While Greek troops were taking away Macedonia from the south, Turkey was recapturing Thrace from the southeast. That same month the coalition government of Stoyan Danev, which carried out part of the *pokrastvane*, fell. King Ferdinand appointed a new cabinet headed by Vassil Radoslavov as prime minister. Bulgaria's conclusive defeat in the Second Balkan War forced the Radoslavov government to accept the terms of the Bucharest Peace Treaty (August 10, 1913), followed by the Treaty of Constantinople a month and a half later. The Treaty of Constantinople allowed Bulgaria to retain control over most of the Rhodope Mountains (the rest remained in Greece), a territory densely populated by Pomaks. But Bulgaria was also bound to honor a number of provisions related to the protection of Muslim rights and freedoms. Article 7 of the treaty established that all Muslim (and other) persons living in former Ottoman territories presently annexed to Bulgaria were to become full-fledged Bulgarian citizens. Those wishing to retain their Ottoman citizenship, however, could immigrate to Turkey within next four years with all their movable property. Article 8 of the treaty guaranteed all Muslims living in Bulgaria the right to equality before the law, freedom of conscience, and freedom to profess and practice their religion. It further mandated that Bulgaria recognized and respected the right of Muslim parishes to own property as well as to maintain and regulate their own hierarchical structure. Articles 9 and 10 of the Treaty of Constantinople additionally decreed that all rights and privileges—including property rights—acquired by persons and/or entities established under valid Ottoman laws were likewise to be retained and respected. A separate provision, binding for Bulgaria and Turkey alike, guaranteed that Christian and Muslim burial grounds would be respected. Article 16 established the right to free movement of nationals of the two countries within the territory of the other.<sup>81</sup>

After the Balkan Wars Bulgaria embarked on a process of restoring its relationship with Turkey and improving the treatment of its Muslim minorities. The cabinet of Vassil Radoslavov played a pivotal role in the postwar healing. On October 16, 1913, for example, the government published a “Manifesto to the Population from the Newly Liberated

Territories,” proclaiming its commitment to respect the rights and freedoms of the Bulgarian citizens from the new territories.<sup>82</sup> Consequently the Rhodopean Pomaks expressed their appreciation for the government’s reversal of the conversion by voting en masse for Radoslavov’s Liberal Party, effectively aiding his reelection on February 23, 1914.

## CONCLUSION

The brutal *pokrastvane* of 1912–13 was a move toward territorial, political, and cultural consolidation of the Bulgarian state and nation. Bulgarian authorities, supported by the church, hoped for a quick and efficient national unification through conversion of a significant segment of the population—a step deemed necessary to thwart potential territorial claims by Turkey. Dictated by national ideals, fashioned by the ruling elites and the intelligentsia, and fed to the masses, the politics of coercive assimilation inspired the dominant ethno-religious group to accept and execute the *pokrastvane*.

The spirit and letter of Bulgarian nationalism was that of an emerging nation-state. The previously subjugated population, which lacked traditions of self-government, sought to build a sovereign national state. Harboring no respect for individual freedom or cultural difference, the new nation intended to substitute the formerly subjugated status of the prevalent ethno-religious group with one of undisputed domination over all other communities within the claimed territories. The strategy was to enforce cohesion through coercion rather than through integration of dichotomous groups. The more closely affiliated these groups were with the former oppressor, the more likely targets of coercion they became.

The language typical of Bulgaria’s nationalism echoes from the letter of a group of patriotic activists from Pazardzhik (who would eventually carry out the conversion of Pomaks in the central Rhodopes) to the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, to prime minister Ivan Geshov, and to the minister of internal affairs, Al. Lyutskanov, on December 1, 1912:

The Bulgarian soldiers fulfilled the trust laid upon them by the King and the People.... The victorious Bulgarian troops gave freedom to our subjugated brothers beyond Rila and the Rhodope [Mountains]. Bulgaria is great, whole, and strong. But with this comes a great responsibility: in a future united Bulgaria we will have many foreign peoples and faiths. And foreign faiths bring

about foreign ideals.... One people, one society will be easier to rule and better off because unity of creed would enable that society to prevail. Even philanthropists dream of a mankind guided by the same moral principles—by one ideal.

And what loftier, brighter ideal could mankind have than Christianity?

We led a war not of conquest, but of freedom; a war of the Cross—the creator of all culture and civilization.

This is why one of our goals must be to spread Christianity among all our future subjects. To enlighten and educate these citizens, we must inculcate Christianity in their minds....

Only Christianity will elevate his [the Pomak's] mind and soften his heart. Only by embracing Christianity will he be equal to us in the shared love for our country.<sup>83</sup>

All typical characteristics of Romantic nationalism are identifiable in this excerpt: Bulgaria moved to affirm sovereignty and control over the new territories by coercing the local Pomak population into religious conversion. The nation-state's prevalent majority desperately sought sovereignty as a means to change their previous status as a subjugated people. For the ruling elites the fastest and most efficient way to enforce territorial and cultural sovereignty was through forced assimilation.

The Pomaks were an obvious target for assimilation from the start because they shared a language with the nation's dominant ethno-religious group. Their Islamic religion, however, posed two problems for Bulgaria's ruling elite. First, Islam was the faith of the former Ottoman "oppressor." Therefore it constituted a religio-cultural identity against which the new Bulgarian nation sought to define itself by glorifying its Christian heritage and denigrating that of the "oppressor." Consequently the Pomaks could not be Muslim and Ottoman and had to be Orthodox Christians and Bulgarians. But the resulting violence failed to win the Pomaks for the Bulgarian nation, as might have democratic respect for their difference.

This first comprehensive conversion had a lasting impact on the Pomak identity and cultural heritage. The effect was twofold. First, the *pokrastvane* set a precedent for subsequent Bulgarian regimes to embark on brutal assimilations of the Rhodopean Muslims (and Muslims in general). Second, for the first time, the relatively stable until then sense of Ottoman-Muslim identity of the Pomaks was shaken to its core by the label "descendants of forcibly converted Bulgarian Christians," imposed

on the community by force. Henceforth this ideology would become the core value of Bulgarian nationalism in respect to the Pomaks and their “proper” place within the (Christian) nation-state of Bulgaria.

# NOTES

1. Mary Neuburger, *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). Also by Mary Neuburger: “Bulgaro-Turkish Encounters and the Re-Imaging of the Bulgarian Nation (1878–1995),” *East European Quarterly* 31 (March 1997): 1–20; and “Pomak Borderlands: Muslims on the Edge of Nations,” *Nationalities Papers* 28 (2000): 181–98.
2. Kristen Ghodsee, *Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Transformation of Islam in Post-Socialist Bulgaria* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).
3. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, 49–70.
4. Velichko Georgiev and Stayko Trifonov, eds., *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani 1912–1913*.
5. See *ibid.* See also Tetsuya Sahara in this volume (chapter 14).
6. See Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite*.
7. For evidence of (voluntary) conversion to Islam, see Anton Minkov, *Conversion to Islam in the Balkans*. See also Maria Todorova, “Conversion to Islam as a Trope in Bulgarian Historiography,” in *Balkan Identities*, 129–57; *idem*, “Identity (Trans) formation among Bulgarian Muslims” (Location: Global, Area, and International Archive, 1998), at <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8k7168bs> (accessed November 30, 2009); Ulf Brunnbauer, “Histories and Identities: Nation State and Minority Discourses—The Case of the Bulgarian Pomaks” (Karl-Franzens-University of Graz, 1997), at [http://www.gewi.kfunigraz.ac.at/csbsc/ulf/pomak\\_identities.htm](http://www.gewi.kfunigraz.ac.at/csbsc/ulf/pomak_identities.htm) (accessed November 30, 2009); Antonina Zhelyazkova, Bozhidar Aleksiev, and Zhorzheta Nazurska, *Myusyulmanskite obshtnosti na Balkanite i v Bulgarija* (Sofia: IMIR, 1997); Vera Mutaftchieva, “The Turk, the Jew and the Gypsy,” in *Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria*, ed. Antonina Zhelyazkova, 5–63.
8. Nikolay Haytov, “Smolyan,” 6–13.
9. Brunnbauer, “Histories and Identities.”
10. Todorov dismisses the chronicle as a fake based on three main reasons. First, the language of the document “was too remote from the language of seventeenth century documents”; moreover, the language “reflected nineteenth century forms and conventions.” Second, he found apparent factual discrepancies between the chronicle and Ottoman government documentation from the same period. According to Ottoman sources, the Chepino Valley villages—the arena of purported Islamization—were part of the property of a *vakf* (charitable religious foundation in Islam) from the mid-1500s onward, not a “*voynuk*” ([community of] peasants, serving as soldiers in an auxiliary military corps of the Ottoman army, usually recruited

from among the Bulgarians),” as the chronicle describes them. Third, according to Todorov, the strong “anti-Greek feeling emanating from the document” is clearly anachronistic. The Bulgarian struggle for religious independence from the Greek Orthodox Church and the fervent anti-Greek sentiment, he justly stipulates, only date back to the middle of the nineteenth century and certainly not to the eighteenth century, when the supposed conversion took place. Maria Todorova, “Conversion to Islam as a Trope in Bulgarian Historiography,” 129–57.

11. Ibid., 134–35.
12. The term “Islamization” has two important connotations in the language of Bulgarian nationalism: “forced” and “voluntary.” The “forced Islamization” thesis promotes the idea that the formerly Christian population of the Rhodopes accepted Islam during different periods between the 1400s and 1800s through various forms of coercion. One method of conversion to Islam reportedly occurred through the institution of slavery, whereby the invading Ottomans turned part of the subjugated indigenous population into slaves, who were subsequently emancipated and given land upon becoming Muslims (the *atik/muatik* practice). Another form was by taking local women for wives, who were then converted to Islam. Yet a third method, much touted by Bulgarian historians, was the forced recruitment of Christian boys for training and service in the *yeniçeri* (Janissary, from Turkish *yeniçeri*, “new soldier”) elite Ottoman military units (the *devşirme* practice). Mutafchieva, “The Turk, the Jew and the Gypsy,” 9–10.
13. Ibid., 10.
14. For example, the ethnic Turks, who commonly speak the Turkish language, were not to be directly assimilated, according to the internal instructions of the *pokrastvane*. A letter from Maxim, archbishop of the Plovdiv Diocese, to the Orthodox clergy in charge of the *pokrastvane* of Haskovo, Stanimaka, Pazardzhik, Panagyurishte, and Peshtera reads: “The conversion of pure Turks is not absolutely prohibited. But they can only be baptized if they have wished to do so, and only after they have partly learned the [Bulgarian] language.” Darzhaven Arhiv/State (National) Archives—Plovdiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 115, 464.
15. George W. White, *Nationalism and Territory*, 180.
16. Todorova, “Conversion to Islam as a Trope in Bulgarian Historiography,” 138–39.
17. White, *Nationalism and Territory*, 180. White, for instance, writes: “All Eastern Orthodox Christians were the same to the Ottomans. The Ottomans made no attempts to distinguish one Orthodox Christian from another, whether they were Russians, Bulgarians, Serbian, Greek, or others. Ethnicity was irrelevant, and modern nationhood had no meaning” (ibid.). Also Christopher Cviic, *Remaking the Balkans*, 7.
18. Alexander Kiossev, “The Dark Intimacy,” 175.
19. White, *Nationalism and Territory*, 180, 182.
20. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
21. Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite*, 13. This phrase is used by Jeromonk Pavel, *protosingel* of the Plovdiv Diocese, in a letter to Stoyu Shishkov from November 24, 1912. The excerpt reads: “Can we count on a more or less *en masse* conversion of the Pomaks (in the Rhodopes)? What do you think would be the best time to start proclaiming them in the Christian faith and baptism: right now

- or after our relations with Turkey have been reestablished? I am afraid that if we wait until the conclusion of the peace treaty, *this opportune moment would be irrevocably lost* [emphasis added]." Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 52K, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 818, 1–3.
22. Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrástvaneto na Bálgarite*.
  23. Ibid., 157–71. Confidential report sent to Maxim, archbishop of Plovdiv, and to several ministers of the Bulgarian government by a civilian committee from Pazardzhik engaged in the conversion of Pomaks in the Chepino valley, February 22, 1913. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 107, 79–85.
  24. According to Stoyu Shishkov, who was directly involved in the conversions and later published a book about them, the Pomaks inhabiting European Turkey on the eve of the Balkan Wars (the early fall of 1912) numbered 400,000 and were distributed in 500 towns and villages: Edirne (Odrin), 131,455 people in 207 towns/villages; Thessaloniki (Solun), 98,297 people in 190 towns/villages; Bitolya, 36,669 people in 93 towns/villages; Skopje, 13,114 people in 23 towns/villages. Stoyu Shishkov, *Balgaro-Mohamedanite (Pomatsite)*, 34.
  25. Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, 1–21; Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria*, 23–95.
  26. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 1–21; Crampton, *Bulgaria*, 97–188.
  27. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 7. For details on the Young Turks and Turkish nationalism, see Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*.
  28. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 1–21; Crampton, *Bulgaria*, 150–219.
  29. Crampton, *Bulgaria*, 190–219. See also Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, 49–70.
  30. When so indicated in parentheses, the information stems from the volume of original documents edited by Dr. Velichko Georgiev and Dr. Stayko Trifonov entitled *Pokrástvaneto na Bálgarite Mohamedani (1912–1913)*.
  31. Darzhaven Arhiv, Balgarska Academiya na Naukite/Bulgarian Academy of Science, Fond 11K, Inventory 3, Archival Unit 1676, 2–3 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrástvaneto na Bálgarite Mohamedani*, 65). All Bulgarian sources, including archival documents, used in this chapter are translated from Bulgarian by the author.
  32. "The vicinity" refers to "Stanimaka, Ahı Çelebi, Daridere, and Skeçe, and—above all—Chepelare, Shiroka Laka, Alamidere, Turyan, Arda, Raykovo, and Pashmaklı" (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrástvaneto na Bálgarite Mohamedani*).
  33. "Report on the Situation in the Districts of Ahı-Çelebi, Egridere, and Skeçe after the Bulgarian Troops Passed through the Region from 2 December 1912." Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 121, 12–13 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrástvaneto na Bálgarite Mohamedani*, 17–18).
  34. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, 145–9 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrástvaneto na Bálgarite Mohamedani*, 88–91).
  35. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 116, 239–41 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrástvaneto na Bálgarite Mohamedani*, 289).
  36. Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrástvaneto na Bálgarite Mohamedani*.
  37. Ibid.
  38. In another letter to Ivan Shishmanov from February 10, 1913, Stoyu Shishkov,

- writes: "It has been a week already since the Pomaks in Chepelare have been converted as well, and they are so enthusiastic that it is as if they've never been Mohammedans. The men wear hats with crucifixes on them—a sign testifying to the fact that they are no longer Mohammed's followers—and the women, who have thrown off the veil, are lighting candles, kissing the icons, and crossing themselves admirably." Darzhaven Arhiv, Balgarska Akademiya na Naukite/Bulgarian Academy of Science, Fond 11, Inventory 3, Archival Unit 1676, 6–11 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 135–36).
39. Ibid. Also see figures 11.2 and 11.3
  40. Confidential report of the Pazardzhik activists on Pomak conversion to the Holy Synod, to Archbishop Maxim of Plovdiv, and to several ministries, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of War, and others from February 22, 1913. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 107, 79–85 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 157–71).
  41. Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 157–71
  42. Ibid.
  43. Ibid.
  44. Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*.
  45. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the other Western Christian powers were sympathetic to the self-determination cause of the newly emerging Christian nation-states in the Balkan Peninsula after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, as suggested in a document cited in this chapter (the Carnegie Report). The Great Powers, however, were also concerned with the humanitarian situation of the Muslim population that remained within these nation-states. For instance, a number of peace treaties signed between Bulgaria and the Great Powers contained special provisions that guaranteed certain minority rights, including religious freedom (see the section "War and *Pokrastvane* No More"). The *pokrastvane*, a clear breach of these provisions, was unwelcome by the Western powers.
  46. Words of Maxim, archbishop of Plovdiv, on the margins of a report sent to him by Sv. V. Iliev from January 30, 1913. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, 39 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 87). In the document Maxim wrote: "Suobshti mu se ustno...da ne hodi s voynitsi ni sus strazhari, za da ne se petni cv. Delo i se dava povod za obvineniya, che tsurkvata si sluzhi s nesvoystveni nei sredstva" (He was orally told...not to go around with soldiers and gendarmes for that would sully our holy mission [of *pokrastvane*] with accusations that *the church resorts to means uncharacteristic of its nature* [to convert the Pomaks]) (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 87; emphasis added).
  47. Central National Archives—Sofia (TsDIA), Fond 568, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 766, 4 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 14).
  48. Mehmed Shehov, interview by author, Valkossel, Bulgaria, June 24, 2007.
  49. Ibid.

50. Ibrahim Imam and Senem Konedareva, *Ablanitsa prez vekovete*, 42, 43.
51. Ibid., 42–44.
52. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission*, 278–79.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., 279.
55. Ibid., 279–80.
56. Ibid., 282.
57. Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria*. Conclusions to the same effect may be gleaned from the following works, among others: Nikolay Haytov, “Smolyan”; and *Rodopski Vlastelini* (Sofia: Fatherland Front, 1976); Petar Marinov, *Salih Aga, Rodopski voyvoda i deribey: Cherti iz života i upravljenieto mu—Dramatizatsia po ustni predanii i legendi v pet deystvia* (Plovdiv: Collection Rodina, 1940); Salih Bozov, *V imeto na imeto* (Sofia: Fondatsia Liberalna Integratsia, 2005); and Imam and Konedareva, *Ablanitsa prez vekovete*.
58. This is implied by the totality of records published in Georgiev and Trifonov’s volume.
59. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, 32 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 58).
60. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, 10 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 85–86).
61. Telegram of Maxim, archbishop of Plovdiv, to the mayor of the town of Kaloffer from February 3, 1913, Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, 57 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 110).
62. Telegram of Maxim, archbishop of Plovdiv, to Yossiff, bishop of Daridere, from February 3, 1913. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, 62 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 111).
63. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 124, 137–38 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 142).
64. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 125, 22–23 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 35).
65. TsDIA, Fond 586, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 1014, 1 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 278).
66. Protocol 11 of the Holy Synod from the session of February 12, 1913, TsDIA, Fond 791, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 24, 114–21 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 137–40).
67. TsDIA, Fond 791, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 24, 114–121 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 137–40).
68. TsDIA, Fond 791, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 24, 114–121 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 137–40). Western Protestant missions were also active in the conversion of Muslims in the Balkans, so there was a kind of competition for converts between them and the Eastern Orthodox, who dominated most Christian nations on the peninsula.
69. TsDIA, Fond 568, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 757, 1 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani*, 28).



70. Protocol 2 of the Holy Synod from its session on January 19, 1913, TsDIA, Fond 791, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 24, 11–14 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 62).
71. The letter is dated December 31, 1912: TsDIA, Fond 568, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 800, 16 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 21).
72. The letter is referring to the Russian-Turkish War of 1876–78, as a result of which Bulgaria gained its independence. The Russian imperial troops invaded the Ottoman Empire and fought most of the war within modern-day Bulgaria.
73. Protest letter from the population of Er-Küprü, Dryanovo, and Bogutevo to the chair of the Parliament from February 4, 1913, Darzhaven Arhiv, Bulgarian Historical Archives, Fond 15, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 1832, 22 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 113).
74. Letter of Archbishop Maxim of Plovdiv to the Holy Synod from February 5, 1913, Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 123, 117 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 289).
75. The report is dated September 30, 1913: Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 117, 69–70 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 415).
76. Report of B. Hristov, priest in Er-Küprü, to Archbishop Maxim from October 14, 1913, Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 117, 83–84 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 419–20).
77. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 117, 74–78 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 416–17).
78. Darzhaven Arhiv, Fond 67K, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 117, 207–8 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 456).
79. TsDIA, Fond 791, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 24, 579, 581–82, 587–88, 598 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 421–22).
80. TsDIA, Fond 791, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 24, 579, 581–82, 587–88, 598 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 421–22).
81. Fatme Myuhtar, “The Human Rights of the Muslims in Bulgaria in Law and Politics since 1878,” 16–17.
82. “Manifesto to the Population from the Newly Liberated Territories,” *Official Gazette* 329 (October 1913).
83. Letter of a group of patriotic activists from Pazardzhik to the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, to prime minister Ivan Geshov and to minister of internal affairs Al. Lyutskanov of December 1, 1912, TsDIA, Fond 568, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 404, 1–3 (Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 15).

## Bulgaria's Policy toward Muslims during the Balkan Wars

*Neriman Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu*

The period between 1877 and 1885, during which the Bulgarian Principality was established and expanded, was an important time in the process of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. During that period Bulgaria was the home to a sizable Muslim population. At the same time a great number of Rumeli Turks were forcibly removed from their homes, in which they had resided for hundreds of years. The beginning of the Balkan Wars was the breaking point for the Muslims in Bulgaria. Muslims affected by Bulgarian policies can be divided into two groups. The first consisted of Muslims who lived in the Bulgarian Principality and were Bulgarian nationals. The Bulgarian government's decision to begin the war against the Ottoman Empire put these Muslims in a difficult situation, especially because they saw the Ottoman state as a fatherland and were supported by it. The second group consisted of Muslims in Ottoman lands captured by the Bulgarians. This chapter is concerned with Bulgaria's policies toward the second group.

But first it is important to discuss the available sources on Bulgarian policies toward the Muslims during the war and how this topic has been evaluated in different historical narratives.

### SOURCES AND HISTORIES OF THE BALKAN WARS AND BULGARIA'S POLICIES TOWARD MUSLIMS

In the Bulgarian historical narrative the phrase "Macedonian Bulgarian" has remained in usage to this day. The Thrace region, which composed the Edirne Vilayet, was seen as Bulgarian land much like Macedonia. Consequently, Bulgaria justified its capture of these lands as "liberation."

Socialist historical narratives are critical of the Bulgarian government's policies during this period. They blame the "bourgeois politics" of Tsar Ferdinand and the Bulgarian bourgeoisie for Bulgaria's defeat and loss of most of the territory that was regarded as parts of the Bulgarian fatherland. But the policies toward the Muslims in the regions that Bulgaria captured did not undergo any critical analysis until 1990. Some works have been written concerning the forcible Christianization of the Pomaks living in Rhodope Mountains due to their "being Bulgarian." Velichko Georgiev and Stayko Trifonov's 1995 volume of official documents about the Christianization of Muslims is an important source.<sup>1</sup> Yet Bulgarian historians have not taken much interest in writing about the policy of the Bulgarians toward the Muslims living in eastern and western Thrace after Bulgarian armies advancing on Gallipoli and Çatalca captured it. Instead they have primarily emphasized the grievances of Bulgarians.<sup>2</sup>

The historical narrative constructed by many Turkish historians considers the grievances of the Muslims. One of the first and most important works on the massacres and attacks against the Muslims during the Balkan wars is by İlker Alp. His book includes many photographs and documents from the Turkish Military archives ATASE (Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Dairesi Başkanlığı Arşivi) in Ankara.<sup>3</sup> Ahmet Halaçoğlu wrote one of the most important works regarding the migrations caused by the Balkan Wars. His doctoral dissertation includes detailed documents from the Ottoman archives about the reasons for the migrations, the settlement of migrants, and the migration commission.<sup>4</sup> H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu's work also touches on the issue of migration from the Balkans during the Balkan Wars.<sup>5</sup> Bilal Şimşir shows that approximately two hundred thousand Turkish Muslims were killed during the wars.<sup>6</sup> The Turkish historical narrative has been confirmed by many foreigners as well. For instance, Justin McCarthy's *Death and Exile* claims that an "ethnic cleansing of Muslims" took place.<sup>7</sup>

Some other recent publications include Emine Bayraktarova's doctoral dissertation, "The Status of Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (1908–1919)," and Sibel Orhan's master's thesis, "The Bulgarian Massacres of Turks during the Balkan Wars," based primarily on newspaper sources of the time.<sup>8</sup>

Memoirs are also an important source of information regarding Bulgaria's policy toward Muslims in Thrace during the Balkan Wars, especially those composed by Ahmet Cevat, Mahmut Muhtar Paşa, and Dr. Cemil.<sup>9</sup> Many other works on the massacres of Muslims dating back to the Balkan Wars have been written by Turks. There are also Bulgarian

memoirs on the wars. These include the memoirs of Simeon Radev, who participated in the war on the Bulgarian side as a volunteer, and the memoirs of Oton Barbar, a Pole who participated in the Balkan Wars.<sup>10</sup> Documents found in the Ottoman Başbakanlık Archives (BOA) and ATASE Archives as well as in the Bulgarian archives in Sofia and Plovdiv are an important source of information regarding the wars. Some of these documents related to the Pomaks have been published in edited volumes. The Carnegie Report is also an important source of information on the massacres during the Balkan Wars.<sup>11</sup>

#### THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT'S CHRISTIANIZATION POLICY TOWARD THE POMAKS DURING THE WAR

The Bulgarian Principality, created after the Treaty of Berlin, was recognized as autonomous. The rights of the Muslims living within the borders of the principality were guaranteed according to its constitution.<sup>12</sup> On the eve of the wars, however, both the Bulgarian government and the Bulgarian people started to react negatively toward the Muslims. According to Bulgarian documents, the Bulgarian peoples, who saw the Muslims as "servants" of the Ottoman administration, aroused animosity against the Ottomans. They held the Muslims in Bulgaria responsible for the Ottoman administration's 500-year presence in the region. Hence the Bulgarian villagers began harassing Muslims.

Yet the Bulgarian army was primarily responsible for instigations against the Muslims living in the newly occupied regions. After the start of the First Balkan War, prime minister Ivan Geshov, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and especially Tsar Ferdinand undertook a campaign of forced Christianization against the Muslim Pomaks in the Rhodope Mountains (a mountain range that extends from western Thrace to eastern Macedonia) under the leadership of the heads of the Macedonia-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization (VMRO). They believed the Pomaks to have been originally forcibly converted to Islam, because they spoke a Slavic language that was close to Bulgarian. According to the Bulgarian historical narrative, the Bulgarian government applied a policy of Christianization to reinforce Bulgarian hegemony over the "newly liberated" territories.<sup>13</sup>

The reasons for this harsh extermination and assimilation policy toward the Pomaks were manifold. The Pomaks living in Rupçoz, located south of Plovdiv, had been volunteers in the Ottoman army during the Bulgarian rebellion. Some Pomak volunteers even organized attacks

against Bulgarian villages that had attacked their villages during the rebellion, including attacks on the village of Batak. The massacre that the Pomaks undertook there, known throughout the world press as the "Batak Massacre," was a major factor in the decision of the Great Powers to intervene.<sup>14</sup> The Russian armies were violently resisted throughout western Thrace and especially in Pomak villages during the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War. According to the Berlin Treaty, Pomak villages in the Rupçoz district stood within the borders of the new created *vilayet* Eastern Rumeli which was under Russian occupation and Bulgarian control. Muslims in the Kırcaali and Rhodope region refused to be part of this *vilayet* and took up armed resistance. In accordance with an agreement between Bulgaria and the Ottoman government in 1885 concerning Bulgaria's annexation of Eastern Rumelia, the Rupçoz Pomak villages and the Kırcaali region were given back to the Ottomans. When the Bulgarian armies entered Pomak villages during the First Balkan War they either massacred the people and forced them to migrate or started to Bulgarize and Christianize them collectively. The Christianization policy can be understood as a type of punishment for the previous resistance of the Pomaks. In spite of the stipulation of freedom of religion in articles 40 and 42 of the Tirnovo Constitution, no respect was shown for the Muslims' religion.

The Baptize Committee was established in Nevrokop (now Gotse Delchev) in the western and central Rhodope and started the Bulgarization campaign during the war. Accordingly religious representatives and teachers were specially trained in order to Christianize the Muslims by going through each village and neighborhood. Maksim, the metropolitan of Plovdiv, quickly Christianized the Muslims in the Rhodope, particularly between late 1912 and 1913. A group of twenty-two people, consisting of mostly merchants, teachers, and lawyers, engaged in religious conversion in Tatar Pazardjik (Pazardzhik). In a letter to the Spiritual Council and Ivan Geshov dated December 1, 1912, members of this group wrote that the following numbers of Muslims changed their religion in the villages: 250 households in Kornitsa, 50 in Zirnevo, 200 in Lizhnitsa, 200 in Breznitsa, and all Muslims in Teshovo, Tirlis, and Dobrinita.<sup>15</sup> In the sources, 150,000 Pomaks were forcibly converted to Christianity and were forced to wear a special hat.<sup>16</sup>

Many Pomaks were exposed to hunger, homelessness, and the massacres of the Bulgarian army; however, they were able to protect themselves from Bulgaria's hostile policies by becoming Christians. The priests gave small children Bulgarian names and baptized them. Mosques were

converted into churches, and traditional Muslim dress was forbidden. Muslim religious customs were banned; everyone was forced to practice Christian religious customs. After the Radoslavov government assumed power following the Balkan Wars from 1913 onward, the assimilation policy was lifted and Muslims were allowed to return to their religion. But assimilation policies toward the Pomaks were continued and gradually tightened in later periods.

#### THE BULGARIAN ARMY AND THE POLICIES OF THE BANDS TOWARD THE MUSLIMS DURING THE WAR

Bulgaria justified the war as an attempt to save the Christians and especially the Bulgarians living in Macedonia and Adrianople from the "oppression" of the Turks. But the Bulgarian tsar Ferdinand's real aim was to capture Istanbul, Thrace, and Macedonia.<sup>17</sup> When the Balkan War was declared, an army of volunteers, named the Macedonia-Adrianople Army, was formed in addition to the Bulgarian Army. This army included Bulgarians who had migrated from Adrianople and Macedonia as volunteers. It consisted of approximately fifteen thousand soldiers, including 531 foreigners, the largest group being 275 Armenians.<sup>18</sup> In the Bulgarian historical narrative, the very participation of the volunteers in the fight against the Ottomans was justification for the war in and of itself. The large number of volunteers was interpreted as an indication of how much the Bulgarians and other peoples had yearned for hundreds of years to achieve their freedom.

The Bulgarian government and the VMRO bands, who had previously been at constant odds and experienced a host of disagreements with each other, found common ground during the Balkan War against the Ottomans. They both believed it to be a liberation war. The Bulgarians, who had a good army, managed to advance on Ottoman territory, seize many villages, and place them in the possession of Bulgaria.

Regions seized by the Bulgarian army were subjected to massacre, pillage, and plunder. According to information in archival sources these massacres were systematic. Upon hearing news of the massacres committed by the Bulgarian soldiers and the Macedonian committees, Muslims fled en masse out of panic and fear. Turks living in villages in the Lüleburgaz and Edirne regions in particular abandoned their homes upon hearing the news that the Bulgarian army was quickly advancing, plundering homes, and killing Turks. Oton Barbar, a Pole who was a captain

in the Sixth Infantry Regiment of the Bulgarian army, explained the advance of the Bulgarian army in his 1920 memoirs. The Bulgarian army, he wrote, advanced quickly and took towns and villages by force. He witnessed the Bulgarian regiment coming upon Vaysal in the Edirne region. There they burned some of the Turks' homes then abandoned the village, leaving only a few local Bulgarians remaining. Bulgarians living in the village were given permission to occupy the homes that the Muslims had abandoned. On October 17, 1912, the Bulgarians advanced toward Lüleburgaz. After they captured it, it looked like a dead city. In a panic, the Muslims vacated their houses and ran to the rail station. One of the two trains there left the station just as the Bulgarian army began to open fire on it. Meanwhile the Greeks broke into and plundered the shops that the Turks had abandoned. Barbar wrote: "We saw what was probably a Turkish shop owner lying dead in front of the shop door while a Greek emerged from the shop. In his hand was a half-opened box of sugar. This Greek, who was shocked and frightened at the sight of us, started to distribute the sugar among the Bulgarian soldiers standing on the path."<sup>19</sup>

Another interesting thing happened as the Bulgarian army was occupying Lüleburgaz. All of the houses along the path that the soldiers had trodden were marked on their doors with the sign of the cross in chalk. The Christians who lived in the region tried to protect themselves from being killed by marking their doors in this way to show that they were Christian. In a number of instances Muslims were lined up in the streets and shot. According to Barbar, Greek men, women, and children would stand in front of their homes, hold icons in front of their faces, and make the sign of the cross. Many Greek women would wave white handkerchiefs from their windows.<sup>20</sup> The demeanor of the Christians toward the Bulgarian army as described in Barbar's memoirs clearly shows how great a threat the Muslims were under.

#### THE MACEDONIAN-EDIRNE ARMY AND THE ARMENIAN VOLUNTEER UNIT

In relation to the massacres of the Muslims, the Macedonia-Edirne Volunteer Army rises to the forefront. The activities of this army against the Muslims are made clear in Leon Trotsky's reports. A wounded soldier who was among the Armenian volunteers brought to Sofia told Trotsky that they entered Ottoman lands from Kırcaali. The Muslim-inhabited regions were abandoned and the villages burned. The animals wandered aimlessly without caretakers. Before the Muslims returned, the

Bulgarians and the Macedonia-Edirne volunteer army burned their homes. The Macedonia volunteers believed it necessary to kill the Turks that they encountered outside the villages because they thought that they were Ottoman agents (indeed they legitimated these killings in accusing the Turks of being agents). They would first ask the Muslims a few questions to try to see if they could learn anything from them then would shoot or stab them. The head of the Armenian unit, Andranik (Ozanian),<sup>21</sup> who was fabled among the Armenian revolutionaries, supposedly did not allow the Armenians to sabotage property and commit massacres, but when he and the other Armenian volunteers found the chance they would burn Muslim houses. A Turk who was found by the Armenians was also stabbed. "But," said the wounded Armenian volunteer, "it is necessary to point out that everyone remembered the massacres that were committed against the Armenians."<sup>22</sup> It is clear from this report that the Turks were hated and that the Bulgarians pursued a systematic policy of massacre based on such feelings.

#### THE MASSACRES COMMITTED BY BANDS

In Macedonia and Thrace many large massacres were perpetrated by Macedonian committees and bands. Evidence for this is found in the Carnegie Report and in an article published in the newspaper *Le Temps* on July 10, written by a Catholic priest named Gustave Michel who lived in Kukuş. According to this information, the leader of the Bulgarian band, Donchev, and his followers shut all of the men inside a mosque and forced all of the women to gather around the mosque and watch. The committee members threw three bombs inside the mosque, yet it did not completely burn. They then set fire to the mosque, burning some seven hundred men alive. Those attempting to flee were shot by committee members standing around the mosque. Michel personally saw half-burned human legs, arms, and heads in the streets. Donchev's band also undertook massacres in Planitsa. First they would gather the men inside the mosque and burn them alive. Then they would gather the women in the village center and burn them as well. In Kukuş the Muslims were killed by the local Bulgarians of the town, who burned their mosques. All unarmed groups of Turkish soldiers who fled and reached Thessaloniki were killed.<sup>23</sup> Examples of other massacres, acts of arson, and robbery perpetrated by similar committees and bands can be found.

One such act of aggression was experienced in mid-1912 in Petrovo within the district under the influence of Yane Sandanski, a famous



committee leader who allied with the Committee of Union and Progress.<sup>24</sup> All of the Turks living in Petrovo were killed. Mersiya Makdermot, the author of Sandanski's biography, writes that Sandanski was unaware of this act of aggression when it first happened and that when he learned of it much later he gathered the children of the slain families and gave them to Bulgarian families in order to preserve their lives.<sup>25</sup> If this information is accurate, then it shows that Muslims were unable to be saved even in the regions where more moderate committee members lived.

#### REACTIONS TO COERCION, OPPRESSION, AND MASSACRE

The most notable reaction to the Bulgarian army's tactics by Muslims was their mass migration from the region. A resistance movement was formed in the Kırcaali region against these atrocities of the Bulgarian army and bands. The resisters, who were supported by the Ottoman government, established a temporary government. Documents show that the resisters requested weapons from the Ottoman government to defend themselves against the increasing savageries of the Bulgarians.<sup>26</sup>

Another important practice of the Bulgarian government concerns the properties and lands held by the Muslims and Turks. I have confirmed the existence of a number of petitions by the migrant Muslims to have their lands protected.<sup>27</sup>

#### THE QUESTION OF MIGRATION AND NATIONALITY AFTER THE TREATIES

On September 29, 1913, a treaty between the Ottoman state and Bulgaria was signed.<sup>28</sup> Article 7 of the treaty stipulated that people living on lands given to Bulgaria be recognized immediately as Bulgarian nationals. Muslims who preferred to remain Bulgarian nationals would be afforded the same rights as other Bulgarian citizens. Those wanting to become Ottoman nationals were given a four-year grace period. Minors could choose their nationality when they reached the age of twenty-one, the age of maturity according to Bulgarian law.<sup>29</sup> As migrants came to Ottoman lands, they gave a statement to Bulgarian officials; even though it was necessary for them to obtain documentation from the Ottoman embassy, many did not complete this step because they were making great haste to migrate.<sup>30</sup> Thus they petitioned to have their processing done once they reached the Ottoman state. Their petitions and foreign identity papers that listed their names and place of origin were printed

in Roman rather than Cyrillic letters.<sup>31</sup> The migrations and nationalities of Bulgarian Muslims were topics of great debate until the Republican period.

## CONCLUSION

The Bulgarian army and associated volunteers pursued a policy of capturing Ottoman land on the pretext of "liberation" from the Turks. Information found in both archival documents and memoirs shows that the Bulgarian army systematically sought to assimilate the Muslims and ethnically cleanse them from the region. The Christianization of the Pomaks in the Rhodope mountains and the show of force against the Muslim population indicate that the Bulgarian government sought either to annihilate or forcibly expel the Muslim population in areas that the Bulgarians had captured. Other Christian groups, emboldened by the Bulgarian army, also raided Turkish houses and took their property and possessions. Such policies on the part of the Bulgarians embittered the Muslims and the Ottoman government toward Bulgaria.

## NOTES

1. Velichko Georgiev and Stayko Trifonov, *Pokrăstvaneto na Bălgarite Mohamedani (1912–1913)*; Evgeniya Krăsteva-Blagoeva, "Za imenata i Preimenuvaniyata na Bălgarite Myuysyulmani (1912–2000)," 127; Hüseyin Memişoğlu, *Bulgar Zulmüne Tarihi Bir Bakış*, 17.
2. For the policies of the Greek and Serbian military administrations toward the Bulgarians during the first Balkan War, see Todor Petkov, Svetlozar Eldarov, Nikolay Yanakiev, eds., *Natsionalno-osvoboditelnite Borbi na Bălgarite ot Makedoniya i Odrinska Trakiya prez Balkanskata Voyna (1912–1913)*, 191.
3. İlker Alp, *Belge ve Fotoğraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi (1877–1989)*.
4. Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri (1912–1913)*.
5. H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanlar'ın Makûs Talihi, Göç*, 3.
6. Bilal N. Şimşir, "Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Göç Sorunu," 52–53.
7. Justin McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 6, 144–99.
8. Emine Bayraktarova, "Bulgaristan'daki Müslüman Azınlıkların Statüsü (1908–1919)"; Sibel Orhan, "Balkan Savaşları'nda Türklere Yapılan Bulgar Mezalimi."
9. Ahmet Cevat, *Balkanlar'da Akan Kan*; Mahmut Muhtar Paşa, *Balkan Savaşı Üçüncü Kolordunun ve İkinci Doğu Ordusu'nun Muharebeleri*; and Dr. Cemil, *Bulgar Vahşetleri İntikam, Evlâd ve Ahfâda Yadigâr*.
10. Simeon Radev, *Tova, koeto vidyah ot Balkanskata Voyna*; Oton Barbar, *Moite Spomeni ot Voynite 1912–1918*, 20–23.
11. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*.

12. For the full text of the 1889 Tirnova Constitution accepted by the Bulgarian Principality, see BOA, HR.SYS 323/1, 2; also, for detailed information on the announcement of the first constitution, see Neriman Ersoy-Hacisalihoglu, "Bulgaristan Prensliği'nde Anayasa'nın İlanı," 107-18.
13. Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrštvane to na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 7.
14. For the debate on the Batak Massacre, see Martina Baleva and Ulf Brunnbauer, *Batak kato Myasto na Pametta*; Richard Millman, "The Bulgarian Massacres Reconsidered"; and Ömer Turan, *The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1908*, 47-54.
15. Georgiev and Trifonov, *Pokrštvane to na Bălgarite Mohamedani*, 7-8, 16.
16. Dr. Cemil, *Bulgar Vahşetleri İntikam*, 170; Ahmet Akgün, "Bulgaristan'da Asimilasyon ve 'Zavallı Pomaklar' Adlı Bir Risale"; Ömer Turan, "Rodoplarda 1878 Türk-Pomak Direnişi ve Rodop Komisyonu Raporu," 140.
17. Georgi Andreev, *Koburgite i Katastrofite na Bălgariya*, 27.
18. Also registered in the army were 82 Russians, 68 Romanians, 40 Serbs, 21 Austro-Hungarians, 12 Montenegrins, 3 Greeks, 1 Albanian, 1 English, 1 Italian, and 1 Iranian volunteers. Petkov, Eldarov, and Yanakiev, *Natsionalnoosvoboditelnite Borbi na Bălgarite*, 77, 78.
19. Barbar, *Moite Spomeni ot Voynite*, 23.
20. Ibid.
21. For additional information on the Armenian Volunteer Unit and Andranik, see Bülent Yıldırım, "Bulgaristan'daki Ermeni Komitelerinin Osmanlı Devleti Aleyhine Faaliyetleri (1890-1918)," 116-20.
22. Leon Trotsky, *Die Balkankriege, 1912-13*, 284-85.
23. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission*, 278-79.
24. Mehmet Hacisalihoglu, "Yane Sandanski as a Political Leader in the Era of the Young Turks."
25. Mersiya Makdermot, *Za Svoboda i Săvăršenstvo*, 384-85.
26. BOA, DH.KMS, 63/26. Another interesting demand was that it be permitted to take photographs of the Turks exposed to such cruelty during the Balkan Wars to be shown in the Turkish cinema. BOA, DH.KMS, 63/49.
27. For instance, Molla Hasanoğlu, who migrated to Istanbul, requested that he have rights to his land in Bulgaria. BOA, HR.HMŞ.İŞO, 21/13.
28. Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuk ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri*, vol. 1: *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Antlaşmaları* (Ankara: n.p., 1953), 457-76.
29. BOA, DH.EUM.MEM, 69/7; DH.UMVM, 123/141.
30. BOA, DH.MB.HPS.M, 14/19.
31. BOA, DH.HMŞ, 30/128.

## The Aggressiveness of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Serbs in the Public Discourse during the Balkan Wars

*Amir Duranović*

The religiously diverse territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, long considered the frontier between Catholic Europe and the “East,” by the second half of the nineteenth century had become the fault lines of numerous clashing territorial, cultural, and economic ambitions. Shaping the contours of what would become the ethno-national struggles of emerging political constituencies linking South Slavic Christian Orthodox identity politics, Russian imperial expansionism, and the contradictory forces of entrenched Ottoman administrative traditions was the newfound ambition of the Habsburg Empire in the Balkans. As its immediate neighbor to the south, Bosnia and by extension the territories known as Herzegovina became a logical expansion of a dynamic alliance between once hostile political traditions—German (Austrian) and Hungarian—that both sought ways to consolidate their domination over central Europe and its economic potential. Upon consolidation through a formal alliance, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary gained new impetus to expand southward at the expense of Ottoman and Russian assumptions of cultural hegemony in the Balkans. Ironically it would be the ethno-national fissures that increasingly made Ottoman rule in the region tenuous at best and permitted the Austro-Hungarian Empire formally to entertain a new role.

Through the Russo-Ottoman War in 1877, that Habsburg role solidified into a reality, culminating in a diplomatic rationale accepted by all the major powers in Europe. As part of a larger resolution, the Great Powers understood that the Dual Monarchy not only had interests in

the Balkans but would provide the best way forward in the form of an administrative regime over formally Ottoman territories in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak.<sup>1</sup> Although the Berlin mandate of 1878 had intended for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy faithfully to govern Bosnia and Herzegovina as an exclusively Ottoman territory, the true aspirations of the Habsburg Empire's political and economic elite always pushed the Dual Monarchy toward its annexation.<sup>2</sup>

As discussed in detail below, the sequence of historical events after the occupation demonstrates that the monarchy considered the newly ceded territories as its own. As a consequence, immediately after 1878, it introduced administrative modalities that would permanently settle its legal claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>3</sup> More than simply satisfying various parties' interests in the Balkans, however, the events after occupation speak of a strong diplomatic engagement by which the monarchy strove to strengthen its newly secured economic and political strategic gains. This entailed two different attempts at annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of the nineteenth century. Both attempts failed, however, due to significant international issues, especially the settlement of the Armenian Question and the crises in Crete, which ultimately delayed the issue of annexation for decades.

This chapter explores in detail the consequences of a contentious process of formal annexation in light of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. While offering background in order to appreciate how the Habsburg Empire accomplished its disparate goals with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the central focus here is on the method by which various indigenous agents in the region engaged this process, as reflected in the war taking place elsewhere in the Balkans. Surfacing ethno-national sensibilities among self-identified Serbs (Orthodox Christian Slavs), Bosniaks (Slav Muslims), and Croats (Southern Slav Catholics) ultimately exploded into entirely new forms of confrontation with the Austro-Hungarian administration, which deserves closer scrutiny within the context of a study of the Balkan Wars. Indeed both Muslim and Orthodox Christian communal identities were hardened into modern forms of ethno-national organization as a result of the policies adopted by neighboring regimes in Serbia, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire. In time the increasingly sharpened divide between the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina along sectarian lines translated into an entirely new set of administrative priorities for the Austro-Hungarian administration, in turn indirectly affecting the long-term consequences of the Balkan Wars.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE AND DIPLOMATIC FOUNDATIONS TO ANNEXATION

At the beginning of the twentieth century, members of both the monarchy's political and military elite maintained the opinion that the question of annexation deserved priority because of the contentious dynamics of the state's internal affairs. A final settlement of the Bosnia and Herzegovina question, in other words, promised to resolve internal tensions as well as address the monarchy's external ambitions.

Crises within the monarchy at the beginning of the twentieth century in many ways mirrored those of the Ottoman Empire. Factions claiming to represent different "ethno-national" communities demanded, in increasingly vocal and occasionally violent tones, increased regional autonomy vis-à-vis Vienna. Adding to the Dual Monarchy's troubles, the recently reconciled Hungarian and German (Austrian) factions increasingly found themselves at opposite ends of the empire's political spectrum, especially in respect to dealing with the regionalisms afflicting the monarchy's Balkan—Serbian, Romanian, and Croatian—constituencies. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina promised to address these lingering tensions between often clashing Hungarian and Austrian interests.

As much as policies toward the Balkans reflected domestic Habsburg concerns, actualizing the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina also depended on a stable international climate, especially in respect to the Dual Monarchy's relationship with Russia. In this regard the Dual Monarchy and Russia could only fulfill their different territorial ambitions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. In order to realize these expansionist agendas, the Ottoman Balkan provinces needed to face a series of crises (as discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this volume), which would make external intervention mutually acceptable for all the major powers involved. In sum, persistent crisis in Macedonia, İşkodra, Yanya, and Sanjak/Novi Pazar between 1903 and 1908 gave both the Dual Monarchy and Russia (as well as the larger diplomatic community in Europe) a pretext that allowed two of the Ottoman Empire's greatest long-term rivals to realize their Balkan ambitions at Istanbul's expense.

In this respect the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina's annexation appeared in earnest during the 1906–7 period as a result of two circumstances. The first was the election of Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal as minister of foreign affairs for the Dual Monarchy. Such personnel changes in Vienna corresponded with a larger shift in power among the major

European powers (including the Ottoman Empire, with the CUP revolt of 1908) that proves crucial to understanding the sequence of events leading to the Balkan Wars. Besides Great Britain, France, and Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire underwent important changes by the end of 1906. Crucially, Wladimir von Beck was appointed as the head of the government, while Conrad von Hötzendorf became the chief of the military command. Their appointments and Aehrenthal's appointment as minister of foreign affairs reflected the power shift toward the archduke Franz Ferdinand, who gained more significant influence over political decisions during this crucial period.

The central personality of the new political course became Aehrenthal, whose appointment revealed a shift that went beyond systemic reform within the Austro-Hungarian state. It also implied the initiation of a more offensive diplomatic campaign toward the Balkans. One of Aehrenthal's main diplomatic priorities from the start of his mandate was the regulation of those internal political disagreements that persisted within the imperial state. The resolution of internal rivalries would improve the Dual Monarchy's overall military and diplomatic performance, crucial at a time when Russia was undergoing similarly aggressive reforms aimed at expanding its influence in the Balkans. The rise to prominence of the question of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina reflected this goal of harmonizing the military and diplomatic focus of the Austro-Hungarian state.

As the region's administrative reports show, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by late 1907 demanded significant changes. Baron István Burián, the minister of finance and the most senior authority responsible for conducting the monarchy's administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, warned in his reports that the situation had become critical enough to make annexation the most convenient route for the Dual Monarchy. At the heart of Burián's concerns was a growing link between strident ethno-nationalist rhetoric among certain politically active groups in the region and neighboring countries like Serbia and Montenegro.

This increasing appreciation for the need of a new policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina translated well in Aehrenthal's correspondence with Russian foreign minister Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky, who appeared ready to accept the annexation by the Habsburgs in return for their support for Russia's ambitions to control the Bosphorus Straits. At least at this time Russian support for so-called southern Slav Orthodox concerns could be compromised for more direct Russian interests.

The Young Turk revolution in the summer of 1908 provided the perfect pretext for formal annexation. Austro-Hungary had concluded that in practice Bosnia and Herzegovina should be governed jointly as a special territory (*corpus separatum*). The decision for Hungary and Austria to share the province equally was delivered to the governments of the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Italy, and Germany by special diplomatic envoys.<sup>4</sup>

Critically, Bulgaria's proclamation of independence was announced at the same time, on October 5, 1908. According to an earlier agreement Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia proclaimed independence from the Ottoman Empire in order to produce a great shock for the Ottoman state, thus providing cover for what became the lesser of two crises: the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>5</sup>

The annexation decision did, however, provoke an international crisis among the European powers who had been signatories to the 1878 Berlin agreement, ultimately requiring the organization of a new international conference. But the conference idea was complicated by the uncompromising agendas of each major power. France wanted to maintain its support for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Great Britain had a difference of opinion concerning some issues that required further discussion. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy accepted the function of this planned conference in principle, but under the condition that its current positions in Bosnia would not be questioned. For its part Germany also supported the idea of a conference to address what seemed to be Britain's outstanding concerns, all of which were resolved when an agreement was reached between Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire regarding compensation. Similarly, Russia covered some of Bulgaria's financial obligations toward the Ottoman state, thereby addressing some of the major concerns among the European powers, which were primarily focused on the outbreak of war. In turn Serbia began to soften its objections, declaring on March 3, 1909, that it would not violently resist Austrian-Hungarian expansion into Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>6</sup>

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was in direct conflict with article 25 of the Berlin Treaty. In an attempt to reach a formal resolution of these legal issues caused by his policies, Aehrenthal worked to produce a package of financial compensation for the cash-strapped Ottoman state. Reaching such an agreement with the Ottoman state would permit the other Berlin Treaty signatories to give formal approval of the annexation. The Ottoman minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Paşa, formally accepted Aehrenthal's proposals, which included the Austro-Hungarian



withdrawal from its garrisons in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, a new trade agreement, and an economic compensation totaling 2.5 million pounds.<sup>7</sup>

In this way the crisis slowly subsided even with Serbia, which accepted the annexation as a *fait accompli* on March 30, 1909. In 1910 Bosnia-Herzegovina gained its first constitution.<sup>8</sup> While the immediate crisis had been averted diplomatically by early 1910, events elsewhere in the Balkans quickly brought the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina back onto center stage. As noted throughout this volume, the alliance first between Montenegro and Serbia and later with other Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire made war increasingly likely in the contested regions of Macedonia/Kosova/İşkodra/Yanya. A few incidents along the borders (often instigated by Serbian officers who secretly patrolled the territory in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, Kosovo, and Macedonia) became the pretext for open violence between Ottoman and Serbian troops. Beside the military provocations, the parties also created propaganda efforts and made psychological preparations for war.<sup>9</sup> By 1912 the stage for a new Balkan war was set.<sup>10</sup>

Much of this volume provides the reader with a detailed assessment of how the war directly affected the societies involved in the conflict—including Serbia and Montenegro, which both share borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The changes incited by the 1912–13 wars also caused a wave of social, economic, and political mobilization in the by then fully integrated Austro-Hungarian Balkan territories, which did not formally participate in the war. Hence the Balkan Wars represent one of the crucial events that influenced the new configuration of Europe's political map instigated by those decisions to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908.<sup>11</sup> In sum, the wars directly impacted the Austro-Hungarian territories and forever changed the relationship between certain neighboring groups and the administration charged with sustaining greater Habsburg interests in southeastern Europe.

The events in the Balkans during the 1912–13 wars heavily influenced the course of South Slavic national movements. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina they also strained the national-confessional relations to the point that events in domestic Bosnian politics began to mirror those in the larger Balkans.<sup>12</sup> We can observe a certain realignment of political options for the Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats and their political representatives. Similarly this 1912–14 period marks the militarization of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, decreasing the influence and thus the power of civil structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is crucial to understanding the deterioration of Austro-Hungarian authority. In direct correlation with the Balkan Wars, Serbian nationalism generally

emerged as a dominant force in Bosnia-Herzegovinian affairs. These manifestations of nationalism would become especially important in the public discourse after the Serb army achieved certain successes in the First Balkan War.<sup>13</sup>

In stark contrast to the sudden rise of Serbian triumphalism with the capture of Ottoman territories (including Kosova), the Balkan Wars proved a disaster for the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), who reacted to the defeat of Ottoman troops with bitterness. The Bosniaks considered this the defeat of a political entity to which they had belonged in previous centuries. This not only reflected a lingering association with the Ottoman state itself but with Islamic civilization, which formed the basis of Bosniak culture. At the same time the defeats of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars brought a realization that the previous illusions about the return and significant presence of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans were no longer feasible. The logical conclusion was that from 1912 on the Bosniaks should reorientate their political ambitions toward West European civilization.<sup>14</sup>

The very different and immediate reactions to events in the Balkan Wars reflect a deep divide separating Serb and Bosniak politics. In such a situation the Bosnian Croats fluctuated between sympathies toward their temporary South Slavic Balkan allies and their traditional loyal relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In this context the Croats functioned as a restraint on otherwise belligerent Bosniak and Serbian political elites in the parliamentary assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>15</sup> Internal Croat political relations went through a process of changes after the Croat Catholic Association (*Hrvatska Katolička Udruga*: HKU) and Croat People's Society (*Hrvatska Narodna Zajednica*: HNZ) participated in the congress of right-wing parties in Zagreb, where a fusion of these two parties was recommended. By not accepting the union from the summer of 1912, the three representatives of the Croat People's Society—Đuro Džamonja, Vjekoslav Jelavić, and Luka Čabrai—joined the opposition in the parliament, setting the stage for a potentially violent deterioration of interethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>16</sup> This rapidly changing set of conditions thus becomes the long-understudied consequence of the Balkan Wars, as discussed below.

#### THE BALKAN WARS AND LOCAL REACTIONS

In the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina the atmosphere during the fourth parliamentary session was marked by political readjustments caused by the Balkan Wars. The gradual exclusion of the Ottoman

Empire from southeastern Europe not only had direct consequences for the lives of the people who had been under the sovereign rule of the sultan but involved Bosnia and Herzegovina to the point where some scholars even considered them warring parties.<sup>17</sup> As already noted, because of the Bosniaks' historical, cultural, and religious ties with the Ottoman Empire, Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina translated military defeat in the same terms. In a similar set of calculations, but with very different results, the Serbian victory on the front translated into a new, often vocal celebration of Serbian nationalism. The clashing local reactions to a war transpiring in neighboring Balkan territories quickly translated into tensions throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After the outbreak of the First Balkan War, *Zeman*, the journal of the United Muslim Organization, expressed its deepest sympathies toward Ottoman Muslims on October 15, 1912. While the editors articulated a sense of despair for the victims of a brutal war, they intensely criticized individuals from Sarajevo and Mostar whose telegrams greeted the Serb army as "the rescuer of oppressed brethren in Turkey." In this manner *Zeman* also condemned the journal run by Derviš-bey Miralem, called *Novi Musavat*, which at the outbreak of the war failed to write "one word condemning the nastiness of the Balkan peoples."<sup>18</sup>

I should emphasize that certain shades of opinion existed within the Bosniak community, which reflected the different views of people on certain political questions. For example, some youths of high school and academy age occasionally expressed an anti-Austrian stance while demonstrating support for pro-Yugoslav ideas. These positions held by a portion of the Bosniak intelligentsia differed greatly from the mood of the Bosniak masses, however. The political representatives in the parliamentary assembly likewise reflected different positions.

Regardless of their different reactions to the outbreak of the First Balkan War, by the end of July 1913 Rifat-bey Sulejmanpašić and Derviš-bey Miralem, leaders of the opposing parliamentary groups, adopted a common initiative that they presented to Oskar Potiorek, the provincial governor for Bosnia and Herzegovina. They demanded that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy intervene diplomatically in the events in the Balkans. While at the heart of their joint plea was the return of Edirne to the Ottoman Empire, accomplished during the course of the Second Balkan War, this attempt to lobby the Austro-Hungarian administration reflects a larger relational shift between the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the larger region.<sup>19</sup>

The reactions of both the Serb political elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb (Orthodox) population as a whole were much more uniform than those of their Muslim and Catholic neighbors. From the start it became clear that the leaders of the Serb political representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina equated the interests and the aims of officials in Belgrade with their own. This unequivocal affiliation with Serbia (and Montenegro) extended to the larger public at times.

At the beginning of the war, for instance, all the leading Serb journals published decrees calling on the population to collect humanitarian aid for the Serb and Montenegrin Red Cross. At the same time many readers of these newspapers crossed the border to join the Serb and Montenegrin army, a gesture of loyalty to a foreign state generally applauded by the Serbian media.<sup>20</sup> As the war evolved, this same press helped reinforce such militant enthusiasm by celebrating each of Serbia's string of military victories against the Ottoman army. On October 9, 1912, for example, the journal *Otadžbina* ran reports that glorified the victories of the Balkan alliance against the Ottoman Empire. Reinforcing such messages was an article appearing on the front page of the same issue by Petar Kočić, a Serb political representative in parliament, reiterating earlier calls for generous donations to the Serbian Red Cross: "It is our human duty, our brotherly duty; God is calling us to help our brothers who heroically endeavor to create better conditions for the splendid future of the Serb."<sup>21</sup>

In this setting, relations between representatives in the parliamentary assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina changed in accordance with events in the Balkan Wars. Beyond the predictable differences over how to interpret the outbreak of the war politically, a divergence of opinion arose as Orthodox Christians and some Catholics positively reacted to the successes of the Serb army, reflecting a possible rapprochement, temporarily at least, of Croats and Serbs that mirrored efforts by the early advocates of Yugoslavia and the Illyrian movement in Zagreb since the late nineteenth century. Such unity took the form of public celebrations, often accompanied by the kind of rhetoric that had long frightened authorities of the Austro-Hungarian state. To mark the arrival of Serbia's army at the Adriatic Sea near Durrës, for example, a group of around five hundred Serbs and Croats took to the streets of Sarajevo honoring a Balkan alliance that promised only to expand the territorial reach of Serbia, a state increasingly regarded with hostile eyes by loyalists to the Vienna/Sarajevo government.<sup>22</sup> As observed by Mustafa Imamović, demonstrations such as those in Sarajevo on November 16, 1912, served to forge

temporary alliances within the intelligentsia that crossed Serb and Croat barriers. The Croat press (excluding the *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, a Croat paper that remained hostile to Serbia's expansionist demands) supported the Balkan alliance's destruction of the Ottoman Balkans. At the same time Serb political journals, including the usually aggressive nationalist paper *Otadžbina*, took a more moderate tone toward the Croats, reflecting this crucial moment of unity that only heightened Austro-Hungarian fears of a South Slavic nationalist movement exploding in its Bosnia and Herzegovina territory.<sup>23</sup>

These activities of the Serb political elite and their press, harnessing the successes of the Serb army to project a new spirit within the Austro-Hungarian territories, had a profound effect on the Orthodox Slav population in general. After more than a year of such media manipulation of Serbian nationalist pride, it became clear even to more cooperative Serb members of the Austro-Hungarian legislative bodies that Serbs within the Dual Monarchy had crossed a critical existential threshold. Vojislav Šola, a Serb representative in the parliament, warned the Bosnian provincial governor Oskar Potiorek in September of 1913 that the "Serb victories near Kumanovo and Bregalnica overwhelmed the Bosnian Serbs" to the point that they could no longer be brought back to being loyal subjects of the Austro-Hungarian state.<sup>24</sup> Such statements from loyal Serb subjects undoubtedly spoke to the level of expectation of the larger Serb population, resulting in a noticeable drop in respect for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. In other words, military victories elsewhere increased Serbian nationalistic hostilities toward the administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina and beyond, an incitement of forces that quickly translated into open revolt.

The peak of political support for the Serb and Montenegrin armies came during the aforementioned Serb army's advance to the Adriatic coast. In reaction to such a strategic coup, the Serb faction within the Bosnian parliament requested that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina formally send official congratulations to the Serbian government for the country's military successes.<sup>25</sup> On the basis of this request various youth movements organized meetings of support in Sarajevo, manifestations of Serbian nationalism that were answered by Bosniak counter-demonstrations, also organized in Sarajevo. Such conflicting reactions to events during the Balkan Wars clearly put the Austro-Hungarian government in a difficult position.

In regard to this demonstrated support for an Austro-Hungarian policy to halt Serbia's expansion at the expense of Balkan Muslims, Bosniaks organized the collection of aid in those town councils where Bosniak

representatives made up the majority. In other words, as a way to confront local Serb campaigns to provide aid to Serbia's military, Bosniaks mobilized local Muslims to support those families whose members were called up to serve the Austro-Hungarian army increasingly used to suppress internal Serbian/Croat radicalism and restrict Serbia's territorial expansion in general.<sup>26</sup> This open support for policies and institutions that hoped to suppress Serbian nationalism demonstrated the kind of administration that dramatically clashed with developments among the Serbian population.

The official policy of the monarchy regarding the Albanian Question (discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this volume) was very much present in the public discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniak counterdemonstrations mentioned above reflected particular support for the policies of the Austro-Hungarian government toward the Albanian issue, which became the central area of focus for the European powers confronted by Serbian expansionism. After the independent state of Albania was recognized in November 1912 by Vienna as a way to reverse territorial gains by the Serbian and Montenegrin armies, the local Serb political elite responded with confrontational rhetoric bordering on threats of open revolt. All Serb representatives in the parliamentary assembly, for example, issued a common statement published in *Srpska Riječ*, *Narod*, and *Otadžbina*, the most influential journals in Serbian politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the news of Vienna's recognition of an independent Albania:

The unprecedented sacrifices and glorious victories of the Serb army and the high cultural and state life of the Kingdom of Serbia completely justify that the Kingdom should take all the old regions that are spread to the coast of the Adriatic Sea. The stance of Austria-Hungary, which seeks autonomous rights for the uncultured Arnauts [Albanians], even though it deprives the South Slavs of the same rights in its own state, which tries to forbid Serbia to enjoy the fruits of its famous victories, causes the deepest bitterness in all layers of the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Stating brotherly feelings and their admiration for the brethren in Serbia and Montenegro, Serbs, members of the Bosnian and Herzegovina parliament, hereby do commit their holy duty, convinced that with this they are offering the most probable expression of the feelings of the whole Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>27</sup>

This statement shows that several different trends in Serb politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina converged at the critical moment of conflict between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy; what they all shared was an unquestioned support for Serbia and Montenegro (or more specifically, their governments and politics). At the same time, in a special column titled "Turkish [Muslim] Brutality," *Otadžbina* cited some texts from medieval history and the period of Ottoman conquest of the Balkans in order to create an atmosphere of hatred toward the Ottoman administration in the region.<sup>28</sup> *Otadžbina's* negative and aggressive approach regarding the Balkan Wars and the corresponding political conditions is an indicator of a growing use of discourse in the Habsburg Empire aimed at discrediting the sovereign claims not only of Albanians (and Muslims more generally) but of the Austro-Hungarian state as well.

In this tone *Otadžbina* continued to lobby for Serbia's rightful claims to these territories by conjoining its editorials with the statements of sympathetic groups in other parts of the Dual Monarchy. This included support for Serbian expansionism from the Prague (Bohemia) Chamber of Commerce and Craftsmen, a body dominated by Czechs. It sent a memorandum to the Austrian minister of commerce, Schuster, claiming that a Serbian harbor on the Adriatic coast would not harm Austrian commercial interests and demanded that the minister convey this conviction to the Foreign Ministry, at the time working with other European powers to secure Albanian independence. *Otadžbina* interpreted those statements of the Prague Chamber as "Czech support for the Serbian harbor," showing that the Serb editors clearly hoped that gestures of solidarity from fellow Slav subjects of the Dual Monarchy would sway Vienna's elite to change its policies in the Balkans.<sup>29</sup>

This unequivocal support from local Serbian newspapers often justified the achievements of Serbia's military victories by heralding the sacrifices and "glorious" successes of the Serb and Montenegrin army, which "justly" recaptured the old regions spreading all the way to the coast of the Adriatic Sea, a strategically vital area that became part of independent Albania. Another dimension to this statement is the openly negative attitude toward Albanians, called "uncultured Arnauts" by these outspoken advocates for greater Serbia. In their reaction to the intervention by, among others, the Austro-Hungarian state, which supported the Albanian state at Serbia's expense, Albanians were negatively juxtaposed with the Kingdom of Serbia, which had a "high cultural and state life" in contrast to "barbarians."

This radicalized rhetoric regarding Albanians anticipates the more general Serb nationalist hostility toward all Muslims, especially their Bosniak neighbors. An examination of how Bosnia's Serbs objected to Vienna's Balkan policies born out of a fear of Serbian territorial expansion may offer a hitherto ignored set of warning signs of what was to come in Austro-Hungarian-administered Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Wishing to discredit Austro-Hungarian politics regarding the support of Albanian independence, a policy that compelled Serbia to abandon its Adriatic territories captured during the 1912 campaign, the increasingly nationalist Serbian newspaper *Otadžbina* wrote that "Austria has the least rights to interfere in the independence of one nation [Albanians], an outlaw and robber nation incapable of independent sovereign life, which by culture is very much similar to black tribes of Central Africa."<sup>30</sup> Continuing with its racialized rhetoric to delegitimize Austro-Hungarian state calculations, *Otadžbina* stated that the inhabitants of Albania "did not mature from tribal life to become a patriarchal country [like its more 'civilized' European superiors]...and was established neither by [European] colonization nor by insurrection. That proves that an independent Albania is not a product of a developed national self-consciousness and remains in a state of feudalism."<sup>31</sup>

We learn from such statements that Bosnian Serbs were becoming increasingly disloyal to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which calculated that an expansionist Serbia at Albanians' expense would have negative long-term consequences for its interests and was willing to harness the chauvinism of European racism to justify the brutalization of entire peoples. As representatives of Serbian interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to claim that the monarchy "deprives" South Slavs within its own borders of their right to "autonomy," while denying Serbs their destiny in the larger Balkans, the stage was being set for future confrontations that would drive the Austro-Hungarian state to declare war on its neighbor.

Indeed we can conclude from such statements printed in local newspapers that self-identified Serb politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Balkan Wars constructed two tracks of public discourse, both leading to the permanent break between Serbs and the Dual Monarchy. On one hand, local Serbian political leaders helped draw a picture of support for the Serb and Montenegrin army, whose successes were shared by *all* Serbs, even inside the Dual Monarchy. On the other hand, their statements produced a negative sensibility toward the Austro-Hungarian



Monarchy and its official policies during the Balkan Wars that pushed intercommunal relations to a point of no return. This can best be seen in the text published in the same issue (December 8) of *Otadžbina*, where the Serbian soldiers' capture of territories leading to the Adriatic Sea was justified as the fulfillment of an "old dream."

The press in Serbia had clearly adopted *au courant* strategies of mass mobilization. Certain journals in Bosnia and Herzegovina copied and conveyed some parts of these articles in order to reflect the atmosphere in Serbia. Troubled by this rapid deterioration, the Croatian newspaper *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, reprinting articles from *Straža* and *Balkan* in order to reflect the kind of hostility that existed beyond Austro-Hungarian borders, cautioned its readers that the belligerency found in the Serb press was increasing every day. Adding to the images of hysteria exposed by *Hrvatski Dnevnik* was the reporting from *Cetinjski Vijesnik*, which frequently wrote about "unprecedented atrocities" against the Serbs in order to stir the emotions of Bosnia's Serb population.<sup>32</sup> Upon reviewing this body of journalism produced in the region, the *Hrvatski Dnevnik* warned that "if these bloody articles, which they bring against Austria, were to be bombs from the arsenal in Kragujevac, our Monarchy would have already been blown to pieces."<sup>33</sup> The paper also revealed to its readers the tenor of the Montenegrin press, which also belligerently called for war against the Ottoman Empire because of the stance of the "Turkish bullies toward the Serbs over the border."

These examples show how Croat public opinion in Bosnia and Herzegovina was rather inconsistent in how it characterized the Balkan Wars. The *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, which in its editorials incessantly explored the Croat political opinions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, supported the Balkan alliance at the beginning of the wars. This initial support faded, however, when Croat-Bosniak and Serb-Croat political relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina transformed over the course of the war. The change of opinion by the editors of *Hrvatski Dnevnik* coincides chronologically with the Serb army's reaching of the coast of the Adriatic Sea and the corresponding rise in Serbian racism toward "Turks" and "Arnauts," codes for Muslims in general.<sup>34</sup> Importantly, the change in position of the *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, which accepted subsidies from the government, followed the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic agenda on Albanian independence. Thus *Hrvatski Dnevnik* started to advocate a more positive approach to Muslims in general and Bosniaks in particular by offering many articles on the Balkan Wars in which it stated its sympathies toward Muslims,

claiming that Bosniaks and Croats were “brothers by blood, language, and common origin.”<sup>35</sup>

While this study of the evolving use of rhetoric in local media may help chart a rapidly declining relationship between the Austro-Hungarian government and a large portion of its South Slav Orthodox population, the deterioration of local relations between Bosniaks and Serbs cannot be appreciated without considering other internal dynamics. One of the major elements pushing these domestic tensions to spiral into open hostility was the administration’s attempt to transform the region’s economy. In a matter of decades attempts to industrialize the region in order to benefit the larger investment strategies of key economic figures in the larger Habsburg Empire not only uprooted long-standing local economic relations but, more importantly, initiated a social revolution that ultimately affected intersectarian relations in the region. The next section, on what is understood as the Bosnian agrarian question among Austro-Hungarian administrators and their local opponents, demonstrates how attempts to redistribute land in order to dilute resentment toward the old Ottoman landed elite sharpened the intersectarian rivalries to the point of open conflict.

#### THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

Even though the Austro-Hungarian period in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina is known for introducing the first wave of industrialization in the region, the majority of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population still lived off the land. This means that the society was still mainly agrarian and rural. At the heart of Austro-Hungarian attempts at reforming a former Ottoman land regime was the appropriation (buyout) of land from the mostly Muslim landed elite, who monopolized ownership while the mostly Slav (and Christian) peasantry worked as paying tenants. The initiated projects to regulate agrarian relations for the benefit of formerly landless peasants had some positive results, especially the passage of the Law on Giving Loans for the Voluntary Buyout of *Çifliks* (tenants’ lands), which codified the practice of buying out holders of Ottoman-era *çifliks*. With this law issued on April 4, 1911, the local administration had the resources—through loans—to allow the provincial government to buy out local Muslim landowners and redistribute the land to those who previously labored as tenants on it.<sup>36</sup> The statistical evidence concerning the buyout of *çifliks* for 1912 shows that these buyouts were proportional to

the religious and national identity of the tenants: 4,429 Orthodox, 1,335 Catholic, and 56 Muslim tenants were granted land.<sup>37</sup>

Even as the voluntary buyout of these lands produced good results, local reactions to the war following the general progression toward secularism negatively impacted such policies. While the Serb political leadership and its largely urban constituency remained peaceful, it was the Serb village population that was most affected by rising nationalism instigated by the Balkan Wars. The greatest disturbance took place in Krajina, the northwestern region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a large number of Serb farming communities lived among other communities (mostly Bosniak Muslims).

As reported by local authorities, the largest source of tensions were the rumors that spread about the alleged entry of the Serb army into Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of relieving Serb peasants of their obligations to pay rent to non-Serb (Muslim and Catholic) landowners. In such an atmosphere clashes between Serb peasants and Bosniaks often took place.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities reacted by imposing emergency restrictive measures. Contextualizing these examples within the model of social, cultural, religious, and national relations that evolved in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Balkan Wars period covered here leads to the conclusion that the social tensions between the tenants and the landowners contributed to the larger conflict between Serbs and Bosniaks.<sup>38</sup> Socioeconomic explanations for why tensions grew during the Balkan Wars are as relevant as the often overemphasized "primordial hatreds" found in the scholarship. The growing cases of physical attacks, intercommunal fighting, and scores of misunderstandings are the consequence of the kinds of relations that emerged between Muslim and Serb rural communities, in many ways created by long-standing rivalries over land use and only exasperated by the rhetoric following the breakout of the Balkan Wars.

Even though the application of the Law on Giving Loans for the Voluntary Buyout of *Çifliks* in 1912 initially proved successful at one level, due to the new political tensions surrounding the Balkan Wars it was necessary to introduce several additional initiatives to address relations between landowners and tenants. Demands for such modifications of the law came from both Serb representatives in the Bosnian parliament and certain representatives of the official Austro-Hungarian authorities. Specifically, officials began to think about the possibility of imposing an obligatory buyout of *çifliks*. The aim of such a measure was to neutralize

the growing political influence of Serbia in Bosnia and Herzegovina by giving more Serb peasants full ownership of the land on which they labored.

The two officials most linked to this idea were Leon Biliński,<sup>39</sup> the common minister of finances, and Oskar Potiorek, the provincial governor for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In presenting his proposals to Potiorek on May 22, 1913, Biliński considered turning the obligatory buyouts into investment opportunities, enabling private sources of finance to conjoin their quest for profits with local peasants' desires to own the fruits of their productivity. Potiorek's ideas about how to improve the management of land in the province did not entirely coincide with Biliński's proposal. His political aim was to keep the Serb peasant population in "their lethargic condition" in order to assure that the Croat and Bosniak intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia remained fundamentally hostile to Serb ambitions. His aim was to pit the economic interests of these different groups against each other in order to thwart the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs from uniting behind a common anti-Habsburg position. Potiorek's attitude in respect to Bosnia and especially its parliament was generally that the government should continue to rely on both the Croats and Bosniaks' continued rivalry with Serbs, while the Serb opposition should be recognized as irrecusably hostile to the Habsburg state, as an inevitable factual state in this certain issue.<sup>40</sup>

The main difference between the views of these two politicians was that Biliński advocated for the obligatory buyout of land regardless of the wider political agents involved, because this would provide for a profitable window of opportunity for investors from elsewhere in the Dual Monarchy; Potiorek, however, who was also in favor of the obligatory buyout, believed that this could only take place after the foreign political situation was resolved. By this he meant a military intervention against Serbia, which he fervently advocated. At the same time, Potiorek felt that some concern should be shown to the landowners before resolving the Serb issue. With the aim of convincing Biliński to agree to his suggestions, Potiorek reminded his counterpart of how Bosniak landowners negatively reacted to Biliński in 1912 when he presented his views in front of communal delegates. Not only were Bosniak landowners hostile to the forced buyout proposals but funds for such a project were lacking.<sup>41</sup> The region did not prove very attractive to any possible investor. During 1912 and 1913, for example, the buyouts of *çifliks* yielded over 21 million krone, and yet agriculture in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not receive any significant investments. Rather than investing in the building of new industrial

plants or modern management techniques for mass production, the majority of the money collected was spent on luxury goods.<sup>42</sup>

Despite these barriers, requests for the introduction of the obligatory buyout did not cease. At one point a crisis within the group of Serb representatives to the Bosnian parliament who were pushing for this policy changed the way in which the agrarian question was debated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the fourth parliamentary session a shift of power occurred within this group. The faction mobilized by the Serb journal *Srpska Riječ*, led by parliamentarians Vojislav Šola and Gligorije Jeftanović, was caught in the middle of a fight between the larger Serb caucus and a vote of no-confidence from the government on the other side. Twelve representatives of their party were forced to hand over their mandates, so the majority of mandates (nine) on the irregular elections were won by representatives of the newly formed Serb National Party (*Srpska Narodna Stranka*), led by Danilo Dimović and Dušan Jojkić.<sup>43</sup> The central question in their political program was the agrarian issue, and they were open to forming a pro-government majority in parliament consisting of representatives from all three confessions—a final goal of Leon Biliński.

Moves toward achieving these goals were already noticeable by the end of 1913, when Danilo Dimović made a motion in parliament for the government to pass a reformulation of the land law that would be approved by both interested parties engaged in the agrarian reforms discussed above. The essence of this proposal by Dimović's party was lowering the interest rate on loans granted to allow for the buyout of *čifliks*.<sup>44</sup> The Serbian opposition in parliament violently opposed this, demanding an obligatory buyout of all lands owned by Bosniaks and Muslims in general. These requests formulated by Dušan Kecmanović, who stated that the voluntary buyout caused the appreciation of land prices as a result of "market" forces rather than government price-setting, promised to weaken any positive effects of the voluntary buyout. In his speeches Kecmanović decried the failures of the Austro-Hungarian government to resolve the agrarian question, the basic reason for being granted the mandate to execute the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 by the Great Powers.<sup>45</sup>

Even though these issues do not reveal anything new about an earlier suggestion coming from the Serbian representatives, Kecmanović's objections do reveal a new set of arguments that challenge the Austro-Hungarian administration of this increasingly contested region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, his rhetoric was extremely aggressive

and at certain moments deteriorated into an open call to arms. This can best be seen through the discussion of Vasilj Grđić, a member of the parliament who, in debating this suggestion, took Serbia as an example of how agrarian relations should be solved. In making this argument, Grđić emphasized that "Serbia can say to many beys (if they were to say do not harm the beys): 'It would have been better for you if you had fought at Kumanovo.'" The implications of this rhetoric are clear: the failure to collaborate with the Serbian army in its conquest of Ottoman territories provides the pretext to justify the seizure of Muslim lands.

Šerif Arnautović, a virilist member of parliament (his parliamentary membership came by virtue of his position as president of Vakf Fund), reacted to Grđić by saying that Kumanovo only "gave Šćepan [Grđić] eggs for the election [meaning that Serbian victories in Kosova actually led to his party losing the election]." In response Grđić stated that he would "want a Kumanovo to be here [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] even if it meant that another set of eggs would arrive. Did you understand me?"<sup>46</sup> Grđić's threat directed at Arnautović was one of the most open threats of sectarian war in Bosnia and Herzegovina made by a supposedly responsible member of parliament. With this example of a creeping Serbian nationalism born out of the Balkan Wars, we can see how Serbian expansionism elsewhere influenced the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Unlike their Serb counterparts (or even Austro-Hungarian authorities), the position of the Bosniak representatives in the parliament regarding the agrarian question remained consistent. At the heart of the Bosniaks' efforts was the desire to prevent the introduction of the obligatory buyout, most evident in the debates surrounding Danilo Dimović's proposals. Since these proposals had support from key members of the government, the most fervent opponents were Adem-aga Mešić and Hamdi-bey Džinić, both members of parliament. For his part, although Šerif Arnautović had once offered a counterproposal that was in accordance with the government's proposals, not even he spoke in favor of the obligatory buyout of *çifliks*. In this context we should note that the provincial governor, Oskar Potiorek, put Bosniak landowners in the situation of having to choose between cooperating with the government in alliance with Croat representatives in order to defend their interests and opposing these proposals, which were embraced by a newly reconstituted and openly nationalist Serbian faction.<sup>47</sup>

Brought to such a conflicted state, the Bosniak representatives supported Danilo Dimović's suggestion, which was passed with significant

objections from the Serb opposition during the voting process.<sup>48</sup> Dimović's proposal passed with a majority of votes, whereas Dušan Kecmanović's proposal received the votes of the opposition.

Beyond the agrarian question was also the issue of refugees who began to stream into Bosnia due to the Balkan Wars. Apart from having a humanitarian and social aspect, the refugee problem also contributed to the growing "national" issues facing Bosnia and Herzegovina. In most cases the refugees were families who had emigrated from Bosnia and Herzegovina during Austro-Hungarian rule and were forced to return home during the Balkan Wars. Among the many "push" factors compelling these refugees to return to Austro-Hungarian-ruled Bosnia was the policy of forced mass conversions of Muslims to Christianity and even Catholics to Orthodoxy (mostly in Montenegro). On top of such policies adopted by Serbia and Montenegro, murder, robberies, and the plunder of Muslim and Catholic villages made refugees out of tens of thousands of former Ottoman subjects.<sup>49</sup> While condemned by the Serb government as an attempt to change the demographic balance in the region, the accommodation of these victims of an early form of "ethnic cleansing" was understandable. The situation proved that it was impossible for these refugees to secure the support of the Ottoman authorities, so many reached out to the Austrian consuls based in the war zones for help. Most of this help came in the form of formal permission to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>50</sup>

Reactions to this in Bosnia and Herzegovina were varied. Austro-Hungarian authorities allowed the return of refugees and through the consul in Salonika organized the transport of refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina via Trieste. By mid-1913 around five thousand refugees had arrived by this channel. Then the provincial government stopped financing the returns and tightened the criteria for gaining help in repatriation. As for the care of refugees who did make it to Bosnia, they were largely settled on state land, with most of the charitable work done by the provincial government and the Muslim population. The participation of Bosniak political representatives in proposing initiatives for the care of refugees was recorded by mid-1912, with members of parliament Rifat-bey Sulejmanpašić and Safvet-bey Bašagić proposing the granting of state land according to confessional criteria.<sup>51</sup>

A number of activities with the aim of organizing aid for these refugees began. These included the settlement of refugees and the large collection of first aid in Bosanska Gradiška in January 1913. This action was supported by parliamentary representatives Rifat-bey Sulejmanpašić,

Ragib-bey Džinić, and Adem-aga Mešić. Besides the gathering of food and clothing, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent (Hilal-i Ahmer) joined these activities, including the permanent settlement of refugee families.<sup>52</sup>

The settling of refugees created new political tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At one level, village populations feared that the refugees would be settled on their common lands. The Serb political elite exploited these fears and evoked concern that a growing Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina would threaten Serbian interests. In general, non-Muslim villages openly resisted the settlement of refugees. At the same time, however, those Muslim villages that did not identify with the refugees flooding across the border in terms of family or clan ties also resisted. Interestingly, the Serb intelligentsia publicly maintained a balanced view of this issue. Two of the most influential Serb journals, *Narod* and *Otadžbina*, were vocal in their opposition to the repatriation of refugees, whereas *Srpska Riječ*, the moderate journal, maintained a more reconciliatory tone, stressing that good relations between the Serbs and the Bosniaks should be maintained and that the opinions expressed in *Narod* and *Otadžbina* did not represent the attitudes of the Serb population in general.<sup>53</sup> Despite these nuanced positions held by different Serb groups at the time, historians have since attempted to equate the policy of resettling Muslim refugees of the Balkan Wars with an explicit threat to the Serb population from these victims of war creating a demographic imbalance.<sup>54</sup>

In order to avoid coming to these same conclusions, it is necessary to highlight that the atmosphere shaping interethno-national relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Balkan Wars constantly shifted from open hostility to cooperation. In Mostar, for instance, Nikola Kašiković owned a large carpenter's shop where he employed twenty-four Muslim workers. When the Balkan Wars started, Kašiković, in addition to the financial aid that he sent to the Serb Red Cross, volunteered his only daughter to Montenegro in order to care for the wounded. At the same time a call to collect aid for the Red Crescent in Mostar was answered by numerous Muslims. Among them were Kašiković's employees, who collected 20 krone each, making up a total of 480 krone. After this news spread throughout Mostar, Nikola Kašiković fired all of his employees.<sup>55</sup> Clearly a number of different kinds of pressures animated and reanimated relations between members of different groups.

As analysis of local newspapers has shown, sentiments expressed toward the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy changed frequently as well.



In Trebinje, on the border with Montenegro, a verbal dispute between Austro-Hungarian soldiers and a Serb state official who spoke against the monarchy many times in a pub set off a firestorm that spread beyond the local confines of the confrontation. After the soldiers started singing songs in honor of the monarchy, the official exclaimed: "Down with it," leading to a violent confrontation that reached the pages of regional media and the ears of government officials in Sarajevo.<sup>56</sup>

Influences of the Balkan Wars on the political, social, and economic processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with special reference to Serb-Bosniak political relations, show how internal social relations deteriorated after specific events. The temporary abolition of certain constitutional regulations, for example, had unforeseen consequences for local relations. In May 1913 Oskar Potiorek introduced the following exceptional measures to address the deteriorating conditions and enervated local relations:

- (a) the suspension of constitutional regulations
- (b) limiting the freedom of movement, the work of societies, and the holding of meetings
- (c) limiting the production, sales, possession, and carrying of weapons, munitions, and explosives
- (d) nominating civilians under military jurisdiction for specifically determined actions
- (e) intensification of judicial criminal procedures and the abolishment of trials by jury
- (f) restrictions on printing
- (g) limitations regarding postage for letters and other kinds of packages
- (h) limitations and control of telegraph and telephone communication
- (i) regulations on keeping homing pigeons.<sup>57</sup>

The contentious implementation of these extraordinary measures by the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina was accompanied by the violent reaction of a number of politicians who opposed them. As their leader Danilo Dimović argued, the implementation of these extraordinary measures constituted a direct attack on Serbian communities. Instead of providing for a more stable situation, this actually irritated "all Serbs and flurried the public opinion of the Serbian nation."<sup>58</sup> Similar opposition was forwarded by a group of Serbian politicians gathering around Kosta Kujundžić.<sup>59</sup> Considering the way these measures were interpreted by Serb constituencies throughout Bosnia, Oskar Potiorek's intention to solve the Balkans crisis could be argued to be militarily

justified. The main goal of those advocating a military solution, especially the ones based in Vienna, was that a draconian administration would disable Serbia and hinder its eventual union with Montenegro. With that aim in mind, the idea of building a rail line in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar was raised again. As the main proponent of these measures, Oskar Potiorek was given the command of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Corps of the Austro-Hungarian military, located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia, in 1911.<sup>60</sup>

#### CONCLUSION: LONG-LASTING CONSEQUENCES OF THE BALKAN WARS

The idea for the creation of a united country of Southern Slavs became more intensively present in public discourse from the middle of the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century a few specific steps were made toward its realization. In nearly all conceptions of the creation of a Yugoslav country, Serbia was to have the leading role. Later Yugoslav historiography posited that Austro-Hungary was the main opponent of the South Slavs union, and Austro-Hungary was seen as an exponent of German imperialistic policy in southeast Europe. Serbia, in contrast, was assumed to be an integrative factor in South Slavs' unification. The victory of the Serbian army in the Balkan Wars elicited a response among Southern Slavs living in Austro-Hungary (as illustrated in the previous section). After the Balkan Wars Austro-Hungary was faced with an enlarged and strengthened Serbia.

Given the conditions of World War I, the Serbian government led by Nikola Pašić decided to move toward the final realization of the Yugoslav idea as Serbia's main aim. In 1914 that decision was stated in an official document known as the Declaration of Niš (Niška Deklaracija). During World War I, activities were undertaken to realize the Yugoslav idea. The Yugoslav club also gave its support to the unification of the South Slavs as well as a group of South Slavic politicians from Austro-Hungary with the May Declaration of 1917 (Majska Deklaracija). The joint appearance of the Serbian government and the Yugoslav club was specified with the Krf Declaration of 1917 (Krfška Deklaracija), where both parties had to make certain concessions about the role model for the joint country of the South Slavs. But Serbia had the dominant role in the realization of that objective. The South Slavic regions on the borders of Austro-Hungary were united in 1918 into the Country of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, which on December 1, 1918, was united with the Kingdom of Serbia into

the United Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The assemblies of Montenegro and Vojvodina had previously voted for unification with Serbia. With that step the first Yugoslav country was formed.<sup>61</sup>

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the question of Yugoslav unification still raises many issues worthy of research. This is particularly the case in the understanding of the position of Bosniaks regarding the newly formed country. To understand their position at the end of the war in 1918, it is important to understand their attitude toward Austro-Hungary at the beginning of the war in 1914. Due to their experiences during the Balkan Wars from 1912 to 1913, Bosniaks passionately accepted the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and understood World War I as their war,<sup>62</sup> which they were dragged into as loyal subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy. Events during the Balkan Wars helped Bosniaks to understand that the alternative to Austro-Hungarian governance was not the Ottoman Empire but rather Serbia, and this strongly determined their loyalty to the Habsburg Monarchy. The fear of union between Bosnia and Serbia made Bosniaks loyal to Austro-Hungary during the whole war, even though the degree of that loyalty was becoming weaker with time.<sup>63</sup>

The weakening loyalty toward the monarchy was caused partially by the poor protection of Bosniak citizens in eastern Bosnia at the end of 1918 but also due to fear of the violence conducted against the citizens of the region. At the same time, the fear of the Serbian army's arrival was present among the Bosniaks, because some groups considered it a foreign and occupying army. Still, Bosnian policy and religious ethics were meant to crush that fear by expanding the Yugoslav idea among Bosniaks, which is what happened at the end of 1918.<sup>64</sup> Until that time Bosniaks had mainly cherished the idea of remaining within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The active political role of Mehmed Spaho, the most eminent member of the newly formed Yugoslavian Muslim Organization, meant a stronger bonding of Bosniaks with his political concept: the Yugoslav option.<sup>65</sup>

Serbia's territorial expansion was realized during the Balkan Wars and was woven into the ideological narrative of the newly formed Yugoslav country. Through territorial expansion during the Balkan Wars, Serbia gained space and strategic importance. Successes from the beginning of World War I as well as the breakthrough on the Salonika front additionally strengthened their position before the formation of the first Yugoslav country. The Serbian royal family was at the head of the newly formed country, and all leading positions in political, military, economic, and social aspects of life were held by members of the Serbian civil elite. Only

one non-Serb was the president of the Yugoslav government between the two world wars: Anton Korošec, the president of the Slovenian People's Party (Slovenska Ljudska Stranka).

## NOTES

1. Momir Stojković (ed.), *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi*, 253–54.
2. In the historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina the most complete review of the situation during the annexation crisis can be found in Zijad Šehić, "Aneksiona kriza 1908–1909. i njene posljedice na međunarodne odnose."
3. Dževad Juzbašić, "O nastanku paralelnog austrijskog i ugarskog zakona o upravljanju Bosnom i Hercegovinom iz 1880. godine," *Politika i Privreda u Bosni i Hercegovini pod Austrougarskom Upravom* (2002): 11–47; idem, "O uključenju Bosne i Hercegovine u zajedničko austrougarsko carinsko područje," *Politika i Privreda u Bosni i Hercegovini pod Austrougarskom Upravom* (2002): 49–86; a shorter version of the second paper was published in German: Dževad Juzbašić, "Die Einbeziehung Bosniens und der Herzegowina in das gemeinsame österreichisch-ungarische Zollgebiet," *Österreichische Osthefte* 30 (1988): 196–211; Zijad Šehić, *U smrt za cara i domovinu!* 30–49.
4. Stojković, *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi*, 269–70.
5. Šehić, "Aneksiona kriza 1908–1909."
6. Milorad Ekmečić (ed.), *Naučni skup posvećen 80. godišnjici aneksije Bosne i Hercegovine*; Stojković, *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi*, 253–70; Mustafa Imamović, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 239–43; Imamović, *Pravni položaj i unutrašnj-opolitički razvitak Bosne i Hercegovine*, 229–38; Juzbašić, "Aneksija Bosne i Hercegovine u problemi"; Šehić, "Aneksiona kriza 1908–1909."
7. Stojković, *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi*, 262–64; Juzbašić, "Aneksija Bosne i Hercegovine u problemi"; Šehić, "Aneksiona kriza 1908–1909."
8. Complex relationships between Austria and Hungary, especially regarding the legislation of the so-called fundamental Provincial Law, have been studied extensively in respect to Bosnia by Juzbašić, "Aneksija Bosne i Hercegovine u problemi."
9. Safet Bandžović, *Iseļjavanje Bošnjaka u Tursku*, 207–8.
10. For the Austro-Hungarian perspective on the Balkan Wars, see Karl Kaser, "The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913."
11. Dževad Juzbašić, "Utjecaj balkanskih ratova 1912/13. na Bosnu i Hercegovinu i na tretman agrarnog pitanja," *Politika i Privreda u Bosni i Hercegovini pod Austrougarskom Upravom* (2002): 459–73. This work is also available in German: Dževad Juzbašić, "Der Einfluss der Balkankriege 1912/1913 auf Bosnien-Herzegowina und auf die Behandlung der Agrarfrage." See also Dževad Juzbašić, "Refleksije ratova na Balkanu 1912/13 na dizanje Muslimana u BiH."
12. Juzbašić, "Utjecaj balkanskih ratova."
13. Imamović, *Pravni položaj i unutrašnj-opolitički razvitak Bosne i Hercegovine*, 318.
14. Ibid.
15. Juzbašić, "Utjecaj balkanskih ratova," 459. The Bosnian parliament consisted of a combination of the social, confessional, and *virilist curial* system and was of

a highly complex nature. Unlike other representative institutions in the Dual Monarchy, the Bosnian parliament was not even based on any particular local tradition. Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were divided along confessional lines into three electoral bodies (also known as *curiae*). This concept assured each ethno-religious group a specific number of seats proportional to its percentage of the total population. Within this confessional electorate were also separate socially based *curiae* (urban, rural, landowning, and the intelligentsia). To sum up, parliament consisted of a total of seventy-two elected deputies along with twenty deputies also known as virilists, who gained their seats by virtue of their positions. Although the fundamental Provincial Law was promulgated earlier in 1910, this brought no big changes whatsoever in the position of the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ultimate control still remained in hands of the Ministry of Finances and its bureaucratic Provincial Government in Sarajevo. Parliament did not elect a provincial government; nor was the government responsible to parliament for its work. The parliament's legislative rights and power were extremely limited. It had the right to participate in the making of laws (to debate only those issues that were not exclusively in the competence of the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments). Moreover, all parliament members, regardless of their identity, acted jointly in relation to the provincial government until certain tough debates took place in 1911 and later (as discussed throughout this chapter). Further work of the parliament was carried on in an atmosphere of interparty (and very often interconfessional) conflict, with the provincial government endeavoring to create a "pro-government majority" composed of representatives of all three confessions. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand marked the end of the parliament's activities. By imperial decree on July 9, 1914, the current session formally ended. Emperor Franz Joseph later dissolved the parliament by his patent on February 15, 1915. Even though the outcome of the parliament's legislative activities was rather modest, a short constitutional period from 1910 to 1914 represented an important stage in the development of political relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Juzbašić, *Nacionalno-politički odnosi*, 245; Imamović, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 245–46; Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, 334–45.

16. Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, 318.
17. Milorad Ekmečić, "Uticaji balkanskih ratova na društvo u Bosni i Hercegovini," 406.
18. Juzbašić, *Nacionalno-politički odnosi*, 143–44.
19. Ibid.
20. Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, 319; Juzbašić, *Nacionalno-politički odnosi*, 144.
21. *Otadžbina* 133 (October 9, 1912).
22. This sort of manifestation evoked a reply from around three thousand Bosniaks who demonstrated against the Balkan allies. Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, 319.
23. Ibid.
24. Juzbašić, *Nacionalno-politički odnosi*, 172.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 146.
27. *Otadžbina*, November 3 (16), 1912, 1.
28. *Otadžbina*, November 20, 1912, 1.

29. *Otadžbina*, November 8 (21), 1912, 1.
30. *Otadžbina*, November 3 (16), 1912, 1.
31. *Otadžbina*, December 8, 1912, 1.
32. *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, August 26, 1912.
33. *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, February 6, 1913.
34. Juzbašić, *Nacionalno-politički odnosi*, 125–26.
35. *Ibid.*, 126.
36. Edin Radušić, “Agrarno pitanje u Bosanskohercegovačkom Saboru 1910–1914.”
37. Ferdo (Ferdinand) Hauptmann, “Privreda i društvo Bosne i Hercegovine u doba austrougarske vladavine (1878–1918),” 185–96. For this fundamental work on the Bosnian economy, see the version in German: “Die österreichisch-ungarische Herrschaft in Bosnien und der Hercegovina 1878–1918.”
38. Juzbašić, *Nacionalno-politički odnosi*, 146.
39. For Biliński’s memories on Bosnian policy, see Leon Biliński, *Bosna i Hercegovina u Uspomenu Leona Bilińskog* (original: *Wspomnienia i Dokumenty—Tom I 1846–1914* [Warsaw: n.p., 1924]).
40. Juzbašić, “Utjecaj balkanskih ratova,” 203.
41. *Ibid.*, 204.
42. Ferdo Hauptmann, “Privreda i društvo,” 186.
43. Imamović, *Pravni položaj*, 321–22.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Stenografski izvještaji o sjednicama bosanskohercegovačkog Sabora. IV/1913/1914*, 17–19.
46. *Ibid.*, 32.
47. Juzbašić, “Utjecaj balkanskih ratova,” 205, 206.
48. *Stenografski izvještaji o sjednicama bosanskohercegovačkog Sabora. IV/1913/1914*, 41.
49. In the historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Safet Bandžović’s overall review of happenings in the Balkans at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, in the context of the Balkan Wars, mass migrations, crimes, and violations, is the most comprehensive. See Bandžović, *Iseljavanje Bošnjaka u Tursku*, 207–64. He also researched the question of the demographic de-Ottomanization of the Balkans in this period: Safet Bandžović, “Demografska deosmanizacija Balkana i kretanja bosanskohercegovačkih muhadžira (1878–1914).”
50. Tomislav Kraljačić, “Povratak muslimanskih iseljenika iz Bosne i Hercegovine u toku Prvog balkanskog rata.”
51. Juzbašić, “Utjecaj balkanskih ratova,” 199.
52. *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, January 14, 1913.
53. Juzbašić, *Nacionalno-politički odnosi*, 148.
54. Ekmečić, “Uticaji balkanskih ratova,” 402.
55. *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, January 14, 1913.
56. *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, January 18, 1913.
57. Hamdija Kapidžić, “Skadarska kriza i izuzetne mjere u Bosni i Hercegovini u maju 1913. godine”; idem, “Previranja u austro-ugarskoj politici u Bosni i Hercegovini 1912. godine.”
58. *Stenografski izvještaji o sjednicama bosanskohercegovačkog Sabora. IV/1913/1914*, 44.
59. *Ibid.*, 45.

60. For a more detailed review of the history of the construction of railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Dževad Juzbašić, *Izgradnja željeznica u BiH u svjetlu austrougarske politike od okupacije do kraja Kallayeve ere*; idem, *Politika i privreda u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougarskom upravom*.
61. Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije (1918–1978)*, 15–28.
62. Amir Duranović, “Prva godina Prvog svjetskog rata: Džemaludin ef. Čaušević na stranicama Sarajevskog lista.”
63. In the historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the question of 1918 was actualized again in 2008 at the Round Table organized by the Institute for History from Sarajevo. Works were published in the thematic issue of the journal *Historical Searches: Historijska Traganja* 3 (2009): 1–258. The following work on the attitudes of the Bosniak political elite is especially valuable: Husnija Kamberović, “Projugo-slavenska struja među muslimanskim političarima 1918. godine.”
64. Husnija Kamberović, *Hod po trnju*, 20–22.
65. Husnija Kamberović, *Mehemed Spaho (1883–1939)*.

## Paramilitaries in the Balkan Wars

### The Case of Macedonian Adrianople Volunteers

*Tetsuya Sahara*

The Balkan Wars brought about a drastic change in the political geography of the southern Balkans, transformed how people interacted with each other, and set the foundations for the contemporary international border regime so crucial to our way of thinking of the peoples in the Balkans as constituting “different” nations. During these wars an enormous human catastrophe took place, with countless incidents of massacres, massive population displacement, and forced assimilation. The roots of the carnage and calamity arose from the manner in which nation-states, all former Ottoman territories, pursued their goals of territorial expansion in highly ethnically mixed regions. As a result huge numbers of “unwanted populations” were cleansed for the sake of the “redemption of the national land.”

The atrocities carried out in the name of “national liberation” created a deep chasm in the memory of both the victims and perpetrators. The chasm produced a perpetual discord in the image of self and others within each Balkan nation. As each state committed more or less the same atrocities against the civil population, every nation became both victim and perpetrator.

The divided narrative of the war might best be expressed in the ambivalent image of volunteer soldiers. On one hand, scholars treat them as heroes; on the other hand, others have bitter memories of them, often reducing them to criminals. To most Bulgarians, the “Hayduks” and *komitadjis* are freedom fighters, while for Turks they are the worst nightmare. The same is true for Andartes, whom Greeks adore and Bulgarians detest. Likewise, Vojvoda Vuk is a national hero for Serbs but a loathed enemy for the Albanians. This disagreement does not stop at the point



of re-creating the national self-image; it continues to produce new narratives of atrocities committed against one group by another. These volunteer soldiers, who have often been enshrined as national heroes in temples scattered throughout postwar countries, continue to serve as role models for following generations. Equally prevalent is the vilification of some of the same people as another "nation's enemy," leading to an entirely different kind of nationalist historiography that celebrates victimhood as much as heroism.

The central issue explored in various ways throughout this volume is how historians can address this clear gap in perceptions about key processes of the war, including how to interpret these volunteer soldiers, who played such an important role in the conduct of the Balkan Wars. In this chapter I assess the military activities of the Macedonian Adrianople Volunteers (MAV) and try to account for their role in the war, both as independent actors and as a tool of war for the states involved.

#### THE MACEDONIAN ADRIANOPLE VOLUNTEERS

The Macedonian Adrianople Volunteers was an independent military unit organized by the Bulgarian army at the beginning of the First Balkan War. It was composed of 18,870 men and was undoubtedly the largest foreign legion that operated during the wars. The legion was officially proclaimed to be a unit composed of soldiers who did not hold Bulgarian passports. As such, a number of Ottoman citizens (especially Armenians) as well as a number of non-native people joined the corp after its creation.<sup>1</sup>

At first glance the volunteer unit has all the markings of a mercenary unit. The soldiers were unpaid, however, and offered their services for different reasons. Some were motivated by the belief that the war was a "modern crusade" that would expel the "Muslim barbarians" from Europe. Others sympathized with the Bulgarian cause and joined the war in order to help realize national unity. The latter sentiment dominated the legion, as the majority of the soldiers were Slavic Orthodox Christians coming from the Ottoman territory.<sup>2</sup>

Contemporary Bulgarian historians ascribe a noble and altruist set of characteristics to the legion. It is often claimed that the Macedonian Adrianople Volunteers was one of the largest and most patriotic voluntary military units in the history of Bulgarian people. The popular image of the legion is also positive. The veterans of the legion were applauded as national heroes, and many monuments have been built for them in contemporary Bulgaria.<sup>3</sup>

The inauguration of the legion was officially announced on October 6, 1912, six days after the general mobilization of the Bulgarian army. The Bulgarian government issued a special order titled "Condition for the Establishment of the Volunteer Detachment." According to the regulation, those who expressed the will to fight for Bulgaria were to be accepted into the army whether they were ethnic Bulgarians or not.<sup>4</sup>

The enrollment of foreign volunteers in the regular army was not exceptional; other Balkan countries had a certain number of foreign citizens serving as well. In the case of Bulgaria, however, the foreign fighters were not attached to regular units but were organized into an independent detachment. To date the reason for this extraordinary regulation has not been clearly explained. Some historians guess that the huge number of applicants made it necessary to establish a special unit. For example, Yono Mitev claims that the enthusiastic call for participation was the background of the formation of independent volunteer units:

The headquarters received hundreds of telegraphs from all over the country. The immigrants requested arms and ammunitions with which they would pass the borders to begin partisan activities in the enemy's territory. Others requested to be enrolled in the volunteer units and to participate in the battle along with the regular army. So a telegraph from Burgas, sent to the Ministry of War on the very next day of the mobilization, said: "Five hundred Bulgarians, coming from Macedonia and Adrianople and living here, want to participate in the present-day war. Please give us the instructions to organize a special detachment and send us to the appropriate place with equipment." Such telegraphs were coming from all over the country. At the same time thousands of volunteers appeared in front of the headquarters in Sofia. They requested weapons, uniforms, and appointments.<sup>5</sup>

A huge number of volunteers continued to arrive in Sofia. They asked for weapons and uniforms and demanded to go with the army to fight. Meanwhile volunteer units were being formed in relatively large cities. They persistently requested to be dispatched to the front as soon as possible: "125 Macedonians have been enrolled here without uniforms and weapons. They want to set out immediately. Orders and instructions are necessary." Such petitions were arriving from every corner of the country.<sup>6</sup>

It seems undeniable that immense enthusiasm had bubbled over in Bulgaria since the mobilization and that a large number of people

expressed their will to fight the “Turks.” One source claims that more than twenty-five thousand applicants appeared after the announcement of the plan for the Macedonian legion.<sup>7</sup> The existence of massive support, however, cannot fully explain the following development in regard to the Macedonian legion.

According to Petur Durvingov, an official chronicler of the MAV, the first plan to organize volunteer bands had appeared on October 1, a day after the mobilization began. In order to raise a unit speedily, the general commander of the Bulgarian army, Ivan Fichev, entrusted the work to Durvingov and his fellow officer, Alexander Protogerov. Protogerov was a reserve lieutenant colonel and Durvingov, our main source on the early history of the MAV, was a major on the general staff office. Fichev instructed his subordinates on how to organize the units: the bands must be composed of former guerrilla chiefs (*voivodes*), “revolutionaries,”<sup>8</sup> and volunteers; their mission was to collect information on the Turkish army in the Ottoman territory as well as to mobilize the local populace and local guerrillas to help hinder the enemy’s preparation for war. The general staff of the army was to supply them with the sum of 60,000 levs and 600 guns for this purpose.<sup>9</sup>

Upon receiving instructions, the two officers formed the “staff of the partisan detachment” and recruited three more Bulgarian officers—Stefan Nikolov, a reserve lieutenant colonel, Dimitur Atanasov, and Captain Velichkov—to help organize MAV. On October 1 they wrote up the rules for the volunteer bands that would operate in Macedonia and Adrianople during the liberation war. The document laying out these rules defines the mission of the bands. They were to destroy bridges, railways, telegraph lines, highways, and provision and weapons depots in their assigned territory, to attack objects used by the enemy for military transportation and communication, and to gather information on the enemy’s activities and troop numbers.

As for the legal status of the bands, the regulation clearly defined it as part of the military, stating that members were to be subject to military law. The members were to give an oath of allegiance to the Bulgarian emperor as well as to the “fatherland.” The bands were required to communicate with the regular units and to make reports to them. The band commanders (*voivodes*) were given the same status and privileges as army officers. They were entrusted with the authority to decide on operational objectives, discipline, and recruitment. They could even enroll fighters in the Ottoman territory on the condition that they would later give detailed lists to the staff of the partisan detachment. Desertion from and

disobedience to a *voivode* could be met with capital punishment. They could also make the requisition for supplies from the civil population in exchange for vouchers.<sup>10</sup>

In light of these regulations the guerrilla bands were designed to be a special force of the regular Bulgarian Army with the task of sabotage behind the enemy line. From a theoretical point of view, the responsibility for the eventual misconduct and other contingencies of the guerrillas was to fall upon the Bulgarian Army. In prescribing how to interact with the civil population, however, the authors of the rules contented themselves with adding the ambiguous regulation that the bands had to pay attention to the protection of the "Bulgarian population." They offered no instruction on conduct with non-Bulgarian civilians except for one article that states "it is prohibited to collect money from the populace in Turkey."<sup>11</sup>

After drafting the rules, the staff of the detachment of partisans took up the work of organizing the guerrilla bands. According to Durvingov, they completed their work by October 5, 1912. According to Hristo Silyanov, a *voivode* attached to a guerrilla band, a meeting of former guerrilla fighters took place as early as the morning of October 2 for this purpose.<sup>12</sup> Protogerov and Durvingov gave them the following instructions:

five hundred guns are to be supplied for the organization of small guerrilla units, each of a dozen men. The organization and dispatch must be carried out as soon as possible and completed before the declaration of war. The units are to engage in various destructive activities: attack the enemy's line of supply, bombardment of bridges, cutting the telegraph wires, intelligence gathering of the enemy's force and the route of its advance. Each guerrilla must be careful to camouflage as if an ordinary person. Fighters had better wear village clothes in order to hide easily. It is necessary to enroll experienced and dedicated personnel. Each unit must cross the border separately through different routes and take utmost precaution.<sup>13</sup>

After the meeting the commanders were provided with documents that they could exchange for guns, cartridges, bombs, and ox-hide sandals from the depot of the army.

If the date and the testimony of Silyanov were true, a question arises: how could Protogerov and Durvingov gather the former fighters so quickly, on the next morning when they allegedly received Ivan Fichev's

orders to mobilize. Silyanov accounts for this by highlighting that the meeting took place at the call of the liberation committee of the Internal Macedonian Adrianople Revolutionary Organization, not the staff of partisans. The guerrilla leaders, in other words, gathered through the existing personnel network of the Macedonian revolutionaries.

This suggests an intimate connection between the staff of the partisan detachment and the Internal Macedonian Adrianople Revolutionary Organization (IMARO). Indeed the link between the staff and the IMARO was close and strong. Alexander Protogerov was born in Ohrid in 1867. He first entered into the Supreme Macedonian committee and participated in its guerrilla activities as an officer. After the dissolution of the committee in 1905, he joined IMARO and soon became a prominent member. On the eve of the Balkan Wars he was the chair of the executive committee of the Macedonian-Adrianople fraternity. Later he was to become a member of the central committee of IMARO and to dominate the organization after the death of Todor Alexandrov. Durvingov and the three other officers (Nikolov, Atanasov, and Velichkov) were either veterans or current activists of the Macedonian organization. To symbolize the intimacy of the two organizations, the temporary headquarters of the partisan detachment was set up in the building of the Macedonian-Adrianople fraternity.<sup>14</sup>

Immediately after the first meeting dozens of bands were created. Some of them were newly formed, while others were a relabeling of previously existing groups. An average-sized band had from 10 to 20 fighters. An exception was the band of Mihail Gerdjikov, which had 180 fighters. By the time war was declared, a total of fifty bands had been set up. Soon after the beginning of the war two more bands were created in Dupnica and at least 250 fighters enrolled in the bands attached to the Rhodope detachment in Chepelare. These bands were dispatched to a variety of places in Macedonia, Thrace, and the Rhodope. An additional thirty-four bands had already been operating in Macedonia by the time of general mobilization. A total of 2,174 soldiers were enrolled either in the bands created by the staff of the partisan detachment or in those that already existed in Macedonia.<sup>15</sup>

At the same time seven intelligence centers were set up in the border region. The centers were responsible for the secret dispatch of bands into Ottoman territory, for the supply of food and ammunition, and for the retrieval of information collected by units already infiltrated inside Ottoman lands.<sup>16</sup>

After dispatching the guerrilla bands, the staff of partisan detachment was transformed into the "staff of MAV" with a small modification in the

command structure. Durvingov says that this was carried out according to his proposal of October 6. The plan, however, had been under discussion in the general staff office for years. In fact Ivan Fichev had written an article on this question as early as February 23, 1911. In the article Fichev emphasized the military significance of Bulgarian emigrants coming from the Ottoman Empire. He wrote that the emigrants were quite useful as an auxiliary force in the peripheral zones of military operation. They could be employed as spies, reconnoiterers, and guides and could engage in a variety of sabotage activities. Along with these guerrilla-type units Fichev proposed the creation of larger volunteer battalions modeled after the one founded during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877.

These battalions were to be useful in capturing Razlog and the entire Pirin region and in turning them into the base of replenishment, supply, and operation against Demirhisar, Strumica, Shtip, and Kochani. The battalions would also be helpful in taking over the mountainous regions between Strandja and Malko Turnovo as well as the Rhodope and the left bank of the Maritsa River. In order to materialize this plan, Fichev emphasized: "It is necessary to make preliminary investigations, plans, and deliberations, even during peace time. Without them the creation of volunteer battalions would be quite difficult, confusing, and disorganized."<sup>17</sup> This is quite suggestive when considering the progression from the foundation of the staff of partisan detachment to the creation of MAV.

On September 8, two days after the official announcement of the formation of MAV, Maj. Gen. Nikola Genev was appointed as the general commander of the legion. Alexander Protogerov became the lieutenant commander, and Petur Durvingov the chief of staff.<sup>18</sup> Under their supervision the first six battalions were formed in Sofia at the beginning of October, while the other six were set up by the middle of the same month. The battalions were reorganized into three brigades on October 24.<sup>19</sup>

Stefan Nikolov was commander of the First Brigade, Anton Pchelarov of the Second, and Alexander Protogerov of the Third. In light of this development the continuity between the partisan bands and MAV is undeniable. So is the connection between MAV and IMARO.<sup>20</sup> According to Durvingov, the staffs first envisaged that the soldiers were to be deployed into battalions regardless of their place of origin. The command structure, however, eventually reflected the territoriality of Macedonia and Thrace as well. Each of the fifteen battalions not only was named after a city of the two regions but was mainly composed of immigrants coming from the same city or neighborhood. Thus the First Debur Battalion contained men mainly from the Debur region, the Second Skopje

Battalion from the Skopje region, the Third Salonika Battalion the Salonika region, and so on. The conspicuous exception may be the Twelfth Lozengrad Battalion, which contained two companies composed of non-Bulgarians. The first company, known as the "heroes' company," was a mixture of foreign soldiers. The second company was earmarked for the Armenian soldiers.

#### MAV AND WAR CRIMES

Unlike the partisan bands the three brigades were incorporated directly into the regular formation of the Bulgarian army and were dispatched to the eastern front on November 12. They operated in the Rhodope Mountains and western Thrace, contributing to the victories of the Bulgarian army in these regions. On November 18 the Second Brigade captured Ferre, and the next day the First Brigade entered Malgara. They defeated the Ottoman army under the command of Yaver Paşa on November 20 and captured Komotini the following day. The Rhodope detachment entered Ksanthi the same day. During the battle the soldiers of MAV fought bravely: their persistence and altruism are highly applauded by contemporary Bulgarian historians.

Despite this record of victories for the MAV, the initial battles in the Rhodope and western Thrace are tainted by the reports of atrocities widely committed by the Bulgarians against the Muslim population. İlker Alp, a Turkish historian, denounces these outrages:

Bulgarians committed a lot of destruction and atrocities in their zone of occupation soon after the assault. They were carrying out crimes [against the civil population]. It is no exaggeration to say that no village, town, or city was spared from the Bulgarian crime. All the adult males were killed in most of the villages. In many cases the entire population including children and women was annihilated.<sup>21</sup>

Alp's claims, dismissed by some as exaggerations, seem not altogether baseless. The atrocities committed by the Bulgarians against the Muslim population were widely reported by other sources. Theodore Zaimis, a Greek politician, published the following report in 1914:

At the first investigation of Demir-Hissar, last October, the Bulgarians massacred all the men of the village of Petrovo and after

having outraged women and young girls, locked them in the mosque and set fire to it. They played on the bagpipes while the victims were dying. At Petritch they made the wives and daughters of the victims dance before the bodies of the Mussulmans. At Doiran many thousands of Mussulmans were slaughtered and all their goods were plundered. At Nevrokop it was the same. At Meleniko, Drama, Serres, Dede-Agatch, Strumitza—everywhere the Bulgarian has passed—one sees only blood, dishonor and ruin.<sup>22</sup>

It is true that the Zaimis report was prepared for the sake of the Greek war propaganda and included certain distortions. But the testimony of Father Gustave Michel, the head of the French Catholic mission at Kilkis, cited in the same report, is accepted by the *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Report) as “a truthful account of the excesses of the Bulgarian bands during the autumn of 1912.” According to Father Michel, a Bulgarian band under a certain Donchev arrived in the Kilkis region and committed atrocities against the Muslim civil population. His band allegedly burned 345 Turkish houses in one day in the villages of Raionovo, Planica, and Kukurtevo and massacred the villagers.<sup>23</sup>

In the light of these witnesses it is undeniable that certain atrocities were carried out by Bulgarian elements in areas of military activities of the MAV. This leads us to the question: has the MAV made any attempt to deny or justify these charges? In this regard the following story concerning the Dedeagaç atrocities related in the Carnegie Report merits attention. In Dedeagaç some 150 soldiers of MAV perpetrated a massacre of the Muslim population. According to the report, this was “a minor massacre” carried out by “the dregs of the local Christian population (Greeks and Armenians) with the aid of some Bulgarian privates of the Macedonian legion, who were accidentally left in the town without an officer.”<sup>24</sup> The Carnegie Report tries to isolate the incident in this manner by claiming that it was motivated by the sentiment of reprisal for the random killing by the army of Yaver Paşa. It also tries to pardon the commanders by stressing that the soldiers were left without an officer. This lenient assessment, however, seems to be inappropriate in the light of the following facts.

The main source of information for the report was R. Wadham Fisher, an English volunteer in the Fifth Battalion of the Macedonian legion, who wrote:



Some 150 men were left in the town, either because the order did not reach them or because they were too exhausted to obey it. No officer was among them, and they were organized by a private soldier, Stefan Boichev....<sup>25</sup> On November 19 the lower class Greeks and the soldiers began to pillage the town together. A certain number of the local Turks were undoubtedly killed. These excesses must be explained by the absence of any officers.<sup>26</sup>

This witness contradicts the story related by Petur Durvingov, who explains the circumstances of Dedeğaç during the night from November 18 to 19 as follows. When the main body of the Second Brigade of the MAV retreated from the city, the commander Anton Pchelarov assigned a soldier of the Fourth Company of the Fifth Battalion, Stefan Bogoev, the duty to collect remaining soldiers and to organize the command to preserve order in the city. Following the order, Bogoev gathered some 150 soldiers and organized patrols beyond the outposts in the night. He was especially praised by Durvingov because he succeeded in deceiving the enemy. Bogoev lit many bivouac fires during the night and made the city appear to be full of soldiers. Along with these measures he organized a militia by distributing arms to the Christian citizens and arrested dozens of Turkish soldiers.<sup>27</sup> It is this Stefan Bogoev that Wadham Fisher claims was the leader of the soldiers. Therefore it is irrelevant to consider the case to be an act by private soldiers.

Durvingov gives us two additional pieces of information on the misconduct of the MAV soldiers in Dedeğaç. In his report on November 25 the commander of Dedeğaç, Captain Kiprikov, describes the situation as follows: "The city is patrolled by the local militia as well as the remainders of the Macedonian legion.... The entire Turkish population is under arrest. Tomorrow we will release women, children, and the elderly." This bears witness that members of the MAV were assigned the duty of preserving order in the town and engaged in the indiscriminate arrest of the Muslim population. The same day Bulgaria's envoy to establish a truce, 2nd Lieutenant Torkom, sent a secret report from Dedeğaç to the Third Brigade of the MAV: "Here people feel serious fear caused by the frenzy perpetrated by some volunteers. They did it in defiance of the order and petition of their commanders.... I had the pubs closed, gathered the majority of the soldiers, and instructed that we had expected them to be well disciplined because they were volunteers. I also disarmed and arrested one who had been completely drunk."<sup>28</sup> As this witness shows, the misconduct of the MAV soldiers was not always the product of the fury of

war but was caused by a certain lack of discipline for which the Bulgarian chain of command was accountable.

The atrocities were not only caused by fury and by lack of discipline. Several witnesses show that some atrocities were intentionally committed. The Carnegie Report discussed in detail elsewhere in this volume describes one such atrocity committed by Bulgarian guerrillas in Serres. A deliberate and unprovoked massacre took place there when the Bulgarian army captured the town. Male members of the civilian population were killed en masse, followed by a large-scale pillage of the town and violation of women and children. The report admits that the perpetrators of the atrocities were chiefly "Macedonian insurgents (*komitadjis*)" and that they acted under the watch of the Bulgarian military authorities.<sup>29</sup>

Witness "Yousouf Efendi, President of the Moslem Community of Serres," offered testimony cited in the same report: the "Macedonian insurgents" were sixteen men led by "Zancov."<sup>30</sup> According to Durvingov, the staff of the partisan detachment dispatched band 10 led by Georgi Zankov with ten rifles and a total of twenty-four men to the Serres region.<sup>31</sup> It is indisputable that the "Macedonian insurgents" were Bulgarian military men disguised as guerrillas.

Simeon Radev, a famous Bulgarian writer and a former member of the MAV, admits the misconduct of some of the guerrilla bands of the partisan detachment. In his memoir on the Balkan Wars, he discloses the following story:

At the time of mobilization, bands were formed and dispatched before the army in order to operate at the rear of the Turks. Some of them behaved well, others remained useless as they lost their way. Others preoccupied themselves in robbery and extortion of the Turkish population. The case of Michael Dumbalakov in Kavala was especially dishonorable. Karamanov, the district Governor of Kilkis, told me that he tried to arrest him, but that Dumbalakov fled to Thessaloniki under the protection of the Greeks. After the end of hostilities, some of the irregulars remained in the parts of Macedonia that were occupied by us and kept committing atrocities. When I met General Savov in Dimotika, I requested him to enroll them all in the Macedonian Adrianople volunteers. The order was issued but either incorrectly enforced or neglected.<sup>32</sup>

The Michael Dumbalakov referred to here was born in the village Suho in the Thessaloniki (Salonika) region. He was appointed the

commander of band 1 of the partisan detachment on September 18, 1912. He led twenty-eight fighters and set out for Aegean Macedonia, his native country.<sup>33</sup> Among the examples of hair-raising cruelty by the *komitadjis* that İlker Alp gives is the following passage: “When they passed a village near Visoka, the band of Dombalakof shut the male population up into a slaughterhouse, killed them by swords, and cut up their bodies like sheep.”<sup>34</sup> Taking the time and place into consideration, “Dombalakof” was no doubt Michael Dumbalakov himself.

Radev gives us another example of extreme chauvinism among the ranks of the partisan detachment, led by Dimitur Lyapov-Gurin. He was one of the earliest members of IM[A]RO and first entered the MAV as a member of the band led by Georgi Zankov that operated in the Serres district. He was later incorporated into the headquarters of the Third Thessaloniki Battalion. According to Radev, Lyapov was “the one who had the greatest hatred for Turks.” Radev recalls the following remarks by Lyapov when they witnessed the Armenian persecution in Istanbul in the 1890s: “Turkish people should not have a place among humanity.” When the First Balkan War was about to break out, Lyapov-Gurin insisted that the war’s aim was not only the liberation of Bulgarians from Turkish rule but the total elimination of Turkey from the European map. He even swore to destroy any memory of Turkey on European soil. Lyapov-Gurin seems to have kept his word after the outbreak of the war, as Radev explains:

When he stayed with his band in Mehomiya, he set fire to the Konak [local government building]. Daniel Krapchev, a member of the band, warned, “What are you doing?” Lyapov replied, pointing out the flames, which had already been rising: “As you see, I am looking at how Turkey is burning.” Krapchev protested that the place was no longer a part of Turkey and that the building could be used for Bulgaria. Krapchev finally yelled at him in a trembling voice of indignation: “This is forbidden by the Hague Convention!” Lyapov replied: “Does the Hague Convention allow forming *bashi-bozouks*?”<sup>35</sup>

The discussion to this point has centered on the deviations of certain members of the “partisan detachment.” Because they had the appearance of irregulars, it is still possible to consider the extraordinary brutalities during the war as the personal acts of *voivodes* who were more or less given a free hand in their assigned zone of activities. If so, the atrocities

were beyond the control of the Bulgarian army's command staff. Lyapov-Gurin's last remark, however, suggests that the atrocities taking place under the guise of irregulars were premeditated rather than being the personal crimes of certain *voivodes*. Here a question arises: did the regular army commanders intentionally use the irregulars as a tool to intimidate the civil population or not? The following episode disclosed by Petur Durvingov provides a clue.

On November 20, after the fall of Malgara, the general commander of the cavalry brigade, Colonel Salabashiev, gave an order to the Third Salonika Battalion of the MAV to dispatch five bands to the Kuru-dag with the mission "to reconnoiter the enemy." Each band was composed of twenty to twenty-five men and led by either former *voivodes* or insurrectionists. According to the report of the Third Salonika Battalion, "when those five bands were sent to the Kuru-dag with the aforementioned mission, the situation had been seriously dangerous. Many *bashi-bozouk* bands led by Hadji Sherif Bey had ranged over those villages and perpetrated terrible atrocities upon the Christian population." As the five bands entered the area, however, "the enemy was forced to evacuate the region in a short while." When the main body of the battalion passed through the area, "we found it completely cleansed of enemies." The report highly applauded the "achievement of those bands and their brave and experienced *voivodes*." The *voivodes* and the other band members were decorated later due to those services.<sup>36</sup>

This story leaves us with a somewhat strange impression. Why were the bands of a "reconnaissance" mission highly praised for "cleansing" *bashi-bozouks*? It is also mysterious why the *bashi-bozouks*, so prevalent in the region, were swiftly wiped out by a small number of lightly equipped soldiers. The same report tries to explain this: "The fear caused by the appearance of our bands among the Turkish army and population was so great that everywhere it began to be rumored that the Kuru-dag was full of *komitadjis* who would annihilate everything on their way." The report also exposed the dishonorable story of one of those bands. The fifth band was composed of twenty-two men and led by former *voivode* Misho Ivanov. It was expected to take the Malgara-Dogandji-Bulgarkyoy-Keshan route. The battalion commander held great expectations for this band, but it was betrayed:

For a long while it was unknown where the band was, as it gave no report. On November 20 when the battalion was in Keshan, the *voivode* sent a dispatch saying that he was in the Aegean coast.

The band returned in Saklu village on December 3 but without its *voivode*. He had been arrested and sent to a court. The reason for his arrest is unknown to us. We asked the band members, but they did not know what crime he had committed.<sup>37</sup>

The hesitation and reluctance to disclose the details of the misconduct of the *voivode* may imply the existence of a horrible back-story. Moreover, the lenient tone of reproach seems to reflect a certain sympathy for his fate. Indeed the MAV headquarters even tried to cover up the event. Simcon Radev discloses the following story:

Irregular bands led by *voivodes* had been dispatched from the First Brigade with the duty of intelligence and protection of the Christian population from the Turkish guerrillas who had emerged in the neighborhood. These bands perhaps had not kept to good behavior in some ways, and Colonel Salabashiev issued an order to the Hayrebol detachment, in which he severely upbraided them. Lieutenant Colonel Nikolov said: "You will go now to Hayrebol and persuade Colonel Salabashiev to withdraw the order because it is hazardous to the entire Macedonian-Adrianople volunteers and may create serious misunderstandings."<sup>38</sup>

We may wonder about the reason behind the apprehension of the MAV leadership and fear of the hazardous effect on "the entire Macedonian-Adrianople volunteers." If the misconduct was the product of certain deviant *voivodes*, they should have been punished individually without any greater consequences for the rest. In other words, the MAV commanders would have had no grounds to worry that the upbraiding of the "irregulars" was their direct responsibility. Therefore it is plausible to consider that the "irregulars" were intentionally used as a tool to intimidate the civilian population by the MAV headquarters.

Indeed, contrary to the picture of self-praise, the contributions of the MAV on the battle front were mostly as an auxiliary force forming the rear guard. Thus Ivan Fichev gave the order to Alexander Protogerov on November 12 and emphasized that his duty was "to fight and dispel enemy *bashi-bozouks* and parties at work with the [Turkish] regular force." The same order was reiterated on November 18 in the following way: "Your duty is to clean up the region between Dimotika and Komotini of *bashi-bozouks*." On November 20 the general commander of the

Second Army reminded General Genev of the supreme importance of cleansing the rear and flank of *bashi-bozouks*.<sup>39</sup>

The disarmament of the Muslim population was no less an important duty of the MAV. On November 13 Fichev urged Protogerov to take “pacifying” measures in the countryside. The next day Fichev also sent the following instruction to Genev: “While you are energetically pursuing the assigned duties [the cleansing operation against *bashi-bozouks*], at the same time take measures to disarm the Turkish population.”<sup>40</sup>

Urged by their superiors, the commanders of the MAV were busy dispatching units throughout the region with the duty of cleansing the territories. The zone of operation eventually turned out to be a vast area spreading south from Haskovo to the Aegean coast. One major region under their jurisdiction was the eastern Rhodope, where Pomaks and Turks constituted the majority population. As discussed in greater detail by Fatme Myuhtar-May’s contribution to this volume (chapter 11), the mission was not easy: MAV units found the Muslim population in “quite hostile sentiment.” On November 11 the commander of the border guard complained about the situation as follows. “Taking into consideration the fact that the population is inclined to hostility in this wide region, I believe it will need several days more to clean up the Arda region.”<sup>41</sup>

It is not irrelevant to examine the sentiment of the Muslims mentioned here, because the extraordinary hostility of the population was often used as an excuse for the “excesses” of the soldiers. During the war, especially when they were accused of misconduct against Muslim civilians, the Bulgarian authorities liked to justify these acts as accidental outbursts of revenge: “The Pomaks might take advantage of war conditions to attack their Bulgar neighbors as they have done on previous occasions, as at Batak.”<sup>42</sup> The banal rhetoric of age-old ethnic hatred can easily be rebutted by the following witnesses. Leon Trotsky testified that Bulgarian troops in the Rhodope sector destroyed a Pomak village with its entire population, houses, and farms by artillery fire, with no regard for age and gender, at the beginning of the war.<sup>43</sup> Trotsky believed that the event set a precedent for similar atrocities. George Young, a British scholar, even went so far to say: “Coming to Bulgaria, we find that in the first impetus of military action measures were taken against the Moslemized Bulgars of the Rhodope—the Pomaks—which might to the suspicious suggest a policy of precautionary extermination. A large percentage of the male Pomak population was expatriated and interned at Adrianople, where far too large a proportion died of disease and hardship.”<sup>44</sup>

These assertions on intentional expulsion of the Muslim civilians can be confirmed by the following telegraph sent by the Second Army to the Kurdjali detachment on October 26. During this short period a significant number of Muslim refugees were gathering on the right bank of the Arda River, apparently with the aim of returning to their homes. The Second Army headquarters, however, ordered the deployment of battalions on the left bank with the task of stopping the refugees from returning.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, if a motive such as “revenge” had ever existed, it was the product of the Bulgarian Army, which had treated indigenous Muslims as a fifth column.

A more plausible explanation for the hostile sentiments of the Muslims is provided by Major Totev, the lieutenant commander of Kurdjali. On November 25 he reported:

According to the information at my disposal, many of the refugee Turks who fled to the right bank of the Arda River as far as Egridere are returning to their villages west of Kurdjali.... Likewise, the population is coming back to the villages east of Kurdjali. I suppose that, especially in the villages west of Kurdjali, owing to the lack of food, salt, and other necessities, *bashi-bozouks* have been formed and are beginning to attack traffic and even the town of Kurdjali.<sup>46</sup>

As described here, the mass exodus and subsequent return of part of the local population produced a serious humanitarian crisis and eventually precipitated armed resistance.

The operation became all the more difficult because the Bulgarians paid little attention to the difference between the campaign against *bashi-bozouks* and the disarmament of the Muslim population. The Second Army headquarters, for example, gave the following instruction to the Kurdjali detachment on October 31: “The cleansing of the flanks and rear of the gangs is not difficult work if you use the force at your disposal. You have enough strength to disarm the population and to send them into the interior toward Haskovo.” As this passage shows, the military leadership equated the disarmament with the cleanup operations. To make matters worse, the very definition of *bashi-bozouks* was quite ambiguous and opportunistic. This word may suggest a Muslim militia or armed band, but the reality was quite different. Those who hid guns or were suspected of doing so were often identified as *bashi-bozouks*. Anyone who showed any sign of resistance or disobedience was treated

likewise. Therefore on November 12 the Kurdjali detachment instructed the reconnaissance squad on the manner of disarmament: "To the nearby villages, send only patrols of several men with a messenger selected from the captured locals. Let him induce the population to give up arms. Then let him warn that every attempt on our soldiers will bring death and the village will be burned and destroyed. Summon the leaders and detain them as hostages."<sup>47</sup>

The same day Durvingov gave the border guard a similar order: "Take the most energetic measures in the region between the old border and the left bank of the Arda River up to Susuz village, including those to rid the region of *bashi-bozouks*. If you encounter resistance in any villages, inspire terror."<sup>48</sup>

These instructions seem to have been carried out literally. The Muslim population protested to the Bulgarian military governors against the "outrages" committed by the MAV soldiers.<sup>49</sup> The Ottoman-Turkish newspaper *İkdam* likewise reported the devastation of the Arda region. "A total of 15,570 households or 90,400 Pomak Muslims had lived in 88 villages in the basin of the Arda River. A part of them fled in Komotini at the time of invasion, and the rest remained on the spot.... Bulgarians killed teachers, prayer leaders, village heads, and other notables immediately after their invasion. Then they transformed mosques into churches, stationed Orthodox priests, and converted the people into Christianity by the force of bayonets. Those who didn't accept were killed in unprecedented ways, having their nails and teeth ripped out and their mouths and noses cut off."<sup>50</sup>

Leon Trotsky provided more direct witness testimony of MAV activities. Trotsky met a member of the Armenian company of the MAV (who was wounded and had recently returned from the front line) at the end of November 1912 in Sofia. According to Trotsky's interview:

"It was hard out there in the field," the wounded man told me, "very hard. Though we knew we weren't going to a wedding feast, we hadn't expected it would be like that. We marched, and on the eighth day we arrived in [Malko] Trnovo, where they issued us Mannlicher rifles with bayonets, and from there we were sent, along with the Macedonian legion, to Kirjali, where we spent twenty-four hours practicing marksmanship, and then crossed the Turkish border. All around us the country was deserted; the villagers had been burned, the cattle were roaming about homeless. We set fire to places, too; or rather, the Macedonians did—Andranik



wouldn't allow us to. Any Turks we came upon outside the villages, even if they were unarmed, we had orders to treat [them] as spies and kill. The Macedonians did the same: first they interrogated anyone they met, to get what they could out of him, and then they shot him or stabbed him to death."<sup>51</sup>

The witness vividly describes how the regular battalions of the MAV committed atrocities against Muslim civilians when they were carrying out cleansing operations.

### CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented in this chapter shows that members of the MAV during the Balkan Wars clearly did not conduct themselves in the heroic manner often depicted by contemporary historians and in popular tales. The alleged altruist soldier who took up arms for the liberation of the oppressed people had another face: a warlike fanatic with strong chauvinist sentiments. The legion was not the epoch-making institution that was hurriedly set up for the sake of the massive foreign applicants to the Bulgarian army. It was planned and prepared by the joint act of the Bulgarian army and the IMARO and had a strong presence of IMARO members.

The legion had two different faces as well. While the battalions were incorporated into the regular formations of the Bulgarian army and took part in the open battle with their Ottoman counterparts, the rest of the members engaged in various destructive activities behind the enemy lines. Initially, there was a certain division of labor between them; the irregulars were to engage in various sabotage operations, including the persecution of noncombatants, while the regulars were expected to carry out normal missions. But such distinctions could not last long.

When the regular units were assigned the duty of rear and flank guard, they also embarked on massive atrocities against the civil population. Thus the clandestine cooperation between the irregular and the regular units ended at the initial stage of the war: they merged into one group by the end of 1912. A total of forty of the forty-nine bands that had been operating were dissolved and incorporated into the existing battalions of the MAV.<sup>52</sup>

The assessment of the MAV activities requires critically engaging the stereotypes produced by these nationalist war campaigns as provided by the Carnegie Report. The report undervalues the commitment of regular units and obstinately insists that the widespread atrocities were the

product of the mutual hatred among the populations. It claims: "We have repeatedly been able to show that the worst atrocities were not due to the excesses of the regular soldiery, nor can they always be laid to the charge of the volunteers, the *bashi-bozouks*. The populations mutually slaughtered and pursued with a ferocity heightened by mutual knowledge and the old hatreds and resentments they cherished."<sup>53</sup> This assessment is challenged by the facts cited in this chapter. First, the distinction between irregulars and the regular units was irrelevant, as shown by the case of the MAV. The alleged irregulars were in fact soldiers in civil costume: the regular army had provided them arms and ammunition and assigned the special duties. Second, the atrocities committed during the cleansing operation were due to neither excesses nor lack of discipline. Intimidations and exemplary killings were carried out intentionally and as part and parcel of a premeditated military plan. Third, the alleged outburst of "ancient hatreds" was either grassroot resistance to the organized crimes or inevitable acts for survival. Without a calculated military plan of civilian persecution, members of the population would not have had a reason to attack their neighbors.

This chapter shines a spotlight on the atrocities committed by certain members of the MAV during the first stage of the Balkan Wars. The MAV was the largest foreign legion during the war, so its activities warrant specific study. I do not mean to say that Bulgarians are to be uniquely blamed for their use of paramilitaries in the persecution of civilians. In this regard the MAV bands were not the worst example of bloodthirsty military bands operating during the Balkan Wars. It is necessary to investigate the cases of the other states to gain a full picture of the atrocities perpetrated by the paramilitaries during the war. The Balkan Wars were a war of nationality, not in the sense that ordinary people mutually attacked their neighbors as claimed by the Carnegie Report but in the sense that the nationalist states tried to maximize their territorial gain by eliminating "unwanted populations." In such circumstances every party must have employed more or less the same strategy and made use of the same methods. But these facts by no means mitigate the moral obligation of the parties concerned. It is the duty of scholars to inspect the disgraceful records of those who have been called heroes.

#### NOTES

1. They consisted of 275 Armenians, 82 Russians, 68 Romanians, 40 Serbs, 15 Austro-Hungarians, 12 Montenegrins, 3 Greeks, 2 Czechs, 1 Albanian, 1 Croat,

- 1 Englishman, 1 Italian, 1 Iranian, and others. Georgi Ginchev, "Chuzhdencite v bulgarskata armiya prez Balkanskata vojna (1912–1913 g.)," 141.
2. The term "Slavic Orthodox Christians" may be unsuitable for the context. "Ethnic Bulgarians" is more appropriate. But I want to avoid unnecessary discussion whether about they were Bulgarians or Macedonians. It must be added that all existing sources that I examined (Turkish, Bulgarian, English, French, and Russian) are consistent in calling them ethnic Bulgarians.
3. One source claims that the monuments have been built in as many as seventeen villages. Bulgarski Boini, "Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie, 1912–1913."
4. Nacionalen Voennoistoricheski Muzey, "Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie."
5. Yono Mitev, *Geroizmat na Bulgarskiya narod prez Balkanskata vojna*, 33–34.
6. Ibid., 35.
7. Nacionalen Voennoistoricheski Muzey, "Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie."
8. "Revolutionaries" here means either former guerrilla (*chete*) fighters or participants in the 1902 uprising.
9. Petur Durvingov, *Istoriya na Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 1.
10. Ibid., 8–10.
11. Ibid., 9–10. Durvingov's narrative on the formation of the guerrilla bands contains several inconsistencies. While he asserts that the date of writing "the rules" was September 18, the text quoted in his book has the date of September 17. According to Durvingov, the order to set up the staff came on September 18. After this Durvingov and Protogerov convened with three other officers, discussed with them the way to gather guerrillas, decided the location of intelligence centers, set up the office, wrote the draft of "the rules," and made arrangements to get the money and ammunition. These activities seem to be too much to be done within one day.
12. Hristo Silyanov, *Ot Vitosha do Gramos*, 352.
13. Ibid., 355.
14. Durvingov, *Istoriya na Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, viii, 1–2.
15. Ibid., 10–14.
16. Mitev, *Geroizmat na Bulgarskiya Narod*, 35.
17. Durvingov, *Istoriya na Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 26–27.
18. Mitev, *Geroizmat na Bulgarskiya Narod*, 33–34.
19. Glavno Upravenie na Archivite pri MS, *Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie 1912–1913 g.*, 9.
20. Leon Trotsky noticed this connection and added the following information in his dispatch: "The war has absorbed the Macedonian revolutionary into itself. It has dispatched the 'anarchist' Gerdzhikov to cut telegraph wires, and entrusted the old plotter Georgy Petrov with running the supply services of the Macedonian legion." Leon Trotsky, *The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky*, 235.
21. İlker Alp, "Bulgar Mezalimi," 135.
22. Theodore Zaimis, *The Crimes of Bulgaria in Macedonia*, 4–5.
23. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, 74–75.
24. Ibid., 76.
25. I cannot find Stefan Boichev in the list of MAV soldiers.
26. Carnegie Endowment, *Report of the International Commission*, 280.

27. Durvingov, *Istorija na Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 244, 254–55.
28. Ibid., 288, 290.
29. Carnegie Endowment, *Report of the International Commission*, 75–76.
30. Ibid., 280.
31. Durvingov, *Istorija na Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 11.
32. Simeon Radev, *Tova, koeto vidyah ot Balkanskata Voina*, 61.
33. Glavno Upravljenje, *Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 251; Bulgarski Boini Znamena, “Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie”
34. Alp, “Bulgar Mezalimi,” 152. Alp gives us the following picture of the Bulgarian atrocities in Kavala: “According to a German witness, *komitadjis* detained 39 Muslim notables when they entered Kavala. They stripped them of everything and tied all three people into one. Then they began torturing them to death. Some were torn apart by bayonets and had their head broken by rifle butts. Others had their throats cut like sheep.” Ibid., 151.
35. Radev, *Tova*, 62–63.
36. Durvingov, *Istorija na Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 244, 256.
37. Ibid., 255–56.
38. Radev, *Tova*, 37.
39. Durvingov, *Istorija na Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 108, 214, 250–51.
40. Ibid., 113.
41. Ibid., 144.
42. George Young, *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, 287.
43. Trotsky, *The War Correspondence*, 283.
44. Young, *Nationalism and War*, 287.
45. Durvingov, *Istorija na Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 116.
46. Ibid., 289.
47. Ibid., 120, 148–49.
48. Ibid., 145.
49. Ibid., 367.
50. *İkdam*, August 15–16, 1913, cited in Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri (1912–1913)*, 35.
51. Trotsky, *The War Correspondence*, 254–55.
52. Glavno Upravljenje, *Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 892–93. The rest of the partisan bands were reorganized into three new battalions during March 1913. Durvingov, *Istorija na Makedono-Odrinskoto Opulchenie*, 535–36.
53. Carnegie Endowment, *Report of the International Commission*, 148.



### PART III

## Assessing Local, Regional, and International Reactions to the War



## Between Cross and Crescent

British Diplomacy and Press Opinion  
toward the Ottoman Empire in Resolving  
the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913

*Pamela J. Dorn Sezgin*

The Balkan Wars (1912–13) were not the first order of business confronting British politicians and their public. The first decades of the twentieth century in Great Britain were times of instability and crisis, both at home and in the far reaches of the empire. David Brooks wrote that rather than being “the last brilliant phase and expression of a golden age of peace and prosperity...[an] Indian summer of stability and imperial splendor before the cataclysm of the first World War,” it was a time when “the British people felt the ground shifting beneath their feet.”<sup>1</sup> It was also a time when domestic politics were embroiled in upheaval and change. Feminists and trade unionists challenged the established rule of law. Movements such as nationalism and socialism tested the political order. This was not a generalized crisis but part of a continuum of democratization that began in the 1860s.<sup>2</sup> Violent protests and political extremism were only pushing the boundaries, challenging traditional parliamentary institutions to be more inclusive.

Great Britain’s influence faced challenges on the international stage too. These began in earnest with the crisis presented by the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), which tested the limits of empire. Britain wanted to maintain control in South Africa by incorporating the Boer republics, but the protracted war drained Britain’s financial and military resources and left it in a precarious international position.<sup>3</sup> Britain’s role as the strongest global power was no longer a given, as it had been in the Victorian era. While London was still the metropole of a worldwide empire,



the early twentieth century brought fissures and cracks into the colonies and administrated territories. Nationalists from Ireland to the South Asian subcontinent called for "Home Rule." Germany and the United States vied with Britain as international powers, and Germany was particularly worrisome due to its naval prowess.

To maintain its standing on the global stage, Britain was drawn into the affairs of continental Europe. The Balkan Crisis of 1912–13 presented an opportunity for Britain to take the lead as a world power. The London Peace Conferences (one of which was attended by representatives of the Balkan states and the other by ambassadors from the Great Powers), which commenced on December 17, 1912, and the ensuing peace initiatives in 1913 provided vehicles for Britain to demonstrate leadership in world politics and assert its hegemony over the other European powers.

This study explores the London Peace initiatives via press opinion in the major British newspapers and periodicals of the time. Press opinion is defined here as the views and biases expressed in these publications. It is not "public opinion," because the opinions expressed do not reflect the ideas of the general public but instead are those of the authors of the articles, the artists who created the political cartoons, the editorial boards, the publishers, and the owners of the periodicals. Newspapers in Edwardian Britain were generally owned by political parties and reflected the views of their political constituents.<sup>4</sup> They were also financially dependent upon wealthy patrons as the business of journalism changed in the late nineteenth century.<sup>5</sup> Finally, they were often involved in advocacy, such as sponsoring and organizing demonstrations and fund-raisers for the causes they expounded.

Press opinion is important as an avenue of historiography because it provides a diversity of perspectives.<sup>6</sup> The London peace accords on their own were viewed as a failure by most historians: they were lengthy debates with little resolution. The conflict continued in the Balkans during the winter of 1913. Even after the Ottoman Empire signed the agreement to end the First Balkan War in May 1913, the conflict continued. One month later Bulgaria attacked Greek and Serbian forces in Macedonia, beginning the Second Balkan War, which lasted until August. So peace did not arrive at the end of this long effort. The correspondence, the treaties, and the minutes of the meetings yield interesting information about the peace initiative, but they do not necessarily reveal a diversity of interpretations by people from the era.<sup>7</sup> Press documents, though, can provide precisely those native and time-bound interpretations. Materials in the press can answer the following questions. How did educated political

people interpret the successes and the failures of the accords? How were the players in these conflicts viewed by the British? How did British writers interpret the Balkan Crisis in terms of their own problems in maintaining the British Empire?

#### SOURCES OF DATA AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

The sources of data for this study represent a sample of the major newspapers found in England over a nine-month period: from November 1912 through July 1913. The Liberal press is represented by the *Westminster Gazette*, the *Times*, and the *Contemporary Review*. The Socialist press is illustrated by the *Daily Herald*, founded in 1912 and funded by the Labour Party and the Trade Union Movement.<sup>8</sup> The Conservative press is represented by the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *National Review*. The *Manchester Guardian* and the *Nation* illustrate the Radical press.<sup>9</sup> *Punch* provides an excellent source of political cartoons for this analysis. Finally, the *African Times and Orient Review* provides an unusual, culturally relativistic and inclusive view of the British Empire. The press sources reviewed include both dailies and the more lengthy foreign policy reviews.

This chapter uses several theoretical constructs to organize and evaluate the interpretations from 1912–13 found in British newspapers. The first is a modified view of Orientalism, a late British Empire paradigm studied and deconstructed by Edward Said.<sup>10</sup> Said contends that the discourse of Orientalism in Europe was *essentialized* by using stereotypes and *decontextualized* the East by using a vague and imaginary geography that extended from North Africa to India and beyond. The East was treated as a monolithic “Other” by the West, in Said’s opinion, in order for the European imperial powers to gain control over it. Said’s notion derived from Michel Foucault’s concept of discourse as the articulation of knowledge and from Antonio Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony. Orientalism was situated in the imperial context, where the East was turned into a structure of myth prefabricated for Western use.<sup>11</sup> For other perspectives on *Orientalism*, see Jonathan Schmitt’s essay in this volume (chapter 17).

Critics of Said, such as John MacKenzie, point out that he is also essentializing the West and treating it as a monolith in an ahistorical discussion. In MacKenzie’s view, Said’s binary discourse of West and East, Occidental and Oriental, does not grapple with political economy, class, or gender differences.<sup>12</sup> The great diversity of materials produced by nineteenth-century European travel writers also counters the idea of

essentializing one side or the other.<sup>13</sup> The value in Said's use of Orientalism is in its role as an emblem of colonial domination and imperial power. This is not just a category of dispassionate, scholarly interest: it has hegemonic qualities.

Orientalism is only part of the equation when discussing the Balkan Wars and peace initiatives. While the "East" as a category may be useful for understanding Western European writers' accounts of the Ottomans, Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire were viewed differently. Maria Todorova deconstructed "Balkanism" in much the same way that Said approached Orientalism, but with the caveat that no common West and no common Western stereotype of the Balkans existed.<sup>14</sup> She cautioned that diversity and nuance must be taken into account for a thorough understanding of the Eastern Question in the early 1900s. Thus, in interpreting the historical images from the Balkan Wars in the British press and investigating the perspectives of different newspaper writers, European diplomats, and British politicians, the approach here is to include both their Oriental and Balkan stereotypes as well as their representations that are nonstereotypic, ambivalent, and in some cases even positive.

#### BRITISH WAR REPORTING

The First Balkan War was started by an alliance of Christian states in the Balkan Peninsula composed of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro (henceforth called the Balkan Allies or Balkan Leaguers). Agreements were made from March through October 1912, in which these states assigned northern Macedonia to Serbia and southern Macedonia to Bulgaria. They agreed to military actions against the Ottoman Empire and also contemplated fighting Austria if it interfered. On October 8, 1912, Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire, joined by the other Balkan Allies on October 17, one day after the Ottoman declaration of war.<sup>15</sup>

Fighting was grim. The atrocities and difficulties prompted a Carnegie Endowment study. Members of the Balkan Commission of Inquiry were journalists and academics from Austria, France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and the United States.<sup>16</sup> Reporters traveled freely with the Serbian (written as "Servian" in this period), Bulgarian, and Ottoman forces. Two British reporters who traveled with the Serbian forces were Philip Gibbs and Bernard Grant. The photographs taken by Grant in their published journal of the war illustrate the harsh conditions of cholera, famine, and wartime hardship, such as Turkish villages being burned by the Balkan armies.<sup>17</sup>

Gibbs's views of the Ottomans and of the Balkan peoples were not favorable. For example, in covering the siege of Adrianople (Edirne), he wrote: "Old Turks licked their lips at the thought of the vengeance, and promised themselves a cheerful time with curved knives and upward thrusts." Gibbs was equally uncomplimentary about the Bulgarians:

These savage thoughts prevailed also among the peasant soldiers on the Bulgarian side, who were disheartened by the failure to capture a city which had seemed like a ripe pear ready to fall into their hands, and they were angered by the great losses which they sustained from the surprise attacks and the continued shell fire.<sup>18</sup>

Gibbs also was disappointed with the Serbian government in Belgrade at the outbreak of the war because it was in no hurry to begin the war. He thought that the Serbian government was stalling and pursuing diplomatic avenues with the Great Powers in order that "they might assemble all their fighting men and collect their munitions of war. Some of the big guns had still to be delivered." He found "the enthusiasm of the people was wild and unrestrained" for the outbreak of war: "The call to the colours had been answered by the peasants, by the townsmen, by clerks and shopkeepers as though it were the invitation to a national festival in which religion was mingled with merry-making."<sup>19</sup>

The Gibbs and Grant book was reviewed in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, where it was lauded as an example of exciting war reporting. War, viewed with all of its hardships and disaster, was an interesting adventure and "all-absorbing," according to the reviewer, who continued: "Mr. Gibbs presents to the general reader not only the pictures of battles, but those dramas of war in which the curtain rises on the farm and homestead. He has seen among the Bulgarians the amazing business side of war, the feeding, clothing, doctoring, and transport of troops." The *Pall Mall Gazette* book reviewer was not neutral about the Ottoman soldiers. He also depicted the Bulgarians as fierce: "As it was, the Balkan peasant, trudging in indifferently into a welter of blood, roused from his lethargy only by actual fighting, became the historic avenger of the Cross against a rabble, whose own symbol had become less the Crescent than the wooden bullet."<sup>20</sup> The fierceness of the Bulgarians served as a common trope in British war reporting, appearing also in the *Pall Mall Gazette*'s daily dispatches.

Gibbs's articles appeared in his newspaper, the *Graphic*, as well as being extracted in other dailies such as the *Westminster Gazette*.<sup>21</sup> Grant was the photographer for the *Daily Mirror*. These gentlemen were not the

only reporters working for several periodicals simultaneously. Dr. E. J. Dillon was another writer whose analyses appeared in both the *Contemporary Review* and the *Daily Telegraph*, while being abstracted in the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *Westminster Gazette*.<sup>22</sup> Dillon was a member of parliament and an Irish nationalist.<sup>23</sup>

Dillon's stereotype of the Serbs was that they were both clever and nervous.<sup>24</sup> Writers for the *Pall Mall Gazette*, in contrast, were favorable to the Serbs, particularly their leaders and the Serbian nobility residing in London. For example, in an article headlined "Revival of the Salon, a Balkan Tea Party in London: Slav Patriots," a correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette* wrote a warm, fuzzy account of Mme. Olga Novikoff's party for visiting Serbian, Montenegrin, and Bulgarian dignitaries. Mme. Novikoff was a seventy-two-year-old Serbian noblewoman. The correspondent described a gathering at her London home: "The stairs of the house have long since been named 'The Balkans.' ... One day this week these wooden hills were crowded by the mountaineers themselves. Mme. Novikoff had a big tea party, and Bulgarian, Servian, and Montenegrin marched shoulder to shoulder from a redoubt of books to a victory of cakes and tea."<sup>25</sup>

Another article from the same newspaper a few days later heralded a play written by King Nicholas (also known as Nikola Petrovich Njegosh) of Montenegro. The article was entitled "Play Written by a King: May Be Produced in London: Poetic Patriotism." The focus of the king's play was the dream of a great "Balkan," meaning Christian, empire.<sup>26</sup> The Montenegrins shared the descriptor "patriotic" with the Serbs in the British press. King Nicholas was a poet of some note and the father-in-law of the kings of Italy and Serbia as well as a relative of the Romanovs in Russia.<sup>27</sup>

Journalists and the readers of newspapers, as evidenced by articles and letters to the editor, commented on the types of war reporting in various papers. They also argued about the portrayals of the different Balkan peoples in the British press. For example, a reader of the *African Times and Orient Review* wrote a letter to the editor to complain about the magazine's depiction of the Greek army. The complaint was that the writer of the article "states the motive of the Greeks in laying claim to the islands of the Aegean was a religious one." The letter writer signed his epistle as "Near East." "Near East" charged the writer of the magazine article with bias against the Greeks, giving proof of Hellenic heroism in battle from accounts in other British newspapers:

Surely the gentleman [writer of the article] has not read accounts of the Correspondents of the *Times*, the *Telegraph*, the *Chronicle*,

who have followed the Greek army.... Your contributor has not read the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent's defence of the Greeks and his description of the fighting of their army.<sup>28</sup>

The writer of the article in question was none other than Ellis Schaap, an expert whose posts about the Ottoman Empire showed a remarkable lack of bias and a depth of understanding of the conditions there in the early twentieth century. Schaap wrote a strong response, countering that "Near East" was too trusting of press sources and had "a very large share of that simple faith that believeth every word—provided it comes from sources to whom the word 'Turk' is anathema."<sup>29</sup> Thus the British readers and writers connected to the same periodical in this case held divergent opinions about the various Balkan groups and the Ottomans during this conflict.

The *African Times and Orient Review* was an unusual journal within the British press because of its unique perspective: its writers were indigenous subjects of the British Empire, educated in the British colonial system but often advocating a greater voice for people of color and in some cases autonomy of the African and Asian subjects. This journal was founded in 1911, after the First Universal Races Congress, a meeting of cultural relativists and antiracism activists (including W.E.B. DuBois) held in London. Its founder was Dusé Mohamed Ali (1866–1945), an Egyptian-born pan-Africanist and pan-Islamist, who was raised and educated in England and enjoyed fame as a Shakespearean actor. He moved in the high echelons of British society, which included Sir Edward Grey; Lady Margot Asquith, countess of Oxford and Asquith and wife of the prime minister; Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, who served as viceroy of India and foreign secretary; and many members of the British Cabinet.<sup>30</sup>

In some cases the various periodicals referred to each other and commented on their competitors' coverage of the war. For example, several issues of the *Pall Mall Gazette* discussed "new magazines."<sup>31</sup> Writers in the *African Times and Orient Review* often quoted other journals or took issue with them. For example, the writer using the pen name Harmachis ended his article on "Great Britain versus the Islamic World" with a quotation from G. Thomian from the *Contemporary Review* that admonished England not to lose the "last opportunity" to mend relations with Turkey and "the whole Islamic World."<sup>32</sup>

Likewise, Leo Maxse's magazine, the *National Review*, called the war reporting by the British dailies "lurid and fanciful."<sup>33</sup> Although the article cited no names of newspapers, "Our Correspondent" clearly referred to

the news bulletins found in the international section of the dailies usually coming from Reuter (an international reporting service established in 1850 in the Kingdom of Prussia with the invention of the telegraph and moved to London in 1851, called Reuters today) or from their own unnamed reporters. The *National Review* was a serious publication dedicated to foreign policy critique and understanding. Its articles gave careful historic and geographic background information about their subjects. Its writers were members of parliament and other branches of the government. Leo Maxse, the editor, frequently corresponded with members of the Diplomatic Service. For example, he had regular contact with British diplomats Charles Hardinge and Charles Spring-Rice.<sup>34</sup>

Charles Roshier in "Random Notes on the Turk," also in *African Times and Orient Review*, debunked the stereotype of "The Unspeakable Turk" and advocated avoiding prejudice. He found that the Turk was more European than "Oriental," a term that he put in quotation marks. He took issue with a writer from the *Pall Mall Gazette* whose observations "in general were correct" except for depicting the Turk as "slow and stupid." Roshier cautioned his readers to remember that the same stereotype was applied by the French to the British, but "presumably the *entente cordiale* has changed that."<sup>35</sup>

The summer of 1912 was difficult for the Ottomans. Albania, Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace were taken by the Balkan states. Serbia conquered a port on the Adriatic at Durres (Durazzo, Drach). Austria and Italy saw this conquest as a threat to the Habsburg monarchy. Bitter battles took place at Adrianople (Edirne), Scutari (İşkodra, Shkodër), and Janina (Yanya, Ioannina). Ottoman resources were sorely taxed. For example, in Constantinople (Istanbul) bread was seized for use by the army, putting ordinary people under hardship because "the city does not have mechanized bakeries" and could not produce enough bread for the troops and the populace at the same time.<sup>36</sup> In November 1912 the Ottoman government made overtures to the British requesting its help in brokering a peace agreement. This situation was described in the November 4, 1912, edition of the *Westminster Gazette* under headlines such as "Victors Advance: Defeated Remnants Still Resisting"; "Fighting on Saturday. Great Slaughter of Turks, South of Lule Burgas"; "Threatening Salonica: Allies Closing In"; "Eight British Warships: Hurried Departure from Gibraltar"; and "Turkey's Plea: Appeal to Great Powers."

The Bulgarians were making gains against the Turks by utilizing the latest technology: airplanes that were gathering surveillance on the Ottoman positions. Reuters described the Bulgarian airmen as follows:

## Airmen Invaluable

Great satisfaction is expressed here at the eminent services rendered to the General Staff throughout the war by the Bulgarian airmen, who time and time again have brought invaluable information of the Turkish positions and movements. They have recklessly exposed themselves to the enemy's fire, but except in the case of M. Popoff, who was killed recently, they have escaped scot-free. Reuter [*sic*].<sup>37</sup>

This account juxtaposed a prevalent stereotype of Balkanism with elements of twentieth-century modernity. The Bulgarians were described as “reckless,” a stereotype used by Western European writers to describe certain Balkan peoples and part of the Balkanism repertoire according to Todorova.<sup>38</sup> Balkanism viewed the Christian inhabitants of Balkan nations as uncivilized, crude, primitive, cruel, and disheveled, although they had potential for development by more powerful Europeans. Their “passionate and reckless” nationalism was admired and romanticized by the English, from Lord Byron (George Gordon) in the early nineteenth century to the writers of war reports for British newspapers in 1912. The Bulgarians used a state-of-the-art technology, the airplane, that was praised in the same paragraph that offered a traditional Western European stereotype of them.

Both the article about the Bulgarian airmen and the previously mentioned article about the bread shortage in Constantinople illustrate the idea that the Ottomans were at a disadvantage because of their lack of technology. But these short reports do not develop that idea in any detail. Bulgaria, which had twenty-one airplanes used mainly for surveillance, was not the only Balkan state to have airplanes. The Greeks had six aircraft, including two sea planes, and the Serbians had ten planes. The Ottomans had five airplanes but did not use them during the Balkan Wars.<sup>39</sup> Airplanes, as a symbol of modernity, had great appeal and appeared in cartoons in the Ottoman revolutionary press (1908–11).<sup>40</sup>

British press accounts of the Ottoman army usually depict starved foot soldiers and/or horses in poor condition, although the Ottomans were said always to fight courageously. In an article by the Reuter news service entitled “Prisoners Reach Belgrade: Barefooted, Ragged and Almost Starving,” captured Albanian (termed “Arnaut” by the British from the Turkish name for Albanian, “Arnavut”) recruits to the Ottoman army were described as happy to have been “given a satisfying warm meal” even though they had been captured by Serbs and marched to a Belgrade



fortress.<sup>41</sup> A later account in the *Daily Herald* entitled "Why Scutari Surrendered: 120 People Died from Sickness and Hunger in a Day" described the poor condition of the Ottoman cavalry.

The brother-in-law of the Ottoman ruler of Scutari (İşkodra) was interviewed in Vienna for this article. He described in detail the starvation of the Ottoman troops in Montenegro. Over eight thousand Ottoman horses also died of starvation. By the time fodder was available, no horses remained.<sup>42</sup>

### THE BRITISH/OTTOMAN RELATIONSHIP

By requesting British assistance in brokering peace, the Ottoman government merely took advantage of an old relationship. The English had a longtime interest in the "Near East," the non-European lands governed by the Ottomans, from North Africa through the Mediterranean Levant to Anatolia and the Persian Gulf. This interest was mainly in the guise of the British Levant Company (formed in 1581) for commerce. By the mid-nineteenth century the British government had begun using independence movements as a means of spreading their influence and finding new areas to become British protectorates. British advisors also were involved in the Tanzimat reforms instituted by the Ottomans from 1839 through the 1860s to modernize their legal, tax, trade, educational, and governance systems.

The Ottomans had a long-standing mistrust of the British, despite sometimes friendly relations. This was motivated by a series of international conflicts (such as between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire and between the Ottoman Empire and Greece) and by national uprisings in portions of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.<sup>43</sup> Some years after its separation from the Ottoman Empire, for example, Egypt came under British control in 1882. Another example concerns the British territorial annexation of the Ionian Islands between 1815 and 1864, when these islands were finally given to the Greek nation-state.<sup>44</sup> The British expected favors from the Ottomans, which usually meant gifts of territory, such as Cyprus and the area that is now Kuwait in the Persian Gulf. An article in the *Pall Mall Gazette* reported such an exchange on January 14, 1913. Two members of the British government, Sir Francis Dyke Acland (1874–1939), fourteenth baronet and undersecretary of state for foreign affairs (1911–15), and Sir Bertram Falle (1859–1948), first Baron Portsea and member of parliament for Portsmouth (1910–18), discussed an agreement made between Turkey and Britain in

the event that Russia tried “to take possession of further Turkish territory in Asia.” Britain promised to help defend the sultan “by force of arms,” but in return “assigned to her [Britain] was the island of Cyprus.”<sup>45</sup>

The British, however, were never willing to play the role for the Ottomans that the Russian Empire played in support of Slavic nationalism in the Balkans. The British Foreign Office constantly invoked the idea that all of the Great Powers would monitor and promote Ottoman interests, rather than just Great Britain. And such support would be forthcoming only if certain conditions were met, which mainly involved changes and reforms in the political system regarding the Ottomans’ Christian subjects. For example, in November 1912 British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey noted in a memorandum to the British ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Gerard Lowther, that he could not grant the Ottoman grand vizier Kamil’s request that Britain “give the same degree of support to the Moslems as Russia was according to the Slavs.”<sup>46</sup>

The Ottomans’ mistrust of the British meant that they also invited other European powers, notably Germany, to help them. For example, the Ottoman Army received training from the Germans prior to the Balkan Wars. The Germans and the British were great rivals at this period of history, so another layer of complexity was added to the British/Ottoman relationship. This complexity is reflected in political cartoons from *Punch* magazine. In one the king of the Hellenes sits with the German emperor, thanking him for their success. The emperor turns aside and remarks to himself, “I suppose he can’t be referring to our organization of the TURKISH ARMY [emphasis in the original]” (see fig. 15.1).<sup>47</sup> Of course the Germans had a great deal to do with organizing the modern Greek state too, particularly in the nineteenth century.

The first king of the modern Greek nation-state was King Otto (Othon in Greek), a former Bavarian prince who reigned from 1832 to 1862. Bavarian bureaucrats and architects played a vital role in organizing the new Greek political system and the Athenian built-landscape in the nineteenth century. Otto was deposed in 1862, and the Great Powers nominated a Danish prince from a German noble family to serve as the king of the Hellenes. King George I served from 1863 until his assassination in Salonika during the Balkan Wars on March 18, 1913. King George was followed by his eldest son, King Constantine I, who ruled from 1913 to 1917 and from 1920 to 1922. The *Punch* cartoon depicts King Constantine. Constantine’s wife, Sophia, was from a Prussian royal family, another example of the transnational and cosmopolitan ties of European royalty that muddled the political waters and made political alliances all



## PEACE INITIATIVES AND THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA

Before the Peace Conference and the Ambassadors Conference even began in December 1912, the European powers were involved in the Balkan Wars, sending their battleships to Balkan ports to observe and be ready to protect their citizens and property abroad. For example, the *Westminster Gazette* reported that three British cruisers were ordered "eastwards from Malta...in case of eventualities." This incident occurred after a British steamer was seized in the port of Salonika by the Greek navy for "attempting to run the blockade outside Salonica [*sic*] Harbour." The Greeks charged that the British steamer was "in the service of the Turkish government."<sup>49</sup> Sightings of German and French boats in Balkan ports were also noted by the British press.

The European powers were divided into two groups, a designation that continued into World War I: the Triple Alliance consisted of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy; and the Triple Entente was composed of Britain, France, and Russia. The groups together were referred to as the "Great Powers" or just the "Powers" in the British press from December 1912 forward. The Triple Alliance actually was formed much earlier, in 1882, when these three countries agreed to support each other if attacked by either France or Russia.

The Triple Entente formed because of French and British concerns about Germany. France felt threatened by Germany, with whom it had ongoing disputes about a mutual Alsatian border, redrawn five times from the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) through World War I. P. Couvray from Brighton echoed these concerns in a letter to the editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*. Couvray cautioned that the first battles "in the next Franco-German war" would be decisive and that France's fate was in its own hands because England's help would come too late if France was vanquished.<sup>50</sup> Britain was worried about the growth of the German navy. France and Britain signed an agreement in 1904 called the Entente Cordiale (Cordial Understanding) to support each other.

In 1907 the Russians joined them. The Russians were worried about the expansion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Balkans were contested, with some territories under partial Austro-Hungarian control and others protected and supported by Russia. Russia was instrumental in the independence movements of Bulgaria and Serbia, fostering pan-Slavic solidarity and nationalism as a means of expanding its influence. Russia promised to protect Serbia if Triple Alliance members intervened in the Balkans.<sup>51</sup>

When the peace conference was suggested in November of 1912, Raymond Poincaré's proposals were discussed in the British press. Poincaré was head of a coalition government and foreign minister in France. He prepared, "in accordance with the British and Russian Governments, a scheme of mediation between the Balkan belligerents which will shortly be submitted to the Governments of Vienna and Berlin," reported the *Westminster Gazette*.<sup>52</sup>

Once the European powers accepted the proposal, it would be presented to the Bulgarian and Turkish governments. An armistice was signed on December 3, 1912. The London Peace Conference was composed of delegates from the Ottoman Empire and from the Balkan Allies, including Greece, which did not sign the armistice. It convened on December 16, 1912. Simultaneously the Ambassadors Conference was called by Sir Edward Grey, foreign secretary of Britain. The Ambassadors Conference consisted of delegates of the Great Powers.

According to British Press reports in the dailies, the Ambassadors Conference delegates were concerned that none of their own countries receive territory or an unfair advantage from the conflict in the Balkans. Their main fear was that the Balkan War could spread west to the rest of Europe. That is what A. J. P. Taylor calls "the balance of power" that so characterized late nineteenth-century European diplomacy after the 1848 revolutions and the "twentieth century chaos" of growing nationalisms.<sup>53</sup> But the balance was only on the surface. Each of the powers had its own agenda for the conference. The Russians wanted to keep the Bulgarians out of Constantinople, upon which Russia had long-standing designs. The Russian Empire sought unfettered access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Russia was the most troublesome of the powers to the Ottomans. The continual conflicts in the nineteenth century in Anatolia and Central Asia were aimed at keeping the Russians from expanding their territory at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were eventually able to keep the Bulgarians from advancing on Constantinople, and one result was that Russia appeared conciliatory at the London meetings. The Russians, though, were concerned regarding the actions that Austria-Hungary might take toward Albania. During this period Serbia, Russia's protégé, had been shipping pork to France via Bosnia, overriding an Austro-Hungarian boycott of their products and trade restrictions. Bosnia had increasingly come under Austro-Hungarian control. Albania likewise was a contested space. In the thirteenth century it had been part of a greater Serbian empire. During the period of the Balkan Wars it was seeking independence from the Ottomans and was essentially up for grabs by its Balkan neighbors. The Bulgarians

considered Albania theirs because it had been under their rule in the ninth century.

The Serbs, Montenegrins, and Greeks all invaded Albania during this period (1912). In November 1912 an independent Albania was proclaimed, but it was short-lived. It was recognized by the Conference of London in July 1913 but collapsed the next year (1914) after an uprising by Greeks (who considered the territory part of Epirus). It ceased to exist as an independent political entity during World War I, when it came under the control of first the Greeks then the Italians. Albania only reemerged as a modern nation-state in November 1921. Surprisingly, Albania was missing from the Balkan War cartoons in the British press. While debates were held in the British parliament concerning the situation in Albania, there was considerably less mention in the newspapers and policy reviews than of its Christian Balkan neighbors.

Austria-Hungary was of concern to the readers of British periodicals too. At least seven pages of Dr. E.J. Dillon's foreign affairs report of January 1913 in the *Contemporary Review* was devoted to Austria-Hungary. This was considerably more space than he devoted to the Ottoman Empire or to the Balkan countries that constituted the peace conference delegates. Readers apparently were more concerned with their immediate neighbors in Western Europe than with the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan Crisis was a forum for articulating European desires and trying to forecast the outcome of such vast diplomacy in more immediate terms: what would it mean to the powers? Dillon pointed out that Austria-Hungary, while a "political necessity" for Europe's stability, lacked national unity and was "made up of ethnical [*sic*] fragments."<sup>54</sup> Thus Austria-Hungary's potential instability was of concern.

Dillon's question for the Great Powers was whether or not "Europe will be able to act as a single entity or will split into two groups, each of which will descend into the arena." He explained that the purpose of the Peace Conference was "to settle and define" a "diplomatic deal between the Balkan Coalition and the Ottoman Empire...which will also ascertain the wishes and resolves of the Great Powers on a number of reserved questions arising out of territorial changes, with a view to harmonizing them." Above all, in Dillon's words, the powers wanted to avoid "a general war for the sake of some wretched little port on the Adriatic."<sup>55</sup>

This theme was echoed in a cartoon by Leonard Raven-Hill (1867–1942), *The Boiling Point* (see fig. 15.2). The powers were depicted as old military men in their respective and distinctive native dress, crowded into a boiling cauldron.<sup>56</sup> Great Britain, of course, is depicted as John Bull.



### THE BOILING POINT.

FIGURE 15.2. *The Boiling Point* by Leonard Raven-Hill, *Punch*, October 2, 1912, 275. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

Other pundits in Britain, particularly those from the government, were worried about Anglo-German relations. Sir Edward Grey, the foreign secretary and the host of the Ambassadors Conference, in Taylor's words, "wanted to make a practical demonstration that no hostile or aggressive policy would be pursued against Germany or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves [Britain]." <sup>57</sup>

Grey must have been successful with this strategy, because Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, the German ambassador to London, praised him continually. Lichnowsky wrote in his memoirs, "My Mission to London, 1912–1914," that Grey, having "succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences...wished to do his best to eliminate the Anglo-German." Grey's plan was to provide assurances that neither Britain nor British support would be used against Germany. He wanted to pursue "a friendly rapprochement and understanding...to bring the two groups nearer." Lichnowsky saw Grey's purpose as "to ensure the peace of the world...a mutual insurance against the risk of war." He thought that Grey's discussion on economic and colonial questions would divide the spheres of influence in both the colonies and Asia Minor (Anatolia) among the powers.<sup>58</sup>

Lichnowsky's memoirs praised Grey and defended his positions, but the prince paid for that perspective when he returned to Germany. Lichnowsky's superiors in Berlin were distrustful of his pro-British stance. They thought that their ambassador had been duped by the British. Nonetheless, for a brief respite, Lichnowsky and Grey succeeded in bringing better relations to Britain and Germany, perhaps on the strength of their collegiality.<sup>59</sup>

Sir Edward Grey seems to have had this effect on other delegates too. A writer in the *National Review* who took the *nom de plume* "Constantinople" mentioned that Kamil Bey, the Ottoman grand vizier during the negotiations, had the same problem as Prince Lichnowsky because of his relationship with Sir Edward Grey. While Kamil Bey was in London, a coup d'état occurred in the government at home. His new superiors suspected him of being too pro-British and conciliatory.<sup>60</sup>

#### TERMS OF THE TREATY

The Balkan Allies demanded war indemnity from the Ottoman Empire as well as all of its territories in Europe, excluding Albania but including Crete and the Aegean Islands. The Ottomans would be allowed to keep Constantinople (Istanbul) together with a strip of land from Midia (Midye) on the Black Sea to Rodosto (Rodoschuk, Tekirdağ) on the Marmara Sea and the peninsula of Gallipoli (Gelibolu). The terms put forth by the Balkan states meant that the Ottoman Empire would have to give Adrianople (Edirne), an important commercial center, agricultural hub, and former capital, to the Bulgarians. Giving it up would mean not only that a large number of Ottoman Muslims and Jews would be



displaced but also that the Bulgarians would have a straight shot toward Constantinople should they make future plans for invasion.

The Ottoman government did not like the terms of the Balkan Allies, so they delayed making any statements until January 1, 1913, when their own peace proposals were advanced. The Ottoman demands were that (1) territories west of Edirne would be ceded but the powers would make the decision about Albania's autonomy; (2) Edirne would remain an Ottoman city, and the Ottomans and Bulgarians would further negotiate the frontier; (3) they would not cede the Aegean Islands but would discuss questions relating to them with the powers; (4) they would abide by the powers' decision about Crete; and (5) these four aforementioned points formed an indivisible whole.<sup>61</sup>

The Ottoman proposals were thus in direct opposition to the proposals advanced by the Balkan Allies. A stalemate ensued for most of the month of January, during which time the proposals were discussed in the British press, which depicted the Ottoman Empire as intransigent and stubborn. The reasons for the Ottomans' opposition to the proposals were not given in the dailies or even in the foreign policy reviews during this time. Ottoman policy seems to be unknown to British writers, with the exception of Ellis Schaap and some of his colleagues at the *African Times and Orient Review*. The British press never mentioned the reasons for the Ottoman government's hesitancy in signing the accords. Schaap took the British government to task some nine months later (September 1913). He scolded it for cheating the Ottoman Empire, which trusted the powers to be equitable. Instead the empire was treated unfairly, while the British public was misled with malicious statements about the "unspeakable Turk." Schaap wrote that the events of the summer of 1913 swayed an "increasing number of Englishmen who in the light of recent events [the Second Balkan War] are now siding with Turkey on the subject of Adrianople and who understand that the Turkish cause has not been properly stated."<sup>62</sup>

The Ottoman representatives in London in January 1913 felt increasing pressure to cave to the powers' demands in the treaty. Edirne/Adrianople, though, was the sticking point. The National Assembly (Divan) voted on January 22, 1913, to concede to the demands of the Balkan Allies. Kamil Paşa (called "Kiamil" in the British press) telegraphed the Ottoman representative in London that very night, directing him to yield Adrianople and authorizing the cession of all territory in Europe. It was a painful decision and one that other factions in his government could not accept. The next day, on January 23, a coup d'état occurred in Constantinople. Kamil was removed from power; Nazım Paşa, the war

minister, was murdered; and Enver Bey took control of a new government. The coup effectively made further negotiation useless.

In March the new government regained control of Edirne from the Bulgarians via military action, which settled the question of its future. Mediation resumed in April, and the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Allies signed peace agreements at the end of May. The Treaty of May 30, 1913, included the provisions of the first treaty, with the exception that Adrianople now remained as Edirne under Ottoman control. The powers were given the responsibility of deciding the fate of the Aegean Islands, Albania, and the status of Mount Athos in northern Greece.

#### DEPICTIONS OF OTTOMAN INTRANSIGENCE AND BALKAN BELLIGERENCE

Political cartoons aptly illustrate the London Peace and Ambassadors Conferences in December 1912 and January 1913. In early January 1913 the powers really did not know what the Ottoman government would do. Said's Orientalist stereotype appears in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, where the Ottoman Empire is depicted as an elderly gentleman wearing a fez and smoking while playing a game of chess. On the other side of the board are the four Balkan Allies: Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. The Ottoman Empire blows increasingly more smoke in the first three frames of the cartoon, until the chess game is completely obfuscated by smoke in the last frame. The cartoon is called *Peace Conference Chess* (see fig. 15.3).<sup>63</sup> The smoke-blowing Ottoman, symbolizing the elderly empire, is confusing the game. The Balkan Allies cannot see the board clearly, giving the Ottoman an advantage, which in truth he did not really have because European territory was being taken away for the possibility of peace.

Other images of the Ottoman Empire depict either a fat old man in ethnic dress or a young boy who is being reprimanded by his schoolmarm, who represents Europe. The old man is wearing baggy trousers (Turkish *shalvar*), a sword or dagger tucked into his waistband, slippers with turned-up toes, and a fez, of course, perched on his head. This clothing style is stereotypic. In 1912 Istanbul grandees were wearing European dress suits made by Levantine Italian and Jewish tailors who reproduced the latest Parisian fashions. Representatives of the Turkish government would have been wearing full military dress with emblems of their rank and status decorating the uniform, much like the depictions of the powers' ambassadors.

Contrast the cartoon costuming with the dress of elite Ottoman bureaucrats photographed by the Armenian company Abdullah Frères, the

## PEACE CONFERENCE CHESS.

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FIGURE 15.3. *Peace Conference Chess*, unsigned, possibly by George Roland Halkett, *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 7, 1913, 8. Used with permission of the University Library, Georgia State University, Atlanta.

official Ottoman court photographers in the mid-nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries.<sup>64</sup> These bureaucrats are resplendent in their use of European style. Depicting the Ottoman Empire in *Arabian Nights* splendor in the cartoons reduces the most powerful people in the empire to a status of the exotic “Other,” a monolithic Orientalist depiction.

In one of the *Punch* political cartoons, a Balkan Leaguer is in full military dress pointing a gun at the Ottoman (in the imaginary costume mentioned above) as though robbing him. The Balkan Leaguer, who has a stereotypic Slavic appearance, is wearing a Bulgarian military hat and nice riding boots and has a walrus mustache and furrowed brow. The Bulgarian says to the Ottoman: “It’s Your Money We Want.” The Ottoman responds: “Money, My Dear Boy? Search Me.” The particular costume worn by the Ottoman in this cartoon entitled *No Effects* is simple, and his sword is broken on the ground. He looks impoverished, as if he has no money. The “money” referred to the indemnity that the Ottoman Empire was instructed to pay the Balkan Allies in the London Treaty of December 1912 (see fig. 15.4).<sup>65</sup>

Contrast the Ottoman in *No Effects* to his countryman in a *Punch* cartoon called *Another Peace Conference*. The Ottoman’s expression is



### NO EFFECTS.

BALKAN LEAGUER. "IT'S YOUR MONEY WE WANT."  
 TURKEY. "MONEY, DEAR BOY? SEARCH ME!"

FIGURE 15.4. *No Effects* by Leonard Raven-Hill, *Punch*, March 26, 1913, 235.  
 Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

more sanguine and in control in this second cartoon than in the preceding one. He is sidling up to a younger man dressed as a Greek Evzone (light-infantryman: currently the term used for the National Guards at the Greek parliament, whose uniform, based upon the costume of nineteenth-century anti-Ottoman insurgents, symbolizes the Greek nation-state) wearing the classic white pleated skirt called a *fustanella* and tights. The Evzone looks surprised and a bit frightened of the Ottoman.



### ANOTHER PEACE CONFERENCE.

TURKEY (to Greece). "AHA! MY YOUNG FRIEND, ALONE AT LAST! NOW WE CAN ARRANGE A REALLY NICE TREATY."

FIGURE 15.5. *Another Peace Conference* by Leonard Raven-Hill, *Punch*, October 8, 1913, 301. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

He is also wearing two saddle bags slung across his shoulders. One is marked "Territory," and the other "Spoils of War." The Ottoman, pleased to have found the Greek alone, says, "Aha! My young friend, alone at last! Now we can arrange a really nice treaty." By the fall of 1913 Greece had its own territorial ambitions and the Balkan "Allies" were fighting among themselves in the Second Balkan War. The Ottoman Empire at this point volunteered to broker a peace, but none of the powers took this offer seriously (see fig. 15.5).<sup>66</sup>

The Greek costume depicted in figure 15.5 illustrates a common practice in these political cartoons. Nation-states are symbolized by national dress. In the Balkans, where nation-states split from the multiethnic, polyglot, culturally plural Ottoman Empire, this was sometimes problematic. The *fustanella* in the twentieth century came to represent the nation-state of modern Greece, but it was originally used in one region of the Balkans: Epirus, an area contested between Greece and Albania. The Albanian version had a longer skirt, but it was nonetheless a skirt worn by fierce mountain men.<sup>67</sup>

The duality of the initial London Peace and Ambassadors Conferences was expressed eloquently in the *Punch* cartoons. The Balkan Allies are often depicted as children, while the powers are adults. This was the case in *Five Keels to None*, where the child Montenegro is seated on the floor playing with blocks labeled "SCUTARI" (the city in which the First Balkan War broke out). The powers are all dressed in the regalia of admirals. They lean into the window of the nursery and say, "Come outside young'un, we've prepared a nice little demonstration for you." The child responds: "Oh, go away, you silly sailor-men, can't you see that I'm busy?" (see fig. 15.6).<sup>68</sup> Of course Montenegro was too busy starting the First Balkan War!

The idea of Europe as "Europa," a classical goddess dealing with unruly mortals, was a popular theme in the *Punch* cartoons. Europa was the teacher, and the Balkan Allies and the Ottoman Empire were her students in several of the cartoons. This motif expressed a familiar imperial theme: the powers had a "civilizing mission" to the "Other." The Balkan and Ottoman Others simply could not manage to live in peace on their own; they were unable to figure it out. Europe was needed to mediate. In the cartoon *Subject to Correction* a beautiful Europa is standing outside of a conference room labeled "Balkan Peace Conference." She is looking in at several young gentlemen who are wearing Balkan ethnic dress and sitting around a table, pouring over maps. Europa tells them: "Now then, get on with your maps and when you've finished them, bring them to me and I'll show you where you've gone wrong" (see fig. 15.7).<sup>69</sup>

Infantilizing the "Other" and depicting the size of the characters on different scales in political cartoons were also techniques designed to convey meaning to the readers of newspapers and magazines. The largest figures were those with the most importance. The smaller figures were subordinate. Adults were more powerful and respected than children, who had to be taught to behave correctly. The Balkan states were often depicted as unruly schoolchildren in the *Punch* cartoons. The Ottoman



### FIVE KEELS TO NONE.

THE UNITED POWERS. "COME OUTSIDE, YOUNG 'UN, WE'VE PREPARED A NICE LITTLE DEMONSTRATION FOR YOU."

MONTENEGRO. "OH, GO AWAY, YOU SILLY SAILOR-MEN; CAN'T YOU SEE I'M BUSY?"

FIGURE 15.6. *Five Keels to None* by Bernard Partridge, *Punch*, April 9, 1913, 283. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

Empire was sometimes also a child but not always. In many of the cartoons the Ottoman Empire is an adult, often an elderly person of some girth. Size matters. This depiction illustrated the contradictions in British foreign policy: the Ottoman Empire had historical significance, after all. It had some structural parity with the British Empire. The Ottoman Empire was a well-established political entity. The Balkan states, in contrast, were relatively new nations.



### SUBJECT TO CORRECTION.

EUROPA. "NOW THEN, GET ON WITH YOUR MAPS, AND WHEN YOU'VE FINISHED THEM BRING THEM TO ME AND I'LL SHOW YOU WHERE YOU'VE GONE WRONG!"

FIGURE 15.7. *Subject to Correction* by Leonard Raven-Hill, *Punch*, December 18, 1912, 487. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

Europa was not always a beautiful goddess in the cartoons. In the cartoon entitled *Settled* the Ottoman Empire is depicted as a child being punished by having to stand in the corner. Schoolmarm Europa is an unattractive middle-aged woman who looks like a man in drag, modeled on one of the British politicians, most likely representing British prime minister Herbert H. Asquith. Europa is wearing masculine shoes and holding a book called *The Balkan Question*. Pointing to the child, Europa





### SETTLED.

DAME EUROPA. "YOU'VE ALWAYS BEEN THE MOST TROUBLESOME BOY IN THE SCHOOL. NOW GO AND CONSOLIDATE YOURSELF."


TURKEY. "PLEASE, MA'AM, WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?"

DAME EUROPA. "IT MEANS GOING INTO THAT CORNER—AND STOPPING THERE!"

[Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, has expressed the hope that Turkey will now confine its energies to consolidating itself in Asia Minor.]

FIGURE 15.8. *Settled* by Bernard Partridge, *Punch*, April 2, 1913, 263. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

tells him: "You've always been the most troublesome boy in the school. Now go and consolidate yourself." The child responds: "Please, Ma'am, what does that mean?" And Dame Europa answers: "It means going into that corner and stopping there!" The reference to "consolidation" was to the powers' policy as articulated by Sir Edward Grey that the Ottoman Empire would consolidate its territories in Asia Minor (Anatolia) and get out of Europe, giving up the Balkans (see fig. 15.8).<sup>70</sup>



TURKEY (JUST) IN EUROPE.

FIGURE 15.9. *Turkey (Just) in Europe*; unknown artist, *Punch*, April 2, 1913, 272. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

The theme of consolidation was also expressed in a drawing that appeared in *Punch*: the Ottoman Empire is depicted as a kneeling man, weeping and begging for his life, with his face pulling back from the Balkans and the remainder of his body in Asia Minor and the Levant (see fig. 15.9).<sup>71</sup>

During the Balkan Wars the British Foreign Office consistently advocated the idea that the Ottoman Empire would be better off if it withdrew from Europe to its Anatolian and Near Eastern territories, remaining only in Asia and thus giving up its Balkan territories. The idea supposedly was that the Ottomans could do a better job of administering less territory and the so-called eastern territories.

The schoolroom motif where Turkey and three of the Balkan Allies are depicted as children with their schoolmarm Europa is a common motif in British political cartoons from the Balkan War period. In another cartoon, *The Good Boy of the East*, the Ottoman Empire is shown as a student wearing a European school boy's jacket and shirt with baggy *shalvar* and a fez, an interesting juxtaposition of modernity and traditionalism combining Eastern and Western clothing. Again the boy is standing in the corner. He is looking on as Europa admonishes Greece, whose representative is wearing the Evzone costume, and Bulgaria and Serbia, both



### THE GOOD BOY OF THE EAST.

TURKEY (from the corner in which Europa has put him). "I FEAR, MADAM, THAT OUR YOUNG FRIENDS ARE CAUSING YOU SOME EMBARRASSMENT. BUT, WHILE GREATLY DEPLORING THEIR INSUBORDINATION, I REGRET THAT I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO RENDER ANY APPRECIABLE ASSISTANCE TO YOUR AUTHORITY."

FIGURE 15.10. *The Good Boy of the East* by Leonard Raven-Hill, *Punch*, June 4, 1913, 435. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

schoolboys wearing modern European-style military dress uniforms with distinctive headgear. Thus the Ottoman Empire and Greece are in distinctively ethnic dress, while Bulgaria and Serbia are wearing modern military garb. Europa is dressed as an ancient Greek deity but with modern glasses on her nose. The Ottoman boy is the only one who speaks. The caption reads: "I fear, Madam, that our young friends are causing you some embarrassment. But, while greatly deploring their insubordination, I regret that I am not in a position to render any appreciable assistance to your authority" (see fig. 15.10).<sup>72</sup>

The Ottoman figure in this cartoon is referring to the Second Balkan War, which began during the summer of 1913, in which Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia were fighting over the Macedonian territories and other border issues. The Ottoman Empire in 1913 was no longer in charge of the Balkan countries. In the cartoon Europa is embarrassed because the Balkan Allies did not go along with the powers' peace initiatives and instead were taking territory from each other. The Ottoman figure seems smarter, more genteel, and better-behaved than his school fellows in this cartoon, emblematic of the "I-told-you-so" attitude expressed by *African Times and Orient Review* writer Ellis Schaap, who (in a previously cited article) railed against the powers' double-dealing with the Ottoman Empire.

The important issue of control of Adrianople (Edirne) was dealt with in the *Punch* cartoons as well. It was the Ottomans' recapture of the city that allowed the new government led by Enver Paşa and his envoys finally to negotiate a settlement in London. The Ottoman Empire, looking as pleased as Punch (the puppet in *Punch and Judy*), was perched on an ancient stone monument in a cartoon entitled *Kismet* (Turkish for "fate"). Europa bears an uncanny and somewhat unkind resemblance to Prime Minister Asquith (see fig. 15.11).<sup>73</sup> She has a copy of the Treaty of London tucked into her waistband and an unhappy expression on her face. The Ottoman figure, sitting against a panorama of the city of Adrianople, states: "Quite like old times, being back here." Dame Europa responds: "Ah, but you'll be kicked out, you know." And the Ottoman, getting the last word, replies: "Well, that'll be like old times, too." Asquith was known during the Balkan conflicts and the peace negotiations for being against the Ottoman Empire. He made an infamous speech taking that perspective in Birmingham in 1913 that got substantial critical press coverage.<sup>74</sup>

The Adrianople theme also featured in cartoons with Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary. In the *Punch* cartoon *A Question of Detail*, Grey, who is dressed in British naval regalia, is talking to the Ottoman Empire, a fat old man leaning out of a window draped with his flag. The Ottoman is looking down upon Sir Edward, who tells the old man: "You'll have to go, you know. The Concert [the powers] feels very strongly about that." The Ottoman Empire responds with a smile: "And who is going to turn me out?" Sir Edward replies: "Curious you should ask me that; it's the one point we haven't decided yet. Have you any preference in the matter?" (see fig. 15.12).<sup>75</sup> This last point encapsulated the Ottomans' relationship with Britain during the peace initiatives. All the cards were stacked against them. The agreements were to the Ottomans' disadvantage on many levels, especially because the empire was expected



### KISMET.

TURKEY (in Adrianople). "QUITE LIKE OLD TIMES, BEING BACK HERE."


DAME EUROPA. "AH, BUT YOU 'LL BE KICKED OUT, YOU KNOW."

TURKEY. "WELL, THAT 'LL BE LIKE OLD TIMES, TOO."

FIGURE 15.11. *Kismet* by Bernard Partridge, *Punch*, July 30, 1913, 111. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

to make all of the concessions. In the cartoon, though, Grey, symbolically representing the British government, asks for preferences, quite an irony in the absence of choice.

The last Adrianople cartoon analyzed here is *Saving Her Face*. Europa's serious facial expression and her cascading headdress resemble Queen Victoria, who of course died in 1901, making this image an



### A QUESTION OF DETAIL.

SIR EDWARD GREY. "YOU'LL HAVE TO GO, YOU KNOW. THE CONCERT FEELS VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THAT."

TURKEY. "AND WHO'S GOING TO TURN ME OUT?"

SIR EDWARD GREY. "CURIOUS YOU SHOULD ASK ME THAT; IT'S THE ONE POINT WE HAVEN'T DECIDED YET. HAVE YOU ANY PREFERENCE IN THE MATTER?"

FIGURE 15.12. *A Question of Detail* by Bernard Partridge, *Punch*, August 20, 1913, 171. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

anachronism. Perhaps the cartoonist saw Queen Victoria as a representation not only of Great Britain but also of the idea of European power and empire itself. Of course Victoria was regent during much of the initial phase of the Balkan Christian nation-states' independence movements throughout the nineteenth century. The cartoon reinforced the idea that her administration built the diplomatic relationship with the Ottomans, which continued into the early twentieth century.

Victoria-Europa is pointing at a dwarflike Ottoman Empire, who is perched on a ladder painting signs at the Hotel Adrianople. One sign is being painted over another. The old sign reads: "Under Entirely New Management," a reference to Bulgaria's siege and occupation of the city during the First Balkan War from November 1912 through March 1913. The most recent sign states: "Under the SAME Management," alluding to the Ottomans' recapture of the city during the Second Balkan War on July 22, 1913.<sup>76</sup> The Ottoman figure in the cartoon addresses Queen Victoria: "Sorry, Madam, I couldn't oblige you by retiring." And Victoria answers: "Not at all, you may remember that at the very start I strongly insisted on the *status quo*" (see fig. 15.13).<sup>77</sup>

This cartoon parallels an interesting historical summary of British-Ottoman relations in the *African Times and Orient Review*. In the article "Turkey and England: From the Berlin Treaty to the Treaty of St. James" the writer Harmachis contrasts British views of the Ottoman Empire from the nineteenth-century Victorian politicians to his early twentieth-century contemporaries. Harmachis begins his article by describing the Crimean War Memorial and his deep disappointment about "the turn things have taken." During Queen Victoria's time "the Turk was considered by all English people...as an English gentleman in Oriental garb, inheriting every virtue and representing humanity and civilization as against Russia's barbarous methods and anarchy." Today (1913) "the majority of British politicians" have done an about-face and think that the Ottoman Empire "has no right to exist; and the Balkan allies are the real advocates and supporters of civilization and progress." Harmachis takes to task the British attitude that the Balkan Allies were "the Christian Crusaders of the Balkans": this was an erroneous perspective brought about by "the British press, who unscrupulously supported them and represented them to the British public as the champions of emancipation and *Christian Salvation* [emphasis in the original]."<sup>78</sup>

Harmachis traces historical relationships between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain from the nineteenth century into the 1910s. He blames William Gladstone for breaking trust with Abdülhamid II by calling him "the man of Sin," further alienating him. Moving forward to the time when the Young Turks came to power and their constitution was proclaimed in 1908, Harmachis points out that the Ottomans "did not fail to demonstrate their absolute faith in England as the champion of liberty," despite three decades of German influence on the previous administrations. He continues: "the Young Turks enthusiasm in favour of England cooled down when they found that England was not willing to



### SAVING HER FACE.

TURKEY. "SORRY, MADAM, I COULDN'T OBLIGE YOU BY RETIRING."

EUROPA (with great dignity). "NOT AT ALL. YOU MAY REMEMBER THAT AT THE VERY START I STRONGLY INSISTED ON THE *STATUS QUO*."

FIGURE 15.13. *Saving Her Face* by Frederick Henry Townsend, *Punch*, September 24, 1913, 261. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

uphold Turkey against Russia, who was the backbone of Bulgaria's bold attempt." Harmachis also mentions the rupture in Anglo-Ottoman relations with the removal of Kamil Paşa. He ends on a positive note, mentioning that "from various Turkish authorities with whom I discussed the relations between England and Turkey, I gather that Turkey desires to come to a permanent understanding with England...and they are prepared to make reasonable sacrifices in exchange for England's support."<sup>79</sup>



## BRITISH POLITICS, THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND THE PRESS

Sir Edward Grey was the most frequently mentioned government figure in the press during the period from the fall of 1912 through the summer of 1913. Portrayed as a hero, he was literally depicted as a knight in shining armor or as some mythic figure such as Prince Charming. Both images were found in the *Punch* cartoons. In *Prince Charming and the Sleeping Beauty* Grey is the prince and Peace is Sleeping Beauty (see fig. 15.14).<sup>80</sup> He speaks to Sleeping Beauty in French, the language of diplomacy, and asks her to wake up.

In a second example, *Peace Comes to Town*, Grey and Peace are together again five months later (see fig. 15.15).<sup>81</sup> He cautions her to hold on tightly and "sit close" in mock Old English, warning that the last time they came this way together she had the bad luck to fall off. This dialogue provides a clear reference to the Treaty of London at the close of the First Balkan War and its nonresolution. Grey is again a knight in shining armor in this cartoon, and Peace is consistently depicted as a classical goddess or perhaps as an angel with big wings, with a dreamy, pre-Raphaelite look.

Grey was viewed favorably during the 1912–13 British peace initiatives by the cartoonists at *Punch* and in other periodicals but was later criticized and even blamed for causing World War I by some British politicians. Grey had a long career in foreign affairs, beginning after 1895 as the recognized Liberal spokesman in the Commons and continuing with his appointment in 1905 to the Foreign Office by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. As foreign secretary Grey had considerable power. Only the prime minister could effectively check his activities. As Zara Steiner observes, parliamentary control was erratic. Debates usually happened after an action was taken: "parliamentary sanction was required only for treaties which involved financial obligations."<sup>82</sup>

Grey was often criticized, both in the press and particularly by members of parliament, for playing things too close to the vest. Members of parliament were in the dark about the policies of the Foreign Office and sometimes felt that Grey was holding things back from them. Sir Mark Sykes raised the pan-Islamic question in the House of Commons on November 27, 1911, and complained about the public's ignorance of British policy toward the Ottoman Empire as well as a lack of information from the foreign secretary.<sup>83</sup> It was actually an exchange between Grey and the members of the House on the same date that yielded a great deal of information about British foreign policy, from Morocco to Persia and the



### PRINCE CHARMING AND THE SLEEPING BEAUTY.

SIR EDWARD GREY (to Peace, adopting the language of diplomacy). "ÉVEILLEZ-VOUS, MADMOISELLE, S'IL VOUS PLAÎT."

[Official Translation: Wake up, Miss, if you please.]

FIGURE 15.14. *Prince Charming and the Sleeping Beauty* by Leonard Raven-Hill, *Punch*, December 25, 1912, 507. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

Ottoman Empire. The British politicians were concerned not only about commerce but also about fairness in dealing with the various parties in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, and the situation of Christians in Asia Minor. Sykes's "pan-Islamic" question referred to possible reactions to foreign policy positions regarding the Ottoman Empire by Muslim subjects of the British Empire in South Asia. Grey's responses were detailed,



### PEACE COMES TO TOWN.

SIR GREY. "PRITHEE, FAIR DAMSEL, SEE TO IT THAT YE SIT CLOSE, FOR I MIND ME THAT THE LAST TIME WE TWAIN FARED THIS WAY TOGETHER THOU DIDST HAVE THE MISCHANCE TO SLIP OFF."

FIGURE 15.15. *Peace Comes to Town* by Bernard Partridge, *Punch*, May 21, 1913, 403. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.

with an emphasis that Great Britain should remain neutral in these foreign conflicts, such as the Italian-Ottoman War that was taking place in 1911. Grey answered his critics:

You cannot have one Government, a neutral Government, in the position of collecting information and publishing it with regard to operations in war of other Governments who are at war. It is

impossible.... The Government has adopted, and I think rightly adopted, the policy of neutrality and non-intervention in this war. I do not say that under no circumstances would we depart from that; but it would have to be under circumstances which gravely concerned British interests.<sup>84</sup>

A. J. P. Taylor describes Grey as having “inherited something of Gladstone’s moral earnestness,” which impressed both his international and domestic colleagues.<sup>85</sup> Grey, though, was a shrewd politician, and morality often gave way to political necessity. His experience in the cabinet was strengthened, as Steiner observes, due in part to his colleagues: “three Liberal-Imperialists—Asquith, Haldane and Grey—were in key ministries and represented a powerful faction.”<sup>86</sup> When Asquith became prime minister, Grey continued as the foreign secretary.

Two men were instrumental in formulating Grey’s policies. One was Charles Hardinge, who served as permanent undersecretary from 1906 to 1910. The other was Louis Mallet, who served in a variety of posts: private secretary to Grey (1906–7), assistant undersecretary (1907–13), head of the Eastern Department (1912), and ambassador to Constantinople (1913–14). Both Hardinge and Mallet were anti-German. Hardinge’s memoranda to Grey were full of his suspicions about German motives and hostility, and of particular concern was Germany’s growing navy. Mallet, whose appointment in the Foreign Office had been made at Hardinge’s suggestion, shared these views; but his work increasingly concerned the Balkans and the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. This was the infamous “Eastern Question” that had dogged British foreign policy and the press since the mid-nineteenth century. Steiner writes: “Mallet knew that the Balkans represented the weak link in the entente system and that the British public would not support Russia in a Balkan war.”<sup>87</sup> These concerns played out in the British press, both in the dailies and in the more lengthy foreign policy reviews.

Another player in policy formulation was Arthur Nicholson, permanent undersecretary from 1910 to 1916. He was not always happy about the political dimensions of his job and sometimes was at odds with Grey. Nicholson’s ideas were not popular. He felt that Germany was the only real threat in Europe and personally pursued a closer relationship with Russia, which was controversial at home and not always authorized. Nicholson opposed Grey’s friendly talks with the Germans in 1910, the German emperor’s visit in 1911, and the activities of the Anglo-German Friendship Society. Nicholson’s views were more in line with those of

Conservative leaders in Britain. Indeed he criticized the Liberals as being “both weak at home and inept abroad.”<sup>88</sup>

A reader of the *Pall Mall Gazette* (a Conservative daily) echoed Nicholson's views, illustrating a distrust of Germany and suggesting where to place blame for the powers' inability to get the Balkan Allies and the Ottoman Empire to resolve their conflict in January 1913. The writer laid the blame squarely at the feet of the Germans:

If Germany chose, she could bring Europe into line within twenty-four hours, and present a joint European note to the belligerents [the Balkan Allies and the Ottoman Empire in this instance], compelling them to formulate such terms as both sides could accept. But unfortunately, the difficulty is that Germany's point of view and that of her ally, Austria, with regard to Balkan affairs, differs *in toto* from that of the Triple Entente [France, Russia, and Great Britain]. Germany has considerable interests in the Ottoman domains, and she most wisely considers that if the Balkan Near East is jeopardized, consequently Germany's position in and aspirations concerning Turkish territory would be injuriously affected.<sup>89</sup>

Radicals and Labour Party supporters were suspicious of pro-Russian views and talks with tsarist officials in 1912 and 1913. Radicals were opposed to war and believed that changes in policy regarding the treatment of Christian minorities by the Ottomans might help to preserve the peace. They worked with members of the Young Turks, the political party that overthrew Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1908 and ruled through 1912. A rival faction in the government, the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), overthrew them during the London peace talks. Later the British Radicals' disappointment in the progress in the Balkans morphed into support for the national “liberation” of Slavs and Greeks. A.J.A. Morris writes: “Left-wing journalists abandoned their caution as Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs registered stunning victories in the field... [showering] Balkan peoples with their blessings.”<sup>90</sup>

Not all Radicals shared the same views, as evidenced by the opinion of the *Manchester Guardian's* London correspondent, who wrote that he saw at least two factions: those who would drive the Ottomans “bag and baggage” out of Europe versus those who saw the Young Turks as a means of containment against “Old Russia.”<sup>91</sup> Some Radicals and Liberals were

even moved to join the Balkan armies, à la Lord Byron from an earlier age, as illustrated by a small obituary in the *Pall Mall Gazette* entitled “Englishman’s Death: Killed Whilst Fighting with the Greeks.”<sup>92</sup> The article memorialized Palmer Newbold, “a prominent Birmingham Liberal, and a member of the Balkans Committee,” who was killed near Ioannina (written as “Janina” in the British press) “whilst fighting bravely.” Newbold had served as secretary of his local Liberal Association since 1909 and had taken part in the campaign of 1897, being known as a good organizer with competencies in electoral work.

The Foreign Office had no official press bureau or “official newspaper,” but some newspapers and journalists had close ties to that branch of government. The *Times* came as close as any periodical to reflecting official policies and circulating diplomatic news. As previously noted, Leo Maxse, editor of the *National Review*, kept in frequent contact with Charles Hardinge and others in the Foreign Office. Valentine Chirol became a journalist after working for four years in the Foreign Office, but he resigned from the *Times* in 1911, prior to the Balkan conflicts. Grey was closest to J. A. Spender, editor of the *Westminster Gazette*, and to C. P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian*.<sup>93</sup>

Labour and Socialist Party publications, in contrast, printed only short reports about the First Balkan War and its peace process. Their focus was on domestic issues, both locally in the British Isles and internationally, in the far outposts of the British Empire. One exception to this orientation was a cartoon that appeared in the *Daily Herald* in which domestic policy issues were juxtaposed with the Balkan Question. The cartoon entitled *Crescent and Cross* showed a rather self-righteous British Liberal cradling “The Holy Writ of Libel” with a cross displayed on the top of his umbrella. The Liberal faces a “broken Turk,” who is designated as such in the caption (see fig. 15.16).<sup>94</sup> This Ottoman soldier, bleeding and battle-weary, is taller than British Liberalism, but he is bowing his head in a defeated and humble position. His right hand is on his heart, a traditional Muslim gesture of respect. British Liberalism addresses him: “You and your odious practice of shutting pure women up in harems! What are the gaols [jails] for?” The viewer gets the impression that British Liberalism, depicted in full capitalist regalia, is a bit jealous of the Ottoman’s control of his women, who stay in the harem (Turkish for the women’s section of the home) and not in public view. British Liberals at this juncture in history were struggling with their own women, suffragettes who were filling the jails due to their sometimes violent protests.

**CRESCENT AND CROSS.**



THE DEATHLESS SPIRIT OF ENGLISH LIBERALISM (to the broken Turk): "Serves you right, sir, serves you right! You and your odious practice of shutting pure women up in harems! What are the gaols for?"

FIGURE 15.16. *Crescent and Cross* by Will Dyson, *Daily Herald*, May 2, 1913, 1. Used with permission of the British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent, [www.cartoons.ac.uk](http://www.cartoons.ac.uk).

CROSS AND CRESCENT:  
FRAMING BALKAN TURMOIL IN RELIGIOUS TERMS

The majority of writers in the British press framed the debate about the Balkan conflict and the “Eastern Question” (the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from its European territories in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars) in universal terms. They saw it as a war between Christianity and Islam, which of course, in the British view, Christianity must win. The exceptions to this rule were writers in the *African Times and Orient Review* like Charles Rosher and Ellis Schaap and respondents in the *National Review* such as Charles Hunter and “Constantinople” (another writer’s *nom de plume*). The writers of articles in the dailies and even in serious policy journals like the *Round Table* supported this view and conceded that the eventual expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Europe was inevitable and proper.<sup>95</sup> This expulsion was the *raison d’être* put forth by the Christian Balkan Allies, who hoped to win over the powers as fellow Christians. As Ellis Schaap warned, this was an erroneous and malicious view based upon press bias. He implied that it was due to an actual propaganda campaign by the Balkan Allies in the British press.<sup>96</sup>

Schaap’s criticism of framing Turkish and Balkan politics and territorial disputes in a crusader discourse based upon a binary pair of religions provides a strange glimpse into our future. Contemporary press bias in reporting about the Muslim world in the twenty-first century also invokes the crusader trope, some hundred years later. Schaap’s media critique might have been written about reporting on the United States’ war in Iraq that began in 2003.<sup>97</sup> Such prejudice is an invidious cancer that lingers for centuries, perhaps because of its simplicity in framing complex debates. It appeals to power brokers who wish to manipulate the masses and to the masses themselves, who do not question such categories.

Writers in both the *National Review* and the *African Times and Orient Review* debated the anti-Ottoman, anti-Muslim prejudice in a series of articles that warned of its far-reaching impact in the future. The writer Constantinople warned that such prejudice clouded understanding of the real causes of the Balkan conflicts: infighting and struggles over modernization in the Ottoman Empire, where European models of government promoted by the British since the nineteenth century might not really be appropriate, and the rise of nationalisms in the Balkans. He went further to warn that British prejudice of the type promoted by Prime Minister Asquith in his fiery anti-Ottoman Birmingham speech only served to inflame the masses and would be detrimental in the long run to British capitalism and business interests after the war.<sup>98</sup>



Vindex, a writer for the *African Times and Orient Review*, echoed these sentiments. Vindex was known for his articles about comparative religion and Islam in the review, one of the few British periodicals that promoted cultural relativism. He emphasized that Islam had nothing to do with the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. In his view the real reason was “the transplanting of Western notions into uncongenial soil.”<sup>99</sup>

Both “Constantinople” and the writers of the *African Times and Oriental Review* also warned of the consequences of British anti-Ottoman sentiment on the large Muslim populations in the British Empire’s Indian subcontinent and African colonies. Both British and Indian Muslim writers engaged in a series of debates to convince their readers of the importance and morality of the Islamic faith. The *African Times and Orient Review*’s December–January 1913 issue contained two important articles. One by Dr. George Watson MacGregor Reid discussed how the Balkan Wars were affecting Britain’s Indian subjects of the Muslim faith. The other, by Khwaja Kamal-ed-Din, a Muslim from India, gave an insider’s view of the conflict from an Indian perspective.<sup>100</sup> The same issue also included a section on India and the Balkans in the Albanian Committee’s Resolution. The committee “regrets the readiness of so many of the British Public to accept, without investigation, charges of wrong-doing made against the Turks, as unfair to them and likely to irritate and alienate our fellow-subjects in India.” The resolution called for justice for all peoples and rejected “any settlement in which the rights of Moslems and Jews are ignored.”<sup>101</sup>

Muslim and Jewish rights and the displacement of these populations in the Balkans during the 1912–13 wars were hardly noticed in Western Europe. The exceptions were the prominent London Sephardic Jewish community and a Jewish agency in Paris, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, both of which tried to help refugees. The story of property damage and atrocities committed by Balkan Christians against these Ottoman communities that had coexisted for some 450 years still remains somewhat obscure and exotic within the framework of Western European history.<sup>102</sup>

#### PRESS OPINION AND BRITISH HEGEMONY

The British press did not just reflect attitudes, strategies, policies, and stereotypes regarding the various players in the Balkan Wars and the peace negotiations. As much as it reflected culture, ideology, and politics, it also structured and framed those phenomena for its readers. The press

either could contextualize the debates about Turkey and the Balkans, providing substantial information, or could decontextualize them with a simple stereotype. It did both at different times and in different publications. To contextualize information and people, the press provided in-depth, serious, unbiased reporting. The reviews and newspapers are full of maps and statistical documentation, such as the number of soldiers employed in the defense of various Balkan cities. The foreign policy reviews provided insider opinions, travel reports, and sophisticated political commentary. The British reader could gain an understanding of the history, geography, religion, and lifestyle of the various Balkan nationalities or of the Ottomans by reading these reviews.

The British reader could just as easily gain bias and prejudice by being fed a stereotype, a mythic person, a monolith that reduced someone's culture to a caricature like the "unspeakable Turk." Decontextualization reduced the reasons for the decline of the Ottoman Empire to a good versus evil, crusader archetype. Buying into an archetype was easier than investigating the highly complex factors of economic variables, technological change, and the rise of nationalisms that contributed to the breakup of the Ottoman Empire into independent, modern nation-states. Decontextualization divorced human beings from their culture, made them exotic "Others," and put them in a mythic land. Decontextualization made a neat package with no sloppy edges.

The reality, though, was something quite different. Studies of the Ottoman and Balkan presses before and during the Balkan Wars illustrate that these societies also were composed of many influences and were cognizant of European stereotypes. Modern technologies, popular culture, Francophone literature and culture, consumer goods, and European social theories had penetrated the Ottoman Empire by the early twentieth century. Symbols and images of many of these things, from roller skates to women's hats to airplanes, were common fare in the Ottoman revolutionary press as well as in the newspapers of neighboring areas such as Slovenia.<sup>103</sup>

The response to archetypes is predictable. Archetypes are simple and easy to understand. They are a formulaic trope representing an immutable entity. For example, when the Balkan nations were portrayed as children, it was an unwritten code for the reader: because the Balkan states were children, the powers were needed to provide direction. The powers were the "adults" in Europe. The ambassadors from the powers had their own separate meetings, while the Balkan Leaguers and the Ottomans had the Peace Conferences in December 1912 and January 1913. The Peace

Conference attendees were referred to as “delegates,” not as “ambassadors.” But many of the Peace Conference delegates were actually ambassadors: they were paid professional diplomats, men of achievement recognized in their own countries. Yet in the London press the distinction as “delegates” gave them an inferior status and also a subliminal one. This was a subtle use of language to express the superiority and the hegemony of the powers.

The constructs Orientalism and Balkanism provide units of contrast to organize and compare ideas in the British press about both the Ottomans and the Balkan Allies. As the analysis and discussion of the political cartoons and foreign war reporting shows, images of Christians and Muslims were very different. The Orientalist stereotype of the “terrible Turk” was in play during the Balkan Wars, in contrast to the earlier British view of the Ottoman as someone comparable to a British gentleman (the Victorian view that Harmachis cited). The Balkan Allies, in contrast, were championed as Christians but still stereotyped for their recklessness, especially the Bulgarians and Serbs. The inexperience of the Balkan states translated into their depiction as children in need of direction by their schoolmarm Europa in the *Punch* cartoons. Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria were dressed in full military regalia, despite being depicted as children, whereas Greece, though a Christian state, was portrayed in ethnic dress, like the Ottomans. While the Evzone *fustanella* was associated with the fight for Greek independence from Ottoman Turkey in the 1820s, it was still a badge of “Otherness” because of its distinctiveness. The Greeks in the cartoons sometimes were also seen as being perhaps more “Oriental” or Eastern than the other Balkan states, an attempt by some in the British press to justify the British Empire’s continued interference in Greek political affairs.

The Orientalist and Balkanist stereotypes, though, were not the only views projected by the British press during 1912 and 1913. Divergent views still appeared in the press, and the professional diplomats and ambassadors were friendly with each other at the peace conferences, which added a level of complexity. The powers’ diplomats enjoyed such cordial personal interactions among themselves and also with the Balkan and Ottoman ambassadors that their governments sometimes worried that “they had been duped by the British,” to use the words of Prince Lichnowsky’s superiors. Periodicals like the *African Times and Orient Review* and the *National Review* tried to present sympathetic portrayals of the “Others” and relate their “otherness” (in this case Islam) to someone connected to home in the British Empire: the Muslims of India.<sup>104</sup> Some

writers in the press were worried that Muslims in India, a British protectorate, would be angered if the Ottomans were not treated fairly by the British during the Balkan conflicts. This could lead to a very dangerous situation, fueling India's own nationalist and independence aspirations.

Press opinion also provided an interesting set of interactions and contradictions. Readers wrote letters to the editor, taking issue with stereotypes and analyses of the Balkan and Ottoman situation and challenging the writers of the articles. Writers critiqued their peers from other periodicals, presenting different sides of the same story, being self-reflective about it by summarizing the competing arguments, and requiring the reader to make a critical assessment of divergent materials. In contrast, the international news organization Reuters was also present and represented the idea that one international press service could or should structure the representation of the news for diverse publications.

The idea that an international pool of writers working for one company should provide homogeneous reports and commentary was in conflict with the nature of the Edwardian press, which valued diversity of opinion. Prior to World War I each newspaper or journal had divergent views and strong associations, advocated particular ideologies, and championed a particular political party. Nonetheless, during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 we find the Reuters reports also infiltrating the British press and a few writers like Dillon and Gibbs supplying several different journals. So homogeneity on one level coexisted with diversity in the British press.

The danger in the modern homogeneous style of press service was that foreign policy reporting could become a monolith if only a limited set of perspectives was used. This practice jeopardized the Edwardian-style free-for-all of divergent views passionately linked to groups of people in political parties who took action around specific causes. Add to that monolithic reporting a set of convenient archetypes such as those present in Orientalism and Balkanism and the press may hinder the real work of diplomacy. Who will discover the insider's view? Where are the Ellis Schaaps, the Charles Roshers, or the Vindexes who provide alternative views to those favored by the establishment? Indeed such homogenization of the reporting perhaps set the stage for the British propaganda machine of World War I: Wellington House.<sup>105</sup>

Divergent press opinion as manifested by the domestic reporting in Edwardian newspapers was better for historiography too. The texts were richer and offered more potential for looking at hierarchical systems from many levels, rather than from just one perspective. To a great extent

the press sources used in this study came only from the elite sector of the Edwardian press. Popular literature read by working-class people was not surveyed due to the emphasis on diplomatic history here. Diplomats and governmental leaders, those who made foreign policy, were usually elites. Those concerned with manipulating foreign policy include wealthy business people, politicians, and career foreign service officers, who mostly come from privileged backgrounds. The exceptions in this study may have included some of the letter writers and some of the professional writers working for the *African Times and Orient Review* who were immigrants to London or “natives” of the British protectorates in which they lived. Indeed, the review advertised for such people with banners across its pages such as the following: “Native correspondents and agents wanted in every quarter.”<sup>106</sup>

These factors make issues of gender and class difficult to incorporate into this study for the years 1912–13. Perhaps some of the authors using pen names in the journals and newspapers were women. The genders of “Near East” and “Constantinople” are unknown. In these years women who were writing for newspapers used pen names or did not sign their work in the dailies. Women were infrequently mentioned in the sample of news articles and foreign policy articles analyzed. The exceptions were the elite women named for hosting parties for visiting Balkan nobility and for gathering relief supplies. In the entire sample of articles reviewed here, only one article in the *Westminster Gazette* in 1912 actually featured a woman as the main subject. She was said to be exceptionally beautiful and to have been living in Sofia, Bulgaria, before the Ottomans were expelled. Her name was not given. The text reads like a novel, and it is hard to determine whether the account was fact or fiction. In any event the article provided little substance for understanding the Balkan Wars, the peace initiatives, or their representation in the British press. It was simply another version of the “mysterious East” archetype.<sup>107</sup>

Understanding the role of press opinion in the 1912–13 Balkan Wars and peace initiatives has relevance for our own times. In the 1990s political violence again gripped the Balkans in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Kosova. In 2003 Montenegro was back in the news, having recently split from Serbia. The national borders of the Balkan states were not resolved in 1912–13. They continued to be articulated in the 1990s via armed conflicts and still remain unstable, in a kind of stalemate today. Contemporary Turks are still treated as the “other” by Europeans, as evidenced by their long application for full membership in the European Union. The old powers have admitted some of the Balkan states but still

refuse to allow Turkey to join. And from time to time Western European politicians still raise the ugly “Eastern Question”: is Turkey really “European” or does it still have some troublesome “Oriental” laws or practices that must be changed? Archetypes are persistent: hence the need to understand them better.

## NOTES

One hundred articles and fifty political cartoons from British newspapers and magazines were reviewed, representing a nine-month period from November 1912 through July 1913. This body of data includes material from the following publications: *African Times and Orient Review*, *Contemporary Review*, *Daily Herald*, *Manchester Guardian*, *Nation*, *National Review*, *Pall Mall Gazette*, *Round Table*, *Punch*, the *Times*, and *Westminster Gazette*. HANSARD, 1803–2005, the compendium of British parliamentary records, was consulted for the speeches of politicians and Foreign Office personnel from 1911 to 1913. The online version is available at <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com>.

1. David Brooks, *The Age of Upheaval*, 1.
2. For contrasting points of view, see David Powell, *The Edwardian Crisis*; and George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*.
3. Powell, *The Edwardian Crisis*, 2.
4. We are not precisely in “Edwardian” Britain during the period of this chapter: Edward VII died in May of 1910, and his son George V was actually the king during the period 1912–13 discussed here. I am using the term “Edwardian” in a broad sense to designate trends in British politics, press, and society prior to World War I that stand in sharp contrast to the same institutions in Victorian Britain and in the institutions that followed the Great War.
5. See James D. Startt, *Journalists for Empire*, for more information about the press and public debate in Edwardian Britain.
6. As Leon J. Goldstein emphasizes in *Historical Knowing*, historians construct a narrative from different, often competing, representations.
7. For copies of the diplomatic documents and correspondence, consult *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*.
8. *Justice*, *Clarion*, and the *Labour Leader* were other examples of socialist newspapers. These periodicals were concerned mainly with domestic labor disputes or international socialist meetings. They had less interest in foreign policy in the issues published from December 1912 through July 1913 than the other newspapers did. See Stephen Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain*.
9. Excellent synopses of the Radical press are provided in Zara S. Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*, 110–17; and in A. J. A. Morris, *Edwardian Radicalism, 1900–1914*, 226–32.
10. Edward Said, *Orientalism*.
11. John M. MacKenzie, *Orientalism*, 4.
12. *Ibid.*, 11.
13. For examples of the wide range of opinions, observations, stereotypes, and

relativistic portrayals of visits to the Ottoman Empire, see Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*; and Reinhold Schiffer, *Oriental Panorama*. My favorite British woman traveler is Lucy M. J. Garnett, whose *The Women of Turkey and Their Folklore* presents an astonishingly clear description of customs and lifestyles of minority women in the late Ottoman Empire.

14. Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*.
15. See Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*.
16. See Nicholas Murray Butler, ed., *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*.
17. Philip Gibbs and Bernard Grant, *Adventures of War with Cross and Crescent*. Available online at [http://www.archive.org/stream/balkanwaradventuOOgibbuoft/balkanwaradventuOOgibbuoft\\_djvu.txt](http://www.archive.org/stream/balkanwaradventuOOgibbuoft/balkanwaradventuOOgibbuoft_djvu.txt).
18. Gibbs and Grant, *Adventures of War*, 107.
19. *Ibid.*, 17.
20. *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 7, 1913, 1, 9.
21. See the *Westminster Gazette*, November 4, 1912, 8.
22. An article in the *Westminster Gazette*, January 4, 1913, 8, extracts Dr. Dillon's views of the Turkish proposals at the peace conference; in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 2, 1913, 2, we find his report about the future of the peace treaty. His articles appear in the *Contemporary Review* on a regular basis throughout 1912 and 1913 in the Foreign Affairs section.
23. See appendix 11 in Geoffrey Miller, *Straits*, 539.
24. Dr. E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," *Contemporary Review* 103 (February 1913): 261–80.
25. *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 3, 1913, 7.
26. *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 7, 1913, 1.
27. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 6.
28. Near East [pen name], "To the Editor," *African Times and Orient Review* 1, no. 11 (May 1913): 359.
29. E. Schaap, "Christmas Fare," *African Times and Orient Review* 1, no. 11 (May 1913): 359.
30. See Imanuel Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement*.
31. *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 1, 1913, 9.
32. Harmachis (pen name), "Great Britain versus the Islamic World," *African Times and Orient Review* 2, no. 14 (mid-August 1913): 52.
33. Sir Charles Hunter's "Three Weeks in the Balkans," *National Review* 370 (December 1913): 37.
34. Zara S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914*, 189.
35. Charles Rosher, "Random Notes on the Turk," *African Times and Orient Review* (Christmas Annual 1912): 51.
36. *Westminster Gazette*, November 4, 1912, 9.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*.
39. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 17, 19.
40. See Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911*, 304–14.
41. *Westminster Gazette*, November 4, 1912, 10.

42. *Daily Herald*, May 8, 1913, 5.
43. For an excellent exposition of British-Ottoman diplomacy, see Feroze A. K. Yasamee, "Ottoman Empire"; and *Ottoman Diplomacy*.
44. The Ionian Islanders became the "Irish of the Mediterranean," and stereotypes of them abounded in the British press in the mid-nineteenth century. Thomas W. Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion*, does a nice job of showing how the women of these islands manipulated the stereotype and gained their own power from it in the new legal system imported into their imperial British protectorate.
45. *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 14, 1913, 8.
46. Cited in Joseph Heller, *British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914*, 75 (correspondence from Grey to Lowther of November 15, 1912).
47. Frederick Henry Townsend (1868–1920), *Deutschland Ueber Alles* [cartoon], *Punch*, September 17, 1913, 241. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd., London.
48. Richard Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*.
49. *Westminster Gazette*, November 2, 1912, 8.
50. P. Courvay, "The European Situation," *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 13, 1913, 8.
51. Note that some of these alliances shifted during World War I. See Neil Demarco's illustration from *Britain and the Great War* or the British National Archives web-site, "The National Archives Learning Curve" at <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWentente.htm>.
52. "M. Poincaré's Proposal: Reported Agreement by the Triple Entente," *Westminster Gazette*, November 2, 1912, 8.
53. A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*.
54. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs."
55. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," 110–11.
56. Leonard Raven-Hill (1867–1942), *The Boiling Point* [cartoon], *Punch*, October 2, 1912, 275. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
57. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, 495.
58. Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, "My Mission to London, 1912–1914" [memoirs], translated from the French, available at <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/lichnowy.html>, 1–22, part of the World War I Document Archive online assembled by members of the World War I Military History List (WWI-L).
59. A biography of Prince Lichnowsky can be found at <http://www.worldwar1.com/bioclic.htm>.
60. Constantinople [*nom de plume*], "Turkey To-day and To-morrow," *National Review* 370 (December 1913): 624.
61. Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 103.
62. Ellis Schaap, "Turkey and Promises," *African Times and Orient Review* 2, no. 15 (mid-September 1913): 94–95.
63. The artist is not identified, but the style looks like the work of George Roland Halkett (1855–1915): *Peace Conference Chess* [cartoon], *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 7, 1913, 8. Used by permission of the University Library, Georgia State University, Atlanta.
64. See Engin Özendes, *Abdullah Frères*.
65. L. Raven-Hill, *No Effects* [cartoon], *Punch*, March 26, 1913, 235. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.



66. L. Raven-Hill, *Another Peace Conference* [cartoon], *Punch*, October 8, 1913, 301. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
67. See Isa Blumi's "Undressing the Albanian."
68. Bernard Partridge (1861–1945), *Five Keels to None* [cartoon], *Punch*, April 9, 1913, 283. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
69. L. Raven-Hill, *Subject to Correction* [cartoon], *Punch*, December 18, 1912, 487. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
70. Bernard Partridge, *Settled* [cartoon], *Punch*, April 2, 1913, 263. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
71. *Turkey (Just) in Europe*, *Punch*, April 2, 1913, 272. Unfortunately the artist's signature is illegible. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
72. L. Raven-Hill, *The Good Boy of the East* [cartoon], *Punch*, June 4, 1913, 435. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
73. Bernard Partridge, *Kismet* [cartoon], *Punch*, July 30, 1913, 111. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
74. See Edward David, ed., *Inside Asquith's Cabinet*, 123–24.
75. Bernard Partridge, *A Question of Detail* [cartoon], *Punch*, August 20, 1913, 171. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
76. For additional information about the siege of Edirne/Adrianople, see Syed Tanvir Wasti, "The 1912–13 Balkan Wars and the Siege of Edirne"; and Avigdor Levy, "The Siege of Edirne (1912–1913) as Seen by a Jewish Eyewitness," chapter 11 of his book *Jews, Turks, Ottomans*, 153–93.
77. F. H. Townsend, *Saving Her Face* [cartoon], *Punch*, September 24, 1913, 261. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
78. Harmachis (pen name), "Turkey and England: From the Berlin Treaty to the Treaty of St. James, 1878–1913," *African Times and Orient Review* 2, no. 13 (mid-July 1913): 9–10.
79. *Ibid.*
80. L. Raven-Hill, *Prince Charming and the Sleeping Beauty* [cartoon], *Punch*, December 25, 1912, 507. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
81. Bernard Partridge, *Peace Comes to Town* [cartoon], *Punch*, May 21, 1913, 403. Used with permission of Punch, Ltd.
82. Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*, 129.
83. Heller, *British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire*, 55. The original transcript of Sykes's speech and Grey's response can be found in Hansard: HC Deb, November 27, 1911, vol. 32, cc43–165.
84. Contrast the lengthy foreign policy debate of November 27, 1911, in Hansard (HC Deb, November 27, 1911, vol. 32, cc43–165) to the more brief exchanges on the "War in the Balkans": HC Deb, December 5, 1912, vol. 44, cc2477–78; HC Deb, January 21, 1913, vol. 47, cc188–89; HC Deb, April 8, 1913, vol. 51, c974; HC Deb, July 15, 1913, vol. 55, c1036; HC Deb, July 24, 1913, vol. 55, cc2189–90. The only other lengthy discussion in this period concerns Ottoman Turkey's financial situation and the events in Albania and Montenegro, on May 8, 1913; see Hansard, HC Deb, May 8, 1913, vol. 52, cc2298–2329.
85. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, 436.
86. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy*, 86.

87. Ibid., 105.
88. Ibid., 123–24.
89. L. Graeme Scott, “Letters to the Editor: The European Situation, Dangers of a Peace Conference Breakdown,” *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 7, 1913, 4.
90. Morris, *Edwardian Radicalism*, 226.
91. *Manchester Guardian*, October 24, 1912, 9.
92. *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 2, 1913, 2.
93. This information comes from Steiner’s discussion of the press in *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy*, 186–92.
94. Will Dyson (1880–1939), *Crescent and Cross* [cartoon], in the *Daily Herald*, Friday, May 2, 1913, 1. Used with permission of the British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent, [www.cartoons.ac.uk](http://www.cartoons.ac.uk).
95. See *The Balkan War and the Balance of Power*, Round Table 3 (December 1912–September 1913): 395–424.
96. Ellis Schaap, “Adrianople, the Turks and the Powers,” *African Times and Orient Review* 2, no. 14 (August 1913): 46–47; and idem, “Turkey and Promises,” *African Times and Orient Review* 2, no. 15 (mid-September 1913): 94–95.
97. See Daoud Kuttab, “The Arab TV Wars”; and also Douglas Little, *American Orientalism*.
98. Constantinople, “Turkey To-day and To-morrow,” 629. Asquith’s Guildhall speech is discussed by David, *Inside Asquith’s Cabinet*, 123–24.
99. Vindex (pen name), “Downfall of Islam,” *African Times and Orient Review* 1, no. 10 (April 1913): 306–7.
100. *African Times and Orient Review* 1, nos. 6 and 7 (December–January 1913): Dr. MacGregor-Reid’s “The War in the East,” 191–94; and Khwaja Kamal-ed-Din’s “Cross versus Crescent: Impressions of the Present Crisis on the Minds of Indian Muslims,” 197–98.
101. “The Albanian Committee,” *African Times and Orient Review* 1, nos. 6 and 7 (December–January 1913): 185.
102. See Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue, *Sephardi Jewry*; Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914*; and Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities*; idem, *The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire*.
103. See Damir Globočnik, “The Balkan Wars in Slovenian Newspapers’ Political Cartoons.” *Zgodovina za vse/History for Everyone* 10, no. 1 (2003), online at <http://www2.arnes.si/~gkrec/Doc/Eng/Balkan%20Wars.pdf>. Ottoman cartoons of the Balkan crisis are also analyzed by Tobias Heinzelmann, *Die Balkankrise in der osmanischen Karikature*; and in Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press*.
104. For a detailed treatment of the role of Islam in British politics following World War I, see Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*; and M. Naeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*.
105. See Justin McCarthy’s recent work on “British Propaganda and the Turks,” a presentation that he first gave at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London in January 19, 2001, and further developed into *The Turk in America*.
106. *African Times and Orient Review* 1, no. 5 (November 1912): iii–iv.
107. See the *Westminster Gazette*, November 4, 1912, 8.

## Perceiving the Balkan Wars

### Western and Ottoman Commentaries on the 1914 Carnegie Endowment's Balkan Wars Inquiry

*Patrick J. Adamiak*

On August 2, 1913, a French lawyer, a British journalist, and an American professor set out from Paris on a novel mission. These men, who were to meet with German, Austrian, and Russian professors and lawmakers farther east, formed the Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars.<sup>1</sup> The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, founded in 1910 by American industrialist Andrew Carnegie to “spend [its] annual income in any way appropriate to hasten the abolition of war,”<sup>2</sup> funded the commission and put it together in only a few weeks to investigate the reported atrocities of the Second Balkan War (June 16, 1913, to July 18, 1913). While experts were sought and funds were secured, the war ended abruptly; the commission's role morphed into examining the aftermath of the two Balkan Wars.

The Carnegie Report was published in 1914 and republished in 1993.<sup>3</sup> In the decades since the report's first publication, many journalists and scholars have commented on it. Using the 1914 Carnegie Report as a focus this chapter presents a historiographical analysis of five commentaries on the document, in order to examine five groups' perceptions of the Ottoman Empire. I focus first on a section of the report that may help analyze the perceptions of the authors in regard to the Ottoman Empire; second, on a sample of the international response in 1914, using the July 20, 1914, review published in the French newspaper *Le Temps*; third, on Ottoman self-perception in 1914, using several Ottoman newspaper reports concerning the commission's work in 1913 and 1914; fourth, on modern authors' perceptions, based on the 1993 republishing; and finally

on some recent Turkish uses of the report that aid in constructing a modern Turkish view of the Ottoman past.

The discussion of the Carnegie Report began even before it was published in the summer of 1914. From the announcement of the endeavor, accusations of bias plagued the commission. Two of its members, Professor Paul Milioukov of Russia and Dr. H. N. Brailsford of the United Kingdom, were suspected of pro-Bulgarian sympathies. Milioukov lived from 1859 until 1943 and was famous as a politician striving for a constitutional democracy in Russia.<sup>4</sup> Brailsford lived from 1873 to 1958 and was a celebrated British journalist, foreign correspondent, and liberal activist.<sup>5</sup> Works written by the two men reveal their perspectives on the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans. Milioukov writes in his memoir that his years spent in Sofia (1897–98) left him with a preference for the Bulgarian cause against the cause of the Serbians.<sup>6</sup> Milioukov advocated using constitutional Bulgaria as a model for the Russian state.<sup>7</sup> Brailsford also showed his preference in his written works on the topic. In *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future* (1906), Brailsford supports the Bulgarian interpretation of the Greek Patriarchate's suppression of Slavic languages. He also writes that the population of Macedonia is Slavic and that Turks and Greeks only exist in the cities as residue of past conquests.<sup>8</sup> These biases were known to the international public, as a lively series of argumentative articles in the international media disclose.<sup>9</sup> When the Carnegie Report was published in the spring of 1914, for instance, it was revealed that Milioukov and Brailsford wrote the five most important of the seven chapters, and these chapters did represent the Bulgarians in a slightly more favorable light. However, the report still painstakingly presented ample evidence of atrocities committed by all sides during the Balkan Wars. This evidence includes pages of testimony and accounts of atrocities committed against the Muslims of the Balkans by all sides.

#### TOP OF FORM

The report has only been the focus of one other scholarly work, Dr. Ivan Ilchev's 1989 Bulgarian-language article in *Istoreschky Pregled*.<sup>10</sup> This article focuses on the commission's travels and the drafting of the report. Thus this chapter is the first work that attempts to situate this critical primary source in a historiographical context. My primary method is to analyze the perspectives of the authors of the report and the commentators writing about it. This method is a type of discourse analysis, a concept introduced by Michel Foucault in his *Archaeology of Knowledge*.<sup>11</sup>

The idea of a discourse goes against the notion that a work is created solely by its author, expressing individual views. Instead a given work is a collective construction.<sup>12</sup> The discourse centered on the 1914 Carnegie Report is subordinate to the Orientalist discourse described by Edward Said. This important concept needs to be examined in some depth to appreciate the attitude of the report's authors and the discourse concerning it.

Edward Said published *Orientalism* in 1979. This work took a long-established body of intellectual theory and applied it dramatically to the real world. Resting Orientalism on the body of poststructuralist thought, Said asserted that the knowledge production of the old and respected academic school of Orientalism, the study of Eastern cultures and peoples, directly aided and abetted Western imperialism. In interviews Said acknowledged that the most lasting idea that he took from the works of the thinker Antonio Gramsci was the concept that everything can be thought of geographically: as a map that is territory to be fought over. As William V. Spanos notes, this concept helps to visualize the system of Western knowledge production that attempts to map out and conquer the contents of the universe. Spanos argues that Said's work can be connected to a genealogy of Western thought that can be traced from the classical period to the modern era through the optic of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*. When Foucault's ideas on the post-Enlightenment West are "re-constellated in the Heideggerian matrix, this post-Enlightenment version of power became the privileged means of bringing universal peace...to a volatile world, a world that the dominant culture represented as being otherwise in perpetual strife."<sup>13</sup>

This use of knowledge to dominate, pacify, and accommodate is an important concept that is echoed in Foucault's famous pan-optic gaze. Knowledge production created a "super-vised space to be conquered, mapped, classified, colonized, and administered. It is, in other words, a 'disciplinary' or, more inclusively, an 'imperial' gaze."<sup>14</sup> This is manifested in the modern world in a society where knowledge production itself is an imperial tool. Who is looking at whom becomes as important a method of domination as economic or military superiority. This Imperial Gaze can be equated to the Orientalist Gaze: the Western observer looking over the "Orient" (an idea itself created as a binary opposition to the West) in order to analyze and classify it.

Before continuing with this discourse analysis, however, we must make an addendum to the concept of the Imperial or Oriental Gaze. Maria Todorova noted that the powerful paradigm shift created by

Orientalism was very closely identified with Islam.<sup>15</sup> She proposed that the Christian East was treated no differently than the Islamic East and that the concept of a Balkanist discourse should be used. Therefore the concept of a Balkan Gaze should also be considered. There is no theoretical difference among the Imperial, Orientalist, and Balkanist Gazes. The crushing weight of centuries of binary Western thought attempting to organize and conquer lies behind each of them; the only difference is in focus. The Imperial Gaze is too general in scope for this discussion, so I focus on the Orientalist Gaze and its derived relative, the Balkanist Gaze, to analyze the 1914 Carnegie Report and its discourse.

Hans Theunissen notes that Western thought considered the Ottoman Empire the “Unchanging East.”<sup>16</sup> No matter what the Ottomans did, the West still considered their entire realm to be in a perpetual state of decay. The British politician William Gladstone famously wrote: “[The Turks] were, upon the whole, from the black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity. Wherever they went, a broad line of blood marked the track behind them; and, as far as their dominion reached, civilization disappeared from view.”<sup>17</sup> This quotation encapsulates the Orientalist gaze, but it is not alone. Similar terminology continued to be used for decades. It is not hard to find this sentiment echoed in early twentieth-century materials. In his exhaustive 1906 biography of Gladstone, John Morley reminds the reader that “Turkish engagements were broken, for this solid reason if for no other that Turkey had not in the resources of her barbaric polity the means to keep them.”<sup>18</sup> This sentiment was reflected in contemporary newspaper articles concerning the Balkan Wars. On November 5, 1912, two editorials ran in the *New York Times*. One focused on the brutality of Turkish soldiers in the war, while the other opined that Europe should be thankful to the Slavs, who “bore the brunt of Turkish ferocity and atrocity, saving the West from similar horrors.”<sup>19</sup> These articles demonstrate both the short-term focus on Turkish brutality and the larger discursive concern with “the ‘Turk’ in Europe as an oppressive invader. The ‘Turk’ was seen as the ‘Other’ to the West, who existed either to be brought into line or to be eradicated, as seen in the discussion of the Orientalist Gaze. The two principal authors of the report, Brailsford and Milioukov, shared this view. Brailsford states as much in his survey of life in Ottoman Macedonia: “In point of fact, [the Christian peasant] is the servant of an alien conqueror, who barely recognizes their common humanity...[t]he sole law which regulates these complicated and elastic relations is the big revolver which the [Muslim] landlord wears in his belt.”<sup>20</sup> Melissa Kirschke

Stockdale notes that Milioukov shared the common Russian view that it was a special Russian duty to liberate the South Slavs.<sup>21</sup> This point of view, not unsurprisingly, appears in the body of the Carnegie Report itself.

#### THE COMMISSION'S VIEWS OF THE OTTOMANS

The commission held a very low opinion of the Ottoman Empire. This mistrust and animosity is very clearly expressed in the first chapter, the commission's historical background on the Balkan Wars. In explaining the Macedonian Question in 1905–7, the report lays out in very clear terms the commissioners' view of "Turkish" power.

[G]radually an understanding begins to be reached [between the European powers and Turkey], as questions are taken one by one, and the attempt is made to reform Turkish administration, police, finance and justice in Macedonia...the details of this portion of Balkan history, [are] too familiar. Generally speaking, it is the repetition, on a larger scale, of what had been going on for half a century. First, unreal concessions, then, as soon as they begin to become onerous, general reform on paper which sweeps away and slurs over all practical details; and finally, the moment of tension once over, and the attention of Europe averted, the old order once again—with the single difference that the concessions agreed upon this time were more important.<sup>22</sup>

After this clear statement of the commission's opinion on autocratic Ottoman government, the report begins to contradict and muddle the picture on the very same page:

[T]he young Turkish revolution promised to solve all difficulties and pacify all hatreds by substituting justice for arbitrary rule, and freedom for despots. First and foremost it proclaimed complete equality as between the diverse nationalities inhabiting Turkey, in reliance on their Ottoman patriotism.

Far from satisfying the tendencies of re-awakening nationalism, it sets itself a task to which the absolutism of the Sultan had never ventured; to reconstruct...Turkey...and transform it into a modern state, beginning by the complete abolition of the rights and privileges of the different ethnic groups.... This assimilation,

this "Ottomanization," was the avowed aim of the victor, the committee of "Union and Progress."<sup>23</sup>

It would seem from the first quotation that the commission was concerned about the "absolutism" of the Ottoman government. In the next quotation we see a favorable portrayal of the Young Turk revolution. Presumably the commission wanted the Ottomans to move away from absolutism and arbitrary justice toward a modern state built on the equality of citizens and the rule of law. The second quotation would confirm that general sentiment. In the third quotation, however, taken from farther down on the same page, we see that the commission is vehemently against the concept of equalizing the Ottoman Christian population. The Young Turkish government did slide into autocracy, as it continued the push for a strongly centralized government accompanied by the ideology of a united Ottoman nation.<sup>24</sup> But the commission suggests that it wanted the Ottoman government to move toward modernity and even the equality of citizens as a positive ideal. The lesson to draw from these quotations is that European attitudes toward the Ottoman Empire were paradoxical: if the Ottomans were absolutist and arbitrary, they were a blight to be removed; if the Ottomans tried to install the hallmarks of a modern state, including the rule of law and relative citizen equality, they were perfidiously trying to steal the one protection that the Christians of the empire had, and they had to be stopped.

The underlying feelings of the commission are also laid bare in the terminology used for the wars. The first Balkan War becomes the "War of Liberation." The second becomes the "War of the Allies." The first war "free[d] Europe from the nightmare of the Eastern question and g[a]ve her the unhoped for example of the union and coordination which she lacks." In many places the first war is referred to in glowing terms, only sullied by the extreme violence in its execution. The second war is more somberly appraised. For example, "At Sofia...the final agony had been reached more quickly than in Belgrade."<sup>25</sup>

The final agony is the decision to go to war. In the worldview of the report there is no question that the first war was totally justified. The end of the report contains more vivid language along these lines:

Centuries of oppression and suffering at the hands of the Turks, the unpromising outlook for good government in Macedonia because of hostile factions in the Turkish government, and the possibility of the alliance of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria in what



seemed a just and holy cause, were felt to fully justify the concerted movement against the Turks.<sup>26</sup>

The Carnegie Report makes casual remarks about the supposed habits of the Turks in general throughout. For example, while the report spares no detail in describing the Bulgarian offensive into Thrace during the first war and the attendant pillage and murder, it is not the Bulgarians but the Turks who, “[o]n taking the offensive,...transported their habits of pillage across the frontier.” In other words, the Bulgarians act for retribution or some other mysterious motivation, while the Turks are the ones who pillage habitually. Similarly, free of evidence or proof, the report states in chapter 1 that “Balkan diplomacy knew well enough that the ‘Sick Man’ was incurable.”<sup>27</sup> The “Sick Man” is a famous trope about the Ottomans from the late nineteenth century until the demise of the empire after World War I.<sup>28</sup> These negative features of the Ottomans are assumed throughout the document.

Interestingly enough, by the later chapters the Ottomans disappear from the picture almost entirely. This would seem to parallel the European view that the Ottomans were an anachronism that should fade into history. The commissioners were well received by the Bulgarian government, received some cooperation from Serbia in obtaining documents but were not allowed on Serbian soil, and toured parts of Greece without clear permission from the Greek government. They also went to Istanbul, and at least one member toured Thrace and Edirne. In the section about the economics of the wars only Bulgaria and Serbia provided casualty figures. But through some means the commission was able to obtain detailed economic information from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro. The report contains no data for the Ottoman Empire. These data are summarized in the chapter and provided in full in the appendices, fascinating statistics for any economic historian. However equitably the report treats the atrocities against the Muslim populations of the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire is not really considered an active participant, merely a passive recipient of the activities of the Balkan states.

This is not just evident in chapter 6, “Economic Results of the Wars.” In the other concluding chapters (chapter 5, “The War and International Law”; and chapter 7, “The Moral and Social Consequences”) the Turks are mentioned as victims but never as perpetrators. Although the report contains clear evidence that the Ottomans were just as guilty of war crimes as the other parties involved, they are not mentioned in chapter 5, where every other nation is accused of war crimes. Similarly the moral and social lessons of the war are to be learned by the Balkan

states, not by the Ottomans. The commission has a clearly Orientalist viewpoint in not assigning the Ottomans any agency. This conception of the Ottoman Empire is the most obvious example of the authors' Eurocentric worldview.

#### THE RESPONSE OF *LE TEMPS*

The review of the Carnegie Report published in *Le Temps* on July 20, 1914, by its Athens correspondent is very long and does not mention anything but the report's pro-Bulgarian bias. According to the *Le Temps* review, in every instance the report seeks to place doubt on Bulgarian atrocities and blame the Greeks, Serbians, and Romanians. Although the Romanians are only briefly mentioned in the report itself, the French response alludes to them often and never mentions the Ottomans. The Muslims and Ottomans are at least referred to in the report frequently, even if in an unfavorable light. *Le Temps* also provides more evidence of the pro-Bulgarian slant. It sarcastically states that Drs. Milioukov and Brailsford went to Bulgaria without the other members and mysteriously found evidence that exactly fit their preconceived notions about the Bulgarians' lack of blame.

The article in *Le Temps* also includes an anecdote from a newspaper correspondent based in Athens, who went to Salonika to meet with the commission and provide his account of the wars. One of the commission members, M. Justin Godart, apparently refused to meet with him, declaring that he was only compiling economic data and could not take depositions himself.<sup>29</sup> Another account states that a professor at the Sorbonne conclusively proved that the Greek soldiers' letters provided as important evidence in the report were fakes.<sup>30</sup> *Le Temps* declares that the commission ignored this report. The article concludes that the motive was not humanitarian at all but political, with Drs. Milioukov and Brailsford aiming to use the report as a platform to get the Treaty of Bucharest overturned. This treaty, which concluded the Second Balkan War, was unfavorable to Bulgaria. The last line of the article declares that the report exists specifically to prove the Bulgarian thesis about the Balkan Wars.

The severity of the criticism contained in the response to the Carnegie Report in *Le Temps* is very revealing. Everyone writing about the report in 1914 knew of the accusations leveled against the commission, but only the French response expounded on the controversy. It may be a stretch to imply that the entire point of the report was to advance the Bulgarian cause, because it does indict the Bulgarians as well, even if not to the same degree as the other nationalities. Much of the further evidence against

the report is anecdotal. It would be interesting to see the comments of the Sorbonne professor Hubert Pernot, but this response appears no longer to be extant. It should also be noted that the article was written by *Le Temps*' Athens correspondent and that the Greeks were not happy with the report as published. It is possible that the correspondent's proximity to the Greek point of view may be reflected in this article.

#### THE OTTOMAN RESPONSE, 1913–1914

The Ottomans, a major participant in both the wars and the Carnegie Report's explanation, have been silent in this account thus far. In fact Ottoman newspapers followed the commission's progress with interest, manifested in three long articles and several shorter ones. The first response came on August 30, 1913, and outlined the project of the Carnegie Commission as it was en route to the Balkans. The article was tellingly titled "Ba'de Harab-ı Basra." This idiom translates directly to "After the Destruction of Basra" and means an action that takes place after the deciding event has already occurred. The word choice is very evocative and demonstrates the author's feelings about the European response to the Balkan Wars. The article further criticizes the European response to the Balkan Wars, calling the Europeans "willfully negligent [*musamaha*]" and outlining Russian support for the Bulgarians.<sup>31</sup> It is important to note that in the days and weeks previous to the publishing of this article daily updates on Bulgarian atrocities during the siege of Edirne had been published. The author is very concerned that the inquiry should discover Bulgarian crimes and even states that he hopes that the commission will uncover the truth and reveal the crimes committed against both the Muslims and the Greeks. The author further exhorts his compatriots and people of the state of Greece to support the commission wherever it goes. It is clear that the author of the article is disappointed in the response of the Europeans to date but is optimistic that the inquiry will uncover Bulgarian crimes against Muslims and Greeks alike. Further articles reveal this optimism to be ephemeral.

Several short articles covered the progress of the commission while it was conducting its business. One article published a few days after the article on August 30 mentions how the commission was being held up in Belgrade, an occurrence that is mentioned in the introduction to the report itself. Later the paper printed a portrait of Andrew Carnegie on the front page with a caption, familiarizing readers with the benefactor of the commission.<sup>32</sup> Carnegie is described as a millionaire philanthropist most

notable for his construction of the Peace Palace in The Hague. Coinciding with the conclusion of the commission's fieldwork, on September 12 a short article was written about how one of the commissioners, "Monsieur Milioukov," was a member of the Russian Duma and had Bulgarian sympathies.<sup>33</sup> This shows that even while the Ottomans may not have had as much discussion concerning the sympathies of the commission as in other countries they were at least aware of the accusations.

The newspapers were silent in the ensuing months, during which the report was being compiled. On May 12 a press conference was held in Paris that released the prologue of the report and announced that the full report would be published in a month's time. The response in *İkdam*, published on May 13, 1914, covers the May 12 press conference that released the prologue and announced the date of the general release of the report in English and French.<sup>34</sup> This article notes cynically that the prologue only affords the Turks a very small mention while focusing on the Christian combatants. A section of the prologue is even presented in translation to support this. The author uses the contents of the prologue as a starting point to pen a polemic about Turkish nationalism, arguing that if all other Balkan peoples, including the Albanians, have a nation, then the Turks should as well. The solidarity of the Muslims and Greeks against the Bulgarians from the previous article has been dropped by this point, in favor of a more exclusive appeal to the victimization of the Turks. Without the daily updates on the conditions in Edirne to focus anger on the actions of the Bulgarians, and with the perspective of time, the actions of the other Balkan nations apparently were able to come to the foreground.

The next response in the Ottoman press came in the daily *Tanin*, a mainstream newspaper and an organ of the CUP.<sup>35</sup> The voice we hear in the Ottoman response is much different from the tone of the American and European responses. Those responses are focused on the lead-up to the war, belittling the Balkan peoples and their brutal, immature habits, and on what the response of the civilized nations should be. Indeed the article printed in response to the full report even differs from the previous Ottoman articles. While they were sometimes optimistic and sometimes cynical, this *Tanin* article is written in a triumphalist tone. It reads as if the Carnegie Report exclusively favored the Ottomans, with only a short introductory paragraph for exposition, and then quickly delves right into an amalgam of quotations from the report. After the main body comes an exhortation for action. Each of the three sections is considered in sequence.

The first thing to note is the simple title: “Carnegie Report—Investigations in the Balkans—Greeks and Bulgars.”<sup>36</sup> The review gives a very one-sided account of the Carnegie Report, stating that “during the second partitioning every faction—Greeks and Bulgars—half of the Muslim inhabitants of Macedonia were tortured and forced out by the Greeks and Bulgars, and there are signs of killings and horrors during the partitioning.” Although the Muslim world is mourning, the review recommends that Muslims need to staunch their tears and take precautions against the “barbaric Greeks and Bulgars.” It continues: “Indeed in this account of the inquiry there are excesses of the Greeks and Bulgars against the Turks. [The Greeks and the Bulgars] cut down and scythed the Turks, and we must remember the Muslim women and children.”<sup>37</sup> After that comes a long section consisting almost entirely of translated quotations from the report. It is important to note that the review does not even think to question the truthfulness of the report. It insinuates that the report was only written to expose Greek and Bulgarian culpability, with little other purpose. The choice of quotations shows more of this pattern.

A short quotation is provided from the introductory chapter on the history and causes of the Balkan Wars. Then the review quotes at length a section from the first several pages of the second chapter, on the effects of the war on the noncombatant population. The review intersperses this narrative with parts from the related appendix, which is referred to in the text. Indeed the review covers pages 71–73 and then the related appendix. It is unclear if the reviewers read any other part. The long quotation provided consists of the most lengthy account focused solely on Muslim suffering contained in the report. It prefaces this, however, by reminding the readers of the cruelty of the Muslims and the perceived deficiencies of past Ottoman government:

In all these incidents of repression, the local Muslims had played their part, marching behind the Turkish troops as *bashi-bazouks* and joining in the work of pillage and slaughter...to the hatred of races was added the resentment of the peasantry against the landlords [beys], who for generations had levied a heavy tribute on their labor and their harvests.<sup>38</sup>

Unfazed by the criticism, the Ottoman text begins on the very next line, entirely cropping out the offending narrative: “The defeat of the Turkish armies meant something more than a political change. It reversed the relations of conqueror and serf;<sup>39</sup> it promised a social revolution.”

The main body of the quotation concerns the events around the town of Prashuta,<sup>40</sup> near Serres in modern Greece. The Muslim notables of Prashuta drew up and sealed a document written in Turkish and delivered it to the commission. The letter from Prashuta details the exact number of murders and goods stolen from each of twenty-five small villages and Prashuta itself. The *Tanin* review, however, begins with a summary of the situation for the Muslims of eastern Macedonia, during the first war in the period between the evacuation of effective Ottoman authority and the reestablishment of control by the Greek army six weeks later. The review focuses on a particular series of events in the town of Drama and nearby Yailadjik. "It is not surprising in these conditions that the Muslim population endured during the early weeks of the war a period of lawless vengeance and unmeasured suffering. In many districts the Muslim villages were systematically burned by their Christian neighbors."<sup>41</sup> The review continues with this quotation until it reaches a reference to the appendix. The Ottoman text switches in midsentence from the regular text of the report to the appendix, to give an account of fifteen Muslims killed, 9,500 sheep and 1,500 goats stolen, and a number of other material goods carried off by Greeks.<sup>42</sup>

The next section proceeds from the singular account of one "Muslim Notable of Yailadjik" to the next section of the appendix. This short section contains the most blatant distortion of truth in the Ottoman review, indeed in any document related to the Carnegie Report. Although the quoted text does not return to the main section of the report, the Ottoman text jumps to the next appendix cited in the narrative on page 72. The report refers to this appendix as the evidence of an atrocity that would have been worse had it not been for an "energetic Bulgarian Prefect." From the Carnegie Report appendix:

The population of the Drama district totaled 18,000, of whom 13,000 were Moslems, and of these latter 3,000 were Pomaks and the remainder Turks.... During the first war, in the latter half of October, the Greeks, acting as allies under the shelter of our troops, began to take their private revenge upon the Turks, killing, looting and violating.<sup>43</sup>

It continues on for some time like this. This would seem to be inflammatory enough for the Ottoman public. The Ottoman text, however, states: "In the district of Drama, it was seen that 13,000 Muslims were killed by the Greeks."<sup>44</sup> By mixing the text around and adding several

words, the author undoubtedly intended to blame the Greeks for the killing of 13,000 Muslims near Drama, intentionally misstating the report's mere mention of 13,000 Muslims present.

After this bold misstatement of fact, the *Tanin* article proceeds to frame the events at Prashuta for its audience. From the aforementioned list of twenty-five individual Muslim villages that were pillaged, the Ottoman review simply adds together the numbers of dead and amount of cash stolen, for a total of 195 deaths and 42,475 liras.<sup>45</sup> After reviewing the number of dead and amount of the stolen goods, the Ottoman review turns to the involvement of members of the Orthodox Church in the atrocities. The report itself suggests:

Such civil administration as there was in the early stages of the conquest was conducted by the Greek Bishop...[i]n the villages all these excesses seem to have been the work of local Greek bands. The most active of these bands was led by a priest and a war-like grocer who was a member of the Bishop's council. The Turks indeed accuse the Bishop of directing all these atrocities.<sup>46</sup>

The *Tanin* article renders this as: "At the time the majority of the active agitators came from the Greek priests, with the Greek schoolteachers and the members of the Greek congregations amplifying the grievous and unusual acts that happened here."<sup>47</sup> A cautious statement made by the commission, qualified by a statement that the local Muslims did indeed chiefly blame the local Greek bishop, is transformed into an indictment of the Greek community, with the attention focused on the two chief organs for spreading the idea of the nation, the clergy and the schoolteachers. After this the *Tanin* article provides detailed quotations from the aforementioned list from Prashuta. Of the twenty-five villages and Prashuta itself in the list, five (20 percent) mention Greek teachers or clergy involved in negative acts. These five are quoted in detail, with two merged into one, to create four testimonials.

According to the accounts of the events occurring in the villages of Palihor and Orphano, nine Muslims were killed.<sup>48</sup> In Palihor these murders were committed by the local Greek schoolmaster, and in Orphano one man was apprehended by a local priest and executed on the orders of the bishop. These reports are simply copied down into the Ottoman text. In the village of Kotchan, "for his own vengeance, the Bishop killed one Muslim."<sup>49</sup> In three short reports we see three crimes committed by the Greek clergy or schoolteachers, all credulously reported in *Tanin*.

More interesting are the events that occurred in Mouchtian and Carpan. In Carpan a reoccurring character in these misdeeds, Myriacos Mihail (the aforementioned “war-like grocer”), kills four Muslims specifically on the order of the Greek bishop. In Mouchtian, Mihail and his band murder twenty-five Muslims and throw them into the ravine of Casroub. An epitaph follows: “In the twentieth century of progress, the skeletons which may still be seen in this ravine present to the eyes of Justice a monument capable of enlightening her regarding Hellenic civilization.”<sup>50</sup> The Ottoman version quotes: “The Greek Bishop knowingly sent Mihail to commit the crime at Casroub Ravine.”<sup>51</sup> Then the author repeats the epitaph.

The events in Prashuta are described in the commission’s report in great detail. The Greek bishop formed a council, which included the priest Nicholas and the warlike grocer Mihail. Ten Muslims were executed with the bishop’s approval, according to the deposition included in the report’s appendix. On the evening of the execution, “the students of the Greek school assembled in the courtyard of the government house and sang the Greek national anthem.”<sup>52</sup> In the *Tanin* article this account is reproduced in its entirety.<sup>53</sup> This episode is presented by the Ottoman author in language almost identical to that of the Carnegie Report, without quotation.

Another piece of text that presents a good insight into the Ottoman psyche included in the Ottoman review occurs a few lines down from these accounts. The article quotes from the report: “The burning of villages and the exodus of the defeated population is a normal and traditional incident of all Balkan wars and insurrections. It is the habit of all these peoples. What they have suffered themselves, they inflict in turn upon others.”<sup>54</sup> This quotation itself is one of the most essentialist sentences in the entire book of almost five hundred pages. It succinctly summarizes the feelings of Western Europeans and Americans toward the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the century: that these people are semihuman slaves to instinct and memories of past events. It is startling to see this quoted as a high point of the article, suggesting an Ottoman internalization of the Western narrative. Indeed it occurs in the penultimate paragraph. The inclusion of this quotation highlights the contradictory nature of late Ottoman rule. The Young Turks were strongly anti-imperial yet presided over an empire themselves and did not consider the contradictions. Here in the Young Turk period we see an example of the same mind-set. A strongly worded criticism of the Balkan people, a category to which the Turks belong, shows that the Ottomans



felt themselves superior to the other Balkan peoples to the extent of not including themselves in the same category.

The article concludes with strong words. It declares the report an excellent and clearly written account and description of the famously horrible and lamentable days of the “second partitioning” of Macedonia. The report is so excellent that it would be reasonable to translate the text into Turkish for the consumption of the general public. No Turkish translation was ever made, so it would seem that anyone who read the Ottoman text walked away thinking that a prestigious international body had ruled decisively in favor of the Ottomans and against the Balkan Christian powers.

### 1990S

The newspaper articles and journalistic reviews, as well as the new introduction and preface included in the republishing of the report, suggested that the body of the report itself be taken uncritically. Indeed this is exactly what happened. Misha Glenny uncritically published selections from the report in his book *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–1999* (1999). In fact he seems to have cherry-picked the most salacious and least verifiable stories. “A woman of Haskovo described how her little child was thrown up into the air by a Turkish soldier who caught it on the point of his bayonet...[they] saw [him] carrying it in triumph across the village.”<sup>55</sup> This quotation comes from a section of the report where the commissioners do not even bother to couch their writing in neutral terms and simply repeat scandalous stories.<sup>56</sup> In fact, this quotation is popular in books on the Balkans published since 1993. Andre Gerolymatos quotes the same passage in his book *The Balkan Wars: Myth, Reality, and the Eternal Conflict* (2001). Gerolymatos even puts in a biblical reference to emphasize the Christian versus Muslim aspect, despite the preponderance of Christian on Christian violence in the 1912–13 wars. He prefaces the bayonet quotation as follows: “On the Thracian front, for example, retreating Ottoman troops exacted a terrible revenge for their defeat in the First Balkan War. In village after village, Turkish soldiers, irregulars, and even ordinary Muslims exacted their pound of flesh.” I would like to provide one more quotation: “These Turks took a pleasure in torturing children, too...tossing babies up into the air and catching them on the points of their bayonets before their mother’s eyes.”<sup>57</sup> This quotation does not come from histories of the Balkans written since 1993, based on the report. It comes from Fyodor

Dostoyevsky's 1880 novel *The Brothers Karamazov* and describes rumors that the characters have heard from the front—of the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War. This would suggest that the stereotype of cruel Turkish soldiers bayoneting babies was popular at least in Russia, the homeland of Milioukov, the author of the chapter that includes that anecdote. Perhaps this anecdote was fabricated and simply copied down into the report. This is a good example of why the report must be looked at critically, which many authors have not done.

#### THE REPORT IN NEW MEDIA

The Carnegie Report has become a common source for materials written on the Balkans today and also for those written on the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Not all of them take the report quite as naively as the aforementioned authors. Richard C. Hall, for instance, also cites the report several times. Each time, however, he quotes only objective facts such as population differential charts or reports about the political situation or military headquarters records before saying in his section on his sources: "Probably the most objective evaluation pertaining to the atrocities is found in the Carnegie Report."<sup>58</sup> But Hall is wary of the report and also refers readers to Ilchev's article and rejoinders printed by the Greeks in order to make their own decision. Justin McCarthy is virulently critical of the report in his book *Death and Exile*, referring to it as an anti-Greek and anti-Turk document. He notes that no commissioners spoke Turkish and that "[t]he Ottoman Empire is throughout viewed as an 'Oriental' state that is worthy of notice only insofar as its actions affected Greece, Bulgaria, or Serbia."<sup>59</sup> After this disclaimer McCarthy proceeds to quote the report eight times. Indirectly citing the report, the Turkish language *Balkanlar ve Türkler* quotes one of the pages of *Death and Exile* where McCarthy draws information from the report.<sup>60</sup>

Since the rediscovery of the report in the early 1990s, it has gained a new lease on life as an important source in articles and books on the Balkans, focusing either on more contemporary events or on the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Most cite it as an accurate source. Only more scholarly works such as Hall's *The Balkan Wars* and McCarthy's *Death and Exile*, along with Ilchev's 1989 article, have bothered to probe the original controversy of the report and critically assessed it. However, one important arena for the new reception of the document has yet to be discussed. The report features prominently in lively Internet debates of modern Turks, Serbs, Macedonians, and Greeks, all using it as a source to support their

various arguments free from the constraints of publishing in traditional media.

More interesting is how the report has been inserted into modern Turkey's discourse. Even though the Balkans formed a core part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, Turks have removed the Balkans from their national psyche. Following this trend, Turkish sources do not spend the same amount of time as the Greeks or Macedonians do in arguing over the validity of the report to justify their nation. But some Turks have inserted the report in an auxiliary way into Turkey's nationalist discourse. An excellent example of this is found on the Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü web page.<sup>61</sup> Although presented quite neutrally,<sup>62</sup> the site contains articles from a distinctly Turkish nationalist point of view. An article on the "Armenian Question" suggests that the Armenians are intractable in denying access to records in order to hide information. A section of the article suggests that the crime of genocide was invented long after 1915, so the term should not retroactively be applied to events that may or may not have happened in Anatolia in 1915. The article uses the report as evidence: "A report that researched war crimes in accordance with the Hague Conventions during the Balkan Wars in 1912–13 significantly talks about crimes against humanity and calamities that came especially against the Turks."<sup>63</sup> The article then discusses how many of the signatories of the 1907 Hague conventions did not intend to abide by them and includes a quotation from the Greek foreign minister. This article specifically uses sections of the Carnegie Report to highlight grievances against Turks and Muslims, including the Pomaks. Much like the 1914 *Tanin* article, it does not question the report and simply uses it to support an argument. It is fascinating to see the report woven into the Armenian Question, suggesting that since the crimes against the Ottoman Muslims presented in the report were not prosecuted and even because the signatories "did not envision enforcing the Hague Conventions" any crimes possibly committed by the Ottomans in 1915 should not be prosecuted either. But this is not the only aspect of the report that commands interest in Turkey.

An article on "English Propaganda and the Bryce Report" begins with the thesis that "[p]rejudice directed against the Turks by Americans and Europeans has gone on for a long time during this century." The article goes into great depth on British propaganda against the Central Powers and especially against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, so we would not expect to find mention of the Carnegie Report, which did not deal with World War I at all. According to the article, "While the

above mentioned list takes into account almost all of the propaganda, some of which we must resort to for more information, extra material appears. Sometimes the respected American organization Wellington House successfully brought its own agents [into action]. For example, the Carnegie Endowment Report was attributed to the English Propagandist Parker and can be shown to have been distributed to help out [the English cause]."<sup>64</sup> In one short paragraph the author retroactively fits the Carnegie Report, now a common source on the history of the Balkan Wars, into the Anglo-American imperialist conspiracy to seize Ottoman lands and attempt to dismember the Turkish homeland. Turkish nationalism is somewhat paranoid and anti-imperialist.<sup>65</sup> The report therefore could not be any sort of attempt at objectivity but had to have been created by the Americans in collusion with the English to try to demean the Turkish nation.

However, the Turkish response is not entirely paranoid. The Carnegie Endowment eventually put together another report in 1998 about the breakup of Yugoslavia. Although this new report would seem to have had less of an impact than the 1914 Carnegie Report, the press release announcing the publication of the Turkish edition of the 1998 report makes an interesting reference. It notes that the authors see themselves as the continuation of the 1914 report into our present day and that the "unbelievable document" seems to cover the events of yesterday as well as today.<sup>66</sup> This press release shows both that the Carnegie Endowment considers this report a valuable part of its own history and that in Turkey it is considered a valuable and objective report as well.

### CONCLUSION

The Carnegie Report has become an important source concerning the atrocities committed in the Balkan Wars. The commission went to the Balkans under a cloud of controversy. Many different groups knew that much was at stake depending on the outcome of the report. Accusations of bias came from Western commentators and the governments of Balkan powers alike. This controversy followed the commission even after the report was made public, and much of the commentary focused on the controversy rather than on the report itself. This criticism in 1914 made the report a more valuable document, because the criticism was still remembered and the report was more likely to be viewed with a critical eye. But the flaws of the report and the unfortunate timing of its release, shortly before World War I, caused it to fade into obscurity for decades.

The Carnegie Report has created a more lasting impression since being rediscovered in the early 1990s. On the whole it was accepted with more credulity in the 1990s than it was in 1914, when the original publication caused a controversy. The use of the report in the 1990s and 2000s often echoed the imperialist point of view of the authors in 1914, contributing to the Orientalist discourse by minimizing and deemphasizing the importance of the Ottoman Empire in the region.

The commentary on the report and the attitudes of its authors offer important insight into different perspectives on Ottoman history. For all its flaws the report still comments on the atrocities and crimes carried out against the Muslim population of the Balkans as the Ottoman Empire experienced its final collapse in Europe. Considering the Muslim population worthy of inclusion into such a report is unusual. Europe, as we have seen, often preferred to show Muslims as ruthless occupiers and Christians as innocent bystanders. This alone makes the report valuable as a source that provides a relatively unbiased account of Christian attacks on Muslims. The way the Ottoman press covered the production of the report is also interesting. The coverage ranged from being hopeful to being pessimistic and ultimately led toward a censored view of the findings that made the Greeks and Bulgarians appear to be totally at fault. The final article in the sequence, the July 13 article in *Tanin*, is reflective of the Ottoman mind-set at the time. Turkish nationalism formed as a reaction to other Balkan nationalisms, during a period of collapse and defeat. The review in *Tanin* vividly illustrates this desperate mentality, selectively editing almost five hundred pages to appear as if the commission had exclusively reported on the atrocities committed by Bulgarians and the Greek clergy against Ottoman Muslims.

The discourse concerning the report in the 1990s reveals more. Many authors still marginalize the impact of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula, focusing instead on negatives and old tropes about the savage Turks, if the Ottomans are mentioned at all. George Kennan made no secret of his disdain for Ottoman rule in the introduction of the 1993 edition, which unfortunately set the tone for much of the discourse that would follow. Turks themselves have inserted this report, which was written and reviewed in the formative period of what would evolve into modern Turkish nationalism, into Turkish nationalist debates that are important today, such as the Armenian Question or imperialist aspirations toward the Ottoman Empire or Turkey.

The authors of the report and the author of the French article in *Le Temps* saw the formerly Ottoman Balkans through an imperial lens,

commenting on the unseemliness of a Muslim power on European soil, if acknowledging Ottoman agency at all. *Le Temps* specifically creates a narrative where the Greeks and Bulgarians operate in a vacuum, seemingly devoid of Ottomans. The Ottoman press, in contrast, bent the report to seem as if Balkan War atrocities were inflicted only on Muslim elements in Europe. We have also seen modern authors selectively use the report to bolster paranoid nationalist arguments. In examining the bias of the 1914 Carnegie Report's authors themselves and the bias of subsequent commentators, we can gain important insights about how European, Ottoman, and modern Turkish observers have conceived of Ottoman power and the people of the Balkans. Therefore the report can stand as a unique historical primary source on the last phase of the Ottoman Empire in Europe as well as a valuable record of the mind-set of the authors and the events that led to the peculiarities of modern Turkish nationalism.

#### NOTES

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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (hereafter Carnegie Report), 9.
2. Joseph Frazier Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 898.
3. George Kennan, *The Other Balkan Wars*.
4. For more information about the life and work of Milioukov, see Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, *Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880–1918*.
5. For more information about Brailsford, see F. M. Leventhal, *The Last Dissenter*.
6. Stockdale, *Paul Milioukov*, 83.
7. Paul Milioukov, *Russia and Its Crisis*.
8. H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia, 195–200*, 80–99.
9. "The Macedonian Committee of Inquiry," *Times* (London), September 4, 1913; "The Macedonian Committee of Inquiry: Hellenic Reply," *Times* (London), September 6, 1913; "The Macedonian Committee of Inquiry: Bulgarian Reply," *Times* (London), September 9, 1913.
10. Ivan Ilchev, "Carnegie Report, 1913."
11. Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*.
12. Peter Burke, *History and Social Theory*, 100.
13. William V. Spanos, *The Legacy of Edward W. Said*, 93, 65.
14. *Ibid.*, 31.

15. Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 18.
16. Hans Theunissen, *The Role of Architecture in European and Ottoman Views of "Ottoman Westernization,"* 8.
17. W.E. Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*, 10.
18. John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone VII* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1906), 156.
19. "The Macedonian Committee of Inquiry," *Times* (London), September 4, 1913; "Europe's Most Savage War," *New York Times*, November 5, 1912; "Europe's Debt to the Slavs," *New York Times*, November 5, 1912.
20. Brailsford, *Macedonia*, 55.
21. Stockdale, *Paul Milioukov*, 5.
22. Carnegie Report, 34.
23. *Ibid.*, 34–35.
24. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 106.
25. Carnegie Report, 1, 65.
26. *Ibid.*, 265.
27. *Ibid.*, 41, 134.
28. Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 79.
29. "À propos du rapport Carnegie," *Le Temps*, July 20, 1914.
30. This refutation does not appear to have been published and could not be located for the purposes of this chapter.
31. "Ba'de Harab-ı Basra," *İkdam*, August 30, 1918.
32. "Her sene Lahey'de," *İkdam*, September 3, 1914. Often *İkdam* would print a large photo of a person who had been prominent in the news recently on the front page. On this day Andrew Carnegie filled this position.
33. "Monsieur Milioukov," *İkdam*, September 12, 1913.
34. "Carnegie Komisyonu Raporu," *İkdam*, May 13, 1914.
35. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 292.
36. "Carnegie Raporu—Balkanlarda Tahkikat—Rumlar ve Bulgarlar" *Tanin*, July 13, 1914. It should be noted that here the review uses the term "Roman" for the Greeks. In its summarization of the Carnegie Report, the review generally uses *Rum* in original material written for the review and *Yunanlı* for Greeks when it is quoting directly from the report, although there are exceptions.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Carnegie Report, 71.
39. The *Tanin* text simply omits "conqueror and serf."
40. The name for this town was determined by locating the exact text that the *Tanin* author was quoting in the Carnegie Report. The town name used in this chapter is the version used by the authors of the report. Other town names also use the spelling provided in the report.
41. Carnegie Report, 72; *Tanin*, July 13, 1914, lines 34–37. The Ottoman version replaces the reports "systematically" with "thousands of" Muslim villages.
42. Carnegie Report, 72, 281; *Tanin*, lines 50–58.
43. Carnegie Report, 288.
44. *Tanin*, lines 59–64 (emphasis added).

45. Ibid., lines 71–76.
46. Carnegie Report, 72.
47. *Tanin*, lines 78–81.
48. Ibid., lines 82–89.
49. Ibid., lines 96–97.
50. Carnegie Report, 282.
51. *Tanin*, lines 90–95. Interestingly this is one of only a few quotations actually contained in quotation marks. Even though a great deal of the Ottoman text is directly lifted from the pages of the Carnegie Report, the author very rarely lets the audience know that he is actually quoting.
52. Carnegie Report, 283–84.
53. *Tanin*, lines 98–110.
54. Carnegie Report, 73; *Tanin*, lines 125–29.
55. Carnegie Report, 131.
56. For example, early in the Carnegie Report the commissioners write that they cannot trust round numbers from peasants, because these are normally invented. Yet in the section this story comes from the commission freely quotes round numbers of deaths.
57. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, 283.
58. Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913*, 183–84.
59. Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 167–68.
60. Gürbüz Bahadır, *Balkanlar ve Türkler*, 76; he cites McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 144.
61. Gündüz Aktan, “Ermeni Sorununun Hukuksal Boyutu.”
62. “Enstitü’nün temel amacı Ermeni sorununun tarihsel, psikolojik, hukuki ve uluslararası boyutlarını göz önünde bulundurarak geniş bir perspektiften incelenmesidir” (The basic goal of the Institute is to examine the historical Armenian question with a general perspective by taking into account psychological, legal, and international dimensions). <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=tr&Page=Sayfa&No=1> (accessed June 25, 2009).
63. [http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankasi/tr/index2\\_1\\_1.htm](http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankasi/tr/index2_1_1.htm) (accessed June 26, 2009). The article cites pages 148–58 of the Carnegie Report, about refugees and assimilation of nationalities.
64. “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda İngiliz Propagandası ve Bryce Raporu.”
65. Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 202.
66. Feyzullah Altunkaynak, “Balkanlarda sukunet mümkün mü?”



## Whose Is the House of Greatest Disorder?

Civilization and Savagery on  
the Early Twentieth-Century Eastern European  
and North American Frontiers

*Jonathan Schmitt*

In his preface to the 1914 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's inquiry into the "causes and conduct" of the Balkan Wars, Paul Henri, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, engaged in what amounts to an apologia for the Peace Commission's very existence. He anticipated not only that the report would spur his "realist" detractors to charge that both moral and material benefits derived from the practice of war (hence the commission's objection to war on principle amounted to a kind of callow pacifism) but also that some might submit that the Great Powers that the commission represented—the United States, France, England, Germany, Austria, and Russia—should take a more reflexive gaze, noting their own policy failures and defeats, before training a critical eye on the "Eastern Question."<sup>1</sup> It is certainly curious that a privately funded organization's plea for the cessation of international armed conflict would require a prefatory defense, and the manner in which de Constant proceeds to particularize the international/colonialist embroilments of the commission's member states merits even further scrutiny:

What are you going to do in the Balkans, you French, you Americans, you English, you Russians, you Germans? Have you not enough to do with Morocco to look after, with Mexico, with South Africa, India, Persia? Yes, we have plenty to do at home, but let us give up all exterior action if we pretend to wait until

everything in our own house or conduct is reformed, before we can attempt to help others. I do not consider the French state more perfect than any other human organization, but nevertheless my own imperfection need not prevent me from doing my utmost to be useful.<sup>2</sup>

While this apostrophe may at first glance seem a merely formal concession, I believe that the anxiety it concealed was in fact instrumental, a kind of cardinal point of orientation for the entirety of the commission's assessment of the Balkan Wars. I concede at the outset that "anxiety" as an analytical category may present unusual difficulties—namely, the excavation of the trace of a psychological/emotional state most strictly applied to individual subjects in the rhetoric of a paradiplomatic body like the Carnegie Commission. But I nevertheless believe that discourse emanating from the "West" in the early twentieth century concerning the "Eastern Question" (to which the Peace Commission contributes) is beleaguered by an uncertain, ambivalent, and always potentially destabilizing relationship with the Balkan subject, the Balkan "other." The question, then, is what exactly constituted Western European conceptions of their Balkan neighbors and what attributes and potentialities (reducible in virtually every instance to *similarities and differences* relative to the "West") the Balkan peoples were invested with in the mind of the Great Powers.

To problematize an already scabrous inquiry, it will also be necessary in what follows to consider the implications attendant to the fact that, in the instance of the Carnegie Commission inquiry, the "powers" added the United States to their privileged cadre. To be sure, the commission was assembled and financed by private U.S. capital, a sufficient enough explanation for America's signatory status. While I accept this, the inclusion of the United States also could be construed as almost "honorary." In this regard I believe the addition of the United States to the Great Powers in the commission's assessment of the "causes and conduct" of the Balkan Wars amounted to a great deal more than the simple crediting of a benefactor. Not only did certain U.S. circles have a very real—and at times pointed—interest in the Balkan powder keg, but in the early twentieth century European powers turned an eye toward the United States and its recently pacified domestic "frontier." Many Europeans grudgingly looked at what transpired in the Americas in an effort to develop the conceptual apparatus by which they would construct their discursive relationship with their liminally western Balkan "other."<sup>3</sup>

This chapter offers some provisional evidence in support of Lene Hansen's claim of Western civilization's anxiety in the face of its Balkan other. More specifically it attempts to show how that anxiety was constituted in a context that had begun to admit—and, I argue, appeal to—the adolescent geopolitical identity of the United States. For the moment, however, forgoing precision, I would like to propose that the anxiety that perforated the Peace Commission's engagement with the atrocities and occasions of "inhumanity" that left a grisly stain on the early histories of fledgling Balkan "nations" was in fact a measure of uncertainty felt by the members of the commission—a nagging self-doubt—concerning the value and potential of Western "civilization" itself.

### AMERICAN VOICES AND THE "EASTERN QUESTION"

We can ascertain a great deal about the anxiety that I have proposed from de Constant's justification of the commission's moral authority on the theoretically coextensive topic of "civilization" and "peace." A closer look at the verbiage that he employed discloses a few peculiar discursive assumptions, not only about the nature of the Balkan peoples but also about the Great Powers themselves. In his brief prolepsis (quoted above) concerning the "disorder of the Great Powers' houses," de Constant is clearly referring to European colonial efforts and their varying degrees of success and failure by the early twentieth century. America, however, is mentioned in passing as beset by a disorder, it seems, of another magnitude altogether.

De Constant chose to cite the United States' tense relationship with the sovereign nation of Mexico as potentially compromising to its reputation. It is certainly the case that American business interests (particularly rail and oil) instigated U.S. intervention in the Mexican Revolution—America deployed military forces in Veracruz in 1914, the same year the Carnegie Report was published. But this particular international entanglement could not properly be termed "colonial."<sup>4</sup> In point of fact Mexico represented an overlap in Europe and America's international economic (that is to say, imperial) designs. European nations (particularly Great Britain, but to a lesser extent France and Germany) were making an effort to profit from infrastructural development in Mexico at the time of the revolution and hence were in direct competition with U.S. business interests.<sup>5</sup> De Constant's association of the United States with the political turmoil in Mexico may in some part have been influenced by England's demur at the upstart American empire's attempt to

turn the revolution to its advantage. Notwithstanding this conjecture, for de Constant to dig beneath the surface of U.S.-Mexican relations and subtextually impute a less than honorable explanation to American involvement in the Mexican Revolution—which did not have only the just treatment of the Mexican population at heart—would seem outside the purview of the commission's goals. Or would it?

The implication in de Constant's preface seems clear enough: anticipated criticisms of the European powers hinge on the mismanagement of empire. Taking this into consideration, we must ask why de Constant chose to mention the United States' border skirmish with Mexico rather than its recent and more overtly colonial efforts in the Philippines and Caribbean—or, for that matter, its annexation of the Hawaiian islands in 1898.

Moreover, why did the report's introduction completely elide a comparison in the U.S. imperial/colonial project that hindsight perceives as most salient: the subjugation/subjection of its native populations? One explanation is that U.S. intervention in Mexico resembled more the Western European involvement in the Balkan Wars than did the individual signatory states' colonial projects. More than the French in Algeria, the British in India, or Germany in Togoland, the American action in Mexico entailed a "modern," "civilized" nation imposing itself unilaterally—whatever its motives—on the domestic affairs of a purportedly underdeveloped, less modern, but still autonomous foreign state. Although European nations did not involve themselves militarily in the Balkan Wars proper—except that Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908 did demand an occupying gendarmerie—the Balkans had been the site of intense Great Power diplomatic intervention since at least the Treaty of Berlin. The recognition by European powers of the development of a new strain of imperialism in the United States—the emergence of a new "discursive object"<sup>6</sup>—that subordinated outright colonization and unapologetic resource extraction to clandestine economic penetration may have influenced the Great Power representatives' rhetorical treatment of the United States in the Carnegie Inquiry.

In the case of the United States moving troops into Veracruz to support U.S. business interests, the action was intended to "manage" the political fate of a foreign nation, not to occupy it with the goal of abrogating its sovereignty. The same could be said to be the case with Western European intervention in the Balkans. Diplomatic programs like the Mürzsteg Punctuation in 1903 unilaterally endeavored not only to make recommendations to Istanbul on how to administer its Macedonian subjects

but also to appoint European commanders—presumably because natives could not be trusted to do the job—to organize and oversee the local gendarmerie.<sup>7</sup> But these structural similarities alone do not fully explain the new status of the United States in early twentieth-century geopolitical strategy. What is essential to this argument is that America brought to the diplomatic table a self-anointed status as a nation somehow free of “colonial” baggage. Not bearing the mark of empire, not vitiated and exhausted by imperial overextension, the United States served as a model—for the moment, notwithstanding rank European and American sanctimony—for a new, twentieth-century-style empire. It is of no small relevance, as John Skirius points out, that by 1913 French, German, and British interests had all but turned their backs on resource development in Mexico, “concluding that cordial relations with the United States were more important than Mexican oil.”<sup>8</sup>

Certainly, considering the situation on the continent, European powers did not want and could not have afforded to involve themselves in armed conflict across the Atlantic. But beyond the excessive material demands that militated against engaging the United States “on its own soil,” America’s emergence as a new “discursive object,” its construction as an “uncolonial” Western power, began to exercise gaining influence on the political strategy of the Great Powers. I am suggesting that U.S. exceptionalism was entrenched in the thinking not only of America’s citizens and politicians but also of its European allies.<sup>9</sup> The larger point, however, is that the prevailing discursive reality constructing the United States as somehow uncorrupted by a colonial legacy as in the same way the Great Powers of Europe had a profound impact on the ideological assumptions operative in the Carnegie Report. As Michael Adas writes: “the persistent conviction that the [exceptionalist] American experience...could serve as a template for the future of...less developed cultures, not only justified interventionism in the outside world, it often promoted the predisposition to denigrate the worth and viability of non-Western cultures.”<sup>10</sup> Following Adas, the United States’ putatively uncolonial project of Manifest Destiny begins to appear as a constant shadow in the Peace Commission’s rhetoric that barely conceals—that by turns endorses and censures—European and American ambivalence about the projects of modernity, empire, and civilization.

A comparative optic serves best to bring to light these veins of ambivalence in the assumed monolith of Western civilization/modernity (whose unassailable “achievements” underwrote the paternalistic “civilizing mission” of entities like the Carnegie Commission).<sup>11</sup> In particular

the United States' engagement with its native populations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides a useful metric by which to develop a more complete understanding of what the Carnegie Commission intended to achieve by way of its rhetorical intervention in the Balkan Wars. Fully aware of the hazards implicit in considering Euro-America as a static, teleologically realized whole, I proceed here from the assumption that the United States' view of itself as "exceptional" with regard to the colonial enterprise—and its attendant civilizing mission—is stark evidence that it was in fact deeply implicated in the project of empire. It is certainly the case that the commission's European members had varying ideas about their different relationships with empire—whether or not France, England, and the others considered their colonial ambitions/frustrations to be cognate with those of the U.S. government. But it is equally certain that all member states represented in the commission vetted themselves as occupying an Archimedean territory staked out by their civilization/modernity, which conferred upon them the special privilege of adjudicating the "progress" of other (liminally Western or non-Western) states. Take, for example, the commission's thoughts on the "racially" motivated violence that erupted between Greeks and Bulgarians in Macedonia after the first Balkan War:

A traditional enmity has divided them since the dawn of history, and this is aggravated in Macedonia by a certain social cleavage.... In talk and in print one phrase summed up the general feeling of the Greeks toward the Bulgarians, "*Dhen einai anthropia*" (They are not human beings).... When an excitable southern race, which has been schooled in Balkan conceptions of vengeance, begins to reason this way, it is easy to predict the consequences.<sup>12</sup>

While other scholars have noted that the Carnegie Commission maintained a certain distance from invoking ancient, primordial hatreds (premodern and inimical to civilization) to explain the bloodletting in the early twentieth-century Balkans,<sup>13</sup> passages like this speak to how deeply ingrained such functionalist discursive modes were in the thinking of the commission's authors. Although it may be too much to suggest that the commissioners shared the Greek opinion of Bulgarians, their citation of "traditional enmity" among an "excitable southern race" is at the very least conditioned by a condescending paternalism. By attesting to residual primordial conflicts that have continued since the "dawn of history" as the root cause of the "ethnic" strife that (it is implied) was both

the cause and the effect of the belligerence between emerging Balkan nations, the commission implicitly gives its approbation to a European civilization gradient that descends from West to East.<sup>14</sup>

But where does the United States stand in relation to this assumed descent into savagery as one proceeds east across the European continent? Before turning to America's dealings with the Indian "savages" within its own borders, it is necessary to situate the early twentieth-century "American Mind" in relation to the burgeoning global "clash of civilizations."<sup>15</sup> An article published in *Harper's Weekly* in 1897 is instructive in this regard. In a piece that raised questions about the certainty of America's global role in the coming twentieth century, U.S. navy officer A. T. Mahan observed a rising trend in European politics to turn inward "away from the seaboard" and train its focus on domestic affairs. He discerned this Old World tendency toward continental insularity during the European Belle Époque—however misguided and self-serving such a conclusion might be—even more starkly in America: "nowhere is the influence of this school [excessive concern for domestic development] so unchecked and so injurious as in the United States, because, having no near neighbors to compete with us in points of power...and also because, with our great resources only partially developed, the instinct for external activities has remained dormant."<sup>16</sup> According to Mahan, this undue preoccupation with internal national concerns (largely the obsession with the domestic economy) might well lead to a defeat in the great and potentially glorious battle on the historical horizon: the conflict between progressive "Western Civilization" and the just stirring behemoth of a diametrically opposed civilization in the "East":

The history of the present century had been that of a constant pressure of our civilization upon these older [Eastern] ones, till now, as we cast out eyes in any direction, there is everywhere a stirring, a rousing from sleep, drowsy for the most part, but real, unorganized as yet, but conscious that that which rudely interrupts their dream of centuries possesses over them at least two advantages—power and material prosperity—the things which unspiritual humanity, the world over, most craves.... Time and staying power must be secured for ourselves by the rude and imperfect, but not ignoble, arbiter, force...which so far has won, and still secures, the greatest triumphs of good in the checkered history of mankind.<sup>17</sup>

In Mahan's calling Western power to arms, we see an explicit discursive construction that would animate not only Euro-America's self-conception but also its diplomatic and military policy throughout the twentieth century—and to the present day.

At the close of his essay Mahan began to particularize these civilizations lately "rousing from sleep" that he perceives as a growing threat to Euro-America: "Decadent conditions, such as we observe in Turkey... cannot be indefinitely prolonged by opportunist counsels or timid procrastination... a time comes when heroic measures must be used to save the life of a patient or the welfare of a community.... Europe, advancing in distant regions, still allows to exist in her side, unexcised, a sore that may yet drain her life blood." In this instance Mahan clearly is referring to the Great Powers' interest in maintaining the "status quo" with regard to the "Eastern Question." His exhortation to robust national defense—and, if necessary, decisive military engagement in the East—implicitly called the wisdom of the 1878 Berlin Congress into question. According to the *Realpolitik* of this U.S. naval commander, to appease the Ottoman Empire—and other "outposts of barbarism"—is naively to ignore the basic fact that its "hopelessness of political and social improvement the lapse of time renders even more certain."<sup>18</sup>

In an op-ed piece appearing in the *New York Times* sixteen years later Mahan again addressed the American public, this time to inform them that the Second Balkan War—a "civil war," as he called it—was most certainly a result of this same "hopelessness of political and social improvement" that defined Ottoman rule. Quoting English lawyer Sir Edwin Pears—"resident in Constantinople, where he is president of the European bar"—Mahan drove home the point that "wherever Turkish misrule has been removed, the young Christian States have been fairly started on the path to civilization." He then went on to caution American readers, this time in his own words, that issues in the Balkans "are very intricate and involve national interests and racial sympathies, resembling family quarrels, very difficult for an outsider to understand... [n]or should we forget the centuries of bondage, retarding the development of healthy national character."<sup>19</sup>

Mahan's attitude toward the plight of the Balkan states mired in civil conflict was shot through with what I would term soft ethnocentrism, a kind of racially biased thinking that constructs non-Euroamerican peoples—in this case the liminally Western Balkan "type"—as in need of the paternalistic tutelage of a superior civilization. This patronizing



disposition that enabled the presently backward Balkan “client civilization” to be viewed as a discursive object by the American public must be seen in relation to Mahan’s decidedly less generous appraisal of the “Turk.”<sup>20</sup> Mahan’s opinion, as he expounded it in *Harper’s*, was that the Ottoman Empire represented “a sore that may yet drain the life blood” of Western civilization. In this construction the “Turk” stood as the dark inverse of the Euro-America, a figure in diametric opposition to the ethical, political, social, and economic achievements of the “West.” With civilizational polarity thus conceptualized, the Balkans stand on the threshold, in a position of tense liminality, oscillating between the Western light and Eastern gloom. In short, the Balkan states represented for this U.S. military man the very stakes of the geopolitical game, which pits civilization itself against a new barbarian horde.

Curiously, Mahan could have “looked away from the seaboard” and seen the same struggle being played out in his own country. His assessment of global civilization conflict appeared in *Harper’s* a mere seven years after the Wounded Knee Massacre on the Pine Ridge Lakota reservation in South Dakota. As the last open conflict in the United States’ war against its indigenous peoples, Wounded Knee by all estimates closed a chapter in American-Indian relations. From 1890 forward the last of the hostile Indians on the western American frontier were pacified and subjected to reservation life as “wards” of a “foreign” government: the official U.S. attitude toward its native people was one of benevolent paternalism. Mahan’s insistence of “looking outward” for the enemies of civilization entailed a kind of tactical amnesia—an endemic repression of the cognitive dissonance that typified Euro-American engagement with its non-Western counterpart.

Pervasive hypocrisy would be another way to describe this state. Following (loosely) Frederic Jameson’s dictum “never moralize,” however, I instead rely on the roughly analogous psychological category to illuminate the thinking of Western powers vis-à-vis civilizational achievements. The United States, as noted above, engaged in an outright massacre of over three hundred Lakotas at Wounded Knee. Raining down ordnance from newly acquired—and very “modern”—Hotchkiss artillery, the reconstituted Seventh U.S. Cavalry (the same unit that had been routed by the Sioux-Cheyenne alliance fourteen years earlier at the Battle of Little Bighorn) indiscriminately murdered men, women, and children who were not mounting an attack but running for their lives.<sup>21</sup> With such atrocities on the historical record, the unqualified insistence by a military officer on the achievements of the United

States in the realm of civilization should give pause.<sup>22</sup> This, however, is precisely the point. The cultural gradient that elevated Western Europeans over their Eastern neighbors had, by an anfractuons and reputedly “uncolonial” route, established a similar hierarchy across the Atlantic. It subordinated Indians—by dint of the irrefutable facts put forth by the discourse of civilization—to the new Great Power, the United States of America. The very fact that the United States was a signatory to the Peace Commission’s inquiry is evidence of this consolidation of American and Western European hegemonic civilizational politics. The role played by the U.S. representative to the Balkan Inquiry helps to establish more exactly American’s rhetorical position in relation to the liminally Western other—a category that also encompassed the United States’ native “wards.”

As Patrick Adamiak notes (chapter 16 in this volume), the bulk of the commission’s report—notwithstanding de Constant’s preface—was written by the British and Russian representatives, Dr. H. N. Brailsford and Professor Paul Milioukov, respectively. The voice of the American member of the Carnegie Commission, Samuel T. Dutton, was marginal at best. As his biographer Charles Levermore explains, Dutton’s appraisal of the Balkan conflict, which contained his recommendations for its amelioration, was not included in the body of the report but was instead submitted in a memorandum to the chair of the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of Intercourse and Education.<sup>23</sup> This memorandum is rife with the racial calculus that was the hallmark of the Euro-American colonial endeavor. What separated Great Power intervention in the Balkan conflict, however, is that it amended the functionalist typologies that animated Western social science in the early twentieth century—those that Edward Said and the other “subaltern” theorists would later elaborate as the Western construction of its primitive and ultimately inferior non-European “other.”<sup>24</sup> Rather than being mired and unsalvageable in their savage state, “liminally western” Balkan nations were located on a continuum of development *toward* full-fledged civilization. The Balkan peoples, as constructed by the discourse of the Peace Commission, were not confined in binary, insurmountable “primitive” opposition to Euro-America’s self-proclaimed superior civilization; instead the Balkan states—like the United States’ Indian “wards”—were seen as exhibiting a true potential for civilized development. Dutton’s summary of the origins of the Balkan conflict clearly demonstrates this point. He began his unpublished memorandum with the following enumeration of the Balkans’ “difficulty in the way of peace”:

The national hatreds, always fierce, have been reawakened by recent events...the unrestrained and barbarous methods of carrying on war by all Balkan nations, with moral consequences so terrible that they can hardly be appreciated...the general backward state of education, the devitalized and decadent conditions of state religion, the instability of political institutions, and the lack of ethical standards...the absence of those restraints upon war which operate in other parts of Europe, such as interdependence through trade, easy communication and intercourse, as well as knowledge and appreciation of one nation for another.<sup>25</sup>

Again, as with Mahan, Dutton's rhetoric pullulates with the pious cant of Western civility.

Dutton's Balkans, for their very barbarity, were on some level inarticulate. They represented, in the psychoanalytic formulation, "the unconscious of Europe," a place unrestrained, backward, devitalized, and decadent, with a cultural climate founded on the lack of the paternal hand necessary to form, direct, and manage "moral" subjects.<sup>26</sup> Dutton's prescription for the social ills of the Balkans was to deploy disinterested arbiters—objectivity being the exclusive purview of the post-Enlightenment Western mind—to reason with the warring "races" and convince them of the benefits of emulating European civilized behavior. The first order of business, for these arbiters, would be to insist that the Balkan states observe the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, which demanded "religious tolerance" if they were to be recognized as independent nations. At this juncture Dutton conveniently forgot that his own country was presently engaged in codified religious *intolerance*, having legislated the prohibition of some Indian rituals deemed inimical to civilized development—in particular, the Sun Dance, an annual rite practiced by the Western Sioux that incorporated self-mortification and had been integral to the social cohesion of the people.<sup>27</sup>

Dutton then went on to recommend that the Carnegie Endowment Commission should appoint:

[a] wise, tactful, and experienced person...to visit the Balkan States, make the acquaintance of university men, scholars, publicists, and such statesmen that are known to favor justice and fair play. This agent would talk to them, discover the national animus, the sentiments felt toward neighboring nations, and public opinions as to the possibility of bringing about conciliation.... The

agent should be free and unhampered, make friends, and command respect by his personality and impartial attitude.<sup>28</sup>

Here we see that a Western “agent” employed by the commission might potentially further the peace process, if he represented himself as impartial (*rational*) and appealed to the more enlightened judgment of those who presumably had the “benefit” of some Western European education (university men, scholars, publicists) and hence would be capable of logic and reason in ways that the general Balkan populace decidedly was not. Dutton’s suggestion here, taken in concert with his earlier characterization of the Balkan people as inherently violent and given to conflict and disorder (the “moral consequences of which can hardly be appreciated”), was consonant with Mahan’s appraisal of the situation and also in keeping with the text of the Carnegie Inquiry that was published. Again the Balkan people were represented as capable but untutored—as a result of either Ottoman tyranny or deep-seated ethnic enmity—in the ways of civilization. The Balkan states, over and over in the discourse of Western diplomacy, were portrayed much like children—errant, brutal, and ignorant for want of proper instruction. This “discursive object,” the Balkan people as children, dictated the conceptual parameters by which Great Power diplomacy wrestled with the “Eastern Question.” This discourse on the Balkans in the early twentieth century bore a striking resemblance to the construction of another savage “discursive object”: the American Indian, with whom the United States wrestled within its borders.

#### ALMOST BUT NOT QUITE THE SAME

One of the last recommendations that Samuel Dutton made in his memorandum on the Balkan conflict was that at some point in the future it might be advisable to convene a diplomatic meeting (consisting of Balkan notables and “a few” American and European representatives) in an effort to promote continued stability and peace in the region. Dutton went on to say that “the conference, if successful, would naturally grow into something larger and might be as influential in that part of the world as the Mohonk conference has become in the Americas.”<sup>29</sup> It is of interest that Dutton invoked the Mohonk Conference as a model on which to base the suggested Balkan conference. The Lake Mohonk Conference was an annual meeting in upstate New York of European and American “humanitarians” and philanthropists whose project was eventually

the promotion of international peace; the conference originally convened in 1883, however, with the sole purpose of discussing the “Indian question.”<sup>30</sup>

A cursory pass through the published proceedings of the Lake Mohonk Conferences in 1912 and 1916—dates that effectively bracket the Balkan Wars—reveals the enthusiasm with which the assembled “humanitarians” attacked their cause. The majority of the discussion revolved around the improvement of health services and education on reservations in the United States. Never for a moment did the paternalistic discourse of social improvement for Indians slip its mask to reveal any doubts about the possibility of Native Americans’ attaining full participation in American civilization. This being the case, I do not wish to disparage the conference’s mission in total. But a close reading of sections of the proceedings demonstrates that, for all the goodwill of those convened at Mohonk, racist assumptions and a hierarchical conception of human societies are the central and operative—if tacit—constituents of their humanitarianism. The “Platform” statement of the 1916 conference articulates a general framework for the betterment of native peoples as follows: “The general object of [our] policy should be to bring the present *abnormal* condition of Indians to an end as speedily as possible, by the incorporation of the Indian in the general citizenship of the United States [emphasis added].” Leaving aside for the moment precisely what the conference might take to be the “abnormal” condition of Indians, the platform’s next statement throws into stark relief racist assumptions that even the most dedicated humanitarians could not expunge from their thought (the “discursive object” in the instant holding the place of the “return of the repressed”):

We deprecate as unwise and dangerous legislation which will remove all authority respecting our Western Indians from the control and supervision of the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.... The policy of all Indian administration should include at the earliest possible date the segregation and individualization of Indian tribal property, in order that *competent* Indians may have available immediately all the resources to which they are entitled and that they may be completely severed from the guardianship of the Government [emphasis added].<sup>31</sup>

The issue of “competency” was a hallmark of Indian issues in early twentieth-century America. Whether or not individual Indians were

competent dictated to what extent they would participate as U.S. citizens. Competency accrued to two important factors, one quasi social-scientific and the other economic. First, the amount of Indian versus white blood was thought to be an indicator of an individual Indian's ability to assume the role of a full-fledged American citizen. Second, emanating from the first factor, this determinate of "blood quotient" was seen to be directly translatable into the capacity to comprehend and discharge the private ownership of property.<sup>32</sup> With this in mind, the next paragraph of the Mohonk Platform exhibits a very different inflection: "We urge that immediate steps be taken by the enactment of new legislation or otherwise, further to protect all incompetent Indians, *especially full bloods*, in order that their property rights may be conserved and their resources expended under proper supervision [emphasis added]." <sup>33</sup>

The direct reliance on racial markers to determine Indian "competency" is strikingly similar to assumptions in the discourse mobilized by the Carnegie Commission to portray/explain the civil unrest over the course of the Balkan Wars. Recall that, according to the commission, that Greeks loathed Bulgarians not because of historically contingent circumstances—orchestrated by the Great Powers—that had pitched the entire Balkan sociopolitical landscape into chaos but because their "races" had been in mortal conflict from time immemorial. This sort of ancient enmity could be assuaged, however, by the right kind of "civilized" intervention. The rhetoric of Indian advocates in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century United States proceeded along the same lines.

Herbert Welsh, civilian political activist and founder of the Indian Rights Organization (1882), had the following to say concerning the more recalcitrant "primitive" faction of Sioux (Western Plains Indians) that resisted burgeoning U.S. assimilationist policy:

There are two great and sharply defined parties among the Sioux Indians today.... First. [*sic*] There is the old pagan and non-progressive party. Inspired by sentiments of hostility to the Government and to white civilization. It delights in the past, and its dream is that the past shall come back again—the illimitable prairie, the vast herds of vanished buffalo...the still fiercer thrill of bloody struggle with other savage men.<sup>34</sup>

The role of "civilized men" in this context—the robust and enlightened white men of the American Republic—was to bring to the surface the latent potential for progressive, modern social congress that had, for

lack of a proper role model, lain fallow in the Indian “since the dawn of history.” Welsh’s language here (and it is important to remember that he believed himself to be a champion of the Indian cause) hewed very closely to that of the Carnegie Commission. In the face of the a priori beneficence of U.S. civilization—not to mention its inexorable charity—the Sioux were burdened with the challenge of maturity, of passing from the adolescent stage of “noble savagery” to the adulthood of “civilized man.” Welsh did not believe (nor did U.S. policy makers) that Native Americans were incapable of this maturity, just that certain historical forces had blocked their development. This was an attitude of paternalism par excellence, and it mirrored almost exactly the approach taken by the Peace Commission in its assessment of the Balkans. As Lene Hansen states, “the report is a textbook example of the optimistic Enlightenment construction of civilization politics where civilization was seen as a state of moral, economic and political culture accessible to non-civilized peoples, in this case the Balkans.”<sup>35</sup> The commission saw its duty much the same way as Indian activists in the United States saw theirs. Welsh continues his appraisal of the Sioux “problem” in the late nineteenth century, speaking of the measurable success that the civilizing mission had already accomplished among the natives, creating a faction within the “tribes” that he characterizes as “[a] new, progressive, and what may properly termed Christian party, whose life was begotten, nourished, and trained by the missionary enterprise and devotion...[this party displays] an awakened moral purpose, newborn, or well-developed, the stirring of an enlightened conscience, and of a long-dormant intellect.”<sup>36</sup>

Hansen, quoting de Constant, directs us to this same “missionary enterprise” (though without the overt conflation of civilization and Christianity) at work for those who would shepherd the new Balkan states into the light: “These unhappy Balkan States have been up to the present, the victims of European division much more than of their own faults.... Europe has chosen to make them ruined belligerents, rather than *young clients of civilization*, but it is not yet too late to repair this long error [emphasis in the original].”<sup>37</sup>

Implicit in both passages is what could rightly be termed a “developmental paradigm.” For the Sioux, their maturity was “begotten, nourished, and trained” by U.S. paternalism—by the patient diligence, as it were, of an attentive parent. In de Constant’s eyes the Balkan states have been the victims of Western Europe’s delinquent guardianship; yet these presently nascent and, by no fault of their own, chaotic Balkan nations still had the potential to mature to the level of their birthright: civilized

European statehood. As “young client states,” the Balkans must still shake off the backward and at times barbaric “Turkish” influence. It was “modern” Europe’s failing that it did not intervene sooner in an effort to eradicate that influence. While the Carnegie Commission did not explicitly claim that the “primitive” nature of Ottoman social and political structures repressed the Balkans’ potential for civilized modernity, that correlation is stated in no uncertain terms in Western scholarship.

In a 1913 edition of the *American Political Science Review* N. Dwight Harris had the following to say about the Ottoman Empire and its failings in Macedonia:

The majority [of the Ottoman sultans] very largely nullified their own efforts [to rule the Balkans effectively]...by an inexhaustible avarice for power and pleasure, coupled with a natural indolence and a disposition to employ corrupt methods both in private and public life...it was not until the nineteenth century, when Russia, France and Great Britain assumed the duty of protecting the Christians under Ottoman Rule, that a partial success was achieved.<sup>38</sup>

Echoing this view, in a 1917 edition of the *Journal of Race Development*, Constantin A. Chekrezi finds a convenient explanation for the Balkan crisis along the same lines: “playing the role of the arrogant and merciless conqueror...the Balkan States had drawn from the methods of the Young Turks whom they had zealously supplanted...they even surpassed the Turks in determination and criminal efficiency.”<sup>39</sup>

As a sort of capstone to this discursive structure, a scholar writing for the *Slavic Review* in 1962 neatly sums up the whole matter, proclaiming that “the social and psychological effects of Ottoman rule are apparent in both the [Balkans’] Muslim and Christian communities: technical and intellectual conservatism, attachment of low social value to work, suspicion of government, economic wastefulness and inefficiency. The Ottoman feudalism stifled the creative potential of the people.”<sup>40</sup> This particular piece circulated in a scholarly journal almost fifty years after the Treaty of Bucharest—a span of time in which European society had twice pitched itself into the decidedly uncivilized chaos of world war. We can read this in one of two ways: as blind and intractable chauvinism or as a mechanism of repression, a strategy by which the West’s anxiety about its own capacity for “civilization” could be assuaged by comparison to a non-Western polity that it construes as “barbaric” a priori.



At this juncture Said's *Orientalism* seems like an almost automatic theoretical invocation. Whether through the accumulation of social-scientific "colonialist knowledge" or by way of the fabrication of the larger, more fantastic taxonomy of the uncivilized "exotic," which by turns attracts and repels the Western gaze, the West's construction of its Oriental other makes for a very tidy binary by which to interpret hundreds of years of Western exploitation and intervention in the East. But, as Robert Young has pointed out (particularly in his discussion of Homi Bhabha's "reorientation" of Said's Occident/Orient binary), a disturbing fissure runs through the monolith of Western self-conception.<sup>41</sup> Young points out, glossing Bhabha, that a kind of "disarticulation" of the discourse of Orientalism occurs when the Western subject actually encounters the "others" (or, as in the case of this chapter, their liminally Western counterparts). Although Western observers believe themselves to be certain about this "other," which Western Enlightenment discourse purports to have penetrated and classified, it will always, in the context of reality "on the ground," be fugitive, will always escape the taxonomical confines constructed to contain it.<sup>42</sup> The point I am making in this chapter, however, is that this crisis of classification/knowning that Subaltern Theory has illuminated in colonialist discourse does not go far enough. The ambivalence at the heart of the West's putative hegemony is not merely of an intellectual or abstractly taxonomical stripe. This ambivalence in fact throws the West's very conception of itself into disorder. This is all the more striking when Western intellectuals and policy makers engage peoples who are culturally and/or geographically proximal. The Balkans have a very credible claim—both culturally and geographically—to a measure of European heritage; the native inhabitants of North America live within the very borders of a territory that white European colonizers believed themselves absolutely guaranteed to occupy—either by religious promulgations like the doctrine of discovery or by vague conceptions of divine right and historically determined "Manifest Destiny."<sup>43</sup> In both cases a slippage between the identity of "self" and "other" disrupts the "Western Gaze."

To focus this assertion it is useful to compare the Carnegie Commission's Inquiry and the general tenor of early to mid-twentieth-century Western scholarship on the Balkans to correspondence between U.S. government reservation field agents and the Federal Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A disgruntled field agent on the Pine Ridge Sioux reservation wrote to his superiors in Washington in 1896:

A serious drawback in the work of civilizing these or any Indians...is found in the universal custom of relatives and connections by marriage considering that what one has belongs to all. As such relations are usually very numerous and for the most part idle and improvident, no one family can accumulate anything.... This not only discourages any attempt to be industrious and to accumulate property...but it puts a premium on idleness and unthrift, for he who idles save his muscle, but fares as well as does he who works.<sup>44</sup>

Here we see a criticism (or, rather, a level of frustration) with a non-Euroamerican culture's social customs that bears remarkable similarity to charges leveled against residual Ottomanism in the Balkans. As Wayne Vucinich maintained in the 1962 *Slavic Review*, Balkan peoples "put a low social value on work and were suspicious of the government." Clearly Vucinich considers Western values to be antithetical to idleness and contempt for the state. But the failings of the Balkan peoples in living up to the expectations of their Western European patrons (the Carnegie Commission refers to the Balkan nations as "young client states") were no fault of their own. Blame could either be placed on the Turks for their despotism and refusal to allow the Balkan culture to "mature" or on the Europeans themselves for not having intervened soon enough on behalf of their "almost Western" kin. This conception of "almost but not quite," again a construct of subaltern theorist Homi Bhabha, becomes crucial in understanding Western Europe's relationship with the Balkans (and in the relationship of "white" Americans with Indians, as discussed below). In his article on what he terms the "borrowed colonialism" of the Ottoman Empire, Selim Deringil asks if "the reason the Ottoman phenomenon is ignored by both Subalterns and their opponents is because it is precisely 'almost the same but not quite'? And to go even further, may we venture that the 'not quite' bit is the fact that it was a Muslim power?"<sup>45</sup> Can it also be suggested that an intercurrent of foundational identification problematized white America's construction of its native populations as savage wards?

According to scholar Philip Deloria, white America's relationship with the idea of "Indianness" has been fraught with contradictions from its inception:

[For white Americans] Indians represented instinct and freedom. They spoke for the "spirit of the continent." Whites desperately desired that spirit, yet they invariably failed to become aboriginal,

and thus “finished.” Savage Indians served Americans as oppositional figures against whom one might imagine a civilized national self. Coded as freedom, however, wild Indianness proved equally attractive, setting up a “have-the-cake-and-eat-it-too” dialectic of simultaneous desire and repulsion.<sup>46</sup>

This dialectic of “desire and repulsion” fell into the background as the United States expanded westward. Indians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became more overtly constructed as an impediment to U.S. civilization and progress. But, as with early twentieth-century Western appraisals of the Balkans, this “backwardness” was no fault of their own.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, as the Indian Wars on the Western frontier were drawing to a close, Congress took up the question of what to do with the government’s native wards in earnest. In 1887 (three years before the Wounded Knee Massacre) Senator Henry L. Dawes, the chair of the Committee on Indian Affairs, sponsored a bill that would restructure land ownership on Indian reservations. The move from communal ownership of land by Indian tribes to the allotment of private land titles for Indian individuals was seen by Congress as an essential step in assimilating Native Americans into white society. As Francis Paul Prucha maintains, “No panacea for the Indian problem was more persistently proposed than allotment of land to the Indians in severalty. It was an article of faith with the reformers that civilization was impossible without the incentive to work that came only from individual ownership of a piece of property.”<sup>47</sup>

The allotment legislation, which came to be known as the Dawes Act, would issue to heads of Indian families parcels of land (in most cases 160 acres) that would be held in trust by the United States for a period of twenty-five years. The trust period—which proscribed the hasty leasing or sale of the acreage—was intended not only to protect these new Indian homesteaders from white citizens who might try to capitalize on native inexperience with private ownership and purchase land at an unfair price but also to ensure that the Indians would have sufficient time to acclimate themselves to the “civilizing” effects of private property. The Dawes Act, however, like the bulk of Indian policy enacted by the U.S. government, was rife with contradictions. First, the moment individual Indians were granted a patent on a parcel of land, their families automatically became U.S. citizens; but this citizenship came with one glaring caveat: the full protection of a citizen subject’s private property

guaranteed by the Constitution was curbed by a policy of U.S. government paternalism: for the “Indians’ own good,” they could not dispose of the land, even if they saw fit to do so. Beyond this, in keeping with the doctrine of discovery, Indian tribes were still considered dependent sovereign nations. This being so, was the citizenship conferred on Native Americans by land ownership to be conceived of as dual? Were the Indians who lived on Pine Ridge, for example, equally vested with the privileges provided by membership in the Sioux nation *and* with the rights protected under U.S. citizenship? As it turned out, questions like these proved largely uncontainable. As Prucha notes: “The final provisions on citizenship in the Dawes act were a compromise: Every Indian to whom an allotment was made and every Indian who separated himself from his tribe and adopted the ways of civilized life was declared to be a citizen of the United States.”<sup>48</sup>

But Dawes himself was not happy with this final draft of the allotment bill. As far as he was concerned, renunciation of tribal affiliation did not go far enough to prove that an Indian was ready for the responsibilities of U.S. citizenship. According to Dawes, only a duration of custodianship under the benevolent eyes of the government—during which the Indians would learn that private property was indispensable to “civilization”—would prepare Native Americans to be fully dressed members of the U.S. polity. Members of Congress who championed “immediate citizenship for all Indians were disappointed because tribal Indians on reservations were still excluded.”<sup>49</sup> These tribal Indians would prove to be a most intractable reality for U.S. policy makers. Regardless of what Indian policy stipulated about the ways in which Native Americans should behave, many Indians had no interest in becoming yeoman farmers. The promise of American citizenship did not turn out to be as tantalizing as the government had hoped. Traditional Indian culture was much more difficult to dislodge than Congress had surmised.

#### BOSNIA, MÜRZSTEG, AND BUFFALO BILL

A parallel to the reservation system’s civilizing mission in the United States can be found in Austro-Hungary’s “colonization” of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, a topic taken up with greater detail by both Tamara Scheer (chapter 6) and Amir Duranović (chapter 13) in this volume. Prior to the unilateral annexation of Bosnia by the Habsburgs in 1908, the project of cultural reorientation of the territory had begun in earnest. As article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin states, “in order to assure the

maintenance of the new political state of affairs, as well as freedom and security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the right of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial roads in the whole of this part of the ancient vilayet of Bosnia.”<sup>50</sup> Austro-Hungary’s occupation of Bosnia was regarded from its inception as an effort to rescue the territory’s population from the despotic and borderline savage influence of the Ottoman Empire. The language of the treaty bears this out insofar as explicit provisions are made for “the freedom and security of communications” and “having military and commercial roads.” Much as in the case of the reservation system in the United States, initial military control was merely the necessary foundation for commercial/market penetration. As Robert J. Donia maintains:

Austro-Hungarian administrators frequently voiced the hope that Bosnia-Herzegovina would become a contemporary European society. Their policies, however, aimed only to append the outward manifestations of modernity to a traditional society. *They saw themselves as missionaries of a cultural revival that would end the backwardness and particularism that they believed bedeviled Bosnia’s peoples* [emphasis added].<sup>51</sup>

The overlap of the colonial projects in Bosnia and North America is certainly evident in the Habsburgs’ self-conception as cultural missionaries; but the notion of this missionary project as a type of “revival” complicates the issue. In the case of U.S. paternalism toward its native wards, the civilizing mission was avowedly didactic—Indians who had never had enjoyed the benefits of civilization could be remade as citizens under the tutelage of the U.S. government (of course, as discussed above, this citizenship came with certain caveats). Austro-Hungary’s colonial project, in contrast, sought to reawaken cultural potential in Bosnia that had languished under Ottoman rule. But whether the project intended to create citizen/subjects *ex nihilo* or to resuscitate a cultural potential long dormant, the colonized populations in both Bosnia and North America were constructed as in desperate need (unbeknownst to themselves) of instruction on the ways of civilized life. Both the people of Bosnia and the Indians in the United States, according to the powers that ruled them, were like children who required a “proper” parent. As Donia claims: “[the Habsburgs] stood *in loco parentis* and believed that the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina could be best understood, motivated and disciplined as children.”<sup>52</sup>

Beyond the overt paternalism, another similarity between Bosnia and North America invites comparison—the phenomenon of domestic imperialism. Donia suggests that Bosnia existed after 1878 as Austro-Hungary’s “proximate colony.” Bosnia’s colonial experience, he maintains, was “more acute, and the antagonism between the colonizer and the colony more intense because of the proximity and interconnectedness of the two polities.”<sup>53</sup> It is beyond the scope of this chapter to conjecture what the precise disposition of Habsburg occupiers toward their Bosnian subject was. But Austro-Hungary attempted to impose a narrative of historical continuity between itself and the people of Bosnia, which suggests that at the very least the Habsburgs believed themselves to have some kind of autochthonous right—at least insofar as Bosnia had the germ of European Christendom—to the territory that they would eventually unilaterally annex.

The same thinking, the construction of the same “discursive object,” animated Austria and Russia as they implemented the 1903 Müritzsteg Punctuation. Responding to the increased level of violence directed against Ottoman presence in Macedonia—and the attendant “collateral” brutality between those in the region who identified as Vlach, Greek, or Bulgarian—Austria and Russia demanded drastic administrative changes from Istanbul.<sup>54</sup> In addition to stipulating that the command of the local gendarmerie be handed over to generals of “foreign nationality” (read: European), the Müritzsteg Punctuation also insisted that the Macedonian population be divided along “ethno-national” lines. Provision 3 of the Punctuation read as follows: “As soon as the appeasement of the country will be noted, the Ottoman Government will be asked for a modification in the administrative division of the territory in view of a more regular grouping of different nationalities.”<sup>55</sup>

A reliance on the logic of primordial affiliation that underwrote the Austro-Russian stipulation that different nationalities be separated from one another in order to quell violence may actually have intensified the violence. The heightening of tensions after demographic reorganization was a peculiar and devastating feature of Western European intervention in the Balkans. The logic of this intervention was circuitous: an ethnic unit based on social-scientific taxonomies was created ad hoc for administrative purposes; its design was then justified by an appeal to a static, primordial ontology. Interestingly, this mirrored certain structural assumptions about Indian tribal affiliation and leadership made by the U.S. government. As Thomas Biolsi makes clear in the case of the Western Sioux, leadership roles were diffused across fluid groupings of Lakota

bands that dispersed and converged depending on season, on the need to pull resources for hunting or war, or on their calendar of ritual observance. In the mid-nineteenth century, as the United States expanded westward, the imperative to manage tribal populations effectively led to treaties in which a handful of Sioux notables were designated by the United States government to speak for the entire nomadic polity.<sup>56</sup> This imposed political organization did not reflect the reality of Sioux life “on the ground” any more than the Mürzsteg Punctuation accurately assessed the demographic realities in Macedonia. And in both cases the imposition of ontological preconceptions about a given “people” onto their social and political structures had disastrous consequences.<sup>57</sup>

It is interesting that this notion of primordial affiliation or autochthonous right—while applied to the detriment of the Western Sioux—was also operative in U.S. citizens’ *self-conception* as they settled/colonized North America. Its justification, however, hinged not on social-scientific taxonomies but on a strange, and secularly indefensible, belief that the birth and development of the American polity was guaranteed by a kind of “cosmic teleology.” Michael Adas develops this thinking further:

In this view, the emergence of the United States as a global power represents the working out in the mundane realm of a larger, divinely inspired plan. This sentiment can be found in American readings of their history from the Puritans’ conviction that the epidemics that ravaged the Indian population of New England were God’s way of preparing the New World for their settlement to [contemporary American apologists who] believed the “hand of providence” responsible for the strong leaders who have emerged in times of crisis in U.S. history.<sup>58</sup>

American exceptionalism, then, is a discourse that absorbs its “other” in that U.S. nationhood will not—by force of teleological historical law or by the always already accomplished will of God—countenance any resistance. Leaving aside for the moment the potentially unnerving similarity that this kind of thinking bears to vulgar Marxist thought, I wish to return to a claim made at the outset of this chapter. Western policy makers and intellectuals (specifically those who were responsible for the Carnegie Commission Inquiry) faced a certain anxiety about the success of Western civilization itself in their assessment of the Balkan Wars. This anxiety was in part conditioned by a feeling of ambivalence toward the

seemingly incontestable dominion that America enjoyed over its colonized subjects.

As Philip Deloria notes, the white American relationship with Indian peoples has always been paradoxical: "Indians signified social harmony—one thinks of the stereotype of the peaceful native village, people interacting in seamlessly pleasant and ordered ways. These were the well-worn antimodern ideas.... But Indianness also carried a full complement of countermeanings. Dating back to the revolution, these meanings were linked to the very different idea of radical individual freedom."<sup>59</sup>

The idea of individual freedom, however, was drastically curtailed when it came to Indians as citizens. Native American rights were abridged—when not being annulled in total—by the unilateral action of the U.S. Congress on several occasions.<sup>60</sup> The instability of Indian rights vis-à-vis the U.S. state and its recognized citizens speaks again to the dialectic of attraction and repulsion that constituted Native America as a discursive object in the early twentieth-century United States. The ramifications of this ambivalent relationship with Indians extended not only to culturally embedded prejudices and condescension but also to certain legal codification regarding the citizenship status of Native Americans. The image of "Noble Savages" with their "radical freedom," while seemingly a positive characterization, was in fact a backhanded rhetorical indictment. "Nobility" was readily subordinated to "savagery" in U.S. efforts to manage Indian populations; and the attraction of "radical freedom" diminished in inverse relation to U.S. endeavors to establish territorial sovereignty and codify a national "rule of law." As Pricilla Ward avers, the debate that surrounded the territorial sovereignty of Indian nations vis-à-vis the interpenetrated suprasovereignty state and federal U.S. governments was one that disclosed deep anxieties about American unity and subjectivity. In her discussion of the Indians' "liminal" status as "legally representable" U.S. subjects, Ward maintains that "indigenous peoples...profoundly troubled the [U.S.] conception of natural law—particularly the rights to own and inherit property, including the property of self." The tension between state and federal legal status in late nineteenth-century America—the constant slippage of one legal subjectivity into another—was recapitulated in the rhetoric of U.S. state and federal courts as they attempted to define the citizenship status (and hence legal recourse) of Native Americans. The legal "unrepresentability" of native peoples in the United States actually marked "the return of the cultural repressed, what is entailed in (and covered up by) the making



of Americans.”<sup>61</sup> The uncertainty surrounding the status of Indians as legally constituted U.S. “subjects” in the late nineteenth century did not, however, trouble entrepreneurs who wished to capitalize on their value as marketable “objects”—objects, it turns out, that were in high demand among the European public.

In 1887, the year the Dawes Act was passed into law, Europe was abuzz with excitement over the “social harmony” and “radical individual freedom” that American Indianness somehow managed to synthesize. In the same year when real Indians in the United States were being forced by the hand of Congress to settle down and learn the civilizing value of private property, Buffalo Bill Cody’s Wild West Show debuted in London. “‘The representative frontiersman of his day’ and his ‘exposition’ of real Indian warriors [and] genuine Anglo cowboys...became perhaps the most sought-after party guest of the United Kingdom’s upper classes.... Queen Victoria [even] ordered a command performance for her private viewing at Windsor Castle.”<sup>62</sup>

Despite the general excitement spurred by a “genuine American frontiersman” in Europe, a deeper and more complex set of cultural and racial anxieties helps to explain the Continent’s fascination with Buffalo Bill and his Indian warriors. As historian Louis S. Warren explains: “In the 1890s, complex European ideas connected race, culture, and national borders. Nations were thought to be roughly contiguous with patterns of racial settlement, and their frontiers were profoundly racial boundaries. In this connection, the Wild West show served as a kind of allegory for European politics. Articles about ‘frontier tensions’ between, for example, Germany and France, appeared alongside reviews of the show.”<sup>63</sup> Bill Cody represented for Western European nations a robust, self-assured, and judiciously violent frontier manhood—Cody had tamed the savages in his land to the extent that he was able to hire them in effect to *perform as themselves* in his spectacle. Cody’s Wild West show catered to virtually every aspect of the Euro-American public’s mythologized conception of the American West. It would be hard to invent a more successful paternalism. Cody encouraged the Indians he brought with him to Europe to maintain the trappings of their “savagery,” to “play Indian” for the European public in a way that indicated a certain valorization of their traditional ways—the demand for such representations was valorization enough—while simultaneously rendering the Indians themselves docile and harmless. What Cody achieved was precisely the goal at which the Dawes Act had aimed: Indians remade by commodity (or, in Cody’s case, *as* commodity). By putting Native Americans’ very “Indianness” on display, the Wild West show penetrated and reformed the nature of their

identity, making “real live Indians” products on the market. And European audiences paid for these Indian commodities in a frenzy.

But at the root of Europe’s consumption of “Indianness” was more than just the appeal of exoticism—anxiety over the “Eastern Question” also fueled the purchase. As Warren writes:

[The Balkans] had many similarities to Cody’s version of the American West. Its racially segmented, mutually hostile [populations] were analogous to Cody’s Indians, Mexicans and white cowboys. Like peoples of the American West, they ranged between primitivism and civilization, struggling to carve life from the wilderness amid continuous race war. Ultimately, the eastern frontier could almost *be* the American West.<sup>64</sup>

In this conception Europe’s eastern frontier (the newly emerging Balkan states) mimics the American West as a kind of structurally enantiomorphic political and cultural crisis—but the glass is much darker on the European side. While Cody represents a healthy and justified conquest—a veritable “taming” of brutal nature—the European frontier offers images of terrible uncertainty, violence unrestrained and unsanctioned, and racial degradation. The potentially “regressive” and uncivilized nature of the Balkan conflicts (which European powers both greedily attempted to turn to their political and territorial advantage and reluctantly intervened in, arrogantly believing themselves to be “burdened” with the role *in loco parentis*) “inverts New World expectations: the Christian errand in the wilderness becomes the traveler’s ordeal, the city on the hill becomes the castle ruin...into which the traveler stumbles in the hour of dark need...the removal of the wilderness savages by the bearers of light, becomes the transformation of the pilgrim into a monster.”<sup>65</sup>

The authors of the Carnegie Peace Commission Inquiry, writing some two decades after Buffalo Bill thrilled Europe with its own inverted image, were beset by the same anxiety about their “civilizing mission” that drew fans by the thousands to see “wild Indians” pretend to resist “white” America’s divinely mandated conquest. Considering the possibility that Western European intervention in the Balkans may not bear the fruits that “civilized paternalism” seems to have enjoyed in the American West, de Constant equivocates at the outset of the commission’s report: “It seems as if this had all gone for nothing. The facts that face us today are a tragic and derisive denial that any good has come of all this eloquence and feeling. Would it not be better for us to remain silent, and let things go?”<sup>66</sup>

In the next paragraph de Constant answers his own question:

We have been silent, we have let things go long enough.... we... wish only for the triumph of the four young allied peoples in shaking off the domination of the Sultans of Constantinople, in the interest of the Turks and perhaps of Europe herself.... The Americans, unlike Europe, do not approve of resignation, silence, withdrawal. They are young, and they can not endure an evil which is not proved to them to be absolutely incurable.<sup>67</sup>

For all de Constant's embattled certainty that Western Europe was justified in its paternalism, believing that the mantle of the civilizing mission rested securely on its refined shoulders, in the last analysis he looked to America's robust, possibly naïve, but still estimable "young" civilization for moral orientation. To this day the "client states" in the Balkans still pay a price for this.

#### NOTES

1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, 3–5.
2. *Ibid.*, 96.
3. In her discussion of the "civilization politics" instrumental in the Carnegie Report, Lene Hansen mints the phrase "liminally Oriental" to describe the Western European conception of Balkan peoples. I choose to reverse the semantic trajectory of this coinage, however, in an effort to stress (geography aside) the appeal to cultural proximity—whether genuine or manufactured in the name of "civilized" Western largesse—that the Great Powers, as represented by the Peace Commission, cultivated toward the Balkans. As this chapter shows, it was this proximity, this identification and apprehension (in both senses of the word) of cognate origin, that was at the root of Western European ambivalence as it contended with the "Eastern Question." See Lene Hansen, "Past as Preface," 350.
4. U.S. military intervention in Veracruz, while not pursued with the intention of taking outright control of foreign territory and hence not strictly "colonial," may well be described as "imperial." Though the terms are often used interchangeably, the distinction between colonial/imperial enterprises is an important one: colonial action is the explicit use of power to occupy and subordinate people and territory; imperial gains are achieved by less flagrant cultural and economic subjugation. For a useful discussion of this difference in the context of Native Americans, see Jeffery Ostler, *The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee*, 2–3. On American business and the Mexican Revolution, see John Skirius, "Railroad, Oil and Other Foreign Interests in the Mexican Revolution, 1911–1914."
5. Skirius, "Railroads, Oil and Other Foreign Interests," 28, 38–40.

6. In Foucault's usage, the discursive object is the conceptualized exteriority that is simultaneously the product and target of discourse, which in effect (and specifically conditioned by historical contingency) sets the conceptual limit of the "discussion" of a purportedly discrete phenomenon. "The relations are established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioral patterns, systems of norms techniques, types of characterizations; and these relations are not present in the object.... They do not define its internal constitution, *but what enables it to appear*... in short, to be placed in a field of exteriority [emphasis added]." Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 45. Implicit in Foucault's elaboration is the epistemological tension between "phenomenology" and "ontology." Developed in the realm of "discursivity"—again, a set of historical conditions that discourses manufacture and paradoxically address as having a stable reality prior to their enunciation—the phenomenal historical object is "naturalized," constructed to masquerade as ontologically rooted. In the case of Euro-American perceptions and interactions with "less civilized" states, this distinction accrues great significance; the emergence of a paternalistic attitude toward Balkan or Native North American "others" not only marks a shift in the putative "reality" of subjugated peoples but also discloses an implicit transformation in the societies from which the discourse emanated. It is this transition that I believe to be the precise site of "anxiety" in early twentieth-century Western Europe and the United States.
7. For an overview of the events surrounding the 1903 Austro-Russian council in Mürzsteg, including a full English translation of the Punctuation, see Nadine Lange-Akhund, *The Macedonian Question, 1893–1908*, 141–45.
8. Skirius, "Rail, Oil and Other Foreign Interests," 38.
9. On American exceptionalism, see Michael Adas, "From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon."
10. *Ibid.*, 1696.
11. It is vital to intervene at this point and make very clear that Western Europe's and America's status as beacons of "modernity" must *not* be assumed to have proceeded—having grown—ineluctably from the nineteenth century through the post–World War II era. It is imperative that modernity not be understood as having preexisted the historical contingencies that gave it its postwar shape. Geopolitics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not represent the beginning stages of a fixed trajectory toward Euro-American hegemony, *did not*, to borrow a concept from an outmoded biological doctrine, exist as "modern" in some performatist sense, having a priori reality, intact and fully born but unelaborated. As Europe and the United States (and the Ottoman Empire, for that matter) entered the twentieth century, "modernity" was still very much an uneven and disaggregated phenomenon. To impose such a category in a backward and *ex post facto* teleologically justified manner represents a terribly pernicious logical fallacy: a colossal enterprise of *petitio principia* in which all humanity putatively outside the boundaries of the Euro-American modern is sanctimoniously reduced to a prop in a preordained narrative. My thinking about the disingenuous and coercive imposition of "the meta-narrative of modernity" on historical agents who in fact resisted and continue to resist its lurching metastasis is owed in its entirety to the

work of Dr. Isa Blumi. For an essential discussion and subversion of the category of “modernity” in the Red Sea littoral and the Western Balkans, see Blumi, *Foundations of Modernity*.

12. Carnegie Endowment, *Report of the International Commission*, 96.
13. See Hansen, “Past as Preface,” 357–58.
14. For a useful general discussion of the West/East cultural gradient in Europe, see Norman Davies, *Europe*, 54–55.
15. For a thorough overview of the East/West civilization clash as articulated by Samuel P. Huntington, see Hansen, “Past as Preface,” 348–49.
16. A. T. Mahan, “A Twentieth-Century Outlook,” 526. It must be noted that for all Mahan’s pious cant concerning American insularity, as a naval officer at the turn of the nineteenth century he was more than slightly aware of early U.S. imperial/colonial designs in both the Caribbean and the Philippines. In fact Mahan would exercise tremendous influence in Theodore Roosevelt’s administration; his book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* informed Roosevelt’s effort to extend U.S. naval power globally. The “cognitive dissonance” displayed by Mahan and other U.S. apologists and policy makers concerning American empire is addressed at much greater length later in this chapter. For a discussion of the relationship between Roosevelt and Mahan, see Peter Karsten, “The Nature of ‘Influence.’”
17. Mahan, “A Twentieth-Century Outlook,” 527–28.
18. *Ibid.*, 532.
19. A. T. Mahan, “The Balkan Quarrel,” 6.
20. “Client civilization” and “client state” are terms used repeatedly in the Carnegie Report to designate the Balkan nations’ potential for membership among the more fully developed states of Euro-American civilization.
21. For an overview of the Wounded Knee Massacre, see Ostler, *The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism*, 338–60.
22. Civilizational discourse insists that the modern “nation-state” is the ideal sociopolitical unit that all societies should without reservation aspire to; but as Isa Blumi insists in his introduction to *Foundations of Modernity*, this category of “modernity” (and by discursive extension the “nation-state”) is a kind of functional—and functionalist—mythology: “The central problem is that ‘Modernity’...in many ways subsumes all our abilities to discuss ‘alternative’ realities. This Modernity operates in its own kind of ‘sublime,’ ideological order beyond the corrective machinations of subversive theory and the actual ‘facts’ on the ground” (2). Some historians of Europe—in many cases, those not associated with “subversive” theory—have engaged in deconstructions of modern European state mythologies, though not necessarily with the express purpose of mounting a frontal attack on the category of modernity proper. George Dangerfield’s seminal *The Strange Death of Liberal England* offers a portrait of the British nation on the verge of complete social collapse on the eve of World War I: the Ulster revolt, profound labor unrest, the suffragettes, and a creeping popular paranoia about the specter of German aggression all contributed to grave destabilization of the English “national” body. Eugene Weber’s *Peasants into Frenchmen* casts late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century France as a disaggregated and fractious polity that required at times draconian state impositions on its populace—a kind of internal colonization

in the form of standardized schooling and conscription—to forge a cohesive French “nation.” And it cannot be forgotten, as David Blackbourn exhaustively demonstrates in *The History of Germany, 1780–1918*, that the development of German nationalism and Germany as a proper “nation-state” occurred quite late and was a tremendously uneven, stridently contested, and at times brutal process. All this is to say that the “Great Powers” that trained their civilized, putatively inviolate and cohesive “modern national consciousnesses” on the “Eastern Question” were themselves beset with turmoil and uncertainty as they too struggled to manufacture Western modernity.

23. Charles Herbert Levermore, *Samuel Train Dutton*, 141.
24. Said’s “Orientalism” is discussed at greater length later in this chapter. It is important to note here, however, that his rigid digital formulation of Europe/Orient has been taken to task by a host of scholars. Among them, and most relevant to the present argument, is Maria Todorova, who opposes to Said’s often reductionist critique of the Occidental textual production of the Orient the idea of “Balkanism,” a category that entails not only European discourse’s “exoticization” of the Balkan “other” but also the concrete geographical and human “facts” of states and peoples contiguous with Western “civilization.” See Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, xxiv–xxxiv.
25. Samuel Train Dutton, memorandum to Dr. Nicholas Bulter, chair of the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of Intercourse and Education, January 1914, no citation; quoted in Levermore, *Samuel Train Dutton*, 141–42.
26. Unfortunately the notion of the Balkan predisposition for violence and disorder still plagues scholarship of the East. This prejudice is particularly virulent in the work of Julia Kristeva. Kristeva, a Bulgarian-born psychoanalytic cultural theorist, immigrated to France to escape her vision of the Balkans as “Europe’s unconscious source of carnage and violence.” Contemporary France represents for Kristeva the orderly, cosmopolitan civil society analogous, in the psychoanalytic lexicon, with the paternal “ego,” the intervention of the civilizing “symbolic” from which emanates differentiated, ethically constituted subjectivity. While dressed in the technical argot of post-Freudian thought, Kristeva’s rhetorical renunciation of her Balkan origins and her construction of the latter as the site of uncivilized “maternal” and unrestrained, subject-abrogating violence are merely a recapitulation of the “civilizational politics” that animated Euro-American intervention in—and cultural exploitation of—the Balkans in the early twentieth century. See Dušan I. Bjelić, “Julia Kristeva.”
27. For a discussion of the U.S. federal ban of the Sioux Sun Dance, see Ostler, *The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism*, 174–79.
28. Quoted in Levermore, *Samuel Train Dutton*, 143–44.
29. Quoted in *ibid.*, 145–46.
30. For general background on founding members and participants of the Lake Mohonk Conference, see Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father*, 202–3.
31. *Report of the Thirty-fourth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples*, 8.
32. Thomas Biolsi, *Organizing the Lakota*, 11–17.
33. *Report of the Thirty-fourth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference*, 8.

34. Quoted in Prucha, *The Great Father*, 217.
35. Hansen, "Past as Preface," 354.
36. Quoted in Prucha, *The Great Father*, 218.
37. Carnegie Endowment, *Report of the International Commission*, 8; quoted in Hansen, "Past as Preface," 354.
38. N. Dwight Harris, "The Macedonian Question and the Balkan War," 198.
39. Constantin A. Chekrezi, "Albania and the Balkans," 336.
40. Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule," 616.
41. Robert Young, *White Mythologies*, 141–43.
42. *Ibid.*, 143.
43. "[The] doctrine of discovery...promulgated in its most basic form in 1493 by Pope Alexander IV...established in American domestic law that the Indians owned the equitable title to their lands subject only to the superior title exercised by the discoverer." Vine Deloria Jr., "The Evolution of Federal Indian Policy Making," 240.
44. *Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1896 Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 291; quoted in Thomas Biolsi, "The Birth of the Reservation," 34.
45. Selim Deringil, "They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery," 314.
46. Philip Joseph Deloria, *Playing Indian*, 3.
47. Prucha, *The Great Father*, 224.
48. *Ibid.*, 226–28, 232.
49. *Ibid.*, 232.
50. *Modern History Sourcebook*.
51. Robert J. Donia, "The Proximate Colony: Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule," *Kakanienrevisited*, <http://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/RDonia1.pdf> (accessed November 9, 2007/), 1.
52. *Ibid.*, 3.
53. *Ibid.*, 1.
54. It is vital to note here that individual association with an "ethnic" group in Macedonia was in fact a fluid and often opportunistic phenomenon. As Macedonia was a territory hotly contested by Serbia, Bulgaria, the Ottomans, and those who identified themselves as "Macedonian," local stakeholders often mobilized and exploited ethnic and national categories—which would have been untenable under different circumstances—to achieve political objectives. For a thorough discussion of this "ethnic entrepreneurialism" in the Balkans, see Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 71–72; for a discussion of the manipulation of the historical narrative of ethnicity in Macedonia, see Keith Brown, *The Past in Question*, 9–21.
55. The Mürzsteg Punctuation, reproduced and translated from French in Lange-Akhund, *The Macedonian Question*, 143.
56. Biolsi, *Organizing the Lakota*, 34–37.
57. As Lange-Akhund points out, "The use [by the Great Powers]...at the same time of religious concepts and national ideas would be revealed to be exceedingly dangerous and led to political instability, not only [in] Macedonia, but [in] the whole Balkan peninsula: Lange-Akhund, *The Macedonian Question*, 146. In the case of the Lakotas, Biolsi comments that the official—and arbitrary—recognition of "chiefs" by the U.S. government led to the enervation of Lakota political life by

creating a context suited to graft and fomenting a factionalism formerly unknown to the Western Sioux: the rivalry between the “traditional” and “progressive” Indian. See Biolsi, *Organizing the Lakota*, 37–39, 151–86.

58. Adas, “From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon,” 1695.

59. Deloria, *Playing Indian*, 158.

60. The most egregious example of the U.S. Congress flouting treaty obligations to Indians stemmed from the landmark 1903 Supreme Court ruling *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock*. This verdict stated that because native peoples in the United States were in fact “wards of the State,” any act of Congress—regardless of what might have been stipulated in a given treaty—with respect to Indian nations was vested with plenary force, insofar as Congress in its role as guardian would not act against the interests of its wards. Notwithstanding the overly sanguine logic of this decision, Congress availed itself of its provisions just a year later, passing legislation that permitted the formerly illegal government-brokered sale of “surplus” reservation lands to white ranchers and farmers without tribal consent. See Prucha, *The Great Father*, 295–97.

61. Priscilla Ward, “Terms of Assimilation,” 61.

62. Louis S. Warren, “Buffalo Bill Meets Dracula,” 1125.

63. *Ibid.*, 1150.

64. *Ibid.*, 1151.

65. *Ibid.*, 1153.

66. Carnegie Endowment, *Report of the International Commission*, 1.

67. *Ibid.*, 1–2.



## Impacts of the Balkan Wars

### The Uncharted Paths from Empire to Nation-State

*Isa Blumi*

Underlying any study of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 must be a quest to identify causes and effects. This volume is heavily invested in such a search, as is evident throughout. Predictably, this has led to contradictory, if not ultimately confusing, narratives. What these often conflicting stories ultimately imply is that any attempt to study the animating factors leading to and resulting from the Balkan Wars will suffer from a fundamental flaw. Any composite narrative (frequently attempted in monographs on the “Balkan Wars”) misrepresents the reality of disparate and geographically dispersed events that were contributing to very different processes taking place at the same time (and even in the same place).

This chapter invariably also suffers from this methodological weakness in that it too mobilizes a narrow selection of events (at the expense of excluding others) in order to suggest possible interpretations of so-called origins and enduring legacies of the 1912–13 Balkan Wars. A major impediment to analyzing the disparate events identified as contributing to the Balkan Wars’ long-term consequences is in some part the result of focusing on specific administrative zones—the mountainous borderlands of Kosova, Īškodra, Serbia, and Montenegro known here as the *Malësi e Madhe*—without fully engaging seemingly peripheral events beyond these locales.

As correctly emphasized elsewhere in this volume, “Serbian,” “Bulgarian,” and “Ottoman” politics are messy, with competing factions operating under very different conditions, catering to very different constituencies, whether in Austrian-administered Bosnia and the Sancak (Sanjak), rural Macedonia, or Istanbul. This chapter adds to the complications by considering some of the conflicting agendas among those fluid

clusters of actors straddling the political and commercial frontiers of Montenegro, Serbia, and the western Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, by geographically expanding the scope of our search for some of the causal factors leading first to the wars and then to their inevitable impacts on both postconflict state administrations and the communities living under these arrangements, it is possible to complicate the underlying agenda of this volume and encourage an altogether new focus on these historically important events and their aftermath.<sup>1</sup>

For much of the period leading up to the Balkan Wars, Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian strategies included collaborating with elements of the Ottoman population who were later to become victims of some of the more brutal forms of persecution that make the Balkans notorious today. In other words, there are considerations at play that cannot rely on the clichés that leave an ethno-national imprint on the way we write about these events. Beyond the concerns with neighboring states' interests in these same regions, we must consider economic explanations. For example, the appropriation of wealth, especially land, by the victors deserves our attention. The notion that commercial interests were intimately involved in the process of taking land from the previous inhabitants may help provide depth to the manner in which postconflict administrations approached incorporating the territories and/or the populations that were torn away from the Ottoman Balkans in 1912–13.

Taking this interpretive range into consideration, this chapter suggests different kinds of short- and long-term social and political consequences of the Balkan Wars than are traditionally presented in the scholarship. In the first part of this intervention, I highlight how forces afflicting the larger empire since the Berlin Congress of 1878 contributed importantly to the collapse of internal relations crucial to regional stability. Contrary to common belief, many of the problems associated with the increasing violence in the region—from the Macedonia crisis explored by a number of contributions in this volume to the “Albanian” revolts in the *İşkodra*, *Kosova*, *Manastır*, and *Janina* provinces between 1908 and 1912—actually have their origins in the idiosyncratic applications of “reforms” that undermined the capacity of various states to manage their regional affairs effectively. These reforms correspond with a crucial outburst of what I call “ethnic entrepreneurialism” that animated much of the Ottoman Balkans after 1878 as forms of “nationalist revolt” retrospectively imposed by later scholarship. The problem is that they cannot so easily be assumed to reflect the post-Ottoman social and political orientations that would still require World War I to take place.

Linked to these periodic bursts of violent opportunism by indigenous actors tied to external interests is the failure of internal state mechanisms to resolve residual conflicts within communities. The fact that other examples of successful interventions by the Ottomans and their partner states to resolve local conflicts were ignored when resolving conflicts of a far smaller scale in the Malësi borderlands ultimately led to the series of contingencies that generated new kinds of political forces in the wider region. The conjuncture of factors that led to very different policies of conflict resolution on the part of the Ottoman state helps explain how the initial victories in late 1912 actually transformed the political horizons of the Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Montenegrin elite. In other words, the very failure to apply measures of accommodation in the Kosova/İşkodra highlands (Malësi) in contrast to the ways in which Ottoman officials in Yemen successfully navigated insurrection ultimately altered the possibilities for indigenous actors to interface with postconflict administrations. This in turn affected the policies of these postconflict states, which became as much expansionist as colonial, armed with all the residual epistemological paraphernalia associated with ethnic engineering. In sum, the real Ottoman legacy in the Balkans is the way in which intervening power dynamics, often realized in different ways at the local level rather than in political centers, led to a shift in the kind of regime that occupying states (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro) used to administer those former Ottoman Balkan territories captured after 1912.

Similarly, as a result of these rapid changes on the ground, new opportunities arose for an entirely new class of political agents, leaving much of the post-Ottoman Balkans to face an even more radical form of nationalism that actually emerged as a result of the sudden victories of late 1912 at the Ottoman Empire's expense. Ultimately, rather than being a product of a contrived, long-term strategic realization of state expansion, the cases introduced in this chapter suggest that the contingencies created by the war introduced entirely new political orientations for a wide variety of actors, including Kosova/Albanian Muslims.

I have long argued that various manifestations of local agency—trade, politics, social, and cultural exchange—destabilized the modern border-as-extension-of-the-state. In place of the assumed geographical order that the diplomatically drawn boundaries of 1878 offered the region, peoples living within these “borderlands” experienced the parallel trajectories of the still unharnessed modern world.<sup>2</sup> In addition to laying out a detailed study of the new frontier administrations that the new states of Montenegro and Serbia had to impose on their frontiers, I introduce cases of

local mobilization that ultimately challenged these new borderland regimes and the sense of possibility for various political entrepreneurs directly affected by the Balkan Wars. In these cases it was the contradictory demands of governance in reaction to local contingencies that opened up avenues of action for a number of indigenous actors and hence permit our rereading of the region's history at large, both before and after the Balkan Wars themselves.

Ascendant locals like İsmail Kemal Bey (İsmail Qemali), Isa Boletini, and Esad Paşa Toptani emerged in this period with considerable power; that, however, is only part of the story. Their activism certainly obliged the emerging regional state administrations to adapt to the conditions that they created on the ground. But as a result these adjustments created even more channels of engagement for locals. The consequences were a growing list of potential constituents, clients, and rivals to these ascendant locals and all the competing states created by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878—an Austro-Hungarian regime in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and a territorially expanded Greece.<sup>3</sup>

Reconsidering the complex interplay of pre-World War I state-building measures as reflective of *local dynamics* thus offers us an opportunity to explore the complexity of the modern world through largely ignored indigenous channels informed by the very Ottoman context in which they emerged. In a word, we are not simply dealing with nation-states and national heroes (or villains) as defined by boundaries. The transformations that contributed to the foundations of war in the western Balkans remained a local experience that was then translated into other forms once it became filtered through the emerging state bureaucracies of the era. In other words, there can be no separation between what the post-Berlin (1878–1912) regimes tried to impose on the borderlands of the modern world and the interactive dynamics that took place between the local stakeholders and the Ottoman state.

#### THE MOBILIZED LOCAL

As explored in a number of contributions to this volume, revisiting the events in Macedonia at the turn of the century contributes to the paradigm shift sought here. The reasons why well-armed mixed *çeta* groups (rebel units) during the crucial 1903–8 period were fighting, mistakenly attributed to “ancient” ethnic hatreds or a natural predilection to violence among backward Balkan peoples, can be more fruitfully explained

by seeing these rebels as constituent groups struggling to secure a safe home for their families and fellow community members. The events taking place in the late Ottoman Balkans were actually part of a productive exchange, no matter how contrived the nationalist tropes proclaimed by a self-appointed intellectual vanguard rhetorically co-opting historical events in places like the provinces of Manastır and Kosova were. When the two contradictory states of social, economic, and political existence met (when, for example, Bulgarian, Greek, or Serbian state agents paid “Christian” peasants to fire guns at their Muslim neighbors), a sort of productive friction took place that ultimately constituted the historical force studied in this volume.

Demonstrating that events throughout the last fifty years of the Ottoman Empire do not especially fit the paradigm of ethno-nationalism, however, requires an altogether more complex method of reading the past. It is clear from analyzing the correspondence between the communities in the region and Ottoman and Austrian officials that the rumors circulating of secret plans by Russia, Serbia, and Greece to divide the Ottoman Balkans spurred people to action. Considerable interaction between Ottoman officials and their Austrian and Italian counterparts reveals this dynamism within the polyglot communities that openly supported the “rebel groups” circulating in the wooded hills of Manastır. Far from wanting segregation, these people resented the church officials sent from neighboring countries to try to divide their villages along sectarian lines. Italian observers, in particular, were impressed by the cooperation that Muslims and Christians demonstrated when resisting such provocations from outside.<sup>4</sup>

Contrary to interpretations of these events as simple confrontations between natives and Ottoman “Turks,” Ottoman and local power was modified and transformed in offices and around tables and subsequently retrofitted in newspapers and telegrams that defy the interpretive limits imposed by the scholarship. Already by 1910 some advocated parceling out the Ottoman Balkan territories into new forms of administration, perhaps best interpreted today using ethno-national terms. But despite these examples of support for reading regional struggles in Macedonia, Kosova, or Malësi as “Albanian,” “pan-Slavic,” or “Greek” nationalist manifestations, they remained dispersed gestures meant to shape outside opinion, more in line with forms of “spin” or the yellow journalism in early twentieth-century print media.<sup>5</sup> A more complicated analysis of the possible alternative agendas at play among some of the top personalities retroactively associated with nationalism in the western Balkans (in this case Albanians like Esad Paşa Toptani, Isa Boletini, and İsmail Kemal

Bey) may help make it easier to accept the larger subversion of dominant paradigms in the historiography. One of the more problematic figures is the supposed founding father of the Albanian state, İsmail Kemal Bey/İsmail Qemali Bey (1844–1919).

Studying the various personas of Qemali in the larger context of the eventual fragmentation of the empire helps us to appreciate how simplistic notions of perpetual ethnic rivalry can be misleading. A prominent Ottoman official whose family had long-standing interests in and around the Adriatic port town of Vlora/Avlonya, Qemali was able to use his numerous commercial and political alliances in Epirus to make his way not only up through the ranks of Ottoman power but in the broader eastern Mediterranean world as well. In many ways by 1903 Qemali had become the most powerful politician in Epirus as both members of various opposition groups and the sultan's palace solicited his support. In this regard his case amply demonstrates the need to understand that individual political or economic fortunes did not take shape through a matrix divided along sectarian or so-called ethnic lines.<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps the most interesting issue from the 1878–1912 period concerning Qemali was his support for the attempt by Athens to develop local support for the annexation of the entire northern area composed of Tosk (southern Albanian) Orthodox Christians to Greece, today known as the Epirus question. Many in Athens, fearing the extension of Slavic influence in Macedonia after 1905, openly sought to unite with Toskë. The key to the first stage of this policy was to inflame political and economic tensions between the indigenous population of Tosk and Ottoman authorities: Greece had an active agenda to encourage both the Muslim and Rum Orthodox Toskë to strive for stronger cultural and political as well as economic ties with Greece.<sup>7</sup>

Infused with liberal idealism and armed with a set of demands that circulated in the elitist halls of European progressive culture at the time, core members of the Ottoman opposition like Qemali frequently operated under essentially shifting sets of principles.<sup>8</sup> A patriot of the Ottoman identity that underpinned his party's ideological foundation, he worked to bridge ideological gaps such as those that separated Armenian factions in the opposition from their rivals. Qemali's relationship to protonationalist groups is therefore quite complex and often misconstrued because of what has been deemed to be his role in late 1912 as the "father of the Albanian nation."<sup>9</sup>

A closer look at Qemali's activities between 1912 and 1915 (when much of "Albania" was under siege or occupied by Greek, Bulgarian, Montenegrin, and/or Serbian forces), which were often in direct contradiction

to the actions of other key Balkan-native members of the leadership of the CUP now directing a war against the Balkan states, highlights the play of contradictory motivations. It needs to be stressed that the anti-Hamidian movement was highly fragmented, even at the point of its successful capture of power in 1908, with conflicting agendas and strategies that ultimately created schisms in the various opposition parties operating throughout the empire and beyond. At one point serving as the chair of the CUP, Qemali had at least conflicted loyalties in respect to the survival of the Ottoman state in the Balkans, which led to important shifts in how he and his local allies interacted with the larger world. For example, we can see through the opposition's Geneva-based newspaper *Osmanlı* that Qemali's sentiments shifted from France to Britain.<sup>10</sup> But that returns us to the larger point in this chapter: any number of animating factors contribute to a disparate and nonlinear trajectory of events, socioeconomic forces, and political opportunities. Thus it is irresponsible to interpret the motivations of disparate clusters of interests using the benefit of hindsight. Like many others within the broader spectrum of Ottoman-Balkan actors, Qemali had a plethora of push-pull factors to address over the course of the 1908–15 period, making any reductionist characterization of his motivations no longer compelling.

This interpretation lends new meaning to many of the activities of Qemali and fellow members of the Ottoman-Arnavut intellectual elite, both those in exile and those in the empire (who receive greater attention from Çağdaş Sümer in chapter 26 of this volume). While Qemali may have shared certain common interests with his fellow southern Albanian elite (Toskë), his activities on behalf of the CUP required him to mobilize the assistance of armed Macedonian, Armenian, and Serb groups as much as Albanians. In fact he lobbied movements that attacked Muslim Albanian communities in Manastır. This should influence the way in which we ultimately read the reported collaboration between Albanian and Bulgarian revolutionaries at the time and cause us to reconsider what motivated communities in the Kosova/İşkodra highlands occasionally to side with Montenegro against the CUP government between 1910 and 1912.<sup>11</sup>

### THE 1908 PARADOX

I consider the Ottoman Empire's lasting failure after the removal of the Abdülhamid old guard in 1908–9 to be the subsequent misappropriation of local support to try to marginalize rather than co-opt some of the old

regime's local supporters. The case of Isa Boletini from the Mitrovica borderland reflects the failure of the new regime to accommodate valuable local assets after 1908. Boletini's power and influence, being so firmly linked to the sultan, was clearly threatened by the Young Turk revolt of 1908. While others in the region celebrated the demise of the Hamidian regime, for many such as Boletini the events in the summer of 1908 threatened their economic lifeblood and political security. This constitutes yet another important set of issues that the historiography has all but ignored since the end of World War I. While the literature tends to see the events taking place in the region as an undifferentiated, universal expression of opposition linked by a common, often "ethnic" unity, considerable numbers of local "Albanian," "Serb," "Greek," or "Bulgarian" stakeholders, including Boletini, were adversely affected by the sudden shift in power.

Instead of revealing a shared ideological, spiritual, or even economic goal, the events leading to and immediately following the revolt in Manastir and Kosova suggest a complicated exchange of competing interests. As far as Isa Boletini was concerned, the events surrounding the Young Turk revolution would displace him from one of the concentric circles of power in the region, thrusting him into a global arena that he would ultimately prove incapable of controlling. His subsequent conversion into an archenemy of the "infidel" CUP movement, making him into a loyalist to the sultan at a time when many of his Kosovar neighbors (and future historians) were investing in the idea of revolution, forced important new challenges (as well as opportunities) upon him that extended well beyond his Mitrovica/Drenica/Kosova base.

Perhaps the most evocative incident that revealed to Boletini just how divided Kosova was took place in 1908, as people in northern Kosova reacted to the news of a local revolt led by the Tosk captain Resneli Ahmed Niyazi Bey in Manastir on July 5.<sup>12</sup> As is now well documented, activists in Kosova organized a massive demonstration of support for Niyazi, and the larger anti-Hamidian opposition began to stir up rebellion.<sup>13</sup> The result of this mobilization in Kosova was a face-off at an eastern Kosova railhead called Ferizaj (Firzovik).<sup>14</sup>

As opposing factions constituting significantly different groups in Ottoman Kosova—one in support of the sultan's legitimacy and the other an alliance of "rebel groups" numbering up to six thousand—clashed outside Ferizaj, it became apparent to the Ottoman officials linked to the new Young Turk regime that the shifting interests of very different independent actors in the region were threatening the new regime's ability



to secure its Balkan frontiers.<sup>15</sup> According to the Ottoman official negotiating with the still peaceful rebels led by Necib Draga and Bayram Curri, the sultan's loyalists, including Isa Boletini, had gone to Ferizaj to "discipline" the rebels but were greatly outnumbered.<sup>16</sup> Indeed reports suggest that the pro-CUP numbers swelled as locals began to realize the opportunity. The revolt in southeastern Kosova, like those surfacing throughout Macedonia from the 1890s onward, suggests that this was a perfect example of the uncommitted majority waiting on the sidelines to see the results of a conflict between the state and a local contingent of rebels before taking sides. As in most successful rebellions, the sense that the fortunes of the political elite both in their immediate surroundings and in the larger Ottoman Empire had changed may have animated many to choose sides. In the case of Ferizaj the sultan's loyalists would be obliged to retreat and stand aside (but not change sides) as a loosely formed committee, emboldened by local successes, sent telegrams to Istanbul demanding the restoration of the 1876 constitution.<sup>17</sup> The problem for historians eager to characterize these events with the benefit of hindsight is that those sending the telegrams, as well as those claiming to be "loyal," had very different, often changing, interests.<sup>18</sup>

Again our models of analysis have forced us to misinterpret these confrontations to mean something much more damaging to the state than was actually the case. It was the sultan's political failure to follow the suggestions of the grand vizier (a Tosk named Mehmed Said Paşa, whom the sultan fired after being advised to restore the 1876 constitution) and not the "natural" desire of Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, or Rum to separate from the empire that accounts for the subsequent tensions. Such political failures on the part of the sultan and his advisors over the next few months resulted in open and violent resistance in Kosova and Macedonia. Again this violence should not be mistaken for a desire for ethno-national separation from a previously heterogeneous society. Instead of seeking separation, antiregime agents argued for the restoration of the constitution that promised equality and justice for all members of Ottoman society—a demand, in other words, to help preserve the empire. At the same time, those locals sympathetic to the CUP transformation in Istanbul (many of the inner circle of the CUP actually came from the western Balkan region) faced other locals eager to defend old privileges granted by the sultan. Within months of the takeover of the new regime, which soon led to the empowerment of locals like Hasan Prishtina, Necib Draga, and others, members of an entrenched loyalist group led by Isa Boletini found themselves leading a politically complicated rebellion

against this new Young Turk government. Unfortunately for men of Boletini's orientation, the local revolts occasioned massive countermeasures on the part of the Ottoman state that broadened the CUP state's investment in repressing local communities, often in ways that contributed to spreading violence and ultimately to political confusion for all the inhabitants of the western Balkans.<sup>19</sup>

It was the fateful decision by the inner circle of leaders within the CUP in Istanbul (along with their local allies, including Necib Draga of Mitrovica) to expand the state's capacity to project power in the strategically vulnerable Malësi borderlands, to implement "reforms" to raise revenue, and to increase conscription that ultimately undermined the regional order. The relatively mild campaign led by Cevid Paşa that started in November 1908 pitted the new CUP-led regime against Boletini and his fluctuating ranks of regional allies, who were increasingly found on the other side of the Ottoman frontier in Serbia and Montenegro. The nature of this campaign against a former ally of the sultan ultimately transformed the domestic contours of political and commercial order in the entire region.<sup>20</sup>

In time the heavy-handed application of policies that were meant to streamline the modernization process while securing the empire's borders actually opened the doors for the external intervention and internal chaos that made defeat in the 1912–13 Balkan Wars possible. As we now know, Boletini's efforts to reposition himself in the world as a rebel against the CUP government and its new methods of instituting modern state reforms failed to secure his Mitrovica homeland from disaster.<sup>21</sup> The CUP adopted perhaps the most destructive policy for the western Balkans during a renewed campaign by Mahmut Şevket Paşa in the summer of 1909—the conscription of tens of thousands of able-bodied men from Kosova and their deployment to fight in distant provinces of the empire. This time the ability of local entrepreneurs like Boletini to wedge themselves into regional and international politics had come at the expense of their homeland's long-term autonomy.<sup>22</sup>

In time Boletini would position himself as a nationalist by backing some of the very leaders of the CUP in exile (such as Qemali) who would eventually take the opportunity to carve out a twentieth-century niche and lay claim to an Albanian state.<sup>23</sup> In this context, changing external conditions influenced the decisions of men like Boletini and Idriz Sefer (a famous Kosovar rebel leader) in ways that could easily have been adopted opportunistically by the CUP in Istanbul, as they were by Prince Nikola in Montenegro and the ruling parties in Belgrade.<sup>24</sup> The consequences

of Boletini's actions and the counteractions by the CUP government in Istanbul (through henchmen in uniform like Şevket Paşa and Necib Draga) and the regional states like Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro actually contributed to circumstances that made it impossible for native peoples to continue to defend themselves against the modern state.<sup>25</sup> By 1910 and 1911 the revolts in these borderlands had taken on dramatic proportions, leading many intellectuals based in Istanbul to suspect that the survival of the empire would lie in the state's ability to suppress what they saw as the Montenegrin and Serbian corruption of local Malësorë and "backward" rural leaders.<sup>26</sup> Such a discursive turn is indicative of the kind of instrumentalization of the individual Ottoman subject (either of the physical body or of the conceptual political body) that is helpfully explored elsewhere.<sup>27</sup>

The violence subsequently afflicting the region could hardly be described as cunning, heroic, or in any positive sense linked to a "patriotic agenda" being advanced by any of those involved. The results of these "Albanian" rebellions and the counterinsurgency measures against them actually caused a shift in the balance of power that led to the swift capture of Kosova by Serbian and Montenegrin troops in late 1912 and the brutal, final annexation of more than half of the Albanian-Ottoman lands to various Slav states.<sup>28</sup>

Looking more critically at what is usually treated as "Albanian" resistance to Slav and Greek expansionism and Ottoman occupation, I have suggested elsewhere that the interactions between those assumed to be early patriots actually involved far more complicated sets of issues and motives. For our current purposes, we need to read the transactions between the Ottoman state and multiple local actors as informed concerns of varied interests that predate nationalism. In so doing we can re-interpret events that involved a broad range of interests that often seem contradictory or conflicted. Even after the events of 1878, 1908, and even 1912 many would-be Albanians still advocated maintaining strong links to the Ottoman Empire. They saw no contradiction in self-identifying as Kelmëndi, Albanian, or Catholic *and* as subjects of the sultan. In fact many of these late Ottoman cultural giants wrote to their fellow Ottomans and advocated the consolidation of community in the hope that this homeland would serve as a barrier to the encroaching menace of secularism, ethno-nationalism, and xenophobia.<sup>29</sup> Of course such sentiments were not shared by everyone. Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Serbian, and Greek money provided new opportunities for those willing to mobilize local constituencies to advance the interests of their patron state.<sup>30</sup>

That being said, the very fluidity of life, the many internal and external transformations caused by war, economic transformations, and subsequent state policies covered in this volume constantly afflicted the various temporary polities in different ways. In other words, the dynamics of Ottoman life were such that far too many options still existed for local actors to adjust, adapt, and ultimately escape modern coercive measures. To the frustration of the Young Turk inheritors of three decades of Hamidian rule, a “modern state” in such plural societies required politics, negotiation, and multilayered interactions whose very by-product created numerous channels of action for the peoples of the western Balkans. This was certainly evident by 1911, when a new campaign to suppress local insubordination led by Turgut Paşa culminated in the effective maintenance of stability in the lowlands of Kosova and İşkodra but also the creation of a new form of social organization and resistance in the highlands.<sup>31</sup> Central to these events was the fusing of the mutual interests of external actors and local constituencies. To the Austria-Hungarian consuls closely monitoring events, this constituted an inexplicable alliance between Catholic Albanian communities, often blindly persecuted by Turgut Paşa’s 40,000-man force, and the Montenegrin government. Crucially the forces at play were animated by large-scale movements of populations, in which entire communities fled Ottoman persecution for the safety of Montenegro, which increasingly meant a monopolization of food and shelter by King Nikola’s regime (at the expense of local Malësorë communities, who often demonstrated hostility toward the refugees). In other words, calculations of future state-building seem completely undermined here. Muslim and Catholic highlander Albanian communities, fleeing persecution by the Ottoman state, were not being accommodated by indigenous Albanian highland communities that had lived within the borders of Montenegro since 1878 but were being increasingly directed to a position of subordination and dependence on the Montenegrin state.<sup>32</sup> Over time dependence on Montenegro for mere survival during the winters of 1910 and 1911 left these dispersed Catholic communities at the mercy of calculations that would change again by the end of the summer of 1912.<sup>33</sup>

By 1912 this had changed even for men as locally prominent as Isa Boletini. Such agents of history suddenly faced a new challenge: a re-configured, dispersed community whose labeling under larger identity categories imposed by the outside world would eventually shape the policies of occupation by outsiders. The new forces entering into societies largely depopulated of able-bodied, local men due to the destructive

military policies of the CUP regime would make once highly contested sociopolitical spaces vulnerable to external interests that were securing absolute power. In this context local agents adopted new approaches to new realities, leaving a complex set of postconflict decisions influencing subsequent generations of historians.

The cases of Isa Boletini and various other local rebels proved that partnership with the Ottoman state was indispensable to anyone seeking to impress a larger mark on the region's post-Berlin history. At the time none of the locally based *bayraktars* (government-appointed community heads) or their rivals had the resources to secure the alliances that they needed to maintain leverage in a region transformed by the creation of nation-states. This was clear from the relative military stalemate that would exist until 1912, with the Ottoman state campaigns often granting new concessions after failed military measures left the regional administration adrift in commercial ruin. As a result the day-to-day experiences of all the principals were mostly shaped by an interlocking dynamic of reactions and counterreactions by local stakeholders and the various states involved. In many ways a form of administrative rupture took place that resulted in the appearance of different operational (and thus competing) models as each state tried to cope with the actions of men such as Isa Boletini and the Malësorë.<sup>34</sup> These dynamics in turn affected locals who were potential allies with all the principals involved, whether aspiring regional leaders, ambitious Tanzimat-era parliamentarians, or the various state bureaucracies that were creating new realities on the ground. In the end all these cases of friction provided the foundations for broader, longer-term institutional and socioeconomic change.<sup>35</sup>

#### POSTCONFLICT ORIENTATIONS

The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 have been widely remembered through the social, institutional, and economic transformations that they brought to the societies that participated in them. For a number of reasons only partially germane to this chapter, Albanian speakers have generally been left out of this memory. This is largely emblematic of the academic fixation on the emergence of the nation-state, a process from which Albanians emerged relatively late. As a consequence, histories of the region that include Albania tend to focus on the events that specifically led to the formal declaration of independence on November 28, 1912, and leave out important events that do not immediately pertain to issues of Albanian nationhood.<sup>36</sup> Failure to move conceptually beyond the 1913 Albanian

state has resulted in some telling omissions of the historical experiences of more than half the world's Albanian speakers, who were to find themselves outside "Albanian" frontiers in 1913.<sup>37</sup>

To demonstrate how this process took place and how historians may interpret it, let us consider two Albanians who played a significant role in the events that have survived the screening process of history. The case of the much maligned Esad Paşa Toptani (1863–1920) demonstrates most distinctly the operational strategies of historical figures in creating their own place in a nation's present and the seemingly counterintuitive rationale that they often maintain in times of transition. Esad Paşa Toptani has been castigated as the villain in Albanian national historiography, at least in the post–World War II period when Enver Hoxha's regime was busy rewriting the history of Albania and the Balkans. It should be remembered, however, that Esad Paşa was a member of the most powerful family of central Albania and that his nephew became "King Zogu" during the 1920s and 1930s. Toptani's actions thus fuse a notion of subjectivity common to himself, Boletini, and Qemali but at the same time demonstrate how actors can approach their intervention in history in distinct ways. If we bring a more critical eye to bear on these processes, we may be able to avoid the external distortions imposed by tyrannical regimes eager to erase or embellish moments of the past.

Unlike Boletini and Qemali, Toptani would leave quite different and, perhaps more importantly, unstable traces on the history of post-Ottoman Albania. They are unstable because his role as interpreted by the numerous and distinct Albanian communities in the world exposes some of the often forgotten external dynamics that play into the ways in which societies understand their past. Beyond the issue of contemporaries actively engaging in making their own historical place is the social and political context in which post–War War I historiography has been written.

#### ESAD PAŞA TOPTANI

In direct contrast with Isa Boletini, whose place is secure at least in Kosova's pantheon, Esad Paşa Toptani's historical reputation has witnessed a dramatically different kind of progression. First, Toptani came from a prominent local family whose landholdings in the middle of the nineteenth century translated into considerable power in Istanbul. His formative years therefore are based on having enjoyed substantial privilege within Ottoman society that provided possibilities for action that

were not available to the two other men dealt with in this chapter.<sup>38</sup> It is important to remember, however, that despite being part of an elite element of Ottoman power circles, both in the Hamidian and the Young Turk periods, Toptani nevertheless had to intervene constantly on his own behalf in order to secure that privilege.

The shifting dynamics of local power and the ways in which local power translated in Istanbul have usually been ignored when historians discuss elite politics and the phenomenon of the "landholders" of Albanian historiography. As far as Albania was concerned, such local power did not necessarily guarantee relevance in the country's political future. Indeed the aforementioned local revolts of 1909, 1910, and 1911 in Malësi as well as the declaration of independence at the end of 1912 forced many local communities into a new relational dynamic in which Italy, Austria, and regional Balkan states like Montenegro/Serbia and Greece became the surrogate patrons of local power holders.

Hence Esad Paşa Toptani's whole career was spent in active engagement in often contradictory projects in order to protect his status in a part of the world where political control would change hands several times over a four-year period. He accomplished this by securing his access to imperial governing circles through the power he could exert using a loyal and well-armed local army that served under his command. In a region with little or no promise of stability, Esad Paşa was able to assure himself a key role as a local power broker through this military asset. It is not really possible to explain how he accomplished this within the confines of this chapter, but his awareness of the need for strategic planning and his understanding of the necessity of keeping all doors open are indicative of a degree of sophistication, even ruthlessness, that needs to be studied without the accusatory tone adopted by most Albanian historians since 1945.

While we could characterize the cases of Qemali and Boletini in a similar manner, Toptani's elite status and the circles in which he moved meant that the nature of his power and the manner in which he had to assert his claims to the future differed according to circumstances. This was made clear in reading the writings of his contemporaries, who largely feared him and in the end condemned him for his ruthless survival tactics.

Toptani's survival of the transition from Hamidian rule to the Young Turk period is proof enough of his political skills. Indeed the way in which he imposed himself onto the new regime demonstrates his understanding of the need to be sensitive to the local factors at play during

regime changes. Immediately after taking power the CUP identified and solicited the assistance of prominent locals throughout the empire, aware that it could not impose its “revolution” without the assistance of those who were basically sitting on the fence. As suggested in the case of Isa Boletini in Kosova and northern Albania, the changes of 1908 were not popular among many Albanians. Toptani accepted an invitation in September of 1908 to visit the CUP delegation in Scutari as acting head of the local gendarmerie, a position that he more or less created for himself in late 1907. As a result of this initial meeting, according to Italian and Austrian sources, Toptani then accompanied a local delegation to Salonika and secured the trust of the CUP central committee still based there. As a result he immediately positioned himself in the new regime and became a key component in the extension of state power in distant Albania.<sup>39</sup> The period was fraught with challenges, however, that demanded constant attention and a keen eye for the subtle changes taking place in the larger world, a skill that he demonstrated repeatedly over time.<sup>40</sup>

Toptani was elected to the Ottoman parliament on December 17, 1908, along with twenty-five other Albanian delegates.<sup>41</sup> It appears that he was somewhat unspectacular in his role as parliamentarian, and his ambitions to establish a place in the decision-making apparatus of the empire as a whole were blocked by more capable Albanian representatives from southern Albania. In addition to these impediments to his advancement in imperial politics, talk of war and the constant specter of the empire breaking apart were present throughout the Young Turk period. It is here that Toptani began to assert himself, again locally, playing the role of intermediary between locals and Istanbul and capitalizing on the growing insurrection in Kosova.<sup>42</sup> One way in which he benefited from the insurrection was in the flow of money and weapons into the area. The Italians identified him as the biggest smuggler of weapons into central Albania, which suggests that he began to amass both considerable individual wealth and (as would become clear in 1913 and 1914) a small army of loyal followers.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, when war loomed in his native Albania in 1912, Toptani calculated that his interests would be better served by leaving isolated Istanbul altogether and establishing himself inside Albania, making an early claim to the region’s leadership at a time of crisis.<sup>44</sup> These early measures speak of a man consciously maneuvering to keep ahead of events and to give himself the flexibility to remain relevant. Such relevance is clearly key to the survival of Ottoman leaders and their entourages, a relational dynamic equally important in times of transition and war.



Esad Toptani's days in Scutari (İşkodra/Shkodër) during its siege by Montenegrin and Serbian forces were marked by his continued calculated behavior, beginning with his shrewd attempt to place himself at the helm of military and political leadership in northern Albania. By asserting himself along with his well-groomed armed retinue in Scutari in late 1912 he had the opportunity not only to negotiate a place in the inevitable changes that were taking place in the region but also to be active in shaping events and creating changes himself. This is important in many respects, because the siege of Shkodër has been posited as a pivotal moment in the history of northern Albania.<sup>45</sup> Esad Paşa understood the significance of the first Balkan War against the Ottoman state and his own role in the defense of northern Albania, which indicates a man capable of writing his own place in history. Toptani calculated that Shkodër, the largest and culturally most important Albanian city at the time, would be the key to securing a political future in the region. His foresight is remarkable: he not only proved capable of securing the city's defenses for months but seemingly knew in advance that the key battles for regional power would be held in and around his base.<sup>46</sup>

It was clear to Esad Paşa that the empire's control over the region was evolving. Much like Isa Boletini, he wanted to dictate the terms of these changes, which were of course as yet unclear. Northern and central Albania would be the base for his ambitions, from which he could mediate among the rising Slav powers, the fading Ottoman state, and the other European states. Interestingly, it is clear from the archives that he was setting the stage for such a role before the siege of Shkodër actually began in late 1912. The *vali* of İşkodra, Hasan Rıza Paşa, after consultations that took place in 1911 when Esad Paşa was serving as the head of his commission, expected him to raise and organize northern Albanian contingents that could supplement Ottoman regulars, who were badly outnumbered by their Slav adversaries. At the same time when Esad Paşa was securing the perimeter defenses of İşkodra, however, he seemed to busy himself in consolidating his power among the communities around the city, which he would rely on for support in manpower and supplies in the period that followed. It is even more interesting, however, that he was apparently in contact with Montenegro's leaders well before the First Balkan War began.<sup>47</sup> Hence in many ways Esad Paşa was both creating the conditions for war and defending against it. This again can be appreciated by remembering that he was the principal arms smuggler in the region, basically rearming the very Albanians who would end up fighting Ottoman and Montenegrin troops.<sup>48</sup>

At the beginning of the siege of Shkodër it was clear that years of revolt and repression had seriously fragmented the region. Serb, Russian and Montenegrin, Austrian, and Ottoman money was the primary glue that had established temporary alliances, resulting in a confused and disorganized Ottoman defense and an even more confusing array of personal rivalries. The Toptani clan was keeping the flow of gold and weapons open to all parties and Esad Paşa himself was actively engaging in discussion with Montenegro, Serbia, and Russia, which was of great concern in Vienna and Istanbul.<sup>49</sup> Despite his early overtures to Cetinje and Belgrade, it is clear that Esad Paşa was also maintaining a close relationship with members of the Young Turk regime, to the extent that they entrusted him with securing the region's frontiers.

Esad Paşa Toptani's ambitions are probably most exemplified in his contradictory actions during the siege of Scutari. While his men performed the most important task of keeping Slav forces at bay, Esad Paşa was also at odds with Hasan Rıza Paşa, who was in command. Ultimately Esad Paşa was accused of being responsible for the mysterious death of Hasan Rıza Paşa in what many suggest was his attempt to take sole control of the forces in Scutari.<sup>50</sup>

After the death of Hasan Rıza Paşa, who was apparently trying to secure the evacuation of non-Albanian troops from the city at the time, Esad Paşa continued to defend the city, despite the disease and starvation that were already causing deaths among the civilian and military population. Hence the allegations of his "treachery" to Albanians seem unfounded at this stage. He ultimately did negotiate the surrender of the city, some three months after the European powers were suggesting that the city was lost. This may have saved Scutari from annexation rather than having proved disastrous for "Albanian history." By holding out in İşkodra Esad Paşa put pressure on the European powers, who were initially resigned to letting the city fall to the Slav armies surrounding it. Through dramatic measures such as incarcerating the Austrian and Italian consuls and refusing Russian "diplomatic" efforts to negotiate the evacuation of Turkish and Arab troops from the city along with civilians, the lingering humanitarian catastrophe finally attracted Europe's full attention.<sup>51</sup>

Importantly, despite being in a city under siege, Esad Paşa was also intimately engaged in events in central Albania, where a provisional government had been created (with himself as minister of interior) after the declaration of independence in late 1912. By April 1913, after he had secured a form of international administration over İşkodra, Esad Paşa returned to Tirana and openly challenged the weak if not completely

powerless government headed by İsmail Kemal Bey.<sup>52</sup> As a result Esad Paşa began to make open claims to be the ruler of “autonomous” Albania in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, within two weeks he had a functioning government put together, staffed by ministers, and even a state letterhead.<sup>54</sup>

Toptani’s place in regional politics, much like that of his primary adversary, İsmail Kemal Bey, depended as much on outside support as on his ability to generate local legitimacy.<sup>55</sup> Esad Paşa sought to consolidate his local claims by maintaining his essential stabilizing role in the region. This in many ways answers questions about why he was eagerly creating such controversy with his claim to a government while at the same time claiming to operate with the agreement of Istanbul.<sup>56</sup> In the end he wanted outside powers to rely on his power to restore stability in order to assure his place in any future discussions about the region.<sup>57</sup>

This forces the historian to consider the context in which Toptani was operating. The conditions of the day did not demand unmitigated loyalty to a state or even to individual leaders. The key was the perception of success, often expressed by someone’s capacity to generate money and weapons to placate those allies who would fight and die for faction leaders such as Boletini, Toptani, or the Ottoman state. This is where Toptani’s active role in asserting his own place in the region’s recent memory and future possibilities is most clear. The time of extended war in which Serb and Greek forces occupied most of Albanian-inhabited territory for long periods reflects the highly contentious and fluid channels through which communities and individuals passed during moments of great uncertainty. Amid the chaos, the old regional dynamic between Tosk Albanians and Ghegs like Toptani would loom large.<sup>58</sup> For political and economic reasons Esad Paşa was much at odds with the southern Albanian Ottoman elite, as represented by figures like İsmail Kemal Bey.<sup>59</sup> He was able to secure funds, assistance from the Italians, and the loyalty of a significant force by the middle of 1913, which gave him the capacity to assert some form of local control over the region without the support of the southern Albanian elite, whose loyalties and allegiances gravitated toward Greece and who had the support of the British and French.<sup>60</sup>

While Esad Paşa is generally condemned for his dealings with Serbia and Montenegro, it must be remembered that the power vacuum created by the departure of the Ottoman army and the challenges in the international system at the time meant that he had little or no alternative but to deal with either Slav or Greek powers.<sup>61</sup> From his negotiations with the generals besieging İşkodra until Serb forces were compelled to evacuate

northern and central Albania, he understood that power in the region rested much more in the hands of Belgrade and its allies the British and French than with the fading Ottoman state.<sup>62</sup>

While most historians seem to assume that all Albanians were struggling for independence, I would suggest that an independent Albania was not necessarily the option most obvious to people on the ground. It is clear that Toptani was not taking chances in a world in confusion. Various offers from Montenegro, Rome, Istanbul, and Belgrade in one shape or another to let him rule over central Albania in return for the stability that he could promise indicate that his appreciation of the world at the time is far more accurate than our interpretations of that world more than seventy-five years later. I suggest that a strong and sizable number of the elite in the Ottoman Empire were not willing to entrust their futures to the creation of nation-states. The same held true in Albania, I believe. The waters of independence looked very threatening to many of those who were key to the functioning of Albanian society. Esad Paşa was clearly of the opinion that independence would only lead to partition and therefore supported claims for autonomy within the context of an Ottoman Empire that had not yet been parceled out by the Great Powers and accepted support from Montenegro, Italy, and Serbia in the hope of staving off military occupation.<sup>63</sup>

All this would change with the outbreak of World War I, of course, and we see Esad Paşa's continued activities in the region shift from claims of loyalty to a loosely defined Ottoman project to one more in line with the plan that Austria, one of the occupying powers after 1915, had envisioned for the region. At this stage Esad Paşa's options were once more limited to survival. His correspondence with potential supporters in Vienna suggests what I believe is a defense of his role in response to the tempest of the times. In these documents, found in the War Archives in Vienna, Toptani sought to secure his place with the Austrians, who had soundly defeated the Serbian army in the Balkans in early 1915. His formal relationships with the Ottoman Empire, with the Serbs, and with his immediate past were now completely severed.<sup>64</sup>

The state apparatus that actually emerged was managed by people who had no stake in the region over which they expected to rule. As a result the operating logic was no longer cooperation in developing mechanisms to engage the fellow subjects of a heterogeneous state. In other words, by the spring of 1912 the Ottoman western Balkans would become a zone of violence not to subjugate but to extricate. The military regimes of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro were no longer interested

in managing new territories with indigenous communities intact; their *modus operandi* was expulsion and plunder, a politics of eradication that had already been in practice in the plains of North America and in southern Africa, central Asia, and soon in the Middle East.

The many divisions within so-called Albanian communities discussed here also help to explain the chaos of the interwar periods in Albanian, Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish histories. This is especially the case in borderland areas, including the Malësi, Kosova, Bulgaria, Thrace, Macedonia, and Epirus. Such political fragmentation resulted in a comprehensive expulsion of the remaining communities of these areas after World War I in a process of population exchanges sanctioned by the League of Nations. The “modernity” that thus rose out of the ashes of an Ottoman experience of six hundred years no longer tolerated nuance; the opportunity to project absolute power left planners no longer interested in negotiating power with local stakeholders. Instead the administrative goal was the full-scale extradition of people unfortunate enough to be labeled “minority” or “Turk.” In other words, who these geographically dispersed and persecuted peoples were and how they would live or die in a post-Ottoman world to a great degree depended on how they were categorized by new state bureaucracies and on their ability to “navigate” the criteria of nationality largely determined by the French- and British-dominated “world community” known as the League of Nations.<sup>65</sup> As a consequence, most of the local self-identified constituent groups highlighted throughout this book did not survive the fall of the Ottoman Empire, because they were incapable of surviving in the new post-Ottoman categories of the state. In the process they lost their voice and their role in history, because the rest of the world no longer had to engage them.

But perhaps most importantly the failure to imagine the consequences of an Ottoman collapse also informs how we can revisit parallel dynamics at work within a CUP regime that was not monolithic in its approach to social and political unrest in the larger Ottoman context. The reasons why Istanbul adopted such harsh responses to challenges presented by locals in Kosova and İşkodra during the 1910–12 period (which ultimately alienated local communities) can be explained if put in context, but the fascination with “modern” forms of central state control cannot fully satisfy. In some cases the Ottoman state actually harnessed much more local, well-established methods of conflict resolution that accommodated and co-opted local rebels in ways that more satisfactorily addressed larger existential threats to Ottoman interests. This was certainly the case in 1911 in Yemen, situated in an equally contentious

context by the Red Sea, where an expansionist Italy and British imperial projects openly funded rebellious communities at the direct expense of the Ottoman state's abilities to rule Arabia.<sup>66</sup> Innovative management of local politics in Yemen led to a binding alliance with a long-standing rebel, which signals the possibility that similar attempts at conflict resolution either were at play or at least were entertained with respect to the Balkans. At this analytical juncture, returning to an otherwise misused set of cases involving similar kinds of local agents of stability/instability in the Kosova/İşkodra provinces can offer a new approach to the study of sources of conflict and their possible consequences.

### CONCLUSION

This chapter has briefly explored what I see as a possible alternative to appreciating types of war memories. The three men studied here demonstrate how divergent the paths taken by individuals may be. The various ways in which they would emerge as primary actors in the course of the war suggest that their very complex differences throughout their lives require that we expand on our appreciation of how historical actors interact with the world around them. Rather than simply relying on general categories to situate them within grand sociological schemes, a more useful way of appreciating memories and the events that shape them is to recognize the direct inputs that individuals have in how we remember their world. While these men all came from "Albanian" families, the very paths that they took as well as the ways in which they actively sought to engage themselves in the events around them require a far more detailed and less general study of the war. As the biographies of these three men demonstrate, no matter how much we try to encompass historical events in composite narrative form, such frameworks inevitably prove inadequate to illuminate the contingencies and deeply personal impact that outside events may have on human beings.

This study also has initiated a method of appreciating those individual contingencies that returns direct cognition to the actors involved. The actions of three men and the people around them actively intervened in history. In addition, they took part in the composing of the facts, figures, and events that would be remembered today. Most importantly, however, they actively engaged in the writing of that memory, if not with their own hands then at least with a conscious effort to influence how we are to remember them, a level of agency that social scientists and historians rarely concede to their subjects.

## NOTES

1. Again I am ready to concede that this deeper elaboration of causes and consequences in a geographically limited arena only muddies the waters further. At the same time, however, I must stress the importance of not seeking to encapsulate in any single narrative the dynamics contributing to, and ultimately transforming, the lives of those involved, even in such a narrow scope as covered here. Therefore I am offering a corrective in the sense that it points to other possible ways of asking questions of our sources, in effect highlighting events transpiring before, during, and after the wars as stimulants for new social, political, economic, and/or cultural orientations.
2. Isa Blumi, "Thwarting the Ottoman Empire"; and idem, "Contesting the Edges of the Ottoman Empire."
3. See M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Sluglett, eds., *War and Diplomacy*.
4. BBA, TFR.1 KV 103/10242, Italian colonel report, dated August 29, 1905. French and British observers later remarked on similar solidarity between "ethnic and religious groups" among the Sandanski group circulating in the Serres/Serez region. National Archives of the United Kingdom (NA), FO 371/534, O'Connor to Grey, dated Pera, March 13, 1908.
5. Some contemporaries who attempted to link Austro-Hungarian interests with those of certain actors in the western Balkans via the media asserted that much of the violence discussed throughout this chapter reflected growing demands for "Albanian" independence from the so-called Young Turk-led government dominating the Ottoman Empire. Among other works, see Ekrem Bey Vlora, *Die Wahrheit über das Vorgehen der Jungtürken in Albanien*; and Leopold Freiherr von Chlumecky, "Die Jungtürken und Albanien."
6. Qemali's influence rested on his links with others in the region and his ability to conduct the affairs of many constituencies across any cultural barrier that might emerge. For this reason he was a highly sought-after ally by the opposition to the sultan in the late 1890s; as well as having close contacts with British agents, he had become a prominent CUP leader by 1904. He actively lobbied governments throughout the Mediterranean. In this capacity he helped press the sultan into making reforms while occasionally advocating forming a political union between his home districts in Epirus and Greece. See Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 113–23.
7. The same could be said about Montenegro and to some extent Serbia vis-à-vis the Albanian Muslims and Orthodox Christians (but not Catholics) living in the Kosova and İşkodra provinces. In the case of Montenegro, British agent Edith Durham, today heralded inaccurately as an unequivocal supporter of "Albanian" independence, openly worked with Prince Nikola well into the winter of 1912–13 to secure the services of local Malësorë in a bloody struggle over the frontiers of the western Balkans. See her reports in the *Guardian* from October 16 to November 11, 1912.
8. For details of Qemali's efforts as a loyal Ottoman, see BBA, HR.SYS 1792/1, Tevfik Paşa to Anthopoulos Paşa, no. 46333–28, dated Istanbul, March 3, 1902.
9. Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878–1912*, 463.

10. On Qemali's sentiments toward the British, which would translate into open praise for British civilization in *Osmanlı*, see BBA, HR.SYS 1792/1, no. 15918/90, Münir Bey to Tevfik Paşa, dated Paris, February 19, 1902. For an example of this media campaign to highlight the need for the Ottoman state to move closer to Britain for the benefits of obtaining modern civilization, see "İngiltere Dostluğu," *Osmanlı* 111, dated August 30, 1902.
11. Among other works, see Nevila Nika, *Përmbledhje dokumentesh mbi kryengritjet shqiptare (1910–1912)*; Gjergj Nikprelaj, *Kryengritja e Malësisë e vitet 1911*; Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo*; Bilgin Çelik, *İttihatçılar ve Arnavutlar II*; and Banu İşlet Sönmez, *II. Meşrutiyette Arnavut Muhalefeti*. These studies, however, argue that such interactions are instrumental to an ethno-national narrative that should not be assumed on the basis of retrospection after World War I, when conditions were entirely different from those pertaining before the outbreak of war in October 1912: Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 177–89.
12. For Ottoman reports on the events, see BBA, TFR.1.KV 206/20501, dated Priştina, 24 Cemaziyelahir 1326 (July 24, 1908).
13. See Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 2–15.
14. Çelik, *İttihatçılar ve Arnavutlar*, 98–111.
15. BBA, TFR.1.KV 206/20501, Galib Bey to Palace, dated 1 Temmuz 1324 (July 7, 1908). The legacy of these events was dutifully tabulated by Ahmet Şerif, a journalist for the Young Turk daily *Tanin*, in issue 624, dated May 28, 1910.
16. More than thirty thousand men are said to have come to the support of the revolution. Süleyman Külçe, *Firzovik Toplantısı ve Meşrutiyet*, 11–15.
17. Külçe (ibid., 60–61) provides a copy of the telegrams. What is interesting about the demands for the restoration of the constitution is the justification for defying the sultan put forward by the signatories. From the mufti of Üsküp/Skopje, Hasan Fehmi, to a number of *bayraktars* and merchants, all self-appointed state loyalists (numbering 190 people in all), the call for change in the empire was based not on separatist demands but on more parochial, individual considerations. Sönmez, *II. Meşrutiyette*, 86–91.
18. Fortunately more and more scholarship is emerging to suggest that events in the Balkans during this era were animated by a variety of concerns among the principal actors, including competing commercial interests, the wish to limit the growing tax burden levied by the CUP-led government, and growing agitation from neighboring states. See, for instance, Alberto Basciani and Antonio d'Alessandri, *Balciani* 1908.
19. The Austrian consul in the region was especially interested in these events; his early reports on efforts to capture Boletini were highlighted as significant in the power dynamics of the entire borderland region from November 1908 onward. See, for instance, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [ÖStA], HHStA, PA XXXVIII/386 (hereafter HHStA), Zambaur, Mitrovica, to Foreign Minister, report 105, November 25, 1908.
20. Again the Austrian consuls based in the region provide the best information on these events, which expanded into a new spring campaign in what was ultimately reduced to a policy of burning down the homes of possible Boletini sympathizers. See HHStA, PA XXXVIII/387, Zambaur, Mitrovica, to Foreign Ministry,



- report 28, April 10, 1909, and HHStA, PA XXXVIII/404, von Rudnay, Prizren, to Foreign Ministry, telegram 9, March 27, 1909. For details of how these measures ultimately changed life in Boletini's region, see, for instance, Ahmet Şerif, "İpek'den Mitroviça'ya," *Tanin* 650, June 23, 1910.
21. For the local alliances established by Isa Boletini after 1908, which clearly concerned the CUP authorities in Kosova, see BBA, TFR.1.KV 151/15031, Kosova Vali to Interior Minister, dated 8 Recep 1327 (July 26, 1909).
  22. For detailed reports on the various strategies to undermine local resistance to this dual campaign of suppressing a local insurrection and raising troops for overseas campaigns, see the valuable Austrian-Hungarian consular reports from Mitrovica and Prizren: HHStA, PA XXXVIII/387, Zambaur, Mitrovica, to Foreign Ministry, report 41, May 16, 1909, and HHStA, PA XXXVIII/404, Prochaska, Prizren, to Foreign Ministry, report 51, June 9, 1909.
  23. Despite the considerable manpower that Kosovar historians claim Boletini brought to the Qemali government, he was nevertheless relegated to commander, along with Rıza Bey Gjakovës, of the gendarmerie in Qemali's state—hardly the position awarded to an influential major personality in the region.
  24. It was reported that at the height of CUP oppression in the western Balkans and rumors of Bulgarian and Serbian invasion Boletini openly boasted about his continuing value as an intermediary to diplomats and European journalists, all of whom were quite keen to win the loyalty of a man responsible for instigating such diplomatic trouble for so many years. NA, FO 109/2407.4322, August 20, 1912.
  25. Indeed by the time Boletini's patron, Sultan Abdülhamid II, was ousted from power, he had realigned himself with local forces and initiated an uprising in Kosova that soon became a struggle for Albanian autonomy. With the Ottoman army closing in on Boletini, his struggle changed once again. By late 1910 he was in exile in Montenegro, under the protection of Prince Nikola, and was planning a new round of confrontation, this time on behalf of Cetinje. See Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE), SAP Pacco 669, Cetinje, June 19, 1910, no. 351/108, consul in Montenegro to San Giuliano, MAE.
  26. For representative sentiments circulating in a leading newspaper of the time, see the front pages of Lütfi Fikri, "Arnavutluk İğtişâşı," *Ifham*, 22 Mayıs 1328 (June 4, 1910); and idem, "Arnavutluk Islahatı," *Ifham*, 25 Mayıs 1328 (June 7, 1910).
  27. Jonathan Schmitt explores aspects of this turn of events (chapter 17 in this volume), and other Ottomanists have recently studied this dynamic at play. See Usama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism."
  28. For a useful summary of these events, see George Gawrych, *The Crescent and the Eagle*, 185–202.
  29. Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 80–92.
  30. On the role played by Austrian money in encouraging various regional Albanian-language committees that aimed to mobilize local demands for cultural autonomy from Greek and Ottoman institutions, see HHStA, PA XXXVIII/396, Posfai, Manastir, to Foreign Ministry, report 34, May 25, 1909; and Nathalie Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*, 616–31.
  31. Events in the Gjakova (Yakova) and Peja (İpek) districts were closely monitored by Austrian consuls in the region. See HHStA, PA XXXVIII/387, report 25, von Tahy, Mitrovica, to Foreign Ministry, October 6, 1911.

32. On the manipulative efforts by the Montenegrin government to offer sustenance selectively to those refugees who could better serve their immediate strategic interests, see HHStA, PA XIV/33, Liasse XXXIV, "Albanesisches Aufstand," Freiherr von Giesl, Cetinje, to Foreign Ministry, report 104, December 5, 1910. Despite supporting accounts by Albanians that celebrate the role of Edith Durham in supporting so-called pan-Albanian causes against the Slavs, Turks, and Greeks, it is clear from her own letters that the British agent used most of her political skills up to December 1912 (after the Balkan Wars began) to help Prince Nikola forge alliances with destitute refugees from Ottoman territories. This often came at a high price for local Malësorë, whose leverage over the Montenegrin state would immediately fall. This disaster translated during the war into a violent set of policy changes inside the Montenegrin state vis-à-vis its Malësorë subjects. Edith Durham, *The Struggle for Scutari (Turk, Slav, and Albanian)*.
33. In the winter of 1910 the Catholic Kelmëndi communities were most targeted by Cetinje. HHStA, PA XIV/33, Liasse XXXIV, "Albanesisches Aufstand," in Zambaur, Scutari, to Foreign Ministry, report 109, December 12, 1910.
34. For the way events transpired during the 1910 spring/summer campaign, see Austro-Hungarian consular reports: HHStA, PA XXXVIII/387, von Tahy, Mitrovica, to Foreign Ministry, telegram 23, May 11, 1910; von Tahy, Mitrovica, to Foreign Ministry, report 95, July 28, 1910, Prochaska, Prizren, to Foreign Ministry, report 60, May 15, 1910; and Prochaska, Prizren, to Foreign Ministry, report 126, October 14, 1910, 387, 404, 403.
35. The nature of state action against local insurrections forced local leaders who remained loyal to the CUP government, like Necib Draga and Hasan Prishtina, to accommodate growing local frustrations by vocal opposition to state policies. In time demands for local self-management schemes reflected indigenous concerns that such violence only undermined their capacity to maintain local power hierarchies. See, for instance, Çelik, *İttihatçılar ve Arnavutlar*, 384–402; and Sönmez, *II. Meşrutiyette*, 150–55.
36. For the way in which the Ottoman state interpreted the declaration of independence, see BBA, BEO Irade Harbiye 309255. Anything close to being called an Albanian "state," however, only materialized in 1920 when a national council was established. Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror (AQSH), F. 246 D. 1 V. 1920 is the file located in Tirana that reveals the contested nature of this nation-building process.
37. Kosova and western Macedonia's Albanian speakers are well known by now as embodying the consequences of this territorial exclusion, but what is identified today as the Chameria issue is central to those involved in Albanian politics today. The Albanian State Archive has recently attempted to address this by publishing documents pertaining to the issue along the Greek/Albanian border. Kaliopi Naska, ed., *Dokumente për Çamërinë, 1912–1939*.
38. In a revealing letter to the Austrian consul in Marseille, a man named Kissey [?] wrote that he was with Esad Paşa between 1893 and 1896 in Janina, where he was a commander of a gendarmerie force. The letter describes Esad Paşa as possessing great intelligence for a young man of thirty and being at ease with other elites like the Vloras, Vrionis, and Djelal Bey Klissure and his troops. He is described as a hard religious man who was vehemently opposed to Europeans and did not speak well of the Catholics of northern Albania. The profile is revealing inasmuch

- as it shows a man already firmly in control of his image and in command of a social identity that translated to his political rhetoric and deeds in the future. See HHStA PA XII/423, Consul, Marseille, to Foreign Ministry, documents 154–55v, May 7, 1913.
39. See ASMAE, SAP Pacco 668, consul to MAE, no. 452/187, dated Scutari, September 11, 1908.
  40. HHStA, PA XII/423, Liasse XIV, provides extensive intelligence on Esad Paşa Toptani's political efforts during the early Young Turk period.
  41. For a list of the Albanian deputies, see *Leka* 9, November 28, 1937, 363. This newsletter, published periodically by the Jesuits in interwar Albania, is probably the best single source and the foundation of modern Albanian historiography.
  42. As an example of this dual role, *İkdam* reported that Esad Paşa had organized a commission and personally visited the areas in revolt in and around İşkodra in order to assure local communities that Istanbul was doing its best. I would suggest that these meetings had far more to do with consolidating contacts than with shoring up CUP loyalties in the region. See *İkdam*, April 8, 1911.
  43. On Esad Paşa's activities as the region's primary smuggler of weapons, see ASMAE, Ambasciata e Costantinopoli B. 220, consul in Durazzo to Italian Embassy in Constantinople, no. 489/27, Scutari, June 23, 1910, reporting on a letter from the vice-consul in Durazzo on June 19, 1910. For a report on Esad Paşa's local power as evidenced in his relations with Italian merchants as well as with the diplomatic community in the area in late 1910, see ASMAE, SAP Pacco 669, letter of complaint to the Mutassarif of Durazzo, no. 364/116, Durazzo, October 30, 1910.
  44. Toptani's motivations behind this volunteering of his considerable force to defend İşkodra is ignored today, but a contemporary provides a good overview of the events that brought Esad Paşa to his position as self-proclaimed leader of autonomous Albania by 1913. See HHStA, PA XII/423, documents 136r–138v, report by Sureia Bey, Vlora, to Foreign Ministry, May 6, 1913.
  45. An important source of information is an extensive profile of Toptani by Italian officials in March of 1914; see ASMAE, Archivio di Ganinetto Pacco 29. An interesting apologia for Esad Toptani produced by members of the Albanian diaspora in Istanbul in the 1970s offers a different interpretive angle on his legacy: Tahir Kolgjini, *Esat Pashë Toptani dhe Akuzat, Qi Baben*.
  46. For the siege of Shkodër, see Genelkurmay (General Staff), *İşkodra Savunması ve Hasan Rıza Paşa*; Preng Uli, *Hasan Riza Pasha*; and Jérôme Tharaud and Jean Tharaud, *La Bataille Scutari d'Albanie*.
  47. HHStA, PA XII/424: various folios point to Esad Paşa's early solicitation of the support of Prince Nikola before the siege of İşkodra began.
  48. ASMAE, SAP Pacco 670, consul to San Giuliano, no. 190/71, Scutari, February 25, 1911, MAE. Dai Bey Toptani, a relative of Esad Paşa, was reportedly managing the distribution of the arms once they entered Albania.
  49. These fears are outlined in a telegram sent from Salonika in May of 1913, reminding Vienna that Esad Paşa was a manipulative and opportunistic character whose ties with Serbia and Russia were still not well understood. See HHStA, PA XII/423, documents 62–63, telegram 263, Salonika, to Foreign Ministry, May 1, 1913.
  50. For the view of the Austrian military attaché in Istanbul, Joseph Pomiankowski,

see HHStA, PA XII/423, documents 223–30, “Der Fall von Skutari,” no. 124, Constantinople, May 3, 1913. The report clearly calls Esad Paşa an opportunist who took advantage of the chaotic situation in Scutari to secure control of the forces there.

51. For details of the kinds of measures taken by Esad Paşa to assure European engagement in Scutari, see ASMAE, Ambasciata e Constantiniopoli B. 223, telegram 1826, March 28, 1913, in which it is reported that Austrian consul Marquis Johann von Pallavicini was placed under military guard by Esad Paşa; and telegram 1832, dated March 28, 1913, on how Esad Paşa secured the necessary conditions from Prince Nikola of Montenegro and Austria’s foreign minister, Count Berchtold, to assure that Scutari would remain under “international” protection after the laying down of his troops’ arms.
52. İsmail Kemal Bey proved utterly incapable of securing the territories under his administration (December 1912–April 1913). The invading Greek military had besieged Vlora/Valona and other southern Albanian cities for weeks, leaving little or no power for İsmail Kemal Bey to resist Esad Paşa’s moves in April 1913. See ASMAE, Ambasciata e Constantiniopoli B. 223, telegram 4669, December 6, 1912, on a report from Durazzo that Greek forces were bombing Valona and that the population throughout the region was in a state of panic. This was to produce a great deal of animosity toward İsmail Kemal’s claims to leadership in the period that followed.
53. In spite of Esad Paşa’s much vaunted allegiance to the Ottoman state, the Sublime Porte passed on a message to the Italians meant to be communicated to him: the Sublime Porte expected him, as a loyal servant of the state, to take his men (numbering over twenty thousand) and board ships waiting to take them to Beirut, as negotiated between the warring parties. Of course Esad Paşa was not party to those negotiations. It is indicative of just how far things had gone in terms of the relationship between himself and Istanbul that the Porte needed the Italians to pass on a message to him. See HHStA, PA XII/423, documents 97–98, telegram 1088, von Merey, Rome, to Foreign Ministry, May 4, 1913.
54. See the letter written to Austrian and Italian officials requesting recognition of the state declared by Esad Paşa Toptani in which members of his council, including the minister of war, Mehmed Rushdi, and the president of the council, Vehbi Bey, outline the claims of this early state. HHStA, PA XII/423, document 16, no. 26, Valona, April 29, 1913. Within two weeks of this correspondence it was reported that Montenegro had supported Esad Paşa’s claim to the throne of Albania. The Austrian consul in Scutari, Alfred von Zambaur, said that little could be done if Esad Paşa wanted to make such a claim, because he did have control of almost all of central Albania, with fifteen battalions at his disposal and another five based in Scutari despite the cease-fire. See HHStA PA XII/423, document 120, von Zambaur, Scutari, to Foreign Ministry, telegram 1669, May 6, 1913.
55. While Albanian historians today claim that Esad Paşa was always hated, this is simply not the case, at least according to a number of contemporary reports. Indeed it was reported from as far away as Athens that Esad Paşa had developed a “mythical” status that may have been the occasion for hostility in Greece but nevertheless speaks of something far more complicated than the assertions of contemporary

- historians. See HHStA, PA XII/423, document 121, Baron Braun, Athens, to Foreign Ministry, telegram 1557, May 6, 1913.
56. With regard to those claims the Ottoman state, while trying to maintain some contact with Esad Paşa, was at the same time distancing itself from him vis-à-vis the international community. Istanbul clearly felt it had been outmaneuvered by Esad Paşa. In a "note verbale" written from the Ottoman embassy in Vienna, the Sublime Porte declared that Esad Paşa "n'a été chargé d'aucune mission politique par le Gouvernement Impérial. Les assertions de certains journaux et de quelques milieux intéressés à cet égard sont des suppositions malveillantes ou de pures inventions" (is not charged with any political role by the Imperial Government. The assertions made by some newspapers and interested parties in this matter are purely malicious speculations and fabrications). HHStA, PA XII/423, documents 51r–51v, Vienna, May 2, 1913.
  57. The Austrians, for one, clearly appreciated Esad Paşa's local power, reporting that he was both extremely intelligent and very popular in the country. That did not mean that they trusted him, however, especially as they were busy trying to secure their own candidate for king of Albania. See HHStA, PA XII/423, documents 125r–v, no. 148, von Rudnay to Berchtold, Durazzo, May 6, 1913.
  58. In fact many of the documents found in the Austrian archives refer to Esad Paşa as "Präsident der Ghegheria" (president of Ghegheria), a reflection of regional factors that clearly affected how European consuls interpreted events on the ground. See HHStA, PA XII/423, document 307r–v, von Rudnay to Vienna, telegram 321, Durazzo, May 17, 1913.
  59. It appears that by June 1913 Esad Paşa was increasingly seeking ways to draw in the fragmented elements of central Albania. A telegram sent from the French vice-consul in Vlora/Valona reported that İsmail Kemal Bey had received a note from Abdi Bey stating that a number of leaders in Dibra, Mati, Durazzo, and elsewhere were calling for a reconvening of the "national council," which declared independence in late November 1912. According to İsmail Kemal Bey, this was not to be trusted: Esad Paşa was trying to draw İsmail Kemal Bey out in order to destroy him. İsmail Kemal reminded the French (and Austrian) consuls that he still had considerable support in Berat and other southern regions and was in no hurry to cave in to Esad Paşa. See HHStA, XII/423, documents 472–73, Lejhanec, Valona, to Durazzo consulate, telegram 649, June 4, 1913.
  60. The Austrians believed that Esad Paşa had at least twenty thousand men at his immediate disposal in central Albania, with another six thousand on various duties throughout the rest of the country. This represented a significant force that had to be taken seriously. See HHStA, PA XII/423, document 62, von Rudnay, Durazzo, to Foreign Ministry, telegram 747, May 2, 1913.
  61. For an illuminating report on a conversation between an unidentified official and Esad Paşa Toptani in late April 1913 and his rationale behind forming alliances with the Serbs and Montenegrins, which involved large sums of money, see HHStA, PA XII/423, document 133r–v, Vienna, May 6, 1913 [author unknown].
  62. While ultimately seeing Esad Paşa as an adversary, Austrian officials nevertheless seem to have understood the rationale behind his alliances with his relatively powerful Serb and Montenegrin neighbors, which concerned Austria. This is

perhaps an indication that Esad Paşa Toptani understood the realities on the ground far better than Enver Hoxha's historians did. See HHStA, PA XII/432, documents 69–72, no. 24, Pallavicini, Constantinople, to Berchtold, Vienna, May 3, 1913.

63. In much the same way that Isa Boletini sought out Western journalists to ensure that his place in local politics would be secure, Esad Paşa actively reached out to the Italians through their special correspondents, who paid a visit to the “uomo di eccezionale energia” (man of exceptional energy). Unfortunately for Esad Paşa, his ability to control what was written about him was limited. See a page-long interview with Esad Paşa in a Milan-based paper, *Secolo*, on May 18, 1913: Luciano Magrini, “Un lungo colloquio con Essad Pascia a Tirana.”
64. Kriegsarchiv/Austrian War Archives, NFA MGG 920, document 23. Ironically the religious elite in Istanbul, on paper allied with Austrian troops in the war, issued a fatwa against Esad Paşa for finally declaring his and Albania's break from the Ottoman Empire as well as for arranging the murder of Haxhi Qemali, who was seen as a key component in Istanbul's effort to maintain influence in Albania. ASMAE, Ambascata e Constantiniopli B. 223, Rome, January 25, 1915.
65. Theodora Dragostinova, “Navigating Nationality in the Emigration of Minorities between Bulgaria and Greece, 1919–1941.”
66. Isa Blumi, *Foundations of Modernity*, chapter 2.

## Ottoman Disintegration in the Balkans and Its Repercussions

*Sevtap Demirci*

Balkan history can be analyzed from both a national and an international perspective. The first perspective concerns the rise and development of nations and their relations with each other, while the second concerns their relations with the outside world. According to this second perspective, on which I focus here, each unit becomes a mere pawn in the vast diplomatic game that came to be known as the "Eastern Question."<sup>1</sup> The Eastern Question, an expression used to indicate the problems created by the decline and gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, persisted for a century and a half as the most enduring and intractable of all diplomatic issues. The situation was further aggravated by the pressing need to produce a quick solution to what would become of the Ottoman Empire and how to divide the Ottoman lands among the Great Powers. "The Eastern Question only interests Europe," said Otto von Bismarck at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, "though it [has] effects upon the relations of the Great Powers among themselves."<sup>2</sup> The more economic and strategic interests of the Great Powers in the empire grew and ensuing rivalries became visible, the more firmly the Eastern Question became established as a priority on the agenda of international relations. The Balkans have always been a formidable and vital part of the Eastern Question.<sup>3</sup> Therefore the Balkans and the Eastern Question are interconnected.

From the mid-nineteenth century until the beginning of World War I the Ottoman Empire, called the "sick man of Europe," faced multiple crises, most of which resulted in the loss of territory and subjects. Not only the policies of the Great Powers but also the differences between the various nationalities and religious communities constituted

big threats to the unity of the empire and to the ultimate fate of the Balkan people.

As a number of other chapters in this volume argue, the root of the matter was Macedonia.<sup>4</sup> No other area in the Balkans was the subject of so many disputes and the cause of as much bloodshed as Macedonia. To a very considerable degree, Balkan diplomacy after 1878 revolved around the explosive question of how Macedonia should be divided among the three neighboring countries: Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia.<sup>5</sup> Although the year 1878 is generally acknowledged as the beginning of the troubles, the Macedonian Question actually came into being in 1870, as Elisabeth Barker states, when "Russia successfully pressed the Ottoman Empire to allow the formation of a separate Bulgarian Orthodox Church, or Exarchate, with authority extending over parts of the Turkish province of Macedonia."<sup>6</sup> This step quickly brought Bulgaria into conflict both with Greece and with Serbia. The Greek patriarch in Constantinople, for example, declared the new autocephalous Bulgarian Church to be schismatic, and the Greek state sharply contested the spread of Bulgarian ecclesiastical, cultural, and national influence in Macedonia. Similarly the Serbian government, still nominally subject of the sultan, complained of the Ottomans' decision through ecclesiastical as well as diplomatic channels, and (after an interruption caused by Serbia's war with Turkey in 1877) also tried to resist Bulgarian influence in Macedonia. So began the three-sided contest for Macedonia.<sup>7</sup>

Bulgaria was chosen due to its geographic proximity to Russia and, along with Serbia, constituted Russia's chief instrument in exerting its influence in the Balkans through the Orthodox Church and through support of the "oppressed Slav people." While the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate is accepted here as the origin of the Macedonian Question, some say that Bulgarian interference in Macedonia had started some years earlier. Others find the root of the trouble in the San Stefano Treaty of 1878, in which Russia demanded the annexation of all of Slav Macedonia by Bulgaria. For their part Bulgarians blame the subsequent Treaty of Berlin, through which the Great Powers took Macedonia away from Bulgaria. Turks blame the same treaty: Macedonia had stood aside from the general political evaluation of the Balkan Peninsula until the Congress of Berlin and only then had entered the international political stage.<sup>8</sup> This view contains much truth, because at the end of the Berlin Congress six powers had the right to intervene in Macedonian affairs in order to supervise the application of the reforms (to improve the life of Christians) mentioned in article 23.<sup>9</sup> All these factors clearly contributed



to the Macedonian problem; but the fact remains that Russia's sponsorship of the Bulgarian Exarchate caused the first clash.<sup>10</sup>

### THE ATTITUDE OF THE GREAT POWERS

To analyze the Macedonian dispute and policy of the Great Powers within the historical context, it is worth looking primarily at the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. Following the defeat of the Ottoman army, the Russian threat to Istanbul was imminent. The Ottoman government had no choice but to sign the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, which gave Bulgaria enormously inflated frontiers. The war and the Treaty of Berlin that followed had what Hakan Yavuz assesses as several “detrimental social and political implications” for the empire: “the map that emerged after the Treaty of Berlin ignored natural boundaries as well as land and trade routes, and most of all it ‘recast the Ottoman Balkan possessions in such a way that it was no longer militarily feasible to defend them against either foreign aggression or internal insurrection.’”<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore the Treaty of Berlin provided guarantees of religious liberties in Macedonia and elsewhere. The Ottoman authorities delayed or obstructed the implementation of the European reform projects designed for the Christian communities, however, in the belief that they would encourage the growth of the national aspirations of the Christian communities. The second concern was the growing interference of the West in the domestic affairs of the empire and the possible dangers that might follow. The third issue was the growth of Muslim opposition to the reform projects.<sup>12</sup>

Among the Great Powers, Russia and Austria-Hungary were directly interested in the Balkans, but their interests clashed. The tsar, who proclaimed himself the natural protector of all Slavs, tried to establish Russia's domination of the Balkans by supporting the claims of the Slavs against the Ottoman central authority.<sup>13</sup> The main goal behind Russia's policy was to expand south into the Black Sea region in order to control the Straits—a gateway of immense strategic importance between the Balkans and Asia—by weakening the Ottomans in the region.

As other chapters in this volume indicate, the Austro-Hungarian Empire's policy was to secure land in the Balkans at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary, as the official protector of the Catholics in the peninsula, had wielded the right to administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Ottoman provinces, and to maintain a garrison in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar since 1878. The Austro-Hungarians wanted to prevent the growth of South Slav nationalism (viewing the growth of Serbian

power in the Balkans with considerable unease) and to prevent Russian influence from spreading into the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

For his part German chancellor Bismarck was concerned about the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans and stood behind Austria-Hungary in order to defend the integrity of the Habsburg Empire. He supported all the initiatives taken until the Congress of Berlin in 1878, by which time Germany's interest in the Ottoman Empire had become visible and begun to grow rapidly.<sup>14</sup> Already heavily involved in internal Ottoman politics, Germany officially opposed a war against the Ottoman Empire. Seeing the inevitability of the Ottoman disintegration, however, Germany began toying with the idea of replacing the current Balkan area with a friendly "greater Bulgaria" with its San Stefano borders—an idea based on the German origin of the Bulgarian king.

Britain, although officially a staunch supporter of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, took secret diplomatic steps encouraging the Greeks to counteract Russian influence. It also encouraged Bulgarian aspirations in Thrace, preferring a "Bulgarian Thrace" to a Russian one. British opinion was echoed in Prime Minister Gladstone's question posed in the *Times* in 1897: "Why not Macedonia for Macedonians, as Bulgars for Bulgarians and Servia for Servians?"<sup>15</sup> But not long after this statement, Britain would take a cautious stand toward the whole affair. Its main area of interest—as a naval power—was the Straits, the route to India, Egypt, Basra, and Africa.

Hence Britain and Austria were the two powers that objected to the establishment of Slav dominance and the increased Russian influence over the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire. The British press echoed this opinion (*Daily Telegraph*, July 8). The empire would be "under the immediate protectorate of England," and the British government was to become "responsible for the just and efficient administration of a country rich and varied in resources." No further Russian encroachments would be possible in the sultan's Asiatic dominions. To ensure Ottoman integrity Britain's garrisons were to be planted on the "magnificent Isle of Cyprus," whose "ample harbours would shelter commanding British fleets; and with the Persian Gulf for the other terminus of the Indian land route thus controlled, we shall gain imperial benefits equivalent to those which our strength and administrative skill can confer."<sup>16</sup>

France and Italy were the two powers relatively less involved in the whole issue. In that respect France followed a policy in favor of keeping the status quo due to fear that the region might fall under the complete control of Austria-Hungary and Russia, while Italy was not directly interested in Macedonia except culturally and focused more on the coastal

areas of Albania, Montenegro, and Greece, as Francesco Caccamo (chapter 7) and Isa Blumi (chapter 18) show in this volume.

### THE POLICY OF BALKAN NATIONS

Throughout the nineteenth century, determined to come to an immediate solution by bringing the Eastern Question to an end, the Great Powers accelerated their efforts by siding with the Balkan subjects of the Ottoman Empire. They formulated their policies to liberate the "oppressed people" in the name of the humanitarian and religious reasons. There were clear indications that the Berlin Congress would settle the Balkan issue according to the interests of the Great Powers and not according to the principles of self-determination and freedom.<sup>17</sup>

Macedonia became the zone of contention for several nationalist movements in about 1890, and Ottoman power showed signs of evaporating. In order to achieve political ends, organizations such as IMRO demanded the application of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, according to which the administrative reforms were to be implemented in the European lands of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>18</sup> "Liberty or death" was their slogan, aimed at "liberating" Macedonia from Ottoman domination. Such committees placed all their hopes on European diplomacy. As Nadine Lange-Akhund writes, the Great Powers were "torn between their desire to maintain peace, their different interests in the Ottoman Empire, and the problem of responding in the best possible manner to the national aspirations of the Balkan peoples."<sup>19</sup>

Though the phrase "Balkan nations" was used in the subtitle, the term "nationality" seems to have had no meaning in the Balkan states.<sup>20</sup> What is requisite for the constitution of a nation? Singleness of origin, unity of tradition, common ancestry, common language, institutions, administration of laws? These peoples were sufficiently differentiated to constitute homogeneous states. Therefore patriotism became a key concept that stirred them to revolt. Conflicts of a national and religious character contributed to the weakening power of the Sultan Abdülhamid II and led to the increasing interference of the Great Powers in Macedonian affairs.<sup>21</sup> The major weakness of the Macedonian reforms, which the Europeans failed to see (or chose to ignore), was that no "Christian Macedonians" existed *per se*; instead there were Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, and Vlachs who were Christians but also harbored nationalist aspirations and were supported by the neighboring Balkan states. Therefore reforms granted to the European provinces of the Ottoman

Empire inevitably encouraged different Christian communities still living in Ottoman domains.<sup>22</sup>

At the beginning of the twentieth century the conflicts of a national and religious nature once again succeeded in bringing about the intervention of the Great Powers.<sup>23</sup> The Macedonian Question entered a new phase with the Young Turk revolution of 1908. The attempts of the Great Powers to intervene in Macedonia were dropped on the grounds that the new regime might be willing to pursue a more conciliatory policy. The Balkan states, however, lost no time in taking advantage of the transitory period. Bulgaria proclaimed its independence, and on the same day Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, evoking fury in Serbia.<sup>24</sup> The Ottoman Empire, unwilling and unable to go to war with Bulgaria and Austria, accepted the *fait accompli*. Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania organized and financed revolutionary movements in order to divide Macedonia into zones of influence. The subject area was under the sovereignty of the Ottomans, so such uprisings were not tolerated and were suppressed by the Porte. Nonetheless this was seized as an opportunity to sway international opinion against "massacres of the Christians" and the "brutal regime of the Ottomans." The ethnic, historic, strategic, and economic claims of the Balkan states as well as the exploitation of these states by outside interests finally led to a catastrophe in 1912. The Balkans became the battleground of Europe.

#### THE FINAL BLOW: THE BALKAN WARS

The history of the Balkans and its complications is a composite of multi-dimensional elements. As Branimir M. Jankovic writes, "on one hand there are interests and aspirations of the Great Powers and on the other aspirations of the Balkan people to liberate themselves from various forms of subjugation and tutelage."<sup>25</sup> The Balkan states firmly believed that it was time for the Balkan people to liberate themselves from the Ottoman Empire. The Great Powers were in no position to stand in their way because they no longer conducted a concerted policy regarding the Balkans.<sup>26</sup>

While the Ottoman Empire was engaged in war with Italy in Tripoli,<sup>27</sup> the news of the Balkan Alliance reached Istanbul: Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro had united to drive the Ottomans out of Europe and to put an end to five hundred years of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. Austrian avowal of its intention to protect its interests in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and Russia's mobilization of its troops on the Galician

frontier were clear signs of the general European conflagration. All of Europe was plunged into a state of uneasiness about whether the Great Powers would be drawn into a larger conflict with each other. Montenegro's declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire was followed by an ultimatum presented by the other three Balkan states demanding autonomy for Macedonia. The answer of the Porte was a declaration of war against Bulgaria and Serbia on October 1912. The Bulgarians attacked Thrace, while Greece declared war on Turkey and attacked in the Aegean.<sup>28</sup> Due to the economic difficulties (lack of arms and ammunitions and lack of discipline in the army because of the long years of constant war) the Ottoman army suffered a defeat and asked for an armistice.

At the London Peace Conference on December 16, 1912, pressure was put on the Porte for the conclusion of peace. The Great Powers were able to force the weakened Ottoman Empire to cede Adrianople to the Allies and accept the frontier of eastern Thrace as well as leaving the fate of the Aegean Islands to them. This degree of destruction caused a lot of patriotic sorrow among the members of the Committee for Union and Progress. Unionist Mahmut Şevket Paşa overthrew the government of Kamil Paşa on January 22 and became the new grand vizier. The new government would in no way accept the terms of the London Peace Conference. In the process of establishing the new government, however, the Ottomans missed the deadline that had been granted for formulating a reply. When they failed to announce the official reply of the new government within a week, the representatives of the Balkan states denounced the armistice and ordered the resumption of hostilities on February 3, 1913. After Adrianople fell, the Ottoman government had to accept the provisions of the London Treaty on May 30, 1913. The Balkan states now possessed all of the Ottoman territories in Europe.

Bulgaria's attack on Greece and Serbia on June 29, 1913, started the second episode of the Balkan Wars. It was no longer a question of liberating Macedonia from the "Ottoman yoke" but of defeating rival Christian states. So they started carving the Balkans up from inside rather than enabling the Great Powers to do so. The Balkan states had already agreed to the division of all the Ottoman possessions in Europe. Therefore Austria's interference in the matter of securing a national existence for Albania had a secondary effect. Each of the Balkan states inaugurated a policy of nationalizing the new inhabitants that had fallen to it under the terms of new treaties. Stephen P. Duggen writes that by the end of the Balkan Wars the Ottoman Empire resembled "a sucked egg with an unbroken shell."<sup>29</sup>

### SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE BALKAN WARS

In light of these events it is possible to reach a number of conclusions on how the disintegration of the Ottomans changed the geographical and political destiny of the Balkans as analyzed here as well as the social and cultural futures of the region and its people (which is the subject of other valuable research). These conclusions may be outlined as follows.

The first issue of the newspaper *Mechveret* (Consultation) published by the Young Turks on December 3, 1895, described their program as follows: "We ask for reforms not for this or that province but for the whole Empire, not in favor of a nationality alone but for all the Ottomans, be they Jewish, Christian, or Muslim."<sup>30</sup> This oath was the base of the implementation of the constitution declared in 1876. This constitution would also dissuade powers from interfering in the affairs of the empire and ease the strict internal regime conducted by Sultan Abdülhamid II.

But the Young Turks' program of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," intended to regenerate the empire, failed to produce the desired effect. To quote G. F. Abbot, "the policy of unifying all the heterogeneous elements was seen as Turkey always maintained towards the rival nationalities, of which the population of the Empire is made up, the attitude of a passive onlooker.... Their internecine struggle did not seem to concern it directly.... Young Turkey has inaugurated a new policy—a policy of unification of all the heterogeneous elements into one people. What nature has divided, man cannot unite."<sup>31</sup> The heterogeneous national composition of the Balkans had been one of the major causes of the conflict. Each side denied that it had been the aggressor, accusing the others of atrocities that had created chaos and anarchy on all sides and claiming that its actions had been in retaliation. Hatred and distrust were endemic. While the Balkan states declared their policy "to correct their frontier," their true and ultimate goal remained expanding their territories. This first began with the plea for liberation, developed into a struggle of conquest, and finally ended as a brutal war of extermination, although the perpetual cry was "peace."

It is the customary view that the Great Powers made history and that the international situation was a matter of the balance of power that they established. In this power game the small nations merely became the targets of the interests and the ambitions of these Great Powers. But we should not overlook two major effects of the Great Powers. If item one was aggravating the regional instability due to their diverse interests

(thus provoking wider disputes through which the total breakdown of the Ottoman Empire became inevitable), item two would be that the Treaty of Berlin had to be agreed to by the Ottomans under these circumstances. For the Balkan states and the Great Powers who supported these national aspirations out of their own interests, the repeated and defiant violation of the Treaty of Berlin had created this catastrophe. For the Ottomans the Treaty of Berlin itself had been the cause of this unrest. Treaties ideally are created to resolve problems, yet it was clear that this treaty was based on the policies of the Great Powers, whose interests lay in the principle of "divide and rule." The root of the matter was how they would divide the conquered Ottoman territory. Therefore it was not the awakening of national consciousness but the artificial creation of this feeling by the Great Powers in order to secure their interests in the region and to solve the Eastern Question that brought about the Balkan Wars.

The end effect was the Ottomans' engagement in the Balkan Wars. Their territorial, financial, and human losses were so great that the devastated empire had no time or means to make the necessary preparations for World War I, so its defeat was inevitable. The Eastern Question had become so entangled that World War I was the only way to unravel it. In the end the Ottoman Empire lost almost all of its European possessions; five hundred years of Ottoman rule in the Balkans came to an end. The Balkans were no longer a part of the Eastern Question.

Analyzing the disintegration effects internally shows that the Young Turks' desperate efforts to keep the different elements of the Empire intact around the idea of "Ottomanism" proved fruitless. The Balkan Wars made it clear that this ideal had come to an end and needed to be replaced by a new ideal that was limited in scope, legitimate, and obtainable: "Turkism." The Ottoman identity was abandoned or reshaped in another form: "Turkishness." The concept of a "Turkish nation" and/or "Nationalists" started to be expressed more openly during the Nationalist struggle after the collapse of the empire following World War I. It is ironic that the Young Turks/Committee for Union and Progress came into existence and acted as an operational group in the Balkans yet became engaged in a struggle with the very territory in which they had been born and grown as an organization.

Some views evaluate the Balkan Wars from a religious angle and state that they were a struggle of the Christian Balkan peoples against Islam, that it was a war symbolized as "Cross against Crescent." Here the contradiction may arise as to how such supposedly religiously united people

became powerful rivals for the hegemony over the Balkans. Does this not indicate that religion in this case did not unite these people against the Islam represented by the Ottomans?

The Macedonian Question finally came to an end. A new map was drawn. The Eastern Question was out of the way. As noted, it was all about fixing the western boundary of Turkey and ending the power of the Ottomans in the region. This was achieved through a great loss of lives, resources, and humanitarian values. Was it all worth it? Did the region settle down in peace once and for all? We might argue that it resolved the problem: the empire disintegrated. If that is the case, we cannot help wondering why the same geography still produces multiple complications and never-ending renewed violence today, a century later.

To conclude, the Eastern Question and the Balkan Wars are interconnected and should be dealt with together. The clash of interests among the Great Powers was strongly stimulated by the idea that the Eastern Question would be resolved once and for all through the partition of the Ottoman Empire and that the Balkan Wars offered a path to achieve this. With the loss of all Ottoman possessions in the Balkans, the initial part of the solution of the Eastern Question was successfully achieved. And the success was crowned when the total destruction of the Ottoman Empire was completed at the end of World War I.

The awakening of national consciousness among the peoples of the Balkans and the exploitation of this feeling by the Great Powers to their advantage in order to secure their interests in the Balkans aggravated the already complex and complicated situation in the region. The Eastern Question, which flared up with the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78, continued with the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, and came to an end with World War I, was answered through the loss of the Balkans for the Ottomans. With the presentation of the Treaty of Sèvres to the Ottoman government soon after World War I the Great Powers believed that they had finally reached a solution to the Eastern Question. The total destruction of the empire had been completed with the partitioning of Ottoman Anatolia. But the rising Nationalist movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal put an effective brake on this quick solution. Turkish military victory was followed by a diplomatic victory at Lausanne (1923). The Turks put an end to the long-lasting Eastern Question. Its major elements—the clash of interests of individual states, the ensuing wars, and redesigned geography as a result of treaties—would take their place in history.



## NOTES

1. Sevtap Demirci, *British Public Opinion towards the Ottoman Empire during the Two Crises*, 11.
2. Norman D. Harris, "The Effect of the Balkan Wars on European Alliances and the Future of the Ottoman Empire," 106.
3. Demirci, *British Public Opinion*, 11.
4. The term "Macedonia" is usually employed in its most restricted—and probably its most correct—meaning to designate the region of the Balkans embraced within the three Ottoman *vilayets* (provinces) of Salonika, Monastir/Manastır, and Kosova/Kosovo, lying between the districts of Adrianople and Albania. For the purpose of this study, however, "Macedonia" is applied to the whole region of Europe retained by the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I.
5. L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, 517.
6. Elisabeth Barker, *Macedonia*, 7. (The most important Christian institution that survived the medieval states was the Orthodox Church, which conserved the cultural heritage of particular peoples and preserved the ethnic individuality of the faithful. Until 1870 Greek clergy had spiritual control of the Orthodox population of Macedonia. With the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, in 1870, however, the Orthodox Church lost its spiritual supremacy.)
7. Ibid.
8. Mehmet Hacısalioglu, "Muslim and Orthodox Resistance against the Berlin Peace Treaty in the Balkans"; Mustafa Tanrıverdi, "The Treaty of Berlin and the Tragedy of the Settlers from the Three Cities"; Bernard Newman, *Balkan Background*, 13.
9. Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty reads: "The Sublime Porte is obliged to carefully implement the Organic Statute in the island of Crete, introducing changes which would be assessed as justified. Analogous statutes adapted to local requirements, with the exception of the tax exemption approved to Crete, will be equally introduced in the other parts of European Turkey as well, which are not subject of particular drawing up in this Treaty. The Sublime Porte is to engage special commissions, composed to a great extent of local members, which are to work out the details of the new statutes for each province. The organisation projects to be worked out by the commissions will be submitted for examination to the Sublime Porte, which in turn, before passing any of the acts, will request the opinion of the European Commission established for Eastern Rumelia."
10. Barker, *Macedonia*, 9.
11. M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Transformation of 'Empire' through Wars and Reforms," 18.
12. Gül Tokay, "Macedonian Reforms and Muslim Opposition during the Hamidian Era," 52.
13. For more on Russian policy, see Bekir Sami Seçkin, "Rusların Balkanlarda bir Konfederasyon Kurma Teşebbüsleri"; Ronald Bobroff, "Behind the Balkan Wars."
14. After completing its unification in 1871 Germany became involved in the Eastern Question as a newcomer. As a late entry in this political game its economic and financial interests (trade, mining, railways, companies) and cultural influence (French was the first foreign language used in the empire) were far behind those of Britain and France.

15. Jane K. Cowan and K. S. Brown, "Introduction," 1.
16. Walter G. Wirthwein, *Britain and the Balkan Crises, 1875–1878*, 398–99. The British opposed the Russian annexation of Batum mainly because of the importance of central Asian markets and the trade routes between Trabzon and Tebriz. The future status of Kars was also important for the British because of the route to Syria and Mesopotamia. Once it became certain that the Russians were not willing to give up their gains in the East, this prompted the British to sign the Cyprus Convention with the Ottoman Empire on June 4, 1878: Gül Tokay, "Ottoman Diplomacy at the Berlin Congress (June–July 1878)," 244.
17. Branimir M. Jankovic, *The Balkans in International Relations*, 88.
18. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO, established 1893) was the most prominent one. Its aim was to secure full autonomy for Macedonia. For more information, see Nadine Lange-Akhund, *The Macedonian Question, 1893–1908*, 35–44.
19. *Ibid.*, 11. European diplomacy recognized the Eastern Question as an international issue, and the Treaty of Paris of 1856 placed the rights of the Christian population ruled by the Ottoman Empire under the guarantee of the Great Powers. In other words, by putting an end to the Crimean War, the Great Powers had secured the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the empire by placing its independence and territorial integrity under their guarantee.
20. Demirci, *British Public Opinion*, 13. The Ottoman Empire was a good example of successful maintenance of religious and ethnic toleration for the various *millets* living within its frontiers. These *millets*, which formed the complex mosaic of Ottoman society, were "closed" but never immune to external influences, which varied in degree and kind.
21. The Ottoman administration was already weakened economically and financially by the European-controlled Public Debt Administration set up to collect the payments owed to European creditors. See Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923*; Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820–1913*; Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 128.
22. Gül Tokay, "A Reassessment of the Macedonian Question, 1878–1908," 262.
23. Russia and Austria-Hungary agreed on reforms for Macedonia in October 1903 and got the other Great Powers to consent to the creation of an international gendarmerie for the territory. Under this scheme, which led to considerable friction between the participants, all the Great Powers except Germany took control of a gendarmerie zone in Macedonia. In 1905 Britain tried to secure international supervision of tax collection in Macedonia. This proposal was finally accepted, under heavy pressure, by the Ottomans. In the summer of 1908 Britain and Russia seemed on the verge of agreeing to a fresh scheme for reforms in Macedonia, but in July the Young Turk revolution broke out.
24. Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin (1878) gave Austria the right to "occupy and administer" Bosnia-Herzegovina; therefore Austria occupied the area "temporarily." The pretext was to restore law and order: the actual intent was to obstruct Serbia and to curb the Russian influence in the region. In 1908 the annexation was made permanent. (It should be kept in mind that in the eighteenth century Russia became Austria's chief rival, and their conflicting aims in the Balkans had to be reconciled.)

25. Jankovic, *The Balkans in International Relations*, 12.
26. For more information on the Great Powers policy toward the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars, see Salahi R. Sonyel, *Gizli Belgelerde Osmanlı Devleti'nin Son Dönemi ve Türkiye'yi Bölme Çabaları*, 170–90.
27. Italy feared that Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia would diminish its influence and that Italy had received nothing in the Treaty of Berlin while other powers had enriched themselves territorially: the time seemed ripe to proclaim its position as a true Great Power by demanding a share in the partition of Africa, which had been pursued for many years by England, France, and Germany. William M. Sloane, *The Balkans*, 160.
28. For a detailed history of the war, see İsmet Görgülü, *On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912–1922*, 10–16.
29. Stephen P. Duggen, “Balkan Diplomacy I,” 38. For more detailed information on the Balkan Wars through the eyes of a German war correspondent, see Wilhelm Feldman, *İstanbul'da Savaş Günleri, Bir Alman Gazetecinin Balkan Savaşı Hatıratı*, 23–148; Yarbay Bekir Fikri, *Balkanlarda Tedbiş ve Gerilla “Grebene”* (memoirs of a Turkish army commander during the Balkan Wars).
30. Lange-Akhund, *The Macedonian Question*, 311.
31. G. F. Abbot, “The Near Eastern Crisis,” 688.

## “And the Awakening Came in the Wake of the Balkan War”

### The Changing Conceptualization of the Body in Late Ottoman Society

*Melis Hafez*

In 1916 Ottoman educator and bureaucrat Ali Seydi Bey blamed the empire's humiliating defeat in the First Balkan War on the physical infirmity and lack of agility of the Ottoman soldier. Ali Seydi Bey went further, saying that it was not merely the Ottoman soldier but the *Ottoman body* in general that was responsible for the military defeat. “We have forgotten our duty to strengthen our bodies,” he claimed, “and are so lazy that even our blood circulates languidly in our veins.”<sup>1</sup> Was this bold statement a singular articulation voicing the bitterness of the humiliating defeat of the empire at the hands of its former subjects in 1912 and thus an anomaly or was it a belief shared by many of the reformists after the Balkan Wars? If it was the latter, was such a belief an emergent or an established discourse on the body of the political subject in late Ottoman society?

Ali Seydi Bey's lament was neither a singular incident nor a peculiar phenomenon. Rather, it was part of a larger narrative on work and industriousness that became increasingly visible in the Ottoman world after the mid-nineteenth century. Taking the defeat of the Ottoman armies in the Balkans as a context, this chapter suggests some underlying indications of greater, long-term sociocultural processes and tensions in Ottoman society. In order to expose such fissures, it specifically traces the relationship between the conceptualizations of the healthy, productive, and able body and the discourses on the formation of an ideal citizen, as articulated in morality books (*ahlak kitapları*), in articles in newspapers

and journals, and in published memoirs on the Balkan Wars. In this regard the following discussion contributes to an investigation of how the practice and discourse of work and productivity in the modern sense were established in late Ottoman society and how, through the establishment of specific binaries such as productivity/laziness, the relationship between body, work, and leisure was reconfigured as a constitutive element of the Ottoman nation-formation process.<sup>2</sup>

The Balkan defeat thus serves as the historical moment that reformers identified as a wake-up call, using it to demand a rigorous examination of the physical condition of not only the soldiers but also civilians. Although the defeat triggered the proliferation of reform calls and the actualization of some at the institutional level the hard-working and able body of the political subject was discursively constructed as a national resource much earlier than the Balkan defeat. What the reformers presented as “awakening,” therefore, was built on a half-century-long practice of disciplining the productive body for the betterment of the emergent Ottoman nation.

#### MAKING A NATIONAL BODY

A majority of us are weak-spirited and lack perseverance. But how, I ask you, can we have perseverance in a culture that endorses morbidity and immobility? How can anyone have a worldly ambition, in a country like this, where we see people mourning on every corner and hear a lazy beggar in every street? What kind of ethical system can this ambitionless, motionless, dark, asocial environment offer, other than one that is just as lifeless, static, goalless, and lethargic?<sup>3</sup>

Across the ideological divide, many Ottoman writers and members of the intelligentsia hurled considerable invective at the “lazy, inactive, and careless nature of the people” who lived a lifestyle that upholds contentment (*kanaat*), resignation (*tevekkül*), patience (*sabır*), and abhors “work and ardor” (*sa’y u gayret*).<sup>4</sup> Laziness was conceived as a social disease at the heart of the empire’s “decline.”<sup>5</sup> In the late nineteenth century the cultural significance of laziness was no longer seen as part of the natural order of things but as a social and national problem to be dealt with promptly. The “Turkish national morality,” an early twentieth-century author lamented, was not based on arduous work but on military might, which was “long gone.”<sup>6</sup> The adjectives “indolent,” “lazy,” and “inactive”

came to be associated with the common people, and "industrious," "productive," and "active" became the target attributes that every citizen needed to acquire. In examining the cultural production of this era, including both the textbook and nontextbook versions of the genre of morality books, it becomes clear that these caustic remarks are not marginal but central to debates on the character of the people, their bodies, and their industriousness.

The causes of the weakening of the empire were hardly a new subject. In the sixteenth to eighteenth century "mirrors to princes" treatises targeted specific policies of the ruling institutions, holding them responsible for the problems of the state.<sup>7</sup> As Virginia Aksan demonstrates, the content of the mirrors literature was far from static in the early modern period.<sup>8</sup> Although the list of those considered responsible for the weakening of the Ottoman Empire was a long one, ranging from unruly Janissaries to the "meddling of the palace women" in state affairs, the population was never deemed to be a source of decline. The nineteenth-century texts, however, began scrutinizing the social and "essential" characteristics of Turks, Muslims, and/or Ottomans (depending on the author and the period) as a population. Thus, as Michel Foucault might put it, once the notion of population was conceived, it was accused of various social diseases.<sup>9</sup> Strikingly, these new narratives held accountable not the traditional culprits of the early "modern mirrors" literature, such as specific ruling elites, but the entire population.

In late Ottoman society, when the empire began to employ modern state mechanisms, the body of the political subject entered the reform agenda as a part of the emergence of "the social" as a field of intervention and discipline.<sup>10</sup> In this regard the quest for modernity was (and still is) constituted through various dichotomies that order and produce the very experiences of human beings. Simply stated, the modern order separates the individual into two distinct realms: the body, which corresponds to the material world, and the mind, which corresponds to the moral world governed by "the moral order."<sup>11</sup> Once this separation was formulated, both domains became fields of intervention. This is most apparent in the Ottoman texts that appealed to "the education of the mind" and "education of the body."<sup>12</sup> While books on morality discursively constructed the body as the locus of the productive and hardworking ideal citizen, hence prescribing a moral order, the parallel physical culture (including physical education and the culture of sports) attempted to strengthen the individual body, concomitantly introducing principles of order.<sup>13</sup> But the body/mind of the political subject was not merely an educational project.

The voices in the public sphere signal sustained anxiety about the bodies within the empire, making it an issue of the contested imperial public space.

While the concern about the body was entwined with the anxiety about the empire's perceived decline, the Ottoman Empire was not alone in its attempt to harness the resources of its people at the individual and the total level. In this regard it would be a mistake to view the anxieties of the late Ottoman society as *sui generis* problems of the empire. The most distinguishing character of states in the modern era is the ruling elite's desire and, most importantly, ability to harness the previously untapped resources of the population. Through various channels and institutions, including mass education, mass conscription, mass transportation, and medical and judicial regulations, modern nation-states produce and regulate the ideal national character.

This national character stood in stark contrast to the assumed imperfection of the lower classes, criminals, idlers and minorities within, and/or the colonial subjects outside the metropole. As Jonathan Schmitt shows in his contribution to this volume (chapter 17), the characteristic infirmities of the "other" as a major trope of the Orientalist discourse most likely reflect the anxieties of colonialist endeavors at "home."<sup>14</sup> It would be a mistake to limit the usage of this trope to Orientalist discourse, however. In fact, "character" is a major concept of the modern episteme. It appears as an "explanatory force by representing the historically molded 'nature' of both the individual and society."<sup>15</sup> Similar anxieties were shared not only by the other polyglot empires such as tsarist Russia, where the Zemstvo officials blamed Russian peasants for being slothful and opposed to education,<sup>16</sup> but also in relatively homogenized nation-states such as France. The seminal 1897 book *Anglo-Saxon Superiority: To What Is It Due?* by the French pedagogue Edmund Demolins is a good example that demonstrates how reification, and subsequently the necessity for its rectification, was central for the many nations of Europe.<sup>17</sup> Some scholars, such as Eugene Weber in the context of rural France and Jonas Frykman and Orvar Lofgren in the context of rural Sweden,<sup>18</sup> have argued that the practices and discourses of hygiene, time thrift, self-discipline, and efficiency are part of a process that is "akin to colonization."<sup>19</sup> It is essential to acknowledge, as Timothy Mitchell has shown in his study on the colonialism-avant-"colonialism" in Egypt (with all its disciplinary practices and its division of the world into two realms), that modernity itself is a colonial project.<sup>20</sup>

Tracing the changing conceptualizations of the body of the political subject, both as a site of intervention and as a trope for the nation, offers

new understandings of the workings of modern historical processes. The body was one of many resources that needed to be harnessed to form a new society, where all members would shoulder the burden of advancing the nation-state. Ideal character was believed to be achieved by rectifying the body. Engaging in physical activities, as Bruce Haley has shown in the context of Victorian Britain, was a way to obtain the discipline and courage required in this endeavor.<sup>21</sup> In 1905 Louis Querton argued that progress depended on state intervention in the "construction, conservation, and enhancement of the efficiency of the human machine."<sup>22</sup> In fact, the motor as a metaphor for the human body is intertwined with the history of the modern era. As Anson Rabinbach has shown, conceptualized as a conduit of power, the body became the focus of scientific interests across ideological divisions in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe.<sup>23</sup> But assuming causality between scientific discoveries and the shifting social meanings of the human body that led to a range of public policies is overly simplistic. The evolving conceptualizations of the body should not be viewed merely as products of scientific discoveries; both are products of changing cultural frameworks.<sup>24</sup>

It is therefore essential to stress the role of social practice in emergent discourses. In the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire engaged in a series of reforms targeting bureaucratic offices. With the initial reforms to create a centralized bureaucratic system, issues of indolence, laziness, inefficiency, and absenteeism in overpopulated offices quickly came to the fore.<sup>25</sup> The bureaucratic reforms attempted to address the situation by (re)defining work and work time. They restructured offices, regulated officials, and engaged the employees in practices that redefined their temporal and spatial experiences. By bombarding government offices with bills and regulations on efficiency and productivity, these state-led reforms helped implement a new consciousness of work and work-time. Thus bureaucratic offices, where most of the reformers (even briefly) received their formal training, became the laboratories of the new work concepts.<sup>26</sup>

It is important to bear in mind the constructed nature of the state/society binary. Taking Dipesh Chakrabarty's warning seriously, the state should not be viewed as the sole source of power and as external to these processes. Both the state and the nation are subject to the same forces in their formation: the spread of capitalist market relations and the nation-state system as its political unit.<sup>27</sup> Therefore the anxiety about the body in the nineteenth century should be placed within the matrix of creating a nation, by producing an ideal and its misfits, where the definitions of both were constantly contested. Equating state formation with



nation formation decenters the perceived power of the state and leaders, as they become part and parcel of a larger epistemic transformation. In this vision the concepts of population, the modern state, and the popular embrace/contestation are all linked. The bureaucratic bills that targeted officials deemed lazy and unproductive, the emphasis on moral education and ethics, and the moralization of work and industriousness were part of the epochal shift experienced by nineteenth-century Ottoman society in everyday life. It did not happen overnight or in a linear way. To understand the anxiety about the body and the various discourses and practices it produced, we must consider historical contingencies.

Morality books, written mostly by the bureaucrats/intellectuals, contributed to the moralization of work and the development of an exclusionist language cautioning against idleness and laziness. These books played an important role in popularizing, moralizing, and politicizing the discourse of productivity as a “national” project. Although morality books are an old genre, they had new incarnations in the late nineteenth century, offering emergent discourses on work, the body and time, self-discipline, and citizenship.<sup>28</sup> They differed from the pre-nineteenth-century medico-ethics books by talking not only about individual bodies but about the entire body politic.<sup>29</sup> They introduced the productive body to the field of the social and, in a sense, transmitted the imperial orders that specifically targeted the bureaucrats in the governmental offices to a larger audience. Ultimately these authors sought to make all Ottoman subjects work toward the same goal of advancing the nation. In other words, transformation of the content of these books was one way in which a new awareness regarding the body became visible on a discursive level.

Examining morality books as cultural products enables us to see how productivity and hard work were moralized and how the body of the individual became a trope for the Ottoman nation as a whole. The books detailed how the ideal Ottoman (or Muslim or Turk, depending on the author and time) must regard his/her body as a valuable entity, practice good personal hygiene, and eat a healthy diet. As one of the most important characteristics of these books, the authors dedicated chapters to the protection of bodily health: hygiene and sanitation (*hıfzıssıhha*),<sup>30</sup> making it a *sine qua non* of morality. For example, in his introduction of the subject of hygiene and the protection of health, Dr. Hüseyin Remzi said that *hıfzıssıhha* was the most important area of knowledge for morality education, noting that in “modern countries” (*memalik-i mütemeddine*) education in hygiene precedes education in morality. According to him,

health would improve only when the laws of hygiene were known better by the people.<sup>31</sup> In his book *İlm-i Ahlak*, Abdurrahman Şeref explained the three components of a person's duty to his/her body as taking care of hygiene, practicing gymnastics, and observing moderation (*itidal*). For him, not taking care of the body is conflicting with the science of morality.<sup>32</sup> Ali Rıza, author of multiple textbooks on morality, subpositioned the religious law of keeping one's body clean under the vague notion of "laws of hygiene" in the section "the duties of the self" and advised students to exercise daily.<sup>33</sup> In this regard gymnastics was a method to fight against fatigue.<sup>34</sup>

For an ideal citizen and ideal society, hard work and productivity were defined as forces able to counter laziness and idleness. As Hüseyin Remzi argued in 1898, laziness was a disease that could destroy not only a single person but an entire population.<sup>35</sup> The single panacea for the problems of the political subject's lazy body was work. The ideal Muslims elevated their body and spirit through work. This was at once a religious and a national duty. Laziness corrupted bodily health,<sup>36</sup> whereas work not only strengthened the body but elevated a Muslim's morality.<sup>37</sup> Lazy people fail to improve their corporal and spiritual strengths.<sup>38</sup> On the individual level the motto was that disciplined work was a source of happiness and even the elixir of life.<sup>39</sup> The writers of these books, just like the other producers of culture in the urban centers, were "subject to and cognizant of the same pressures as the state planners."<sup>40</sup> They addressed the Ottoman nation as a single entity sharing a homogeneous culture. These writers crafted an ideal image that emphasized the differences between the "classical Ottomans" and "the Ottoman nation of today" and found its nonideal opposite in various groups within the empire.

Those who shirked their duty were categorized as social misfits, whose inactive and lethargic bodies would cause the demise of the empire from within. Ali Rıza Bey's *Morality for Girls* reflects this notion. Employing medical language, Ali Rıza Bey argued that laziness spread from one body to another in society.<sup>41</sup> The individual body was a trope for the body politic, and laziness was not an individual problem but an epidemic. In his description of the ideal nation, like cogs in a machine, each and every body worked for the same goal and produced harmoniously. The lazy person was a useless cog in a "magnificent machine." In this depiction it is obvious that those who did not produce, labeled as lazy and unproductive, had no role to play in society. Carrying the machine metaphor to an extreme level, Ali Rıza Bey stated that these useless cogs had no place in the nation and indeed had "no right to live."<sup>42</sup>

This line of thinking was expressed in a post-Balkan War world by Celal Nuri when he placed those who “corrupted the body” at the top of the list of the country’s enemies. In 1913 he warned his readers against excessive idleness and unemployment, and even against idly strolling along the Cadde-i Kebir in Beyoğlu. These were the main causes of the corruption of the Ottomans and “a far greater enemy than the [Bulgarian] General Mikhail Savoff,” who defeated the Ottoman armies and nearly reached the gates of Istanbul during the first Balkan War.<sup>43</sup> It is ironic that Savoff himself was a product of the Ottoman education reforms. More specifically, he was one of the first graduates (class of 1876) of Mekteb-i Sultani, otherwise known as Galatasaray Lycée, the first non-military school to introduce physical education into its curriculum.<sup>44</sup>

The debates on producing a productive nation were written into a gendered narrative. The disciplinary techniques combined with emancipatory promises, “the double move” as Afsanah Najmabadi calls them, were a feature of modernist gender discourses. In effect nation formation began with the womb.<sup>45</sup> In the literature on duty, motherhood was the crown jewel. A well-known Ottoman educator, Edhem Nejat, argued that “the mothers...carry the most important and profound duty in the nation,” because they raise the nation’s soldiers.<sup>46</sup> In his book *Morality for Girls* Hüseyin Remzi stated that “a mother who knows duty longs to raise children who can give their life [*efna-yı vücud*] for the sake of [their] religion, state, and country; and [the mother] educates [*terbiye*] them to do so.”<sup>47</sup> As Omnia Shakry illustrates, the reformers in Egypt conceptualized *terbiye* as a part of “national duty,”<sup>48</sup> and this played a decisive part in the changing roles of mothers in the education and discipline of “Egypt’s children.”<sup>49</sup>

In mobilizing the disciplinary and emancipatory forces, the production of healthy and able-bodied children was regarded as one of the most important duties of the nation’s women. As a part of this duty, women of varying status became the target of debates on productivity. The established dichotomy of work versus laziness impelled the categorization of women into one category or the other.<sup>50</sup> The year of the Balkan War (1913) Celal Nuri called for ending the traditions that kept the women at home: “Our nation is degenerating from inside. By incessantly sitting, our women prevent the physiological development of their bodies.” Even more damning, in the streets “seldom do we encounter a woman with a body we can call ‘normal.’” According to Celal Nuri, a survey of the body types in the country would reveal that “many of the Turkish females have amorphous and abnormal shapes.”<sup>51</sup> Thus these women aesthetically

disturbed the male gaze and, more troublingly, hindered the development of the nation.

Undoubtedly, the "amorphous women" gave birth to useless children.<sup>52</sup> According to Edhem Nejat, Turkish children were sickly, feeble, lazy, and dim-witted, their bodies rotten from immobility and their complexions always a variation of pale. Anyone who toured Anatolia, he argued, would see these children of the "once sublime Turkish nation" in this condition and understand that it was a social problem far beyond the borders of the capital. The world of Ottomans (*Osmanlılık cihani*) was collapsing because of the lack of good education, he said. The blame, according to Nejat, lay with none other than the Ottoman mothers.<sup>53</sup>

Through the prism of the body discourses and politics, we can discern the constant reconstruction of the "modern" and the "traditional." Knowledge was organized based on this binary, not only among Ottoman intellectuals but also among the historians of this period, especially those who adhered to the modernization theory.<sup>54</sup> The binary was a social reality at the core of their social outlook. The activeness of the modern body was set against the traditional indolent body. The binary of modern/traditional, of course, was not produced in a politically void space. The Hamidian regime was labeled the embodiment of traditionalism by members of the opposition, and this charge was replicated in twentieth-century historiography.<sup>55</sup> In the hands of some morality-book authors, incessantly attacking and criticizing the traditional was an all-purpose political weapon.

The past was not entirely reduced to a "tradition" that needed to be eradicated. In fact the tradition constructed by the reformers was Janus-faced. While one face was accused of looking backward, pulling the nation into indolence and inactivity, the other was elevated to the position of being "classical" and therefore an ideal to be emulated. The reformers, believing that the first face corrupted the second, carefully separated the two and constructed an ideal-classical typology for the Ottoman nation. The ideal Ottoman and ideal body were at once a project of the future and a projection of history. Thus Ottoman reformers, in the trajectory of the ideology of nationalism, created an ideal not only in the future but also in the past. While the former set an urgent "national goal" to be achieved in the near future, the latter formulated and produced a "history" for the nation. Hence the ideal Ottoman was a lost treasure that needed to be found. "History is witness," Ali Seydi argued, "that our ancestors were our superiors in terms of their bodies and bodily constitutions. Because of this [superiority] they surpassed us in terms of being

successful in their endeavors.”<sup>56</sup> “Ottoman decline” was understood as the corruption of the national character:

Our forefathers attributed great importance to practices that strengthened the body, as horsemanship, playing *cirid* [javelin throw], wrestling, and hiking. That is why during the times of those respectful people our country progressed in sciences, knowledge, business, craftsmanship, military matters, and morality. It was only later that these aspects were abandoned. Bodies were not taken care of. Our...nation [*milletimiz*] has fallen into lethargy and laziness.<sup>57</sup>

The characteristics of the ideal Ottoman were familiar to many. “In the past,” İsmail Hakkı said, “we used to have great love for activeness—a love that equaled our love for our religion.”<sup>58</sup> Of course, this was not an uncontested past. Some authors, such as Baha Tevfik, argued that an ideal Ottoman “character” never existed to begin with. For him, the laziness, immorality, and barbarity that came to determine the contemporary “national character” were a continuation of “yesterday’s pride, nomadic lifestyle, and Janissary infighting.”<sup>59</sup> Paradoxically, the elevation of the “Ottoman character” to an ideal level and its equal and opposite denigration shared the same narrative of historical essentialism necessary to create a nationalist discourse.

#### WAR AS A “MORAL REVOLUTION”

In a 1932 book addressing the educators of the recently established Republic of Turkey, İsmail Hakkı stated that wars, whether lost or won, cause moral revolutions. He argued that the Ottoman trenches brought together the kindred spirits of the “naïve” Anatolian youth and the educated urbanites. These soldiers with disparate backgrounds, while fighting together against the enemy, exchanged ideas, thereby empowering each other. Thus the Balkan Wars, he contended, despite their sad legacy, helped awaken the Turks.<sup>60</sup> It was not merely the hindsight of a distorted nationalist narrative that provided this perspective, according to İsmail Hakkı. The idea that the Balkan Wars led to a national awakening was prevalent right after the wars and was voiced as early as 1914 in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>61</sup> Arguably the increased urgency and calls for implementation of reforms to produce a healthy and able body can be attributed to the “revolutionary effects” of the Balkan War.

In the First Balkan War the Ottoman armies were soundly defeated by the Balkan League of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro. As a result the last Ottoman lands in the Balkans, including Macedonia, Albania, and Thrace, were lost. These regions constituted a core area of the empire, home to the 16 percent of the population. Edirne, a former Ottoman capital, fell to the Bulgarian army after a long siege that became both a symbol of defiance and a symbol of defeat. As we learn from the detailed study of the consequences of this defeat in other chapters in this volume, tens of thousands of refugees flocked into Istanbul, devastating the city. The Bulgarian army came very close to the capital, which was a sign for the majority of the people that the empire was under imminent threat.

Both the preparation for war and war itself are sources of state and societal transformation.<sup>62</sup> Wars are not merely events but social processes whereby the interdependency of war-making and nation-building becomes evident. In this case the Balkan defeat shaped the thoughts of the political elites by showing them that the empire was engaged in a life-or-death struggle. Reformers and political elites called for all-out mobilization in every aspect of life, which, as Mustafa Aksakal has shown, "converged with the ideas of waging war and gaining independence from the imperialist powers."<sup>63</sup> In this immediate context the half-century-old concern for the body of the Ottoman citizen became overwhelmingly visible in cultural production. More importantly, after the Balkan defeat the moralistic prescriptive language employed against the body of the political subjects took on an accusatory tone.

The defeat of the Ottoman armies opened the floodgates of the internalist explanations. In the wake of the defeat, several voices can be discerned from the chorus of explanations of why the Ottomans lost the war. Some reformers noted the dysfunctions observed in the military. The political fissures and disputes among the army's commanders and the inadequate training of the soldiers were considered major causes of the defeat.<sup>64</sup> The reforms of the Young Turks had not yet taken root in the army, which had deep divides between the recently assigned and older cadres. Other contemporary sources, as was the custom with many of the deficiencies of the empire, laid the blame on the Hamidian regime. According to Ahmet İzzet Paşa,<sup>65</sup> Sultan Abdülhamid's policy of eschewing field exercises rendered the army useless in real-time maneuvering. İzzet Paşa attributed this policy to the sultan's fear that an army that could maneuver might topple him. The training in the military academies emphasized theoretical education in mathematics, cosmography,

and literature but not military praxis. If the Ottoman army had any success, it came from “natural warrior qualities [*tabii cengaverlik hassaları*],” not from training.<sup>66</sup>

İzzet Paşa was not alone in decrying the Ottoman army’s lack of military training. Because of the perceived deficiency in the training of the military during the Hamidian period, new practices had been introduced after 1908. The military field exercises that took place in the summer of 1908 made the “sad” condition of the army even more salient to the reformers.<sup>67</sup> But these exercises were interrupted upon the Italian occupation of Tripoli in 1911 and did not resume until the First Balkan War. The problem surfaced in a report written by Colonel Cemal,<sup>68</sup> which was later published in Mahmud Muhtar Paşa’s memoirs. The colonel reported that the lack of proper training cost the Ottomans the war: “The reason for the army’s scattered behavior is not because of any deficiency of weakness in spirits, but due to lack of training and education.”<sup>69</sup> The belief that the defeat was caused by insufficient military training did not go uncontested, however. In 1914 İsmail Hakkı argued the opposite in his *Terbiye ve İman*: “If we have been immobile for centuries, it is not because of our ignorance about hygiene and training the body, but because of our hatred of worldly affairs of life. Losing faith [in worldly affairs] is the greatest cause of laziness and indolence.”<sup>70</sup> Whereas the colonel’s report viewed training and material conditions as the cause of the defeat, Hakkı assigned blame to character faults.

The representation of the reserve officers (*redif*) in the writings of the commanders completely contrasts with that of the graduates of the empire’s military schools. Certain essentialist characteristics, such as laziness, lack of discipline, and even bestial behavior, were attributed to the common people (the reserve officers). Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, the commander of the Third Army Corps, said in his memoirs that the *redif* were the first to desert the army. When he tried to stop them, the “animal-like creatures did not even look at my face” but kept running. Their bestiality, it appears, was not caused by their frightened state but was innate. The *paşa*, who elsewhere called the *redif* “gnarled and bent, old and disorderly,” said that in comparison to the trained soldiers they were like “beasts in their villages!”<sup>71</sup> The “animal-like” *redif* army was depicted as killing time in the coffeehouses and failing to keep a respectful distance from higher- and lower-ranking soldiers.<sup>72</sup>

Sifting through the texts produced for popular readership, it is easy to fall into the trap of accepting a skewed representation of the “causes” of the defeat. More specifically, the issues of character, ignorance, and

bodily weakness occlude the real problems of the Ottoman army. As Feroz Yasamee shows (chapter 8 in this volume), the Ottoman army suffered from a plethora of problems, including deployment errors, slow mobilization, an inadequate number of soldiers, deficient field transport, and supply shortages (most importantly of food). Some soldiers identified cholera as their most important enemy.<sup>73</sup>

The Ninth Field Artillery Regiment reported to Mahmud Muhtar Paşa:

For twenty-one days the soldiers were given warm meals only when they were situated in Kirkkilise. At other times they were given half a meal, consisting of hard biscuit and bread.... It is normal for the commanders, officers, and soldiers...who were deprived of food for twenty-one days to lose strength and thus be unable to fulfill the duty they owe to their homeland.... Their health has been worsened by the above-mentioned deprivation, [and it is] known that one cannot expect service and success from unhealthy, feeble bodies. [It is] difficult to stand the cries of the soldiers who ask for bread and to see the cannons hauled by [not two but] four animals stuck on the road because of hunger and weakness. If any service is still expected from our regiment, its commanders, officers, and soldiers, we must strive to give them their full rights regarding the assurance of protection of their health and life, which are protected under the law.<sup>74</sup>

Although these and similar explanations by lower-ranking officials appeared in the reports and writings of the commanders, considerable importance was still placed on character traits and lack of bodily training.

The critique of the military body did not remain within the confines of the barracks. The reformers made the population at large equally responsible for the defeat in their writing. The perceived infirmities of the national body became a common thread in social critiques calling for a mobilization. Authors emphasized moral corruption not only of the army but of the entire nation as the reason for the defeat. Even Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, who offered extensive analysis on the military shortcomings and strategic mishaps, eventually argued: "It is apparent that, because we are really behind in terms of scientific knowledge and morality, the defeat did not belong to the army alone, but also to the entire nation."<sup>75</sup> In his book *Debacle* on the Balkan defeat Hafız Hakkı Paşa compared the "reality" with his ideal:



Let's think about a nation in misery: its rural population is perishing because of famine and lack of air, while its urbanites are getting paler at opium cafes and, sheltered [from reality], becoming more effeminate each day. And now let's think about a nation that lives a humane life, by its rural people owning homes and food... and its urbanites spending time on riding horses, playing *cirit*, and engaging in sports, and by doing so becoming agile and fully masculine. Undoubtedly, the [former] will be defeated a thousand times more than the latter.<sup>76</sup>

Note that city people suffered from moral corruption and effeminacy, while peasants only lacked the basic necessities of life and hence possibly remained masculine. Whereas property and wealth increased the likelihood of peasants' success on the battlefield, city people required character-improving activities like sports.

The connection between the defeat and the call to strengthen the Ottoman body is a curious one. During war the ideal individual citizen-soldier sacrifices his own body for the larger body (i.e., the nation).<sup>77</sup> Morality books of the era reflected the putative relationship between the individual body and the nation's salvation. In his 1911 book *Modern Morality Detailed*, Ali İrfan emphasized that the future of the homeland and the nation's salvation depended on the future generation's physical and spiritual life (*hayat-ı bedeniye* and *hayat-ı ruhiye*).<sup>78</sup> Moreover, the nation was imagined as a body: much to the chagrin of the reformers, it was sick, feeble, and corrupt. Abdullah Cevdet, an ardent modernizer, ridiculed the fact that *Bab-ı Meşihat* had called for a special prayer (*Salat-ı Tefriciye*) to be recited in the mosques during the war. In his view the Bulgarians were "praying" with their actions, by working hard and strengthening their nation. Likening the nation to a diseased body, he lamented: "Our skulls are empty. No meat is left under our skins, no bone, nor blood.... Anatolia is sick, and it is dying."<sup>79</sup> As noted, Ali Seydi Bey, who wrote extensively on the work-body relationship, blamed the defeat on the Ottoman soldiers' lack of agility: "Our soldiers were not able to march or hold a gun for long periods of time; thereby they lost the war to the vulgar Bulgarians."<sup>80</sup> In other words, the Ottoman body—as a whole—was accused of committing the high crime of causing the defeat.

The book *Why We Were Defeated in the Balkan War* is representative in its approach of taking the burden of defeat outside the barracks and laying it on the shoulders of the people in general. The book was published in 1913, immediately after the war, by an anonymous author known

only as "Elif."<sup>81</sup> Written from a military perspective, it contains harsh and realistic criticism of the Ottoman military leaders. The book enumerated several reasons for defeat in the First Balkan War, including political disputes among army leaders, lack of sea power, and a lack of connection between the commanders during the preparation for war. The book devoted one chapter to a single issue, "The Failings of the Nation." The author argued that war is waged not only between the material aspects of two nations but also between their morals. In this formulation, as we have seen before, the body becomes a symbol of both fronts. Admonishing the nation for being lazy and indolent, the author brought up the issue of physical training, heatedly asking the nation: "Where are your training clubs? Where are your marksmanship clubs? Don't you have any national ideals?" Based on these activities people earned the right of entrance to the "nation." Those who refused to contribute to their nation through hard work and activity were criticized: "Everybody, according to his abilities, should work for the betterment of the nation; those who do not comply with this should simply declare that they have nothing to do with this nation and then keep their mouths shut and sit on the side."<sup>82</sup>

This example clearly links the individual citizen's body to the body politic. Another exclusionist remark came from İbrahim Hilmi, who wrote the preface of this anonymous book. In narrating impressions from his tour of Anatolia and Syria right after the Balkan Wars, he decried that more defeats were imminent "[i]f we do not weed out the invalids and those who are malicious, and do not leap to a life of productiveness and order."<sup>83</sup> According to this argument, those who did not contribute to the nation were not only denied the right to "speak" on behalf of the nation but should be weeded out.

The meaning of the defeat was interpreted by Ottoman intellectuals in different ways. Some, like İbrahim Hilmi, regretfully asserted that the defeat did not change anything. The people of Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt lived as if nothing had happened, "just as calm and languid as ever" in their sluggish sleepiness, feeling no need to awaken. The people returned to their "age-old quiescent and pleasures," while a handful of educators, instead of teaching and training, were "playing cards in the coffeehouses."<sup>84</sup> Others greeted a new horizon. Unlike İbrahim Hilmi's bleak view, Ali Seydi saw a glimmer of hope in the defeat. As noted, Ali Seydi was among those who claimed that the reason for the defeat was the unhealthy body of the Ottomans. For him, it constituted a watershed moment: after the Balkan defeat, recruitment for Boy Scout programs kicked off and the Ministry of Education started to offer classes

in physical education in middle and high schools. In his view, this was a crucial shift. In a dialogue appearing in *Musahebat-ı Ablakiye*, the teacher declares to his pupils: "The awakening interest in Boy Scouting will turn you into able-bodied [*kaviyy-ul vücud*] and undaunted fellows for the homeland."<sup>85</sup> Boy Scouting, in fact, spread in the Ottoman Empire almost simultaneously with its spread in Europe (see the discussion in "Conclusion" below). Of course the enthusiasm for scouting came after a struggle that had lasted more than half a century to make the healthy body a national goal and part of the national curriculum.

Whereas Ali Seydi saw a glimmer of hope, İsmail Hakkı went further, celebrating a fait accompli and rejoicing that the Balkan defeat, although unfortunate, loosened the grip of the old culture that "denigrated this world, this life, and action and promoted a culture of cemeteries and nothingness." He argued that the defeat "awakened the belief in and the enthusiasm for exercise [*idman*], which has been accumulating for years," thereby paving the way for auspicious developments: "Games, sportive activities, Boy Scouting have started to spread even to the obscure corners of Anatolia." Hakkı noted that a life based on action and struggle had emerged as the goal of the nation, as the former culture was buried in a graveyard—a time for mourning for the "old culture."<sup>86</sup> Reflecting the new ideas on the body in an essentialized way, the author saw certain aspects of life as "traditional" and therefore unhealthy; thus it was justified to cast them outside the boundaries of the modern.

## CONCLUSION

In this country educating the masses should not mean making them read the alphabet and recite passages. More than anything, it should mean giving them several things: a body that will allow to conduct a [military] ambush regardless of how snowy the weather is; a mind that can apprehend the world...; a heart that can appreciate the [country's] flag; ... and the courage to die for Rumelia.<sup>87</sup>

Admittedly, the link between the Balkan defeat and the newfound enthusiasm for physical education, sports, and physical activity was exaggerated by the authors examined here. The Balkan defeat was not the start that they presented. The discourse on the body, as shown earlier, had been developing for some time in various ways. Along with the normative authority of morality books on the body and its role in the emerging

nation, publications on gymnastics and physical education gained increasing popularity throughout the nineteenth century. Translated works that appeared during early Tanzimat, such as the 1847 *Treatise on Gymnastics* (*Risale-i Cımnastik*) and the 1867 *Manual for Gymnastics* (*Cımnastik Talimnamesi*), were soon replaced by the works of bona fide Ottoman physical education enthusiasts, such as Faik Ali (Üstünidman) (1859–1942) and Selim Sırrı (Tarcan) (1874–1957).<sup>88</sup> Contemporary periodicals contained many articles on maintaining good hygiene and developing a healthy body, supported by numerous pictures of simple exercise techniques. The necessity of physical education (*beden terbiyesi*) had long been established (starting with the military schools in the early 1860s and quickly spreading to the civil schools). As noted, Mekteb-i Sultani (aka Galatasaray), established to train bureaucrats in 1868, was the first nonmilitary school to offer physical education to its students.<sup>89</sup> In 1869 physical education became mandatory in the middle schools. By the turn of the century the Aşiret Mektebi, Mühendishane, and Mülkiye and the *idadi* schools of Istanbul and İzmir all had classes in physical education.<sup>90</sup>

Although the authors exaggerated the shift that happened with the defeat, they were right about a new interest in a militarized physical activity: Boy Scouting. The Boy Scouts were first established in 1908 by Lt.-Gen. Robert Baden-Powell as a military project to train British soldiers. He observed that British soldiers were not prepared to navigate the fields of Africa in the Boer War; nor were they experienced in fighting in difficult conditions. Boy Scouting almost simultaneously spread to the Ottoman capital. By 1910 the Sultani schools and by 1911 the *idadi* schools in Istanbul were organizing Boy Scouting activities.<sup>91</sup> Still, except for a few locations such as Manastır (where Edhem Nejat was the high-school principal) and Edirne Muallim Mektebi (where Nafi Atuf [Kansu] was principal), Boy Scouting was limited to certain schools in the capital. After the Balkan Wars the scouts gained prominence among the reformers. It is telling that in early 1914 Boy Scouting (İzcilik, previously translated as *keşşaflık*) under the name İzci Ocağı was severed from the Ministry of Education and reassigned to the Ministry of War as one of the most prized youth programs. Enver Paşa was declared the head chief. Accordingly, when 262 educators from various cities of the empire attended the Boy Scout gathering in April 1914, Boy Scouting was no longer a phenomenon limited to the capital.<sup>92</sup> The body, first part of the curriculum in the military schools, was now subjected to militarization outside the barracks. The militarization that became the salient characteristic of the last decade of the Ottoman Empire and the first decades of

the Turkish Republic cannot be understood without taking into account the process by which the body of its citizens became a site of national anxiety.

The transformation of the conceptualizations of the body, as a project of nation-formation, was not a newcomer on the scene at the time of the Balkan Wars. As the building block of a nation, the body became a topos: the nation's perceived infirmities, including laziness and lethargy, had to be removed if a productive, healthy, and able nation was to be established. With the transformation of the discourse on the body in morality books, this new awareness became more visible and was partly integrated into the education system. Morality books demonstrate that the deployment of bodies for greater social change was a popular theme long before 1912.

The increasing militarization of the body in the post-1908 Ottoman period and even more so in the early Republican period should not be abstracted from its nineteenth-century roots. But it was during the Balkan Wars, which were taking place at the conjunction of political turmoil and independence movements, that the connection between the particular body and the national body as envisioned by the modernists became more salient and imperative. The Ottoman body deemed to be "accustomed to slacking" and accused of harboring social vices was now accused of causing the Balkan defeat. This shift was not only built on a century-long practice that made the body part of the nationalist discourse but also made an emergent narrative visible on the national level and hence became an indication that this discourse was becoming hegemonic.

## NOTES

1. I would like to thank Dr. James Gelvin for his critical comments on this chapter and his continuous support. Special thanks to the editors of this volume, Dr. Isa Blumi and Dr. Hakan M. Yavuz, for their valuable advice.

The quotation in the chapter title is from İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu), *Terbiye ve İman*, 43. İsmail Hakkı, later İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1886–1978), was an important figure in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. For a short biography and list of his works, see Aylin Özman, "İsmail Hakkı Baltadjioghlu (1886–1978)." Also see Osman Kafadar, *Türk Eğitim Düşüncesinde Batılılaşma*. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are mine. Ali Seydi Bey, *Musabehat-ı Ahlakiye*, 21–22.

2. For more information, see my doctoral dissertation: "The Lazy, the Idle, and the Industrious: The Discourse and Practice of Work and Productivity in Late Ottoman Society."
3. Hakkı, *Terbiye ve İman*, 35.
4. İsmail Kara, *Dinle Modernleşme Arasında*, 37. On *kanaat*, see, for example, Namık

- Kemal, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri*, 219. For *tevekkül*, see Yağlıkçızade Ahmet Rifat, *Tasvir-i Ahlak* (Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1305 [1887/1888]), 82–83.
5. [Anonymous], *Ceride-i Havadis* 141 (Receb 15, 1259 [August 1, 1843]). Something similar occurred in the Spanish Empire. According to Ruth MacKay, "Lazy, Improvident People," the critique of the "lazy guilds" by the writers of the Spanish Enlightenment reflects an inherited discourse of Western Europe's othering of the Spanish experience, not a social reality. Ruth MacKay, "Lazy, Improvident People."
  6. Celal Nuri (İleri), *İlel-i Ahlakıyemiz*, 61.
  7. For a good discussion of the genre, which is also known as *nasihat* literature, before the nineteenth century, see Virginia Aksan, "Ottoman Political Writing, 1768–1808." The ruling elites not only did not view ignorance as a social problem but saw it as a differentiating characteristic of the commoners. For the *cahil-söz sahipleri* division in the Ottoman nonmodern political world, see Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*. These treatises were (ab)used by modernization theorists who employed a now outdated decline paradigm. See Donald Quataert, "Ottoman History Writing and Changing Attitudes towards the Notion of 'Decline'"; Cemal Kafadar, "The Question of Ottoman Decline"; and Gabriel Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy*, 135–62. For Orientalism's role in historiography of the Middle East in general, see Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East*.
  8. Aksan, "Ottoman Political Writing." For instance, as Aksan shows, by the end of the eighteenth century the concept of "circle of justice," a central tenet of these treatises, was waning, whereas the concept of duty to *din u devlet* (religion and state) was increasingly emphasized.
  9. Michel Foucault, "Governmentality."
  10. For a discussion on how domains such as the social became sites of knowledge/power production, see Mary Poovay, *Making a Social Body*, 1–24.
  11. Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 95–127.
  12. See, for example, Mehmet Refet, *Terbiye-i Dimağîyye yahud Usul-ü Terbiye*; Mehmet F. Şüenu and M. Sami, *Kadın Jimnastiği yahud Terbiye-i Bedeniye*.
  13. For sports and physical culture in late Ottoman and early Republican Turkey, see Yiğit Akın, "Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar" *Erken Cumburiyette Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor*; Atif Kahraman, *Osmanlı Devletinde Spor*; for a recent work that expands the scholarship on body and subject formation, see Wilson Chacko Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*.
  14. According to Schmitt's analysis, the Carnegie Endowment's Orientalist-discourse-laden report on the Balkan conflict reflects the deep anxiety of the United States about its experience with Native Americans.
  15. In his book on schooling in Egypt, V. Edouard Dor says: "The Egyptian is...lacking in all initiative; his character is one of indifference and immobility, engendered by a lack of security...which has killed the spirit of industry." V. Edouard Dor, *L'Instruction publique en Egypte*, 5, 10–11, 16, 22; quoted in Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 105.
  16. Ben Eklöf, "Peasant Sloth Reconsidered."
  17. Edmund Demolins, *À quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons?* This book was translated into Arabic and into Turkish by A. Fuad and A. Naci. E. Demolins,

- Anglo-Saksonların Esbab-ı Faikiyeti Nedir?* (Istanbul: Kethabhan-e Askeri, 1330 [1914/1915]) and became a handbook for reformers: see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 110–11.
18. J. Frykman and O. Lofgren, *Culture Builders*.
  19. Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 486.
  20. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 95–127. See also Timothy Mitchell, “Introduction” and “The Stage of Modernity,” in *Questions of Modernity*, ed. Timothy Mitchell, xi–34.
  21. Bruce Haley, *The Healthy Body and Victorian Culture*, 123–40.
  22. Louis Querton, *L'augmentation du rendement de la machine humaine*, 4; quoted in Anson Rabinbach, *The Human Motor*, 207.
  23. Rabinbach, *The Human Motor*, 45–68.
  24. Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and Society*, 11.
  25. A student of late Ottoman history and literature will not miss the common image of the bureaucrats as an overpopulated army of men with their agonizing laziness and inefficiency. See the partly autobiographical observations of Mizanji Murad Bey (1854–1917) in a novel originally published in 1890. Mehmet Murat, *Turfanda mı, Turfa mı?*
  26. Elsewhere I have examined how these bureaucratic reforms contributed to the discourse and practice of the work ethic and productivity: see “Ottoman Bureaucratic Reforms and the Development of Modern Work Concepts in Late Ottoman Society.”
  27. Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Labor History and the Politics of Theory.”
  28. Morality books, which feature prominently in my dissertation, remain relatively unmined in the historiography of late Ottoman history. Exceptions include Benjamin C. Fortna, “Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman ‘Secular’ Schools.”
  29. For the Ottoman medicinal world and its practices, see Miri Shefer-Mossensohn, *Ottoman Medicine*. To get an idea of how a nonmodern morality book addresses the issue of health, see Kınalızade Ali, *Ahlak-ı Alai*.
  30. Literally, protection of health.
  31. Hüseyin Remzi, *Ahlak-ı Hamidi*, 43.
  32. Abdurrahman Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak*, 62, 63.
  33. Ali Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus İlm-i Ahlak, Birinci Kısım*, 24–25. This book is specifically written for female students.
  34. Abdurrahman Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak*, 63. Books that particularly address gymnastics and sports are not examined here, because the emphasis of this chapter is on how the body became a subject of morality books. Examples of the gymnastics and sports genre include Ali Faik (Üstünidman), *Cimnastik yahud Riyaziyat-ı Bedeniye*; Nazım Şerafeddin, *Bahçe ve Salonlarda Cimnastik Talimi*.
  35. Hüseyin Remzi, *Hocahanım Kızlara Dürus-u Ahlak*, 92.
  36. Ali Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus, Birinci Kısım*, 30–31.
  37. Hüseyin Remzi, *Ahlak-ı Hamidi*, 51. For similar remarks, see Abdurrahman Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak*, 76.
  38. Abdurrahman Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak*, 77.
  39. Ali Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus İlm-i Ahlak, Üçüncü Kısım*, 69. See also Abdurrahman Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak*, 76–77.
  40. James L. Gelvin, “Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc?”

41. Ali Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus, Birinci Kısım*, 30.
42. Ali Rıza, *Kızlara Mahsus, Üçüncü Kısım*, 66–68.
43. Celal Nuri (İleri), *Kadınlarımız*, 181.
44. Nafi Atuf Kansu points this out as a failure of Ottomanism, refuting Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi's belief that Galatasaray Lycée was a success for Ottomanism. For Kansu, "[T]he only way to explain... [Savoff's Ottoman background] is to admit that Ottomanism was only an empty illusion." Nafi Atuf Kansu, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi, Bir Deneme*, 118. Mikhail Savoff, twice appointed as the minister of war in Bulgaria, served as the head of the Military Academy of Sofia. He was regarded as the reformist to whom the Bulgarian army owed its modern organization. See Joseph Thomas, *Universal Pronouncing Dictionary of Biography and Mythology*, 2135.
45. Afsanah Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches, Men without Beards*, 184.
46. Edhem Nejat, "Çocuğun Terbiyesinde Valide," *Sırat-ı Mustakim* 7, no. 157 (1327 [1911/1912]): 13–15. Edhem Nejat was a colorful personality, reflective of the fluidity of the ideologies in the early twentieth-century Ottoman Empire. The pieces quoted in this chapter are from his earlier works on *terbiye* published in *Sırat-ı Mustakim*, a journal known for its dedication to the Islamist cause. Later he became active in the Turkish Labor and Farmer Socialist Party (Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Partisi). According to the unofficial accounts, he was murdered in the cold waters of the Black Sea when he and Mustafa Suphi were trying to return to Soviet Russia, after being rejected by the Turkish authorities. For a short biography and general overview of his works on education, see Hamza Altın, "Ethem Nejat ve Eğitim Tarihimizdeki Yeri."
47. Hüseyin Remzi, *Hocahanım*, 161. It should be noted that the discussion appears in the section on "Military Service."
48. In the modern texts the concept of *terbiye* is used to refer to several things, including culture, education, and discipline. For example, see Abdullah Cevdet, *İctihad* 1 (1904), 1. For its nonmodern and modern meanings, see Şemseddin Sami (Fraşeri), *Kamus-i Türkî*, 394. For a discussion of the term in the nineteenth-century Arabic texts produced in Egypt, see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 87–90.
49. Omnia Shakry, "Schooling Mothers and Structured Play," 137.
50. Whether women should work outside the home like men was one of the sustained debates in late Ottoman publications. Karakışla notes that this debate ceased during World War I, when such work became necessary for survival. Yavuz Selim Karakışla, *Women, War and Work in the Ottoman Empire*, 49–52, 91.
51. Nuri (İleri), *Kadınlarımız*, 178–79.
52. Socialization and education of children's minds and bodies in the Ottoman Empire, although beyond the limits of this short chapter, is central to understanding how the productive citizen is produced. For example, Mustafa Hami's book demonstrates how the body became increasingly important in primary education. In its first edition in late 1870, the book allocates fewer pages to the topic than in its subsequent edition in 1872. See Mustafa Hami Pasha, *Vezaif-i Etfal* (1870), 20–36, (1872), 45–81. Another edition of the book appeared in 1899/1900: *Musahhab Vezaif-i Etfal*.
53. Nejat, "Çocuğun Terbiyesinde Valide."



54. For the general tenets and the critiques of the modernization theory, see James L. Gelvin, "The Politics of Notables Forty Years After"; Dean Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Contemporary Study of Societies." For the critiques of the British Marxists, see Harvey Kaye, *British Marxist Historians*.
55. For an example of such an approach, see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*.
56. Ali Seydi Bey, *Terbiye-i Ahlakîye ve Medeniye*, 32.
57. It is necessary to understand the ambiguity of the term *millet* in this period. In its nonmodern usage *millet* was an ethno-religious community (as in Yahudi *milleti* or İslam *milleti*). When the basic categories of thinking fundamentally changed during the nineteenth century, and the culture of nationalism became more deeply rooted, the term was sometimes used to refer to the concept of nation, but at other times the older sense was retained. Ali Seydi Bey, *Musahebat-ı Ahlakîye*, 21.
58. İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu), *Terbiye ve İman*, 49–50.
59. Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, 230; quoted in Haluk Harun Duman, *Balkanlara Veda, Basın ve Edebiyatta Balkan Savaşı 1912/1913*, 83.
60. İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu), *Mürebbitlere*, 39–41.
61. "Meclis-i Mebusan Reisinin Nutku," *Tanin*, May 20, 1914; quoted in Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 19.
62. For comments on war and societal change in the Middle East, see Steven Heydemann, ed., *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East*.
63. Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War*, 29. Aksakal's argument is important for understanding the political thinking of the pre–World War I era. Contrary to most Turkish nationalist historiography, Aksakal argues, Enver was not a single-minded dictator who decided to join the world war on the side of the Germans; rather "the public, or, at least, the broader elite, supported an alliance with Germany and saw war as a desirable path to reclaiming the empire's independence and economic stability." Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War*, 190.
64. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, ed., *Balkan Harbi Tarihi (1912/1913), Harbin Sebepleri, Askeri Hazırlıklar, ve Osmanlı Devletinin Harbe Girişi*, 92–132.
65. For more information on Ahmet İzzet Paşa, see İsa Blumi in this volume (chapter 18). See also Blumi's earlier work *Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire*, 171–91. For autobiographical information, see Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım I*.
66. Quoted in Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Balkan Harbi*, 128–29. For İzzet Paşa on Abdülhamid and field exercises, see İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, 175.
67. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Balkan Harbi*, 130.
68. The future Cemal Paşa. Many thanks to Dr. Feroze Yasamee for pointing this out.
69. Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, *Balkan Harbi, Üçüncü Kolordu'nun İkinci Doğu Ordusunun Muharebeleri*, 45.
70. Hakkı, *Terbiye ve İman*, 49–50.
71. Muhtar Paşa, *Balkan Harbi*, 158, 101, 159. For a strikingly similar description of the peasants, see Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 149.
72. *Harb Tarihi Arşivi*, D1, G.21, Ds 187; quoted in Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Balkan Harbi*, 150.
73. Muhtar Paşa, *Balkan Harbi*, 138.
74. *Ibid.*, 124–25. The date of the report is 21 Ekim 1328 (October 31, 1912). Another

reason provided for the unwillingness of the *redif* was the rumor that the soldiers from Anatolia spoke against fighting for the Balkans, allegedly saying that "the four *vilayets* of Anatolia are sufficient for us." Ibid., 125–26.

75. Ibid., 179.
76. Hafız Hakkı Paşa, *Bozgun*, 68.
77. See Meira Weiss, "The Body of the Nation."
78. Ali İrfan (Eğribozi), *Mufasssal Ahlak-ı Medeni*, 4.
79. *İctihad* 54 (14 Subat 1329 [February 27, 1914]), 1221; quoted in Duman, *Balkanlara Veda*, 82.
80. Seydi Bey, *Musahabat-ı Ahlakiye*, 22. Here of course the author omits to mention that some sections of the army were deprived of food and suffered from a wide-spread famine. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Balkan Harbi*, 148.
81. Elif [*nom de plume*], *Balkan Harbinde Neden Münhezim Olduk*. There is no consensus on the identity of the author. According to Ali Birinci, the book was written by Ali İhsan (Sabis) Paşa. Ali Birinci, "Sultan Abdülhamid'in Hâtıra Defteri Meselesi." Although some historians argue that it was written by Asım Gündüz, I believe that the evidence supports Ali Birinci's claim. In his voluminous memoirs Ali İhsan Paşa claims the authorship of the book: "In 1913,...I published two booklets titled *Why We Were Defeated in the Balkan War* and *The Reasons for Our Military Defeats*. The reason I published these books, which only contained the initial of my first name, was to show that we needed to work [hard] in order to erase the stain of the defeat." Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harp Hatıralarım*, 19.
82. Elif, *Balkan Harbinde Neden Münhezim Olduk*, 85, 86, 88.
83. Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi, "Naşirin İlavesi," in *ibid.*, 96.
84. Ibid., 92–93.
85. Seydi Bey, *Musahabat-ı Ahlakiye*, 21.
86. Hakkı (Baltacioğlu), *Terbiye ve İman*, 43–44.
87. İsmail Hakkı (Baltacioğlu), *Terbiye-i Avam* (Istanbul: İkdâm Matbaası, 1330 [1914/1915]), 9.
88. İsmail Paşa, trans. *Risale-i Cimmastik*; Mustafa Hami Paşa, trans., *Cimmastik Talimnamesi*; Selim Sırrı (Tarcan), *İsveç Usulünde Jimnastik, Terbiye-i Bedeniye, Musavverdir*.
89. Kansu, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*, 119. See also Akın, "Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar" *Erken Cumhuriyet Beden, 49–55*.
90. *XX. Cumhuriyet Yılında Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor*, 14.
91. İsmail Güven, "Osmanlı'dan Günümüze İzçiliğin Gelişimi ve Türk Eğitim Tarihindeki Yeri." The first practitioners of Boy Scouting were the brothers Ahmed and Abdurrahman Robenson, who were employed as physical education instructors in Galatasaray Lycée and Kabataş Lycee, respectively. For more information and biographies, see Gökhan Uzgören, *Türk İzçilik Tarihi*, 1–13.
92. When World War I started, according to the journal *Keşşaf* in 1923, the youths marched from Maltepe to the ferries then crossed the bridge to the Harbiye Nezareti Meydanı in Beyazid in order to volunteer as soldiers. Quoted in Uzgören, *Türk İzçilik*, 8–9.

## Making Sense of the Defeat in the Balkan Wars

Voices from the Arab Provinces

*Eyal Ginio*

A detailed report that appeared in October 1912 in the daily *Filasṭīn* (Palestine) conveys the atmosphere prevailing during the earliest days of the First Balkan War in Jaffa. This newspaper, best known for being the first Palestinian daily to advocate Arab nationalism, availed itself of the Montenegrin declaration of war to proclaim the unity of all Ottomans in the face of military aggression. Under the title “The Big Demonstration” (*al-Muṣāḥara al-Kabīra*), *Filasṭīn* provides its readers with scenes of patriotism and enthusiasm that reigned in Jaffa at the time. This port city, it reminded its readers, reacted very much like people all over the Ottoman state by proclaiming in one clear voice: “To war! Either honorable life or honorable death.”<sup>1</sup>

*Filasṭīn* likewise provides us with some details concerning the public ceremonies that accompanied the public reading of the sultan’s decree (*irade-i sultaniye*) on the afternoon of Thursday, October 10, 1912. A mass rally marched through the main streets of Jaffa. The marchers were later joined by Bedouin horsemen from the Abu Kishk tribe, the main tribe dwelling in the vicinity of Jaffa. The horsemen waved banners and sang military songs (*ahāzīj ḥarbīya*). The agitated mob arrived in front of the government house (*dār al-ḥukūma*). Among the dignitaries who attended the event were the mufti of Jaffa and the representatives of the civil and military administrations. The mufti read the sultan’s statement out loud. Then he proceeded to deliver a speech in which he prayed to God to bring victory to the sultan’s soldiers. The fervent crowds responded with exclamations of joy and utterance of the formula *lā ilāha illā Allāh*.

Following his speech, a certain Shibli Efendi Nawfal spontaneously stood up and proclaimed before the cheering crowds that Ottoman Christians and Jews together with their Muslim brothers would take part in fulfilling the sacred national mission that was incumbent upon all Ottomans: to defend the country and the honor of the flag.

*Filastīn* also drew attention to the distinction between the official and respectable ceremony organized by the government and some spontaneous and unofficial demonstrations initiated by “ignorant persons” (*juhḥāl*) who used the opportunity to open fire with their pistols and guns—an action that was quickly repressed by the government. Similar patriotic mass demonstrations occurred in the following days. In addition to organizing patriotic gatherings, the municipality opened a special subscription to raise money in support of the military effort and thus to enable the citizens to demonstrate their devotedness and patriotism.<sup>2</sup>

We can assume that this report reflected local authorities’ decrees and initiative from above. Indeed numerous similar reports describing public celebrations of unity and patriotism appeared in the Ottoman daily press in other urban centers. During the first days of the conflict and under the restrictions of censorship the press provided only scant information regarding the military developments at the front. In those first days of the war, in which uncertainty reigned, the press dedicated the lion’s share of its coverage to announcing cases of civilian mobilization and voluntarism in order to highlight the popular enthusiasm reigning in all major Ottoman cities. By doing so it attempted to carry the celebration of patriotism out of the field of the state into the realm of civil society. The main slogans promulgated during these ostensibly spontaneous gatherings evoked the unifying and transformative spirit of the Young Turk revolution of 1908.

An obvious gap existed, however, between the spirit of 1908 and the troubled days of early October 1912. The enthusiastic responses to the Young Turk revolution of 1908 in Palestinian cities survive in various local and foreign accounts. The Irish archaeologist Robert Macalister (1870–1950), for example, witnessed those scenes of revolutionary vigor and joy in Jerusalem in which “supercilious old Muslim sheikhs and bigoted Jewish rabbis might be seen embracing in the streets. On all sides was heard the glad cry *hurriyeh*—‘liberty!’” However, for him, this enthusiasm for the newly gained liberty was soon replaced with a “veritable Frankenstein’s monster, with many sided and veritable unexpected energies,” as the notion of liberty was mostly used by locals to extort or reclaim sometimes contradictory privileges.<sup>3</sup>

Clearly the notions of unity and equality were perceived differently by the ruling CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) and the growing opposition in the provinces. Chief among them was the debate separating the CUP and the liberal opposition regarding the implementation of administrative (and economic) centralization, evidently advocated by the CUP. This would have ramifications on the relations between the political center in Istanbul and the provinces, including the Arab provinces of the empire. This discord continued unabated and evolved into one of the major bones of contention raised by the opposition against CUP-supported governments. Following the ultimatum of July 1912, issued by some officers known as the "Group of Savior Officers" (Hâlasakar Zabitân Grubu), a loose coalition of politicians known as the Liberal Entente (Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası) was able to drive the CUP from power. United only by their bitter opposition to the CUP, many of its supporters came from the provincial elites, including some prominent Arab politicians.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, alarmed by the low proportion of Arabs among holders of high office in the Ottoman administration and threatened by the enforcement of administrative centralization, many Arab intellectuals sided with the liberal opposition. But this did not mean a total break with the Ottoman state. As demonstrated by Hasan Kayalı, the predominant sentiment among the Arabs in the Young Turk period favored allegiance to the Ottoman sultan in his capacity as the leader of the Muslim *umma* (community). Notwithstanding demands for decentralization, most Arab intellectuals envisioned the future of the Arab provinces as an integral part of the Ottoman state.<sup>5</sup>

The Italian invasion of the Ottoman provinces in North Africa (later known as Libya) in September 1911 further threatened the image of the Ottomans, especially among Arab intellectuals and politicians. At the earlier stage of the war, the battles against the Italian army stirred up pan-Islamic and Ottomanist sentiments. But the ensuing Ottoman inability to protect those provinces, overwhelmingly inhabited by Arab-speaking Muslims, was perceived by Arab deputies and opposition members as reflecting the government's neglect of and indifference toward the Arabs. These antigovernment criticisms in the Ottoman parliament, however, seemed out of touch with the popular sentiments pouring from the Arab provinces in support of the Ottoman government's continuing heroic effort to defend the Libyan provinces.<sup>6</sup>

The subsequent Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the ensuing military defeat brought a more decisive shift in Ottoman politics. The military coup d'état of January 23, 1913, known in Ottoman history as the Bâb-ı

Âli Baskını (Attack on the Sublime Porte) enabled the Unionists to avail themselves of the desperate situation of the Ottoman state to overthrow the Liberal government and to consolidate their increasingly authoritarian control of the state's politics and military apparatus.<sup>7</sup> Çağlar Keyder claims that the historiography of Arab nationalism perceives the CUP victory over the Entente and the Balkan Wars as a watershed that led intellectuals to turn away from Ottomanism in favor of Arab nationalism. For him, the disintegration of the empire was inevitable after 1913.<sup>8</sup> As I have shown elsewhere, the defeat in the Balkan Wars indeed presented a major blow to the exponents of secular Ottomanism based on equal citizenship.<sup>9</sup> While the shock was tremendous and shared by many segments in Ottoman society, however, the lessons drawn from this military catastrophe were not identical everywhere. In this chapter I examine the responses that can be gleaned in the Arab press and other writings about the Balkan Wars. I also discuss the Ottoman culture of defeat (a term explored below), as manifested in Istanbul and western Anatolia and among the refugees from the lost Balkan provinces. This juxtaposition helps to elucidate the particular characteristics of Arab writing regarding the defeat in the Balkans and its consequences for the Ottoman state in general and its Arab provinces in particular.

#### THE BALKAN WARS (1912–1913):

##### INTRODUCING THE BALKANS TO ARAB READERS

From reading the various articles that appeared in the Arab press during the first weeks of the First Balkan War it seems that the Balkans, the region where the revolution of 1908 broke out and the birthplace of many CUP leaders, was not well known in the Arab provinces. To address this curiosity and the growing interest in the Balkans, the daily press took it upon itself to provide its readers with some historical, geographical, and political background that could explain the conflict and anticipate the war's outcome. The press offered a host of images and selected data on the Balkan states and its leadership.<sup>10</sup>

Scholars today are increasingly highlighting the links connecting the regions in the context of the Ottoman Empire. Certainly the long Ottoman period placed the Balkans and the Arab world under the same rule. It enabled scholars, merchants, pilgrims, soldiers, and others as well as ideas, beliefs, concepts, and perceptions to circulate between these two areas.<sup>11</sup> One example of such solid links between the Balkans and the Arab lands is the establishment of social and economic networks

between the Janissaries (the elite soldiers of the Ottoman Empire recruited in south Albanian lands to serve in Arab provinces) and their patrons back in the western Balkans, for the most part south Albanian (or Tosk) landowners.<sup>12</sup>

It was mostly the late Ottoman period, however, that offered numerous meeting points for Muslim elites arriving from the Balkans and the Middle East. The capital Istanbul and its various cultural, economic, and political institutions were the chief meeting place for politicians, administrators, entrepreneurs, students, journalists, and other publicists originating from the two regions.<sup>13</sup> Pan-Islamic sentiments and affinity with the Young Turks also made Istanbul a convenient haven for some young Egyptians as well as other North African Arabs who lived outside Ottoman boundaries and yet regarded Istanbul as the center of their allegiance and cultural affiliation.<sup>14</sup>

Another and much more extensive encounter must have taken place during the obligatory military service effective since 1909 and against the backdrop of increasing ethnic tensions in the Ottoman Balkans. While the allocation of recruits to the different Ottoman military units was based to a large extent on territorial origin, the Ottoman military authorities nevertheless endeavored to station some units far from their places of origins. Prior to the Balkan Wars some units originating from the Arab provinces were singled out to serve in the Balkans. Some of these soldiers would refer in their autobiographies to the ethnic tensions and conflicts that they witnessed in the Balkans during the years predating the Balkan Wars.<sup>15</sup>

In addition to military service, another encounter between the Balkan Muslims and the Arabs living in the Ottoman realms occurred following the settlement of refugees from the Balkans in the Arab provinces. At least from the Ottoman-Russian War of 1876–78 and the corresponding battles in the Balkans, Arab publicists wrote about political events taking place in the Balkans.<sup>16</sup> The plight of Muslim refugees from the Balkans was one important feature of these conflicts. While most of the refugees settled in Anatolia,<sup>17</sup> a few of them were relocated to sensitive areas in the Arab provinces by the Ottoman authorities.<sup>18</sup> The issue of *hijra* (emigration) from the Balkans, now under Christian sway, to the abode of Islam was raised and discussed by Arab scholars. The Egyptian scholar Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935) received a request for a religious opinion originating from Travnik in Bosnia. In response he issued a legal opinion (*fatwā*) in July 1909, published in *al-Manār*, in which he debated whether Muslims in Bosnia should perform a *hijra* due to that region's transition from

Muslim to non-Muslim rule. In his reply Riḍā refuted a legal opinion issued by an unnamed Muslim scholar “from the scholars of Istanbul.” This scholar ruled that Muslims indeed had a religious obligation to emigrate from Bosnia (*wujūb al-hijra*) due to its annexation to the Habsburg Empire. He likewise said that marriage and other religious obligations incumbent on all Muslims are not valid if performed under non-Muslim rule. For Riḍā, “that Turk” (*dhālīka al-turkī*) was totally mistaken; the Muslims of Habsburg Bosnia had no individual religious incumbency to immigrate to the lands of Islam, because they could safely perform their religious obligations under Habsburg rule. In such circumstances there was no difference between Muslim worship and marriage whether under Muslim or non-Muslim rule.<sup>19</sup>

Interest in the Balkans grew tremendously with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in October 1912. Most of the Ottoman propaganda produced in the Arab provinces and designated for Arab audience was verbal (of which we know little) and print-oriented. Despite the links between the regions, the press coverage of the war seems to have functioned to help the Arab audience learn more about the Balkans. As happened during previous conflicts there,<sup>20</sup> the daily press probably assumed that a large audience would be interested to learn more about the regions in which the combats took place. During the Balkan Wars the Arab reading public viewed the combats in the Balkans almost entirely through the Arab press. Its importance in introducing the Balkans and in popularizing the Ottoman war effort cannot be denied. The creation of Balkan images included both the land and the people, and both were placed within a historical context. Thus, for example, the Egyptian periodical *al-Hilāl* offered familiarity with the Balkans to its readers. Probably using secondary Western sources and borrowing European concepts, the newspaper attempted to make some sense of the ongoing conflict. In November 1912 it dedicated the front pages to a short survey of the Balkans: their history, population, and major urban centers. A political map of the Balkan Peninsula was attached to the article.<sup>21</sup> Jeremy Black relates the increasing use of political maps in the European daily press to World War I and the readers’ interest in “all things military.” He states that the publication of maps rendered readers of newspapers “ever more familiar with campaign and battle plans” and “map-conscious.”<sup>22</sup>

The Balkans were not the only area to be presented in the Arabic-speaking press during this period. Michael Laffan emphasizes the role of the contemporary “globalizing Arabic media” in creating a modern Islamic space where information and opinions were circulated, debated,



and exchanged. The new communities of Muslim newspaper readers were thus exposed to information about other Muslim inhabitants: their particular history and customs and the story of their conversion to Islam.<sup>23</sup>

During the Balkan Wars particular attention was devoted to assessing the Balkans' military capacity. Like many European and Turkish observers, Arab writers were impressed by the Balkan states' ability to inculcate patriotic awareness among their citizens from early childhood and to shape well-equipped armies consisting of soldier-citizens. *Al-Muqtataf* placed a group-portrait of the four Balkan kings on its front page before proceeding to introduce the area to its readers. Pertinent to our discussion is the periodical's remark about the ignorance reigning among the Arabs with regard to the Balkans: "We know more about the history of India and China than we know about the history of the Serbs and the Bulgarians; we are familiar with the description of London and Paris more than we are acquainted with Üsküp [Skopje] and Salonika." But it further claimed that the current war incited the Arab readers to seek information about the Balkans—to acquaint themselves with its landscape, history, politics, and current conditions.<sup>24</sup>

Making the Balkans' landscape familiar and the plight of the Muslim populations of the peninsula known was an important trigger in the civilian mobilization in favor of the Ottoman war effort. As the war proceeded and the Ottomans faced the prospect of massive defeat, including the loss of nearly all its Balkan provinces, the Arab press dedicated larger sections of its coverage on the Balkan Wars to outline the mobilization of the Arab masses—men, women, and children—to assist the Ottoman state in its time of need. It should be emphasized that this spirit of popular mobilization was not merely reported in the Arab press under Ottoman censorship but also in Egypt, from which Ottoman authorities were absent.

#### ARAB MOBILIZATION FOR THE OTTOMAN WAR EFFORT

The Balkan Wars placed the Balkans and their Muslim populations under the spotlights of the Arab and Egyptian media. Names, toponyms, portraits, and landscapes hitherto only slightly known could now be regularly found on the front pages of the leading newspapers. The Arab daily press invested concerted efforts in mobilizing resources and public opinion behind the Ottoman war effort. The rapid development of the Arab press and the spread of charitable organizations supporting the Ottoman cause broadly circulated the war's horrors. Since the late nineteenth

century, the thriving Egyptian press had offered forums and means of communication through which charitable organizations and benevolent individuals could advertise their actions and efforts to solicit funds.<sup>25</sup> These philanthropic associations, in their turn, provided potential contributors with the administrative networks and means through which they could channel their benevolent wish to assist the war's victims. This was true both for the Arab provinces of the Ottoman state and for Egypt. Indeed, one of the major outcomes of these prolonged conflicts was a proliferation of philanthropic associations (many of them headed by politicians and bureaucrats or their female relatives) that aimed to popularize the war and to mobilize large segments of the Egyptian population for the war effort. These associations took upon themselves to mobilize the civil population for humanitarian, military, and political causes.<sup>26</sup>

In this section I delineate some cases in which assistance to the Ottoman army was described in the Arab press. These cases exemplify not only cases of mobilization but also the prevailing discourses regarding the war's aims and its relevance and connection to the Arab masses, including those living outside the actual boundaries of the Ottoman Empire.

When surveying the charitable organizations that played a role during the Balkan Wars, the Red Crescent is prominent as one of the main institutions through which aid could be channeled. Its well-established branches inside the Ottoman state and in other Muslim countries, including Egypt, and its international status and connections with other similar institutions, like the Red Cross, offered countless possibilities for participating in philanthropic activity and assisting the Ottoman cause. The magnitude and significance of the activities of the Red Crescent (especially those branches representing the Ottoman state, Egypt, and India) during the Balkan Wars are evident from the Ottoman Red Crescent annual, probably published in 1913. These organizations sent contributions to assist the war's victims (refugees, prisoners of war, and wounded soldiers) and established field hospitals in Istanbul and its suburbs. A hospital designated to provide medical treatment to refugees was established in the Yedikale neighborhood. These hospitals were staffed by several surgeons, doctors, a team of nurses, and an assortment of volunteers acting as orderlies. They were well equipped and possessed their own store of medical supplies, a kitchen, and a pharmacy. The Egyptian Red Crescent ship, *al-Baḥr al-Aḥmar*, was transformed into a floating field hospital. Taking advantage of Egypt's neutral status, the vessel evacuated refugees and wounded soldiers from Salonika to İzmir.<sup>27</sup>

Philanthropy is often connected to politics. The khedival family displayed its piety and deep concern regarding the war's victims: Muḥammad 'Alī Bāshā (1875–1955), the khedive's younger brother, served as the head of the Egyptian medical delegation to Istanbul. The mother of the incumbent khedive (Emine Ibrahim Hanımsultan, 1858–1931) offered her patronage to the delegation.<sup>28</sup> This benevolence could also boost the image of the khedival family as the primary benefactor of large-scale charitable projects.<sup>29</sup> Donations in aid of the Ottoman cause were collected all over Egypt. Their purpose, we can speculate, was more symbolic than financial. Thus, for example, *al-Muqattam* reported in its issue of November 25 on the collection of considerable sums of money in provincial cities, such as Maṣūra and Damanhūr. Prince Muḥammad 'Alī Bāshā attended the popular gathering in Maṣūra and offered his patronage for the subscription.<sup>30</sup>

For many Ottoman journalists and authors, the solidarity manifested by Muslims from all over the world signaled the only real achievement of the Balkan Wars: efficient links with the Muslim world. For them, this Muslim general mobilization in the Ottoman war effort presented the war as one in which every Muslim had a stake. While exalting the activity of the Egyptian Red Crescent during the Balkan Wars, the daily *Tanin* (Echo, the main organ of the CUP) declared that the assistance of Muslims worldwide, especially in India and Egypt, to the seat of the caliphate and the Turks was one of the clear phenomena of the Balkan Wars. The report further claimed that the wars created strong links within the Muslim world. Thus although this war by all accounts represented a terrible catastrophe, it nevertheless bolstered solidarity inside the Muslim world.<sup>31</sup>

The war inflamed popular responses from different corners of the Arab provinces and in Egypt (as well as in other Muslim territories). Reports of popular mobilization to assist the Ottoman war effort abounded. Some of them were anecdotal. The Başbakanlık archives in Istanbul, for example, contain correspondence relating to an initiative by a certain 'Alī [‘Abd] al-Ghānī Efendī, the quarantine secretary of Sida (Sidon), who approached the committee for assisting the navy with a proposal to construct a submarine (*bir tahtelbahir sefine*) that would assist the Ottoman navy in performing its duties.<sup>32</sup> The Egyptian authorities and local authorities in the Arab provinces also demonstrated their concern and support for the Ottoman cause by staging various ceremonies that became spectacles of Ottoman patriotism.

Special place was given to lavish visits organized for the victorious battleship *Hamidiye* and its captain, Rauf Bey (Orbay). The naval

victories of this battleship during the Balkan Wars were among the few Ottoman military achievements. The Ottoman authorities sought to use the battleship's successes to boost the state's image as modern and equipped with military and naval capacities. During the course of the war the *Hamidiye* moored in many eastern Mediterranean ports. These stopovers—ostensibly made only to load coal—were exploited for propaganda aimed at Arab and Egyptian audiences. The local press followed the battleship's expedition and described encounters between its crew and the local population in detail. Thus, for example, the Egyptian journal *al-Muqattam* reported the enthusiasm of the crowds when the battleship arrived in Haifa harbor.<sup>33</sup> At some stops the leaders of local communities presented gifts to the captain of the *Hamidiye* as a token of gratitude. These presents were carefully chosen to represent the distinctive artistic heritage of the place. The Ottoman naval museum, established in 1897 in Beşiktaş, has an exhibition room dedicated to Rauf Bey. One of the major memorabilia put on display today is a chair made of wood and mother-of-pearl inlay given as a present by a delegation from Damascus.<sup>34</sup>

Yet even as the general mobilization was declared, the enlistment of Arab soldiers in fighting units was limited by the Ottomans' inability to transfer soldiers from the Arab provinces to the battlefields in the Balkans. Due to the Greek navy's superiority and ability to impose its control on the Aegean Sea on the one hand and the lack of effective transport infrastructure in Anatolia on the other, the Ottomans found it almost impossible to move additional soldiers from the Arab provinces to the battlefields in the Balkans. Therefore the Arab audience in the Arab provinces (and of course in Egypt) remained in the position of distant observers.

That being said, the Arab press carefully covered the events, recounted the atrocities happening in the Balkans, and encouraged its readers to assist Muslim war victims through subscriptions. For the Egyptian elite, headed by the khedival family (who originated from the Macedonian city of Kavala), the war presented an opportunity to demonstrate its benevolence and commitment to assist those Muslims in need. Egypt, practically separated from Ottoman domination for almost a century and under British sway since 1882, was nevertheless eager to express its attachment to the Ottoman cause. It should be remembered that loyalty to the Ottoman sultan/caliph was one of the few possible avenues of resistance to British domination. Therefore an orientation favorable to the Ottoman Empire flourished in Egypt between 1882 and 1914.<sup>35</sup> This was especially evident at times of crisis.

Most of the news published in the Egyptian press was taken from the British press. But as the war lingered some of the newspapers dispatched their own reporters to cover the events taking place at the front and to report on the refugees' plight, especially in Istanbul. Some newspapers retained permanent reporters in Istanbul, and the Balkan Wars remained the "main story" for most of the time. The Egyptian press was the primary source of news for Arabs living in the Ottoman lands as well. Being outside the Ottoman state's effective boundaries, the Egyptian press gained the reputation of being relatively unimpeded and without the stringent restrictions of Ottoman censorship.<sup>36</sup>

It is clear from the standpoint of the Egyptian press during the Balkan Wars that the Egyptians felt themselves closely bound to the Ottoman state and even more so to the Ottoman caliph. They accused the Balkan coalition of waging a religious war. Thus, for example, the Egyptian journalist Yūsuf al-Bustānī, writing for *al-Jarīda*, argued that instilling resentment against the Ottoman state in the hearts of Christian Balkan people had become a holy religious command (*farḍan muqaddasan*), a detestation that babies absorbed with their mothers' milk.<sup>37</sup> Much of the Arab response to the Balkan Wars was expressed in terms and images that harked back to historical catastrophes from the past. The Egyptian journal *al-Manār* entitled the Balkan Wars *al-Ḥarb al-Balqānīya al-Ṣalībīya* (the crusader war of the Balkans), which aimed to expel the Muslims from Europe, thus echoing one of the main Ottoman allegations against their Balkan foes.<sup>38</sup>

Memories of the Crusades clearly proved to have retained their power to shape current political identities, alignments, and antagonisms in Arab writing. It should be mentioned, though, that not all Arab journalists accepted this comparison between the Balkan Wars and the Crusades. For obvious reasons, among those Arab journalists who refused to define the war as a struggle between the Cross and the Crescent were local Christians. Ya'qūb al-ʿIsā, the Greek Orthodox editor of *Filastīn*, used the atrocities performed by Bulgarians against Greek villagers during the Second Balkan War to claim that the Balkan Wars were merely a struggle imbued with hatred and malice. While admitting that his opinion was accepted only by a minority, he further claimed that the wars' target was to cause destruction and loss. Against this background the First Balkan War should be regarded just as a war of interest (*ḥarb maṣlaḥa*) and not a combat between the Cross and the Crescent. For him, the vested interests in the Balkans Wars were those of Europe, which was using the Balkan states to solve the Eastern Question according to their agenda.<sup>39</sup>

*Al-Manār* likewise claimed European intervention in the ongoing military conflicts. It contended that “it is clear that all of Europe is currently fighting the Ottomans; four of the small states and one of the European powers [Italy] are fighting it with weapons, while the other European powers fight [the Ottomans] with their politics and authority.”<sup>40</sup>

As the war continued, horrible accounts of Bulgarian atrocities appeared regularly in the Arab press. These were intended to alarm and stir up public opinion. Some victims of the tragedies taking place in the distant Balkans reached Egyptian soil as well. In the aftermath of the Bulgarian conquest of the Macedonian city of Kavala, Muslim war refugees from the city arrived in Alexandria. The khedive himself dispatched his private boats to evacuate the desperate refugees and offered them shelter. Some refugees were settled in his own private *çiftlik* (agricultural estate) situated in Dolmen. Indeed special attention was given in Egypt to the well-being of the Muslim refugees from Kavala, the native city of the khedival family.<sup>41</sup>

When the Egyptian publicists turned to assess the wars’ ramifications for the future of the Ottoman Empire, however, the Balkans were quickly put aside. This phenomenon stands in sharp contrast to the prevailing representation of the Balkans in contemporary Turkish official and popular writings, in which the Balkans evolved to become a kind of Ottoman counterpart to the French “lost territories” of Alsace and Lorraine.

#### THE LOSS OF THE BALKANS AND THE “RETURN” OF THE OTTOMANS TO ASIA

The military defeats of October–November 1912 took a severe toll on the optimistic patriotism that characterized the first days of the war. Acknowledging defeat and incompetence was traumatic, and this trauma found immediate expression in a rhetoric of desolation and alarm in the Turkish-language press. As echoed in their writing, the Turkish-speaking elites perceived the loss of the Balkans as an unprecedented catastrophe. For many of them, it should be recalled, “the Balkans symbolized far more than territory, [it] was at the very heart of what made the empire.”<sup>42</sup> The Arab press shared this shock of defeat. The media were indefatigable in reporting scenes of military rout and the despair of the refugees eking out a precarious existence in makeshift shelters, mainly in Istanbul. Daily reports in the press described mosques and schools rapidly becoming crammed with hundreds of hungry men, women, and children forced from their homes in the lost Balkan provinces. “Disastrous calamity”

(*nakba fātika*) was one of the prevailing labels given to the Ottoman defeat in the Arab press.

The Egyptian press was not indifferent to the ongoing debate in the Ottoman press regarding the military rout. The scale of defeat was openly described and discussed.<sup>43</sup> But the Egyptian press portrayed the defeat as someone else's failure. The culprits were clearly the Turks—or more precisely the CUP regime and its policies. Such blunt accusations, of course, could appear only in the Egyptian press, which was far enough from Ottoman censorship.<sup>44</sup>

Protesting voices were also raised, though more clandestinely, in the Arab provinces still under Ottoman sway. A French official report originating from Damascus analyzed the effects of the surrender of Edirne in March 1913 on Arab public opinion. Though reflecting French vested interests in the area,<sup>45</sup> the report conveyed the bewilderment of the locals in the face of the swift and decisive rout of the Ottomans. The report maintained that “the taking by force of the ancient Turkish capital in Europe left an enormous impact on the Muslims of this country.” According to an assessment included in the report, “even the entrance of Bulgarian troops into Constantinople could not deliver a more profound blow to them. The Christians, for their part, were all rejoicing at the Turkish debacle.” “Facing the fall of Edirne,” everyone in Syria declared that “the Turks are doomed; the Arabs cannot forgive the Ottomans for having ruined the prestige of Islam and for dragging them into the bottom of an abyss.”<sup>46</sup>

In the Turkish-speaking provinces of the Ottoman state, especially in Istanbul, the Balkan Wars and the resulting immense territorial losses constituted the subject of a literature of much grief and lamentation over the nation's sufferings.<sup>47</sup> The Ottoman debacle during the First Balkan War provoked the appearance of various publications that provide insights into the contemporary debate about the causes of the defeat, the ensuing internal crisis, and the possible new means to achieve transformation, revenge, and regeneration. An important part of the plan to revive the Ottoman nation was interlocked with calls for revenge and for the future liberation of the Balkans. This Ottoman “culture of defeat”—to use Wolfgang Schivelbusch's term—surfaced already at the early stages of the First Balkan War. Like other nations that endured a catastrophic defeat (Schivelbusch refers in his study to the American South, France in 1870–71, and Germany after World War I), the Ottomans searched for middle- or long-term factors to account for and possibly explain the unexpected military rout and its tremendous dimensions. They also

perceived the defeat as a call for national awakening and purification that could bring revenge against the enemy in tandem with renewal of the nation.<sup>48</sup>

We find a similar debate on the Ottoman defeat in the writings of Arab and Egyptian authors. For many of them, these wars presented the downfall of humankind and its civilization (*madaniyya*) and in particular the double standards of the West. The Egyptian journalist Tawfiq Ṭannūs characterized the Balkan Wars as “the period of blood and covetousness” (*‘aṣr al-dimā’ wal-maṭāmi’*) in which the militarily powerful side could grasp whatever it desired, legitimizing its claims and deeds merely on the basis of its military might.<sup>49</sup> While Ṭannūs did not exonerate the CUP for its previous flawed and sometimes brutal policies in the Balkan provinces, he mocked the chauvinistic responses in the Western press and its blind support given abundantly to the Balkan states. He admonished Europe for its ethnic fanaticism and its perception of the Balkan Wars as a legitimate Christian *jihād* aiming to drive the Crescent from European soil. His cynical use of the term *jihād* to condemn European aggression against the East is clearly meant to ridicule the European understanding of the term as a reflection of Islamic fanaticism.<sup>50</sup> Indeed Ṭannūs equally blamed the Europeans for having double standards. When they feared Ottoman victory, the European states emphasized the obligation to keep the status quo (as they did in the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, in which the Ottomans were clearly the victorious side). In the face of the decisive victories of the Balkan states, however, the Europeans changed their previous stands in favor of admitting the new order. For Ṭannūs, this outlook of the European states had brought shame on the twentieth century—the ostensible century of civilization and equality.<sup>51</sup>

Equally traumatized by the Ottoman fiasco, Arab authors suggested similar remedies—among them the revitalization of Islam as the major spiritual inspiration of the Ottoman army. But there are two main differences between the Turkish-language writings and their Egyptian counterpart. One is the Egyptians’ underlining of the importance of decentralization for the Arab provinces as a way to safeguard the Ottoman sultanate; the other is the actual disappearance of the Balkans from the scheme of revival. The Islamist *al-Manār* was the most unambiguous about the importance of Islam as a major ingredient of revival. The journal reproved the CUP leaders for imitating France and for assuming that Islam would lead the Ottomans nowhere. The adoption of what the author describes as Ottoman patriotism and Turkish nationalism brought about the military rout.<sup>52</sup>



Even this journal, however, which adopted a critical outlook in regard to the CUP regime, did not contest the Ottoman dynasty's right to lead the Muslim community. The writer insisted on a large array of crucial reforms and political reorganizations that needed to be implemented; otherwise, he argued, all the efforts of the world's Muslims to assist the Ottomans would be of no avail. In his vision the Ottoman state should turn its back on Europe and return to its position as a Muslim and Asiatic power. According to him, the Ottomans must depart from Byzantine and corrupt Istanbul and found a new capital in the heart of Asia, establishing a new government there based on decentralization that would be able to unite the Arabs and the Turks into one powerful nation.<sup>53</sup>

Discussions of the relocation of the Ottoman capital to a more secure place that would additionally strengthen the links between Turks and Arabs indeed appeared in the Turkish and Arab press until the assassination of the grand vizier Mahmut Şevket in June 1913 and the passing of an edict prohibiting further public debate about the relocation.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, *al-Muqtaṭaf* printed in June 1913 a summary of treatises published by Western experts on the venues open to the Ottomans to save their empire and on the potential that awaited the Ottomans in Asia. Quoting the German marshal Colmar von der Goltz (1843–1916),<sup>55</sup> the article stated that “it is currently incumbent [on the Turks] to reconcile with the Arab component, to come to agreement with it and to refrain from considering their sultanate as a European state but to regard it merely as an Asian state.” Furthermore, he predicted that a brilliant future awaited the Ottomans in Asia if they could only forsake their European ambitions.<sup>56</sup>

While most discussions regarding the Ottoman defeat first appeared in the press, four books published in Arabic in 1913–14 explored the Ottoman defeat and its ramifications for the Ottoman state and its Arab provinces.<sup>57</sup> Some of the authors wrote their books before the outbreak of the Second Balkan War. We can assume that the publication of several books in Arabic on the Balkan Wars reflected the public's interest in receiving detailed explanations regarding the Ottoman defeat. Indeed, Maḥmūd al-Shihābī, who published his *Tarikh al-Ḥarb al-Balqānīya* in Beirut in 1913, did not conceal his pride in publishing what he claimed to be the first book on the Balkan Wars in the world. In his rhymed introduction he celebrated the appearance of his book, the first one to tackle the subject of the Balkan Wars, and announced it to the West, “which always condemns the East for its sluggishness.”<sup>58</sup>

All these authors intended their books to provide a comprehensive and accurate picture of the Balkan Wars, their origins, and their possible

outcomes. Like the previously discussed newspaper articles, they provided their readers with detailed information on the belligerent states and their armies and related the main events that took place during combat. In addition some of the authors included Arabic translations of official statements, international treaties, and military edicts distributed to the armies during the war. They likewise offered their own interpretations of the Ottoman defeat, its causes, and the possible paths that the Ottoman state should take in order to survive. These analyses and suggestions are pertinent to this discussion because they amply explore the future desired connections between Turks and Arabs—a topic that was marginal to the discussions in contemporary Turkish literature on the Balkan Wars.

Maḥmūd al-Shihābī offered some reassurance to his readers in his book on the history of the Balkan Wars. His prudent optimism dwelled on the newly homogeneous character of the Ottoman state following the loss of its European provinces. Written before the outbreak of the Second Balkan War, his book described the Ottoman defeat in the First Balkan War. According to him, the Ottoman soldier showed his well-known military abilities during the conflict: braveness and intrepidity that had gained him the admiration of the whole world. The mediocrity of the officers, the poor infrastructure, and the lack of preparations for the war, however, made the Ottoman soldier powerless when confronted by better-equipped and well-trained adversaries. Consequently the Balkan provinces were lost. In his epilogue al-Shihābī found some consolation in comparing the lost Balkan provinces and the remaining Asian areas of the empire:

The Ottoman kingdom was a European-Asian kingdom before the Balkan War. This beautiful setting was the legacy of the early and old politics that provided the Ottomans with the greatest political and economic significance. However, in just a few years it lost most of its former European possessions; some provinces—like the Greeks, the Serbs, the Bulgarians, Montenegro, Romania, and Albania—gained their independence. This was the outcome of the negligence characterizing some politicians and their clinging to authority without any consideration of its positive or negative ramifications for the state. [The fact] that most of the inhabitants of these [European] provinces consisted of elements that were different from the Ottomans [*mukhālif lil-‘Uthmāniya*] regarding their religion, origins [*mashrab*], natural dispositions, and character likewise triggered this loss. Each state began a

process of reunification and claimed its own independence, assisted by the presence of a significant number of people of its own stock in different provinces. The Turks, for example, are less than a quarter of the population in Macedonia, Thrace, and Albania. Even in Istanbul, in which the population is about one million, there are 350,000 Greeks. This may make the capital one day a target for their agitation, disturbances, and greed.<sup>59</sup>

For al-Shihābī, the loss of the Balkans was due to various reasons. But the otherness of the European provinces and their distinct characters drove them apart from the Ottoman nation. The Asian provinces presented a different case altogether: most of their population consisted of Turks or Arabs who were linked by a common ethnic element or a common religion (*tujammi'uhum jāmi'at al-'unṣūr aw jāmi'at al-dīn*). These shared characteristics that brought together Turks and Arabs rendered the Asian provinces much more inclined to peaceful coexistence. Yet he reminded his readers that some parts of the Asian provinces were inhabited by tribes (and not ethnic groups!) that were prone “to draw swords.” These could be found mainly in the Arabian peninsula and among the Kurds. Nonetheless, al-Shihābī concluded his comparison between the European and the Asian provinces by claiming that Syria and Mesopotamia were inhabited by Arabs while the Ottoman coasts and Anatolia (with the exception of Armenia) were the home of the “real Turks” (*bil-atrak al-ḥaqīqiyīn*). This element, he reminded his readers, was the main source of the Ottomans’ strength “ever since they made Bursa their capital.”<sup>60</sup>

Al-Shihābī’s comparison between the European and Asian provinces is significant; while bemoaning the loss of provinces that had been conquered by the Ottomans long ago he nevertheless highlighted the total disparity between their inhabitants and the Ottomans as the principal reason for their estrangement and subsequent political separation from the Ottoman state. The Asian provinces offered a dissimilar reality: the strong ties between Turks and Arabs, based on religion and ethnicity, would enable the Ottoman state to conduct peaceful life without sinking in ongoing ethnic conflicts. His remark about the ethnic multiplicity of Istanbul may indicate his uneasiness regarding its position as the long-established capital of the new Ottoman state.

The braveness and resolution of the simple Ottoman soldier—who proved to be without equals among the worlds’ armies when he was ordered to defend fortified sites—were the only points of light in what is overwhelmingly an account of defeat in Salim al-ʿAqqād’s *Tarīkh al-Ḥarb*

*al-Balqānīya*, published in 1914 in Cairo. According to the author, the successful maneuvers of the battleship *Hamidiye* and its ability to challenge the mighty Greek navy offered another rare case of accomplishment: “its deeds are a chain of glorious feats in which the Ottomans can pride themselves as they shed light over the current darkness that was engulfing our navy and as they replaced the clouds of despair that overcast it.”<sup>61</sup>

Reflecting on the recent events of the Second Balkan War, al-ʿAqqād did not conceal his disdain for the Balkan states. Unable to divide the Ottoman booty, they revealed their “savage character”: each one of them coveted the lion’s share of the plunder. The author admitted his previous admiration for the Bulgarian military achievements, which reflected the Bulgarians’ “wondrous national awakening” (*nahḍatihā al-ʿajība*) that had taken place in the previous quarter century. The shaping of a modern army led Bulgaria from one military victory to another. Al-ʿAqqād was not unique among Arab authors, or among Turkish writers, in his esteem for the military performance of the Bulgarian army and the quality of its soldiers. But the “war of the allies” made him change his mind: “even if they were able to hold their share of plundered Ottoman lands and estates or part of it, they remained totally bereft of the respect of the civilized nations and the admiration of the educated people.”<sup>62</sup>

The reclaiming of Edirne (*istirdād Edirne*) in July 1913—certainly the main Ottoman diplomatic achievement of the Second Balkan War—was celebrated by the Ottoman government as a major national holiday, heralding the rejuvenation of the Ottoman state.<sup>63</sup> The ceremonies that followed the city’s liberation were presented as a sacred experience that provided the nation with a new depth of community united by religion, placing martyrs and new sites of pilgrimage at its disposal. The liberation of Edirne also formed a propaganda tool to reach Muslim public opinion in the Arab provinces and outside the Ottoman lands. The holy month of Ramazan began that year on July 22/August 4, which created an opportunity to commemorate this manifestation of Muslim unity: the press and telegrams that arrived at the Ministry of Internal Affairs on behalf of the sultan reported the joy reigning in the Muslim world on the occasion of Edirne’s liberation and the national festival (*îd-i milli*) proclaimed to celebrate this occasion. This festival became “a day of rejoicing for the Ottomans in particular and the Muslims in general,” to quote from a telegram dispatched by Abdüllah, the mayor of Amare (Al-ʿAmāra in present-day Iraq) on behalf of the town’s inhabitants and tribes.<sup>64</sup> Similar reports arrived from Anatolia and the Arab provinces, as well as from Muslim communities in Bombay, Cape Town, Durban, Rangoon, and

other distant places.<sup>65</sup> The liberation of Edirne therefore was celebrated in a Muslim context as the deliverance of an Islamic population and religious heritage from a Christian yoke: a military achievement that would bolster Muslim solidarity inside the Ottoman Empire and outside its realms.

The liberation of Edirne was celebrated in the Arab press and by Ottoman authors who did not neglect to describe its Islamic heritage and its significance for the Ottoman dynasty.<sup>66</sup> While the future of Edirne was still debated, the Arab press presented its firm support for the Ottoman claim to full suzerainty over the city.<sup>67</sup>

Yet Edirne played a minor role in the Arab vision of the future of the Ottoman state. For most Arab writers, the relations between Istanbul and the provinces and the related need to reconstruct the political cooperation between Arabs and Turks were the main issues to be discussed. Many Arab authors perceived the defeat and the loss of the Balkan provinces as an opportunity to reshape the Turkish-Arab partnership on a more equal basis. To offer some possible directions in July 1913, the Egyptian daily *al-Jarīda* convened a symposium featuring several leading journalists and publicists. They were asked to express their thoughts on the future of the Ottoman sultanate and the modes to revive it (*inhād al-salṭana*) following the defeat.<sup>68</sup> Among those participating in the symposium were some of the leading Egyptian intellectuals, journalists, and editors: Faṭḥī Bāshā Zaghlūl and Fāris Efendi Nimr (the owners of the *al-Muqattaʿaf* and *al-Muqattam* newspapers), the poet Ismāʿīl Ṣabrī Bāshā, the historian Jurjī Bey Zaydān (the owner of *al-Hilāl*), Aḥmad Lutfī Bey al-Sayyid (then the owner of *al-Jarīda*), Farah Efendi Antūn (the owner of *Majallat al-Jāmiʿa*), the publicist Muḥammad Masʿūd, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (the owner of *al-Manār*), Dāʿūd Efendi Barakāt (the editor-in-chief of *al-Abrām*), and others. The different respondents suggested various solutions and scenarios. Most of them referred to the importance of decentralization and granting more powers to the provinces (some of them went as far as using the term “administrative self-government”), full equality for the Arabs vis-à-vis the Turks, propagation of the Arabic language among all Muslims, justice for all, and the importance of education as crucial devices to secure the Ottoman Empire.

What was strikingly absent in this round-table gathering was any kind of discussion of the future of the lost Balkan provinces. Unlike their Turkish colleagues, Arab publicists viewed the Balkan Wars mainly through the prism of Ottoman-Arab current and future relations. The

lost provinces of the Balkans and their Muslim populations were utterly absent from their vision for the future.

### CONCLUSIONS

Between October 1912 and August 1913 the Ottoman state was radically transformed. The loss of the Balkan provinces and the military defeat presented a severe challenge to the state's own survival. The army's performance in the war encapsulated the vulnerabilities of the Ottomans. "One can find in the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912–13) a lesson to consider by the one who listens and guidance to the one who is endowed with reason."<sup>69</sup> With this sentence al-ʿAqqād began his narration of Bulgaria's unexpected defeat at the hands of its former Balkan allies during the Second Balkan War. Indeed Arab authors concurred that the Balkan Wars offered a lesson to be learned by all Ottomans, including the Arab citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Viewed through the lens of the Arab press and books on the Balkan Wars, several aspects of the particular Arab responses to the defeat have been suggested. While Arab authors shared the feeling of humiliation, shock, and trauma caused by the defeat and supported the demand for swift and wide-ranging reforms, they offered a different vision for the future of the Ottoman state.

The Egyptian journalist Tawfiq Ṭannūs described the CUP's vision of constructing a powerful state based, first, on the unification of all the ethnicities inhabiting the Ottoman sultanate to mold a powerful and capable fatherland and, second, on the cultural and social advancement of the country to bring justice and prosperity to its inhabitants. According to him, "we" (Arab intellectuals) shared these aims. But adapting the French model of centralization and ignoring the differences that exist between France and the Ottoman Empire was misleading. The Ottoman state, Ṭannūs reminded his readers, was like a mosaic consisting of different provinces, each with its distinctive geography, ethnicities, customs, and natural conditions. Therefore such a state and its diverse populations could never be governed by uniform order. For this reason Arab publicists advocated a different path to achieve these goals, because the CUP's program could only lead to Turkification (*tatrik*). The Arabs suggested a different mode of partnership that would enable the state to implement the vision of power and progress. This could be achieved by enabling each sector to use its own language, literature, and publications and by a better inclusion of all sectors in the government and in the administration of all topics related to the fatherland.<sup>70</sup>

It seems that Ṭannūs's suggestions dovetailed well with the main arguments raised in Arab writings on the Ottoman defeat and the reconstruction of the Ottoman state. Arab authors shared many of the main features that appeared in Turkish writings regarding the Ottoman rout in the Balkan Wars: shock, humiliation, victimhood, disappointment, and rage over what they perceived as the West's hypocrisy. They likewise agreed with the need to rebuild the Ottoman state on a more solid basis. Many of the Arab authors perceived the Ottoman catastrophic defeat in the Balkan Wars and in the previous Libyan War (1911–12) as a reflection of the CUP's erroneous policies and deeds (especially toward the Arab provinces). But they nevertheless regarded the Arabs as genuine partners in the reconstruction of the state (which they also saw as theirs) even if they were writing from Egypt. Ṭannūs phrased this argument in the following mode: "It is an incontrovertible fact that this Balkan War should serve as the greatest lesson to the Ottomans and especially to the Turks who claimed a monopoly over the government and its restriction to an ignorant group that was not able to identify the malady and that could not treat it through curative reforms."<sup>71</sup>

Administrative reforms were desperately needed. Arab writers argued that the newly built state should be molded on a more equal basis and partnership that would guarantee the Arab provinces and their population an equal share in administering the state while securing their uniqueness and their rights. The appointment of Saʿīd Ḥalīm Paşa, a statesman who was known for his Arab affinities, as grand vizier in June 1913, the modest administrative reforms implemented in the Arab provinces in April 1913 (mainly in the realm of linguistic rights), and the new conciliatory policy of the CUP toward the Arabs could convince some Ottoman Arabs that the government paid attention to some of their demands and ambitions.<sup>72</sup>

## NOTES

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1. "[W]a-ṣarāḥḥat, kulluhā bi-ṣawt, wāḥid, ilā al-ḥarb fa-ammā ḥayāt sharīfa wa-ammā mawt sharīf", "Akhbār Maḥaliya: Al-Muẓāhara, al-Kabīra," *Filastīn*, October 12, 1912. I would like to thank my student Aharon Breznick for providing me with this reference.
2. Ibid.
3. R. A. S. Macalister, *A History of Civilization in Palestine*, 127–28.
4. Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 88, 94–98.
5. Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 211–12.

6. Ibid., 107–8.
7. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, 109–10.
8. Çağlar Keyder, “Ottoman Empire,” 41.
9. Eyal Ginio, “Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913).”
10. For a detailed discussion, see Eyal Ginio, “Between the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the ‘Third Balkan War’ of the 1990s.”
11. For a major discussion on the cultural relations between the Balkans and the Arab lands, see Harry T. Norris, *Islam in the Balkans*.
12. Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, 23–24.
13. As an illustrative example, see the political and economic rise and fall of the six Malhamé brothers. These Maronite Christians who originated from Lebanon were able to develop careers in the Hamidian bureaucracy and form extensive economic and political networks based in Istanbul to become “transimperial power brokers”: Jens Hanssen, “‘Malhamé-Malfamé’: Levantine Elites and Transimperial Networks on the Eve of the Young Turk Revolution,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 43 (2011): 25–48.
14. See, for example, Kenneth J. Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 73.
15. See, for example, the memoirs of the young Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, later to be one of the leaders of the Syrian revolt (1925). His testimony on his military service in Macedonia enables us to view the Ottoman Balkans as he perceived them later in his life. See Fāiz ‘Azām, ed., *Al-Mudhākarāt al-Kāmila lil-Za‘īm Sulṭān Bāshā al-Aṭrash*, 85–86.
16. Kamen Velichkov, “Arab Perceptions of the Balkans at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century.”
17. Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri (1912–1913)*; Justin McCarthy, “Muslim Refugees in Turkey.”
18. See, for example, the Palestinian village of Kaysariya that was constructed in 1878 amid the local crusader and Roman ruins of Caesarea to accommodate Bosnian refugees: Zuhayr Ghanā‘im ‘Abd al-Latif Ghanā‘im, *Liwa’ ‘Akkā fi ‘Abd al-Tanzīmāt al-‘Uthmāniya*, 1281–1338h/1864–1918, 162–77.
19. “Fatāwā al-Manār: al-Hijra va-Ḥukm Muslimī al-Būsna fihā,” *al-Manār* 12 (July 17, 1909): 410–15. See also Muhamed Mufaku al-Arnaut, “Islam and Muslims in Bosnia 1878–1918,” 252–53.
20. See, for example, Abdul Rahim Abu Husayn, “One Ottoman Periphery Views Another.”
21. “Mamālik al-Balqān wal-Dawla al-‘Uthmāniya,” *al-Hilāl*, November 1, 1912.
22. Jeremy Black, *Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past*, 102–3.
23. Michael Laffan, “Another Andalusia.”
24. “Al-Ḥarb al-Ḥādīra wa Mulūk al-Balqān,” *al-Muqtataf*, December 1, 1912.
25. Mine Ener, *Managing Egypt’s Poor and the Politics of Benevolence, 1800–1952*, 23.
26. On the social and political significance of similar organizations in the Ottoman state, see Nadir Özbek, “Defining the Public Sphere during the Late Ottoman Empire.”
27. Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında*, 57–58.
28. On the Egyptian Red Crescent during the Balkan Wars, see *Osmanlı Hilāl-i Ahmer Cemiyeti 1329–1331 Salnamesi*, 178–85. For detailed lists of contributions



- offered to the Egyptian Red Crescent, see, for example, *al-Muqaṭṭam*, November 21, 1912. See also Zuhul Özeydin, "The Egyptian Red Crescent Society's Aid to the Ottoman State during the Balkan War in 1912."
29. See also Ener, *Managing Egypt's Poor*, 100–101.
  30. "Akhbār al-Ḥarb," *al-Muqaṭṭam*, November 25, 1912.
  31. *Tanin* 1581, April 11/24, 1913.
  32. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (hereafter BOA), DH.MTV 29/47, January 9/22, 1913.
  33. "Al-Mudarra'a Ḥamīdiya fi Ḥayfā," *al-Muqaṭṭam*, March 6, 1913.
  34. See also *Babriye Müzesi Kataloğu*, 71.
  35. Israel Gershoni and J. P. Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs*, 6.
  36. Abbas Kelidar, "The Political Press in Egypt, 1882–1914," 1–21; Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*, 51–52.
  37. Yūsuf al-Bustānī, *Tarikh Ḥarb al-Balqān al-ʿUlā bayna al-Dawla al-ʿĀliya wal-Ittiḥād al-Balqānī al-Muallif min al-Bulghār wal-Şirb wal-Yūnān wal-Jabal al-Aswad*, 33.
  38. *Al-Manār*, January 8, 1913. See also Paul E. Chevedden, "The Islamic Interpretation of the Crusade."
  39. "Mushāhid al-Balqān," *Filastīn*, July 12, 1913.
  40. "Al-Mas'ala al-Sharqiya wal-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya al-ʿUthmāniya," *al-Manār*, October 1, 1912.
  41. Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sirasında*, 54–65.
  42. Ebru Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans*, 1. See also Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Young Turks."
  43. See, for example, "Ra'y Mukhtār Bāshā fi Qahr al-Jaysh al-ʿUthmānī," *al-Jarida*, August 10, 1913.
  44. For the Ottomans' attempts to prevent the circulation of Egyptian newspapers in the Arab provinces during the Balkan Wars, see "Ishāʿāt al-Ḥarb fi Filastīn," *al-Muqaṭṭam*, November 21, 1912.
  45. On the British attempts to use the defeat in order to propagate anti-Ottoman feelings in Egypt, see Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 133–34.
  46. This report appeared in a communication gathered by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sent to the General Consulate in Beirut: see Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Nantes, série cabinet politique, fonds Beyrouth, number 363, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the General Consul in Beirut, May 22, 1913. I would like to thank Dr. Asher Kaufman for providing me with a copy of this report.
  47. See Halûk Harun Duman, *Balkanlara Veda, Basın ve Edebiyatta Balkan Savaşı (1912–1913)*; Nesime Ceyhan, *Balkan Savaşı Hikâyeler*.
  48. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat*, 4–35.
  49. Tawfiq Ṭannūs, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya*, 4.
  50. Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*, 89.
  51. Ṭannūs, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb*, 76–77.
  52. "İbr al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya wa-akhṭār al-Mas'ala al-Sharqiya," *al-Manār*, February 6, 1913.
  53. "Al-Dawla al-ʿUthmāniya," *al-Manār*, February 6, 1913. See also "Al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya al-Şalibiya," *Al-Manār*, January 8, 1913.

54. Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 136–37.
55. On von der Goltz, who served in the German military mission to the Ottoman army, see Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 11–12; on his perceptions and suggestions regarding the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars and its ramifications, see Feroze A. K. Yasamee, “Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire,” 117–19.
56. “Mustaqbal al-Bilād al-‘Uthmāniya,” *al-Muqtataf*, June 1, 1913.
57. I was able to find the following books, published between 1913 and 1914 in Arabic, that related the main events of the Balkan Wars and discussed their significance: al-Bustānī, *Tarikh Harb al-Balqān al-‘Ulā*; Salīm al-‘Aqqād, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya al-Muṣawwar bayna al-Dawla al-‘Uthmāniya wa-Duwal al-Ittiḥād al-Balqāni*; Ṭannūs, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya*; Maḥmūd Shihāb, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya*. I would like to thank Professor Bedross Der Matossian for providing me with photocopies of some of these books.
58. Shihāb, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya*, 2.
59. *Ibid.*, 122.
60. *Ibid.*
61. al-‘Aqqād, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya*, vol. 3, 53, 73.
62. *Ibid.*, 94–95.
63. Eyal Ginio, “Transmitting the Agony of a Besieged Population,” 94–97.
64. BOA, DH.MTV 34/59, July 10, 1329/July 23, 1913.
65. See, for example, “Ālem-i İslamda Galeyan: Hind Müslimanları ve Edirne,” *Tanin* 1679, July 20/August 2, 1913; “Ālem-i İslamda Meserret,” *Tanin* 1680, July 21/August 2, 1913. Some of these telegrams are kept today in BOA, DH.MTV 34/59.
66. See, for example, al-‘Aqqād, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya*, vol. 3, 134–41.
67. See, for example, *al-Jarida*, August 6, 1913.
68. al-Bustānī, *Tarikh Harb al-Balqān al-‘Ulā*, 314–27.
69. al-‘Aqqād, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb al-Balqāniya*, vol. 3, 134.
70. Ṭannūs, *Tarikh al-Ḥarb*, 31–32.
71. *Ibid.*, 190.
72. Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 135–41.



PART IV

The Republic of Turkey  
and Republican Introspection



## The Balkans, War, and Migration

*Nedim İpek*

There can be no doubt that the demographic policies of the empires and nation-states differed greatly from each other. In the years that witnessed the first Turkish conquests in Anatolia, for instance, a traditional approach that considered the population the most important source of welfare dominated the mentality of states.<sup>1</sup> Thus, once defeated in the wars against the Turks and having lost significant territories, the Eastern Roman Empire ordered the inhabitants of these regions to move westward. This westward migration in the face of the Turkish conquests continued until the conquest of Istanbul, which put an end to the Eastern Roman administration while also stopping the massive westward migration of the Orthodox populations. As a result the Orthodox populations in the Balkans decided to remain part of the new political configuration—a decision that the *millet* system of the Ottomans also contributed to.

While the Pechenegs, Cumans, Kipchaks, and Oğuzes had been settling in the Balkans since the twelfth century, the real Turkish elements that settled in the Balkan Peninsula came from Anatolia. These Turks from Anatolia settled on the empty plots of land in the Balkans. With few exceptions, the lands of the native populations stayed untouched. With the conversion of Albanians and Bosnians to Islam in massive numbers during the Ottoman rule, “Turk” came to signify the Islamic religious orientation of the Balkan populations. Under the Pax Ottomana, the extant feudal patterns began to erode. The population started maneuvering across wide sections of geography, and different groups started living next to each other within the limits and opportunities of the *millet* system.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 38 percent of the Rumeian population was Muslim. With the influx of approximately 800,000 refugees from the Caucasus and Crimea, this increased to 43 percent.

As a result of economic difficulties, somewhere between 500,000 and 800,000 non-Muslim refugees left the Balkans for other places.<sup>2</sup> Having such a unique demographic mixture, by the nineteenth century the Balkans experienced attempts to build nation-states with reference to ethnicity—a set of moves that surely upset the unique demography of the region.

#### REASONS FOR MIGRATION

At the heart of migrations (whether individual or group-based, small or massive) lies the popular perception of the nondesirable aspects of the regions left behind and the attractive features of the next destination. In the Balkans of the preceding two centuries, which featured so many population movements, two major developments and characteristics most affected such demographic shifts. In 1829 and the 1860s the Greek and Bulgarian population movements from the Balkans to the Crimea and Caucasus were caused by the attractive aspects of these new regions. This perception of attractiveness also triggered migrations to America. The migrations from the Caucasus and Balkans into Anatolia, in contrast, were caused by the unpleasant circumstances in these regions, which produced such massive population movements southward.<sup>3</sup> Needless to say, such migrations into Anatolia cannot be explained by a migratory instinct peculiar to the Muslims.<sup>4</sup>

Both before and after the conversion to Islam, the Turkish communities considered the regions where they could cherish their traditions to be their homeland. Once these traditions were threatened, they began their struggles. When they failed, they felt comfortable resettling somewhere else. Perhaps their nomadic past and their success in orienting to new regions facilitated such decisions to resettle. In fact the regions where the Turks resettled were the places where they could cherish their traditions and ways of life.

The migrations from the Balkans into Anatolia can be explained by the attempts to build nation-states in the Balkans. The nation-states embody defined boundaries and the ability to make law and aim to create common culture, symbols, and values that homogenize the people. In terms of content and function, the formations of nation-states follow different routes. The first model is the one that developed through the leadership of the bourgeoisie, what we may call industrialist liberal or imperialist nation-states. The policies spearheaded by these nation-states directed toward the traditional state structures led to the emergence of

two other types of nation-states: those that the first model carved out in their imperial domain and those that were formed by the leadership of the elites in a struggle against imperialist policies. Accordingly, the migrations from the Balkans into Anatolia can be explained by the demographic policies followed by the nation-states in the region that were established by the help of the Western powers.<sup>5</sup>

The nation-states that developed in the West had the particular foreign policy of dismembering the military empires and carving out nation-states in their stead. One of the most important phases of this plan was their policy that predominantly dealt with the Ottoman space, commonly known as the "Eastern Question" in the field. When this policy was carried out, it meant the end of Ottoman political authority in the Balkans and the emergence of nation-states among the Christian communities in the region. These new political frameworks to be created in the region were also new markets that needed political and economic support from the West, with the added benefit of the factionalization of the Orthodox Church. These policies found their application in the Ottoman-Russian Wars of 1828–29 and 1877–78. The Treaties of Edirne and Berlin that respectively brought an end to these wars established Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro.<sup>6</sup> This process involved the emergence of independent states, resulting in the dismemberment of the empires, and contributed to the emergence of the concept of "Balkanization." In this process the necessary support was given to the Christian ethnic elements for their goals of establishing independent states, while the Muslim ethnic groups lacked a similar support base.

In accordance with the Eastern Question, many nation-states were established in the Ottoman domains, particularly in the areas where the Christians were concentrated the most, leading to the shrinkage of the Ottoman territories between 1800 and 1914 from 3 to 1.3 million square kilometers. The warfare that accompanied the establishment of these new administrative frameworks and the policies of ethnic cleansing spearheaded by the new administrations in the multinational and multicultural spaces led to the massive population movements.<sup>7</sup> The boundaries of these states in the Balkans were drawn in accordance with the European balance of power and thus without any consideration given to the ethnic and cultural makeup of the territories in question.

More specifically, after the Greek rebellion of 1821, the Greek state was established and the boundaries of this new state came to include the Attic peninsula and the island of Euboea (Ağrıboz) to ensure the self-sufficiency and security of the new nation-state.<sup>8</sup> Peter von Sivers argues



that the Greek nationalism signaled the beginning of a new period in the region, which was institutionalized with the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Russian demands to create a Bulgarian state found expression in the Treaty of San Stefano. The multiethnic makeup of the region was not a consideration that determined the course of the creation of the new Bulgarian national state. But the Treaty of Berlin came to replace the Treaty of San Stefano due to concerns over the effects of the new political arrangements on the European balance of power. In the end the Treaty of Berlin divided greater Bulgaria into the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.

The emergence of Montenegro as an independent state was another administrative legacy of the Treaty of Berlin. Due to concerns of safety and security, the Western powers behind the Treaty of Berlin decided to integrate the regions that featured a significant number of Muslim Albanians and Bosnians into Montenegro. Albanians, regardless of their Muslim or Christian affiliation, rejected this new arrangement.<sup>9</sup> The application of this policy of an enlarged Montenegro caused political and military unrest, including the invasion of mostly Albanian-populated Ülgün by the Montenegrin forces.<sup>10</sup> In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 Montenegro brought more territories under its control.

When the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin are examined, it is clear that Russia and the Western powers followed the policy of creating a new political map of the Balkans along the lines of nation-states. In this process the non-Muslim elements in the region were regarded as the “other.” Accordingly Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro emerged either as independent states or as autonomous principalities. Yet no project of creating nation-states for the Bosnians or Albanians in the regions where they were concentrated the most existed. We may think that religious affiliation determined the concept of the nation and thus the view of Albanians and Bosnians as part of the larger Ottoman world. But such an analysis is neither helpful nor healthy, because the Muslims left within the administrative boundaries of Montenegro were asked to convert.<sup>11</sup>

These policies of creating the new Balkan nation-states with no regard for the ethnic and cultural makeup of the region caused divisions in each state between the dominant ethnic group and the minority groups of different ethnicity that came to dominate one or more subdivisions of each new administrative unit. These new arrangements were the results of the conferences and congresses initiated by the Great Powers to find equilibrium in the European balance of power in the first place.

The second phase of this process involves the creation of nations in regions that had their borders specified by the West. First, a dominant ethnic group was chosen in each region; then the goal was to separate the dominant group from all other elements. This process of “othering” involved the notions of racism, genocide, and xenophobia, with emphases on distinct ethnicities and cultural legacies.

In the process of creating nation-states across the Ottoman domains throughout the nineteenth century, Russia and European powers first selected a particular community that would cooperate with their grand designs. In choosing these groups they obviously gave priority to the communities that shared common religious, ethnic, and cultural elements with the Great Powers. In the Balkans the choice was the non-Muslim groups, and the road to success lay in the process of damaging the balance in the region between the Muslims and non-Muslims. The Orthodox Church and educational institutions were instrumental in this process, later strengthened by the organizations that would spread terror among the public. The last phase of this process was the invasion of the region by the foreign powers.

The role played by the Orthodox Church in the processes of othering is rather important. By the second half of the eighteenth century the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Fener Rum Patrikhanesi) started following policies that would increase its administrative, cultural, and religious authority over the Orthodox populations, which in fact corresponded with the Ottoman attempts at centralization. This policy led to a division between the patriarchate and the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Romanian populations.

Othering often began with small ethno-religious communities. The goal and intent of intelligent clergy members was to transform their population into a nation by describing the Golden Age and distant past of each community. The loss of authority of the clergy during the Tanzimat era contributed to this process. Traditionally the church and Christian clergy had important positions in the Ottoman society: the clergy were responsible for the education of Christians, legal matters, collection of taxes, and administration of villages. With the reign of Mahmud II that initiated the processes of centralization, these clergy started losing their authority, in a way reducing their administrative capacities to a mere position of religious representation. Civil Christian leaders started taking the positions of the clergy, who then, as a replacement, opted for leading the national struggle and playing important positions in the spread

of nationalist sentiment. The goal of the clergy, who achieved their objectives particularly among the Bulgarians, Serbians, and Armenians, was initially to create national churches. Thus emerged the Greek Church in 1833, Romanian Church in 1865, Bulgarian Exarchy in 1870, and Serbian Church in 1879, turning the Ottoman Orthodox *millet* (*Rum milleti*) into Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Romanian nations.

The notion of being Greek took on specific characteristics before the Greek Rebellion of 1821, such as the name of the nation, its ancestors, and its distant past. Inspired by the French example, those who steered the course of this ideology of the Greek rebellion othered the Ottoman Empire, the Patriarchy of Constantinople, and the Byzantine Empire, leading to a series of armed clashes with the Ottoman Empire, only to be quelled by the forces coming from Egypt. In order to create the goal of nation-states in the region, diplomatic and even military intervention by the West seemed appropriate. The Western and Russian public sided with the Greek rebels. But regions where the *ancien régime* still had a hold came to reject the Greek ambitions, which also paralleled the Metternich doctrine. In this climate those who laid the foundations of the Greek rebellion needed the political and even military help and support of the *ancien régimes*. Accordingly, the solution was to turn the patriarch into a national hero who could then unite the Greeks with differing political opinions, while marketing the rebellion to the absolutist monarchs of Europe as a religious uprising not a class-based one, thus obtaining the support of both the nation-states and empires for the larger cause. After this shift of rhetoric, the Western intervention became a reality through the Treaty of London (July 6, 1827), the Battle of Navarino (December 20, 1827), and the Treaty of Adrianople (July 14, 1829), forcing the Ottoman Empire to recognize the independence of the Greek state in 1830.<sup>12</sup>

Across the Danube region, in contrast, the Bulgarian clergy played different roles in the processes of othering. The Bulgarian Archbishopric of Ohrid was abolished in 1767 by the patriarchy, and the use of Bulgarian language in religious ceremonies and prayers was prohibited. The Bulgarian clergy accordingly started reacting to these arrangements by embracing the nationalist cause. The centralization of religious life in Bulgaria coincided with the publication of a monograph on Bulgarian history by the Bulgarian monk Paisiy. The Bulgarian priest Sofroniy made sure that the monograph, with its ideas that would ignite the flames of national consciousness, was well circulated among the Bulgarians.<sup>13</sup> Petir Beron wrote about the Bulgarian alphabet for the first time in 1824 and disseminated it. As a result of these developments, the notion of being

a Bulgarian emerged across the Danube region, which was enhanced by pan-Slavism. Venelin, one of the proponents of Russian pan-Slavism, published his book on the Bulgarians that he encountered during the war of 1828–29. According to his study, Bulgarians were not Turks but were descended from the Slavs of the Volga. The notions of Bulgarian nationalism as well as the pan-Slavist ideology were disseminated among the masses through modern institutions of education.<sup>14</sup>

While these studies created a sense of othering between the Turks and Bulgarians, they did not develop a sense of enmity between the two. Yet the pan-Slavists who wanted to establish a Bulgarian nation-state in the Danube region considered it necessary to arouse enmity along ethnic lines in the region, particularly between the Turks and Bulgarians. From this point onward the conflicts among the civil populations can be categorized into three phases. In the first phase, between 1862 and 1868, the brigands formed in Serbia and in the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (Eflak-Boğdan Prensliği) started their activities in the Tuna (Danube) *vilayet*. During the second phase in the early 1870s illegal brigand groups started becoming organized in the Danube region. The third phase is the period of rebellion, which started with the abortive rebellion of 1875 and the later rebellion of 1876, when the bad policies of the central Ottoman administration caused a series of clashes between the civil Turks and Bulgarians. For the Russians these events showed that Turks and Bulgarians could not live together peacefully under the same roof: the solution was to remove the Turkish administration and force out the Turkish elements in the region. Yet brigand activity clearly could not reach such goals.<sup>15</sup>

In the territories where Greater Bulgaria was to be established, 42 percent of the population was Bulgarian and 40 percent Muslim.<sup>16</sup> The demographic studies of the region of Tuna *vilayet* where the Principality of Bulgaria was to emerge after the Treaty of Berlin do not provide consistent statistical data for the prewar period. In fact this era deserves a separate study. Two statistics suffice to make a point here. According to the *Tuna Vilayeti Salnamesi* (Yearbook of the Tuna *Vilayet*) (1285), the *vilayet*, not counting the Sanjak of Niş (Niš), had 711,814 Muslims and 1,020,934 non-Muslims, with a total of 1,732,748 (41.08 percent Muslim and 58.92 percent non-Muslim). According to the Russian author Teplow, 1,026,595 (49.44 percent) Bulgarians and 1,049,964 (50.56 percent) non-Bulgarians (a total of 2,076,549 people) lived in the region.<sup>17</sup>

Against this backdrop the diplomatic and military foreign interventions began. When the Constantinople Conference (Tersane Konferansı)

TABLE 22.1. The Population of the Tuna (Danube) Vilayet

SANJAK	MUSLIM	NON-MUSLIM	BULGARIAN	NON-BULGARIAN
Ruscuk (Ruse)	277,384	191,668	201,025	354,324
Sofya (Sofia)	48,820	294,190	297,500	189,000
Tırnova (Veliko Tarnovo)	143,290	208,546	188,500	112,000
Tulça (Tulcea)	78,266	35,858	40,570	188,930
Varna	113,378	41,538	36,000	74,100
Vidin	50,676	249,134	263,000	131,610
Total	711,814	1,020,934	1,026,595	1,049,964

*Note:* The information in the second and third columns derives from the Ottoman yearbooks of *vilayets*, while the information in the forth and fifth columns comes from the Russian author Těplow. Bilal N. Şimşir, *Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri Belgeler*, vol. 2, clxviii.

failed to solve the problems in accordance with the Western desires, the looming Russian intervention became a reality: the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78 broke out.<sup>18</sup>

#### THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN WAR OF 1877–78 AND MIGRATIONS

With the start of the war the Ottoman commander of the Danube Army, Müşir Abdülkerim Paşa, decided to empty northern Dobruja (Dobruca/Dobrudzha) on the assumption that the Russian forces would cross the Danube between Ruscuk (Ruschuk) and Vidin. While the Muslims in the region followed the orders, the Bulgarians not only refused to leave but also tried to destroy any means of transportation so that the Muslims could not take their chattel with them. Furthermore, even though the people in the region were ordered to burn any food supply that they could not carry with them, they clearly did not: the Russian forces got hold of 500 metric tons of wheat. When the Russians took control of all the regions down to the Danube, most of the Muslims in the region retreated back to Shumen (Şumnu) and Omurtag (Osmanpazarı).

The Russian forces crossed the Danube on the night of July 27, 1877, and came to control Svishtov (Ziştovi). The Russian aggressions in the early days of July toward the Balya pass were successfully opposed by the Ottoman army. After having established their control in Ziştovi, the Russians started dispatching their forces around Ruscuk, Rahova, and Nikopol (Niğbolu) to Ziştovi. Then the forces were divided into three sections to be stationed in Ruscuk, in Tırnova, and along the Danube. The

failures of the Turkish forces in military terms led the Russians to spread all around the Western section of the Tuna *vilayet*, where the Bulgarian population was large. The Russians at times burned down settlements to the south of the Danube. The Western media covered these fires and the destruction thanks to reporters' telegrams sent to the news agencies. For instance, in a telegram by Simony on July 9, 1877, "at Tirnova, the Russians burnt five villages; at Monastir they massacred forty private individuals, including women and children."<sup>19</sup> Those Turks who escaped the massacres were disarmed, while weapons were distributed to the Bulgarians. Now armed, the Bulgarians started attacking their neighbors with the goal of forcing them out of their land and creating a homogeneous population, while making sure that the Turks had no way to return.

After the Russian invasion of Tirnova and Osmanpazari in July 1877, the refugees and local population in the region started heading toward Şumnu. Migrations were not an ultimate solution to their problems, because they were exposed to violence and massacres by the Russians, Bulgarians, or Cossacks in places where they sought shelter. A telegram to the *Norma* newspaper, dated July 15, 1877, described the situation in the following manner: "Mr. Drumond telegraphs from Chumla, that at Tchairy, district Rasgrad, two hundred Mussulman refugees from Sistowa have been massacred by Russians and Bulgarians. At Karatchoumak ten cart-loads of Arnoutlou refugees have been massacred, at Arnoutlou numbers of women and ten children; at Utch Testin whole population killed; at Ostrantcha and Costova all Mussulmans."<sup>20</sup> Those who escaped these massacres at the hands of Russians, Bulgarians, and Cossacks found shelter in Şumnu. A telegram dated July 16, 1877, describes their situation:

Chumla, July 16th, 1.40, P.M. —I have just seen wounded refugees from villages of Heibeli, have been in their houses, have spoken at length and made strict inquiry, accounts agree perfectly in all details with those of yesterday. On Wednesday, July 11th, the villagers of Heibeli, in company with those of many other villages were attacked between Tchairkeui and Kogia-Pounar, by six hundred Cossacks. Heibeli consists of six hundred inhabitants; the women and children were massacred, carts fired at by three field guns; not a single cart was saved and the villagers have not saved a single thing, not even clothing. In the first house I entered one woman had one sword cut on the head and one on the wrist and two lance wounds, one of which is left breast. A child of six years

had a lance wound in chest. Eleven people were in the first house. In the second house one boy eight years old had a lance wound in the thigh, which went right through, one woman had fourteen lance wounds all over her body and a sword cut over her hand; another woman one deep lance wound in her back and four in different parts of her body and two in her breast; one boy of five years old had a lance wound in his thigh; a girl four years old had a lance wound in her back; she was an orphan, her uncle, her only support and his little daughter were killed. Twenty-one people in the second house. I saw the wounds myself. Heibeli is in the district of Sistowa, one hour's distance on the other side of the Jantra river. Among villagers were also thirty-five Tartar families, these escaped. The attack commenced at daylight; all villagers have not yet come in, I am now going out to meet these villagers [*sic*] Kogia-Pounar was burnt in this attack. From what I understand no Bulgarians were concerned, only Cossacks.<sup>21</sup>

Having heard about the attacks on the refugee groups, the people of Stara Zagora (Eskizağra and Yenizağra) and Kazanlak (Kızanlık) also left their settlements in the direction of Edirne. In short, the Turks across the Danube region took to the road along the Thracian shores to Anatolia from January 1878 onward.

As dramatically described by the mufti of Zağra (Stara Zagora), upon the Russian advance across the Danube, sectors of the Muslim populations took to the road in terrible material conditions out of panic and shock. The news of the Russian, Cossack, and Bulgarian treatment of the local populations reached the neighboring regions quickly and intensified the sense of panic and fear in areas that were still under Ottoman control. Those who wanted to leave for the interior were not allowed to do so. While the sense of uncertainty and fright dominated the Muslim quarters of the population, cornering them in their homes, the Bulgarian populations decorated their churches with Bulgarian and Russian insignia in anticipation of Russian occupation. In fine dress, with food and wine in their hands, the Bulgarians welcomed the invading armies. The disarming of the local Muslim population and rounding up of the notables in each locality in an attempt to impose further control followed.<sup>22</sup>

As a result, through the help of the Cossack cavalry and Bulgarian brigands, the Russians brought destruction to many Turkish villages from Zıştovi to the Balkans, slaughtering the Turks and particularly Circassians. The Ottoman military authorities could not provide any help to the civilians; their only advice was to take up arms to protect their

livelihood and lives. Out of fear for their lives, the Turks opted to leave their property behind and took to the road to the Ottoman interior. Yet these refugees were not immune from violence: the Russian soldiers, Bulgarian brigands, and Cossack cavalry continued to attack them on migration routes. The most infamous of these attacks on the refugees was the assault of the Russian and Cossack units under the command of Skobelev in January 1878 against the refugee convoy of twenty thousand coaches. Those who escaped the brutality were left on their own to face hunger and bitter cold. Thousands of Muslims lost their lives in this one instance alone.<sup>23</sup> Thus the Turkish soldiers also had to extend protection to the refugees in addition to their attempts to halt the Russian advance.<sup>24</sup>

In an attempt to get the Bulgarian administration established in the areas now under the control of the Russian forces, the Russians authorized Prince Cerkasky to mobilize the Bulgarian society. The policies of the prince greatly contributed to the growing number of refugees. The biggest practical obstacle to these attempts to create the Bulgarian state was the ethnic makeup of the region where the state was to be established, because the Bulgarians were a minority. Prince Cerkasky could have chosen to establish structures of federation or confederation to accommodate the diverse ethnic makeup or introduce a civic notion of citizenship that would also provide equality to Turks. Assimilation was yet another option, but this was out of the question because the Bulgarians did not have the majority in the region to carry it out. Regardless, the prince was given the duty of creating a state with reference to ethnicity and thus of achieving a Bulgarian ethnic majority by cleansing the region of the non-Bulgarian elements.

To achieve the status of a Bulgarian majority, one option was population exchange, which could involve an exchange of the minority Bulgarian population in Tulcea, Varna, and Ruse with the Turkish majority in Vidin, Veliko Tarnovo, and Sofia or an exchange of the Turks in the northern Balkans with the Bulgarians in the south. This design would only have created Bulgaria as a small entity, however, which would not have fulfilled the Russian schemes. The other option was the total annihilation of the Turkish population, which began to be carried out with the outset of the war. Disarming the Turks and arming the Bulgarians turned into a collective effort at annihilation by the Bulgarians, Russians, and Cossacks, leading to the massacres of Muslims and to a refugee crisis. All these episodes were communicated to the foreign press by the journalists on the field, as evidenced by a number of telegrams, such as the telegram dated July 14, 1877, published in the London-based newspaper the *Observer*:



Mussulmans are abandoning the villages and cities occupied by Russians in Bulgaria. The Bulgarians are making use against [*sic*] Mussulmans of all ages, including women and children. These atrocities are committed before and ordered by Russians, whose officers taking advantage of such shameful atrocities, violate Turkish girls and women, before exposing them to being assassinated. Most decidedly such barbarous acts surpass the supposed [*sic*].<sup>25</sup>

The Turkish elements in Şumnu, Ruscuk, Silistre, and Rodoplar stayed intact during the period of warfare because the Russians did not occupy the region. In contrast, the Turkish population nearly disappeared wherever the Russians came to dominate. During the war approximately half a million Turks in the *vilayets* of Tuna and Edirne lost their lives because of hunger and cold. Approximately a million Turks who had escaped from disease and massacres gathered in Şumnu, Macedonia, eastern Thrace, Rodoplar, and Istanbul. The refugees were planning to return to their homes after the end of the war. But by that time as many refugees as possible were settled in Rumelia, and the remaining refugees were settled in the Anatolian interior.

The peace talks with the Russians were characterized by the Russian desire to keep the European powers out of the discussions and impose their own terms on the Ottomans. The Ottoman delegation in the peace talks, however, was instructed to press for the establishment of the Bulgarian Principality in the north of the Balkan mountains, for Muslim representation in the administrative makeup of the principality, for a one-third Muslim presence in its militia forces, for the return of the refugees to their homes, and for the recovery of their rights over their own properties. Accordingly, Safvet Paşa told the Russian delegation that the Ottoman desire for the domestic administration of the principality was in accordance with the projection of the Istanbul Conference. But Nelidof argued that all Muslims in Bulgaria had migrated and that it was not possible for them to be resettled there. On the second day of the talks Safvet Paşa asked for the establishment of the principality in the north of the Balkan mountains and the exchange of Turkic elements in the north with the Bulgarian elements in the south, but the Russians rejected this offer as well. During the talks leading up to the Treaty of San Stefano the only concession by the Russians was abandoning the notion of the total removal of the Muslims from Bulgaria. In any case, the foundations of a future Bulgaria were laid out in a region of 6.5 million inhabitants, out of which only 2.5 million were Bulgarian.<sup>26</sup>

The transfer of 70 percent of the Balkan territories to the control of Russia and Bulgaria had threatened the European balance of power, leading to the European rejection of the arrangements projected by the Treaty of San Stefano. Accordingly it was the Berlin Congress that came up with a new political map for the region that would pay more attention to the dynamics of power within Europe than to the demographic realities of the region in question. A petition from the refugees sent to German chancellor Bismarck highlighted the necessity for the Western delegations to draft a solution that would involve humane and just arrangements for the people of the region. The same petition argued that the terrible wartime conditions continued to dominate in the time of peace and that the Bulgarian minority continued to maltreat the rest of the society in clear violation of the administrative codes and religious liberties granted by the West. The refugees also contended that this maltreatment by the Bulgarians was part of a clearly mapped-out policy of forcing the Muslim majority to leave the region.<sup>27</sup> Despite such vocal criticisms, the talks in the Berlin Congress did not even feature a section on the status of the refugees. With the Treaty of Berlin a Bulgarian Principality was to be established in the Ottoman Tuna *vilayet* as an entity tied to the Ottoman Empire. The German prince Alexander Battenberg was chosen on April 29, 1879, to be the Bulgarian prince.

The Ottoman Empire in turn attempted to develop new policies to protect the Turkish elements that fell within the boundaries of the Bulgarian Principality and the Eastern Rumelia *vilayet*. In particular the resettlement of Muslim elements in Eastern Rumelia would balance the Russian policy of settling Bulgarians in the region. As a result, the number of refugees who were resettled in Eastern Rumelia was around 100,000, while the number of those who returned to Bulgaria was nominal. Yet both the Bulgarian Principality and the administration of Eastern Rumelia restricted the political and civil rights of the Turks under their sovereignty, increased taxation for the Turkish element, narrowed their religious sphere of action, and pressured them politically. These policies caused a definitive transfer of population from these regions to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government not only utilized all the available diplomatic channels to prevent further migrations but also tried to persuade the Turkish people not to migrate, particularly through the local press. Accordingly, many opinion pieces were published in the Turkish local press of Bulgaria. An article argued, for instance, that "it is not easy to have a homeland and properties. Appreciate your homeland that you inherited from your grandfathers. Once you lose your

homeland, you will not be able to regain it. Regrets do not do any good.” Another newspaper that was published in Filipe (Plovdiv) argued that “our salvation is not to leave here for Turkey but rather to get rid of that notion of migration to protect our religion, nationality, and history.”<sup>28</sup> Despite such notions being circulated in the local press, the Bulgarian massacres of the Muslims continued to force the Turks to opt for leaving their homeland. As a result the Ottoman government had to take the necessary measures to accommodate the refugee movement into its territories from its western borders.

The establishment of the Bulgarian Principality through the Treaty of Berlin reduced the Turkish population to a minority status in Bulgaria. They were granted a set of political and civil rights through the Bulgarian constitution. Despite the wartime massacres and Turkish migrations into the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish population under the new Bulgarian administration was still sizable. Bulgaria could not afford to massacre the Turkish minority outright when the world turned its attention to the Balkans; thus the Bulgarian administration opted for depriving the Turks of their constitutionally guaranteed political rights, destroying the *vakf* properties and religious buildings, and overtaxing the Turkish minority. Yet such oppressive measures on an individual level were temporary solutions: individuals or communities who become the target of oppression tend to preserve their identities by teaching future generations the communal traits that came under attack. Also, policies of assimilation do not yield the desired results in the short run. Assimilation particularly proved to be impossible when a large community with a different religious affiliation was targeted. As a result, the Bulgarian administration chose the method of oppression and violence to force the Turkish minority to migrate to Turkey.<sup>29</sup>

The efforts to consolidate their power by creating a Bulgarian-majority society were also clear in the attempts to encourage Bulgarians in the neighboring states to migrate to the principality—a policy that did not apply to the Bulgarians living in the regions that fell within the borders of a larger Bulgaria, the ultimate territorial goal of the state. As a result of these policies, the Turkish percentage in the demographic makeup of the principality fell from 40 percent to 9.1 percent, but they were far from being totally cleansed from the region. According to the Bulgarian statistics of 1885, the Muslim populations in the principality and Eastern Rumelia amounted to 802,597, which constituted 26.91 percent of the total population. This ratio fell to 13.18 percent by 1910, and the following years saw a further decrease below 10 percent.<sup>30</sup>

While the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was granted the rights and guarantees of life and property ownership as well as religious liberties, coupled with the guarantees that no Bulgarian legal arrangement would be against the interests of the Turkish minority, the Bulgarian administration declared martial law in the regions with a sizable Turkish concentration immediately after the Russian departure and unleashed the state-sponsored acts of terror against the Turkish communities. Even though the legal guarantees promised equality to everyone regardless of ethnic and religious affiliation, the Turks became the targets of violence perpetrated by armed Bulgarians and the members of the Gymnastic Association. In clear violation of the Constitution of Tırnova of 1879 and the Internal Regulations of the *Vilayet* of Eastern Rumelia, the Turks were deprived of their political and civil rights, the rights to life and property ownership, the right to hold public office, the liberty of choosing a profession, and entitlement to education.

A petition dated 1881 on behalf of the Muslims to Prince Alexander clearly delineates the reasons for the migrations from Bulgaria during the principality administration:

with the claims of bringing equality to the people of Bulgaria, Russia removed the region from the Ottoman control and made it independent. The Treaty of Berlin ruled that the Bulgarian administration must be equal in its treatment of everyone in Bulgaria. While we were hoping to get a share from this desired aura of justice, those incapable and ignorant people who came to control the public offices took actions contrary to legal arrangements. We cannot work our land because the taxation rates we are exposed to are higher than what Bulgarians pay. Furthermore, without any legal basis, we are fined heavily on the basis of puzzling excuses. In some villages Bulgarians can easily usurp the registered lands of the Muslims. We as Muslims are exposed to constant insults by Bulgarians in public spaces. Brothels were given permission to operate in Muslim neighborhoods; our daughters are forced to convert before their adulthood and are denied return to their families. Such reasons are forcing us to leave our homeland.<sup>31</sup>

The Treaty of Berlin provided the guarantees for the ownership of property. Article 30 guaranteed that the owners of a property or land who had migrated elsewhere were still entitled to their properties and could sell the right of ownership or rent their properties to a third

person. As a matter of fact, each country that had recently gained its independence granted such rights of ownership to refugees, underlining the continuity of legal ownership in order to avoid any international reactions. Yet in practice these states never did a follow-up on who came to use the abandoned properties and how much rent they owed to the real property owners. As a result, the real owners of abandoned properties did not receive any payments.<sup>32</sup> When the refugees tried to liquidate their properties through their proxies, the Bulgarian courts did not accept the trust deeds on the grounds that they were not approved by the Russian consulates.

The main goal of the Bulgarian Principality was to wear down the Muslims through various measures, force them to sell their properties for prices lower than their actual value, and settle Bulgarians or Serbs in their stead.<sup>33</sup> In response to the provocations of the administration, civilian non-Muslims increased the intensity of violent confrontation with their Muslim neighbors, in hopes of seizing their properties below their actual value or simply for free.<sup>34</sup> Despite such pressures those who refused to migrate also came to lose their properties in certain cases. A petition submitted to the Bulgarian administration sheds light on these instances. It is known that the Ottomans seized the lands of the regional feudal lords in the Danube basin, turning them into *miri* (state-owned) lands, and then distributed these lands among the natives as well as the newly settled Turks within the framework of the *timar* (Ottoman grant of lands/revenues) system. Yet the later disintegration of the *timar* system led to the return of these lands to the *gospodars* (the Rumelian landowning elite). During the Tanzimat period the Ottomans set up commissions to redistribute these lands among the villagers and gave them the register deeds. This redistribution of lands enabled the villagers in the region to work the soil and live on the proceeds from their land. Upon resuming control of the region, the Bulgarian administration took these lands from the Muslim owners and redistributed them among the Bulgarian villagers.<sup>35</sup> The Muslim villagers who somehow continued to keep the ownership of their lands were denied access to their lands. A petition dated 1880 by the Muslims of Köstendil (Kyustendil) complained about the situation:

In the past ten days, there is a growing pressure on us. Charges that lack a legal basis are mounted against some of us. They delay the confirmation of our properties. Farmers cannot sow their lands. The police are renting our lands in front of us to others, and we are denied any proceeds. Any transactions are forbidden among villagers from different villages. They have the monopoly. We

cannot go to see our properties. All these treatments are beyond our capacity to stand. They simply do not want to give our property back to us. Those of us who migrated do not want to come back once they hear about such terrible treatment at the hands of authorities. We are in utter despair. We do not know what to do but seek help from the Sublime Porte.<sup>36</sup>

During the Ottoman times *menafi sandıkları* (chests of public utility) were instituted to support agricultural production. These chests were funded by money collected from the producers. The Muslim families needed to provide documentation showing that they did not owe any money to the chests before they were allowed to migrate. Furthermore, they were not allowed to leave if they were guarantors of debts of their Bulgarian neighbors unless the debts were all paid off. Those who did not owe any money to the chests were not given their shares from the chests. The larger purpose here was to prevent the shift of capital with the Muslims migrating from Bulgaria to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>37</sup>

The residences left behind by the Turks during the war were occupied by the Russian forces. Any leftover residential quarters were handed out to the incoming Bulgarians from Macedonia and eastern Thrace. Estates occupied by the Bulgarians during the war were not returned to their Turkish owners either. As a result most Turks under the principality administration were deprived of their lands and residences; those who continued to hold on to their estates were subjected to tax rates seven or eight times higher.

Another setting where the migratory movements dominated the scene after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 was Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878. The Austria-Hungarian rule in the region saw a number of attempts to change the demographic makeup of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ranging from the settlement of Croat and Polish migrants in the lands of the Muslims and the conversions of Muslims to Catholics through the activities of Catholic associations. When these policies failed to achieve the intended goals, the Muslims came to be denied rights of life and property, forcing them to leave the region for somewhere else. The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina said that “even though it was difficult to leave Bosnia since they were not really used to living far from their homeland, they decided to migrate in order to protect their national identities [*milliyetlerini*].”<sup>38</sup>

The Ottoman desire to perpetuate rule over the region, justified by the very existence of Muslim elements in the Balkans, translated into a set of Ottoman initiatives, often framed in a language of human and

minority rights, to empower the Turkish and Muslim populations in their respective communities. Yet the emergence of the nation-states across the region, with their emphasis on national unity and sovereignty, was in conflict with the Ottoman ambitions, instead aimed at the removal of Turkish elements as well as cleansing of any remnants of Turkish-Islamic culture and civilization. The Western willingness to intervene in Ottoman domestic affairs on the pretext of protecting minority and human rights in the Ottoman context did not generate the same sensibility when it came to the Muslim sufferings, whether during peace or war, in the context of the Balkans. Having failed to protect its Turkish and Muslim populations in the region, the Ottoman Empire had no other option but to resettle the migrants into its interior.

During the war 500,000 Turks died because of hunger and disease. More than 1,200,000 Turks who somehow avoided disease, hunger, and massacres ended up migrating. During the Austrian occupation, 60,000 Muslims left Bosnia-Herzegovina, often resettling in places that were closer to their hometowns such as İškodra, Priştina, Kosova, Taşlıca/Taslidža, and Drac.<sup>39</sup> The refugees were settled temporarily in public buildings such as mosques, dervish lodges, madrasahs, and schools as well as in private buildings such as mansions, villas, and farmhouses. When these options failed to suffice, sheds started to be constructed. The temporary solutions to the housing needs of the migrants caused further problems in these cities, ranging from outbreaks of epidemics to deteriorating public order. In an effort to protect public health and decrease the costs related to temporary settlement, the Ottoman government decided to relocate the refugees permanently into Anatolia. One of the two routes of relocation to Anatolia was through Istanbul, while the other was through the port cities along the coast of Rumelia, such as Varna, Ahyolu Bergosu, Tekirdağ, Dedeğaç, and Selanik. The territories that the Turks left behind, once scenes of multinational and multicultural existence, came under the control of states like Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria that were to rule over a heterogeneous population in terms of culture and ethnicity.

#### BALKAN WARS AND MIGRATION

After the Treaty of Berlin the lands that were left under Turkish control were divided into the administrative divisions of six *vilayets*: İškodra, Kosova, Selanik, Manastır, Edirne, and Yanya. According to the Ottoman census of 1906/7, a total of 4,158,182 people lived in the region (see table 22.2 for details). Of this total 49.37 percent were Muslims.<sup>40</sup>

TABLE 22.2. The Population of the Balkans under Turkish Rule (1906/1907)

VILAYET	MUSLIM	RUM	BULGARIAN	JEW	OTHER	TOTAL
Edirne	618,604	341,529	119,476	23,839	30,348	1,133,796
İşkodra	81,150	8,276	—	—	350	89,776
Salonika	419,608	266,574	155,710	52,395	27,076	921,363
Kosova	379,595	13,829	272,818	1,668	3,743	671,653
Manastır	328,551	286,001	197,088	5,459	7,729	824,828
Yanya	225,415	286,676	—	3,677	998	516,766
Total	2,052,923	1,202,885	745,092	87,038	70,244	4,158,182
Percent	49.37	28.93	17.92	2.09	1.69	

TABLE 22.3. The Population in the Balkans before the Balkan Wars (1911)

VILAYET	MUSLIM	RUM	BULGARIAN	GENERAL
Edirne	760,000	396,000	171,000	1,427,000
Selanik	605,000	398,000	271,000	1,348,000
Yanya	245,000	331,000	—	561,000
Manastır	456,000	350,000	246,000	1,065,000
İşkodra	218,000	11,000	—	349,000
Kosova	959,000	93,000	531,000+	1,063,000
Total	3,243,000	1,579,000	1,219,000	5,813,000
Percent	51	25	19	

Source: Justin McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 144.

In the four-year period between 1907 and 1911 the demographic makeup of the region in question saw some changes, resulting in the increase of the Muslim population from 49.37 percent to 51 percent, an increase of 1 percent for the Bulgarians and a drop of 4 percent in the share of the Rum.

The expansion of the Balkan states continued in the region at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Between 1879 and 1912 a new “project” that can be called “Macedonia” made its appearance in the region, particularly relevant to the territorial holdings of the three *vilayets* of the Ottoman Empire: Selanik, Kosova, and Manastır. The name “Macedonia,” having been recovered from the age of the antiquity, started appearing on the nineteenth-century maps of the region.<sup>41</sup> As if it approved of the geographical and political designation “Macedonia,” the Ottoman government also established a special administration for the region, entitled the General Inspectorship of the Three *Vilayets* (Vilayat-ı Selase Umumi Müfettişliği).<sup>42</sup> The total population of the region that came to be regarded as Macedonia was 2,911,721, while 51.8 percent of the total was



Muslim. The Western sources provide a general population of 2,258,024 for the region and reduce the Muslim population to 36.64 percent.<sup>43</sup>

In an effort to realize the project by attracting further publicity, each Balkan state established and sponsored brigand groups made up of their own citizens or of non-Muslims living in the three Ottoman *vilayets* and promoted terror in the region.<sup>44</sup> Their goal was to destroy public order and thus lay the groundwork for foreign intervention. After a certain period of preparation the gang activities started surfacing in 1895, leading to the Serez Rebellion of 1901. While the Muslims sought refuge in the mountains, Bulgarians left the region for Bulgaria, only to be used by politicians who showcased the incoming Bulgarians to the Europeans to highlight the rhetoric of the Ottoman oppressor and the Bulgarian oppressed. The activities of the brigands first spread to Salonika and then to Edirne, Manastır, and Üsküp. Often the Bulgarian gang leaders urged the Bulgarian villagers to leave for the mountains and then set the Turkish farms on fire. Such disturbances continued in varying degrees until 1908.<sup>45</sup>

Between 1895 and 1908 Macedonia became the setting of those who rallied in opposition to Abdülhamid II. While the Young Turks were united in the goal of overthrowing the sultan, the foreign diplomats and non-Muslims were preparing the plans to remove the region from Ottoman suzerainty. The method of such partitioning was rather similar to the one employed in the pre-1877/78 period. For instance, the officers and politicians under the auspices of the Russian diplomats roamed through the area, inviting the local populations to get rid of the Turkish yoke. The gang leaders who evolved through such a process of indoctrination came to embrace the slogan "Macedonia belongs to the Macedonians." Between 1897 and 1912 the increasing levels of gang activity in Macedonia undermined public order with the larger goal of preparing the groundwork for foreign intervention. Such gang activities resulted in significant casualties among the military personnel as well as other security forces. When arrested on charges of terror and inciting public disorder, the Bulgarian gang members' cry of "Long live the Bulgarian nation" came to distress the Turkish officers deeply. Having personally witnessed such an incident, Kazım Karabekir noted in his memoirs that "there is no meaning to fooling ourselves with a notion of an Ottoman nation composed of these people. They are Bulgarians, Rums, Serbs, Ulahs [Vlachs]...what else is left? ... We are in the age of nationalism. Just like any other nation, we also need to create a national existence."<sup>46</sup>

Thus the method of inciting the breakdown of public order did in fact translate into securing the political goal of foreign intervention in

Ottoman affairs. Such broader political developments also had their impact on the larger society, as is particularly clear in the memoirs. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, for instance, noted the large-scale impact of the gang activities on the Rumelian society and public memory and psychology:

Once there was some smoke in distant skies or once the gunshots were becoming audible, every soul was leaving the streets and only then we as kids were taking a break from our games. It was in those hours that men who were returning home said hi to each other quietly and then entered their houses slowly. Women of the neighborhood were getting together on those nights in a house where the gang stories were being retold...first some petty gossip among them, but it never took long before the conversations came to focus on the gang stories. The most pedantic among the women kept coming up with new stories every night. Every one of the stories was one of horror and mystery. We as kids grew up hearing these stories.... The adults gave the following advice: "if someone on the streets tells you that they brought you some candy, don't take it! That candy is dynamite. It breaks up in your mouth and you blow up." We fell asleep listening to such advice, only to find ourselves this time living through the reign of the gangs in our dreams....

Once daytime came we were going out on the streets to play games. These games were mostly about fights, raids, and wars. Games of banditry and gangs were our favorite. We were choosing leaders and *voivodes* among ourselves; obviously the strongest among us were the natural leaders. The most exciting bandit game was the one that we played with the kids from the Christian neighborhood. That was just like real.

In order to understand the psychological effects of these narratives and stories, it is necessary to look at the demographic makeup of the war zone. The Ottoman government wanted to settle Muslim populations in the Yanya *vilayet* to increase the Muslim majority, a policy that met with opposition from the Western governments and thus failed to materialize.<sup>47</sup> According to the official figures, a total of 4,000 refugees were resettled in the *vilayets* of İşkodra and Manastır. The *vilayet* of Kosova, where the gang activities were concentrated, went through an administrative restructuring after the Treaty of Berlin. In Kosova the total number of Muslims was 195,824, and approximately 60,000 of those were refugees.<sup>48</sup> According to the same census, the Muslim sector in the *vilayet* of

Selanik reached a total of 447,000. One source recorded 60,000 refugees in the *vilayet*,<sup>49</sup> corresponding to 7 percent of the general population. In the *vilayet* of Edirne (which was an important war zone and a path of migration) the Muslim population was 434,366, according to the census of 1881–93, and 111,000 of those were the refugees who were settled there between 1877 and 1893. In other words, 25.55 percent of the Muslims in the *vilayet* of Edirne were refugees. As a matter of fact, the natives of the *vilayet* also migrated during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. Thus, when we factor into the equation the ones who left the *vilayet* during the war and later resettled there, the refugees perhaps corresponded to half of the *vilayet* population. The narratives and stories noted above would at the very least create concerns among the populations of the region, where being a refugee and migrating were part of their life story.

In this very environment Russia would ask for further reforms from the Ottoman Empire. To evade the Russian pressures, Abdülhamid II appointed an inspector-general to the region in 1902. Having interpreted this move as insufficient, Russia and Austria submitted to the Porte a detailed project entitled Mürzsteg Programı, which also received the approval of the participants of the Berlin Congress.<sup>50</sup> In September and October 1912, the Great Powers of the West and their allies in the Balkans started sending to the Ottoman Empire aide-memoires that demanded administrative autonomy for the Ottoman *vilayets* in the Balkans, the appointment of Belgian or Swedish governors, and the establishment of militia forces. These demands would turn each *vilayet* into a de facto nation-state.<sup>51</sup> On top of these pressures, a joint aide-memoire from the Balkan states to the Ottoman Empire, dated October 13, 1912, demanded that the non-Muslim draftees should not be recruited until non-Muslim Ottoman citizens were trained as officers. During the Balkan Wars many non-Muslim draftees ran; some of these deserters joined Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian forces. When the Muslims were recruited, the Muslim villages were left defenseless. Conversely, however, the Ottoman army did feature Greek, Armenian, Jewish, and Bulgarian recruits.<sup>52</sup>

The reign of terror, migration, and warfare did create some level of distance between the Muslims and non-Muslims in the region, leading to the deterioration of the relationship between the two sectors of the society. But above all, the Ottoman military decision makers were clearly concerned about how the non-Muslims could cooperate with the enemy during a time of war. Accordingly, the non-Muslim soldiers were disarmed. But the authorities could not or did not take any measures against the Bulgarian and Greek villages around the war zone. It was these

villagers who formed the gangs that attacked the Turkish soldiers.<sup>53</sup> Parallels can be found in the differing public reactions in the cities and regions that were conquered by the Balkan forces. For instance, a Bulgarian soldier reflected on the public reaction in Kırklareli: "Even before the entry of the first Bulgarian regiment into the city, the Turks had left the city. The Jews followed suit, while the Greeks and Bulgarians remained in the city. When we were marching toward Kırklareli, we captured many arms, ammunition, and medical provisions. The villagers had left most of the food supplies behind. The Bulgarians in Kırklareli met us with joy. Every household entertained groups of ten to fifteen soldiers. They offered us wine and a good assortment of food." Apart from such examples of clear cooperation with the invading armies, the non-Muslim communities within the Ottoman Empire also showed clear signs of open enmity, such as the volunteer bands of Armenians in Sofia who fought against the Turkish army and staged attacks against the Turkish civilians.<sup>54</sup>

During times of war, the war zone and its hinterland are often subjected to evacuation measures to facilitate the military maneuvers. Yet the Ottoman Empire decided not to implement such a policy in the case of the Balkan Wars, which led to the deaths of many people in the war zone as well as greater destruction of property. The war caused an influx of the rural populations into the urban centers. But the real reason for the migration of Muslims was the general policy of destruction of Muslim civilians, as evidenced in the activities of the Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Montenegrin guerrillas as well as of the Balkan armies. The European press covered such treatment of civilian Muslims by the Balkan forces. For instance, the Montenegrins not only killed the Muslims they came to dislike but also showcased barbarous acts of human mutilation. Such treatment at the hands of the Balkan forces led the Muslims of the region to avoid resistance to the invaders. For instance, the Muslim sector of Skopje surrendered without any resistance. At the time of the surrender of the city, the population was about sixty thousand. While some of the Muslims left the city, a large majority of them opted to stay, only to face further retribution from the guerrillas. Just like the Muslims of Skopje, the people of Kalkandelen (Tetovo) also reasoned that surrender to the invading forces without resistance had more benefits (such as lesser destruction to their city) than idealistic notions of resistance.

In a different setting the Serbian forces were looting the Albanian villages (December 23, 1912).<sup>55</sup> The goal was to achieve a Serbian majority in the region.<sup>56</sup> The description of the Serbian policy by the *Daily Chronicle* of London was quite to the point: "the Serbians murdered the Albanians

barbarously. Around Skopje two thousand Albanians were murdered, and in Pristina [Priştine] the number was around five thousand Albanians. It was as if there were no other way of capturing and settling in Albania.”<sup>57</sup> The surrender of Prizren was described:

the city looks like a kingdom of death. They knock on the doors of Albanian homes and they take the males out and shoot them instantly. The number of males who were murdered reached 400 in only a couple of days. Looting, plunder, and rape are common themes. This order dominates the reality in the city: all sorts of treatment of the Albanians are permitted; this is not just a matter of consent; it is a desire and order. On top of all these atrocities, the commander Boze Jankovic forced all the elites of the town to send telegrams at gunpoint that expressed their gratitude to King Peter.

According to the Catholic patriarch of Skopje, the murders amounted to 25,000 in Kosova alone.<sup>58</sup> *Tanin* reported that the number of people who were murdered by the Montenegrins reached 30,000.<sup>59</sup>

The Serbian forces and Bulgarian gangs invaded Manastır after Skopje and burned down nearly all the Muslim villages within the *vilayet* of Manastır, at times leading to the deaths of some of the Muslim villagers. Those who escaped from the fire ended up in Manastır, where the number of refugees reached 15,000. Temporarily settled in public buildings such as mosques, 10,000 of these refugees met their subsistence needs thanks to the aid of the locals, the English and American consulates, and the municipality. Such aid at times failed to reach every single refugee; thus hunger was a daily problem that also caused many deaths among the refugees.<sup>60</sup>

As is clear from the diplomatic sources, demographic engineering shaped the policies of Serbia and Montenegro. As a result of these policies 120,000 people migrated from Montenegro alone during a two-year period between 1913 and 1915.<sup>61</sup>

One of the cities where the Muslim refugees sought shelter was Edirne. The military authorities denied the refugees access to the city, mostly motivated by fears that the entry of large numbers of refugees into the city would wreck the urban supplies. Thus the Muslim refugees were stuck between the city walls and the invading Bulgarian forces, leading to the deaths of many refugees during the Bulgarian attacks and Ottoman defense. Hence the refugees destroyed the wire fences and entered the

city. Edirne had approximately twenty thousand refugees and itself became a source of migration: some of the Muslim residents in the city felt threatened by the Bulgarian advances and started leaving the city for other places. The refugees who sought shelter in the city were transferred to Uzunköprü, Malkara, and Keşan. In the course of a week 20,000 people left Edirne under these conditions.<sup>62</sup> The extent of this exodus increased the prices in the city five-fold. By the end of the Bulgarian siege the prices reached unbelievable levels because food became extremely scarce. The Bulgarians cut the lines of water distribution, thus forcing the residents to use the water of rivers, which became a clear source of cholera. The rumor that Karaağaç was to become the neutral zone caused further mass departures from the city, adding to the already swollen number of refugees. While the prices of rentals in Karaağaç skyrocketed, those who remained in Edirne faced the challenge of food and water supplies and protection of their lives. In these dire conditions, as noted by Kazım Karabekir, no one could expect the residents to contribute to the defense of the city.<sup>63</sup> Edirne fell on March 26, 1913, and was looted by the Bulgarians for three days. The pillage, undertaken by the Bulgarian soldiers and non-Muslim residents of the city, often targeted the houses and shops of the Muslims.<sup>64</sup> At the time of the Bulgarian invasion, the city had a population of about 80,000 locals, 60,000 Ottoman soldiers, 50,000 Muslim refugees, and 40,000 Bulgarian soldiers.<sup>65</sup> During the period of occupation the Bulgarian soldiers oppressed both the Ottoman civilians and soldiers. The Muslim residents of the city locked themselves in their houses, awaiting their fate, while the non-Muslim residents of the city first extended their congratulations to the soldiers and then attended to the looting.<sup>66</sup> In cities that fell to the invading forces, such as Edirne, Kavala, Serez, and Dedeğaç, the method of occupation always followed a similar pattern. Once the Ottoman army had retreated, the residents surrendered without resistance to the gangs, who first looted the properties of the Muslims and then murdered them. The gang members also brought contagious diseases that threatened the general public. A report by the British consulate, dated 1912, described the scene as one of chaos: "Without any exaggeration, there is not even a single Muslim village in the Kavala and Drama region that has not suffered from the Bulgarian gang members and local non-Muslims. In most villages, dozens of males were murdered without mercy. In others, rape and pillage have been noted."<sup>67</sup>

One of the cities that received a significant number of refugees during the period of occupation was Salonika. The growing number of

Muslims in the regions that fell to the Greek forces who sought refuge in the city worsened the situation. The local Greeks spread the rumors that the Ottoman army had been defeated and that the Bulgarians had invaded Istanbul and the Russians eastern Anatolia. Even though the local administration arrested the reporters who publicized such rumors and disavowed them, the rumors had an effect on the larger public, creating a sense of mistrust among the Muslims. In the first week of the war Salonika received refugees from Skopje and Serez and their environs, who were sheltered in mosques and other public buildings.<sup>68</sup> The Society of the Islamic Committee (Heyet-i İslamiye Cemiyeti) tried to meet their expenses and had been allocated 50,000 *kuruş* to carry out the relief effort in a healthy manner. Approximately 6,000 people received daily supplies.<sup>69</sup> An international commission had been established at the same time to attend to the refugee problems in Salonika. Thanks to the efforts of the commission, a refugee camp composed of tents and sheds was established outside of the city, while the public buildings within the city also provided shelter for them. Yet most of the refugees could not be accommodated. This led to epidemics, which came on top of the dwindling supplies in the city. These developments led the Ottoman administration to start transferring the refugees in the city to Anatolia.

The governor of Salonika handed Tahsin Paşa a sealed official report of the administrative council of the *vilayet* that asked him to avoid any confrontations with the enemy forces within and around the city. Furthermore, the notables in the city demanded surrender through the consular channels.<sup>70</sup> On November 9, 1912, the city was surrendered to the Greek forces. It had 50,000 refugees at the time of the Greek takeover. After the Greek occupation, the aid to refugees from the municipal sources came to an end, while the wealthy Muslims of the city failed to establish a relief organization due to fear of the Greek military administration. This led to a decrease in the number of refugees in Salonika: 25,000 of them were transferred to İzmir by January 13, 1913, while some other refugees were sent to the ports of Tekirdağ and Mersin.<sup>71</sup> Those who missed out on these transfers attempted to go back to their hometowns. According to the report of the Carnegie Commission, 135,000 refugees arrived in Salonika during the course of the Second Balkan War.<sup>72</sup> Some of these refugees tried to go back home. For instance, 600 refugees from Ustrumca were attacked by the Bulgarian gangs on their way home, and those who survived the attack were not allowed to settle in their villages. The Greek authorities did not grant them the right of return to Salonika either, leaving the party in destitute conditions in the Toyran mountains

under Serbian occupation, only to face further deaths because of hunger and cold.<sup>73</sup>

Despite the efforts to transport the refugees into the Ottoman territories, the continuous flow of the refugees from the north and west into Salonika made it difficult to relieve the city. Furthermore, the towns and cities around Salonika also accumulated significant numbers of refugees. For instance, the environs of Kavala had 20,000 refugees: 7,000 of them perished on the roads when they were heading home. Attempts were made to transfer the rest to Egyptian and Anatolian port towns.<sup>74</sup>

The Muslims who did not leave their homes during the time of war faced many difficulties in the aftermath of the warfare. They came under psychological pressure because of the circulating rumors that they would be the prime candidates for mass massacres in the next instance of warfare.<sup>75</sup> Such rumors continued to fuel the migrations. The Balkan settlements emptied by the Muslims were resettled with Christians by the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian administrations.<sup>76</sup> While the Ottomans made a number of efforts, these administrations continued to provoke the population in hopes of a further Muslim exodus.<sup>77</sup> In an effort to publicize the events in Europe, the Society of the Islamic Committee in Salonika communicated the following memorandum to the diplomatic missions:

The mass migration of the Macedonian Muslims results from massive pressures mounted against them. Today the Muslims face all sorts of attacks that target their honor, properties, lives, religious beliefs, homes, and values. Up until now such growing pressure and attacks have led more than 250,000 Turks to leave their homelands. Having secured the support of the gendarmerie, the Greeks confiscated our homes day and night by breaking our doors with axes. These residences were then given to the Greeks coming from the Caucasus and Thrace. The Greek officials do not even care to listen to our complaints. There are only two possible answers that could explain this situation: either our administrators want to force us to migrate by destroying the basis of our lifestyles or the administration has utter lack of strength and influence to protect us.<sup>78</sup>

In order to realize their goal of demographic engineering, the Greek administration blamed the Muslims in Macedonia and western Thrace for cooperating with the Bulgarians and then started confiscating their



properties. The administration also tried to get the tobacco trade, which was under the monopoly of the Turks, into the hands of the Greek traders. It attempted to resettle the Greek refugees into the Turkish villages, while forcing the Muslims either to convert or to migrate.<sup>79</sup>

In summary, the First Balkan War lasted for six weeks, while the Second Balkan War lasted for four. According to the *Hikmet* newspaper, the number of the Turks who were murdered throughout the course of the war was 240,000, while Bilal Şimşir fixed the number at 200,000. Furthermore, thousands of people died because of rampant epidemics.<sup>80</sup> In the First Balkan War the Bulgarian advances toward the Edirne-Çatalca line caused the local populations to retreat to Istanbul, Anatolia, and, to a lesser extent, Gelibolu. The refugees flocked into Istanbul along the coast of the Marmara Sea and through the overland route from Tekirdağ. The number of refugees that arrived in Istanbul from Lüleburgaz-Çatalca, Tekirdağ, Ahtapolu, and Midye alone reached 100,000. Moreover, 20,000 refugees were on the roads to the capital, only to see an increase in their numbers once the people of Küçük Çekmece joined the march. Many Greek families migrated along with the Turks to Gelibolu and Çanakkale.<sup>81</sup>

Istanbul was one of the primary destinations for most of the Muslim Turkish refugees. At this time the city had around a million and a half inhabitants, half of whom were of Rum, Levantine, Jewish, and European origin. About fifty thousand people were subjects of Greece. Once the news of the defeat of the Turkish army reached the capital, some of these people poured onto the streets, expressing utter joy. Some of the non-Muslim Ottoman businessmen also wanted the Ottoman forces to be defeated on the battlefield.<sup>82</sup>

Such attitudes among the non-Muslim community in Istanbul affected the local Muslims negatively. The morale of the families in Istanbul was utterly destroyed once the Bulgarian forces started marching toward Çatalca. Terrible rumors started circulating that the Bulgarians had pierced through the Hadımköy line, heading toward Istanbul, while the Ottoman forces were also retreating back to the capital.<sup>83</sup> All males were recruited into the army, so the Muslim Turkish community included only the elderly, women, and children, who did not have the capabilities to protect themselves.<sup>84</sup> As Halide Edip observed, some families in the city started seeing the exodus toward Anatolia as a trustworthy route to take, thinking that “if the Bulgarians arrived in Istanbul, they would butcher us.”<sup>85</sup> According to Georges Remond, who was a war correspondent at the front lines, the non-Muslim residents of Beyoğlu did not express any

feelings of animosity toward the Turks but wholeheartedly desired their destruction.<sup>86</sup> Such a possible takeover of Istanbul by the Bulgarians did not occur during the First Balkan War. As a matter of fact, during the Second Balkan War, the Turkish forces reconquered Edirne, which was followed by the influx of refugees back into the city, this time turning the Bulgarians into refugees.

According to European observers the number of Muslim refugees reached approximately 170,000 by 1913. As a result of the warfare the Ottoman Empire lost significant territories where 2,300,000 people lived before the war. Of the total population of the region, 38 percent continued to live in their homes after the end of the war, while 62 percent were either massacred or forced to migrate.<sup>87</sup> Apart from the invasion zones where forced migration triggered the influx of refugees into the empire, even the Muslims who were subjects of the Balkan states before the war joined these caravans of refugees, seeking shelter in the Ottoman lands. For instance, with the declaration of the war mobilization, the Muslims living in Bulgaria not only faced further pressures from the Bulgarian officials but also encountered threats to their lives and properties. While the Bulgarians forcefully converted Pomaks, the daughters of Muslim families were forced into marriages with the Christians. Those who could not stand such oppression chose to seek refuge in the Ottoman Empire or in Romania.<sup>88</sup>

In general it is impossible to come up with an exact number of refugees in times of warfare and mass population movements. Not all refugees were entered into the records of the *defters* (Ottoman registers) of transfers and resettlement, meaning that the number of refugees was possibly higher than the bureaucratic records indicate. Each study that focused on the population movements from the Balkans gave different figures, ranging from two hundred thousand to a million. Basing his figure on the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior of the Turkish Republic, Justin McCarthy gave an exact figure of 413,922 for the refugees coming from the Balkans into Anatolia for the years between 1912 and 1920.<sup>89</sup>

#### RESETTLEMENT

After the conclusion of the war, the refugees came face to face with the dilemma of either settling in the Ottoman lands or going back to their homelands now under the control of the Balkan states. Most decided to go back despite the oppression at the hand of gangs and hostile attitudes

of the new administrations. The return of the refugees was a policy favored by the Ottoman state, which also tried to craft policies to facilitate their return. When it failed to do so, the Ottomans chose the option of population exchange, which materialized after the war in the treaties signed with Greece and Bulgaria.<sup>90</sup>

The Sublime Porte established a commission that would carry out its policies toward the refugees and find solutions to their problems. The commission planned to resettle the refugees as soon as possible in the empty plots of lands and villages that fell between Yanya, Selanik, Edirne, and Istanbul in an effort to avoid the soaring costs of temporary solutions as well as to increase the Turkish concentration in its western territories. Accordingly, Sultan Abdülhamid II banned the influx of refugees from Rumelia into Anatolia. By resettling the refugees in state-owned lands, empty terrains, and abandoned territories, the Ottoman state also wanted to exploit the agricultural potential of the region in question through the resettlement of refugees, which would indirectly generate income for the state treasury through an increase in taxes on agricultural production. Furthermore, the resettlement of refugees in regions where public order was broken down was seen as a countermeasure.

In addition to the Ottoman efforts to resettle the refugees in Rumelia, the empire resettled some refugee groups in strategic locations of Anatolia. The patterns of resettlement also followed the logic of creating new residential sectors within the empire, backed by agricultural activity. Distance, lower quality of agricultural lands, and harsh climatic patterns rendered eastern Anatolia, Mosul, Aleppo, and Baghdad unfavorable options for the resettlement of the refugees from the Balkans. In addition to such natural factors, another obstacle in resettling the refugees in certain parts of the empire was the initiatives of non-Muslim communities through diplomatic channels, which argued against the resettlement of refugees in certain regions.<sup>91</sup> Some non-Muslim Ottomans even ventured to challenge the security forces of the Ottoman state and thus its resettlement policy in order to prevent the resettlement of refugees in towns, villages, or cities with non-Muslim communities. The gangs that drew members from the non-Muslims in the empire also attacked the refugee convoys and communities at times. For instance, during the course of the Balkan Wars some criminals (originally from the village of Derbent) attacked the refugees who were settled in the village of Atiye, in the *kaza* of Yenişehir, Bursa.<sup>92</sup> The purpose behind the attack was not to pillage properties, because the local Muslims in the same region did not face such attacks; only the refugees were targeted. Despite the extant regional

TABLE 22.4. Statistical Breakdown of Settlers by *Vilayet/Sanjak*

<i>VILAYET/SANJAK</i>	1878	1913	<i>VILAYET/SANJAK</i>	1878	1913
Adana	6,464	6,513	Karahisar	—	201
Ankara	20,735	7,196	Karesi	—	10,689
Aydın	51,938	104,879	Kastamonu	28,815	184
Beyrut	2,542	—	Kayseri	—	4,415
Biga	22,440	2,903	Konya	11,908	6,120
Canik	—	2,786	Kosova	58,535	—
Çatalca	1,557	5,393	Mamuretülaziz	809	173
Diyarbakir	450	—	Manastır	1,651	—
Edirne	110,997	95,263	Maraş	—	3,617
Erzurum	19,572	—	Menteşe	—	615
Eskişehir	—	6,534	Selanik	6,462	—
Halep	1,556	7,552	Sivas	57,259	7,769
Hüdavendigâr	169,283	14,993	Suriye	10,789	2,291
Istanbul	—	2,594	Trabzon	35,189	—
İşkodra	2,346	—			
İzmit	46,463	4,868	Total	667,760	297,548

defiance, the Muslim refugees from Tuna and Bosnia-Herzegovina were resettled often in Thrace and western Anatolia.

While some refugees were resettled in existing neighborhoods and villages, others were resettled in empty lands, which led to the emergence of new neighborhoods. The transition in the position of the refugees from consumers in the Ottoman society to producers took at least a year to accomplish. To cover the expenses of providing shelter and food to the refugees until that transition was complete, particular funds and commissions were established to collect aid from the public. In addition to this aid, the increase in fees, increases in certain articles of taxation, and savings from some public and *vakf* services produced the funds that were set aside for the refugees. When these funds proved inadequate, further funds were allocated from the central budget. Unfortunately, we do not have the official statistics that would indicate the number of refugees officially resettled between 1878 and 1914. Yet, according to one archival source, 667,760 were officially resettled in the years after 1878 and 297,737 after 1913. Table 22.4 shows the breakdown of these numbers for each *vilayet* or *sanjak*.<sup>93</sup>

The refugees were often categorized into two groups: affluent and needy. Those who arrived during the time of war were usually in greater need of financial help. Those who came to the Ottoman lands after the

end of the war and thus were able to sell their properties at home were often better off financially. Yet the proceeds that they collected from the sale of their properties only fulfilled their needs for a short time. The needy refugees were allocated a 40 *para* per diem allowance. The municipalities also tried to cover the funeral and heating expenses of the refugees as much as the municipal budget permitted. In villages, however, these expenses were often paid by the local villagers. In cities and towns the locals helped cover the expenses of food, clothing, and resettlement for the needy refugees. Those refugees who did not receive any support from the locals were given allocations from the state treasury, which was limited to two years, by which time the state expected the refugees to become producers once again.

To facilitate the transition of the refugees from being consumers to producers, it was necessary to provide arable lands, agricultural tools, and livestock to the refugees who were farmers and to offer employment opportunities or loans to set up a business for those who were settled in cities as well as to meet their residential needs. While the state-owned lands were allocated to some refugees, others received lands that had never been cultivated before. The local administrations were given the responsibility to build residences with two or three rooms. These residences were built through the cooperation of the state institutions, locals, and refugees. Refugees resettled in agricultural zones were also provided agricultural tools, seeds, ploughs, livestock, and so on to some extent. These expenditures, however, became a burden on the state budget, which also explains the significant budget deficits in certain years when a massive influx of refugees into the Ottoman lands occurred. When such aid and allocations from the state budget failed to cover the expenses of the refugees, the Ottoman state started negotiations with the moneylenders in Istanbul and even sought foreign debt with suitable provisions. The refugees were exempt from certain articles of taxation for three years, such as income tax, tithes, taxes on livestock, land taxes, and public service taxes, and were also exempt from military service for ten years.

#### IMPACT OF POPULATION MOVEMENTS

Migrations into Anatolia clearly increased the Turkish population, which also led to a growth in agricultural output and taxation revenues by 60 percent. The refugees who were farmers by profession introduced new plants to the Anatolian habitat. The refugees who were settled in urban settings became part of the workforce as manufacturers, artisans,

merchants, and peddlers. The industrial sector was not well developed, so most of the refugees in cities and towns lived on as housemaids and doorkeepers.

The cultural differences between the refugees and the people in the Anatolian interior were minimal, which made it easier for them to adapt to the new surroundings and get along better with the local people. Yet western Anatolia saw some instances of land disputes between the refugees and the local populations. The non-Muslim sectors of the Ottoman society strongly opposed the settlement of the refugees in their territories, a position encouraged by the Armenian patriarch.

The individual members of each refugee household ranged from 2 to 16, averaging 4.9. Some 70 percent of the refugee household included parents and their children, meaning that they were often nuclear families. The father was the head of these families; if he died, the senior male child assumed the lead. These families were generally monogamous, often with two children.

It is necessary to categorize the refugees into two groups in terms of both their economic status and the destination of their migration. The first group consisted of those who left their homes during the time of war and migrated to the places under Turkish control. The Ottoman bureaucracy defined these people as “refugees” (*mülteci*). The settlers were planning to return to their homes after the end of the war. In terms of their economic status, these people were consumers in places they settled. Their needs for shelter, food, and clothing were met by the state and local population. The second group consisted of those who came to the Ottoman lands during the time of peace either as deserters or as holders of passports. These people sold their properties at home with little monetary return and were able to live on these proceeds for a short while. When the temporary period of resettlement took longer than usual, however, these refugees were also vulnerable to economic hardship.

As one refugee put it, it is difficult to imagine what migration entails unless someone lives through it. The foremost experience is having left their homeland behind and taking to the road toward a land full of unknowns. When faced with threats to their lives or under periods of foreign occupation, civilians often resorted to escaping to the mountains. When the foreign occupation drags on, the only option is migration; but the point of destination is often unknown. Wherever they settle, everything is foreign, including the change of identity. People who identified themselves with local attachments such as Ahmet from Varna or Ayşe from Köstence were suddenly defined with a new label, *muhacir* (settler).

As Ziya Gevher Bey, the deputy of Çanakkale, put it, the larger society perceived the settler as someone “who has taken refuge, devoid of any rights, having been exposed to all forms of disaster, helpless, miserable, Turks with a red girdle.”<sup>94</sup> In some instances humiliating adjectives were also used to describe the settlers, such as *kırkı bir sepette gelenler* (referring to their “crowdedness”) and *pis macir* (literally “dirty settlers”). Once a new convoy of refugees arrived in a region, the previous refugees who had settled there suddenly turned out to be Rumelian. Yet these refugees who had migrated earlier to the region were able to identify themselves with the newcomers much more easily than with the locals. Migrations also caused significant shifts in the social status of once wealthy families. These financial difficulties, coupled with the prohibition by the Balkan governments, made it impossible for them to revisit their homelands even as tourists, which led to clear psychological difficulties.

While those who opted for migration went through hard times characterized by an identity crisis, deteriorating social status, and psychological pressures, those who chose to stay in their homelands faced further pressure from the emerging Balkan states. The first change came with the new official identities. The Muslims in the Balkans were not Ottomans anymore but rather Serbian, Montenegrin, and Romanian citizens. While the Muslims were in the majority, the Treaty of Berlin reduced their status to that of a minority. The official status of Muslims within Eastern Rumelia and the Bulgarian Principality remained the same because they were technically Ottoman citizens between 1878 and 1908. Yet the administrations of Eastern Rumelia and the Bulgarian Principality did not accept such a definition, which led to a number of diplomatic confrontations over a long period. After 1909, however, the Muslims under these administrative frameworks were to be defined as Bulgarian citizens/subjects. The national days of Bulgaria were fixed as the birthday of the prince, the date of the liberation of the principality, and the date of the Treaty of San Stefano. The Muslim students were also forced to attend religious ceremonies that celebrated such important national days.<sup>95</sup> The function of such holidays, as in all other nation-states, was to create a unified identity. Thus the Turkish elements who were asked to participate in such activities responded with aversion, for they were used to living under the Turkish and Muslim rule. Other aspects of cultural unity necessitated by the logic of nation-states (such as national education and military service, an official language, a national flag, anthem, and holidays) disturbed the Turkish Muslim elements that once lived in the region as the majority. Such a natural reaction would get stronger once the

existing national regime insisted on imposing such markers of national unity on the minority populations.

Another aspect of the nation-states is the function of national education, which was to reproduce the society and sustain the markers of national identity. The Bulgarian national education system was no exception. As a matter of fact, schools that formed around such an idea of national education started mushrooming in the pre-independence period in the early years of the nineteenth century. With the establishment of the Bulgarian Principality, the minority populations were also forced into the national education system, which insisted on Bulgarian as the medium of instruction for the Muslim children. This led either to the Bulgarization of the Muslim children or to further Muslim migrations from the region. Such a policy of Bulgarization was first carried out among the Pomaks. Between 1908 and 1911, education in Bulgarian was dominant in the Pomak villages on the borderlands. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs accordingly asked the Ottoman government to employ Turkish teachers in Bulgaria.<sup>96</sup> In other words, the Ottoman Empire had to meet the educational needs of the Turkish Muslim populations remaining in the region. According to the report of the Turkish Consulate in Filipe, dated 1911, a sum of 500 liras per month was to cover the expenses of maintaining Turkish teachers in the region. The same report also talked about how the Turkish children faced the impending danger of assimilation and how the families were to migrate to protect their identity, if such a monetary allotment was not set aside. In either case, the decrease in the Turkish population in Bulgaria was imminent.

By 1912 the Muslims had 1,206 schools in Bulgaria. A total of 63,778 students attended these schools: 40,779 males and 22,999 females. The schools had 1,420 teachers: 1,371 males and 49 females. While 130 of them were full-time teachers, the rest also had public duties such as serving as imams and muezzins.<sup>97</sup>

After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, changes took place in the architectural styles of the towns and cities across the region. The Christians coming from the rural areas or from the Ottoman Empire took over the properties left behind by the Muslims, leading to a clear demographic shift in the region. The war also damaged many of the buildings in urban areas. The buildings that belonged to the Christians were restored, while the mosques and Muslim graveyards were destroyed and turned into public spaces.<sup>98</sup> For example, *Trnova* had sixteen mosques, eight smaller mosques, and ten *madrasahs* before the war. Some of these buildings were looted and torn down during the war, and the rare books at the libraries



of the mosques were destroyed. In their stead new public buildings such as parliament buildings, schools, and churches were constructed. Some of the *vakf* lands and properties were sold to third parties. In the end only two mosques were in operation after the war. Pazarlıkyeri Mosque was rebuilt after the war and continued to function with new names like Yeni (New) Mosque and Ferdinand Mosque.<sup>99</sup> Capital cities were the symbols of the strength and dignity of the state structures, whether monarchical or democratic, traditional or modern, so they were rebuilt to reflect the new cultural orientation. For instance, premodern Muslim societies often opted for changing the site of the capital city once they developed a new state structure. In the West, however, despite changes in ruling dynasties, the location of the capitals often stayed the same; the new elites were able to rebuild the capital cities, reflecting the symbolism of the new authority and the new contemporary culture.

But in Bulgaria the cultural genocide was not limited to the changes in the capital city. For example, four out of thirteen mosques in Silistre had been destroyed by 1912, and the new spaces were utilized as public grounds. In Zıřtovi, two out of fourteen mosques and masjids were damaged during the war. The İhsaniye Mosque, with its central location in the city, was torn down by the Bulgarian authorities, who constructed a new theater building in its stead. The Veliřan Mosque was torn down on the pretext that its walls had significant damage. Some other mosques were turned into buildings for military storage, and one other mosque was removed because it stood in the middle of a new road that was planned.<sup>100</sup>

Over time the constructions of cathedrals and churches started transforming the general landscape of each urban center. This new landscape often came at the expense of the Ottoman architectural legacy in the region. In addition to the changing panorama of the cities with the emergence of new architectural styles, the names of towns, villages, and cities were also changed within this larger initiative of creating a new cultural space. These changes in turn caused growing feelings of alienation among the Muslims toward their surroundings. The administrative posts were now filled by non-Muslims, who often perceived the Turkish elements in the Balkans as threats to the new regime. Accordingly, assimilation of these elements into the new culture and/or the creation of a set of measures that would encourage their migration became focal points of policy agendas.

The territories that came under the control of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria after the war had a prewar population of over 7 million: 4,695,200 Christians and 2,315,293 Muslims. Of these Muslims, 1.5 million left

these territories, while 870,000 decided not to migrate; but 300,000 of them ended up migrating during the course of the war. According to McCarthy, 27 percent of the total Turkish population indicated above lost their lives in the war zones and during the course of migration and also because of the attacks by their neighbors as well as officials during times of peace.<sup>101</sup>

The death of civilians is often inevitable during a war, and the death toll of civilians is generally determined by the length of wars. As the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, the Balkan Wars, and World War I clearly prove, however, the wars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries caused a grave death toll of civilians that was beyond comparison with preceding centuries. This is so because the states that expanded their territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire also sought ways to eliminate the remaining Muslim element. In the end, the Russians and the Balkan forces not only fought against the Ottoman Empire but also strove to get rid of the Muslim elements in the newly conquered regions either through massacres of the Muslim populations or by creating the conditions that facilitated their migration. Such demographic objectives also had parallels in other fields, such as the activities of archaeologists who did their best to collect archaeological materials and ethnographic artifacts to enrich the museums as the sites of new national culture.<sup>102</sup>

The Ottoman administration made a number of efforts to avoid the settler movements from the Balkans and to protect the legal status of the civilians in the region. One of them was to publicize the unfair treatment of the Turkish element in the region by the Balkan authorities and accordingly inform world public opinion. To do so, the Society for the Publication of Documents (Neşr-i Vesaik Cemiyeti) was established in Istanbul in December 1912. The society published documents in Turkish newspapers and publicized the stories related to the massacres of the Muslims in the Balkans. These documents and reports were later compiled as a book in French. Those in charge of the *Tanin* newspaper asked their readers to support the newspaper's initiative of increasing the effectiveness of this book by soliciting photos that would support the narrative and paintings and poems that would help further visualize the extent of suffering. Such initiatives attempted not only to publicize the massacres in Europe but also to inject a particular sense of historical consciousness into the hearts and minds of the following generations.<sup>103</sup> The Turkish people were not really used to such methods, however. Celal Bayar later noted in his memoirs that "such initiatives are reflective of what the French called *complexe d'infériorité* and belong to those countries that

are not able to defend their rights and thus instead opt for such methods to stir sentiments for due justice.”<sup>104</sup> Perhaps it was such attitudes of Turkish intellectuals that strengthened the lack of emphasis on the Turkish suffering in the Balkans in the Turkish press and decreased the number of memoirs in circulation. Yet the Society for the Publication of Documents as well as the official channels continued to publicize the extent of the Turkish suffering in the Balkans.<sup>105</sup> On the larger international scene the Society of the Defense of Rights in Macedonia was established in London, with a membership of 150 among the English and Indian Muslims, in order to protect the rights of the Muslims in lands under foreign occupation.<sup>106</sup> The Bulgarian publications, however, pointed out how the Turkish soldiers left the wounded during their retreat and stated that it was the Bulgarian Red Cross that attended to the wounded.<sup>107</sup>

Because the war correspondents were not allowed to observe military maneuvers and combat action, their reports were reduced to renarrating the stories of the soldiers. They also had to send their reports through the official telegraph channels under the military control, so no information could be leaked to the press. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 the circulation of the news about the Muslim suffering was limited in an effort to avoid any social conflict in the Anatolian interior. Yet the Balkan Wars received a greater level of coverage in the Turkish newspapers, which published the reprints of the letters from the war zones, reported on the coverage of the war in the Western press, and covered the official reports and notices.

The Turkish population across the Balkans in general and in the invaded urban centers of Kavala, Serez, and Manastır in particular came to face violence and a series of oppressive measures. With the arrival of invading forces, the Turkish notables in each region were invited to the municipal quarters and then asked to turn in their personal firearms. Having seized their weapons, the authorities distributed them among the Christian community, which in turn gained the necessary means to wrest properties from the Muslim owners.<sup>108</sup> While the properties of Muslims were targets of pillage, the Pomaks became the targets of conversion. Just as each territorial occupation is followed by certain measures of demographic control that would strengthen the position of authority of the invading forces, the Muslim notables and community leaders were murdered or put under arrest or encouraged to migrate. The rest of the community then became the targets of conversion and forced migration. These methods of demographic control and cleansing were part of the strategies of nearly all Balkan states.<sup>109</sup>

The population movements into Anatolia continued during and after the Balkan Wars. The focal point of these migratory movements was Macedonian territories that were divided among the allied Balkan states. The objective of the so-called Macedonian Question was to preserve the existence of each ethnic community. The ethnic groups in the region lived next to each other in mixed communities, so dividing them along geographical lines was simply not an option. Accordingly, Alfred Rüstem Bey recommended the establishment of a Macedonian autonomous administration that would protect the rights and lives of the civilians. Setting up separate administrative divisions in Macedonia would create unhealthy frameworks where people would oppose the ethnically different ruling elite, which would worsen the situation even further.<sup>110</sup> Yet at the end of the day the solution was to divide the occupied territories among the victors and force the Turks to migrate.

### CONCLUSION

In describing the causes for the Turkish migrations into Anatolia from the Balkans, it is important to distinguish the migrations during the war from the ones after the end of the war. The policies of the invading forces to eliminate the Muslim elements in the conquered territories and the uneasiness among the Turks about living under a foreign government constituted two important reasons for the migrations during the course of the war. Yet such policies did not lead to a full-scale migration of Muslims from the region. After the end of the war a sizable sector of the societies strove to live under the new administrative frameworks, particularly in reference to their rights and minority status as established by international treaties. The attempts of the Balkan states to assimilate the remaining population in the region, however, created a continuous flow of migrants from the Balkans into Anatolia.

The Ottoman administration wanted the remaining Muslim Turkish elements in the region to live under the new administrative units in the Balkans, while freely enjoying their rights and minority status. Accordingly, the Porte took many measures that tried to arrest and even prohibit the migrations into the Ottoman territories. Yet the empire's attitude to such migrations always had some flexibility. The Ottoman administration concentrated its attempts to oppose the policies of the Balkan states that tried to eliminate the Muslim populations. These Ottoman attempts ranged from diplomatic initiatives with the European states to reciprocation with the Balkan states. When such initiatives failed to stop the

demographic policies sponsored by the Balkan states, the empire reached agreements with Greece and Bulgaria for population exchanges.

The migrants who arrived in the Ottoman territories after the conclusion of the Balkan Wars were denied access to the Anatolian interior and instead were resettled particularly around the region of Istranca. According to the military authorities, the increase in the region's Turkish majority would create more favorable conditions for military supply during the time of war.<sup>111</sup> As a result of the Ottoman resettlement policy, the proportion of Turks in the general population of Thrace reached 58 percent.<sup>112</sup> During the period of resettlement the migrants who were financially able met the expenses of shelter and food on their own. In the plots designated by the authorities these migrants built their houses using their own resources and became a part of the agricultural sector after having bought plots of land.

In principle those migrants who were in need in terms of finances were to settle in abandoned properties, but very few abandoned residential properties existed in Thrace. The residential quarters of the region suffered terribly from warfare, earthquakes, and fires, leaving very few buildings that were suitable as residences. Thus the aid from the Ottoman authorities, coupled with assistance from the local people, made it possible for the poor migrants to construct new residences.

While the need for shelter was met in this manner, those migrants who required assistance were provided basic human necessities such as food and fuel until they were able to integrate into the society and once again become producers. The local Muslim populations also did not shy away from assistance. This aid was often in the form of cash in towns and cities and in kind in villages. The local aid for the migrants was so great that it could even be seen as a form of emergency tax. The local aid was expected from everyone except children, the poor, widows, women, and poor males. Such aid from the locals as well as the allocation from the Ottoman treasury accumulated in an exclusive fund. This fund was used to cover the transportation expenses of the migrants from cities and towns to villages as well as the accrued costs that all migrants faced until they once again became producers and thus were able to meet their expenses on their own.

#### NOTES

This chapter was translated from Turkish into English by Ramazan Hakkı Oztan.

1. See Hüseyin Arslan, *Osmanlı'da Nüfus Hareketleri (XVI. Yüzyıl) Yönetim Nüfus Göçler İskânlar, Sürgünler*.

2. Kemal Karpat, *Osmanlı Nüfusu (1830–1914) Demografik ve Sosyal Özellikleri*, 113, 96.
3. During the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1828–29 the Rum populations that inhabited the Russian zone of invasion were encouraged to resettle north of the Danube River. See Ufuk Gülsoy, 1828–1829 *Osmanlı–Rus Savaşı’nda Rumeli’den Rusya’ya Göçürülen Reaya*. In the 1860s, once again as a result of Russian encouragement, the Bulgarians along the Danube River were to resettle in the Crimea and the Caucasus. See Nedim İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler*, 269–80.
4. For a study that explains these population movements by emphasizing a migratory instinct peculiar to the Muslims, see Alexandre Toumarkine, *Les migrations des populations musulmanes balkaniques en Anatolie (1876–1913)*, 61.
5. For the emergence of nation-states, see Nedim İpek, “Osmanlı Coğrafyasında Yapay Ulus Devlet Kurma Projeleri,” 11–28.
6. For the establishment of the nation-states in the Balkans, see Andrew Baruch Wachtel, *Dünya Tarihinde Balkanlar*.
7. For detailed information on the settler movements, see İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler*.
8. On the policies during the foundational years of the Greek state, see Bilal N. Şimşir, *Ege Sorunu Belgeler*. On the settler movements from the peninsula of Morea (Mora), see İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler*; Ali Fuat Örenç, *Balkanlarda İlk Dram*.
9. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), YA-Hus, No. 160/43; 162/103, A.MKT. MHM, No. 483/2, Y. PRK. ASK, No. 16/37; Ali Fuat Türk geldi, *Mesail-i Mühimme-i Siyasiye*, 137; Safet Bancoviç, “Müslümanların Karadağ’dan 19. Yüzyıldaki Göçü.”
10. See Besim Darkot, “Karadağ.”
11. Hayri Kolaşinli, ed. *Muhacirlerin İzinde Boşnakların Trajik Göç Tarihinden Kesitler*, 88, 91.
12. On the foundation of Greece, see Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*.
13. See Vračalı Sofroni, *Osmanlı’da Bir Papaz Günabkâr Sofroni’nin Çileli Hayat Hikâyesi 1739–1813*.
14. Bilal N. Şimşir, *Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri Belgeler*, vol. 2, xxxiv; Halil İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 17–23.
15. Şimşir, *Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri Belgeler*, vol. 2, lxix–lxxix.
16. Nedim İpek, *Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Türk Göçleri (1877–1890)*, 13.
17. Karpat, *Osmanlı Nüfusu (1830–1914) Demografik*, 63; İpek, *Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Türk Göçleri*, 13. For a demographic study on the villages in Tuna Vilayet, see Slavka Draganova, *Tuna Vilayeti’nin Köy Nüfusu*.
18. For the events and policies prior to the war, see Şimşir, *Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri Belgeler*, vol. 2.
19. *Russian Atrocities in Asia and Europe during the Months of June, July, and August 1877*, no. 97: Telegram from Mr. Simony to Reuter’s Agency, London, Chumla, July 9, 1877.
20. Ibid., no. 119: Telegram from Mr. Buckland to “Norma,” Edinburgh, July 15, 1877.
21. Ibid., no. 126: Telegram from Mr. Gay to the “Daily Telegraph,” London, Pera, July 16, 1877.
22. Hüseyin Raci Efendi, *Tarihçe-i Vak’a-i Zağra*.

23. İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 19.
24. Ali İhsan Gencer and Nedim İpek, "1877-1878 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi Rumeli Cephesi Vesikaları (Temmuz 1877)," 219-24; Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani ve Devr-i Saltanatı*, 270-71.
25. *Russian Atrocities in Asia and Europe during the Months of June, July, and August 1877*, no. 112: Telegram from Crespin to "Observer," London, Pera, July 14, 1877.
26. İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 31-32.
27. *Appel des Musulmans opprimés au Congrès de Berlin: Leur situation en Europe en Asie depuis le Traité de San-Stéfano* (Istanbul: n.p., 1878), i-iv.
28. İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler*, 369-70.
29. See *ibid.*; and İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler*.
30. See Ömer Turan, *The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1908*.
31. BOA, HR.SYS, No. 305/1.
32. *Ibid.*
33. BOA, HR.SYS, No. 306/1; Bulgaristan idaresinin 1879-1908 arasında Türk nüfus politikası için bk. Osman Köse, "Bulgaristan Emeti ve Türkler (1878-1908)," *Akademik Açı* 1996/2 (Samsun, 1996): 247-81.
34. BOA, HR.SYS, No. 306/1.
35. *Ibid.*
36. BOA, HR.SYS, No. 304/1.
37. BOA, HR.SYS, No. 305/1.
38. İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler*, 118.
39. For detailed information, see *ibid.*
40. Karpat, *Osmanlı Nüfusu (1830-1914) Demografik*, 204.
41. Fikret Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu*, 2-4. Tahsin Uzer, who had a lengthy service record in the region as a civil servant, sees Macedonia as the territories that fell between the Struma, Vardar, and Mesta Rivers. This includes all the territories of the *vilayet* of Selanik and the territories of the *vilayets* of Kosova and Manastır that are not parts of Albania. Tahsin Uzer, *Makedonya Eşkıyalık Tarihi ve Son Osmanlı Yönetim*, 84.
42. Uzer, *Makedonya Eşkıyalık Tarihi ve Son Osmanlı Yönetimi*, 84.
43. For demographic information, see Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu*, 2-4, 11.
44. For the structures, working methods, and activities of the Bulgarian gangs in Macedonia, see Selahittin Özçelik, *Balkanlarda Kimlik Arayışı Bulgar Terör Örgütünün Anatomisi*.
45. Celal Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım, Milli Mücadeleye Giriş*, 81.
46. Kazım Karabekir, *Hayatım*, 393.
47. İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 176.
48. Nedim İpek, "Kosova Vilayeti Dahilinde Gerçekleşen Göçler," 81; İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler*, 331.
49. Nedim İpek, *Selanik'ten Samsun'a Mübadiller*, 32.
50. Karabekir, *Hayatım*, 250-51, 264-67; Leon Troçki, *Balkan Savaşları*, 273-83.
51. Süleyman Tevfik, *II. Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Elli Yıllık Hatıralarım*, 379-93; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 302.
52. Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni*, 162-64.
53. Kazım Karabekir, *Edirne Hatıraları*, 29, 77.

54. Troçki, *Balkan Savaşları*, 283.
55. Ibid., 310; Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 316.
56. Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, 6.
57. Ibid., 7.
58. Noel Malcolm, *Kosova Balkanları Anlamak İçin*, 311.
59. *Tanin*, April 13, 1913.
60. *Tanin*, March 14, 1913.
61. Malcolm, *Kosova Balkanları Anlamak İçin*, 316.
62. Togay Seçkin Bırbudak, "Balkan Savaşlarında Edirne."
63. Karabekir, *Edirne Hatıraları*, 180–82.
64. Justin McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 156.
65. *Tanin*, April 14, 1913.
66. Celadet Bedirhan and Kamuran Bedirhan, *Edirne Sükutunun İç Yüzü*.
67. McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 150.
68. Sadık Ulvi, *Tahsin Paşa Ordusu ve Selanik'in Teslimi*.
69. H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanlar'ın Makûs Talihî, Göç*, 42, 72–74.
70. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 319.
71. Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanlar'ın Makûs Talihî, Göç*, 253.
72. McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 183.
73. BOA, DH. KMS, No. 1/43.
74. Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri (1912–1913)*, 52–53.
75. BOA, DH-KMS, No. 1/43, Lef. 10: 21 KS 1329 tarihli arıza.
76. BOA, DH-KMS, No. 1/43.
77. BOA, DH-KMS, No. 1/43: 13 TE 1329; İkdâm, 7, May 12, 1914.
78. İpek, *Selanik'ten Samsun'a Mübadiller*, 37.
79. Ibid., 38.
80. Bilal Şimşir, "Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Göç Sorunu," 53. For the epidemic diseases during the Balkan Wars, see Oya Dağlar Macar, *Balkan Savaşları'nda Salgın Hastalıklar ve Sağlık Hizmetleri*.
81. Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri*, 47–65.
82. Stephan Lauzan, *Osmanlı'nın Bozgun Yılları*, 170, 80.
83. Georges Remond, *Mağluplarla Beraber*, 16, 33.
84. Halide Edip Adivar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev*, 196–201.
85. Karabekir, *Hayatım*, 23.
86. Remond also noted that the headquarters in the front lines were filled with Rum, Armenian, and Jewish translators who desired an Ottoman defeat. "These shameless thieves and liars, cloaked as translators, often reported false news": Remond, *Mağluplarla Beraber*, 16, 33.
87. McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 181, 183, 190.
88. *Tanin*, February 23, 1913; April 2, 1913.
89. McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün* 184. For the number of refugees, see Şimşir, "Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Göç Sorunu," 47–66; see also Tefkîk Brykioğlu, *Trakya'da Milli Mücadele*.
90. See İpek, *Selanik'ten Samsun'a Mübadiller*.



91. İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 206.
92. *Tanin*, March 12, 1913.
93. İpek, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler*, 331; McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 184; Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanlar'ın Makûs Talibi*, Göç, 190.
94. *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: 4, C. 23, İçtima 3, 75.
95. BOA, HR.SYS, No. 306/1.
96. *Ibid.*
97. Bulgaria had twenty-eight middle schools where fifty-nine teachers taught 1,286 students. By 1912 no high schools or any other higher education institutions in Bulgaria belonged to the Muslims. Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, *Bulgaristan Mektupları*, 56.
98. İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, 135–47.
99. Akseki, *Bulgaristan Mektupları*, 70.
100. *Ibid.*, 83–86.
101. McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 184–89.
102. Bogdan Filov, the director of the Bulgarian Archaeological Institute, made extensive research trips between 1912 and 1918 in eastern Thrace, the Aegean region, and Vardar, Macedonia. He collected and identified 7,330 ethnographic items such as hand-copied books, carpets, firearms, and so on and took them back to Sofia. For more information on the Bulgarian efforts in collecting ethnographic material, see Bogdan Filov, *Rumeli'nin Esaret Günleri*.
103. *Tanin*, February 26, 1913; March 3, 1913.
104. Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, 12.
105. For a detailed description of the massacres of the Muslim Turks as well as the destruction of their residences in Mustafapaşa, Çirmen, Kadıköy, Havsa, Edirne, and Kırkkilise, see “Lettre de Mr. Verdier, Edirne 8 Ağustos 1913,” in *Les atrocités des Bulgares en Thrace*, 21–31; for the massacres of the Turks and Muslims as well as the destruction of their property by the Bulgarians in Hasköy, Çirmen, Karaağaç, Meriç, Paşaköy, Havsa, Mustafapaşa, and Kırkkilise, see “Rapport de M. Maschkov Correspondant du journal Novoyé Vrémya,” in *Les atrocités des Bulgares en Thrace*, 3–20; for official publications, see *Les atrocités des Coalisés Balkaniques*, Nos. 1, 2, 3; *Les atrocités des Grecs en Macédoine*; *Les cruautés bulgares en Macédoine Orientale et en Thrace 1912–1913*; and *Réponse à la brochure des professeurs des université d'Athènes, "Atrocités bulgares en Macédoine."*
106. *Tanin*, April 16, 1913.
107. Troçki, *Balkan Savaşları*, 317.
108. *Tanin*, February 24, 1913.
109. See McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 159, 160, 161, 165, 169, 170.
110. *Tanin*, March 8, 1913.
111. Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri*, 116.
112. BOA, YEE, No. 34/48; 1287 Hicri Senesi Edirne Vilayeti Salnamesi, 142–51; 1288 Hicri Senesi Edirne Vilayeti Salnamesi, 146–55; 1290 Hicri Senesi Edirne Vilayeti Salnamesi, 146–50, 154–63; Karpat, Osmanlı Nüfusu (1830–1914) Demografik, 164–208.

## The Balkan Wars and the Refugee Leadership of the Early Turkish Republic

*Erik Jan Zürcher*

At the time of Atatürk's death in November 1938, fifteen years after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and a full twenty-five years after Ottoman Europe (Rumelia) had been lost in the Balkan Wars, Turkey was an Asiatic country in geographical terms, with 96 percent of its territory in Asia and only 4 percent in Europe. Although Atatürk himself died in Istanbul, the capital was (and had been for the last fifteen years) a town in central Anatolia, over four hundred kilometers from the shores of the Bosphorus, then a full fifteen hours by train. But the political and cultural elite running this country from the heart of Asia Minor was anything but native to the country it ruled.

At the time of Atatürk's death the Turkish cabinet was headed by Mahmut Celal Bayar, born in Gemlik in a family of refugees from Bulgaria. They had left their native area due to the "War of '93," the 1877–78 war against Russia that had brought the Ottoman Empire to the brink of collapse sixty years before. The minister of justice was Şükrü Saraçoğlu, native of Ödemiş on the Aegean coast. The defense minister was Kazım Özalp, longtime president of the national assembly, born in the Macedonian town of Velesh/Köprülü. Şükrü Kaya, the interior minister, hailed from Kos/Istanköy. The foreign minister, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, was a native of Gallipoli. The finance minister, Fuat Ağralı, had been born on the island of Lesbos/Midilli. Education minister Saffet Arıkan came from Erzincan and transport minister Ali Çetinkaya from Afyon. But the minister for economic affairs and agriculture, Şakir Kesebir, like Kazım Özalp, was a native of Velesh/Köprülü. Health minister Hulusi Alataş came from Beyşehir and minister for customs and monopolies Ali Rana

Tarhan from Istanbul. The president himself, of course, hailed from Thessaloniki/Selanik and the president of the national assembly, Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda, from Ioannina/Janina/Yanya in the western Balkans. The chief of the general staff, Fevzi Çakmak, was born in Istanbul. In other words, out of fourteen people in key leadership positions in 1938, only three hailed from inland Anatolia. The other eleven came from the capital, the shores of the Marmara and the Aegean, and the southern Balkans. Six out of fourteen came from areas that had been lost in the Italian and Balkan Wars. To put it yet another way, the 96 percent of the territory that was in Asia contributed only 41 percent of the leadership even after fifteen years of the republican regime, a share equal to that of the provinces and islands lost a generation earlier.

We can take this quantitative approach further. When we look at the political elite of the one-party era in the history of the Turkish Republic, between 1923 and 1946, we see that real power was concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of people that showed remarkable continuity.

A total of seventy-eight persons served in the fourteen cabinets in the period 1923–46 as ministers of the Republic.<sup>1</sup> Many of them had single-term appointments, however, and served for relatively short periods. When we take a more selective approach, we see that thirty out of these seventy-eight served in at least three different cabinets. These persons, who were without exception also members of the National Assembly, can be regarded as the core leadership of the Republic. Some of the members of this group, like Refik Saydam, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, and Abdülhalik Renda, served almost continuously, as this “ranking” shows:

- Şükrü Saraçoğlu (eleven cabinets)
- Refik Saydam (ten)
- Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda (eight)
- Fuat Ağralı (eight)
- İsmet İnönü (seven)
- Recep Peker (seven)
- Şükrü Kaya (seven)
- Tevfik Rüştü Aras (six)
- Hulusi Alataş (six)
- Ali Çetinkaya (six)
- Ali Rana Tarhan (six)
- Mahmut Celal Bayar (five)
- Kazım Özalp (five)
- Şakir Kesebir (four)

Hilmi Uran (four)  
Hasan Saka (four)  
Muhlis Erkmén (four)  
Saffet Arıkan (four)  
Mustafa Necati (four)  
Süleyman Sırrı (four)  
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (three)  
Zekai Apaydın (three)  
Esat Sağay (three)  
Hüsnü Çakır (three)  
Ali Rıza Artunkal (three)  
Ali Fuat Cebesoy (three)  
Sırrı Day (three)  
Raif Karadeniz (three)  
Naci Tınaz (three)

Some of the ministers on this list were important and powerful not just because of their position in the cabinet but because of the other roles they played. İsmet İnönü, of course, became the Republic's second president in 1938. Recep Peker was the general secretary of the Republican People's Party for many years, until that position was handed over to the interior minister under the unification of state and party in 1936. Kazım Özalp served as Speaker of the National Assembly for eleven years, and Ali Çetinkaya served as president of the Republic's most important and much feared Independence Tribunal during the "Maintenance of Order" (*Takrirî Sükun*) period between 1925 and 1929. From its founding in 1924 Celal Bayar headed the increasingly influential group around the Türkiye İş Bankası (Business Bank of Turkey), in which the president and his circle of friends were stockholders.

A number of prominent members of Turkey's political elite are not on this list at all, because they did not hold positions in at least three cabinets. First and foremost this is true for the president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, for the first fifteen years, but the same holds for Fevzi Çakmak, who stood at the head of the armed forces as chief of the General Staff for more than twenty years. The influential architect of Turkish educational reform Reşit Galip should probably be included; only his untimely death prevented him from being a long-serving member of government.

In addition to these very public power-wielders, another group should be included in any analysis of the early republican political elite: the circle of Atatürk's personal friends. After 1928, during the last decade

of his life, Atatürk left the day-to-day running of the country largely in İsmet İnönü's hands but remained the undisputed leader with dictatorial powers (in fact, if not on paper). This meant that access to the president and people with close ties to him, especially if these ties were well known and visible, remained an important instrument of power in Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s. Atatürk gave plenty of opportunities to gain access to him. He regularly invited personal and political friends as well as people who had attracted his attention through their work to his dinner table. Almost no evening passed without one of these dinner parties taking place. They lasted from late evening until dawn, and both alcohol and conversation flowed freely. Decisions reached during these informal gatherings were sometimes imposed on İsmet İnönü and his cabinet, which is an indication of the importance of the dinner parties, but this phenomenon also caused growing irritation on the part of the cabinets in the 1930s. It seems to have been the primary reason for the breach between Atatürk and İnönü in 1937, which resulted in İnönü's dismissal as prime minister. Thanks to the published register of visitors to the president in 1932–38 and the research of Walter Weiker based on it,<sup>2</sup> we know who the most frequent visitors were and who could thus be regarded as the president's inner circle in his later years, irrespective of their official position. A group of ten people who were "frequent" or even "very frequent" visitors throughout this six-year period emerges from the data: Kılıç Ali, Nuri Conker, Salih Bozok, İsmail Müştak Mayakon, Müfit Özdeş, Falih Rıfkı Atay, Hasan Cavit Betül, Cevat Abbas Gürer, Tahsin Uzer, and Edip Servet Tör. These should be added to the cabinet members mentioned above. In addition to these, I think Kemal's longtime close friend and ally Ali Fethi Okyar has to be added to this list, because he was undoubtedly one of the president's inner circle until the unfortunate end of the experiment with the Free Republican party opposition in 1930. Of this group of eleven, seven were born in the lost Balkan provinces.

The precise composition of the core leadership of the Republic can be debated, of course, but looking at the power structure of the one-party state in this way does give us a better view of who was actually in charge than looking at the composition of the National Assembly as a whole. The awarding of membership in the assembly—all-powerful according to the constitution but often a rubber-stamp parliament in practice—was largely used as a means to reward loyalty or to co-opt locally important persons into the regime. For nearly half of the twenty-three-year period under review here, parliament was also officially sidelined because powers had been handed over to the executive under emergency legislation. This

was true for the period of the Law on the Maintenance of Order (1925–29) and for the period of the National Defense Law (1939–47).

When we look at the geographical origins of this group of forty-four early republican leaders (the prominent cabinet ministers, the chief of staff, the president himself, and his circle), we see that three of them hailed from the eastern Black Sea coast (the area between Trabzon and Batumi) and four from inland Anatolia (from places as far apart as Afyon and Beyşehir in the west to Kırşehir in the center and Erzurum in the east). Six came from the Aegean littoral and four from the Marmara coastal areas (from Çanakkale to Adapazarı). Eight were born in Istanbul (the birthplace of one is unknown, at least to me). But the clearest statistical fact is this: 81 percent of the republican power elite came from the area in the West that can usefully be regarded as one region in terms of culture, development indicators (such as family size, literacy, and life expectancy), and ease of communications. This area includes Istanbul, the Marmara, the Aegean, and Rumelia. Only seven (16 percent) of these leaders came from Anatolia, the heartland of the Republic, and nearly half of them from the coastal area around Trabzon.

Of the thirty-six persons (82 percent) who made up the “western” group, no fewer than eighteen came from the southern Balkans and the islands of the Aegean, the areas lost in the Italian-Ottoman War of 1911–12 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. This means that in the first twenty-three years of the Republic 41 percent of the political leadership consisted of refugees from the lost provinces. Although the term *muhacir* is never used for these refugee members of the elite (it seems to be reserved for nonelite refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus), this is in effect what they were. That makes the early republican elite historically very exceptional. It is hard to come up with any other examples that might have explanatory relevance in a comparative context. Taiwan comes to mind, but the first-generation Kuo Min Tang leadership after 1949 never gave up the fiction of ruling all of China. In this sense it is almost the opposite of the Kemalist leadership, which focused squarely on building a new state and emphasized the complete break with the Ottoman past. Israel might be considered another example. It is certainly true that refugees played a crucial role in the building of the state of Israel, but the independent variables of the two cases are too different to be of much use in comparison. To begin with, the Israeli leaders who were not born in Ottoman Palestine did not come from lost provinces of any state of their own: they were immigrants not refugees. The German refugees from Eastern Europe after World War II perhaps offer the best basis

for comparison, in that they were a phenomenon of both mass migration and elite migration from former German territories or areas where Germans had been settled for centuries. In absolute numbers the German refugee problem, involving at least 12 million people, was far bigger than the Turkish one. But if we include the 1877–78, 1912–13, and 1923–24 migration waves, the Turkish experience was probably comparable in terms of percentage of the population as a whole. The mass migration of refugee Germans from the east, however, did not translate into a dominant position for refugees in the political or cultural elite of postwar Germany. Although he collaborated with the former Nazis of the League of Those Expelled and Deprived of Rights (Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten), Konrad Adenauer's cabinets were completely dominated by Rhinelanders and Bavarians, not by people from Silesia or Bohemia. The situation in interbellum Turkey is therefore unique.

The refugee background of the early leadership of the Republic of Turkey must be of significance for our understanding of the way in which this group went about creating a new state and society in their adopted fatherland of Anatolia. But if we want to gain a better understanding of how this background as refugees from the Italian and Balkan Wars had an impact on the republican elite, we need to add a qualitative approach to the purely quantitative approach employed so far. We need to look at the life stories of some of the people involved—without any claim to statistical relevance, but as an illustration of the impact of the Balkan War on the lives and careers of the Young Turk generation. Let us take the examples of four leading politicians of the Republic, two of them military men and two civil administrators.<sup>3</sup>

Mustafa Abdülhalik (from 1934: Renda) was born in Ioannina/Yanya in 1881 in a family of local Muslim notables. He was educated in the İdadiye and Rüşdiye schools of his native town, after which he studied at the Civil Service Academy (Mülkiye) in Istanbul, graduating in 1903. After a short stint as a teacher he entered the bureaucracy of the Ministry of the Interior, serving first as a civil servant in the province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid (Aegean) and then between 1906 and 1912 as district governor and subgovernor in Tepedelen, Pogon, Delvina, Berat, Kavala, and Egeri/Gyrokaster—all in Rumelia and all except one located in southern Albania/northern Epirus. In the immediate aftermath of the First Balkan War, however, in May 1913, he was transferred to Siirt in southeastern Anatolia, more than a thousand miles away from his previous stamping ground. In December 1914 he became provincial governor (*vali*) in Bitlis, and in October 1915 he was transferred to Aleppo. In both these

positions Abdülhalik Bey was directly responsible for the deportation of the Armenian population. After World War I he was interned by the British in Malta for his role in the Armenian massacres. But after his return he reentered the circles of the leadership in Ankara. He was made inspector and governor of Konya province during the national struggle period. Abdülhalik Bey, one of the people with the worst reputations in the context of the Armenian persecutions, actually was appointed the first governor of İzmir immediately after the city had been reconquered in September 1922. This formed the start of the brilliant career that he was to have during the Republic. He served as minister in six different ministries and was elected president of the National Assembly year after year, starting in 1935.

Kazım (from 1934: Özalp) was born in Velesh/Köprülü in Macedonia in 1882. After attending secondary schools in Skopje/Üsküp and Bitola/Manastır, he entered the military college in Istanbul, graduating from the elite General Staff Academy in 1905. He joined the CUP when he served with the Thirty-sixth Regiment in Thessaloniki/Selanik in 1907. Like many of his fellow Young Turk officers he took part in the suppression of the counterrevolution in Istanbul in April 1909 by the "Action Army" (Hareket Ordusu). During the Balkan War he served on the staff of the Fifth Corps. Thus Kazım's early socialization and career were exclusively in the Ottoman Balkans. In 1914 he was then posted to the other extreme of the empire: to the Ottoman-Persian border, a thousand miles away, where he gained fame as commander of the Mobile Gendarmerie Force of Van (Van Seyyar Jandarma Kuvveti). In that capacity he fought the Russians in Iranian Azerbaijan and destroyed much of the Armenian population in his path while retreating. By 1917 he was a colonel and fought in the Caucasus, occupying Batumi in 1918. After the war, as commander of the Sixty-first Division in Bandırma, he was one of the earliest military leaders to organize resistance against the Greek occupation of İzmir. Like many of his colleagues, Kazım was elected to the National Assembly in Ankara while serving in the field. Promoted to full general in 1924, he served as president of the National Assembly for ten consecutive years (1925–35).

Şükrü (from 1934: Kaya) was born in 1884 on the island of Kos/Istanköy. He was educated there and on Lesbos/Midilli, after which he studied at the Galatasaray lyceum and the law college in Istanbul. After the constitutional revolution he was selected for further law studies in Paris. On his return from France he worked first in the Foreign Ministry and from 1914 onward was head of the general directorate for



(resettlement of) tribes and refugees in the Interior Ministry. As such he was not only directly responsible for the resettling of refugees from the Balkans but also a key figure in the organization of the *tehcir* (the deportation of the Armenians in 1915). Later in the war Şükrü settled in İzmir, where he became one of the resistance leaders against the Greeks in 1919. Like Abdülhalik Renda, he was deported to Malta by the British in 1920. After his return to Turkey he served on the delegation to the peace conference in Lausanne. In 1923 he was elected to the National Assembly and from 1924 onward served as cabinet minister almost without interruption until Atatürk's death fourteen years later.

Not only Young Turks with roots in the Balkans or the Aegean were deeply affected by the outcome of the Italian War and the Balkan Wars. When we look at the life story of Ali (from 1934: Çetinkaya), a native of Afyon-Karahisar (or Karahisari Sahip) in western Anatolia, where he was born in 1878, we see that he graduated from the War College in Istanbul in 1898 and gained a reputation over the next few years for the ruthless and effective way in which he fought guerrilla bands as a lieutenant and then captain in Albania and Macedonia. In 1907 Ali joined the CUP organization in Bitola/Monastir (Manastır). He took part in the march of the Action Army in 1909. In 1910–11 his particular expertise as a successful counterinsurgency fighter became useful when he was appointed a member of the commission investigating the application of the Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition. This law, passed on September 27, 1910, allowed the formation of militia units to disarm the population of Macedonia, Albania, and eastern Anatolia by force. These units formed one of the nuclei from which the Special Organization (Teşkilatı Mahsusa) was later formed. In 1911 Ali joined colleagues like Enver, Ali Fethi, and Mustafa Kemal to fight the Italians in Cyrenaica. Like them, he returned in late 1912 to fight in the First Balkan War, which was by then effectively lost. In 1914 Ali was transferred to the Mesopotamian front, at the other extreme of the empire, where he ended World War I as a lieutenant-colonel. After the armistice of Mudros, he was appointed commander of the 172nd Regiment in Ayvalık on the Aegean coast, where he was actually the first army officer to order troops to resist the Greek landings of May 1919.

All four of these life stories of core members of the republican leadership immediately make it clear that the period 1911–13 constituted a watershed in their lives, both personal and professional. Personally, of course, three of them suffered tragedy. Their families had to leave their ancestral home and resettle in Istanbul or Anatolia in 1913. Professionally,

military men who had built their early careers serving in the Third Army like Kazım and Ali (who fought Serb, Greek, Bulgarian, and Albanian insurgents) and administrators like Abdülhalik (who had gained experience exclusively in the Western Balkans) suddenly found themselves posted to the completely unfamiliar world of eastern Anatolia or Mesopotamia, where they tried to apply the lessons that they had learned in the Balkans. When Şükrü Kaya started his work as director for resettlement in 1914, the islands where he had spent his youth (Kos and Lesbos) had just been lost to Italy and Greece. The refugee issue for him was not just another dossier to be handled but a personal trauma.

The main reactions of the Young Turks in the immediate aftermath of the Balkan Wars (1913–14), apart from shock, seem to have been calls for revenge and recriminations about the causes of the defeat, as ample documentary evidence indicates. The recriminations were to be found in newspaper articles and editorials but also in books and pamphlets dealing with the causes of the defeat, mostly written by officers who had participated in the battles, including the top commanders.<sup>4</sup> The short stories published by Ömer Seyfettin during the years of World War I such as “Bomba” (The Bomb), “Primo Türk Çocuğu” (Primo, a Turkish Child), and “Beyaz Lale” (White Tulip), which have remained popular to this day, are filled with hatred for the Christian peoples of the Balkans and calls for revenge by the Turks.<sup>5</sup> Another example is to be found in *Suyu Arayan Adam* (The Man Searching for Water), the memoirs of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. Aydemir was born in 1897 in Edirne in a family of refugees from the Deli Orman region in Bulgaria, who had settled in Edirne after the 1878 war. He remembers 1912 thus:

What could we do? Everything was over. The armies had collapsed, the borders dissolved. The palace was nothing. From the things that had been brought about with such noise by the revolution [of 1908], nothing remained but disappointment. It was as if the country was living its last moments in this atmosphere of unprecedented disappointment and collapsed morale....

When the sky cleared for a moment and a few events followed each other that could give a little hope, a bit of courage, the first reaction was a feeling of revenge that enveloped our souls. This feeling was so strong that we even held Allah responsible for the disaster that had befallen us. It was ferocious enough for us to say “O, you, greatest creator of the Bulgarian beastliness!”<sup>6</sup>

However deep the hatred and however loud the calls for revenge, the political and military position of the empire did not leave any room for attempts to recapture the lost provinces. The Young Turk leadership, which had held power since the coup d'état of January 1913, now had to consolidate its position, handle a massive influx of refugees from the Balkans who had to be resettled (Şükrü Bey's responsibility), and deal with the loss of a large part of the tax income and the rebuilding of the army, which was now purged and radically reformed under the leadership of Enver Paşa and the German military mission.<sup>7</sup>

Revenge *was* taken, but not on the Balkan states. In June 1914, when the threat of renewed war with Greece was still imminent and fears of a Greek invasion abounded, some 130,000 Greek Orthodox were forced into emigrating from the Aegean coastal areas;<sup>8</sup> tens of thousands were evicted from Thrace. In the spring of 1915 the persecution of the Armenians started in the east. It is not hard to understand why the Unionist refugees from the Balkans were deeply involved in the ethnic cleansing of Anatolia: they read the situation in Anatolia through the prism of recent events in the Balkans. When the Young Turk government had to concur in the establishment of two inspectorates-general in the "Armenian" provinces in 1914, with inspectors from Norway and the Netherlands, the Macedonian scenario with foreign supervision being imposed as the result of a deal between the Great Powers seemed about to repeat itself. The Rum, Armenians, Syrians, and Nestorians were seen as communities that might well provide the same lethal cocktail of local guerrilla warfare and foreign intervention that had cost the Ottomans their European provinces. The Balkan refugees among the Young Turks could equate the situation in Anatolia with Macedonia all the more easily because they were generally ignorant about the circumstances in the east. Interest in Anatolia had been on the rise in Istanbul since the constitutional revolution, as witnessed by the series of reports on the country in newspapers like *Tanin* (Echo).<sup>9</sup> But for people who had been born and raised in the European parts of the empire, Anatolia was still essentially unknown. The CUP leadership was very much aware of its ignorance and made study of the ethnic and religious composition of Anatolia a priority. Baha Sait Bey was commissioned in 1914–15 to do a study on the Alevis and Bektaşhis. Zekeriya Bey (from 1934: Sertel), who worked under Şükrü Kaya in the general directorate of settlement of refugees and tribes as head of the directorate of tribes, wrote two detailed reports, one on the tribes of Anatolia and one on the *tarikat* (mystical fraternities) of Anatolia, also in the period 1914–15.<sup>10</sup>

Şevket Süreyya's first acquaintance with Anatolia came when he was sent there as a cadet during World War I. He vividly describes the shock that the recruits from Rumelia experienced when they saw the emptiness, backwardness, and poverty of the area:

So this was Anatolia. At last we were face to face with the reality of Anatolia. But this Anatolia that I saw did not resemble the Anatolia about which I had learned at school or which had figured in poems I had read or in songs sung in school. Yet this had to be the Anatolia of waterfalls and singing nightingales, of golden wheat; the Anatolia that was the world's richest treasure house. The reality was a long dead parcel of the earth's crust whose sand and chalk crumbled and broke apart and became a bit more like a desert each day under the burning sun and the freezing cold. What they called a village there was a set of cavities lost in the emptiness of the steppe. The people who shuffled about in front of the small station buildings that we encountered now and then were like walking parts of this barren earth.<sup>11</sup>

From 1913 onward the Unionists from Macedonia and the Aegean fully embraced this unknown Anatolia as the Turkish fatherland. The desire to prevent Anatolia from becoming another Macedonia was what ultimately motivated people like Abdülhalik, Kazım, and Şükrü in their murderous acts. As we know from the memoirs of other Young Turks (Mithat Şükrü Bleda, Çerkes Mehmet Reşit, Hüseyin Çahit Yalçın) they were convinced that they were engaged in a life and death struggle for the right to exist.<sup>12</sup>

It should come as no surprise that Young Turk officers and administrators who had been deeply involved in the persecution of Ottoman Christian minorities should be among the first to take up the cause of the "defense of national rights" after World War I. After all, in many ways the "national struggle" (*milli mücadele*) was a continuation not only of World War I but also of the interethnic conflicts that had been raging for at least a decade and was interpreted as such by the people involved. Many examples of this type of militant nationalist cadre being "early adopters" of the idea that the struggle for survival had to be continued after the war can be cited. Their track record in the national resistance movement, combined with their military or administrative abilities, was what paved the way for their prominence in the first twenty years of the Republic. Some of them, like Kazım Özalp, Celal Bayar, Ali Çetinkaya,

and Mazhar Müfit Kansu, had been involved in the resistance right from the start. Others, like Abdülhalik Renda and Şükrü Kaya, who had been deported by the British to Malta for involvement in the Armenian massacres, mistreatment of British prisoners of war, or political agitation (and often for combinations of these charges), on their return to Turkey achieved key positions in the leadership of the national resistance from 1921 onward and then in the republican administration.

Remarkably, the refugee leadership in Ankara in the 1920s and 1930s did not prove susceptible to irredentist leanings in the Balkans. This is all the more striking because considerable irredentist feeling could be found in the areas in the southeast that had not been retrieved in Lausanne: Mosul and the district of Iskenderun (the later Hatay). Nostalgia for Rumelia and a sense of loss certainly existed. We know from eyewitness accounts that this was true for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself. As the Young Turk and Kemalist journalist Falih Rıfkı Atay writes in his biography of Atatürk:

Especially when he sang songs from Rumelia, a deep and incurable pain of homesickness brought tears to his eyes. He never forgot his homeland; his eyes clouded over and strayed into the distance as he became lost in memories in which we did not figure; as if he smelled the fields of Rumelia and Macedonia that we had lost and heard the sounds of water and distant bells.<sup>13</sup>

Clearly this attachment to the Macedonia of his youth went very deep even with the founder of the Turkish Republic, but it caused melancholy and nostalgia not political irredentism. The loss of the 500-year-old world of Ottoman Rumelia in a few weeks in 1912 seems to have been accepted as a *fait accompli* by the same people who had been filled with hatred and a desire for revenge a decade earlier. This change in attitude is very visible in a booklet written in 1931 by the same Falih Rıfkı Atay: *Faşist Roma, Kemalist Tiran ve Kaybolmuş Makidonya* (Fascist Rome, Kemalist Tirana, and Lost Macedonia). On his way back from Italy, Atay travels overland from Dürresh/Draç to Thessaloniki/Selanik and expresses both his sense of loss and acquiescence in the new situation:

These mountains where Turkish songs echoed and which had been worn out by Turkish cartwheels, Monastir behind that horizon over there; Monastir that we used to consider as Turkish as Eyüp, and beyond it Kosovo, Üsküp—the powerful waves of

Ottoman memory made my head spin.... But Florina is no longer Turkish. Every now and then you see a piece of wall, the window surround of a Turkish house, hanging down like dirty linen. The inscription "Florina" in Arabic script has been whitewashed and rewritten in Greek. Under the new letters the paint of the old letters has dried like once flowing blood. We should forget Rumelia.

He concludes his report on the journey by saying: "Sadness, longing, and nostalgia will pass. The old history has become distant as a fairytale, the dreams of the past are not even the stuff of fiction anymore. Let us listen to the strict and straight word of reality."<sup>14</sup>

This seems to have been the predominant feeling. The republican leadership accepted the result of the Balkan Wars as irreversible, even though almost half of its members had become refugees through it. How are we to explain this resignation? Memoirs of the protagonists contain no direct hard evidence, but I think the importance of their social Darwinist worldview should not be overlooked. We have ample evidence that many Young Turks were inspired by a form of social Darwinism projected onto peoples and nations, which saw continued survival of nations as being conditional on their ability to prevail over others.<sup>15</sup> They saw the world in terms of a life and death struggle in which only those nations that proved themselves in battle and through catching up with modernity had earned the right to exist. The Balkan states had defeated the Ottomans because they were stronger and more modern, but the Ottomans had gone on to prove themselves in World War I (at Gallipoli in 1915 and against the Russians, who lost the will to fight in 1917). We know from the memoirs of the people most deeply involved that they saw the struggle against the Armenians in exactly the same terms as an existential struggle.<sup>16</sup> In postwar Anatolia the Turks had definitively proved their right to exist as an independent nation by defeating the Armenians and the Greeks and forcing the Great Powers to recognize Turkish independence. The forced modernization of the Kemalist Republic was meant to earn it a place among the strong and successful nation-states of the world, as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk indicated on numerous occasions. My tentative conclusion would be that accepting the success of the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek nation-states was relatively easy for people who saw success as the ultimate legitimizing factor for nation-states, especially if the Italian War, the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the National Struggle were seen as parts of a single whole, in which ultimately the Turks had been the most successful of all. The anger about the loss of Mosul and

Hatay then also becomes understandable. These were areas that the Turks had been denied at the peace conference of Lausanne despite having won the national independence war. Those who had proved themselves stronger on the battlefield were denied the fruits of their victory, which was unacceptable in the social Darwinist worldview of the Kemalists.

#### NOTES

1. Cafer Demiral, *Türkiye'nin 42 Hükümeti*.
2. Walter F. Weiker, "Kemal Atatürk'ün Yakınları 1932–1938."
3. Many Internet sources include biographical details, but none of them can match İbrahim Alaettin Gövsâ's 1940s classic *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi*, from which these data are taken.
4. Mahmoud Moukhtar Pacha, *Mon commandement au cours de la campagne des Balkans de 1912*; but see also Ali Fethi's *Bolayır Muharebesinde Ademi Muvaffakiyet Esbabı*, which itself is a reply to the anonymous *Askeri Mağlubiyetimizin Esbabı*.
5. Halil Berktaş, *Özgürlük Dersleri*.
6. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 54–55.
7. See Edward J. Erickson's foreword in this volume.
8. When Thrace and the Marmara area are included the total number of Greek Orthodox expelled is estimated at between 150,000 and 200,000. The number 130,000 is based on consular reports, but all of these numbers are rough estimates. Cf. Matthias Bjørnlund, "The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification."
9. Ahmet Şerif, *Anadolu'da Tanin*.
10. Nejat Birdoğan, *İttihat-Terakki'nin Alevilik Bektaşilik Araştırması*, 7–8.
11. Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 75.
12. Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Dr. Mehmed Reshid (1873–1919)."
13. Faliş Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya*, 327.
14. Faliş Rıfkı Atay, *Faşist Roma, Kemalist Tiran ve Kaybolmuş Makidonya*, 64, 67.
15. M. Şükrü Hanioglu emphasizes the influence of social Darwinism, particularly as formulated by Gustave Le Bon, on the Young Turk movement in *The Young Turks in Opposition and Preparation for a Revolution*.
16. Cf. Kieser, "Dr. Mehmed Reshid (1873–1919)."

## The Traumatic Legacy of the Balkan Wars for Turkish Intellectuals

*Funda Selçuk Şirin*

The Ottoman Empire started expanding toward the Balkans from the fifteenth century onward, placing particular significance on the region as the gateway to Europe. In the following centuries the Ottoman power in the area came to be challenged by the Great Powers like Russia, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Germany that also had vested interests in the region. Harboring many different ethnic communities, the area witnessed many upheavals, particularly under the influence of the nationalist ideologies that developed after the French Revolution. Accordingly, the Serbian, Croatian, Greek, and Bulgarian nationalist aspirations started emerging particularly between 1806 and 1812.

The Ottoman Empire experienced its first serious defeat in the Balkans during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877 and 1878. A great number of people were forced to immigrate as a result of the war,<sup>1</sup> leading to a significant decrease in the Turkish population and the emergence of new administrative units like Bulgaria, which mostly consisted of Slavs.<sup>2</sup> The corresponding Treaty of Berlin rearranged the boundaries of Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania.<sup>3</sup> The losses in the Balkans continued in the years that followed. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Greece occupied Crete on October 5, 1908, as the Second Constitution was declared. On the same day Bulgaria declared its own independence.

The Second Constitutional period did little to settle the problems in the region. The interventions by Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia increased the tension in the area, and chaos prevailed. Despite their disagreements, Bulgaria's alliance with Serbia on March 13, 1912, had been the actual step that led to the war—a power configuration further consolidated by the Greek and Montenegrin entry into the alliance, thus



preparing the groundwork for the impending warfare.<sup>4</sup> The Balkan Wars broke out after Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 8, 1912. Before the Balkan Wars nearly all Turkish intellectuals were certain of an Ottoman victory—a belief that was replaced with concern in the course of the warfare.

After the advance of the allied forces in the Balkans, the Bulgarians first occupied Tekirdağ on November 11, 1912. The Bulgarians attacked the Çatalca line on November 17 and 18, when the thunder of cannons came to be heard even in Istanbul.<sup>5</sup> This situation had a traumatic effect on both the intellectuals and the general public. Despite the efforts of Şükrü Paşa in defending the city, the loss of Edirne on March 26, 1913, further increased the confusion and grief among the general public and intellectuals. The actions during the siege of Edirne by the Bulgarian forces had been difficult for both the Ottoman army and public. The shortage of food and epidemic diseases had been the most urgent issues for the military.<sup>6</sup> Hafez Rakım Ertür, who had been teaching in Edirne at the time, depicted the conditions in Edirne and in the army during the days of the siege. While his description often focused on the military aspects of events, Ertür noted the commonly held anxiety over the possibility of losing Edirne: he had personally witnessed people's grief and the growing sense of uncertainty. For him, the mere possibility of losing Edirne was enough to worry every single person. Moreover, Ertür assessed Edirne's defense as an example of great endurance, sacrifice, and success and viewed the loss of the city as a "calamity, destruction"<sup>7</sup>—a feeling shared by his contemporaries.

The intellectuals and the general public were quite shocked when Edirne fell to the Bulgarians. The loss of Edirne (which had been an Ottoman city for centuries) to the Bulgarians, who were described as "a handful of bandits/pillagers who had been under the control of the empire until yesterday," caused widespread grief.<sup>8</sup> Many intellectuals expressed these feelings of grief and confusion in their works. A columnist/journalist in *Tanin*, for instance, evaluated the loss of Edirne as the most painful defeat until that day. In order to lessen the traumatic effect of such a loss, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı Bey argued that much had been gained spiritually despite such a substantially important physical loss. For him, the vast damages inflicted on the enemy meant great spiritual gain for the Ottomans.<sup>9</sup> Şükrü Paşa's defense of Edirne became the greatest source of consolation for the Ottoman press.<sup>10</sup> For Hüseyin Cahit, however, the serious defeat and mounting death toll were like a storm that shook the very foundations of the empire.<sup>11</sup> Phrases such as "national

territory of Rumelia, trampled by the enemy” and “a wound to national pride” were commonly heard as a result of the defeats and losses in the Balkans,<sup>12</sup> suggesting the grave impact. All these layers of rhetoric about the losses were not peculiar to one newspaper or intellectual but reflective of the common rhetoric in the period, which solidified further as the legacy of the war became heavier.

#### THE BALKAN WARS AND TURKISH INTELLECTUALS

The loss of a region that was seen as “Üsküp ki Şar Dağı’nda devamıydı Bursa’nın” (Skopje, which was an extension of Bursa on the outskirts of Shar Dagh [Şar Mountains]) in the verses of Yahya Kemal,<sup>13</sup> echoing its connection to Anatolia, had traumatic effects on both the general public and the intellectuals, lowering the self-confidence of the Ottoman people. While an absolute confidence in the Turkish nation and the Turkish army dominated the press as well as other literary works before 1912, all these signs of self-esteem had given way to a sense of serious mistrust in the postwar texts. In psychological terms, however, this loss of confidence and growing sense of insecurity had been quite instrumental in preparing the larger public yet for more warfare: World War I. It had injected hope in people who had been traumatized by the defeats and deaths in the Balkans—the hope of regaining the Balkan territories. The impact of the losses on the public helped the younger generation prepare mentally for a new war, with no clear outcome or end in sight. In this sense it would not be wrong to consider the Balkan Wars a preparation or rehearsal for World War I.<sup>14</sup>

The public and intellectuals were simply shocked at the Balkan states that had declared war on the empire. This was reproached particularly in the press with recourse to the common idiom of “hatred.” The Unionists as well as many others started believing that the best thing to do was to go to war against “these insolent people who had been Ottoman subjects not that long ago.” At this time many rallied in the cause of warfare.<sup>15</sup> As a matter of fact it is quite clear that the Ottoman press had kept a close watch on the processes of alliance formation and other developments in the Balkans before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. Almost on a daily basis the newspapers *Tanin* and *İkdam* featured news on these issues. Concentrating on the alliance formation in the Balkans, the newspapers drew particular attention to how the Balkan states overcame their disagreements and united in a single cause.<sup>16</sup> They also noted how Russia in particular came to mold the alliance.<sup>17</sup> Despite these various articles

on a possible mounting danger, we can sense an air of confidence in the Ottoman press.

This greater sense of confidence and security characterized not only the press but also the bureaucrats, who could not even consider the possibility that the Balkans would attempt separation from the empire. In a speech delivered to the Ottoman parliament, foreign minister Asım Bey noted only a few days before the outbreak of the war: "I am as certain of the Balkans as I am of my own conscience."<sup>18</sup> The common notion that the Balkans would be better off under Ottoman rule was the basis of such a misapprehension. Supporting this belief, *İkdam* argued that it was unlikely that the alliance in the Balkans would take the further step of declaring a war, which would mean financial ruin for the region.<sup>19</sup> With the outbreak of the war this moderate approach started shifting. Although the rhetoric was replaced with sharper notions that only a war could solve the larger Balkan crises, the sense of security continued to rule intellectuals and the press: everyone thought that the Ottoman army would win the war. For instance, Ziya Gökalp's "Balkanlar Destanı" (The Epic of the Balkans), printed in *Tanin* just at the beginning of the Balkan Wars on October 10, 1912, relayed this sense of self-confidence.<sup>20</sup> The belief that the Ottoman armies would be victorious dominated the poem, only to be shattered by the actual turn of events.<sup>21</sup>

Similarly, Ahmet Ağaoğlu asserted that the Ottoman Empire was forced to fight "for freedom and independence" and claimed that the war would bring "utter destruction to Slavism in the Balkans, leading to the unification of the Islamic and German causes."<sup>22</sup> These remarks were reflective not only of the general sense of confidence among the Ottoman intellectuals but also of their failure to assess the situation thoroughly. Ali Kemal was also among those intellectuals who believed that the war was the only solution.<sup>23</sup> *Tanin*, the official newspaper of the Unionists, underlined the urgency of starting the war, claiming a desire for war and higher morale on the part of the general public.<sup>24</sup> From the early days of October the newspaper featured many articles along the same lines, reflective of the common Unionist position.

With the declaration of war the comments on the Balkan states gained a harsher tone, apparent both in contemporary literary works and in the press. The demands of the allied Balkan states were perceived as "great insolence, impertinence, and suicide" and a "reckless, indifferent action."<sup>25</sup> The proper response would be taking up arms.<sup>26</sup> In depicting the Balkan states the Ottoman press often used expressions like "the Balkan parvenus, pillagers."<sup>27</sup> Poetry as a literary genre also reflected similar

attitudes, strengthening the divide between “us” and the “others.” Poems described the Balkan states as barbaric, tyrannical, vicious, and immoral, while the Turkish soldiers were portrayed as self-sacrificing, tough, strong-willed, and virtuous patriots. The poems and other literary genres consolidated the dominant notions of “being tainted,” feelings of vengeance, and rampant animosity, all in a tone overtly critical of the Balkan states.<sup>28</sup> This animosity was further strengthened in the following days of the war.

Exemplifying these sharp depictions rather well, Ali Ekrem Bolayır portrayed the Balkan states as enemies of religion, the state, and chastity and as traitors and rapists, while regarding the allied Balkan forces as “bir kelb-i akur ordusu, bir taife-i ihan” (an army composed of rabid dogs, a group full of rage). The purpose of this military alliance was to drown the Turks and finish off Islam.<sup>29</sup> In a similar manner Mehmet Akif Ersoy described the Balkan states as “Karadağ haydudu, Sırp eşseği, Bulgar yılanı / Sonra Yunan iti, çepçevre kuşatsın vatani” (the Montenegrin bandit, the Serbian donkey, the Bulgarian serpent / Then the Greek dog, completely surrounding the homeland).<sup>30</sup> One of the most important journals of the time, *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), also portrayed the unfolding of events in a similar way.<sup>31</sup> A poem in *Alemdar* defined the Balkan enemies as “a serpent in betrayal.”<sup>32</sup> In short, it is quite clear that the poetry of the time criticized the Balkan allies in a fairly harsh tone.

Depicting the defeat in the Balkan Wars, Abdülhak Hamit Tarhan’s “Validem” (My Mother) of 1913 considered the Balkan states to be “Ottoman servants” and perceived the war as an act of “ingratitude” on the part of the Balkan states, who started “looting the property of the master.”<sup>33</sup> The most important duty of the Turkish youth was to take revenge—a basic theme that was reproduced by contemporary and later poetry. The poems by Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, for instance, argued that taking revenge on a barbaric enemy was a virtue.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, İhsan Vecihi wrote that the goal of the Balkan War was to kill the Turks and criticized the attitude of the Western countries, deeming the West “sefil garp” (the wretched West), a damned civilization, and arguing the necessity for revenge.<sup>35</sup>

Other themes constantly emphasized across the wide body of literature often revolved around the consequences of the war, such as the territorial losses and immigration and the drastic change of life as a result of population movements. Ömer Seyfettin, for instance, who had fought in the Balkan Wars on the Serbian and Greek fronts, was among those authors who portrayed the harsh psychological reality behind the unfolding

of events. Seyfettin was taken prisoner by the Greeks in the Ioannina front and held captive for nearly a year. Having returned to Istanbul, he wrote the short story “Ashab-ı Kehfimiz” (Our Seven Sleepers) based on his observations of the war as well as his term in prison. Discussing Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism, Seyfettin explained why he chose Turkism over the others and went on to depict the nationalistic movements that had been incited among the Balkan nations.<sup>36</sup> Seyfettin’s memoirs (in the form of journals) provided a further venue for his observations and the effects of the war. The memoirs convey the excitement and anticipation before the war, how the war began, the course of the war, and how its conclusion brought disappointment and despair. This line of thinking is not peculiar to Seyfettin, in fact, but sheds light on the emotional state of many intellectuals during those years.<sup>37</sup> The suffering caused by the losses and the difficulties that the refugees faced were subject matters that dominated Seyfettin’s works. The most dominant rhetoric in his works is the sense of grief for all those who suffered and all things that had been lost—a tragedy that became a source of embarrassment and shame. Echoing the same sensitivities, Mehmet Akif Ersoy compared all the events in the Balkans to a fire and the existing condition to hell.<sup>38</sup>

The exchange of words during the war years between Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Ferit Tek, deputy of Kütahya, in a way captured the dominant feeling about the terrible results of the war that dominated the journals and newspapers of the time. Ferit Tek asked: “They will inevitably drive us out of Rumelia; so, instead of being exiled, would it not be better if we just left and gathered in Anatolia?” Hüseyin Cahit replied: “We were not thrown out of Rumelia. I still cannot forget the pain I felt when I heard these words. I wonder if Ferit Bey could carry out what his words necessitated if he had been at the head of the government.”<sup>39</sup> It is quite clear from this exchange that they could not even entertain the possibility of losing the Balkans. The possibility of losing the region was quite traumatic on its own. The grief caused by the losses in the Balkans also dominated Halil Menteşe’s speech delivered at the opening of the legislative year 1914. As the Speaker of the parliament during the third legislative term, Halil Bey asked people not to forget the losses in the Balkans and to keep its memory fresh for future generations—a historical source that would yield further lessons, to be reproduced by the Ottoman intellectuals for future generations. Cavit Bey, the minister of finance, also gave a speech that put emphasis on the significance of keeping the memory of the loss alive.<sup>40</sup>

Despite being written for propaganda purposes, Ahmed Cevat’s *Kırmızı Siyah Kitab: 1328 Fecayii* (Red and Blue Book: Disaster of 1328)

reflected upon the wartime misery and elaborated on similar ideas. In the first chapter, entitled “Oku, Ağla, Düşün ve Uyan” (Read, Weep, Think, and Wake Up), Cevat expounded on the deep psychological implications of the wartime experiences and hoped that these painful memories would be the foundation of an awakening that would ensure national unity—a duty that he ascribed to the intellectuals in the chapter entitled “Vatan ve Vazife-i Münevvere” (Nation and the Duties of the Intellectuals).<sup>41</sup> By the time Cevat wrote the book, Edirne had still not been recaptured by the Ottomans. The timing of its composition particularly explains why the deep psychological impact of the loss and defeat came to dominate the entire book. Ubeydullah Esat Bey viewed the events as a stain and dishonor, arguing that they themselves had blemished the glorious history they inherited. Yet he refreshed hopes that future generations would remedy the stain, suggesting that “the mismanagement of the household” was the reason for the defeat and loss.<sup>42</sup>

Ubeydullah Esat Bey’s hopes seemed to materialize in later years. Abdülhak Hamit Tarhan added two open letters as an appendix to his collection of poems published in 1916 with the title *İlhâm-ı Vatan* (Inspiration of the Motherland), which also featured a foreword by Süleyman Nazif. One of these letters was written as a letter of condolence for the retired field marshal Fuat Paşa, who lost his three sons in the Balkan War and World War I. In an attempt to alleviate his pain, Tarhan argues that the “stains” of the Balkan Wars had been cleansed off thanks to young martyrs like the paşa’s sons.<sup>43</sup> This example echoed the commonly held notion of “cleansing the stains with blood, sweat, and tears.”

While the intellectuals continued to expound upon the great suffering during the wartime, these discussions also led to questioning the reasons behind the defeat and loss. Mehmet Akif Ersoy, for instance, depicted the Balkan Wars as a divine punishment afflicted on a society that did not know how to straighten itself out.<sup>44</sup> His position was shared by others. In the difficult psychological environment at the end of the war, the Islamists came to articulate the most important reason for the defeat as the deterioration of morality, as evidenced by the growing laxity in instruction in religious morals and ethics in schools and madrasahs.<sup>45</sup> The Islamists argued that the Christians took revenge through the Balkan Wars and associated the political and military crisis with the lack of Islamic direction, as exemplified by the constitution: the political revolution had failed to bring about a revolution in social and religious spheres.<sup>46</sup>

In contrast to such claims of moral corruption as the source of humiliation on the battlefield, some intellectuals like İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu and İbrahim Hilmi Çırağan looked for the causes of the defeat and loss

in more secular spheres. In critiquing the Ottoman system of education, they claimed that the driving force behind the victories of the Balkan states was their particular understanding of education that inserted the feelings of superiority and patriotism into the hearts and minds of younger generations.<sup>47</sup> Ömer Seyfettin also argued along the same lines.<sup>48</sup> Comparing the Ottoman army with the Bulgarian one, Seyfettin associated the lack of excitement in the Ottoman army with the lack of spirits and lack of awareness of Turkism, whereas the Bulgarians had possessed such consciousness, which constituted the major source of their army's excitement.

Such criticisms of the Ottoman system of education from the intellectuals were complemented by a growing sense of attachment to notions of citizenship. The negative legacy of the defeat for the idea of national honor also led to the transformation of the way in which patriotism came to be framed.<sup>49</sup> This new definition that was circulated among the younger generations found expression in two distinct ways. First was the notion of sacrificing oneself for one's homeland—a notion that played an important role in preparing the psychological groundwork in the period leading up to World War I. The second aspect, as is clear in some textbooks, was the attempt to construct an organic notion of the nation and citizenship, with exclusive emphasis on the Turks as the main demographic element remaining in the empire. Hence the lack of excitement and national consciousness among the youth was countered by the postwar efforts in instilling a notion of citizenship, which also led to the reframing of the position of mothers as the first educators of the future generations of the empire.

Accordingly, for instance, the writings of Abdullah Cevdet not only reflected upon the confusion and pessimism that emerged after the defeat but also emphasized the necessity to see this painful episode as a wake-up call. Referring to the cannon thunder even heard in the imperial capital, Cevdet asked rhetorically: "Will these thunders and battering wake us up?"<sup>50</sup> For Cevdet, these painful episodes provided opportunities for serious reevaluation. He warned against seeking reasons for the defeat in moral corruption or rampant Westernization. These warnings were not unwarranted: the defeat in the Balkan Wars provided the occasion for many people to publicize their own views. The defeat was a divine punishment for the Islamists and highlighted the absence of national consciousness for the supporters of Turkism. The advocates of Ottoman modernization believed that the reason for the defeat should be sought in administrative failures.

The Balkan Wars and the postwar period were also reflected in many contemporary plays. For instance, Süleyman Sırrı's *Gayz* (Anger) of 1912 depicted the events in the Balkans as a dangerous "fire" that manifested "barbarity." Melikzade Fuat's play entitled *Edirne Müdafaası Yahut Şükrü Paşa* (The Defense of Edirne or Şükrü Pasha) elaborated on the notion that the Balkans had become a stage of violence and argued that the purpose was to drive the Turks out of the Balkans. These plays are characterized by the common character of a young Turkish man who embodied notions of patriotism and boldness. While the war caused a rampant refugee influx that made people leave their homes behind and start a new life wherever they were settled by the state, the young Turkish man in these plays continued to be depicted with a growing sense of vengeance.<sup>51</sup>

Memoirs were another set of source materials that reflected the contemporary atmosphere of the Turkish elites. While these memoirs related to the pains inflicted by rampant migrations and refugee movements, they also argued that the memory of the Balkan Wars was vivid and was not to be forgotten any time soon— notions accompanying the further emphasis on the centuries-old Turkish imprint on the region. Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, who was born in Skopje, considered the Balkan Wars "mel'un bir harp" (a cursed war).<sup>52</sup> Elaborating on the themes of loss and pain, Yahya Kemal personalized the pain of losing the Balkans, trying to identify Plovdiv with Bursa and the Eyüp district, while listing what he came to see as the Turkish imprint in the region during his trip in 1921.<sup>53</sup> His words in a way captured what the Balkans meant to his generation: "If a river lay in the heart of a Turk, it would be the Danube; if it were a mountain, it would be the Balkan Mountains. Even though it has been forty-three years away from the shores of the Danube and skirts of the mountain, I wonder how many centuries need to pass to erase the memories of the Danube and the snow-covered hills of the Balkans."<sup>54</sup>

The same line of thought was also featured in the words of Falih Rıfkı Atay, who argued that the sense of national consciousness for his generation was "the Turkishness attached to Rumelia" and that the borders of this imagination were from the Balkans down to "Bursa and Eskişehir," no farther east.<sup>55</sup> Personally witnessing the unfolding of the war and its aftermath, Atay was among the first to be sent to the region after the capture of Edirne as a journalist for *Tanin*. He wrote his observations in a column entitled "Edirne Mektupları" (Letters of Edirne). He often described the terrible state that the people of the region were forced to live in, with particular emphasis on the massacres by the Bulgarian gangs.<sup>56</sup> His memoirs also reflected similar sensibilities, describing the difficulties



that the people had to endure and putting stress once again on the episodes of “massacres.”<sup>57</sup> Just like Yahya Kemal, Atay also related to the vivid memory of the painful loss of the Balkans commonly shared by his contemporaries, often with recourse to Atatürk’s affection and longing for the region: “Many years later I came to realize how intolerable and unfixable the pain of the loss of Rumelia was to us once I got to see the tears of Atatürk of Macedonia. While Atatürk had never wept, his eyes would become cloudy and shed tears while he was singing in his moving voice with his Rumelian friends the folksongs [*türkü*] from the region. All the Turkish territories from the shores of the Adriatic to Maritsa were gone. For them, Istanbul and Anatolia was in a way a foreign land, a place far from home.”<sup>58</sup> These words also suggested the long-term legacies of the loss of the Balkans for the leadership of the emerging Turkish Republic.

Members of the first generation of the ruling elites of the Republic, who had witnessed the turbulent years of the late Ottoman period, were greatly influenced by the legacies of the Balkan Wars.<sup>59</sup> Having been brought up in the final years of the empire and having experienced what it meant to lose their national homeland through the loss of the Balkans, this first generation of the ruling elites (some of whom were born in the Balkans) turned out to be more cautious in their actions. Holding onto Anatolia as the last resort and as the most viable homeland was also reflected in the process of nation-building. These defining historical moments shaped how the elites, intellectuals, and journalists of the emerging Republic came to perceive and define the enemies inside and outside and how some of their policies during the foundational years of the Republic turned out to be rather harsh.

The effects of the defeat on the notion of Turkish national honor also came to shape what the early republican generation expected from a national leader. The sense of insecurity that had developed as the result of the defeats was at its peak. The words of Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu shed light on the mental state that his generation was in:

Our formative years passed with a growing sense of longing for a national hero. We—by this I mean those who are in their fifties or above—were born in a world where defeat was the norm. Our fathers and mothers used to tell us hesitantly about the Moscow campaigns, the Rumelian riots, the Arab rebellions, and the later interventions by the foreign powers. Our lullabies had consisted of sad folksongs on our lost territories, about those who never made it back home and about the fiancées with teary eyes; as an

everlasting national tragedy the Yemen nightmare was a common theme of our daily conversation in our families. The only social worry of those with a son was the means to evade military duty.... That was why children were sent to schools and why higher education was so popular.”<sup>60</sup>

Yakup Kadri also highlighted the common notion that Mustafa Kemal would overcome this sense of insecurity. Similar thoughts resurfaced in the words of Falih Rıfkı Atay. For Atay, Mustafa Kemal had recovered the nation and its esteem and bestowed it on his generation, who had once been left without a homeland and honor.<sup>61</sup> Atay wrote that Mustafa Kemal’s determination and strong-mindedness had shown his generation that “under no circumstances will a fellow citizen fall in despair in the face of dire straits and yield to a state of vulnerability, even when face to face with situations where there is not even the slightest sign of hope.”<sup>62</sup>

Even though the Balkan region was lost as a territory, the Turkish Republic and Turkish intellectuals continued to have attachments to the region in the transitional period from the empire to the nation-state. The area always preserved its place and values in the memories of the Turkish intellectuals, particularly those who lived through the early years of the Republic. By the end of the war the remaining Muslim population in the Balkans became a focal point of discussion, followed by occasional references to the Ottoman history and Turkish legacy in the region. Traveling to the area two decades after its loss, İsmail Habib Sevük shared the sentiments expressed by Yahya Kemal earlier. Entitling one of his travel memoirs *Bizim Tuna* (Our Danube), Sevük referred to the Turkish legacy that was engrained deep in the fabric of the Balkans and thus not erasable in hindsight. In an attempt to tackle the pains of losing the region, he said: “There are still Turks on the shores of the Danube and they still listen to Turkish. But we have left the Danube to foreigners, haven’t we? Life is not just a matter of breathing in and out; the memory of whatever took place in the past complements life. It is not just water that flows in the rivers but also history. You root out the Turkish element from the Danube and then it becomes a dry river.”<sup>63</sup>

The memoirs of Halide Edip Adıvar especially drew attention to the continuing flow of refugees to Istanbul as the result of war. While Adıvar often referred to the painful episodes that people had been through, she also criticized how badly the war had been managed by the Unionists. The traumatic impact of the war on Adıvar is clear. It was these painful

years that taught her what it meant to be a patriot: "I came to understand the true meaning of the love I bore in my heart for my people and for any events in my country during those days. This love has no connections to any political thoughts or ideologies. This love expresses the force and dominance of a mother that is involuntary and primitive, with origins in nature."<sup>64</sup>

Also referring to the postwar miseries such as migrations and changing lives, Ahmet İhsan Tokgöz elaborated the traumatic impact of the loss of the Balkans. "The hearts of Turkish intellectuals were bleeding. The terrible episodes unfolding in front of our eyes were just breaking our hearts. My dear Mekteb-i Mülkiye across from my printing house was turned into a hospital. On the day when we distributed tea in gas canisters to the brave wounded Turkish soldiers in the classrooms of the school, a great rage of fire took over me—a rage against all who are politically ambitious, European politics, and imperialists. I still cannot put out the fire. And it still burns to this day."<sup>65</sup> While the words of Tokgöz reflected the sensitivity of a journalist toward what had been taking place in front of his eyes, the only term that captured the state of things was "calamity." As it had been for many other intellectuals, the loss of the Balkans had consolidated for Tokgöz the opposition toward the West. The Western support for the cause of the Balkan alliance as well as the press coverage along the same lines infuriated Tokgöz and many others, contributing to the growing anti-Western sentiments.<sup>66</sup>

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who had spent his childhood and early teen years in a refugee neighborhood of Edirne, had hands-on experience of the unease that encircled Edirne and the larger public concern in the early days of the war. In his memoirs Aydemir presented the war and the ensuing troubles in a critical manner. He argued that it was not the defeat in World War I but in the Balkan Wars that brought an end to the Ottoman state both as a reality and as an idea and expressed his disappointment: "Until that day we were clearly living in a dream world. All the things we believed in were, without a doubt, a delusion, a deception. In reality the empire had probably ceased to exist a long time ago."<sup>67</sup>

Similar themes and thoughts on the painful legacy of the Balkan Wars continued to feature in Turkish fiction as well. The dominant themes are the changing lives, the destructiveness of warfare, and the violence against the Turks, while their enemies were portrayed as cruel and ruthless perpetrators of various atrocities.<sup>68</sup> Another thematic constant in the fiction was the homesickness that the refugee families developed in later years, often depicted as tragic human experiences. Families who came to

settle in Istanbul never forgot the Balkans and consistently felt homesick. In fact their idea of a homeland was not Anatolia but the Balkans, where they came from.<sup>69</sup>

Some novels, however, also engaged topics that embodied a further analytic edge than a mere reproduction of a tragic story. Reşat Nuri Güntekin's *Akşam Güneşi* (The Evening Sun), for instance, tells the story of a young man who had been in France for his education during the Balkan Wars, how he came to encounter the propaganda of the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks in France, and the process of his choice of a nationalist ideology. This fictional story line also reflected the conditions of the Turkish intellectuals during the war years.<sup>70</sup> In a similar plot Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu's *Hüküm Gecesi* (Night of Judgment) portrayed the intellectual atmosphere during the war years through the protagonist Ahmet Kerim, a journalist in opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Elaborating on the political setting behind the frontlines, Kerim showcases the connection between the beginnings of the crisis in the Balkans and the wrong policies of the CUP, which were often harsh and lethargic. Kerim criticizes most severely the absence of a national idealism before the war.<sup>71</sup> The traumatic effect of losing the war and the anxiety that arose as a result of the possibility that Istanbul could be occupied was rather vividly described in Karaosmanoğlu's novel.

The traumatic impact of the war on Istanbul has been deep as well. Until the Balkan Wars the Ottoman capital had always kept its geographical distance from the war zones; but the cannon thunder audible across the city, coupled with the mass influx of refugees, created an atmosphere that did not have an equal in the minds of its residents. Such experiences led to serious discussions in cultural and social circles, initiating severe self-criticism and questioning. The literature in this sense provided the necessary vocabulary for the political and cultural discussions, contributing concepts and terminologies to the common idiom that were to dominate the era and the following years. The most popular of these included the notion of being blemished, cleaning with blood, revenge, the necessity of remembering, the notion of national enmity, and unity and solidarity.<sup>72</sup> These concepts linked to the legacy of the war often came to feature in memoirs and novels written many years after the war, indicating a greater continuity of imagery and usage. Travel memoirs as products of postwar trips to the region continued to elaborate the notions of the Turkish imprints in the area. Simply put, all these works functioned to keep the memory of the region fresh and alive, though it was now outside the national borders and thus beyond reach.

One of the greatest effects of the Balkan Wars, often framed as ideological warfare,<sup>73</sup> in the ideological/intellectual sphere was clear in the process of creating a national culture. The trauma of the war contributed to the people's growing affinity with Turkish nationalism, producing various spectrums of nationalism ranging from Anatolianism to populism as well as expansionist and irredentist Turanism.<sup>74</sup> As the CUP, which had seized the power with the coup of 1913, began to embrace the ideology of Turkism, the process of constructing a national culture/identity gained further speed. The Balkan Wars themselves contributed to the growing national sentiment: the war years created an audience that followed and evaluated the unfolding of events from the point of view of nationalism.<sup>75</sup> This audience started reacting strongly to the disintegration of the empire in general and the defeats in particular. Thus the young generations started seeing the ideology of Turkism as the only solution for the future of the empire, and each passing day only strengthened this belief.

The poetry contemporary with the Balkan Wars also reflected this growing emphasis on nationalism, as often evidenced by the growing currency of concepts and themes like homeland and history, Turks, the Turkish nation, glory, honor, cleansing, and the dignity of blood as well as the glorious victories in Turkish history. While the emphasis on Turkish history grew,<sup>76</sup> the most common subject in poetry was the aggression against the homeland.<sup>77</sup> Likened to a human body, the limbs of the country would be ripped apart. Müfit Necdet's poem "Öksüz Yurdum" (My Orphan Country) depicted similar sensitivities, while calling attention to the sanctity of the homeland and the necessity to protect it against any aggression.<sup>78</sup> As another poem contemporary with the Balkan Wars, Mehmet Emin Yurdakul's "Ey Türk Uyan" (O Turk, Wake Up) also highlighted nationalism as the only option through which hardships could be overcome.<sup>79</sup> These kinds of poems were reactions to the events unfolding in front of the eyes of their authors, expounding on notions of grief and national awakening. The constant emphasis on nationalism in poetry had a great influence on the young generations, stirring their feelings to be more sensitive, patriotic, and loyal to the nation.

The activities of the Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocakları), established just before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars on March 25, 1912, started contributing to the spread and development of the ideology of Turkism. The Turkish nationalist tendencies of both the Turkish Hearth and the periodical *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland) had constituted an effective platform where nationalists like Yusuf Akçura, Mehmet Emin, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Ziya Gökalp (particularly after his return to Istanbul) were

able to gather and express their views freely.<sup>80</sup> Particularly after the defeat in the Balkan Wars, however, the Turkish nationalist ideology that began to turn into a political weapon under the sponsorship of the CUP showcased an understanding of nationalism based on “race,” as evident in the rhetoric of the Turkish Hearth. The impact of such organizations on the young generations also continued to grow, with a wide range of activities.<sup>81</sup> The significant increase in the number of meetings, panels, and conferences held by the organizations after 1913 and the activities of paramilitary youth organizations had clear effects on the growth of Turkish nationalism.<sup>82</sup>

While the traumatic impacts of the Balkan Wars led to a growing emphasis on Turkish nationalism among the youth and intellectuals, the heavy death toll and grave defeat left a traumatic imprint on the Turkish national honor. Works like Halide Edip's *Felaketlerden Sonra Milletler* (Nations after Disasters) in this sense functioned to repair the national honor by putting emphasis on the notions of national unity. Referring to widespread grief and pain, both material and psychological, Edip argued that the only option was to draw lessons from the events for the larger purpose of creating a national history. Noting the necessity of reading history, Edip claimed that the priority of the Turks must be to achieve national unity based on the lessons from the past.<sup>83</sup> Fatih Rıfıkı Atay, who bore witness to all the tragedies of the war, also considered this time to be a “period of awakening” despite all its painful and awful consequences. Atay defined himself as being a Turk and his worldview as “Turkism” for the first time after the Balkan Wars.<sup>84</sup> As a correspondent of *Tanin*, Atay also put emphasis on the notion of national history (like so many other columnists and Halide Edip) and urged the Turkish youth to read and learn from their own history. In fact Atay defined the youths of his generation as Turanian youth, whose most important features were “their belief in patriotism and unity.”<sup>85</sup>

For the Ottoman Empire, which had been suffering from the grave psychological conditions that emerged after the Balkan Wars, World War I was partially an opportunity to cleanse off the stain on the national honor.<sup>86</sup> In this sense the policies in accordance with the ideals of the İttihat-ı İslam (Union of Islam) as well as of Turanism should also be considered within the framework of reactions to the terrible defeat in the Balkan Wars. The costs of the defeat were not just material but also psychological, because it created a greater sense of insecurity. The concept of Turanism highlighted the ambition to expand the borders of the empire as a compensation for the previous losses.<sup>87</sup> In fact, at the beginning of

World War I Ziya Gökalp wrote in one of his poems: “Düşmanın ülkesi viran olacak / Türkiye büyüüp Turan olacak” (Enemy lands will be ruined / Turkey will expand and reach the Turan). The later verses of the poem were meaningful in terms of how this Turanian ideal found its justification in earlier failures: “Madeniyet Yurdu Al kan olacak / Her Ucu Yeni bir Balkan olacak” (The Homeland of Civilization will be covered in Blood / Each Border will be a New Balkan).<sup>88</sup> For Gökalp, World War I presented an opportunity for this dream to come true. The notion of Turan was embodied with a new ideal and a new notion of the homeland. Commenting on the extent of the impact of the Turan ideal among the younger generations, Aydemir’s memoirs noted:

In fact this homeland was divided up. It disintegrated. People were often prisoners. Yet the claim was that the homeland will become free once again and embody sovereignty as long as common history, common race, common language, and common desire emerge. According to this new understanding, what mattered was the nation. The whereabouts of this nation was wherever its members had been living. The flags might differ, others might sit on its throne, but this homeland also had a name: Turan. This new voice was a different and unexpected one. After the defeat in the Balkans, this new voice blew like an arousing morning wind in the perceptive horizon of those somewhat educated youth across the country. This ideal may be seen as one that gave comfort and consolation to us, but our generation was in need of this new idea. Because in essence this new voice was the one that made us forget the humiliating mental misery of the defeat, that saved us from the troubles of the feelings of inferiority, that forbade the mundane details of daily life and instead instilled hope and a fresh dream into people’s minds. It opened up new horizons. It brought up hope for salvation, provided a shelter, a last resort. This was a new Erganekon [a legendary valley in Turkic mythology] that brought the defeated together, who then searched for ways for a victorious future—a place that witnessed the forging of a new ideal among the roars of the defeated.<sup>89</sup>

Expressing similar thoughts, Falih Rıfkı Atay argued that Turkism saved his own generation from being left without an ideal in life.<sup>90</sup> For Atay, the ideals of Turanism were the most important steps toward “national unity.”<sup>91</sup> In this sense Turanism provided the ideals that were to

fuel the excitement of the army—which, as noted above by Ömer Seyfettin, was lacking by the beginning of the war and contributed to the defeat.

By the end of the war Anatolia became the top priority for the Turkish intellectuals. While Turkism provided the necessary vocabulary for national aspirations, the orientation toward Anatolia as the territorial core became a necessity in and of itself. Anatolia was the last remaining fort to be protected. In his memoirs Aydemir noted: “No, Anatolia was not a place to realize the dreams of the Rumeli children. Until that time our dreams had evolved around the gates of the Danube, Caucasus, Africa, and India. Our dreams were all about world domination. Every single one of us was going to be a conqueror like Alexander the Great, like Yavuz Sultan Selim, like Napoleon.” While Anatolia was far from satisfying the generational dreams, Aydemir also stated that it was the only option left: “Now a sudden affection for Anatolia.... The bleak Anatolia and the ‘Coarse and Vulgar Turk’ in our old imagination is now history. The people of Anatolia now became the Turks and their language is that beautiful Turkish. Turkishness denoted a sense of superiority. Our homeland was not the Ottoman lands but the Turkish motherland.”<sup>92</sup> Yet Anatolia still continued to signify mystery, disorder, and grievance for this generation: “Anatolia did not satisfy us to feel complete again. The dialects in each region were so diverse that it was difficult for people to communicate. The natural cohesion among the ones from Skopje, Bitola, and Salonika simply did not exist for the people from Konya, Trabzon, and Bitlis. We only remembered Anatolia when someone needed to be exiled from Istanbul or when we needed to send tens of thousands of men to face death in Albania or Yemen. Since the Arabs shifted sides, Anatolia now became the last homeland of the Turks.”<sup>93</sup> While these words by Atay reflected his generation’s attitude toward Anatolia, they also underlined the notion that Anatolia was clearly the last resort for the ideals of Turkism to be applied.

## CONCLUSION

The Balkan Wars, which were considered psychological warfare, paved the way for important political, economic, and demographical reconfigurations. The Ottoman Empire suffered the most by the end of the war, followed by Bulgaria and Austria, which undoubtedly had an effect on why all these three states fought on the same side during World War I. Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro were able to double their territories.<sup>94</sup>



The Ottoman Empire lost 83 percent of its territory and 69 percent of its population in Europe as well as the proceeds that it collected from the region.<sup>95</sup> Thus the loss of such important territories also forced the Ottoman Empire to develop its national economy. The boycott imposed on the Greek merchants during the war years was an example of this move toward a national economy.

At the end of the war it was clear that the Ottoman ideology was no longer enough to revive the empire and save the state, and the ideology of Turkism gained further ground. The loss of the Balkan territories, coupled with the atrocities that took place in the region, left painful memories for the participants. As the cannon thunder was heard in the imperial capital, the immediacy of the defeat made many people come face to face for the first time with the looming possibility of the collapse of the empire. Furthermore, the scenes of the refugees from the region and the wounded soldiers flocking into the capital did not alleviate the aura of panic and trauma in Istanbul.

The most significant effect of the defeat in the Balkan Wars on the Turkish intellectuals was the growing awareness of the necessity to develop and adhere to a national ideology. The postwar period was marked by a set of efforts of self-questioning. Particularly the question of why the empire was defeated found diverse answers in different political circles. Some intellectuals, particularly those in opposition to the Unionist cause, sought reasons for the defeat in the general administrative policies of the Unionists as well as in the tactical aspects of the military operation against the allied Balkan nations. They also felt a growing sense of enmity toward the West. Yet, while the silent Western support for the Balkan initiative infuriated the Turkish intellectuals, the West continued to be perceived paradoxically as an ideal example and model for the postwar period. In this sense the defeat in the Balkan Wars was often considered a wake-up call, highlighting the necessity of a national ideology and unity. Hence the national ideology was the way out of humiliation, presenting an opportunity to compensate for the loss. Accordingly, most literary works considered the defeat in the Balkan Wars to be only a beginning.

A number of intellectuals who had personally witnessed the war clearly reflected on the traumatic legacy of the war years in their literary works. An analysis of all literary works of the period shows that the trauma of the war came to dominate the Turkish intellectuals. This is clear in recourse to common imagery of the defeat and possible ways toward national salvation, contributing to the awakening of Turkish national consciousness and the formation of an audience with a nationalist/

patriotic perspective. In other words, the war literature is not only an avenue into understanding the dominant worldview of the Turkish intellectuals but also a medium that contributed to the formation of a dominant rhetoric of the postwar period.

The role of the defeat in the Balkan Wars is also clear for the processes of nation-building. The literature under analysis here not only reflected the main rhetorical dynamics of this later process but also contributed to the formation of the Turkish collective memory. While the evaluations of the events by the Turkish intelligentsia posited a nationalistic outlook, the new definition of the Turkish homeland as well as the delineation of the new identity formed the backbone of the discussion among the Turkish intellectuals. The Balkan Wars in this sense also played a role in uniting the people. Functionalizing the trauma of the war in the process of nation-building, the Turkish intellectuals' recourse to the common idiom of the necessity not to forget the Balkan experiences contributed to the growing symbiotic link between "remembering" and "waking up." By the end of the Balkan Wars Anatolia became the new homeland, even though the longing and yearning for the Balkans never ceased. The most important element in building a national identity was not only to mold the national memory through a particular form of remembering the past but also to re-create this new territorial setting historically, psychologically, and geographically.

The contemporary and postwar literature was functional in the sense that it historically framed the human sufferings, the lives torn apart, and the atrocities against the Turks in the Balkans, contributing to the emergence of a xenophobic definition of Turkish nationality. After the losses in the Balkans, the Unionists started focusing on nearly every aspect of life, in an attempt to open up venues for Turkish and Muslim dominance. In economic terms the groundwork of a new national economy was laid out. In the larger picture of the postwar period, the public started approaching the non-Muslim elements with increasing doubts. This was especially the case in the Aegean region, where the Greek citizens came to be regarded as the collaborators with Greece.<sup>96</sup> These shifting societal dynamics were obviously a blow to the aura of brotherhood/sisterhood that dominated the Revolution of 1908. As the minorities within the empire took further action for their independence, the ruling class of the empire intensified its grudge against the minorities.

It is possible to see the reflections of these traumas of the post-Balkan Wars years in the period of National Struggle as well as in the early years of the Turkish Republic. The works of Falih Rifkî Atay, as one of the

influential figures of the period, help explain the nature of this trauma. Representing the generation who witnessed the fall of the empire, Atay was especially disturbed by the positions of the Greek merchants during the National Struggle and in the initial years of the Republic, considering the economic activities of the minorities a threat to the integrity of the nation and thus framing the minorities as the dangerous enemy functioning within the nation. Mentioning the disruptive and unrestrained behavior of the Greeks during the days of war, Atay drew attention to how the Greek merchants had been financially supporting the Greek army. Thus for Atay, the national struggle was a matter of not only military and/or political action but also economic action.<sup>97</sup> Integral to Atay's observations in the years of the National Struggle were the particular sensitivities developed by the traumatic legacy of the Balkan Wars.

The effects of the Balkan Wars on the ruling elite of the Republic as well as its intellectual circles are also clear. These intellectuals were the ones who grew up and were educated in the final years of the empire and had witnessed the pains of losing a homeland. Yet such traumatic effects of the war also prepared the ruling elites and intellectuals for the worst scenarios as well as increasing their perceptions of any lingering elements of danger. The possibility of losing Anatolia, the last resort of the Turkish nation, contributed to a sense of alertness, as clearly evidenced in the processes of nation-building.

Furthermore, the experiences of warfare had also shaped the Turkish intellectuals' expectations of the national leadership—expectations particularly shared by the early republican intelligentsia. The loss of territories in the immediate west of the imperial capital by the end of the Balkan Wars had increased the despair and pessimism among the generation of postwar intellectuals. Accordingly, the trauma of the defeat in the Balkan Wars and its effects on the national honor had deepened the urgency and increased the hunger for a strong leadership that would make the nation victorious once again. The Turkish intellectuals rallied around the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who embodied the qualities of a strong leader.

## NOTES

This chapter was translated from Turkish into English by Ramazan Hakki Oztan.

1. Justin McCarthy gives this number as 1,253,500, while Nedim İpek declares it to be 1,230,000. Justin McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün*, 105; Nedim İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri (1877–1890)*, 179; Bilal N. Şimşir, *Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri Belgeler*, vol. 1, 71.

2. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılap Tarihi*, vol. 1, 257–58; Rıfat Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, 344.
3. Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, 355; H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanlar'ın Makûs Talibi*, Göç, 39.
4. Barbara Jelavich, *Balkan Tarihi* 2, 102.
5. Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *İnkılap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*, 314–15; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, 465–68.
6. Oya Dağlar, “*Balkan Savaşları'nda Salgın Hastalıklar*”; Kemal Özbay, *Türk Askeri Hekimliği ve Asker Hastaneleri*; for the condition of Istanbul during these years from a medic's point of view, see Cemil Topuzlu, *İstibdat-Meşrutiyet-Cumhuriyet Devirlerinde 80 Yıllık Hatıralarım*.
7. Ratib Kazancıgil, *Balkan Savaşlarında Edirne Savunması Günleri*, 19–20, 88.
8. Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Batış Yılları*, 53.
9. Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Edirne Sükut Etti Fakat Millet Manen Yükseldi,” *Tanin*, March 29, 1913.
10. “It is not just we who claim that the Defense of Edirne reinstated the Ottoman honor and glory, turning out to be a significant historical event that proved once again the bravery and heroism of the Ottomans. Even enemies also agree on this, and the whole of mankind bears witness to this”: “Şükrü Paşa,” *İkdam*, March 30, 1913.
11. Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), “İş Başına,” *Tanin*, November 14, 1913.
12. Falih Rıfkı (Atay), “Edirne İçin,” *Tanin*, April 1, 1913.
13. Kazım Yetiş, *Dönemler ve Problemler Aynasında*, 225.
14. Zafer Toprak stated that World War I was triggered by the developments in the Balkans: Zafer Toprak, “Cihan Harbinin Provası Balkan Harbi.”
15. Zeki Arıkan, “Balkan Savaşı ve Kamuoyu,” 173.
16. “[W]hat erased all the traces of all rivalries and falsities, all the hatred and throttling? How did our two neighbors who cursed one another until a short while ago come to forget the past and shake hands in front of all the Turks?” “Yunanistan-Bulgaristan,” *Tanin*, January 31, 1912; “Rum ve Bulgar İttihadı ve Türkiye,” *İkdam*, February 18, 1912.
17. *İkdam* tries to draw attention to the role of Russia by quoting the king of Montenegro, who said that “we, the entire Balkan states, are the children of Russia. The desired Balkan alliance will only materialize once Russia declares its satisfaction and resolve for such an alliance.” “Balkan İttihadı ve Rusya,” *İkdam*, February 19, 1912.
18. Rıfat Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa (1839–1919) Askeri Siyasi Hayatı*, 367.
19. “Every sane Bulgarian would know that declaring war on Turkey would bring financial ruin to Bulgaria”: “Bulgaristan'da Muharebe Yaygaraları,” *İkdam*, August 14, 1912; Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim*, 60.
20. Ziya Gökalp, “Balkanlar Destanı,” *Tanin*, October 10, 1912.
21. Mehmet Kaplan, *Türk Edebiyatı Üzerine Araştırmalar I*, 490–516.
22. Ahmet Agayef (Ağaoğlu), “Harbin Avrupa Üzerindeki Tesiri,” *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, October 19, 1912.
23. Ali Kemal, “Harp İstiyorlarsa Harp Ederiz,” *İkdam*, October 2, 1912.

24. "Niçin Uzuyor," *Tanin*, October 4, 1912; "Dünkü Büyük Nümayiş Harp! Harp!" *İkdam*, October 4, 1912; "Osmanlılarda İntibah," *İkdam*, October 5, 1912; Diran Kelekyan, "İnkita-ı Müzakerat İhtimalatı," *Sabah*, December 25, 1912.
25. "Harp," *Tanin*, October 2, 1912.
26. "Artık Nevbet Silahındır," *İkdam*, October 15, 1912.
27. Diran Kelekyan, "Artık Yeter," *Sabah*, October 15, 1912; "Devlet-i Osmaniye ve Balkan Şımarıkları," *Sabah*, October 16, 1913.
28. For detailed information on war literature, see Haluk Harun Duman, *Balkanlara Veda, Basın ve Edebiyatta Balkan Savaşı (1912-1913)*, 1-10.
29. Ali Ekrem (Bolayır), "Orduya Hitap," *Tanin*, February 3, 1913.
30. Mehmet Akif (Ersoy), "Yarası Olmayan Gocunmasın," *Sebüür Reşat* 40, 29 Teşrinisani/November 29, 1912; cited in Duman, *Balkanlara Veda*, 132. For detailed information, see Sema Uğurcan, "Mehmet Akif'in Şiirlerinde Savaş."
31. "Black clouds have covered the mountain peaks / Bulgarian, Greek, Montenegrin attacks / A type of flock came out that is cowardly and traitorous / Mountains, give me a pass so that I can run down the enemy": Feyzullah Sacid, "Haydi Kardeş," *Türk Yurdu* 5, January 25, 1912. For similar notions, see "Nankörler," *Büyük Duygu* 8, July 7, 1329, July 20, 1913, 121; "Bulgarların Bıraktıkları," *Büyük Duygu* 9, June 20, 1329, July 3, 1913, 135.
32. Esrar, "Şiir-i Hamaset," *Alemdar*, 8 Teşrinievvel/October 1912.
33. Gündüz Akıncı, *Abdülhak Hamit Tarhan*, 199-210.
34. "War of revenge... It is this lightning that lies within / If you are not scared, come closer and look at this man, this brother / The hearts of these youths these cry out like your ancestors": Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, *Mehmet Emin Yurdakul'un Eserleri-I*, 127.
35. "Let your heart beat today with a sense of revenge / May your chest swell with rage constantly / Take its revenge one day, do not leave me crying": İhsan Vecihi, "Garba," *Büyük Duygu* 9, July 3, 1913; cited in Duman, *Balkanlara Veda*, 152. Similar emotions dominate the narrative elsewhere, such as the journalist Halka Doğru: "I am the son of the Turk, the son who swallows gunpowder / my only option is to take revenge today / Set about in order to avenge the son of Turan": Feyzullah Sacid, "Öç Türküsü," *Halka Doğru* 8, May 30, 1913; "Acımak Yok İntikam," *Büyük Duygu* 8, July 6, 1329/July 22, 1913 113; "Ölsem de...Selanik'e," *Büyük Duygu* 7, May 23, 1329/June 5, 1913, 110.
36. Cevdet Kudret, *Türk Edebiyatında Hikaye ve Roman, II (1911-1922)*, 17.
37. Ömer Seyfettin, "Balkan Harbi Hatıraları," *Bütün Eserleri*, 269-310; Hülya Balcı Akarlı, "Ömer Seyfettin'in Gözünden Balkan Savaşı."
38. "While the fire in the Balkans still has its sparks / Yet another hellish episode, how early! / Did the hellish years deter further fever? No way!": Mehmet Akif Ersoy, *Safahat*, 278-79.
39. Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), "10 Yıllın Hikâyesi," *Yedigün* 161, September 18, 1935, 20-21.
40. *Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre 3, İçtima Senesi I, vol. 1, 1330 (1914) (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1991), 20-23, 432.
41. Ahmet Cevat, *Kırmızı Siyah Kitab*, 12-27.

42. Ubeydullah Esat, "Felaket Önünde," *Resimli Kitap* 44 (1328/1910): 639–640.
43. Abdülhak Hamit Tarhan, *Bütün Şiirleri* 3, 423–24. For similar notions, see Falih Rıfki (Atay) "Yanan Köy," *Tanin*, September 2, 1913; Abdül Baki Fevzi, "Gazinin Ögüdü," *Türk Yurdu* 11, April 18, 1912, 173; Süleyman Nazif, "Cenk Türküsü," *Türk Yurdu* 24, October 17, 1912, 391; Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, "Ümit Azim: Türk Gençlerine," *Türk Yurdu* 32, February 6, 1913, 136–37.
44. Mehmet Akif (Ersay), "Başlıksız Şiir," *Sebilürreşad* 234, February 21, 1328/March 6, 1913, 374; Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul) "Ordudan Bir Ses," *Türk Yurdu* 35, March 20, 1913, 181.
45. Osman Nuri Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Taribi*.
46. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*, 49–50.
47. Yahya Akyüz, "Eğitim Alanında Aydınların Özeleştirisi ve Balkan Savaşları," 55.
48. Akarlı, "Ömer Seyfettin'in Gözünden Balkan Savaşı," 66.
49. Füsün Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaşım Peşinde*, 322.
50. Abdullah Cevdet, "Mütmain Değilim," *İctihad* 52, 31 Kânunusani/January 1328/February 13, 1913, 1175–77. Şerif Mardin noted that even though the postwar period saw an increase in the anti-Western rhetoric Abdullah Cevdet's attitude remained constant: for Cevdet "there was not a second civilization. Civilization was the European one": Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 16.
51. For similar themes in other plays, see Mehmet Sırrı, *Türk Kanı* (İzmir, 1913); Mehmet Sırrı, "İrkımızın Namusu," *Tanin*, March 31, 1913; Muhittin Mekki, *Güzel Rumeli* (Mamuratül Aziz, 1331 [1915]). For a detailed bibliography of the plays of the period and their characteristics, see Türkan Poyraz and Nurnisa Tugrul, *Tiyatro Bibliyografyası 1859–1928*; Alemdar Yalçın, *II. Meşrutiyette Türk Tiyatro Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 143–49; and Metin And, *Meşrutiyet Dönemi Türk Tiyatrosu, 1908–1923*, 112–15.
52. Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, *Çocukluğum Gençliğim Siyasi ve Edebi Hatıralarım*, 31.
53. Ibid., 39. "The retreat of the Turks from Rumelia caused many, even at times the foreigners, to shed tears. We all know that. Yet I talked to a young gentleman yesterday who carries the pain of the loss in his heart still, and he said in a candid tone and warm voice: 'Apparently the most noble, most brave, and purest element of the Rumeli had been the Turks!'... And I asked him how he came to realize that. In reply he said: 'With the experience of the last thirteen years in the region, the administrative element that has replaced the Turkish rule has not been able to gain the allegiance of the people of the region'" (49).
54. Ibid., 146.
55. Atay, *Batış Yılları*, 73.
56. Falih Rıfki (Atay) "Edirne Yollarında," *Tanin*, July 22, 1913; Falih Rıfki (Atay) "Edirne Mektupları," *Tanin*, 21, August 1913 (and other articles dated August 24, 1913; August 27, 1913; and August 30, 1913, with the same heading); Celal Sahir, "Niyaziye," *Türk Yurdu* 39, May 15, 1913, 263; Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuad, "Meriç Türküsü," *Türk Yurdu* 39, May 15, 1913, 266–67.
57. Atay, *Batış Yılları*, 68; also Falih Rıfki Atay, *Çankaya*, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Dünya Yayınları, 1961), 57.
58. Atay, *Çankaya*, 59.

59. Murat Belge argued that even though most members of this generation had been patriots, they had nothing to do with the “narrow” understanding of nationalism of the following generations. Murat Belge, “Batılılaşma: Türkiye ve Rusya,” 53–54.
60. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Atatürk*, 17.
61. Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Babanız Atatürk*, 5.
62. Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Kurtuluş*, 18.
63. İsmail Habib Sevük, *Tuna’dan Batı’ya*, 35; these travel memoirs were published in *Cumhuriyet* between July 21, 1934, and July 4, 1935.
64. Halide Edip Adivar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev*, 145–48, 149.
65. Ahmet İhsan Tokgöz, *Matbuat Hatıralarım*, 216–17.
66. Tokgöz mentions that the famous French newspaper *L’Illustration* had come out with a special issue celebrating the removal of the Turkish element from the European continent. Expressing his disappointment, Tokgöz notes that “the first page of the newspaper featured a picture of a great number of hunting dogs chasing down the beasts from Asia, thus driving us back to Asia” (ibid., 217).
67. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Sıyü Arayan Adam*, 49–53.
68. Duman, *Balkanlara Veda*, 260. For these narratives, see Necati Cumalı, *Makedonya 1900*; Refik Halit Karay, *Gurbet Hikâyeleri*, 33; and İsmail Çetişli, “Memduh Şevket Esendal’ın Bulgar Zulmünü Anlatan Hikâyeleri,” *Türk Kültürü* 321 (January 1990): 16–17.
69. For such novels, see Halide Edip Adivar, *Mev’ud Hüküm*, 199. Adivar also depicted the war in small details in her novel entitled *Ateşten Gömlek*, with particular emphasis on the details of the conferences that were organized to protest the atrocities; Reşat Nuri Güntekin, *Yeşil Gece*; Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Sabnenin Dışındakiler*.
70. See Reşat Nuri Güntekin, *Akşam Güneşi*.
71. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Hüküm Gecesi*, 197–212.
72. Erol Köroğlu, *Türk Edebiyatı ve I. Dünya Savaşı (1914–1918)*, 119–20.
73. Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*, 559.
74. Köroğlu, *Türk Edebiyatı ve I. Dünya Savaşı*, 117.
75. Ibid., 119.
76. Abdülhak Hamit (Tarhan), “Terane-i Harp,” *Sabah* 10 (T. Evvel/October 1912).
77. A. Kazım, “Vaveylâ-yı Vatan,” *Büyük Duygu* 22 (16 Teşrinisani/November 1913); cited in Duman, *Balkanlara Veda*, 116–17.
78. Müfit Necdet, “Öksüz Yurdum,” *Büyük Duygu* 7, May 23, 1913, 113; Mehmet Emin, “Ya Gazi Ol Ya Şehid,” *Türk Yurdu* 27, November 28, 1912, 49; Feyzullah Sacid, “Ordunun Andı,” *Türk Yurdu* 28, December 12, 1912, 65. As an example of poems that have similar themes, see the following lines: “It is not up to the soldier to give away our flag / Even if Turkish blood covers the ground, Turkishness still stays intact / when there is the option of death, this land will never fall in the hand of enemies / it is not proper for the swords, daggers, to stay in their cases / Let’s spill our blood, let’s gain honor, let’s die, come with me / Let’s show them what it is to die, what it is to be a real man”: Feyzullah Sacid, *Donanma* (Teşrinievvel/October 1912); cited in Duman, *Balkanlara Veda*, 113. Highlighting similar themes, another poem was published in *Senin*, which began publication after the closure of *Tanın*: “Even if the whole world stands against us, it does not give us a slightest scare /

We are the sons of Turks, we don't run away from the enemies, from the cowards / we shatter the worlds, we are here for honor / if we want, we burn the skies down with our roars... / March forward, lions, march forward, toward the West / lay the ground of a heroic victory for the Turk": *Senin* 21 (T. Evvel/October 1913).

79. Tansel, *Mehmet Emin Yurdakul'un Eserleri-I*, xxxix.
80. David Kushner, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu (1876–1908)*, 9–30; Yusuf Sarınoy, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Türk Ocakları (1921–1931)*, 127–37; Masami Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 112–23; Füsun Üstel, *Türk Ocakları (1912–1931)*, 51–60.
81. Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 120–23; Üstel, *Türk Ocakları*, 62–63.
82. For further information, see Zafer Toprak, "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri," 22–26; Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*, 295–96.
83. Köroğlu, *Türk Edebiyatı ve I. Dünya Savaşı*, 121.
84. Falih Rıfki (Atay), "Türk Gücü," *Tanin*, April 8, 1913.
85. Falih Rıfki (Atay), "Hususi Mektepler," *Tanin*, May 5, 1913.
86. Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı*, 592.
87. Köroğlu states that the concept of Turanism started to become a fantasy in the following years, especially during World War I, when conditions became worse. The extreme point would be Enver Paşa and his activities on the Caucasus front: Köroğlu, *Türk Edebiyatı ve I. Dünya Savaşı*, 123–35.
88. Ziya Gökalp, "Kızıl Destan," *Tanin*, August 8, 1914.
89. Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 57.
90. Atay, *Kurtuluş*, 72–76.
91. Falih Rıfki (Atay), "Dostumun Mektubuna," *Tanin*, 25 Teşrinievvel/October 1913; idem, "Kürsü," *Tanin*, 3 Kânunusani/January 1913; idem, "Yeni Irk," *Tanin*, February 14, 1914.
92. Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 54, 58.
93. Falih Rıfki (Atay), "Anadolu Seyahatleri," *Tanin*, June 12, 1913.
94. Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanlar'ın Makûs Talibi*, Göç, 58.
95. Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913–1918)*, 24.
96. Köroğlu, *Türk Edebiyatı ve I. Dünya Savaşı*, 123.
97. Falih Rıfki (Atay), "Peşikan," *Akşam*, May 17, 1921. The title of the article means "warfare-rich" in Italian. Falih Rıfki (Atay), "Müdafaa-ı Milliye Ne Demektir?" *Akşam*, August 8, 1921.



## The Loss of the Lost

### The Effects of the Balkan Wars on the Construction of Modern Turkish Nationalism

*Mehmet Arısan*

As evidenced throughout this volume, the effects of the Ottomans' Balkan defeat in 1912 and 1913 can be explained in many ways from many perspectives. The common point among most of these narratives analyzing these multiple causes of the defeat is that they acknowledge that the wars were the first traumatic stroke in the process of losing an empire. The Ottoman Empire had already started losing territories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but losing the Balkans had a specific significance that caused people to start contemplating losing the whole empire.

The significance of the defeats in the Balkans in particular depends on two main factors. The first is the historical significance of the Balkans for the Ottoman Empire. "The Ottoman Balkans, for centuries, had been the heart of the Empire, for its provinces are by far the most advanced and the most productive. It was these provinces which had provided much of the Empire's wealth and had long been a major recruiting ground for the army and the bureaucracy."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in the first century of its formation the Ottoman Empire held most of the Balkan territories before it expanded into most of Anatolia. In its formative decades it was primarily the contact with the Byzantine and Balkan cultures, rather than Arab and Persian ones, that laid the political and administrative foundations of the empire.<sup>2</sup>

The second issue is that the Balkans, and the port city of Salonika (Thessaloniki) in particular, were the strategic and political stronghold of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP): the center where the 1908 Young Turk revolution was planned and initiated.<sup>3</sup> Under the strict, oppressive, and usually paranoiac rule of Abdülhamid II, the opposing

young military officers, heavily influenced by the European idea(l)s of freedom and nationalism, found a relatively safe haven in both Thessaloniki and Manastır (today Bitola in Macedonia).<sup>4</sup> Their patriotism and nationalist-revolutionary passion sharpened during a struggle with numerous competing nationalistic movements in the larger Balkans and particularly with the Bulgarian gangs (*komitadjis/komitacılar*) that fought against Ottoman rule by using hit and run tactics in the countryside.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, most of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress were born and grew up in the Balkan towns or cities.<sup>6</sup> In other words, the Balkans were their homeland and, as Erik Jan Zürcher notes (chapter 23 in this volume), the source of affiliation that shaped Turkey's political elite alliances for decades to come.

Given these circumstances, the loss of Balkans was the primary concern for the ruling elite of the empire, particularly for members of the Committee of Union and Progress, the forerunners of the Young Turk revolution. It would have been a drastic failure and even a trauma for them to lose the territories that they fought over for years, where they initiated the revolution. By this defeat the Ottoman Empire lost 80 percent of its territories in Europe and 4 million of its population, which constituted 16 percent of the population of the whole empire.<sup>7</sup> Besides, by the time Thessaloniki and nearly the whole of Thrace were lost to invading armies, the Ottoman capital and even the security of the Straits came into play.

The military, demographic, and economic consequences of the Balkan Wars are so deep that each can constitute a separate subject of analysis. This chapter focuses on the political and psychological effects of the wars. A running theme of nervous breakdown and psychological trauma throughout accounts at least in part for the way the emerging post-Ottoman Turkish modernizing elite reacted to the Balkan defeat.<sup>8</sup> More specifically, this chapter analyzes how a particular emergent elite subjectivity ultimately dominated the first half of twentieth-century Turkish political culture; it transformed how these elite understood, and thus mobilized, the notions of the nation and political power.

While trying to figure out the origins of a particular kind of political subjectivity in the last decades of Ottoman Empire, the chapter does not attempt to impose a coherent thought pattern that is supposed to lead to a specific elite typology. On the contrary, the contention here depends upon an internal split within the modernizing elite. Crucially, this does not mean a splitting into two or more separate groups after the 1908 revolution, as happened in most of the revolutions in modern world history.

Rather, this split was already there. It festered in the minds of the revolutionary officers of the Committee of Union and Progress and would later show itself in their conflicting and sometimes desperately undirected behavior. Moreover, this split proved to depend on a peculiar reproduction of an absolutist understanding of power. Such a reproduction would surely be in conflict with many modernist aspirations of the Unionists, given the events following the catastrophic defeat in the Balkan Wars.

#### A CONTINUOUS THREAD CULMINATING WITH 1912

Although the Young Turks had various sources of motivation to organize against the oppressive regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II, it is a widely shared view that reformists were highly influenced by the French Revolution and, more generally, by Western European notions of the “social contract” and freedom.<sup>9</sup> But the Young Turks’ attachment to Western European social and political thought was quite random and fragmented. As such Young Turk “ideology” was very far from constituting a coherent body of thought that could be mobilized to help conceive a systematic plan of action. For one thing, any systematically theoretical framework for a revolution in the Ottoman lands required taking into consideration the local social and political institutions and historical practices.

As Şerif Mardin long ago demonstrated, the Young Ottomans, who could be defined as the forerunners of the Young Turks, tried a blending of European political idea(l)s with some traditional Ottoman and Islamic political views and practices.<sup>10</sup> Although the Young Turks demonstrated an interest in the writings of these forerunners, particularly Namık Kemal’s views on freedom, it was obvious that they had no enthusiasm for such a blend, ultimately seeing no need for it. In this respect most Young Turk ideologues had an elusive and only random connection with Ottoman tradition in general and Islam specifically, while having a very deliberate dedication to Western rationalism even though this had no historical or practical basis in the Ottoman world. As Erik Jan Zürcher points out, “although many Young Turks had some experience in traditional neighbourhood schools where the Koran was learned by heart, the characteristic feature of their education was that they were schooled in secular Western-type schools both at the secondary and higher education level. This imbued them with a science-oriented and materialist worldview.”<sup>11</sup> Despite their European-based rationalist and materialist orientations, however, the Young Turks were confused in comprehending the historical and philosophical advent of the European Enlightenment. Zürcher depicts the Young Turks of the time as a group of idealists

searching for the philosopher's stone, something that would magically bring about a solution to all the problems that they and their country were facing:

For some of the Young Turks, particularly those who stayed in Europe, the sudden discovery of one particular European thinker became all-important. One has to remember that these people were not academic theoreticians or researchers (even if some of them came to hold chairs in universities), but were instead activists on the look out for a solution that would save their state and bring about a reinvigoration of Ottoman society. There was an urgency to their quest for a philosopher's stone that made them impatiently embrace a single idea or thinker uncritically, once they thought they had found it. This happened to Ahmed Rıza with Auguste Comte and his disciple Pierre Lafitte, to Prince Sabahattin with Camille Demolins and Frederic le Play, to Abdullah Cevdet with Gustave Le Bon and Ludwig Büchner, and to Ziya Gökalp with Emile Durkheim.<sup>12</sup>

The issue at stake here therefore is the source of their motivation that caused this group of reformists successfully to lead the 1908 revolution that reinstated the constitution and the parliament of 1876. Consulting the writings of the founders of the CUP movement, with the exception of some marginal factions within the Young Turk movement, none of the major actors seemed to embrace the idea of democracy for the Ottoman Empire. The theme of democracy was glaringly absent in their writings, with no systematic discussion or even reference to the notion appearing in this vast resource of contemporary papers. While democracy was absent, the notion of freedom repeatedly appeared in the Young Turks' political discourse as they worked to instigate the revolution of 1908. Indeed "freedom" became the dominant slogan cheered in the streets of Thessaloniki and Istanbul immediately after the revolution. That being said, it is doubtful that those chanting at the time had any inherent or prior knowledge of what freedom really meant, at least in a political sense. When we consider the historical origins of this notion and the social and political theoretical context from which it came, the Young Turk appeal to this term appears to be on very elusive, shaky, and shallow ground.

Despite these questions, the 1908 revolution surely points to one solid truth: the events of 1908 led to a break with the thirty years of authoritarian and oppressive regime of Abdülhamid II. After all, the rise of the Young Turks' as a distinctive political group depended on their

antagonism vis-à-vis the regime of Abdülhamid II and nearly everything that it represented, rather than simply trying to appeal for a systematic and coherent alternative to it. Put differently, the political aspirations of the Young Turks and the CUP party that they created did not depend on a vertical relationship of identification with a shared and coherent system of political thought or even with an idealized version of it. Rather, their political discourse of freedom, which can be summarized merely as emancipation from the Hamidian regime, depended on a horizontal relationship of negation or differentiation. Thinking in dialectical terms, this means that the existence of one depends on the existence of another. Once one political order ceases to exist, the other's (the Young Turks') cause of existence would vanish. Concerning Abdülhamid II's paranoiac fear of a military coup that would dethrone him, the Young Turks' mode of existence exactly fit into the Hamidian regime's description of the "internal threat."

With this in mind, two points should be emphasized in order to understand the CUP's discourse of freedom, which can be said to have been the main source of motivation for the 1908 revolution, one theoretical and the other historical. The theoretical point relates to the antagonistic positioning of the Hamidian regime and the Young Turks. The historical point relates to the Ottoman conceptualization of freedom, which Şerif Mardin suggests reflects "a longing for a seamless society" that culminated in the Young Turks' attempt to reform the "Ottoman tacit contract" rather than destroying the order. This ultimately accounts for the collapse of the antagonistic positioning, or the relationship of difference and negation, between the Young Turks and the Hamidian regime.<sup>13</sup>

In order to clarify the theoretical point, which refers to the antagonistic positioning of the Young Turks and the Hamidian regime, the Lacanian psychoanalytical notion of fantasy is utilized, with the contention that the situation has a discursive and ahistorical aspect that can be missed if it is merely evaluated in historical terms. This aspect also depends on the ahistorical perception of the West, which is in fact an important issue in the formation of the Turkish modernizing elites' subjectivity (see the discussion later in this chapter). Slavoj Žižek argues that in order to constitute a "common ground" or "an ontological source" for a particular political discourse or movement (in our case the Young Turks) the Lacanian notion of fantasy needs to produce a fantasy of an "other" or an "evil" in order to differentiate and demarcate itself or its *raison d'être*. Especially in designating political movements, Žižek uses the binary opposition of Law (Repression) and Transgression (Liberation)

to make an argument that clearly applies to the Young Turk dialectical relationship to the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II.<sup>14</sup> Every initialization and demarcation of a political movement such as the Young Turks necessitates an oppressor or a Law to be transgressed. Before they attempt to transgress the Law (the sultan) and thereby liberate the people from the oppressor, the Young Turks first have to redefine or invent the Law or the oppressor. This marks the crucial point of self-realization that defines and demarcates not only the object of resistance but the very Young Turk party itself and thus its reason for existence. This proves to be the paradoxical dynamic shaping liberalism in general and the object of much criticism by theorists for decades. In his critique of liberalism, for instance, Charles Shepherson argues:

The peculiar identity that links the liberal individual with the obscene and tyrannical force of fascism *must be disavowed*, and the best form of disavowal is narrative: what is in fact an original unity, a structural relation linking the Reign of Terror with the rise of free democracy and the Rights of Man, is best concealed by a *genetic* narrative, in which the original condition is said to be one of pure freedom, liberty, fraternity and equality, an ideal that eventually comes to be corrupted by a degenerate or perverted form. In this case—what we might call the case of realism, the imaginary level where the true reality is set over against its distorted image—we would be *tempted to denounce* the authoritarian personality as an extreme distortion of the *natural order of things*, by measuring this degenerate form against the liberal, democratic individual; we would seek a return to the origin, before it was contaminated by the tyrannical violence that corrupts it; but in the second case, when we see with the eye of the satirist who recognizes that the natural order of things is already a parody, we have to recognize that the supposedly natural state of things, the normal, liberal individual who has “natural rights” and a native capacity for moral reflection, is itself already inverted, that it contains the totalitarian authority in its origins, not as its opposite, not as its contradiction, not as its degenerate or its perverted form, but as its repressed foundation, its internal “other.”<sup>15</sup>

Moving from this point, it can be claimed that the oppressor (or the Law and the transgressor) and the liberator are like the two faces of one coin: they need the other's existence for their own claim to relevance, a

situation that designates a particular historical era whose limits are defined as such. The paradox for the Young Turk movement, however, is that the 1908 revolution and the eventual dethronement of Sultan Abdülhamid II on March 31, 1909, ended not only a particular era of Ottoman history but also a certain frame of meaning, a particular form of political demarcation, which ultimately demanded the creation of a new form of political differentiation and demarcation for the Young Turks in power. This proved difficult for the CUP to manage. As the party began to demarcate their political identity anew, it had to resort to demonizing those groups that even marginally opposed the Young Turks after the revolution. In other words, the Young Turks were forced to create new enemies out of former allies. The problem was that the political differences between the CUP in power and the opposing groups were not as clear as were the differences between the Hamidian regime and the Young Turks as a whole. The significance of the Balkan Wars thus appears crucial at this very point of international conjuncture. They actually allowed for the construction of a new frame of meaning and a new form of political demarcation, regardless of whether it had been successful or not.

At this point we should further clarify the notion of freedom in historical terms, a reference to the past that would help us to understand the unique features of "freedom" as it was perceived by the Young Turks and in particular by the CUP leading up to the Balkan Wars. The genealogical evolution of this term in fact depended upon the Young Ottomans, the forerunners and previous generation of the Ottoman modernization. The Young Turks were highly indebted to them, especially in their endeavors to form a constitutional monarchy, which the revolution of 1908 was an attempt to restore. Although the Young Ottomans certainly had internal differences, Şerif Mardin emphasizes a common point inherent in all that would simultaneously constitute the point of continuity between the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks, and the early republican elite. By emphasizing the powerful passion in their discourse of liberty, Mardin points out a transcendental or omnipotent source that marked the Young Ottomans' articulation of freedom:

By 1868, Namık Kemal was writing some of the most impassioned prose on liberty that the nineteenth century has seen. There is something mysterious in this ability to swim in what appears as an alien current originating outside the mainstream of Ottoman culture. Part of Kemal's libertarian stance is traceable to the influence of ideas, which originated in Western Europe and trickled

to Istanbul in the 1850s and 1860s. But today, this seems to be an insufficient explanation of his affinity for a form of Western European liberalism. I believe, I can offer an explanation of this attitude whose roots go further back than the nineteenth century and which relies on a less simplistic causal chain while showing extreme complexity.<sup>16</sup>

According to Mardin, this causal chain depended upon the classical Ottoman perception of the state and political power as being set by transcendental points of identification. In explaining this he refers to the influence of Sufi thought in the Ottoman state tradition and understanding of political power, which influenced future generations' perception of European-oriented political movements through a mystical, almost perfectionist outlook.<sup>17</sup> In the European historical context, which shaped the modern concept of freedom, Mardin points out the importance of the historical confrontations between social groups like the church and the empire, the monarchy and the Western feudal lords, and the bourgeoisie and absolutism. Finally "individualism" became a more important theme in determining the meaning of freedom than any collectivist understanding of it in the West. Mardin indicates, however, that an all-encompassing "moral economy" continued to dominate the Ottoman perspective of freedom.

This moral economy corresponded to a certain transcendental pattern of identification within which the Ottoman subjects located their own sense of being. This orientation reflected a certain understanding of monolithic and pantheistic power that "often carried elements of a Gnostic type approach to understanding the cosmos and human beings in it: in a cosmos where truth and good were veiled, the elite soul could escape misery and falsehood by esoteric knowledge of the secret ultimate reality."<sup>18</sup> Such an understanding consisted of a particular form of perfectionism that contributed to a monist idea(l) of the state, people, and power as all part of one indivisible entity. Mardin continues to define this ambition for perfectionism as the "longing for a seamless society" that constitutes the basis of the unique Ottoman legitimization mechanism, which he calls the "Ottoman tacit contract." This mechanism forced rulers to tread with circumspection. The sultan was also restrained by this mechanism: he was not thought of as a distinct agent but as a particular embodiment of the transcendental unity. This understanding is reflected in the Ottoman notions of state sovereignty: *Devlet-i Aliyye* (the transcendental state) and *Devlet-i Ebed Müddet* (the immortal state).<sup>19</sup>



According to Mardin, the monolithic perception of state and society as a transcendental unity marked the Young Ottoman conceptualization of freedom. Although he points out some rifts within the Young Ottomans in terms of the different and uncertain articulations of the transcendental core of the idea of freedom, he claims that all corresponded to a particular form of a quest for a seamless society or “restoring” a supposedly lost coherence and unity of the Ottoman polity.<sup>20</sup> The recurring theme of “saving the state” in the discourses of Young Turks also points to a particular continuous thread in terms of the monolithic perception of the state as an entity that cannot be separated from the notions of country, homeland, and the people. Despite this evocation of well-established ideological principles, its continued reference after 1908 did create some problems in the new formulations that the Young Turks brought to the fore, especially after the Balkan Wars.

#### THE BALKAN DEFEAT AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE “INTERNAL SPLIT”

Until the Balkan Wars the Young Turks’ formulations of saving the state and the solutions they proposed to assure unity and coherence were not radically different from those of their Young Ottoman predecessors. The two generations of reformers shared the point that the transcendental and monolithic understanding of political power and society was no longer functioning, especially for the non-Muslim populations of the empire. Another common point was the discomfort felt among the Ottoman intelligentsia due to the alienation caused by the growing bureaucratic authoritarianism during the nineteenth century. The Young Ottoman complaints about the mimetic Westernization and corruption of the Ottoman bureaucracy under the administration of Ali Paşa and Fuat Paşa and the Young Turk complaints about the paranoiac, oppressive, and clumsy administration of the Hamidian regime were identical, especially in the sense that they stressed the need for a new spirit, a new source of motivation that would restore the unity of the empire.

Turkish historians generally accept that three different solutions were proposed to address the need for a new source of unity in three different eras. Ottomanism was offered in the eras of the Tanzimat and the Young Ottomans as the solution that would help society articulate a common identity able to compete with the nationalisms appearing in Europe after the French Revolution. The actual form in which Ottomanism manifested itself throughout the state’s structures, however, especially when

the non-Muslim population of the empire is considered, proved to be very different from its original mission. This led the Hamidian regime to emphasize Islam as a social and political common identity and as a viable cement for the empire. The post-1908 era is described as the era of the rise of Turkism. The Young Turks saw that as the new spirit and the only solution for an all-encompassing mobilization of the people to protect the remaining territories of the empire.<sup>21</sup>

Although this widely accepted account is true to a great extent, we should emphasize that the appearance of these different modes of identities as cohesive devices is not that clear, both historically and conceptually. This is especially the case in regard to the Young Turks' appeal to Turkism. The Young Turks obviously were not calling for the formation of a modern nation-state that excised non-Turks; rather, as Zürcher notes, they were actually occupied with the question: "How can this [the Ottoman] state be saved?" Moreover, they were not in complete opposition to the idea that Islam could be used to re-create a unifying national cause. Indeed, in contrast to the traditional debates on the rise of Turkish nationalism, Zürcher claims that the idea of the Young Turks' elimination of Ottomanism and Islamism is not completely true: "The Young Turks in exile constantly wrote about the cultural, social and economic development of the Islamic community, interpreting Qur'an and tradition in a positivist and materialistic way, but they did not develop an Islamist political programme."<sup>22</sup> In the period when the Ottoman army was struggling with the Bulgarian and Greek gangs conducting a guerrilla war against the state, the Balkan Turkish journals constantly claimed that "Islam and nationalism had merged into a single construct."<sup>23</sup> Zürcher contends: "the fact that the changeover to nationalism, was made in these circumstances is highly significant, for it leads me to doubt that the nationalism of the Young Turks was truly Turkish."<sup>24</sup>

In emphasizing the pragmatic feature of the Young Turks' endeavors to "save the state," it was too obvious that there was a serious vagueness in determining a certain source for the motivation and unification of the remaining populations of the Ottoman Empire until the traumatizing Balkan defeat. In fact it cannot be claimed that the loss of the Balkans ended Ottoman indecisiveness, but it was a turning point for fixing a particular articulation that had previously caused confusion during the emergence of modern Turkish identity. The Young Turks and the CUP, in particular, were caught between their hatred of a sultan for failing to defend the empire against foreign encroachments and the West. This double-edged hatred thus constituted the ultimate paradox of the Young

Turks' political reasoning. As natives of those Balkan cities that were prosperous prior to the wars who often enjoyed a Western lifestyle made possible by the non-Muslim bourgeoisie in these cities, the Young Turks from the region grew up in an atmosphere that was full of envy for the "West." Later in their lives these same Young Turk idealists witnessed the betrayal of these ideals by the very people that they once envied as "Western." Such a love/hate relationship with the West, or at least its symbols, also made them vulnerable to a hostility toward the traditional idea(1) of the Ottoman state being entrenched in Islamism, which at the time was embodied in the figure of Abdülhamid II. In this sense the only constant in the lives of the Young Turks of Balkan origins was the idea of a sacred and transcendental state whose concrete references had been lost or erased in the long-term effort by the Ottoman state and society to cope with the West.

In considering the effects of the loss of Balkans on the Young Turk's political mind-set, two important aspects appear to be far more important than losing their homeland. The first was their specific relationship with the West. The Balkan defeat was a very powerful blow to the appeal of Western ideas as well as lifestyles, which they themselves were leading. It certainly caused serious disillusionment and ultimately disorientation in regard to their basic aspirations and motivations. The Balkan defeat brought a more powerful need to create (imagine) a distinctive social and political identity vis-à-vis the West, which had already been felt since the Tanzimat.

Europe or the European discourse of Enlightenment had been the only solution for the Young Turks to restore the lost glory of the Ottoman state. As a result they began to develop a modern, European-oriented and secular articulation of a national identity, which would also entail a certain ethnic homogeneity.

As emphasized below, however, such a modern articulation of national identity did not depend solely on the Young Turks' attraction to Western ideals but also on the continuous demands of partition based on the ethnic and national identity claims of the empire's Christian and Muslim subjects. Şerif Mardin points out this situation by quoting Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's memoirs:

[W]hen I first registered in military [secondary] school [I] easily slid into its ranks without any feeling of estrangement. Soon thereafter I too began to see myself as someone who would become part of a great army, who would rush from border to

border, who would defend the existence of a great empire with his sword....

On the maps that hung on the walls of this school, the lands of this wide empire were shown in sugary pink. These lands seemed to me as wide as the world itself,...but I still found them too narrow.

In Africa they extended to Tripoli-Bengaze and the Sahara desert in the middle of Africa, then to Egypt and the Sudan up to the borders of Ethiopia. Even the beylicate of Tunisia was bordered in a pink line, which meant, in fact, a protectorate. And then the lands all the way to the Indian Ocean, Yemen, and Arabia were ours. Iraq, Syria to the Sinai, and finally Anatolia up to the borders of Russia and Iran were ours. Crete, Cyprus, the Aegean, all of Thrace, all of the provinces of Rumelia [i.e., the Balkans] were ours. So even Bulgaria with its status of a protectorate could be counted as ours. Beyond Macedonia and Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, itself pink, would extend the boundaries of the empire to the Sava and Dalmatia.

During recess we children would gather in front of the maps and would look at the frontiers of our state. We would say for the land framed by these boundaries, "Our land," and we would repeat joyfully, "Our land, our state." While pronouncing these words we would feel that something in us would sing, swell up, and that these feelings made me grow in stature, gave me a feeling of pride....

I now knew that the fatherland was everywhere the boundaries of the state would reach. Wherever our boundaries stretched was our fatherland, and these boundaries were the places our army could reach.<sup>25</sup>

Mardin emphasizes the change in Aydemir's tone after the Balkan defeat in respect to his own evolving identity:

However, in the midst of all this confusion a new understanding emerged in the minds of some people. This was a new conception of a fatherland and a nation. In this new understanding the fatherland was no longer the place where the army was in control. We began to think that the real, the profoundest truth was the *people* not the fatherland.... Before [these events] we had also been Turks, but it was thought that the word "Turk," reminiscent as it

was of the hegemony of one people over others, in an empire that brought together many people, would be wounding. And yet the other races living in the empire would all speak of themselves with the name of the nation to which they belonged. In the military school...privileged scions of families from Yemen and Kurdistan, the youth who came from Cherkess villages because they had relatives in the palace, would all sing the praises of their nation and would look down upon us. But we Turks would never bring our connections to the fore. We would deny that link, and whenever the name of our nation had to be mentioned we would simply call ourselves "Ottomans."<sup>26</sup>

This account is a very good example of how the need for the construction of a modern nation-state was shaped during the era. The transformation from a centuries-old multiethnic empire to an ethnically and religiously homogeneous modern nation-state nevertheless would surely create many problems. One of the main problems regarding this issue was that "nation-state" was a Western European political and administrative concept, which had taken shape within the unique historical conditions of Western Europe. Adopting such a concept paradoxically pointed to the worldwide hegemony of Western Europe yet turned out to be a weapon against it.

Mustafa Aksakal, in his recent study of the sociopolitical atmosphere before World War I, gives a significant example of this paradoxical relationship with the West. He refers to a remark by the former delegate to the Ottoman Chamber, Cami Baykut, who was also the co-founder of the National Constitution Party in 1912. Baykut commented that "only Europe stood in the way of the 'Turk's Europeanization.' Through constant interference in the empire's internal affairs, politically and financially, the Great Powers of Europe had tied the Sublime Porte's hands and prevented it from implementing effective reforms, despite the numerous attempts dating as far back as the beginning of the nineteenth century."<sup>27</sup>

The second important aspect of the Balkan defeat and how it influenced the Young Turks is related to the centuries-long monolithic understanding of imperial power, which defined the state, the sultan, the people (the subjects), and the territory as one and the same body. As pointed out above, this understanding was especially applied in reference to the sultan, who was considered the embodiment of a transcendental abstraction of state and had been equated with the territorial possessions and integrity of an empire that included various peoples. Such a

monolithic framework had long been pierced by the advent of the Western European antiabsolutist conceptualizations of political power, state, and popular will. Thus the last sultan's manner of exercising political power overlapped with the transcendental and monolithic understanding of the state. Apart from the claims of incompetence, the Western developments that transformed both the political and military capacities of the state, the most significant point of the Young Turks' opposition to Abdülhamid II was in fact the lack of the strength and glory that a sultan was supposed to represent as the Ottoman Empire lost a great deal of its territories during his reign.

After the Balkan defeat, along with the significance of the land that was lost, the Young Turks also faced the futility of their arguments against Abdülhamid II; they were in the same position as the sultan they dethroned by losing the heartland of the empire. Moreover, by the 1908 revolution no position of a sultan or sultanate would provide a relative symbolic coherence to a unified idea of the state. Although the CUP was quite far from seeing itself as a substitute for both the symbolic and political role of the sultanate, its political solutions for domestic and international problems were closer to reproducing the classical Ottoman monolithic and transcendental understanding of the state than to adopting a plan reflecting European forms of democratic political and administrative institutionalization. In fact, as shown by their actions (which resembled those of their predecessors, the Young Ottomans), members of the CUP were also searching for a formula that would restore a supposed glory as well as the "discipline and order" provided by a social and political perfectionism characteristic of an idealized Ottoman past.<sup>28</sup> This agenda was somewhat elusive; it is unclear whether this desired perfection was ascribed to a presupposed glory of the past of the Ottoman Empire or to a presupposed "total perfection" of the West. The important point here, however, is not to discover whether the CUP was relying on a glorious Ottoman past or on the West as a fantasy of perfection. The crucial issue is how a particular pattern of political orientation reflected a residue of the Ottoman past that manifested itself in the CUP's political mode of being.

The most significant manifestation of such an orientation was the CUP's unwillingness to form a legal and open political institutionalization. Instead the CUP intended to remain behind the curtains and manipulate the political scene by holding the real power in its hand.<sup>29</sup> This may well be interpreted as the CUP's unwillingness to transform itself into just another party or movement that flourished after the 1908

revolution and its desire to control the whole sociopolitical structure. As Hanioglu notes:

Initially, the Committee chose to rule from behind the scenes. The conspiratorial mindset of the CUP leaders, their conservative predilections and reluctance to confront tradition, the protection afforded by the continuity of traditional institutions, and a reluctance to expose their young, unknown and inexperienced cadres to the risks of public scrutiny—all these considerations may have played a role in the decision to stay in the shadows. Whatever the reasoning behind it, the decision not to publicise the names of the central committee members shrouded the CUP in mystery, laying the foundations of an institutional cult that would replace the personality cult that had surrounded Sultan Abdülhamid II. The Committee regarded itself—and wanted to be seen by others—as the sacred agent of imperial redemption and the guarantor of the empire's future security.<sup>30</sup>

The CUP's elusive but discernible association with a certain transcendental and holistic understanding of the state was also manifested in its cynical approach to parliamentarism.<sup>31</sup> The 1912 elections were named the "elections with the stick" due to the open and indirect pressures of the CUP on the electorate to ensure its majority in the parliament. These pressures included "the direct intervention in the campaign process, the arrest of political opponents, banning of opposition meetings and the shutdown of opposition newspapers."<sup>32</sup> The elections evoked a widely shared reaction among many governing circles, particularly in the military, however, and the CUP came under pressure for withdrawal. Thus for a brief period between August 1912 and January 1913 the CUP had no power or influence over the country's administration.

The Balkan defeat, however, not only led to the return of the CUP to power but also revealed that the CUP was the political movement most determined to save the country from collapse. The defeat marked the ineffectiveness of the government that replaced the CUP cadres. Taking advantage of this situation, the CUP raided the Sublime Porte, killed the war minister, imprisoned the members of the existing cabinet, and forced the grand vizier to resign. Surely this was an obvious manifestation of the CUP's sense of urgency and anxiety to prevent the demise of the empire. Another important point is that the end was always more important than the means for the CUP. This was in conflict with its engagement with

Western modernization and would become a repeating mode of behavior in modern Turkish politics to a greater extent. In fact the loss of the Balkans made the CUP less and less concerned with a Western European scheme of legal and political institutionalization.

Although the cynical lack of concern with the Western legal and political institutionalization caused some problems for long-term Turkish political modernization, it also provided flexible and dynamic zones of movement during times of war. The retaking of Edirne was one example of such an advantage. When conflicts arose among the Balkan states after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, "the CUP leadership pressed the government and the chief of staff to resume the offensive and when they hesitated and urged caution, a group of junior officers led by Enver, with the backing of the CUP, took the initiative and launched an attack on Edirne."<sup>33</sup> This resulted in the retaking of the city. In fact these seemingly semiautonomous junior officers, known as the *fedais* (volunteers), were loyal primarily to the CUP and were mostly successful on those fronts where unconventional guerrilla warfare tactics were needed. According to Zürcher, this elusive but effective organization "served as an important 'laboratory' for the national resistance movement which would develop in Anatolia after the First World War."<sup>34</sup>

#### TOWARD AN UNEASY EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKISH NATIONALISM

This elusiveness and uncertainty in exercising political power certainly had a connection with the CUP's attachment to the continuous thread of classical Ottoman understanding of a transcendental state. Although such a stance provided strength and proved advantageous while managing crisis and war, it was a liability for constructing a modern nation-state. A flourishing of Turkist discourses can be observed especially after the Balkan defeat, particularly in intellectual circles. The CUP's articulation of Turkist or Turkish nationalism was somewhat ambiguous, however, even though the policies and reforms that it carried out in the post-1913 era were primarily supportive of an agenda of national homogenization. The reluctance basically depended on the meaning of the concept of "nation," because a certain confusion regarding its religious and imperial connotations was inherent among the members of the CUP. This confusion was accompanied by the Ottoman inheritance of the transcendental idea of the state. Hanioglu notes that "the main task that the CUP leaders took upon themselves was the preservation of the multinational



empire.”<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless the events following the CUP’s coming to power and particularly the Balkan defeat gradually forced the CUP to shape its agenda for establishing a modern and homogeneous nation-state rather than trying to revive a multiethnic empire.

The post-1908 era witnessed not only the nationalist uprising of the non-Muslim Balkan states but the Albanian and Arab revolts. The Muslim-Turkish populations native to the lost lands began to flood Anatolia, while the non-Muslim populations of Anatolia (claimed to be of Balkan nationality) began to emigrate in reverse. This “exchange” of peoples led to a certain homogenization of the ethnic and religious map of Anatolia. Moreover, the Balkan Wars proved that the nationalist fervor of the non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire was so great that most of the non-Muslim soldiers deserted to the Balkan allies.<sup>36</sup>

The recurring theme in most analyses of the reasons that led to the catastrophic Balkan defeat is the lack of motivation not only among the reservists but also among the officers. This was perceived as the lack of nationalist sentiment and fervor, while the enemy was highly mobilized in this respect. Handan Nezir Akmeşe emphasizes this issue in reference to one of the German officers who was serving in the Ottoman army. “The Turkish officer serves for his daily bread, like the mass he possesses no patriotism, he has no sentimental attachment to his weapon, no selflessness, no joy in service, no idealism, without which the harshness of war are not to be borne. Instead, the army was composed of a group of people who did not even know against whom they were being led, tired and weak they went into combat and fell, without knowing why!”<sup>37</sup> This view was in fact shared by many of the leading elite of the time. The need for a far-reaching campaign for Turkish nationalism was emphasized and actualized through the foundation of numerous associations and unions scattered over the remaining lands of the empire and by the rise of nationalist media.<sup>38</sup>

The Balkan Wars triggered the emergence of a unique form of nationalism that can be discerned on three basic points. The first can be defined as an anxiety about survival manifested mostly in the form of a longing for power, which resembles Mardin’s conceptualization of “the longing for a seamless society” as one of the bases of classical Ottoman social and political legitimacy. Some examples from the journals of the era demonstrate this anxiety and longing for power, such as this paraphrase from one of the popular nationalist journals of the time, called *Büyük Duygu* (The Great Yearning):

Only the nation armed with national feelings can participate in the struggle and gain as a result of it the right to remain alive. But let us not spend much time on the word “right,” for there is no one left who does not believe that “right” [*hak*] is nothing other than “might” [*kuvvet*]. The most obvious truth is that those who do not crush will be crushed. The inevitable place of those who do not heed this proverb is the cemetery and history. Thus in order to live we must not strive for “right” but for power.<sup>39</sup>

In many issues of the journal, authors were unequivocal. The very existence of the nation depended on unfettered sovereignty and self-reliance: “Right can only be derived from power, civilization only from power, happiness only from power. Power is everything.”<sup>40</sup> The last sentence is especially significant in assessing what sort of a nationalist sentiment had been emerging from the dust of the Balkan defeat. This discourse is reflective of an urgent need for survival and also frustration, neither of which offered anything positive regarding national identity. Even the title of the journal hinted at the inherent vagueness and ambiguity of the time. A yearning clearly existed, but this yearning had no positive content or direction other than a vague longing for power.

The second point can be related to the lack of a positive and coherent content in the emergence of a nationalist discourse following the Balkan Wars. The basic issue is that the initial emergence of Turkish nationalist discourse was dependent on a mutually exclusive relationship with other nationalisms that had emerged before it.<sup>41</sup> However, there was also a need for a positive definition of Turkish identity. This could include a historical narrative that would justify it on the basis that Turkish identity could not merely rest on a mutually exclusive relationship that emerged with the rise of other nationalisms in and around the Ottoman Empire. In fact most of the emerging nationalist discourses surfaced in opposition to the Ottoman Empire, ultimately depending on a fantasy or narrative of a pure and idealistic existence before the Ottoman occupation. The common point among all these nationalist constructs was the longing for an origin associated with a particular territory that each called the homeland.

The question worth asking is whether Turkish nationalism initially emerged as a formal repetition of the nationalisms that it had been struggling with, especially in terms of (re)constructing a narrative of origin and homeland. Drawing on the discussion above, the answer should be that,

contrary to the nationalisms emerging in direct opposition to Ottoman rule, the narrative of Turkish nationalism was a “necessity” in order to avoid and disavow losing the heart of a 500-year empire. This idea was most visible among the leading intelligentsia of the time, whose origins were Balkan. It is indeed startling that the nationalist discourse following the Balkan defeat and the disappointment with the non-Muslim subjects of the empire turned toward Anatolia as the new, uncontaminated land of the Turks, a substitute for what could have been a revanchist discourse of retrieval of the lost Balkan territories.<sup>42</sup>

Reasons related to the geostrategic, military, and other technical realities of the time surely account for this shift. The issue at stake here, however, is the way in which the idea of Anatolia as the homeland is presented and narrated. It conceals a great trauma, resulting from losing an empire. The remarkable aspect of the narrative that positions Anatolia as the original homeland for the Turks (post-Ottoman Muslims) is how it corresponds with another narrative (or fantasy) that posits Central Asia as the origin of all Turks.<sup>43</sup> In assessing the trauma of losing an empire the historical validity of this narrative is one of the least important concerns for those inheriting the Ottoman collapse. The significant point here is the attempt to disavow or erase the hundreds of years of history of the Ottoman Empire, which felt no need to mention a particular ethnic origin for centuries and instead mobilized a self-identification mechanism very different from the modern European understanding of identity.

If we consider the sincere and formidable struggle of the Young Turks to save “the Ottoman state” as reflective of a wish to restore the empire’s lost dignity, such an erasure did not seem a willful or deliberate act but was the only means of avoiding the huge weight of losing an empire. By emphasizing the new and forgetting what had been lost, the new narrative functioned not as the product of what had been lost but as something entirely (and necessarily) different. This new nationalist narrative corresponded with a different kind of purity, an uncontaminated identity, which located the Turkish self at two distinct points. One was linked to a very particular past in Central Asia,<sup>44</sup> and the other was based in Anatolia, where the hearts and minds of the “pure and simple” Turkish peasants were most authentically found. This romanticization of the Anatolian Turkish peasant as the true and pure subject of the lost glory of the past (the remote past of the real Turks before the Ottomans) becomes a historical oxymoron if we consider the reasons that led the Young Turks to search for the purity of a lost glory or merely the reasons that gave them the feeling of loss.<sup>45</sup>

Although the sociopolitical atmosphere following the Balkan defeat forced the ruling elite to declare a new heartland (Anatolia) and an ethnic articulation of nationalism (Turkism), the CUP in fact retained the transcendental and all-encompassing perception of political power as an intellectual residue of the declining multiethnic empire. This could be discerned not only in its authoritarian and/or antidemocratic policies and the means of exercising power but also in its reluctance or confusion in enhancing a purely nationalist agenda, as if it still felt a debt to a disappearing empire. Moreover, it would not be that easy to shift its mind-set from the dream of restoring a world empire to constructing a modern, medium-sized nation-state.

As the elite who ruled between a declining empire and a rising modern nation-state, the Young Turks and the CUP in particular thus failed to develop a coherent nationalist identity. It was the Balkan defeat that fueled their confusion. As Hanioglu notes, "they were not free to build a state and society from scratch, primarily because they were not prepared to relinquish the Empire." He pictures the CUP leaders as confused and compared them to Tanzimat statesmen who promoted the new while preserving the old: "They kept the Sultan but introduced the Committee; maintained Islamic identity of the regime, yet endorsed secularism; espoused Turkism, yet professed Ottomanism; advocated democracy, but practiced repression; and proclaimed *étatisme* while promoting liberal economics."<sup>46</sup> Although Hanioglu accurately describes the confusions of the time, it may be necessary to reassess the diverse and ambiguous ideas that dominated the ruling elite of the era in terms of their constructive role in developing a new identity and a new political dimension.

In this sense the Balkan defeat also prepared the foundations for the modern Turkish Republic. The remarkable point, however, is that that the Young Turks were faced with a challenge: whether the transcendental and all-encompassing understanding of power would manifest itself in the form of pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, Ottomanism, or an uncertain mixture of them all. They had to leave behind any all-encompassing and transcendental idea of political power to have a deeper comprehension of some political notions necessary to build a truly modern nation-state. Although the following generation would be more successful in creating a viable Turkish Republic, the quest for an all-encompassing and transcendental political power would continue to be a source of unrest throughout the history of the Republic. It was in the end a disturbing and distorted specter of the Ottoman Empire that remains embedded in the modern Turkish political culture.

## NOTES

1. Handan Nezir Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey*, 140. See also Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 76–88; Halil İnalcık, *Devlet-i Aliyye*, 205–25.
2. Heath Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*; Cemal Kafadar, *Between the Two Worlds*; Donald M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453*, 251–393.
3. Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat Terakki*, 97–108. For a detailed account of the planning phase of the Young Turk Revolution, see M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 210–78; Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey*, 114; Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 202.
4. Abdülhamid II's fear of a coup against his throne led him to form alternative troops loyal to him called the *alaylı*, which means the ones who have not graduated from military schools. He preferred to keep most of the educated members of the military (*mektepli*) away from the capital. Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat Terakki*, 67.
5. *Ibid.*, 67–68.
6. Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 99–104.
7. Erik Jan Zürcher, "Greek and Turkish Refugees and Deportees, 1912–1924," 1, <http://www.transanatolie.com/english/turkey/turks/Ottomans/ejz18.pdf>.
8. The term "modernizing elite" is used to refer both to the Young Turks as a whole and to the founders of the Turkish Republic. It has a specific emphasis on the Committee of Union and Progress, however, which was the initial manifestation of the paradoxical mode of existence of the Turkish modernizing elite. The particular political subjectivity that the CUP generated can be said to be determinative in conceiving the political mode of thinking of all the modernist and modernizing political elements (including the different factions of the Young Turks and the opposing elements in the first republican elite) of early twentieth-century Turkey.
9. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 238.
10. Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*.
11. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 112.
12. *Ibid.*, 114.
13. Şerif Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective."
14. Slavoj Žižek, "The Seven Veils of Fantasy."
15. Charles Shepherdson, *Vital Signs, Nature, Culture, Psychoanalysis*, 161–62.
16. Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective," 23.
17. *Ibid.*, 24–26. See also Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Osmanlı Resmi İdeolojisi veya 'Dairenin İçi'."
18. Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective," 24.
19. Ocak, "Osmanlı Resmi İdeolojisi veya 'Dairenin İçi,'" 82–85.
20. The manifestation of the transcendental core of the idea of freedom in the Young Ottoman discourses of freedom was surely vague and contingent because the sociopolitical legitimization of the classical Ottoman period had long been damaged by the enormous loss of prestige of the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century, the relative corruption of many classical Ottoman institutions and practices, and the rise of bureaucratic elitism, centralization, and modernization in the

- nineteenth century. As pointed out in this chapter, however, it persisted by peculiar means in both the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk periods.
21. For a detailed account of the variations of these three modes of identity formations under the influence and/or the pressure of Western nationalism, see Kemal Karpat, "Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to Be Modern Muslim, Ottoman and Turk." See also Erik Jan Zürcher, "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalist: Identity Politics 1908–1938."
22. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 215.
23. M. Sükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 211; as cited in Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 217.
24. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 217.
25. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 44–45; as cited in Şerif Mardin, "The Ottoman Empire," 117–18.
26. Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 59–60; as cited in Mardin, "The Ottoman Empire," 118.
27. Cami [Abdurrahman Cami Baykut], *Osmanlılığın Âtisi*, 21–29; as cited in Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 34.
28. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period, 1908–1918," 66.
29. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 99–100; Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period," 69
30. Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period," 74.
31. As Hanioglu indicates, "although the parliament was the harbinger of constitutional revolution, the CUP, once in power, developed a distaste for strong legislatures. More importantly, they came to share Abdülhamid II's concern about the ability of a strong parliament to undermine the regime and aggravate ethno-religious conflict" (ibid., 80). See also Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Middle East, 1914–1923*, 59.
32. Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period," 72.
33. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 113.
34. Ibid., 114. See also Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period," 81.
35. Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period," 78
36. Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey*, 132.
37. Ibid., 142.
38. Zürcher, *Turkey*, 125–27; and Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period," 83.
39. "İntikam Duygusu," *Büyük Duygu* 2, 16 Mart 1329/March 29, 1913, 17; as cited in Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 37.
40. "İntikam Duygusu"; as cited in Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 37.
41. Turkish nationalism initially appeared as a reaction and/or a response to other nationalisms particularly of the former non-Muslim subjects of the empire. But at this point it may be necessary to emphasize that this does not necessarily mean that it emerged as a xenophobic nationalism with an ongoing potential for violence. Taner Akçam is one of the scholars who define the emergence of Turkish nationalism as necessarily violent and xenophobic as a consequence of the trauma of losing an empire, which also created an offensive and expansionist national hysteria. In defining this Akçam utilizes an essentialist and determinist frame of logic whose methodological basis seems to be flawed. In order to claim that "loss"

and/or the “trauma of a loss” automatically led to violence, Akçam should rely on some particular psychoanalytical theories that seem lacking in his study. In fact, as this chapter tries to demonstrate, the initial emergence of Turkish nationalism was dominated by a defensive anxiety of survival accompanied by a definitional vagueness and uncertainty. See Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic*, 1–57.

42. Aksakal gave two important accounts of the “reinvention” of Anatolia as the new heartland for the “new” nation, which both were written just after the Balkan Wars. Naci İsmail, writing under the pseudonym Habil Adem, attributed the work to Jones Moll: *Londra Konferansı’ndaki Meselelerden*, trans. Habil Adem [pseud.]; Özdemir [Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi], *Türk Ruhu Nasıl Yapılıyor?*; as cited in Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, 25–31.
43. Uriel Heyd, *The Foundation of Turkish Nationalism*, 72–79.
44. The rise of Central Asia as an ethno-national origin also led to the rise of pan-Turkism, which was an idea that became popular after the Balkan Wars. The idea of pan-Turkism intermingled with some themes of Ottomanism, however, which also involved certain aspects of Islamism. Hanioglu describes the situation as a reinterpretation of Ottomanism through Turkish values and symbols, which caused such confusion that the difference between “Ottoman” and “Turk” became ever more blurred. Hanioglu contends that the idea of Turkish separatism inevitably took a back seat to cultural Turkism and was subsumed under the increasingly murky but infinitely malleable notions of Ottomanism and pan-Islamism until the collapse of the empire. While accepting the popularity of Pan-Turkist ideas in the post-1913 period, Zürcher also indicates that it remained more a romantic dream offering an escape from the disasters of day-to-day politics than a concrete policy: Hanioglu, “The Second Constitutional Period,” 83, 101; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 134. See also Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Middle East*, 57–63.
45. The romanticization or glorification of the Turkish Anatolian peasant has been a recurrent theme of the modern Turkish novel from World War I up to the 1970s. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, who was one of the most enthusiastic defenders of the republican revolution and an admirer of Atatürk, is an exception, however; especially in his famous novel *Yaban* (The Stranger), written in the early 1930s, he reflects his disillusionment and disappointment with the Turkish peasant.
46. Hanioglu, “The Second Constitutional Period,” 111.

## What Did the Albanians Do?

### Postwar Disputes on Albanian Attitudes

*Çağdaş Sümer*

As discussed throughout the second part of this volume, the Balkan Wars were only the first stage of an armed struggle that lasted for ten years. Called the “Ten-Year War” of Turkey by Gen. İzzeddin Çalışlar, the events in the Balkans not only provided the foundations for the new nation-state of the Turks but also ideologically shaped its nation-builders and molded the discourse mobilized to realize the Republic of Turkey.<sup>1</sup> As the first and the most humiliating stage of this long struggle, the Balkan Wars thus had some long-lasting effects on the nation-building process in Turkey. These effects are analyzed in this chapter as one of several aspects of the formation of a nationalist discourse, which directly references certain agents linked to the Balkan Wars. Thanks to a number of psycho-historical studies of recent years, we are now more equipped to analyze the effects of trauma on how national identities and the contested nation-building processes formed during the “Ten-Year War” of Turkey.<sup>2</sup> As evidenced in some chapters in this volume, the traumas experienced by Turkish elites in particular during the long process toward creating the Republic have been relatively well studied. While themes like “revenge” and “cleansing the stain of defeat” predominate in our analysis of this crucial generation, the factor of resentment as another crucial element in the formation of national identity and nationalist discourses is basically ignored.<sup>3</sup> In addition to being a source of trauma, I suggest that the Balkan Wars also became a new source of resentment in the formation of Turkish nationalist discourse, especially toward Albanians.

The manner in which Albanians (as the first Muslim people who managed to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire at the end of the Balkan Wars) reacted to the war and the “Albanian Question” preceding



it clearly had an impact on the thinking of Turkish elites by the end of World War I. The first-generation leaders in the new Turkish Republic, composed mainly of officers and intellectuals of Balkan origin, had been involved personally in one way or another with the Albanian Question as army officers or administrators.<sup>4</sup> In 1913, for example, Ipek/Peja-born Mehmet Akif, who would eventually join the National Liberation struggle in Anatolia and write the lyrics of the Turkish national anthem, wrote sarcastically of the Albanians among whom he grew up in Kosovo/Kosova: “Oh, enslaved nation, where is autonomy? I’m afraid that your fortune is now eternal poverty. Oh, independent element, where is your independence? I think that all your hopes are gone forever.”<sup>5</sup> As a general account of the uncertain fate of the recently declared Albanian state, and specifically the bloody occupation of much of Kosovo and Malësi by Montenegro and Serbia, Akif’s words can be read as an accurate expression of loss found throughout the literature of the time. This undertone of irony, however, is crucial for this chapter; as many Albanians fought to “liberate” the western Balkans from the Ottoman Empire, instead of finding liberty, most Albanians found themselves the victims of a new kind of state in the form of expansionist Greek and Slav nationalism.

We find similar accusatory writings against Albanians throughout the published memoirs or public lectures of Ottoman officers who fought on the western front during the war. One common theme was to chastise the lack of loyalty of Albanians during the war. For instance, in a lecture offered by Fevzi Çakmak before the War Academy in 1925 and printed afterward for the use of young officers throughout the Republic of Turkey, the disloyal attitudes of Albanian soldiers, nationalist leaders, and peasants during the war were emphasized as a main source of the empire’s military defeat.<sup>6</sup> Traces of this early trope about a specific form of Albanian treason are found throughout popular contemporary politics. Although different political actors used these arguments in different contexts, the resentments against Albanians have continued to be part of both Turkist and Islamist discourses until today. For instance, in discussion forums on websites Turkish nationalists still blame Albanian treason, using a language of hatred borrowed from Nihal Atsız, emphasizing how Albanians in a time of need betrayed Turks and became allied with Serbians and Greeks during the Balkan Wars. One of the posts declares: “We are going to use the word Albanian synonymously with treason, slyness, immorality, treachery, and theft.”<sup>7</sup> On the other side of the contemporary Turkish political spectrum, Islamists evoke Mehmet Akif’s above-mentioned poem in their disputes against Turkish nationalists in order to demonstrate the consequences of nationalism (*kavmiyetçilik*)

for Muslims in the past.<sup>8</sup> While such discourse seems entrenched in the political rhetoric of contemporary Turkey, its origins perhaps need more analysis in order to help us appreciate more clearly the dynamics at play in post-Balkan War societies as they attempted to make sense of their new, often traumatic realities.

#### ALBANIANS IN THE BALKAN WARS

In order to provide such a historical perspective, in the rest of this chapter I focus on two pamphlets, both of which help us understand the origins of this discourse on specifically Albanian treason. Written from two contradictory perspectives just after the defeat in the Balkan Wars, these two pamphlets contain the basic arguments that have been used since 1913: on one side to blame the Albanians for the failures of the Ottoman state, on the other to defend them from such attacks. But before exploring the details of these arguments, it is necessary to summarize what happened in Albanian lands in order to understand the contexts of these pamphlets.

Actually it is not very accurate and meaningful to speak of a homogeneous Albanian reaction to the Balkan Wars. Albanian responses to the war were varied. Muslims, Christians, peasants, town dwellers, *fis* (kin-based communities of northern Albania) members, and *çetes* (paramilitary bands) all responded to very particular conditions. Their very diversity meant that they had no common program or pool of leaders, making any attempt to generalize a plurality of interests inaccurate at best. At the beginning of the war, for example, fearing the partition of their land among the aggressor Balkan states, many Albanians fought in defense of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, however, some groups gave their support to the invading armies, while others chose to stay out of the fight, remaining “neutral” over the course of the war. This complicated set of calculations is especially evident among the northern Albanians, who suffered a great deal from the new CUP regime’s policies after 1908. For many, the invading armies were not necessarily their primary enemy, at least in the initial period of the war. As George Gawrych notes, “Isa Boletin and other Kosovar chiefs did not oppose the Serbian troops; they claimed a lack of weapons prevented their offering resistance to the invasion” and only started to resist when Serb forces began their brutal invasion of Kosovo.<sup>9</sup> In Shkodër a number of Catholic tribes, fighting the Ottoman army since 1910 with the encouragement of Montenegro, actually joined the forces besieging the Ottoman-held city, while many others fought on the other side, defending north Albania’s primary center of commerce and culture.<sup>10</sup>

In southern Albania the vast majority of Muslim Albanians collaborated with Ottoman forces against the Greek invasion. But after the defeat of the Western Army and the declaration of the provisional government in Vlorë by a group of Ottoman-Albanian officers and politicians, many of these same southern Albanians, especially in the reserve regiments, began to desert in large numbers. They started to attack retreating Ottoman troops, partly for booty.<sup>11</sup> Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, or Ekrem Vlorë, who became a leading nationalist figure, notes in his memoirs that the southern Albanian soldiers escaped from their core units after murdering their Turkish officers, clearly offering future Turkish writers the kind of evidence of “Albanian treason” that is often used today.<sup>12</sup> The consequences of the provisional government’s propaganda campaign to encourage Albanian soldiers to desert their Ottoman units were clear to many observers who wrote about events later. As Ekrem Bey stated, Albanian nationalists in Avlonya and Berat suggested staying neutral in the war and not fighting against Serbia and Greece, in order to secure the friendship of the empire’s enemies. This reflected a perception on the ground that the region’s future no longer lay in Ottoman hands. According to their propaganda, Albania was an independent state from that time on and the Turks’ war was no longer a concern of Albanians. The subsequent flight of Albanian soldiers, with many returning to their homes, facilitated the eventual fall of Yanya and, ironically, the invasion of Çamlık (northern Epirus) by Greek troops, which had long-term negative consequences for the indigenous Albanian populations there.<sup>13</sup>

In this regard Süleyman Külçe’s accounts on the actions of many Albanians’ during the war are worth quoting here. Külçe was an officer in the Western Army under the command of Fevzi Paşa (Çakmak) and witnessed the defeat of Ottoman troops in the war. According to Külçe’s account, northern Albanians, known as Gegs, did not resist the Serbian troops in the Kosova plain. It was only when Serbs reached Debre and Luma that they faced resistance; at that point the invaders were crushed by Albanian forces. After stating that this defeat of previously victorious invading armies demonstrated that “the child has not forgotten his mission,” Külçe asks: “Why did the same child cause so many troubles to the Ottoman army in southern Albania? Those who were disappointed with the Ottoman government were the northern Albanians, the ones beaten by the Ottoman state. What was happening to the Tosks?”<sup>14</sup>

Külçe blames the provincial government and Albanian nationalists in Vlorë for the defeat of the Western Army. In his view, İsmail Kemal (Qemali in Albanian) and his allies made every effort to see the Ottoman

army defeated, and their betrayal incapacitated the already exhausted army. According to Külçe another act of treason reserved to an increasingly undifferentiated, generic “Albanian” was the assassination of the Hasan Rıza Paşa, commander of the army protecting besieged Shkodër from the Serbian army. Külçe blames in particular Esat Toptani, a former Albanian deputy in the Ottoman parliament, for the assassination.

Another contemporary source accuses these southern Albanian leaders of choosing the eagle (local nationalist symbol) over the crescent (Islam), thereby betraying the Ottoman army by breaking the Islamic covenant that privileges the *ümmet* over nationality. In his article published in *Tanin*, the leading newspaper of the CUP, İsmail Hakkı Babanzade stressed that all Albanians should not be collectively blamed, because more than 80 percent of them did not know anything about nationality. It was only the treachery of a small political class linked to İsmail Qemali that deserved blame.<sup>15</sup> Here is early evidence of how subsequent commentaries reacted to events in the western Balkans during the war. Clearly a generic Albanian emerges who would serve as a symbol of all that went wrong, while others would offer more nuanced analysis, suggesting that individual groups, rather than entire peoples, warranted Turkish scorn.

## TWO PAMPHLETS ON “ALBANIANS”: WHO WAS GUILTY?

Although Külçe and İsmail Hakkı were very careful not to use the accusation of treason against all Albanians, the pamphlet entitled *What Did the Albanians Do?* does not take such a nuanced approach. The author of this pamphlet accuses all Albanians of betraying the Ottoman Empire.<sup>16</sup> Written by Hüseyin Kazım, a member of the CUP, this influential pamphlet was published in 1914 by Istanbul’s Yeni Turan Matbaası. Kazım was one of the founders of the Unionist newspaper *Tanin*, which, as seen throughout this volume, became a crucial mouthpiece for the empire’s political and cultural elite. He himself was an influential political and intellectual figure in the Constitutional era, and everything he wrote in his newspaper was likely read by a wide range of Ottoman subjects. After the 1908 Revolution he was appointed to various administrative posts, including governorships of Aleppo and Salonika. During 1911 he was based in Salonika, serving as the governor of this strategic province, allowing him to observe events in larger Albania at close range.

Although Hüseyin Kazım was an important figure, both as an administrator and as an intellectual in CUP circles, he was nevertheless very

critical of the CUP's Balkan policies, particularly regarding the attitudes of the army and the Committee against Albanians. His book *The Revolution of June 10 and Its Consequences* (*10 Temmuz İnkılabı ve Netayıcı*), which he started to write before the Balkan Wars and finished just after them, is an example of self-criticism by a CUP member. In this book Hüseyin Kazım constantly blames his own comrades for their parochialism and states that Albanians were right in their reactions to the new regime because Unionists did not respect their traditions.<sup>17</sup> He also adds, however, that Albanians actually set the stage for the Balkan disaster with their constant rebellions and debilitating, costly insurrections.

In the pamphlet, written after Hüseyin Kazım fell out with his former comrades in the CUP after the defeat, he uses very different language in respect to the Albanians. In fact the tone is so different from what he wrote earlier in the decade that İsmail Kara, publisher of Hüseyin Kazım Bey's memoirs (*Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyete Hatıralarım*), notes that this pamphlet might actually have been authored by someone else.<sup>18</sup> But this pamphlet and another one written in defense of the boycott against Ottoman Greeks after the Balkan Wars were verified as the work of Hüseyin Kazım by Seyfettin Özege, a famous Turkish bibliographer.<sup>19</sup>

At the beginning of his pamphlet Hüseyin Kazım states that his intention is not to answer the question of what the future of independent Albania is going to offer the region's inhabitants. Rather, "This little pamphlet is a cry of cursing that comes from a wounded Turkish heart. A Muslim who betrays his religion and country regardless of his membership on any committee deserves to be cursed, and this country and this religion were betrayed in Albania." In this respect Hüseyin Kazım saw the Albanians as the only reason for the loss of all of Rumelia. Because of them Muslims stayed under the boots of the enemy, a 600-year-old state was shaken from its roots, and the Islamic world collapsed, shedding tears of blood in the process. Hüseyin Kazım's first targets were southern Albanian nationalists such as İsmail Kemal, Avlonyalı Süreyya Bey, and Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, who were often found traveling to European countries in order to gain support for their cause of Albanian independence. According to Hüseyin Kazım, these men of Ottoman rank continued to hold their offices in government thanks to Sultan Abdülhamid's undeserved favor and the subsequent Unionist government's unnecessary hesitations. These men (*herifler*) have spent what they took from the people of Albania by force on the poker table, and they did their best to devastate the country. After expressing his scorn for these southern Albanian traitors, Hüseyin Kazım blames the government of negligence for sending men

like Esat Paşa Toptani to Shkodër and Yanyalı Hasan Tahsin Paşa to Salonika. For failing to identify the true character of these men who would eventually betray the Ottoman Empire, according to Hüseyin Kazım, those Ottoman officials responsible deserve to be cursed as much as those who betrayed their country.<sup>20</sup>

After charging Albanians in general with provoking the Balkan Alliance and devastating the Ottoman army by their disobedience, Hüseyin Kazım directs his anger at supporters of the Entente Libérale. Ententists would not manage to escape from the curse of history, because they tried to manipulate Albanians in order to organize a coup d'état. The movement of the Officers of Salvation (Halaskar Zabitan) and Albanian officials in the region who joined the Albanian rebels were engaging in political activism. Personal interests and reactionism prevailed: for good or bad, all attempts at reform and building a constitution-based society were demolished by their actions. While people applauded Albanians for their actions against the CUP, the enemy was waiting in the shadows for the best time to attack. Hüseyin Kazım asks: "Where were these Albanians when the war got started? They were all in their villages. Only eighty people came for the Elbasan regiment. While the Ottoman army was overwhelmed on the Kumanova plain by the enemy, Albanians choosing to stay out of the fight caused the defeat. They killed Turkish soldiers. They stole Ottoman guns and buried them."

Crucially, Hüseyin Kazım countered arguments apparently circulating at the time that claimed Albanians did not fight because they had been offended by the Young Turks' attitudes toward them (an argument found in the pamphlet written by Ahmed Hamdi). Hüseyin Kazım asks whether being angry with Unionists can be an excuse for treason or not. To him, the proponents of this argument were men without a homeland, brain, or zeal.

Hüseyin Kazım ends by saying:

Draw a lesson, Turks, draw a lesson, Muslims.

The pain of our blindness was very hard. It was very bitter. Let's not fall into this trap again. A new downfall will be a total disaster, I'm afraid. We will fail.

It is an obligation to tell this truth, no matter how bitter it is.

We shouldn't feed snakes in our arms anymore.<sup>21</sup>

In this short pamphlet Hüseyin Kazım makes use of all the arguments that have become central in contemporary discourse on Albanian

treason. His particularly aggressive tone (using the metaphor of “snakes” fed in Ottoman arms) constitutes an early example of the kind of insulting language linked to resentment that has appeared in Turkish nationalist discourse ever since. But this is not the only formula for writing about Albanians and their role in the Balkan Wars.

A second pamphlet, written in the same year as Hüseyin Kazım’s attack, was published in Cairo by an artillery captain named Ahmed Hamdi Bey, who participated in the Balkan Wars when he was a commander in the Western Army. This pamphlet entitled *The Reasons for the Defeat of the Ottoman Army and Albanians* (*Osmanlı Ordusunun Esbabı Mağlubiyeti ve Arnebudlar*) is relatively less known than Hüseyin Kazım’s *What Did the Albanians Do?*<sup>22</sup> As far as I know, Ali Birinci is the only scholar who has used this pamphlet in his book on the Entente Libérale but fails to note its link to the Balkan Wars.<sup>23</sup> Some other scholars, such as Bilgin Çelik and Georges Gawrych, do refer to another pamphlet authored by Ahmed Hamdi Paşa.<sup>24</sup> This piece includes some extracts from Capt. Ahmed Hamdi’s pamphlet that quote large portions of a pamphlet authored by another Ahmed Hamdi. Hakan Kazım Taşkıran, who published Ahmed Hamdi Paşa’s *Arnavutluk Hükümeti Hakkında Mütalaa-yı Muhtasara* in 2008, makes the same mistake by arguing that another book authored by Ahmed Hamdi Paşa entitled *Osmanlı Ordusunun Esbabı Mağlubiyeti ve Arnebudlar* is found in the National Library at Ankara.<sup>25</sup>

Capt. Ahmed Hamdi’s pamphlet is both an apology for what Albanians did during the war and a fierce political polemic with the Committee of Union and Progress.

Hamdi starts his pamphlet by emphasizing that neither he nor his friends belong to any political party, including Entente Libérale, because they are soldiers and believe that soldiers should not deal with politics. He swears in the name of God several times, since he wants to avoid Unionist accusations of being a traitor or possibly a reactionary, a charge often leveled against anyone trying to criticize the CUP.

According to Ahmed Hamdi, although everyone has an opinion about the reasons behind the defeat of the Ottoman army, he is one of the few men who know the truth. All reasons previously given were actually only minor issues; the main reason behind the defeat was the loss of unity within the army. Echoing the kinds of complaints about politicization of the military discussed further by Doğan Akyaz (chapter 27 in this volume), Ahmed Hamdi accuses the CUP of transforming the

whole army into a CUP club, resulting in the takeover of the parliament after the 1912 elections, which entailed an unprecedented use of the army. To Ahmed Hamdi, officers were not loyal to the army, the sultan, or the country anymore but only to the CUP. Actually, while the CUP leadership was aware of the dangers that an overpoliticization of the army might cause, Unionist officers assured power for the CUP members, thus explaining why they permitted the downfall of the state for their own party interests.

After explaining the conditions within the army at the beginning of the war while blaming CUP and its interference in military affairs as the real factor behind the defeat, Ahmed Hamdi responds to each accusation directed at Albanians. He says that some people, and particularly those within Unionist circles, speak of Albanian treason and try to claim that it was deserting Albanian soldiers that accounted for the defeat. He dismisses these charges not only as nonsense but as revanchist lies produced by Unionists. Critically, before proving that these are all lies, Ahmed Hamdi reminds his readers that he is a Turk on both his mother and father's side. Trying to distance himself from Albania and Albanian independence was especially crucial in a context where support for such views was often dismissed as partisan, pseudo-nationalistic apology.

Not only was the CUP at fault for the poor military performances in the Balkans, but Ahmed Hamdi also blames the party's policies of the previous four years for the disaster facing Albanians at the time. During the military campaign against northern Albanians in 1910, soldiers humiliated locals in front of their families by confiscating their guns. While all other groups in Macedonia remained armed from head to toe, CUP was playing into the enemies' hands by selectively taking guns away only from Albanians. Another major failure was the ill-fated implementation of the Law of Gangs, which specifically led to many leading Albanians being exiled or conscripted and sent to distant fronts like Erzurum or Yemen. With these measures, the "Zionist" CUP government aimed to destroy the presence of Albanians in the Balkans, the one collective group reportedly obstructing the CUP from accomplishing its numerous plots.

The Unionists' second campaign against Albanian Muslims started after the 1912 elections. The CUP at the time was trying to form a puppet parliament. It did its best to prevent Albanian deputies from being selected in order to assure control of the legislature. The Albanian response was a general uprising. During the skirmishes with the Ottoman army the defeated imperial forces lost most of their ammunition, which proved



catastrophic during the Balkan Wars, when there was an extreme shortage of bullets. Even more dangerous, mountain batteries were broken because of overuse against local insurgents.<sup>26</sup>

After mentioning the misbehavior of the CUP and army in their campaign to dominate the Albanians, Ahmed Hamdi asks: "What were we expecting from the Albanians who faced various outrages during last four years? They didn't forgive us because we took their guns from their hands." According to Ahmed Hamdi, no mutual trust between Albanians and army officers remained by the time of the Balkan Wars. Albanians called the officers renegades, and the officers accused Albanians of being infidels and lice. "Who can expect glory from such an army in which privates and officers do not rely on each other?"<sup>27</sup>

Despite these hostilities caused by the CUP, Ahmed Hamdi argues, Albanians remained loyal to the Ottoman state and caliphate. Although some groups were fighting for national ambitions in southern Albania, the majority of the Albanians did not show any sympathy to them. Reserve regiments composed of Albanian soldiers showed great valor and sacrificed their lives without hesitation. It was a shame and a sin to accuse these heroes of fleeing the battlefield instead of honoring their sacrifices.

According to Ahmed Hamdi, the reason for defeat in Kumanova was the army officers' lack of military abilities and the disorganization of the troops. Albanians started to desert when the army had already begun its retreat, doing so in order to protect their homes and families from the enemy invasion; they should not be blamed for this.

Ahmet Hamdi accepts the claims that in Ioannina (Yanya) Albanian reserve soldiers fled the battlefield and conducted some attacks on Ottoman units. This can be labeled betrayal. But a long history of humiliations and misbehavior by Ottoman army officers forced these Albanian soldiers to flee. Moreover, the attacks on Ottoman soldiers were organized by some bandit groups who were simultaneously plundering the local population.

In conclusion, after trying to prove that Albanians as a collective have not betrayed the Ottoman Empire, Ahmed Hamdi suggests that the people of Anatolia do not believe the Unionist lies about the so-called Albanian betrayal after they took power as a result of the "*Babıali* Event."<sup>28</sup> Partisan officers were the only ones responsible for the loss of so many lives in the Balkan Wars. Ahmed Hamdi speaks to his fellow readers as such: "Never forgive this cursed committee! Never give up cursing them!"<sup>29</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Although the two pamphlets were written for contradictory purposes, both writers were addressing the same readers: Anatolian Turks. They used the same familiar language mobilized for different causes. While Hüseyin Kazım was blaming Albanians and calling for Turks and Muslims in general to curse them, Ahmed Hamdi accused the CUP as the main source of the disaster and called on the same audience to curse the Unionists. Both writers highlighted that ethnically they were Turks in order to justify their arguments. In this regard only Hüseyin Kazım's arguments survived and in time became a part of Turkish nationalist discourse.

As Isa Blumi argues in this volume and elsewhere,<sup>30</sup> the Balkan Wars and World War I were crucial turning points in the post-Ottoman historiography; after these traumas a new way of imagining the past prevailed, in which people tended to think of competing "ethno-national" monoliths. These two pamphlets written between these two moments offer one of the first examples of this new way of imagining by accusing or defending "Albanians," who were thought to constitute and act as a monolith and thus contribute to the formation of a nationalist discourse. But they also reflect the prewar tensions in Ottoman politics, particularly where they accuse Ententists or Unionists and call people to curse them. Therefore they can be evaluated as examples of a transition from an Ottoman to a post-Ottoman world of politics.

## NOTES

1. İzzeddin Çalırlar, *On Yıllık Savaş*.
2. Traumas, as Vamik Volkan describes, are events during which a large group suffered loss or experienced helplessness and humiliation in a conflict with a neighboring group. Vamik Volkan, "Transgenerational Transmissions and 'Chosen Trauma': An Element of Large-Group Identity."
3. As one of the major contributions of Liah Greenfeld to the study of nationalism, the term "resentment" is used to refer to a form of existential envy toward other social actors. Greenfeld states that this form of envy is different from a mere feeling of hatred against another group. However, in the case of Turkish nationalism (and of course in the case of all multiethnic societies that experienced a kind of separatist ethno-national struggle), however, we should consider both meanings of the term. The envy toward the Western powers and hatred against the internal enemies or traitors simultaneously shaped the discourse of Turkish nationalism. For a more comprehensive discussion of the term, see Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism*.

4. For the impact of the wars on the republican elite, see Eric Jan Zürcher (chapter 23 in this volume).
5. Mehmet Akif Ersoy, "Hakkın Sesleri."
6. Fevzi Çakmak, *Batı Rumeli'yi Nasıl Kaybettik?*
7. <http://www.turkcuturanci.com/turkcu/turkcu-savascilardan-makaleler/icerideki-dusmanlarimiz-arnavutlar/>.
8. [http://forum.donanimhaber.com/m\\_24820941/tm.htm](http://forum.donanimhaber.com/m_24820941/tm.htm).
9. George Gawrych, "Ottoman Administration and the Albanians, 1908–1913," 372.
10. Süleyman Külçe, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Arnavutluk*, 424
11. Ibid., 373.
12. Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk'undan Anılar*, 316.
13. Ibid., 322.
14. Külçe, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Arnavutluk*.
15. İsmail Hakkı, "Osmanlılık İçinde Arnavudluk," *Tanin*, April 5, 1913; cited in Ayten Görgülü, "Arnavut Bağımsızlığının Osmanlı Gazetelerinden İncelenmesi," 82.
16. Hüseyin Kazım, *Arnavutlar Ne Yaptı?*
17. Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, *Balkanlar'dan Hicaz'a İmparatorluğun Tasfiyesi*.
18. İsmail Kara, "Kayd-ı İhtiraz," 2.
19. Hüseyin Kazım, *Rum Patriğine Açık Mektup—Boycot Müslümanların Hakkı Değil Midir* (İstanbul: Yeni Turan Matbaası, 1330 [1914]). For the transcription of this pamphlet, see Hasan Tamer Kerimoğlu, "1913–1914 Rumlara Karşı Boykot ve Hüseyin Kazım Bey'in Bir Risalesi." We know that Özege uses square brackets for names of which he is sure. In addition the authorship of these pamphlets has been accepted by scholars Hasan Tamer Kerimoğlu, Bilgin Çelik, Zafer Toprak, and Hamide Doğan, who all cite these pamphlets in their studies. My intent in this chapter is not to show how Hüseyin Kazım Kadri's ideas had changed with the Balkan defeat but to find out the origins of resentment against Albanians, so this question of authorship has only limited importance in terms of the larger issue.
20. Esat Toptani, a former Albanian deputy, was accused of assassinating Hasan Rıza Paşa in Shkodër, while Hasan Tahsin Paşa was accused of surrendering Salonika to the Greeks without a fight.
21. Hüseyin Kazım, *Rum Patriğine Açık Mektup*, 8.
22. Ahmed Hamdi, *Osmanlı Ordusunun Esbabı Mağlubiyeti ve Arnebudlar*.
23. Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*.
24. Bilgin Çelik, *İttihatçılar ve Arnavutlar II*; and Gawrych, "Ottoman Administration and the Albanians."
25. Hakan Kazım Taşkıran, ed., *Osmanlı'nın Son Dönemi ve Arnavutlar*, 8.
26. Albanians who saw that these cannons were not used against the enemy during the Balkan Wars were saying: "Mori, they have bought these cannons for us, but not for the enemy" (Hamdi, *Osmanlı Ordusunun Esbabı*, 25).
27. Ibid., 25–26.
28. On January 23, 1913, CUP took power via a coup d'état. The Kamil Paşa government was forced to resign; thereafter the CUP established single-party rule, which would end in 1918.
29. Hamdi, *Osmanlı Ordusunun Esbabı*, 40–41.
30. Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*.

## The Legacy and Impacts of the Defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 on the Psychological Makeup of the Turkish Officer Corps

*Doğan Akyaz*

The Balkan Wars are considered the most disastrous defeat in Turkish military history. As a result of this defeat, the Ottoman Empire lost its European territories (“Avrupa-i Osmani” or “Rumeli-i Şahane”), the regions that had been regarded as the Ottoman homeland for centuries. While the defeat has been described with the most negative adjectives in Turkish military sources, a number of military and political explanations are offered to explain it. Among the most important was that the Ottoman officer corps conducted the war with political calculations rather than with strict military strategy. A deterministic link between “defeat” and “politics” (politicization of the military) has thus been established.<sup>1</sup> This claim, born out of the traumatic results of the defeat, found acceptance in the collective conscious of the military, with some significant consequences for the future development of the Republican-era Turkish military. Such a reading of the wars has been transferred to the next generations of Turkish officers through their military education. Even today a Turkish officer who is asked what the Balkan Wars bring to mind would first argue that the defeat was caused by the politicization of the military.

The goal of this chapter is to show how the deterministic link between “defeat” and “politics,” as established after the Balkan Wars, is used in Turkey as a major reference point to separate the military from politics today.<sup>2</sup> In other words, the goal is to weigh the role of the defeat in the Balkan Wars in the construction of the rhetoric against the Turkish

military's involvement in politics since the end of the Ottoman Empire. In order to justify restraining the medium- and lower-level officer corps from becoming involved in politics, it is imperative to develop a narrative, woven with real-life situations, in addition to legal, socioeconomic, and ideological tools that justify the prohibition. By providing a powerful narrative, the Balkan Wars in this sense complemented the rhetoric of the separation of the military from politics since the 1920s. To ground such arguments, this study charts the psychological makeup of the Turkish officers in relation to the Balkan Wars, under what conditions such a reading of the wars came to emerge, and which themes determined this perception. Thus this chapter sheds some light on the following paradoxical issue: while the Turkish military did everything it could to separate each "individual" officer with varying ranks in its hierarchy from politics, why has the Turkish military been the most influential actor in Turkish politics as an "institution"?

#### THE POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY OR THE MILITARIZATION OF POLITICS?

It is well established that the politicization of the Ottoman military was closely tied to the processes of modernization. Thus it may be helpful to provide a short historical context for the pre-Balkan Wars period, particularly in relation to the dynamics of the relationship between the military and politics.

The Ottoman military was one of the institutions at the core of Ottoman modernization; the notion that the state could renew its previous strength and glory by linking to the modernization of the military was especially popular during the transfer of military technology from the West. In this respect the modernization of the military also resituated the military at the receiving end of many other nonmilitary influences. The Western culture and the accumulated knowledge it embodied entered the Ottoman realm through the military. Thus the military, to be modernized so that the state could renew its strength, not only started gaining a new outlook but also turned out to be one of the institutions that initiated the evolution of the Ottoman state.

In such a period of modernization some of the international contexts as well as the domestic political conditions in the empire and some developments within the army placed the Ottoman military at the heart of political developments in a short time. The rebellions, wars, and constant loss of territory kept the military on the agenda of any political debate

inside the Ottoman elite circles. Therefore the efforts from the second half of the nineteenth century onward to save the empire and help regain its previous strength often focused on the military in general and its officer corps in particular.

One reason for the politicization of the Ottoman military and officer corps was the internal political developments. For instance, some members of the Ottoman military were active on the road to the First Constitutional period, aligning themselves with the intellectuals and demanding the announcement of the Kanun-i Esasi (Ottoman constitution) in 1876. The struggle for liberty against Abdülhamid II that started right after the dissolution of the Ottoman parliament in 1878 under the sultan's orders, and the annulment of the Ottoman constitution thereafter, also featured some members of the military. Young and idealist officers who had completed their education in the European-style military schools and thus had access to the vocabulary of modern political thought in particular became the defenders of the struggle against the regime of Abdülhamid II.

In Macedonia, for instance, the young officers from the Third Army worked hand in hand with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The beginnings of the Second Constitutional period in 1908 became possible largely as a result of continued assistance from the military. The March 31 incident (the counter coup of 1909) and the entrance of the Action Army (Hareket Ordusu) into Istanbul, followed by the three-year period of martial law, always kept the Ottoman military at the center of politics.

The politicization of the military was also furthered by the difficult economic conditions and their influence on the Ottoman military. The Ottoman state often failed to pay the wages of military personnel on time—wages that were not even at the level of sustenance to begin with. The unfair procedures for promotions as well as the growing conflicts between the officers risen from the ranks (*alaylı*) and the ones with a military degree (*mektepli*), between the ones with degrees from War Academies (*kurmay*) and those without them, and between the old and young officers contributed further to the politicization of the military. A number of officers whose professional military needs were unmet left the military for political careers.<sup>3</sup>

As a result, before the Balkan Wars the Ottoman officer corps not only was active in daily politics but was also an important ally for those who wanted to secure further political gains, rendering the military both a stage for political struggle and a clear actor. In other words, both as an

*individual* and as part of an *institution*, the Ottoman soldier became an important part of politics, representing different political attitudes ranging from those of the radicals to those of the moderates in the political spectrum. Interestingly, while the Ottoman military was in the process of further politicization, the political scene paralleled the pattern, experiencing the militarization of politics: political actors came to use the power of the military in their favor against their opponents, which can also be called the “coup mentality.”

The political parties of the post-1908 period often used the officer corps as leverage to come to power through coups—an attitude shared by both the CUP and its opponents. For instance, during the Albanian rebellion that had already created a state of governmental crisis in Istanbul, the Halaskâr Zâbitan (literally “savior officers”) faction deepened the crisis when it overthrew the Küçük Said Paşa government. The group was composed of and had close contacts with some officers from the military and some unhappy retired military personnel. The Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (Party of Freedom and Accord; PFA) also wanted to manipulate the military through the Zâbitan Grubu.<sup>4</sup>

At this point it is important to draw attention to an important element in the Ottoman-Turkish political scene. Both the political parties in power and the ones in opposition attributed a central role to the military in their ideological makeup and thus in their corresponding political struggles as a possible actor. In the Turkish political scene this tendency, which is known as the CUP tradition (*İttihatçı gelenek*) in popular rhetoric and can be summarized with the formula military plus political party equals road to power, simply cannot be seen as peculiar to the CUP because it was shared by all Ottoman intellectuals and political parties.<sup>5</sup> This tradition, seen as an indicator of immaturity or the lack of democratic culture, actually played an important role in justifying or at least inspiring the politicization of the military during the Second Constitutional Period.

Many reasons to explain the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars were put forth in the official military publications and memoirs by the officers, often expressed in the context “Why were we defeated?” or “lessons learned.” Some of these explanations concerned the political mistakes made before the start of the war. Yet for the most part the explanations can be seen as self-criticisms, because they pointed out the military practices that shaped the outcomes of the Balkan Wars, often framed in historical continuity and thus branching out from the immediate context of the war.

These criticisms, expressed in a bitter tone, largely focused on issues ranging from lack of morale, education, training, and equipment to the incompetence of the soldiers as well as the problems of the management of the army.

For instance the Ottoman army, due to decades of negligence during the reign of Abdülhamid II, was ill prepared to fight a multifront war. The primary weakness was in the poor training and subsequent lack of discipline, because the army's primary duty in the preceding decades often had been to quell rebellions, functioning more as a gendarme or police.<sup>6</sup> The army lacked the necessary discipline, so the strategic designs prepared prior to the Balkan Wars were not followed; the army ended up being scattered, with the areas of troop concentration and weapon supplies poorly chosen.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, although initially the army was organized to maintain a defensive position, the campaign actually began with an assault upon the insistence of Nazım Paşa, the deputy commander-in-chief.<sup>8</sup> The subsequent chaos, predictable considering the prewar conditions of poor preparation and misallocated strategic positioning, meant that a military defeat was guaranteed.

Perhaps the most glaring factors that contributed to defeat in the first Balkan War were the poor state of Ottoman military logistics and deficiencies in administrative service. This was most evident in the disharmony within the Office of Mobilization, which led to the subsequent hunger among the ranks; a lack of ammunition; the emergence of disease (see Oya Dağlar Macar's discussion in chapter 9 in this volume); and problems with transportation. All these difficulties that contributed to the huge losses in Ottoman military personnel originate directly from the poor development of the officer corps.<sup>9</sup>

In particular the military reforms in the aftermath of the Young Turk revolution contributed significantly to the lack of officers within the military. After 1908 steps were taken to revoke the military promotions awarded during the Hamidian period. Furthermore, with the Law for the Clearance of Ranks (*Tasfiye-i Rütüb Kanunu*) in 1909, all ranked military personnel with the exception of foreign officers and princes (*şehzade*) were subject to specific legal arrangements. This law led to the contraction of the military ranks because it dismissed many officers from service. The second legal arrangement that further deprived the Ottoman military of ranked officers was the attempt to rejuvenate the officer corps by introducing age limits for service. For instance the law of January 11, 1911, that changed the age limits for the officer corps resulted in the retirement of 7,500 officers who had risen from the ranks (*alaylı*). Such



arrangements led to a significant contraction of the number of officers in the Ottoman land forces from 26,310 officers in 1908 to only 16,121 by 1911, a decrease of 10,189 officers. It is true that this rejuvenated the officer corps and introduced a level of compatibility, but such a comprehensive readjustment that failed to calculate its administrative side effects created a dearth of officers across the land forces, with clear consequences in the unfolding of the Balkan Wars.<sup>10</sup> As noted by several observers, the lack of noncommissioned officers who were supposed to bridge the gap between the officers and privates caused a significant reduction in the troops' abilities to conduct the war.<sup>11</sup> Tragically the "reform" of the Ottoman military from the end of the Hamidian era, a process that saw the disbandment of the most experienced soldiers, did not translate into a more efficient and functional military. The new units recruited in the stead of the old guard were clearly unprepared to fight in 1912. Many were reportedly ordered to conduct assaults on trained enemy soldiers without any proper training.<sup>12</sup>

Issues with the lack of coordination between the upper and lower levels of the army became widespread with the outbreak of war.<sup>13</sup> Incompetence, disobedience,<sup>14</sup> unfamiliarity with battle techniques, and especially the lack of discipline due to the deterioration of a feeling of unity in the first days of the war, combined with the commanders' lack of foresight in their administration of the army, all culminated in the now famous *bozgun* (debacle).<sup>15</sup> "[T]he upper command seemed to be utterly unqualified" during the Balkan Wars.<sup>16</sup> In fact the war had been lost when the decision was made to enter it with an army that had been in total disorder to begin with.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to these reasons, one observation as to why the war was lost was common to all the sources that dealt with the reasons for the defeat: the politicization of the military, spearheaded by the officer corps. Before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars the Ottoman army forgot the art of war and was instead obsessed with politics.<sup>18</sup> The role played in the defeat by the politicization of the military and the corresponding divisions within the army along the lines of political parties likewise was reflected in the memoirs of high-ranking officers like Abdullah Paşa, Zeki Paşa, and Mahmud Muhtar Paşa as well as in those by the lower-ranking officers.

According to Abdullah Paşa, who was the commander of the Eastern Army during the Balkan Wars, it was the revolution of 1908 and the March 31 incident that destroyed the ties of brotherhood among the officer corps. These political developments in the first decade of the twentieth century caused the politicization of the officer corps. Abdullah

Paşa argued that the revolution of 1908 in particular spoiled the lower-ranking officers in the military. The subsequent politicization led to a psychological erosion in the army, which he concluded played a role in the defeat:

Particularly in recent times, the involvement of some officers in politics, to the extent that they now could exert influence and power on the political scene, created personal issues among the officers, destroying the unity of action, progress of work, and more importantly the strict discipline that is the most major element in a successful warfare. We started the war with an army that lacked discipline and proper equipment and with an army whose officers were obsessed with coup d'états. Therefore, when these aspects are to be considered and weighed carefully, it will not be necessary to criticize and curse the poor nation and the commanders but only the politicians and the ones who rendered the military thus.<sup>19</sup>

Another observation of the poor performance of the officer corps during the Balkan Wars provided by Mahmud Muhtar Paşa highlighted the devastating effects of the countercoup of 1909 and of the entrance of the Action Army (*Hareket Ordusu*) into the capital on April 11, 1909. After this crisis the Ottoman military evolved to become comparable to the former Janissary corps:

the enthusiasm and zeal that revived in the first year of the Constitutional period eroded as a result of the March 31 Incident or more correctly after the entrance of the Action Army into Istanbul on April 11. The incorrect decision to reduce the ranks of some officers destroyed the chain of command in the army, leaving the troops under the command of incompetent soldiers. Their involvement in politics, the resultant bickering between rivals, and actions that threatened the order and loyalty of soldiers became commonplace activities among the officers. At times these attitudes even amounted to open sedition by the corps; the older generations did not tolerate each other, and the younger officers were in disarray.<sup>20</sup>

The inherent dangers of the politicization of the officer corps in a way reflected the consensus among the higher-ranking officers about involvement in politics Mahmud Muhtar Paşa wrote:

The worst disaster for an army...is the preoccupation of the young officers with nonmilitary duties such as the attempts to reorder their country and army, change the law and legislation, put the government under their control, and establish associations and communities in order to exert influence on the political actions of the State. Before the Constitutional Revolution, these attitudes were extant in the Third Army, where the revolution itself had been in the making. Later these attitudes were instilled into the First and Second Armies.<sup>21</sup>

He added:

Following the entrance of the Action Army into Istanbul, the army became vulnerable to the desires of the young officers with ties to the CUP. Later on, while some of the officers became members of the PFA, some other officers formed the Halaskâr Zâbitan faction. Those officers with lower ranks brewed enmity toward the higher-ranking officers, which was likewise the case between those without degrees from War Academies and those who had them [*kurmay*].<sup>22</sup>

The memoirs of Zeki Paşa, the commander of the Vardar Army during the Balkan Wars, explained how the Kumanova battle turned out to be a defeat despite the low death toll. For Zeki Paşa, the defeat was a result of “the indifference of the officer corps toward their duties, the failure to stimulate the spiritual strength of the soldiers that tends to prove significant in warfare, the lack of comprehension of the major techniques of administrating the course of battle, particularly the lack of sway of the orders given by the higher-ups on the lower-level officers, and involvement in nonmilitary business instead of being loyal to their military responsibility and duty.” What Zeki Paşa meant by “nonmilitary business” is clear: “since the beginning of the Second Constitutional era, some officers, with involvement in domestic politics, violated the rule of military discipline, which is the most important rule of every army. These officers thus damaged the spiritual integrity of the army and its chain of command by destroying the sense of order and purpose for those officers who observed what had been taking place.”<sup>23</sup>

Similarly Fevzi Çakmak pointed out how the politicization of the army damaged its capability to fight a war: “Up until the time when the 1st Division arrived in Albania from Istanbul, it had an extraordinary

pattern of discipline and hierarchy. It embodied perfection in military training, and the division functioned almost mechanically. Its column formations were orderly and the column depth was as specified in the field manual. This orderly division was decayed as a result of the activities of a few officers who were preoccupied with politics. It lost its spiritual integrity, and a deepening sense of mistrust came to develop between the soldiers and officers and between the officers and their commanders. That orderly division disgraced itself.”<sup>24</sup>

While such snippets from the memoirs by higher-ranking officers provide the necessary perspective on the effects of the politicization of the army on its conduct, it becomes more difficult to measure the similar effects on the lower-level corps. Some sources provide details, however, albeit limited in scope, on how the political polarization manifested in the CUP and PFA split in the army had effects on its war capabilities.

For example, Galip Vardar explained how the politicization of the officers was translated into the course of things that took place on the field: “all of the older *paşas* in the higher-ranking posts brewed enmity toward the younger officers, and the former mostly belonged to the PFA and Halaskâr Zâbitan faction. The younger officers were extremely unhappy about how their country was run. They could not pay attention to their duties. Moreover, they purposefully refused to execute the orders coming from the older generation, whom they regarded as traitors and evildoers.”<sup>25</sup>

In a similar manner Hüsametdin Ertürk argued that “the commanders and the older officers, with years of service in the corps, were mostly sympathizers of the PFA, rather fitting with their support for the sultan and caliph. The younger officers in contrast were all supporters of the CUP. The goal of the latter was to overthrow the PFA, come to control the administration, and achieve new victories and conquests through warfare. These two factions in the officer corps did not listen to each other, and the orders coming out of either were rejected by the other on purpose.”<sup>26</sup> Ali Fethi (Okyar) also pointed out how the political differences made the army lack unity of purpose: “So many terrifying things happened during the war. The way the officers wore their *kalpaks* [Turkic headgear] was reflective of their affiliation with either the CUP or the PFA. Who created this chasm in the army? Could anyone whose love for their homeland surpasses their own ambitions come to terms with such a betrayal?”<sup>27</sup>

At times this state of political turmoil within the army amounted to personal confrontations as well. According to Rahmi Apak, the commander of the Fifth Army Corps, Kara Said Paşa, who had an affinity

with the PFA, had a fight in the headquarters of field administration with Col. Efe Kazım, who had ties to the CUP. The colonel got his pistol out and tried to shoot his commander, but the pistol did not fire.<sup>28</sup> Fevzi Çakmak narrated a similar episode where a captain wounded another officer as a result of such political factionalism and was later put under arrest.<sup>29</sup>

Such political confrontations continued uninterrupted even when two officers with differing political views were held captive by the enemy. According to Fevzi Çakmak, "having been terribly defeated in the war, some officers still quarreled over politics, opponents fired at each other, and, strangest of all, the officers did not even stop fighting when being held captive by the enemy."<sup>30</sup> Such extracts from various memoirs do not form a minority impression but prove to be common to most depictions of the events. The sheer number of comparable observations by officers with varying ranks exposes a terrible state of affairs in the military that had significant repercussions at the outbreak of war. These internal challenges were only exasperated, by the way, in regard to the poor integration of the numbers of diverse non-Muslim soldiers who enthusiastically joined after 1908. During the course of the war non-Muslim soldiers started to desert, often in a state of rebellion. It was frequently reported that many of these non-Muslim soldiers also spied on the Ottoman army.<sup>31</sup> The Ottoman military was clearly in a state of functional decline at the beginning of the Balkan Wars, which proved to have had a long-term impact.

#### THE IMPACT OF THE BALKAN WARS ON THE MILITARY

The immediate impacts of the defeat in the Balkan Wars on the military and officer corps were manifold: damage to the reputation of officers; the emergence of self-doubt; and the return of calls for the reform of the army. As can be gleaned from the testimonials of veterans, the defeat led to the emergence of a number of harsh criticisms directed explicitly at the officer corps. As A. Turan Alkan emphasized, the following words by an Ottoman officer reflected how much the defeat damaged the concept of the military and all the other traditional notions associated with it:

the military [was]...of great importance to the nation, existing in order to protect the constitution: did the army waste millions of liras that the nation borrowed from elsewhere to fund the army so that it could lose half of the nation in fifteen days? After having

paid taxes to provide for the army, having been enlisted regardless of whether they could be of help or not, and having fought the enemy when they were poorly clothed and hungry, only to lose their lives in mud, is it really necessary to provide for the army and have a different flag to protect, if we are to lose immediately what we deem to be the territories of our fathers and mothers? Is not it better to hire some watchmen, be it Croat or Kazakh, instead of being destroyed like this?<sup>32</sup>

The defeat also led to the emergence of self-questioning in the army. People sensed that the greater politicization of the army caused many problems that needed to be avoided for the well-being of the nation in the future. In the words of Ali İhsan Sabis:

from now on every *paşa*, officer, and higher-up in the army should become preoccupied with the love of duty, appreciate his duties and responsibilities, and avoid dealing with civic questions and duties such as why the alliance was formed with that state and not with this one and why that person became the minister or governor and not this one. Instead they should prefer training twenty soldiers or solving the problems of the positioning of soldiers in the field or having a couple of training missions for their units. Instead of reading a political piece in a newspaper or a book elaborating on philosophy, they should try to enjoy reading and understanding the field manuals related to warfare.<sup>33</sup>

Officers clearly developed the belief that the army and particularly the higher officers should only be preoccupied with things military in nature.

As for the subsequent military reforms seen as another legacy of the defeat, it is important to point out that such reforms had been an important component of the agenda since the beginning of the Constitutional period. Though much had been invested in reforming the military prior to the Balkan Wars, the efforts yielded few results because of the rampant politicization of the officer corps. Immediately after the defeat in the Balkan Wars, even before any peace treaty, attempts were made to restructure the land forces, with the goal of reviving the synergy of the troops, in accordance with the guidance by the German officers.<sup>34</sup> Interestingly, the German emperor Wilhelm II told the head of the German Board for Military Reform, General Liman von Sanders, who was on his

way to Istanbul, that "it does not matter for you whether the younger Turks or the older ones are steering the course of things. You will only be preoccupied with the army. Remove the politicization from the Ottoman military, because politicization is the biggest problem they have."<sup>35</sup>

Reforming the land forces entailed abolishing the *redif* and *müstahfiz* (territorial reserve) systems, followed by the creation of the army corps (*kolordu*). Each army corps was provided the necessary number of units. The Office of Mobilization, which received many criticisms during the Balkan Wars for its misdoings, was restructured in accordance with the recent wartime experiences. The headquarters of the War Ministry and Navy Ministry were reformed accordingly, and new programs got underway to reform the military schools, training schools, and training fields. On February 14, 1913, the Regulations for the General Military Administration were issued, but the outbreak of World War I did not provide any time or space for their application.<sup>36</sup> Thus what can be seen as the nucleus of the Ottoman military that was to fight in World War I took shape in a short period of military reform.

After the defeat in the Balkan Wars, the reforms directed by the War Ministry of Enver Paşa constituted an important component. What is known as the "Clearance of Ranks" (Tensikat) in the army not only was intended to make the officer corps younger but was seen as an important vehicle to depoliticize the army.<sup>37</sup> In fact, even though Enver Paşa was a quintessential politicized officer, he started taking the necessary measures to depoliticize the military once he became the war minister. Enver Paşa paid attention to military discipline and made sure that the military training was extremely intense so that the officers would not even have time to deal with nonmilitary business.<sup>38</sup>

As a more important legacy, however, Enver Paşa, who believed that the military could become superior through the control of dynamic and knowledgeable commanders, started clearing the ranks in the land forces and the navy. The clearance particularly involved those officers who failed in the Balkan Wars, and commanders who lacked knowledge, skills, and competency were given retirement. Yet such a military reform undertaken by the Unionist faction, as embodied in the persons of Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa, also led to the retirement of many officers who had graduated before Enver and Cemal from the military schools and who were opposed to their political projects. This signals that the operation to cleanse the army was motivated not only by military concerns but also by political ones.<sup>39</sup> This clearance of the ranks also meant that the Ottoman Empire entered World War I with an officer corps that gained important

positions in the military during the early years of their careers. With a few exceptions, it was these officers who also led the Turkish War of Independence.<sup>40</sup>

Enver Paşa's attempts to clear the ranks came after the major transformation of the military as an institution: the coup of 1912 (Bâb-ı Âli Baskını), spearheaded by Enver Bey when he held the rank of major in the army. The coup was carried out on January 23, 1912—between the First and Second Balkan Wars—and was justified on the grounds that the government of Kamil Paşa was about to hand over Edirne to the enemy. Yet Azmi Bey, who became the head of the police after the coup on the orders of Enver Bey, started an investigation of the coup. He concluded that it was a public “protest” (*nümayiş*) involving thousands of people and thus categorized the coup as an “unsolved” political murder.<sup>41</sup> In reality the coup of 1912, which was carried out by only a handful of fearless people, placed the military as an institution at the heart of politics: the Unionist officers became the sole authority in their capacity as both soldiers and politicians.

As a result the military in a way ceased to be a national force, losing its objective position. In the end the concept of a coup d'état became part of Turkish political life. Despite lacking *de jure* legitimacy, the coup became an important practical tool for political actors to gain access to power.<sup>42</sup>

The defeat in the Balkan Wars also left a number of important psychological legacies. The memoirs of several contemporaries clearly reveal a sense of what can be done to make up for the defeat. Interestingly their comments often did not extend to speculating about how the empire would regain the territories lost to their Balkan enemies. Instead these postwar writings consider how to reclaim the fame and honor of the Turkish officer that had been lost with the defeat. Fighting a war was often seen as an important occasion to recover what was lost.<sup>43</sup> This would certainly prove a motivational factor behind the push to enter World War I.

Before the Ottoman Empire entered World War I, the commander general Enver Paşa reportedly awaited for such an occasion “to cleanse the dark stains of the Balkan Wars.” Indeed in his August 1914 declaration of war he said: “To cleanse the dark stains of the Balkan Wars, our military will have to do anything in their capacity to realize the goals of our sultan through divine patronage.”<sup>44</sup> Despite the heroic deeds on some fronts like the Dardanelles, Yemen, and Iraq, however, the Ottoman military once again experienced defeat in World War I. Revenge for the Balkan Wars would have to wait until the War of Independence.



In addition to these consequences of the Balkan Wars, the defeat left a number of long-term political and military legacies for the Turkish Republic. These included the popular belief among officers that coups as tools of change could help initiate periodic reform and clearance in the army. The Balkan Wars also taught the Republican era military leadership about the negative consequences of confrontations between the governing party and the opposition and the corresponding lack of confidence in political parties. This suggested that the only safe way to power was to assure that the military kept out of politics.

When all these legacies are critically analyzed, we can clearly argue that these factors provided the necessary ground of legitimacy for the military to be an important political actor in the Republican period. The following section discusses how the deterministic link between “defeat” and “politicization of the army” continued to function in the Republican period, at times interrupted and at times unchanged.

#### THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT: DEFEAT AND POLITICS

The most important lesson learned from the Balkan Wars was the link established between defeat and politicization of the army, so the notion of keeping the officer as an “individual” out of politics became an important part of the agenda after the Balkan Wars. Yet since 1908 some higher-ranking officers as well as the higher-ups in civilian bureaucracy had been underlining the necessity for the military to stick to its actual duties. Such an effort to depoliticize the officer corps in essence had begun with the politicization of the officer corps.

A quick look at the memoranda and regulations issued by the Ministry of War shows that since 1908 the ministry had asked the officers to obey the structures of the military hierarchy. It warned them against all kinds of activity that were political in nature: being involved in politics; giving speeches; attending political meetings; writing opinion pieces; criticizing or exposing military activities; becoming the columnist-in-chief or head of the editorial office in a newspaper (with the exception of retired and auxiliary officers); and being active in theaters. All the measures that were in place to make sure that the civil servants provided impartial service to the public, such as the ban against any affiliation with a political party and the requirement to sign a document so stating, were also extended to officers and ordinary soldiers. They were asked to take an oath accordingly, vowing on their sacred books. Those who refused to

take the oath and/or sign the necessary documentation were punished. In fact these measures of depoliticization were extended to the extreme: the officers and enlisted men were banned from voting during their time of military service.<sup>45</sup> Such provisions in memoranda and regulations primarily attempted to keep the soldiers out of politics and force them to bond with their actual military duties. If this principle failed to materialize, the military, whose actual duty was to protect the state, could very well steer the course of things toward an utter collapse amid political turmoil.

Involvement in politics was not punishable, however, because the Military Penal Code made no mention of it. Until the Manastır incident the lack of legal grounding continued unchanged, and the military tried to force its members to bond with their original duties without a legal basis.<sup>46</sup> After the Manastır incident, however, Mahmut Şevket Paşa, the minister of war at the time, prepared the first draft legislation, entitled Draft Legislation Prepared as Supplemental to the Military Penal Code with the Purpose of Prohibiting the Military Personnel from Being Involved in Politics (*Mensubîn-i Askeriyyenin Siyâsiyat ile Men'i İştigali Zımında Askeri Ceza Kanuna Zeyl Olmak Üzere Tanzim Olunan Lâyiha-ı Kanuniyye*), which quite ironically did not pass into law as a result of the collapse of the government after the efforts of the Halaskâr Zâbitan faction. The subsequent Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa government passed into law the Temporary Legislation Supplemental to the Military Penal Code (*Askeri Ceza Kanunu'na Müzeyyel Kanun-ı Muvakkat*), which provided a legal framework for subsequent dismissals from the army on the basis of an officer's political activity, whether establishing political parties, simply attending political meetings and protests, publishing opinion pieces, or giving speeches.

Despite the existence of such harsh penalties in the pre-Balkan War period, the legislation did not prove effective in depoliticizing the military. The political parties (both the CUP and its opponents) continued to use the military as a vehicle to come to power. It is also relevant that the governments taking such legal measures were themselves products of some political faction within the army. This paradox probably ultimately explains why effective reform through legislation never materialized.<sup>47</sup>

The mantra that the military must be kept out of politics found its first real moment of application during the Turkish War of Independence and early Republican period. During these tumultuous months depoliticizing of the lower-level officer corps, in particular, took place. In the Grand National Assembly of the early 1920s, a set of legislations dated

June 5, 1920, and September 5, 1920 (article 4 of the Nisab-ı Müzakere Kanunu) regulated the civil servant status of military personnel. According to article 4, no one could hold a public office and serve in the National Assembly at the same time, with the exception of ministry positions in the cabinet, consular office, and offices of the higher command of the military and army corps. In other words, only the higher-ranking commanders of the military and army corps were given the legal framework to serve in the National Assembly while still holding their previous military office. This ostensibly meant that the lower- and middle-ranking officers were legally distanced from politics. In the end this measure secured a place for high-ranking officers in national politics.

After the declaration of the Republic, belief in the necessity to keep the military out of politics gained support at the group meeting of the Republican Party in the early days of December 1923. The corresponding 385th Legislation entitled Legislation of Relevant Regulations for All Military Personnel Who Have Been or Will Be Selected for the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM'ne İntihab Edilen ve Edilecek Olan Bilumum Mensubîn-i Askeriye'nin Tâbi Olacakları Şerait Hakkında Kanun) was passed into law in the first legislative period of the National Assembly. Settling the issue once and for all, the law mandated that members of the parliament could not hold military offices at the same time.<sup>48</sup>

While such regulations were underway to keep military personnel out of politics, another set of constitutional and legal arrangements helped the military as an institution gain an independent status, thus enabling it to play a controversial role from the early years of the Republic onward. In this sense the authority given to Mustafa Kemal by the Legislation of the Commander General (1921) constituted the first steps toward such a status for the military. The Commission of War (Harp Encümeni) (1922), which was the framework responsible for the national defense, provided the nucleus for later institutional traditions because of its extra-governmental nature. With the legislation of 1920 on the selection of the executive branch of the National Assembly, the chief of the Turkish General Staff gained a seat in the cabinet as a minister with a uniform, which can only be explained by the general conditions of the War of Independence and the corresponding concern with running the political and military organs of the state in harmony. With the 429th Legislation of 1924, the Ministry of General Officers (Erkanı Harbiye-yi Umumiye Vekaleti) was turned into an independent organizational framework, as the Office of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff. These institutional

choices, which rendered this office legally above the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense and independent of the Office of the Prime Ministry, thus gave it an independent space for action. This relationship continued unchanged until the end of Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak's term as the chief of the General Staff.

Only after Çakmak's term was the Office of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff placed under the control of the Office of the Prime Ministry. The Higher Military Council (Âli Askeri Şûra) of 1925 strengthened the position of the military within the political system. But the Higher Assembly of Defense and its General Secretariat (Yüksek Müdafaa Meclisi ve Umumi Katipliği, 1933), which were the continuations of the Commission of War (Harp Encümeni) of 1922, and the Higher Council of National Defense (Milli Savunma Yüksek Kurulu, 1949), which was a later creation, can be considered the first steps on the road to the National Security Council of today, making the military an important component of the national defense policies.<sup>49</sup>

When the independent status of the Office of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff as well as the relevant legal arrangements are carefully considered, it is clear that these arrangements secured a central role in the political system for the military. This proved to be a far cry from earlier conclusions that the military should be banished from politics. When this new role given to the military is analyzed, the military clearly emerged first as the supporter of the Kemalist revolution and then as the active protector force of the regime. To this end the access of the political opposition groups to the military was curtailed, and it became invulnerable to any investigative power of the National Assembly. The total control of Mustafa Kemal over the army was established with the emergence of the Office of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff as an independent directorate. Mustafa Kemal's control over the military became institutionalized with the Higher Military Legislation.

The opposition of some *paşas* to this configuration did not produce any result: they failed to control the military, and their demands were reduced to a mere call for the military to have a referee status in the political discussions in the National Assembly. None of the *paşas* were convicted in the trials in the Turkish Revolutionary Courts (İstiklâl Mahkemeleri) of those responsible for the İzmir assassination attempt against Mustafa Kemal, but the military opposition was completely excised from political life. Fevzi Çakmak, who did not oppose Mustafa Kemal's concept of "single-man" (*tek adam*) rule, was given full authority over the military.<sup>50</sup>

In this struggle toward a particular perception of the Balkan Wars by the military and officer corps, the role of Fevzi Çakmak proved crucial. Çakmak graduated from the War Academy in 1898 and served in important positions in various units in the Balkans. During the Balkan Wars, for instance, he was the head of the First Branch (Battle Branch) of the Vardar Army. In the Republican period he was a member of the Turkish Assembly as a general officer from August 5, 1921, to March 3, 1924. His service as the chief of Turkish General Staff lasted for two decades, from March 3, 1924, to January 12, 1944, ending only due to the age limits placed on service.<sup>51</sup> He was the first officer that Mustafa Kemal asked to resign from his position in the Turkish Assembly due to the law that prohibited the holding of military and civilian offices at the same time, and Çakmak duly complied. He did not want the military to be part of politics because of his experience of the defeat in the Balkan Wars.

In addition to the lectures that Çakmak gave and the books that he wrote on the Balkan Wars, he also contributed to the historiography of the Balkan Wars by encouraging officers who served during the wars to write their memoirs. Maj. Gen. Hüsnü Ersü mentions that Fevzi Çakmak gave the following order in one of his conferences: "Those who lived through those historical days [in reference to the Balkan Wars] could serve our nation and military best by shedding light in reference to their memoirs and notes on what has been uncovered in these previous wars, by completing what is missing and correcting wrong information in the works written on these wars. By doing so they could provide a good and truthful source for the future works on our history of warfare."<sup>52</sup>

The theme of "lessons learned from the Balkan Wars" was a constant point of reference during discussions about the importance of depoliticizing the officer corps, not only in the early years of the Republic but also throughout Republican history.<sup>53</sup> The theme played a particularly important role because it demonstrated that such efforts to keep the army out of politics required not only legal support but also a set of socio-economic and ideological tools as well as a supporting narrative drawn from real-life experiences.<sup>54</sup> In this regard the Balkan Wars provided the necessary narrative for the younger officer corps being trained in Turkish military schools to keep politics separate from the military. Indeed even today the first example given to illustrate the necessity of keeping the military out of politics is the Balkan Wars. To prove this assertion, it is helpful to examine how the Balkan Wars have been integrated into the curriculum of the Turkish military school system.

### THE BALKAN WARS AS A TEACHING TOOL

In the military high schools that feed students to the Military Academies (Harp Okulları), which are the main source of officers, the Balkan Wars are taught within the course entitled the Revolutionary History of the Turkish Republic and Atatürkism.<sup>55</sup> The wars are addressed particularly within the context of their causes and consequences. The causes of the war that are emphasized are the nationalism that emerged roughly at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the multinational makeup of the Ottoman Empire, and Russian propaganda in the communities in the Balkan Peninsula in the second half of the nineteenth century and the international competition over the Ottoman territories. The particular emphasis in the reason for the defeat is on the disbandment of experienced soldiers and “the lack of harmony among the commanders.” The consequences of the war include the territories lost as a result of the defeat. The argument is made that the Ottoman state was so weak that it could not even handle the pressures from much smaller Balkan states. The CUP administration initiated a series of military reforms and the beginnings of the alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Germany.<sup>56</sup>

On the level of the curriculum in the military high schools, “the lack of harmony among the commanders” is the phrase used instead of the politicization of the military. But the teachers explain this phrase during the course of instruction and frame it as a consequence of the political disagreements and factionalism in the army. Thus this deterministic link between the politicization of the military and the defeat is imprinted in the minds of the young officer candidates within the particular context of the Balkan Wars, thus inculcating the notion that the military should be kept separate from politics.

The general condition of the Ottoman military before the start of the war also receives its fair share of attention in the textbooks. The observations in this section in particular are intended to instruct the young officers. Among the many aspects emphasized are the positioning of the Ottoman army, the inadequacy of the naval forces, the emergence of a group of unhappy officers as a result of the legislation of the Clearance of Ranks (Tasfiye-i Rütüb Kanunu) in the post-1908 period, and how loyalty was a more important marker than competency for promotions to higher military posts (some officers became marshals during the Hamidian period without any service in any military unit). References are also made to the tensions between officers risen from the ranks and those

with degrees from military schools, the merely theoretical education of the officers without practical training, and most importantly how the officers forgot their actual duties as a result of greater involvement in politics and how such political activities undermined the discipline and the sense of brotherhood in the army.<sup>57</sup>

The last paragraph of the section on the Balkan Wars in this textbook contains the strongest lesson of the story:

The Balkan Wars helped us learn the greatest lessons for the future on the topic of the military. Among the most important of these lessons are that the military reforms should be done gradually instead of suddenly, which may decrease the war capabilities of an army, the importance of avoiding any initiatives that may damage the chain of command in an army, and particularly the necessity to keep the officers who are the core of an army away from any political factionalism. Accordingly, in the immediate aftermath of the Turkish War of Independence our great leader Atatürk asked the officers who were both the commanders of military units and served as members of the parliament to choose one duty or the other, thus making sure that the military was separate from politics. Positioning itself as distant from any political tensions and struggles, the military of the Republic opted for the duty of protecting the interests of the Turkish Republic and nation.<sup>58</sup>

In the course entitled *History of Warfare in the Turkish Military Academy* (Kara Harp Okulu), the Balkan Wars are taught more in terms of the principles of warfare. An evaluation of the political situation in the Balkans with reference to the “Eastern Question” is made after due attention to the Treaty of San Stefano and Treaty of Berlin, followed by an assessment of the geography of the battle zones and the action plans of each party. After an elaboration of how the Balkan Wars proceeded, the principles of warfare (objective, attack, concentration core, economy of force, maneuver, unit of command, safety measures, sudden raid, and simplicity of planning) are examined closely, thus putting an emphasis on the rights and wrongs of the military tactics.<sup>59</sup>

In addition to all these tactical military aspects, the subsections entitled “The Lessons from a Political Aspect” and “The Lessons in Terms of the Involvement of Soldiers in Politics” provide the most crucial parts of the course. They are particularly relevant to what the course wants to imprint on the minds of the officers and how they would come to perceive

this historical event in their professional years. The textbook emphasizes how the Ottoman state lacked a nationalist worldview, objectives, plans, consistent policies, and allies in the international context. The empire followed an inconsistent and unreliable foreign policy, largely shaped by the personal opinions and interests of the Ottoman Sadrazam (grand vizier). Lacking a proper demographic policy, the Turkish elements in Rumelia were settled randomly after the migration of 1877–78, thus failing to provide a demographic defense line. The Albanians, who were the most powerful demographic group in western Rumelia, were alienated from the Ottoman state as a result of mismanagement. The competition among the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian churches was settled successfully, making it easier for their corresponding demographic elements to unite against the empire. “The military became a tool of politics and thus turned away from its original objectives. Whenever they saw it fit, the officer corps that dominated different levels of the military had the power of replacing any cabinet that did not serve their interests with another cabinet they came to like. The military command lost interest in its original objectives, developing an incurable disease. The First Division sent from Istanbul to Gjakova [Yakova] to quell the Albanian rebellion united their forces with the rebels instead of subduing them and marched toward Skopje [Üsküp] in the month of August and killed their political opponents, whether civilians or military personnel.”<sup>60</sup>

In the War Colleges (Harp Akademileri), the highest degree-granting institutions of military education in the Turkish military, the Balkan Wars are part of the curriculum in the course entitled the History of Warfare.<sup>61</sup> While the courses in the War Colleges lack a particular textbook with focus on the Balkan Wars, the classes are held as seminars in which the presentations prepared by the officers on the Balkan Wars are analyzed and discussed. The level of instruction in these colleges corresponds to the goal of graduating officers who will serve as the commanders of various military headquarters with high tactical and operational levels. While the politicization of the military is put forth as a reason behind the defeat in the Balkan Wars, the topic is mostly reduced to the tactical and operational aspects of the military operations during the war, in accordance with the scope and objectives of the colleges’ education. Accordingly, the reasons for the defeat are the mistakes of the troop administration and command and the lack of technological development and its impact on the battlefield.<sup>62</sup>

Thus the Balkan Wars are treated in each educational institution from the military high schools to the War Colleges with the same thematic



focus. The constant emphasis on the politicization of the officer corps as an explanation for the defeat in the Balkan Wars imprints in the minds of the officers the necessity to keep themselves separate from daily political confrontations and tensions. Such a perception is also found in the night-time classes or informative sessions offered in military units where the Balkan Wars are often the example, particularly when the military and politics become a topic of group discussion. The publications of the Archives of the Turkish General Staff Directorate for Military History and Strategic Research (ATASE) on the Balkan Wars are also distributed at the brigade level. Each publication often deals with battles and military operations, thus repeating and continuing the deterministic link established during school years between the politicization of the military and defeat.

The memoirs by many officers who were active in the coup d'états of the Republican period emphasize the lessons learned from the Balkan Wars, with the particular advice that younger officers should stay away from politics. While some of these officers served in the Balkan Wars and World War I, others grew up listening to the stories of these wars. Cemal Madanoğlu, for instance, who took part in the May 27, 1960, military coup, talks about asking his brother as a student in the Military Academy (Harp Okulu) why he carried his sword behind his greatcoat. His brother replied: "You are very little, Cemal, you do not remember the Balkan Wars. In that war we lost all of Rumelia and our people became settlers. We lost the war, and thus it is necessary not to forget its shame. They ordered us to carry our swords in this manner and thus not show them around." His brother continued: "My uncle was a staff officer [Erkânıharp] and my elder brother was a student in the Military Academy [Harbiye Mektebi]...the marches are sung at home: Turkish honor was stained in 1328."<sup>63</sup> Emin Aytekin, yet another revolutionary officer, replied to those who wanted him to take part in the revolutionary activity when he was still a student in the Army War College: "I told them that the tragedies in the Balkan Wars should teach us that an organization established within the military with political considerations, regardless of how it is framed in purpose and meaning, changes its course very quickly and turns into a mechanism that goes beyond its original intentions, which could later turn into a firm tradition within the military."<sup>64</sup>

Kenan Evren, the chief of the Turkish General Staff, who led the September 12, 1980, military intervention, talked about the importance of separating politics from the military profession in a speech that he gave at the annual opening ceremony of the Turkish Military Academy, only eighteen days after the intervention:

My sons! Refrain from getting involved with politics at such a young age. If we are part of politics today, it is because of the necessity to get our nation to a safe haven out of the terrible times our country has experienced. This has been the exact directive of our great leader Atatürk. Whenever a military is involved in politics, it starts losing its discipline bit by bit, destined to a collapse. The clearest example of such a destiny in our contemporary history is the Balkan Wars. Do not take our move as an example for yourselves and then jump into politics. We had to intervene through the chain of command to keep the military out of politics. If we had not intervened, the military would have occupied a central place in politics, just as before. If you pay attention, we are intervening in politics with a chain of command composed of five people. We are doing our best not to get the ranks below us mixed up in it.<sup>65</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

The politicization of the Ottoman officers is constantly emphasized as one of the factors behind the defeat in the Balkan Wars in the education of the Turkish officer corps. This emphasis is a result of both the self-perception of the Turkish military as an institution and the “symbiotic relationship” that the military has developed with Turkish society.<sup>66</sup> In this regard the Turkish army is seen as the last resort when the nation comes face to face with threats to its existence. A military that is politically divided along vertical and horizontal lines cannot fulfill such a role, because such politicization damages the military hierarchy and system of discipline. These are the central tenets of the military profession; losing them means losing the very integrity of the military. The disintegration of the army along political lines results in the disintegration of the country.<sup>67</sup> The tragic experiences during the Balkan Wars and the corresponding loss of Rumelian territories speak to this fact. Thus the separation of the military corps from the realm of politics is crucial for the future of the military and the nation.

But it is not possible to separate the military from politics, particularly given the historical past and how the officers came to assign certain roles to themselves. In both the Ottoman era and the Republican period, the military has been a very important actor in politics. In the words of an officer, “You may keep the military out of politics, but you cannot expect the military not to be influenced by the political currents transforming the very lifestyles of the nation from which it derives its members.

This is against the law of nature, because the military is an entity that lives and reflects.”<sup>68</sup>

This paradoxical reality of how the individual officers are kept out of politics while the military as an institution continues to be an important part of political life can be explained by the roles and status given to the military during the very early years of the Republic. The military first became the supporter of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and then its protector and thus achieved an important status within the state tradition. After every military intervention, this status as the legacy of the early Republican period was further consolidated. In the same process the ability to maintain contact with politics was reduced to the higher level of the military hierarchy, as long as no doubt existed about their loyalty to the Kemalist regime. In other words, a peculiar system was put in place that would make sure that individual officers with varying ranks and levels were kept away from politics, while the Office of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff maintained an influential position in national politics. As a result, a particular model and structure of the military was born that in effect kept the officer corps individually away from politics, while keeping the military institution an effective actor in politics.

#### NOTES

This chapter was translated from Turkish into English by Ramazan Hakki Oztan.

1. While it is clear that the politicization of the military constitutes an important disadvantage during wartime, I do not argue that such a politicization is the only reason for a defeat. In other words, the politicization of the military alone cannot explain the defeat of the Ottoman armies against their Balkan adversaries, whose war capabilities surely did not excel those of the Ottomans. Moreover, the inefficient administration of the battles by the Ottoman officers clearly played a greater role in the defeat than did the politicization of the Ottoman military. Despite this, in the words of Tunaya, “the Balkan Wars became synonymous with politicization of the military”: Tarkan Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler*, 485.
2. For me, the separation of the military from politics suggests the process that leads to limiting the contact with politics only to the highest hierarchical rank or office in the military, as defined in law, in addition to the removal of all possibilities of contact with politics for the rest of the military personnel of varying ranks and hierarchical positions. In this framework the Office of the Chief of the General Staff is not only a military office but also a political one.
3. On the politicization of the military, see William Hale, *Türkiye’de Ordu ve Siyaset*, 41–50; Ahmet Turan Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet Devrinde Ordu ve Siyaset*, 45–80; Zekeriya Türkmen, *Osmanlı Meşrutiyetinde Ordu Siyaset Çatışması*, 13–23; Doğan Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi*, 15–33.
4. See Bülent Daver, “Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası.”

5. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet Devrinde Ordu*, 229–30.
6. Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*, *Üçüncü Kolordu'nun ve İkinci Doğu Ordusu'nun Muharebeleri*, 166, 186; "Therefore during the reign of Abdulhamid II [*bükûmet-i mutlaka*] the army lacked training, discipline, and was unaware of the principles of warfare, reducing it to a body of silence with the sole capability of gendarme duties": Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullâh Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 5. "Since the army lacked competent commanders and the troops were constantly deployed to quell domestic rebellions and disorders, the army was deficient in regular training and discipline—an army not even comparable to the actual gendarme units because the troops were sent back and forth, again and again." Mirliva Pertev, *Balkan Harbi'nde Büyük Karargâh-ı Umumi*, 110–11.
7. Among all the other plans that the Ottoman Office of the Chief of the General Staff prepared with due consideration of possibilities, the most appropriate plan to follow in the face of the Balkan Wars was Campaign Plan Number 5. But this fifth campaign plan was not communicated to the field. At the outset of the mobilization the Eastern Army was handed down Plan Number 1 (against Bulgaria) and the Western Army Plan Number 4 (against Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro). For the details of each plan, see *Balkan Harbi (1912–1913)*, 1:185. In one of his conferences Fevzi Çakmak related that he wanted to see Plan Number 5, but the plan was not extant in the Office of War History, indicating that things were not handled properly and reassuringly in the Office of the Chief of the General Staff during the Balkan Wars. Müşir Fevzi Çakmak, *Garbi Rumeli'nin Suret-ı Ziyai ve Balkan Harbi'nde Garb Cephesi*, 18.
8. Birinci Ferik Zeki, *1912 Balkan Harbine Ait Hatıratım*, 108. "Both as a result of the sad memories and the legacy of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877 and because of the political reasons advanced by the Ottoman cabinet that functioned under the influence of the guarantees received from the foreign governments, the late *paşa* [in reference to Nazım Paşa] always chose to mount constant attacks and wanted to move the front to the enemy territories": Pertev, *Balkan Harbi'nde Büyük*, 8.
9. *Balkan Harbi (1912–1913)*, 134–49.
10. *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi (1908–1920)*, vol. 3 (Ankara: Genkur. ATASE Yay., 1996), 105–7.
11. Pertev, *Balkan Harbi'nde Büyük*, 110; Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*, 175.
12. "Before the mobilization our troops in Thrace and Macedonia were two times the number of those of the enemy. We were to keep our natural superiority with further mobilization in case of war. Yet approximately seventy thousand soldiers were disbanded on the grounds of the number of hostile troops. In this respect we lost our superiority over the enemy during the time of peace": Çakmak, *Garbi Rume-lin'in Suret-ı Ziyai*, 15; Pertev, *Balkan Harbi'nde Büyük*, 109. Mahmud Muhtar Paşa conveyed what the *kaymakam* (lieutenant colonel) Yusuf Rasih Bey said about the officers and soldiers under his command: "It was possible to see some battalion commanders who, upon the receipt of a new duty for their battalion, would take up pathetic manners that cannot be described, trying to avoid the duty in all their capacity. Even though the soldiers are equipped with portable shovels and picks, they were not aware that they could use this equipment to dig a trench to protect themselves and to lean their rifles against the trench walls. There were such soldiers who shot their rifles by holding the rifle butt on their foreheads and bellies. Using

- the rear sight of a rifle has never been seen": Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*, 122–23. "Those soldiers who did not know how to spread out, to make use of the terrain, and even how to use their weapons constituted three-fourths of each battalion. We did not know whether to laugh or cry at the situation of the army where there were those so-called soldiers who arranged the rear sight of their rifles to 2,000 meters, when asked to shoot a target with a 400-meter range, and who tried to put the bullets in their rifles through the mouth of the gun": Selanikli Bahri, *Balkan Harbi'nde Garb Ordusu*, 14. In relation to the issue of demobilization, see also Rıfat Uçarol, "Balkan Savaşı Öncesinde Terhis Olayı ve Seferberlik İlanı Sorunu," in *Dördüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri, Bildiriler* (Ankara: Genkur. ATASE Yay., 1989), 257–77.
13. Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*, 65–66.
  14. Çakmak, *Garbî Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyat*, 42. Gustav von Hochwaechter, *Balkan Savaşı Günlüğü "Türklerle Cephe"*, 74.
  15. Zeki, *1912 Balkan Harbine*, 108; Mahmut Belig Uzdil, *Balkan Savaşı'nda Çatalca ve Sağ Kanat Ordularının Harekâtı* (Ankara: Genkur ATASE Yay., 2006), 133–35.
  16. Fethi Ünsal, "Balkan Harbi Yenilgisinin Nedenleri," 78. "The weakest part of the army was the incompetence of those commanding the divisions, regiments, and battalions. The commanders did not understand the concept of war": Rahmi Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları*, 67. "The debacles throughout the Balkan Wars stemmed from the fact that the middle- and higher-ranking officers did not care for their duties and responsibilities.... The Legislation for the Clearance of Ranks [Tasfiye-i Rütbe Kanunu] not only removed some incompetents from the line of duty but also made it possible that those officers, with high ranks but no actual war experience, started taking important posts of decision-making and management in the field, damaging the harmony in the army. Those officers even left their posts, abandoning their units and divisions at times": Çakmak, *Garbî Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyat*, 478. A German officer who was active in the war as a member of the Ottoman army gave the following as the reason for the defeat in the Balkan Wars: "The Turkish soldier did not lose the war; the responsible ones are those who did not take the necessary measures and acted unprofessionally": Hochwaechter, *Balkan Savaşı Günlüğü*, 67.
  17. Mehmet Kasım, ed., *Talat Paşa'nın Anıları*, 27.
  18. On the political frictions and competition in the army, Çakmak said: "Unfortunately, political frictions at those times like supporting the CUP or Halaskâr Zâbitan faction dominated the army. Once in the telegraph house of Yakova, the officers of the 1st Division, with ties to the Halaskâr Zâbitan faction, asked the Gazi Muhtar Paşa to come over to the telegraph house and then listed their political demands. When the friends of these officers in İstanbul agreed with the list of demands, the cabinet of the CUP resigned and the Gazi Muhtar Paşa cabinet was formed on July 9, 1912": Çakmak, *Garbî Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyat*, 16.
  19. Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde*, 10.
  20. Muhtar, *Balkan Harbi*, 168.
  21. Ibid.
  22. Ibid.
  23. Zeki, *1912 Balkan Harbine*, 36, 5.
  24. Çakmak, *Garbî Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyat*, 15–16.

25. Samih Nafiz Tansu, *İttihâd ve Terakkî İçinde Dönenler*, 142.
26. Hüsamettin Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, 81.
27. Fethi Okyar, *Üç Devirde Bir Adam*, 157.
28. Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın*, 70.
29. Çakmak, *Garbî Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyai*, 473.
30. Ibid., 16.
31. Ibid., 22.
32. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet Devrinde Ordu*, 205.
33. A. (Ali İhsan Sabis), *Balkan Harbinde Askeri Mağlubiyetimizin Esbabı*, 93–94.
34. At this time the British admiral Limpus came to Istanbul to reform the navy and the French general Mujen to reform the gendarmerie.
35. Liman von Sanders, *Türkiye'de Beş Sene*, 25.
36. *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi (1908–1920)*, vol. 3, 107–14. The mobilization for World War I was carried out in accordance with the Temporary Legislation for Mandatory Military Duty of May 12, 1914 (Mükellefiyet-i Askeriye Kanunu Muvakkâtı).
37. Okyar, *Üç Devirde*, 200. For Fethi Okyar's earlier thoughts on the necessity to keep the army out of politics, see his article published in *Asker*: Ali Fethi, "İnkılab-ı Ahirde Osmanlı Ordusunun Politikaya Suret-i Müdahalesi," *Asker* 3, September 18, 1324/1908. In accordance with his ideas on the politicization of the army that he expressed after the Balkan Wars, Okyar resigned from his military post and became the envoy to Sofia.
38. *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi (1908–1920)*, vol. 3, 112–13.
39. Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim*, 111. The memoirs of Galip Vardar tell us that Enver Paşa added 1,500 officers of his own choice to the list of clearance previously prepared by Ferik İzzet Paşa. According to the rumors, the list also included officers like Mustafa Kemal, İsmet (İnönü), Col. Mahmud Kamil, and Kerim Bey, who did not have much sympathy for the Unionist cause. Yet Enver Paşa rejected retiring Mustafa Kemal and the other three colonels. Tansu, *İttihâd ve Terakkî*, 326–27. The numbers related to how many officers were removed from the ranks during the War Ministry of Enver Paşa vary from source to source. According to the memoirs of Halil Menteşe, 163 were let go, while Liman von Sanders said that 1,100 officers were retired: Sanders, *Türkiye'de Beş Sene*, 31. The memoirs of the general Baki Vandemir argued that 800 officers were removed from their posts and provided the following breakdown of ranks: "2 Müşir [Marshal], 3 Birinci Ferik [Full General], 30 Ferik [Lieutenant General], 95 Miralay [Brigadier General, Major General], 184 Mirliva [Colonel], 236 Kaymakam [Lieutenant Colonel], 236 Major, 4 Senior Captain [Kolağası], 4 Captain, 4 First Lieutenant, 2 Lower-Grade Lieutenant": Halil Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları*, 41.
40. To understand how much these dismissals contributed to the emergence of a young officer corps in the Ottoman and later Turkish military, Nihat Ali Özcan compared the ranks and ages of the officer corps that led the Turkish War of Independence with the ranks, ages, and experiences of the officers in the modern Turkish army today. During the War of Independence, officers in the twelfth year of their military careers were the commanders of divisions. In the modern Turkish

army today the twelfth year of service only translates into the rank of captain and the post of commander of the corps. In order to become the commander of a division, at least thirty years of service and an average age of fifty-three are necessary today. The average age of the seventy-three commanders who led and administered the divisions in World War I was only thirty-six, with an average of sixteen years of service experience. This comparison is also applicable to the officers who were the commanders of the army. Eight officers who held the posts of commanders of the army had an average of nineteen and a half years of service experience and an average age of forty. Today forty-two years of service and an age of sixty are the norm. Nihat Ali Özcan, “1919–1922 Yılları Arasında Türkiye’de Milli Ordu.” See also *Türk İstiklal Harbi’ne Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Genkur. ATASE Yay., 1989).

41. Şerafettin Turan, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Ordu-Yönetim İlişkileri,” in *İkinci Askeri Tarih Semineri, Bildiriler* (Ankara: Genkur. ATASE Yay., 1985), 77.
42. Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet Devrinde Ordu*, 207.
43. See Tuncer Baykara, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı’na Girişin Psikolojik Sebepleri,” in *Dördüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri, Bildiriler* (Ankara: Genkur. ATASE Yay., 1989), 360–66.
44. Kazım Yetiş, “İkinci Meşrutiyet Devrindeki Belli Başlı Fikir Akımlarının Askeri Hareketlere ve Cepheye Tesiri,” in *Dördüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri, Bildiriler* (Ankara: Genkur. ATASE Yay., 1989), 61.
45. See Kemal Yakut, “II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi’nde Orduyu Siyaset Dışı Tutma Çabaları (1908–1912).”
46. The Manastır incident, which took place during the Albanian rebellion, involved a set of events on June 21–22, 1912, when a group of officers with Albanian backgrounds, who were also members of the PFA (the political party in opposition to the CUP), took up arms and initiated a rebellion in Manastır in an attempt to overthrow the government. After a short time this group combined forces with another group of Albanian officers and privates who were stationed in the units around Yakova and were also in revolt against the government. After the Manastır incident, which is reminiscent of Resneli Niyazi’s initiation of the revolt in 1908, the draft bill prepared in reaction to the incident clearly threatened those officers with an active agenda and involvement in politics.
47. Yakut, “II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi’nde,” 448.
48. See Bülent Daver, “İstiklal Savaşı’nda Ordu-Politika İlişkileri (1919–1922),” in *İkinci Askeri Tarih Semineri, Bildiriler* (Ankara: Genkur. ATASE Yay., 1985), 191–97.
49. For a detailed account, see Hikmet Özdemir, *Rejim ve Asker*, 44–120.
50. Ümit Özdağ, *Ordu-Siyaset İlişkisi*, 44, 87–91, 95.
51. *Balkan Savaşı’na Katılan Komutanların Yaşam Öyküleri*, (Ankara: Genkur. ATASE Yay., 2004), 45–246.
52. Hüsnü Ersü, *Balkan Savaşı’nda Şarköy Çıkarması ve Bolayır Muharebeleri* (Ankara: Genkur. ATASE Yay., 2006), xiii.
53. The members of the Turkish Armed Forces are prohibited from becoming involved in any kind of political activity. According to article 43 of the Legislation of Internal Services (İç Hizmet Kanunu) in the Turkish Armed Forces, “the Turkish

Armed Forces are beyond and above any political ideas and trends. Therefore the military personnel of the Turkish Armed Forces are prohibited from becoming members of political parties or foundations or maintaining contact with any of their political activities, becoming involved in any political protest and meeting, and giving speeches and writing opinion pieces toward the same political ends." The relevant articles are article 41 of the Legislation and Regulations of Internal Services of 1934 (Ordu Dâhili Hizmet Kanunu ve Talimatnamesi) and the Code of Internal Services in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK İç Hizmet Yönetmeliği), which were issued after the intervention of May 27, 1960. The Military Penal Code also included punishments for those convicted of involvement in politics. According to article 148, military personnel who submit an application to a political party to become members or become members of a political party through any other means, hold a meeting with a political end or participate in a meeting with the same political end, give speeches, write opinion pieces or encourage others with a political end, participate in a political meeting with either an official uniform or civil clothing, prepare a political manifesto alone or within a group for whatever reason, sign the prepared manifesto, collect signatures for the manifesto, or communicate the manifesto to the media or hand it out in public face imprisonment from one month to five years (Askeri Ceza Kanunu, Kanun No. 1632, K.T: 22.05.1930, R.G: 15.06.1930 Sayı: 1520, *Düstur* 3. Tertip, V:11, 367). Also, article 68 of the Constitution of 1982 mandates that the personnel of the Turkish Armed Forces cannot become members of any political party.

54. For the legal, socioeconomic, and ideological tools that were important in the construction of the disciplinary and hierarchical makeup of the Turkish military, which had experienced a deterioration of these assets after the military coup d'état of May 27, 1960, see Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin*, 331–401.
55. The Turkish Ministry of Education approves the curriculum in the Turkish military high schools. The textbooks used for instruction also have to be chosen from a pool of books that have received the approval of the ministry. Through a recent ordinance (number 228) dated December 10, 2010, the ministry rearranged the Curriculum for the Revolutionary History of the Turkish Republic and Atatürkism; the subject of the Balkan Wars was moved to the curriculum of the general history classes. See *Ortaöğretim T. C. İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük Dersi Öğretim Programı* (Ankara: MEB Yay., 2010); and *Ortaöğretim 10. Sınıf Tarih Dersi Öğretim Programı ve 10. Sınıf Seçmeli Tarih Dersi Öğretim Programı* (Ankara: MEB Yay., 2011).
56. Kemal Kara, *T. C. İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, 18–21.
57. *Ibid.*, 10–11.
58. *Ibid.*, 15.
59. Erden Akargün, *Harp Tarihi I*, 3/24.
60. *Ibid.*, 3/41. For further elaboration on perceptions about Albanian culpability in the events in post-Ottoman Turkey, see Çağdaş Sümer (chapter 26 in this volume).
61. The War Colleges Command of the Turkish General Staff includes five colleges: National Security College, Armed Forces College, Army War College, Naval War College, and Air War College.
62. Interviews at various dates with the teachers of the History of Warfare in the Army War College (Kara Harp Akademisi).



63. Cemal Madanoğlu, *Anılar*, 12.
64. M. Emin Aytekin, *İhtilal Çıkmazı*, 22.
65. Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları*, 81–82.
66. Ersel Aydınlu, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Doğan Akyaz, “The Turkish Military’s March towards Europe.”
67. This perception is not limited to the military but also embodies a consensus among many politicians. As a typical example, Süleyman Demirel, who later became the ninth president of Turkey, says: “[W]hen you mix the military with politics, you damage the military. It is also not that easy to pull the military away from politics once it has been mixed up with it. This is the reason behind the Balkan tragedy. The military in that tragedy was a strong one, but it was divided along the lines of the CUP and PFA. In only four days we left behind and lost the territories that we had inhabited for 500 years because of the politicization of the military. Our territories shrank, leaving behind millions of Muslim Turks in the Balkans. The easiest way to destroy a country is to involve its military in politics”: Nazlı Ilıcak, *15 Yıl Sonra 27 Mayıs Yargılanıyor*, 75.
68. Celil Gürkan, *12 Mart’a Beş Kala*, 111.

# The Influence of the Balkan Wars on the Two Military Officers Who Would Have the Greatest Impact on the Fortunes of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey

*Preston Hughes*

As many chapters in this volume describe, the Balkan Wars had a significant impact upon almost every aspect of Ottoman society and government. Wartime refugees, such as Şükrü Kaya, played important roles in post-Balkan Wars governments. New opportunities for Ottoman women were created by the war and its aftermath. War-related motivational poems and songs entered the Ottoman culture. Many other examples are discussed, all pointing to the comprehensive effects of this brief but devastating (for the Ottomans) period of conflict.

One effect of the Balkan Wars that might be overlooked is the impact that they had on the careers of two young Ottoman army officers—Enver and Mustafa Kemal. One would play a key role in the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and the other would play *the* key role in the birth and development of the Republic of Turkey.

First a little background on the two men. They were roughly the same age. They followed a similar path throughout their early military education at the turn of the twentieth century: Manastır military high school, the Military Academy at Harbiye, followed by attendance at the elite General Staff (*kurmay*) course, which in those days was also held at Harbiye. Enver began his military education sooner than Mustafa Kemal. Thus he was two classes ahead of Kemal at the Military Academy and in

the General Staff course. From what I have read it seems that they had little if any contact during this time.<sup>1</sup>

The experience of both men at Manastır and at Harbiye differed in two significant ways. First, there is no evidence that Enver experienced the practice of reading and reciting Namık Kemal's poetry and discussing forbidden Young Turk literature smuggled in from Europe either at Manastır or at Harbiye, certainly not to the extent that Mustafa Kemal and his classmates did a few years later.<sup>2</sup> The Namık Kemal–Young Turk literature, and the atmosphere of political discussion that it engendered, does not seem to have been a major influence on Enver's thinking or his actions during his student years, as it most certainly was on Mustafa Kemal's.

A second difference had to do with their social lives. For all his self-confidence and assertiveness, Mustafa Kemal seems to have been well liked by a significant circle of Military Academy cadets, including most of his classmates who were selected for the elite *kurmay* course. While at Harbiye they went out on the town together, drinking and having fun—and even engaging in pranks on senior Ottoman officers. Kemal's Harbiye colleagues would provide him with key support throughout his military career and beyond. The quieter, more conservative Enver did not seem to have—or to develop later—a similar coterie of close friends and colleagues from his years at Harbiye.

The early years of both men's army careers are well known. Enver was assigned in 1902 to the Third Army in the Balkans, where he became engaged in the struggle against brigands and nationalism-fired rebels operating in the mountains around Manastır. He also joined a secret society dedicated to the establishment of a constitutional regime (*meşrutiyet*), which would soon become the main branch of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) within the empire. And Kemal was initially assigned—he would call it exiled—to the Fifth Army in Syria in 1905. There, along with his military duties, he led in the creation of his own secret society (Homeland and Freedom), a cell of which he later planted in Salonika.

By 1908 Kemal had finally gotten himself assigned to Third Army headquarters in Salonika, with duties as a staff officer. By this time his Homeland and Freedom Society had been incorporated into the CUP, in which he had also become a rank-and-file member, while Enver was already well on his way to becoming a prominent CUP leader with a reputation as a courageous guerrilla fighter.

Kemal chafed at his lack of a leadership role in planning for the coming revolution and its aftermath. He was convinced of the futility

of trying to maintain the Ottoman Empire and its far-flung but loosely controlled and increasingly vulnerable dominions. Therefore he urged that planning for the postrevolution period should accept the inevitable demise of the Ottoman Empire and focus on the creation of a state consisting of a majority-Turkish population established within defensible borders. However, his views received little acceptance within the CUP leadership.

Thus when the revolution did occur, in July 1908, Kemal was essentially a bystander. Enver, in contrast, played a very significant and highly visible role in this episode, for which he was proclaimed the “Champion of Liberty” (*Hürriyet Kahramanı*).

After the revolution Kemal tried to convince CUP leaders and other Ottoman officers that officers who wanted to become involved in politics should leave the military and that those who wanted to remain in the army should get out of politics. This point of view was not popular with many officers in the CUP, especially Enver, who was determined to continue his military career while maintaining his prominent role in the CUP. In January 1909, Enver—who had been greatly impressed by the German military since his Harbiye days—was assigned to be military attaché in Berlin.

In September 1909 the CUP Congress in Salonika took up the issue of whether or not military officers should leave the army if they wanted to remain active in the CUP. Kemal argued strongly *for* the proposal. However, his view was “opposed by delegates who argued that the [reactionary rebellion in the spring of 1909, which had followed the CUP-led revolution in March 1908,] had shown the need for close links between the army and the [CUP].”<sup>3</sup> Kemal received support for his proposal from CUP military members in Edirne, including his Harbiye colleagues Kazım (Karabekir) and İsmet (İnönü). With their support the proposal was approved by the CUP Congress. It accomplished little, however: some two more years would pass before a law banning military involvement in politics was passed. By this time the army had become severely riven by politics, negatively affecting its combat readiness at a time of great peril, especially in the Balkans.

In any case, following the September 1909 CUP Congress, Kemal cut his ties with the CUP. Henceforth he intended to devote himself strictly to his military duties.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile Enver continued to hold a prominent position within the CUP while serving as military attaché in Berlin.

In late September 1911 the Italians attacked the Ottoman-held region in north Africa that today is part of Libya. With Ottoman forces spread from Yemen to Syria to the Balkans, the Ottoman government had no

organized military force to commit to defense of this region. Yet that did not deter Enver from pursuing his dream to save the empire from loss of even the most far-flung and tenuously held territory.

Leaving his post in Berlin, Enver rushed to CUP Headquarters in Salonika, where he presented his plan to lead a guerrilla resistance among Arab tribes in Libya against the Italians. Finding some support there, he went to Istanbul, where he met with the minister of war and the sultan. Both seemed to believe that the cause was hopeless, and neither showed much desire to support his plan. In spite of this Enver headed on to Libya, where he would take control of developing and leading the fight against the Italians. According to Enver's biographer, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, "The difficult mission that Enver had voluntarily undertaken in this unexpected and hopeless war would become one of the most important stepping stones leading him on along the road that he had chosen for himself."<sup>5</sup>

From my reading I believe that Kemal was convinced that defense of north Africa, like the defense of the Ottoman provinces in the Balkans, was not only useless but also a waste of assets (equipment and officers) that would soon be needed to defend eastern Thrace and Istanbul. Nonetheless—driven largely by a desire to "march to the guns" and to share in a cause, no matter how hopeless, in which many of his colleagues were engaged—Kemal too volunteered for service there. He made it to Libya in December 1911, roughly a month behind Enver. For the next year the two men served in the same theater and acquitted themselves well in this ultimately unsuccessful effort.

Thus when the First Balkan War broke out in October 1912 Enver and Mustafa Kemal, along with many of their Harbiye colleagues, were still in the north African desert, fighting the all-but-lost battle there. As the increasingly gloomy news reached them from Istanbul, even Enver could see that his ideal of preserving this distant region of the empire's territory was not going to be realized.

Facing a war for survival in the Balkans, the Ottoman government quickly concluded an armistice with the Italians, giving up Libya in the process. The Ottoman officers in Libya, including Enver and Kemal, made their way back to Istanbul. Before they could get there, however, the First Balkan War was essentially over, without their participation and with the disastrous loss of almost all Ottoman territory in western Thrace. Edirne was under heavy attack, and the army was barely holding at the Çatalca line, the last defensible terrain before Istanbul.

Enver did not arrive at the Balkan front until January 1, 1913, by which time the Ottoman government had already sued for peace and had begun preparing for the upcoming negotiations in London. He assumed duties as chief of staff of the newly created Tenth Corps. Meantime Mustafa Kemal had been assigned to the general staff of the Bolayir Corps in Gelibolu.

In mid-January 1913 the CUP leadership decided to overthrow the government rather than allow it to agree to the onerous terms of peace, which included the loss of Edirne. When no one else would assume leadership of the effort, Enver stepped forward and led the coup. This bold action increased his notoriety both within the military and among the people.

At this point Enver felt a need to give the Ottoman people some good news, something that would reassure them that the coup he had led was a good thing and would have a positive outcome. Therefore in early February he got approval for a military operation against the Bulgarian southern flank, on the Marmara coast northeast of Bolayir. The poorly planned and poorly executed effort failed miserably, partly because the army corps in Bolayir, to which Kemal was assigned as a staff officer, began its attack too soon, resulting in its decisive defeat. Although the corps to which Enver was assigned (which had the mission of conducting an amphibious landing to join up with the Bolayir corps) had been able to put troops ashore, they were withdrawn when it became obvious that the operation could not succeed.

Meantime the Bulgarians had resumed the attack on Edirne in early February, and it fell in late March. The CUP-controlled government immediately sued for peace—just as the government that it had overthrown had done a few months earlier. But now the situation facing the Ottoman government was even worse than it had been four months ago.

A second armistice was achieved in mid-April. In early June the Treaty of London produced the same results as had been proposed in the earlier negotiations. Edirne and all of western Thrace were lost.

By this time Lieutenant Colonel Enver was one of the most influential men among those who exercised real power within the Ottoman government. In January 1913 he had convinced the government to conclude an agreement with Germany that would bring in a mission for military assistance and training. This mission, led by Liman von Sanders, would arrive in November 1913 and would begin to make some headway toward reforming the Ottoman army by the time World War I began.

In the early fall of 1913 an unexpected opportunity presented itself. In June the members of the Balkan League had begun to quarrel among themselves over the spoils of their earlier victory. To deal with their opportunistic former allies, the Bulgarians withdrew their forces from the Çatalca line and from Edirne. Seizing the moment, Enver led a force to reoccupy Edirne. By the end of July 1913 Edirne and all of eastern Thrace had been retaken.

Enver's prominent role in the recapture of Edirne added to his earlier-won accolade as "Champion of Liberty." Now he was also proclaimed "Second Conqueror of Edirne" (the first being Sultan Murad in 1361). All of this acclaim enhanced Enver's fame among the people even as it further solidified his leadership role within the CUP.

With the CUP controlling the government and with the palace essentially removed from a position of influence, Enver (at thirty-two years old and still just a lieutenant colonel) was close to the top of the Ottoman power structure. In January 1914 he would maneuver to win appointment not only to the post of minister of war but also as chief of the General Staff. He had been promoted to colonel a few weeks earlier, but he would now be promoted again, to brigadier general.

Shortly thereafter, at the age of thirty-three, Enver would secure his ties to the palace as well by marrying the sultan's fourteen-year-old niece. As Aydemir wrote, he had by then become the *teksözsahibi*, the most powerful member of the ruling CUP triumvirate.

Enver quickly set about to use that power to reform the military establishment that had performed so poorly during the Balkan War. One of his first acts as minister of war was to purge from the army the officers that he and his younger colleagues considered no longer useful. These consisted primarily of older officers, many of whom were unschooled (*alaylı subaylar*), who had frequently made clear their disrespect for the younger Harbiye graduates. Even Mustafa Kemal, writing several years later, praised the great contribution that Enver had made to the Ottoman army by clearing out the old and inept military leaders and replacing them with young, more competent officers.<sup>6</sup>

Kemal watched these developments from Sofia, Bulgaria, where he had been posted as military attaché in the fall of 1913. In one discussion with the chief of the Bulgarian General Staff he learned that during the Balkan Wars the Germans had given the Bulgarians almost daily intelligence concerning the Ottoman army's plans, troop and equipment status, and morale. He reported this to Istanbul in December 1914 and urged

that careful attention be paid to this report, which had significant implications for “the future.”<sup>7</sup> By this time, however, Enver had already committed the Ottoman Empire to war on the side of the Germans.

Unfortunately for the Ottoman Empire, and for Enver, the next five years would witness the empire’s entry into World War I on the side of Germany, the subsequent loss of that war, and the final collapse of the Ottoman state. Enver’s lack of experience commanding regular military units would prove costly during his attempt to lead an army against the Russians in the east. As Kemal would later explain, “[Enver] was generally ignorant in military matters, as he had not progressed step by step from the command of a battalion to that of a regiment, and so on. Having taken part in fighting with bandits and tribes in Macedonia and [Libya], he had used political backing to rise to the top.”<sup>8</sup>

Enver would be remembered primarily for his role in the disastrous Sarıkamış campaign, the expulsion of the Armenians from Turkey, his own flight from Istanbul at the end of the war, and his final years pursuing a romantic quest for pan-Turanism.

Mustafa Kemal, meantime, would win fame at Gallipoli and would acquit himself well in battle on every front during World War I. He would emerge from that war with the respect and admiration not only of the Turkish people but also of the Turkish officers with whom he had fought. Capitalizing on this support and on his own boundless self-confidence, he would lead the amazingly successful war for independence, followed by the establishment of a secular Republic within the borders of a new Turkey.

In summary, then, one significant consequence of the Balkan Wars was that they facilitated Enver’s military and political advancement while Mustafa Kemal remained in the background. Thus he was not involved in or tainted by the policy decisions that led Turkey to join World War I on the side of Germany. Moreover, once that war ended, Enver—with whom Kemal had never gotten along well—was no longer there to oppose him. Thus he did not hesitate when conditions at the end of World War I presented him with the opportunity to step forward and take a leading role in creating a Turkish state from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Nor did he stumble or overreach. We might argue, however, that it took miracles to help him—and his colleagues—achieve his seemingly preposterous objectives during the long war for independence and the creation of a secular republican government. Most dared not even hope for the former objective and could not even comprehend the latter.



## NOTES

1. Atatürk and Enver biographer Şevket Süreyya Aydemir wrote that by the time Mustafa Kemal entered Manastır, Enver “must have finished this school”: Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya Enver Paşa*, 1:190. Enver graduated in the Military Academy class of 1900, Mustafa Kemal in the class of 1902. Enver graduated in the 55th Harp Akademisi class on December 15, 1902; Mustafa Kemal graduated in the 57th Harp Akademisi class on January 11, 1905.
2. Aydemir wrote that the “atmosphere of Namık Kemal’s literature” may not have penetrated Manastır during Enver’s time there as it would just two years later, during Mustafa Kemal’s years: *Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya Enver Paşa*, 1:190.
3. Andrew Mango, *Atatürk*, 92.
4. *Ibid.*, 148.
5. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya Enver Paşa*, 2:212.
6. Afetinan, “Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’un Karlsbad Hatıraları” (publication information unavailable).
7. Secret Intelligence Report from Mustafa Kemal to the Ottoman Minister of War, December 6, 1914, obtained from the Türkiye Cumhuriyet Başkanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, “Belgelerle Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri” (1913–38), Ankara, 2002, Belge No. 20, 183–84.
8. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Atatürk Hayatı ve Eseri*; cited in Mango, *Atatürk*, 142.

## More History Than They Can Consume?

### Perception of the Balkan Wars in Turkish Republican Textbooks (1932–2007)

*Nazan Çiçek*

In this chapter I delve into the narrations of the Balkan Wars as they appeared in a series of Turkish republican textbooks printed between the years of 1932 and 2007. The topic of the Balkan Wars as part of Ottoman-republican Turkish historiography has been covered in civic as well as history textbooks of the Republic that were taught at primary, secondary, and high schools. Drawing on the assumption that the history textbooks are political texts through which the national/historical consciousness as well as the perceptions of the “other” and the “self” are both constructed and reflected, I examine the Turkish textbooks in order to understand the meaning and the place of the Balkan Wars in the cognitive map of the republican elites who, with their cultural and “symbolic capital,”<sup>1</sup> have undertaken the task of rewriting the history of the Turks as a nation-building strategy.

As social memory studies suggest, the official historiography of a nation-state that mainly manifests itself in textbooks does not necessarily embrace, represent, and reflect the actual and whole social, cultural, and collective memory of that “nation.”

In the field of social memory different stories vie for a place in history through a constant negotiation and contestation.<sup>2</sup> Memory contestation takes place from above and below, from both center and periphery. Because memory is an essential factor in identity formation, nation-states appear to be extremely keen on “achieving the dominance of national memory over other memories and thus excluding and eliminating other contestants for control over other types of identity for primary allegiance.”<sup>3</sup> As Stuart Hall writes, “Identities are the names we give to the

different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves in, the narratives of the past.”<sup>4</sup> In other words, all identities are projects and practices generated by the ongoing memory contestation in a given society and culture. While the nation-building elites struggle to replace other forms of identity with the national one and to reshape the cultural and collective memory, historiography is employed as a powerful tool in overpowering and silencing the rival voices and narratives that represent different memories than the nationally constructed one. As Jonathan Boyarin points out, statist ideologies “involve a particularly potent manipulation of dimensionalities of space and time, invoking rhetorically fixed national identities to legitimate their monopoly on administrative control.”<sup>5</sup> In the process of “nationalizing” the memory of a society, the nation-states set out to control the historiography, and thus the history teaching at schools becomes a national enterprise. History textbooks come to be regarded as vital materials in creating patriots through a certain homogenized interpretation of the past. The nation-states armed with a mass education system instrumentalize history teaching in order to decide what the nation should remember and forget.

For the members of the politico-bureaucratic elite that founded the Turkish Republic on the (discursively much rejected) heritage of the Ottoman Empire, the project of creating a nation-state was the equivalent of creating a culturally and linguistically homogenized sociopolitical body, to be called the Turkish nation, largely based on the Muslims. This Muslim population in Anatolia, however, presented an extremely diverse ethnic and linguistic amalgam; throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s various sectors of society opposed the program of Mustafa Kemal’s Republican People’s Party on ethnic, religious, and political grounds. Therefore educators of the Republic felt compelled to cultivate a more demanding and intrusive sense of nationalism, civilizational modernity, and loyalty to a centralizing state than their Ottoman predecessors had.<sup>6</sup> School had a central place in the socialization of these new Turkish citizens as well as in their integration in the new nation-building project. In the process of “inventing” and “imagining” the Turkish nation, only formal and secular schooling, it was believed, could turn the young generations into ideal Turkish citizens and lead them to internalize the norms and values of the new regime. Accordingly, history teaching at schools was hailed by the Republican elites as an essential component in the construction of the state and in strengthening national unity. As Akçuraoglu Yusuf summarized in the First History Congress (1932), the priority of the new Turkish historiography was to “narrate the past according to the

national interests rather than merely copying the histories written from the perspectives of other nations.”<sup>7</sup> What is more, the new Turkish national history was commissioned to eradicate the inferiority complex that had been generated by the traumatic experience of the “Eastern Question” as well as to challenge the centuries-long Orientalist stereotypes of the Turks. This new mission of Turkish historiography found its expression in a crystallized form in the words of Peyami Safa, a famous writer and journalist of the time:

To break up the inferiority complex that gnaws at the roots of the national consciousness of the Ottoman child who thinks of himself as a dried, crooked, and shrunken branch of an underdeveloped Asian race, a consciousness that was half awakened after the disasters of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tripoli, the Balkans, and Sèvres, after proving to him in one instance that he can enter the European civilized world and making him believe in the possibility of a transition from the single and imposing mass of his history as old as man to a great living organism, to place the stamp of the huge and eternal truth of Turkey on his soul. Well, this is one of the most fundamental bases of Atatürk’s nationalist and civilizational revolution.<sup>8</sup>

In this chapter I place my assessments on the way the Balkan Wars have been narrated in the Turkish republican textbooks against this politically charged backdrop, where the nation-state attempted to reconstruct the memory of the society through “national” lines. This does not mean, however, that the memory of Balkan Wars in the minds of the Muslim population of the Turkish Republic was monopolized or entirely controlled by this official interpretation of the past. The story of the Balkan Wars as told in the textbooks does not necessarily reflect the way they were remembered by other contestants in the field of memory but does reflect the way in which the nationalist elites of the Republic wished them to be remembered by the Turkish citizens. The narrations in the textbooks appear as a product of what counts as “legitimate knowledge” (namely, whose knowledge is most worthy), which, as Michael Apple and Linda Christian-Smith argue, is often “the result of complex power relations and struggles among identifiable class, race, gender and religious groups.” As one of the main artifacts that “plays such a major role in defining whose culture is taught” at schools,<sup>9</sup> textbooks received great attention from the Turkish state. The government ensured that no

textbook that had not been inspected and authorized by the Ministry of Education found its way to the classrooms. As the tendency for centralization and standardization in education became more pronounced, the republican state decided to become involved in the textbook publishing and distributing business more directly. Every year the Ministry of Education organized textbook writing competitions, picked the best book that it saw fit to be taught at all schools across the country, then published the book and distributed it through the book stores that it had established for this particular purpose. Although the state's monopoly in textbook publishing and distribution no longer exists today and many publishing houses operate in the area, the Ministry of Education remains the sole authority in evaluating and choosing the textbooks that will be taught in schools.<sup>10</sup>

The textbooks were used as a tool in the memory contestation to mold the cultural and collective memory of the Turkish society, so an in-depth examination of them gives insights into the way the nation-building elites positioned themselves vis-à-vis the stories told by other contestants in the field of memory. In this sense throughout my analysis I argue that the Turkish republican textbooks are of a *dialogical* nature in a Bakhtinian sense and in a continual dialogue with the other texts regarding the Ottoman past as well as the Western world. In Bakhtin's literary theory the term "dialogic" describes a relation of exchange between two positions—between the self and other, between the subject and society, between two textual voices, between two subjects, and so on. As Bakhtin asserts,

The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer's direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word.<sup>11</sup>

In other words, any discourse or narrative is always oriented toward the preceding and subsequent discourses and narratives and toward an "other" and that other's anticipated answering word. Borrowing from Bakhtin's conceptual framework, I suggest that in their treatment of the Balkan Wars the republican Turkish textbooks hold a continual dialogue with the texts and discourses previously produced by the Ottomans, Balkan nations, and Europeans. While they set out to answer, silence,

confirm, or counter the previously constructed arguments and assertions with respect to the Balkan Wars, they also produce responses to the anticipated reactions of prospective texts and discourses. In my attempt to render the ongoing continual dialogue more perceptible I try to identify and categorize the images and representations of Balkan people and states, Russia, Europe, and the Ottoman Empire as they appeared in the context of the Balkan Wars.

#### THE REASONS FOR THE WAR AND THE CULPRIT

Republican history textbooks almost unanimously agree that the fundamental reason behind the Balkan Wars was the nationalistic aspirations of the Balkan states, which manifested themselves in their ceaseless encroachment upon the Ottoman territory. Yet because nationalism signifies rebellion, dissolution, and loss for the Ottomans, the term “nationalism” has pejorative connotations and seems to have been replaced by phrases such as “Balkan states’ ambition to drive the Ottomans/Turks out of the Balkans” or “Balkan states’ desire to invade the Ottoman territory” in the republican textbooks. As a scholar points out correctly, “the Ottoman elite developed its own interpretation of the understanding of nationalism whereby nationalism was not perceived as something which developed naturally within the society. Rather it was a different method of foreign intervention in Ottoman territory.”<sup>12</sup> Although republican historiography, now teaching the children of a nation-state, admitted that nationalism is an idea and belief that unites the people of a society and gives them a sense of belonging as well as the courage to sacrifice their lives, the concept of nationalism was still associated with the destructive political intervention of the Great Powers into Ottoman domestic matters when dealing with the nineteenth century.

Among the Great Powers Russia gets the lion’s share of the wrath of the republican textbook writers with respect to the nationalism issue in the Ottoman Empire, and obviously not without reason. The Turkish history textbooks almost invariably emphasize the “dastardly” attitude of Russia toward the Ottoman Turks since the time of Tsar Peter I and refer to innumerable intrigues, conspiracies, and aggrandizements that “characterize” Russian foreign policy. Russia is depicted as a despotism that denies liberties and political rights at home but provokes nationalistic feelings of the Balkan peoples against their sovereign (the Ottoman sultan). The texts are replete with examples of Russian “hypocrisy,” which in the broadest context is tacitly used to refer to the double standards

deployed by all the Great Powers toward the Turks in general. In many of the Turkish history textbooks Russia is defined as the “most dreadful enemy” of Turkey, whose only ambition was to create satellite states in the Balkans, capture Istanbul, and control the Straits as well as the eastern Mediterranean. The Russian attempts to carry out this task by waging war against its rivals are held to signify its “barbaric” qualities.<sup>13</sup>

While Russia was almost invariably deployed by the republican history-writing elites as a vehicle to portray the inherently negative aspects of the Western “other” as the “monster” that threatened the very existence of the Turks, after the late 1920s Russia’s Europeanness and membership in the “European civilization” stop being openly expressed or highlighted in the history textbooks in the context of the Balkan Wars. Many textbooks under examination continue to emphasize the role of Russia in inciting nationalistic feelings among Balkan peoples and encouraging them to revolt against their Ottoman rulers, but they carefully avoid associating the Russian provocative attitude with the European civilization *per se*. In the context of the Balkan Wars Russia is singled out as the villain who acted solo in the Balkans, mostly without any help from the European powers. Yet in a considerable number of the textbooks neither Russia’s motives nor its involvement in the Balkan Wars receive any detailed treatment. Without any further explanation Russia is merely mentioned as the intriguing power behind the plot against the Ottoman territorial integrity, which in turn implies that from the very beginning the Balkan nations were not courageous/artful/powerful or perhaps disloyal enough to go to war against the Ottomans.

Owing to the Russian encouragement Serbia and Bulgaria, and later Montenegro and Greece, established an alliance among themselves and declared war on the Ottoman Empire.<sup>14</sup>

Encouraged by the weak state of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the century but mostly due to the incitement and support of Russia, the Balkan states (namely Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro) established an alliance among themselves.<sup>15</sup>

The Balkan states formed a league with a view to parcel out the Ottoman territory in Rumelia among themselves. Russia played a major role in the establishment of this league. It provoked the Balkan states into waging a war against the Ottoman Empire.<sup>16</sup>

In some cases the narrative slightly shifts the blame to the Balkan states themselves, contending that they believed Russia would uphold and bolster them in their war against the Ottomans.

Four Balkan states (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro) united and waged war on the Ottoman Empire. They hoped that Russia would stand by them in their undertakings.<sup>17</sup>

Of all the Turkish textbooks under consideration, only two seemed to find it necessary to explain Russia's motives and interests in a Balkan War waged against the Ottomans in terms of *Realpolitik*. These texts cast Russia in the role of the meticulous and patient architect of the Balkan League instead of a mere provocateur. They assert that by holding a series of meetings and negotiations with the Balkan states Russia made them (or enabled them to) sign agreements among themselves and thus in fact formed the Balkan League itself.

After it was defeated by Japan in the Far East, Russia resumed and revived its Balkan policy. It sought to become the patron of the Balkan peoples as well as to obtain free passage for its warships through the Straits. It had been vigorously fighting its way into forming a union among the Balkan states since 1908 and accomplished this mission with the establishment of the Balkan League in 1912.<sup>18</sup>

The same two texts tell the readers that due to its imperialistically driven ambitions Russia had been planning to sever the Balkans from the Ottomans for over a century because it had needed access to the Mediterranean Sea in order to increase its share in power politics in Europe. These are also the only texts that enlighten the schoolchildren that Russia acted as and wished to be regarded as the protector of Balkan peoples because it shared the same religious and ethnic identity with them. One of these texts is the *History of the Turkish Republic, Turkish Revolution, and Atatürkism* (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*), taught at high schools in the 1980s, in which the narration of the Balkan Wars stands out for its rare attempt to inform the reader on the political background as well as the international relations of the era in a somewhat holistic manner. In explaining the conditions that culminated in the Balkan Wars the authors sketch out the Eastern Question with special reference



to Russia's position in it. The text appears to be an epitome of the perception of the Balkan Wars by the Turkish history textbook writers in the Republican era and seems to gather all the information that until then had been either ignored or scattered in many different texts. It also gives valuable insights into the dialogical conversation held by the republican textbooks with the contestant texts regarding Europe and the Ottoman past.

Nationalism was one of the novelties brought about by the French Revolution. Nationalism in the narrowest sense can be defined as an idea that remarks that each nation should be free to establish its own state and govern itself. Emergence of nationalism caused havoc for the multinational states of the time. The Ottoman Empire too was a multinational state. Ottomans had abstained from intervening in the business of the nations whose lands they conquered and ruled, and hence those nations had the chance to preserve their national entity. These nations had been content and happy with their situation before the nationalism movement arose. After the notion of nationalism became widespread, those nations living under the reign of the Ottomans sought independence. Thanks to the encouragement, incitement, and support of some states a series of revolts appeared in the Ottoman lands. This chapter in Ottoman history, namely the nineteenth century, is known as the era of nationalist revolts. Because the Balkan Peninsula was a land where many different nations existed, most of the nationalist rebellions broke out there.<sup>19</sup>

This typical attitude of the Turkish textbooks in dealing with the impact of nationalism on the non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman Empire is part of the dialogical relationship between the Turkish nation-state and its Ottoman past. In an effort to answer the alleged accusations manufactured by the Balkan states and the European world as to the maltreatment of non-Muslims by the Ottoman rulers, the Turkish textbooks emphasize that the Ottomans never pursued a policy of repression and assimilation that could justify the separatist rebellions. Without openly addressing the accusations about the corrupt and dysfunctional qualities of the Ottoman rule, the textbooks flatly explain that the accusations were mere pretexts designed to vindicate the "ingratitude" and "betrayal" of the Balkan peoples. From the vantage point of the Turkish textbooks nationalism appears to be a vehicle by which the supposedly inherently

“greedy” and “treacherous” character of the non-Muslim Balkan people found expression. They also intimate that Balkan subjects of the sultan were not capable of overthrowing the Ottoman rule on their own. Neither did they appear clever enough to comprehend the bigger picture. By securing the support of Russia, the Balkan states believed that they were backed in their national cause by a power that was their kin in religion and ethnicity without realizing that they in fact fell prey to Russian imperialism and became its tools and puppets.

It was mainly Russia who provoked these rebellions. Russia had started to appear as a powerful state in the seventeenth century. It ruled over a very large territory yet did not own any harbors that would allow it to rule over the seas. Its greatest ambition was to have access to the Baltic Sea and especially to the Mediterranean. In order to be able to have passage to the Mediterranean it had to capture the Black Sea first and then proceed to the Straits. Russia did everything within its power to reach that end. One of the methods it employed was to dismember the Ottoman Empire by utilizing the Balkan nations that were its kin in terms of religion as well as ethnicity and then capture the Straits easily. A large part of the Balkan population was Slavonic and also belonged to the Orthodox denomination of Christianity, like the Russians. Greeks were not Slavonic, but they too practiced Orthodoxy. The clergy of this denomination were trained in the Fener Orthodox Church in Istanbul. Nationalism coupled with the Russian propaganda in the Balkan nations triggered the rebellions in the Balkans. First Greeks and then Serbians, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians revolted one after another and became either independent or autonomous. Before long they started hankering for the Ottoman lands in the Balkans in order to expand their own territory. In the meantime Russia's aspirations toward the Straits remained unchanged. It was using the Balkan people as an instrument and provoking these young states into destroying the Ottoman Empire in order to achieve its own goal. The Ottoman Empire had long been like a toy in the hands of the Great Powers. What was the opinion of those Great Powers toward Russia's aspirations?<sup>20</sup>

As this long extract clearly indicates, in all the textbooks discussed here Russia is carefully distinguished from Europe—or, rather, Europe is distinguished from Russia. The text above is exceptional in its attempt to

depict the position of European powers vis-à-vis the Balkan Wars. While most textbooks chose to exclude the European powers altogether from the narrative of the Balkan Wars, some writers contented themselves only with hinting that the European powers were double-faced and unreliable. They remarked that those powers did not keep their promise as to the maintenance of the existing borders in the Balkans.

When the First Balkan War broke out the Great Powers announced that regardless of the victorious side they would not allow any territorial changes in the region, thinking that the Ottomans might defeat the small Balkan states. Yet when it became clear that the Ottomans had lost the war, they changed their mind.<sup>21</sup>

In the beginning of the war the European powers had declared that they would not agree with any territorial changes in the Balkans; but after seeing that the Ottomans were the defeated side they favored the Balkan states' desires.<sup>22</sup>

Not surprisingly the forthright resentment over the lack of European concern about the aggression of the Balkan states against the Muslim population in the Balkans that had found expression in the republican textbooks in the mid- and late 1920s largely disappeared from the scene from the 1930s on.

A history textbook written for primary school children in 1926 remarks that "Europe, falsely claiming civilization, remained merely a spectator of such oppression and previously unwitnessed barbarity."<sup>23</sup> This kind of explicit confrontation with the European attitude toward the Muslim inhabitants of Balkans who had suffered at the hands of their non-Muslim compatriots during the Balkan Wars vanished from the textbooks in the following years, as the Republic set out to become an "honorable" member of the European civilization and to gloss over the humiliations engendered by the Eastern Question as well as the whole body of Orientalist discourse in the nineteenth century. Extremely graphic narrations of violence had been omnipresent in the late nineteenth-century Ottoman and early republican history textbooks, where not only the Balkan Christians but also their "so-called civilized" European backers were scathingly criticized. This attitude seems to have been largely abandoned from the 1930s on as Turkey increasingly tended

to rehabilitate its relationships with Europe and its Balkan neighbors. As a result, all the textbooks examined here abstain from referring to the violence perpetrated against Muslims and Turks during the Balkan Wars as well as the ensuing mass immigration from the Balkans.

This, however, does not necessarily mean that the Turkish history textbooks stopped having a dialogical conversation with the Western world. By withdrawing the systematic reproach and replacing it with an understanding of the dictates of *Realpolitik* that had ruled the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers, the Turkish textbooks accentuated the Republic's desire to ignore conveniently the past controversies and to become European. As a scholar working on the textbooks points out, however, "an oppressor" (or an enemy in the Ottoman case) "constructed mainly through chosen ignorance rather than systematic stereotyping is no less of an Other."<sup>24</sup>

Among the twenty-two textbooks under examination only two refer to the dynamics of the Eastern Question as a backdrop against which the Balkan Wars played out and directly link the European powers with the Balkan Wars. Both of these texts were produced in the last quarter of the twentieth century, at least seventy years after the Balkan Wars. One of them is again *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük* (1980), already extensively quoted above. It summarizes the traditional British Middle Eastern policy during the nineteenth century, which had been largely devised by Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple) and aimed to maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in order to protect the British commercial, political, and military interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

In the nineteenth century Britain was a great empire with vast colonies. Its sole purpose was to preserve this colonial empire. The center of these colonies was India. In order to reach India as well as its other dominions quickly and easily Britain needed to have control over the Middle East.... It could ill afford a powerful state in the region that might threaten its dominions. Therefore it sought to keep the weak Ottoman Empire alive throughout the nineteenth century and never refrained from making necessary sacrifices to that end.<sup>25</sup>

The text then explains that the dynamics of the imperial rivalry in the Middle East changed irreversibly with the establishment of German

nation-state in 1871, and the Ottoman Empire became the target of German imperialist aspirations.

Emperor Wilhelm II supported Austria-Hungary against Russia and coveted the markets controlled by Britain.... He developed good relationships with the Ottoman sultan, who was also the caliph of the Muslims. His plan was to establish German influence over the Muslims living under the British yoke and also exploit the large and fertile Ottoman lands, which were invaluable for the German economy. This rapport between Germany and the Ottoman Empire made Britain suspicious. Germany was its biggest significant rival, and the last thing it wished to see was the Ottoman Empire's cooperation with such a powerful state. Germany was posing a threat to British dominions, and Britain felt compelled to revise its traditional Middle Eastern policy. In the beginning of the twentieth century Russia was no longer a powerful and intimidating state. An Ottoman Empire controlled by a weak Russia would not cause any discontent to Britain.... In 1908 the British king and the Russian tsar met in the capital of Estonia, Reval (Tallin), and made an agreement. Accordingly, Russia would be free to seize Istanbul and the Straits without any protest from Britain. After this agreement Russians set out to provoke the young Balkan states into waging war against the Ottomans. While the Ottomans were engaged in the Libyan War the Russian ambassador in Belgrade contacted the Serbian and Bulgarian governments and made them form an alliance against the Ottoman Empire. Before long Montenegro and Greece too joined that alliance.<sup>26</sup>

The second text that treats the European powers as main actors in the setting of the Balkan Wars is a history textbook for high schools dated 1995. Although it by no means delves into the features of the Eastern Question in an academic manner, the text nevertheless ensures that the European states' involvement in the Balkan Wars is well understood by the readers. The narration of the Balkan Wars in the text opens with the assertion that "even before the Balkan Wars, European states had already achieved the elimination of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans to a large extent, which had been their dream for centuries. However, the Ottomans still ruled over Macedonia, Albania, and western Thrace, the inhabitants of which were overwhelmingly Muslim."<sup>27</sup>

The accusatory tone adopted toward the European powers appears several times throughout the narrative.

Balkan states, which used to be Ottoman vassals before they became independent, signed secret agreements among themselves. They were under the influence of Russia, and their aim was to drive the Ottomans off the Balkan soil completely. Taking advantage of the Libyan War as well as some other internal disturbances within the Ottoman Empire these states made preparations to go to war with the Ottomans. Their pretense was a familiar one that had been used many times before by the European states: they claimed that the Ottomans were oppressing the Christian subjects in Rumelia and asked for reform.<sup>28</sup>

European states intervened and assembled a congress in London to negotiate the peace treaty. But both Balkan states and European states alike were determined to expel the Ottomans from the Balkans. They asked the empire to cede all its territory in Rumelia, including Edirne [Adrianople] as well as the Aegean Islands. The Ottomans found these demands unacceptable.<sup>29</sup>

This particular textbook also links the Balkan Wars with the Turkish Resistance Movement and Independence War in Anatolia after World War I and turns the narration of the Balkan Wars into part of a larger narrative that accuses the European powers of undertaking an anti-Turkish crusade at the turn of the twentieth century.

In the end of the Balkan Wars the Ottoman Empire lost all its territory in the Balkan Peninsula. This was a result that had been dreamed of by the European powers for centuries. After having seen their dream come true, the European states became bold enough to hope that they could drive the Turks out of Anatolia as well. The British, French, and Italian invasion of Anatolia after 1918 attests to this. What is more, the Europeans, especially the British, helped the Greeks occupy western Anatolia in 1919 and also incited and provoked the Armenians in order to dismember Anatolia and annihilate the Turkish existence there.<sup>30</sup>

The history textbooks published in the 2000s do not repeat any of these accusations. They even return to the approach employed in the

1930s and cease to refer to the European states as main actors in the Balkan Wars.<sup>31</sup> The answer to the question of what caused such an outburst toward European states in the mid-1990s—a component that had been utterly missing in the textbooks of earlier decades—is an easy one. It undoubtedly lies in the catastrophic conditions in the Balkans in the 1990s, especially in Bosnia, where Muslims were subjected to an ethnic cleansing campaign while the European governments remained aloof for a long time. The political repression and assimilation campaign against the Muslim-Turkish minority in Bulgaria by the Todor Hristov Zhivkov regime, which caused hundreds of thousands of Muslims to flee to Turkey in 1989, likewise reshaped the narration of the Balkan Wars in the Turkish history textbooks published in the 1990s and early 2000s. The Muslim-Turkish population left behind in the Balkan region after the Balkan Wars, which seemed to have been forgotten in the earlier accounts, was remembered and reintroduced into the story.

The conditions of the Turks who had remained in the Balkans after the Balkan Wars have always been an issue of grave importance. The attitudes of the Balkan states toward the Turkish population forced many Turks to immigrate to Turkey at different times.<sup>32</sup>

After the Balkan Wars millions of Rumelian Turks who used to be called *Evlad-ı Fatihan* [Offspring of the Conquerors] faced the savageries of Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins. Hundreds of thousands of them fled the Balkans for their life and headed to Anatolia. Hundreds of thousands of Turks were either slaughtered or died due to starvation, epidemics, severe weather conditions, and the grief of leaving their fatherland of five centuries. This sad condition of the Muslims and the Turks in the Balkans has remained unchanged if not deteriorated until today.<sup>33</sup>

After the Balkan Wars a considerably large population of Turks was left within the borders of Greece and Bulgaria. Both of these countries have employed methods of repression in order to force the Turkish population to leave the country. The recent forced exodus of the Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey as well as the suppressive policies of the Greek governments that the Turkish population in western Thrace has fallen prey to for years clearly indicate the way these countries treat the Turks.<sup>34</sup>

#### WHAT HAPPENED IN THE WAR?

The Republican Turkish textbooks appear undeniably reluctant in talking about what happened in the Balkan Wars. None of the textbooks under examination give any detailed account of the battles fought during the war. Most of the authors cover the period by merely stating that the Balkan states attacked the Ottomans and captured the whole Ottoman territory in the Balkans.

Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks joined hands in the Balkans and attacked the Turks. By slaughtering the Turks they took away the Balkans from us. Only Edirne [Adrianople] was left in our hands. Before long a turmoil broke out in Europe, and the world war started. The universe turned upside down.<sup>35</sup>

The accounts of the Balkan Wars are strikingly brief and in stark contrast to the narrations of other wars in the Ottoman historiography or of the Turkish Independence War. Unlike the narratives of so many other wars, the narratives of the Balkan Wars do not attempt to provide long lists of battlefields and commanders or the number of troops. The only place-names that appear in the majority of the textbooks are Yanya, İşkodra, and Edirne, where the Ottoman forces saved face by resisting the attack for a relatively longer period. Selanik (Salonika) is mentioned among the lost territory in five of the textbooks, yet without any reference to its special meaning as the birthplace of Mustafa Kemal.<sup>36</sup> Çatalca is the only location that is mentioned in almost all texts as the place that turned into the symbol of the loss of Balkans in the cognitive map of the Muslim Ottoman-Turkish intelligentsia after the arrival of the Bulgarian army.

The war was lost to the Ottomans because their armies were not commanded skillfully. Armies of the enemy came as close as Çatalca; but thanks to the firm defense of the Ottoman army they were prevented from marching farther.<sup>37</sup>

Ottoman armies were defeated by the much weaker armies of the Balkan League. Only the Ottoman forces in İşkodra, Yanya, and Edirne put up a brave defense. Nevertheless, when the Bulgarian Army came near Çatalca the Ottoman government demanded an armistice.<sup>38</sup>



A few weeks into the war all Ottoman territory in the Balkan Peninsula was lost. Although some heroic defenses took place in some big cities, these battles failed to bring victory owing to the lack of cooperation and synchronization among the army units. Toward the end of 1912 Bulgarians marched toward Çatalca and threatened Istanbul. Cannon shots were heard in the capital of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>39</sup>

The name of Mustafa Kemal as a commander in the Second Balkan War is mentioned in only one textbook, published in 1939. Apparently the rest of the textbooks carefully avoid any association between him and the disaster of the Balkan Wars.

The Balkan League was formed while the Libyan War was still in progress. Combined armies of the Balkan states attacked the Ottoman Empire.... Mustafa Kemal returned to his hometown and found the situation extremely alarming. He was then appointed to the operation department of the Ottoman army unit in the Straits. The Allied Forces (Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Montenegrins) who had invaded Rumelia quickly fell out with each other and started fighting among themselves. The Ottoman Army, which had retreated as far back as Çatalca, saw its opportunity and recaptured Edirne. In this operation Mustafa Kemal acted as the commander of the Bolayır army corps. This post also endowed him with the opportunity to examine the conditions in the Dardanelles and develop a defense strategy for the future.<sup>40</sup>

Among the other names that could find their way into the narration of the Balkan Wars are Rauf Orbay and Şükrü Paşa. The former is mentioned in three textbooks (all of which were written after 1980) as the successful commander of the battleship *Hamidiye*, which “single-handedly and heroically” fought against the Greek naval force in the Aegean Sea.<sup>41</sup> The latter is mentioned in two textbooks only as the “resilient” commander of Edirne who defended the city against all odds for months.<sup>42</sup>

The events during the Second Balkan War receive even less attention, with the obvious exception of the recapture of Edirne (Adrianople) by the Ottomans. All textbooks emphasize that the Balkan states immediately started quarreling among themselves over the division of spoils. This assertion is undoubtedly used to imply that the former vassals of the Ottoman Empire were extremely greedy and uncompromising, which

had made them unmanageable for the Ottoman rulers, and hence to justify the loss of Balkans to a certain extent. The restoration of Edirne by the Ottoman army is by no means depicted as a victory. It is rather seen as the recovery of a lost territory that should never have been lost in the first place. Therefore all of the textbooks merely remark that the Ottoman forces recaptured Edirne, taking advantage of the renewal of the war among the Balkan states, without attaching any glory to it. The single textbook that names Enver Paşa as the commander who should be praised for the success of the restoration of Edirne was written in 2005. This is also the only textbook that includes Enver Paşa in the narrative of the Balkan Wars.

The political atmosphere in Istanbul hardly finds a place in the brief accounts of the Balkan Wars. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the role it played in the defeat do not appear to be a popular topic among the writers. Correspondingly, most of the texts either turn a blind eye to the coup d'état of January 1913 by the CUP or mention it in passing as a simple change of government in the capital.

Some Turkish youth built a society called Union and Progress. Most of the members of this society were good men and came to power when the Second Constitutional era started, yet they failed to rule the country skillfully. The enemies of the Turks saw their opportunity.<sup>43</sup>

In the midst of all these troubles CUP came to power again.... After restoring Edirne CUP reinforced its power. Nevertheless there were disagreements among the leader cadres of the committee. Some of them championed Islamism, while some others favored Ottomanism. These prominent figures, oblivious to the dynamics and dictates of world politics, were only daydreaming. There were some far-sighted people among them who insisted that nationalism was the only salvation [for the Turks]. Yet their opinions fell on deaf ears.<sup>44</sup>

Due to the pressure exerted by some army officers the CUP resigned from the government. Some older statesmen made up the new cabinet.... Edirne was under siege and the Bulgarian army was rapidly approaching Çatalca.... In the middle of this chaos the CUP came to power one more time. It struggled to retrieve eastern Thrace but failed.<sup>45</sup>

Of all the textbooks only three explain that the CUP organized a coup and seized power in 1913.

The successive defeats on the war front gave rise to a government change in Istanbul. Kamil Paşa set up the new cabinet and demanded an armistice.... The unacceptable terms imposed upon the Ottomans by the Balkan states and the European powers, however, caused new turmoil and led the government to vacillate. The CUP overthrew the government (January 23, 1913), and the new cabinet under the leadership of Şevket Paşa rejected the European demands.<sup>46</sup>

### WHY DID “WE” LOSE THE BALKAN WAR?

As a scholar writing on the Turkish textbooks between 1950 and 2000 opines, “the interpretation of the Ottoman history in the Turkish textbooks is a classical case of identification with a state formation of the past.” This high degree of identification is also clearly discernible in a considerable number of the textbooks under examination vis-à-vis the Balkan Wars. The writers of these textbooks, overtly assuming a continuum between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, use the word “Ottomans” interchangeably with the words “Turks” and “Turkish nation” and, more often than not, refer to the Ottomans as “we” or “us.” This tendency reaches its apogee in the texts written between 1950 and 1980, the period that saw the “re-integration of the Ottoman history into the history textbooks as a component of the Turkish national identity.”<sup>47</sup> This was also the time of the emergence and rapid development of the discourse of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.<sup>48</sup> In the textbooks of the following decades, although the empathy with the Ottoman state remains somewhat intact, the relative level of professed identification with the Ottomans declines.

The Ottoman government was oblivious to the conditions in the Balkans. While the Balkan states were preparing for the war some parts of *our troops* [*bizim asker*; emphasis added] were demobilized.<sup>49</sup>

In 1912 Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbians, and Montenegrins altogether declared war on *our fatherland* [*memleketimize*]. In the ensuing

wars known as the Balkan Wars *we* lost most of *our* territory in Rumelia. Edirne [Adrianople] became the new *Turkish* border with the Balkans. The Aegean Islands were ceded to Greece. After the Libyan and Balkan Wars *our territory* shrank substantially. These wars marked the end of the *Ottoman Empire*. [all emphasis added]<sup>50</sup>

The Greeks encroached upon *our* borders [*sınırlarımızın içine girerek*] and captured Selanik [Salonika] [emphasis added].<sup>51</sup>

*We* struggled to save eastern Thrace but failed. Therefore *we* were compelled to demand an armistice [*barış istemek zorunda kaldık*]. In accordance with the peace treaty *we* signed, the *Ottoman Empire* ceded all the territory on the European continent west of a line from Enos to Midia [Midye-Enez] [emphasis added].<sup>52</sup>

The republican textbooks show more interest in the reasons for the defeat than in the reasons for the Balkan Wars. As Ebru Boyar points out, “perceiving history as a means of teaching lessons of the past so that future generations might avoid such mistakes was prevalent in the Ottoman-Republican historical continuum.”<sup>53</sup> Accordingly, several of the textbooks find it their responsibility to enlighten the schoolchildren about the mistakes made during the Balkan Wars that cost the Ottomans very dearly. Two textbooks, one from 1940s and the other from the 1970s, list the conscription of Christians into the Ottoman army for the first time in history among the reasons for the defeat.<sup>54</sup> Another one from the 1960s cites the animosity of Albanians toward the Ottomans (“Arnavutların düşmanlığı”) as a reason.<sup>55</sup> Two textbooks from the 2000s declare that the betrayal of the non-Muslim minorities (*azınlıkların ihaneti*) played a part in the defeat.<sup>56</sup> One textbook, in apologetically charged language, asserts that “during the war the coordination among the army units was ruptured because the telegram and telephone lines had been sabotaged and cut off by the enemy. What is more, our army was devoid of logistical support such as food, ammunition, and soldiers. Because of all these challenges the Ottoman Empire lost the war.”<sup>57</sup> But the principal reasons that cut across all narrations of the Balkan Wars are the widespread partisanship and discord within the army and friction and disagreements among the high-ranking officers and commanders. “Politics,” as many of the textbooks saw it, damaged the abilities of the army beyond repair and gave rise to the ultimate defeat.

# A CONCISE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TURKISH REPUBLICAN AND BRITISH TEXTBOOKS

The space devoted to the narration of the Balkan Wars in the British textbooks extends the space in the Turkish textbooks by a decisive margin. Unlike most of the Turkish textbooks, the British ones treat the Balkan Wars as a fundamental and salient aspect of the Eastern Question and meticulously and extensively analyze the criss-crossed relationships between the Great Powers and the Balkan states. They not only address the territorial aspirations and claims of each Balkan state along with their justification in detail but also discuss the motives of each Balkan state in joining the Balkan League on the basis of *Realpolitik*. The Turkish textbooks omit any mention of Serbia's ambition to gain Albania as an outlet to the Adriatic Sea, Bulgaria's desire to obtain an outlet on the Aegean Coast (especially the port of Selanik [Salonika]), and Greece's irredentist claims to Macedonia. These factors appear as an essential component of the narratives in the British textbooks. Many incorporate the Second Constitutional era into the narrative of the Balkan Wars, opining that the restoration of the constitution and reopening of the parliament in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 accelerated the process of the formation of the Balkan League in 1912. Some assert that fear of the possible success of the constitutional reforms drove the Balkan nationalists to combine their forces and attack the common enemy "before the reforms of the new government should make Turkey much more formidable."<sup>58</sup> As another British textbook suggests, "patriots of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria saw slipping from them another chance of liberating their Macedonian kinsmen from the Turkish yoke" and considered war the only option.<sup>59</sup>

Some British textbooks do not treat the restoration of the constitutional system by the Young Turks as an event whose possibly rehabilitative effects on Ottoman politics and society led the Balkan nationalists to establish the Balkan League and declare war on Turkey. But they nevertheless insist that the policies of the new regime played a determining role in the formation of the league. One British textbook from 1979 replicates the well-known anti-Turkish discourse of the nineteenth century, asserting that the Young Turk regime paved the way to the Balkan Wars itself by persecuting Christian subjects.

Unfortunately, despite the immediate promise of the new regime and its determination to encourage education, promote trade, and eradicate the last relics of medievalism, the movement proved violently anti-Christian. The Patriarch of Constantinople, head of

the Orthodox Church, complained that “they beat us like dogs.” In the last fortnight of April 1909 thirty thousand Christians were slaughtered by “Young Turk” mobs.<sup>60</sup>

In contrast, none of the Turkish textbooks factor the policies of the Second Constitutional regime (whether beneficial or destructive to the Christians) into the analysis of what led the Balkan states to form an alliance among themselves and declare war on the Ottomans.

The tangle of agreements and disagreements among the Balkan states over the division of spoils as well as the reactions of the Great Powers constitute an important part of the narrative of the Balkan Wars in the British textbooks. The Turkish textbooks completely ignore the details of the discord among the Balkan states, hinting that loss of the Balkans renders the details about which Balkan state got what part of the Ottoman territory rather irrelevant.

Not surprisingly, the general tone toward the Balkan Wars in the British textbooks is more distanced and cool-headed. They approach and comment on the subject as an example of the impact that the notion of nationalism had upon the multinational empires at the end of the nineteenth century, which in turn irreversibly changed the balance of power in Europe.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Just as history textbooks of all countries manifest a greater or lesser degree of ethnocentricity, the republican Turkish textbooks narrate the Balkan Wars from the vantage point of the Ottomans but mostly of the Turkish nation-state. They are depicted as part of the regrettable incidents that robbed the Ottomans of their European territory, which they had “chivalrously” conquered and “justly” ruled for centuries. Although the importance of the wars was never denied, they nevertheless were not treated as a watershed that not only contributed to the emergence of the Turkish Republic by sealing the destiny of the Ottoman Empire but also left an indisputable traumatic imprint in the mind-set of the Ottoman-Turkish ruling elites at the turn of the century. This attitude of downplaying the Balkan Wars, which also reveals itself in the relatively scant space devoted to them in the Turkish textbooks, resembles the attitude of the Greek textbooks toward the Turkish War of Independence. “The *Asia Minor Disaster* as it is known in Greece has been mentioned only in passing in most textbooks written up to the mid-1980s.”<sup>61</sup> The “Asia Minor Disaster” was part of the *megali* idea, which had proved

unattainable. The Balkan Wars as historic defeats likewise belonged to the project of Ottomanism and the “dream of saving the empire,” which also had proved abortive. They not only caused humiliation and deepened the Ottomans’ inferiority complex but also accentuated the existence of other forms of identity that the Turkish national identity was now striving to eliminate. The Balkan Wars were in fact the monumental reminder of the imperial Ottoman past, with its extremely diverse and fragmented identity baggage. They were part of a narrative that pitted Ottomanism and Ottoman identity against Turkish nationalism and Turkishness. Moreover, mourning over the loss of Balkans would shake the edifice of Turkish nationalism as a project constructed on the territorial claim of Anatolia as the “true fatherland of Turks” after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. For the politico-bureaucratic elite that founded the Republic, the Balkans were no longer a place conceived as a fatherland. To the leader of the Turkish nationalist movement, “the fatherland in 1919 was Anatolia, where a handful of Turks had managed to survive and the Ottoman Empire and its state and the caliphate and the sultanate were all nothing but meaningless words [*bimâna elfaz*].”<sup>62</sup> In the minds of the Turkish nation-building elites the Balkan Peninsula belonged to the empire. Its loss marked the end of the empire, not the end of “Turkishness,” which would find its “true place” within a nation-state formation in Anatolia. As the founding elites saw it, the war that threatened to destroy the existence of the “Turkish nation” was not the Balkan Wars but World War I, after which Anatolia was invaded by the victorious European powers. Alienation and exclusion of the Balkans from the discursive map of the fatherland was a part of the consolidation of Turkish nationalism.

As another study on the Turkish textbooks confirms, “the references to the Balkan peoples and States are neutral in tone and offered as straightforward descriptions without evaluation or emotional charge.”<sup>63</sup> Yet the effort in answering the unuttered accusations as well as confronting the systematic stereotyping that the Ottomans (and Turks) are subjected to in the discourses and texts produced by the “other” is clearly discernible. Several understatement in the narration of the Balkan Wars say something but let us know another thing. In their dialogical relationship with the Ottoman past and the European world, Turkish textbooks do not opt to deliver a harangue but to construct the episode of the Balkan Wars through silences, reductions, and inferences that speak volumes.

## NOTES

1. I use the term “symbolic capital” in a Bourdieuan sense that “refers to the degree of accumulated prestige, celebrity, consecration of honour and is founded on a dialectic of knowledge and recognition”: Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, 7.
2. Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories*, 1.
3. Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies,” 126.
4. Quoted in Andreas Huyssen, *Twilight Memories*, 1.
5. Jonathan Boyarin, *Remapping Memory*; cited in Olick and Robbins, “Social Memory Studies,” 117.
6. Barak A. Salmoni, “Ordered Liberty and Disciplined Freedom,” 86.
7. Ebru Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans*, 19.
8. “Bütün bu millî şeref ve iddia kabarışları önünde, kendini geri bir Asya ırkının küçülmüş, iğrilmiş ve kurumuş bir dalı sanan Osmanlı çocuğunun, Bosna-Hersek, Trablusgarp, Balkan ve Sevr felaketlerinden sonra yarımıyamalak uyanmış millî suurunun dibini kemiren kendini aşağı görne kompleksini parçalamak, ona Avrupa medeniyeti manzumesine girebileceğini bir çırpıda ispat ettikten sonra, insan kadar eski tarihinin zaman içindeki yekpare ve heybetli kitlesinden mekân içindeki büyük taazzuva geçişin imkânlarını sezdirerek, ruhuna koskoca ve ebedî Türkiye hakikatinin damgasını basmak.... İşte milliyetçi ve medeniyetçi Atatürk inkılâbının en esaslı temellerinden biri”: Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılâbına Bakışlar (Cumhuriyetin 15 inci yılı münasebetile)*, 24; cited and translated in Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans*, 20.
9. Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian-Smith, “The Politics of the Textbook,” 2.
10. “Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Ders Kitapları ve Eğitim Araçları Yönetmeliği,” *Resmî Gazete*, December 31, 2009/27449.
11. Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 280.
12. Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans*, 49.
13. Not surprisingly, in the textbooks of Soviet era, Russia is cast in the role of the “liberator” of the Balkan Slavs. “Russia is generally depicted as a selfless, idealistic, and fraternal strong state that sacrificed itself for the sake of the liberation of its Slavic kin in the Balkans from the ‘Turkish yoke’”: Suat Kınıklıoğlu, “Images and Representations of Turks and Turkey in Soviet History Textbooks,” 262.
14. “Rusların teşvikiyle Sırbistan ile Bulgaristan daha sonra da Yunanistan ve Karadağ hükümetleri ittifak ettiler ve Osmanlı hükümetine harp ilan ettiler”: Enver Behnan, *Tarih Bakaloryası, Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Tarihi*, 126.
15. “Osmanlı Devletinin XX. Yüzyıl başlarındaki zayıf durumu, Balkan devletlerini cesaretlendirdi. Onlar, daha çok Rusya’nın desteği ve teşvikiyle kendi aralarında bir ittifak kurdular. Bu ittifaka Bulgaristan, Sırbistan, Yunanistan ve Karadağ katıldı”: [no author], *İlkokullar İçin Sosyal Bilgiler V*, 137.
16. “Balkan devletleri, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Rumeli’deki topraklarını aralarında paylaşmak için birlik kurdular. Bu birliğin kurulmasında Rusya büyük rol oynadı. Balkan devletlerini Osmanlı Devleti’ne karşı kıskırttı”: [no author], *Tarih Lise II*, 76. Also see Mustafa Cezar, *Ortaokullar İçin Tarih III*, 156, where the author uses



the words “with the encouragement of the Russians”; and Ali Ekrem İnal and Rakım Çalapala, *İlkokul Tarih V*, 118, where the authors say “with the incitement of Russia.”

17. “Dört Balkan Devleti birleşerek (Yunanistan, Sırbistan, Bulgaristan, Karadağ) Osmanlı Devleti’ne savaş açtılar. Bu devletler Rusya’dan yardım göreceklerini umuyorlardı”: Faruk Kurtuluş and Osman Kurtuluş, *İlkokul Tarih V*, 116.
18. “Rusya Uzakdoğu’da Japonlara yenildikten sonra tekrar Balkan siyasetine dönmüştü. Bu siyasette kolladığı amaç Balkan devletlerinin koruyucusu olmak ve Boğazları Rus harp gemilerine açtırmaktı. 1908’den beri hızla giriştiği bu siyasetin bir neticesi olarak Rusya, 1912 yılında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na karşı Balkan birliğini başardı”: Arif Müfid Mansel, Cavid Baysun, and Enver Ziya Karal, *Yeni ve Yakın Çağlar Tarihi*, 161.
19. “Milliyetçilik akımı Fransız İhtilali’nin yarattığı en büyük yeniliklerdendir. ‘Her millet, kendi devletini kurup kendi isteğine göre, kendisini yönetmelidir’ biçiminde kısaca açıklanabilen bu akım, içlerinde farklı uluslar barındıran devletler için bir yıkım olmuştur. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu da çok uluslu bir devlettir. Osmanlılar ele geçirdikleri ülkelerde yaşayan milletleri serbest bırakmışlar, onlar da milli varlıklarını koruyup sürdürmüşlerdi. Milliyetçilik akımı ortaya çıkıncaya kadar bu uluslar durumlarından memnundular. Ama milliyetçilik akımı yayılmaya başlayınca Osmanlı egemenliği altında yaşayan bu uluslar da bağımsız olmak için harekete geçtiler. Bazı devletlerin destek ve yardımıyla ayaklanmalar baş gösterdi. Osmanlı tarihinde XIX. Yüzyıl bu tür ayaklanmalar dönemidir. Balkan yarımadasında çok çeşitli ulus yaşadığı için milliyetçi ayaklanmalar da en fazla burada meydana gelmiştir”: Mükerrrem Kamil Su and Ahmet Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, 6.
20. “Balkanlar’da çıkan ayaklanmaları daha çok Rusya kışkırtıyordu. XVII. Yüzyılda gücünü göstermeye başlayan Rusya çok geniş topraklara sahipti. Ama rahatça dışa açılabilceği limanları yoktu. En büyük amacı Baltık Denizi’ne ve özellikle Akdeniz’e çıkmaktı. Akdeniz’e inmek için önce Karadeniz’i, sonra İstanbul ve Çanakkale Boğazlarını ele geçirmesi gerekiyordu. İşte Rusya bu amaca ulaşabilmek için her yola başvurmaktan geri kalmamıştı. Bu yollardan biri de ırk ve din bakımından akraba olduğu Balkanlı uluslar üzerinde etki yaparak Osmanlı Devletini parçalamak, bundan sonra da rahatça Boğazları ele geçirmekti. Balkanlıların çoğu Ruslar gibi İslam’dı. Onlar da Ruslar gibi Ortodoks mezhebine bağlıydılar. İslam ırkından olmadıkları halde Yunanlılar da Ortodoks idiler ve bu mezhebi yöneten elemanları İstanbul’daki Fener Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi yetiştiriyordu. Milliyetçilik akımı Rusların Balkan ulusları üzerindeki propagandası ile birleşince bu yarımada ayaklanmalar başladı. İlk önce Yunanlılar, arkasından Sırlar, Karadağlılar, Bulgarlar birbiri ardından ayaklanarak ya bağımsız veya özerk devletler kurdular. Sonra da topraklarını genişletmek, büyümek için Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Balkanlardaki topraklarına göz diktiler. Rusya, Boğazlar üzerindeki isteklerini sürdürüyordu. Bu istekleri gerçekleştirebilmek için Balkanlıları araç olarak kullanıyor, bu genç devletleri Osmanlı varlığını sona erdirmeleri için kışkırtıyordu. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu artık büyük devletlerin oyuncağı haline gelmişti. Acaba bu büyük devletler Rusya’nın istekleri hakkında ne düşünüyorlardı?”: ibid., 6–7.
21. “1912 yılında dört Balkan devleti ile savaşlar başladı. Büyük devletler savaşı

- kazanan tarafın topraklarını genişletemeyeceğini bildirdiler. Çünkü bunlar Balkan devletlerinin yenileceğini sanıyorlardı”: İnal and Çalapala, *İlkokul Tarih V*, 119.
22. “Avrupa devletleri, harbin başlangıcında sonuç ne olursa olsun harpten önceki sınırların değişmesine razı olmayacaklarını ilan etmişlerken şimdi Osmanlı Devleti’nin yenilmesi üzerine Balkanlıların istediklerini hoşgördüler”: [no author], *İlkokul Kitapları, Tarih V*, 158.
23. İhsan Şeref, *Cumhuriyet Çocuklarına Tarih Dersleri, Üçüncü Sınıf*, 91.
24. Denisa Kostovicova, “The Portrayal of the Yoke,” 275.
25. “İngiltere, XIX. Yüzyılda çok büyük bir sömürge imparatorluğu kurmuştu. Amacı bu imparatorluğu elinde tutmaktı. Sömürge imparatorluğunun merkezi Hindistan’dı. Hindistan’a ve oradan öteki koloni ve sömürgelerine giden en kestirme yol Ortadoğu’dan geçiyordu.... Bu yolun geçtiği bölgenin güçsüz bir devletin elinde bulunması, İngiltere’nin XIX. Yüzyıl boyunca izlediği belli başlı bir politika olmuştur. Bu nedenle İngiltere XIX. Yüzyılın sonlarına kadar bölgede Osmanlı Devleti’nin yaşamasını istemiş, bu uğurda gereken fedakârlıkları yapmaktan kaçınmamıştır”: Su and Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, 7.
26. “İmparator Rusya’ya karşı Avusturya-Macaristan’ın desteklenmesine çalıştı. İngiltere’nin sahip olduğu pazarlara göz dikti.... Bir yandan da Müslümanların Halifesi olan Osmanlı Sultanına yaklaştı. Bu yolla İngiltere’nin boyunduruğu altında yaşayan Müslümanları etki altına almayı tasarlıyordu. Ayrıca, Osmanlı ülkesi, geniş, verimli toprakları ile Alman ekonomisi için paha biçilmez bir değer taşıyordu. Almanya’nın Osmanlı Devleti’ne yaklaşması İngiltere’yi iyice kuşkulandırmıştı. Çünkü Osmanlı Devleti’nin güçlü bir devletle iş birliği yapmasını isteyemezdi. Almanya artık kendisinin en büyük rakibiydi. Almanların etki alanlarını Yakın Doğu’ya doğru genişletmesiyle sömürge imparatorluğunun can damarı olan yol büyük bir tehlikeye düşmüş oluyordu. Bu nedenle İngiltere geleneksel politikasını değiştirmek gereğini duyacaktır. XX. Yüzyıl başında Rusya çok güçsüzdü. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun zayıflamış olan Rusya’nın etkisi altına girmesi İngiltere’yi fazla rahatsız etmiyordu.... 1908 yılında Estonya’nın başkenti Reval (Tallin)’de İngiltere Kralı ile Rus Çarı bir araya geldiler. Bu buluşma sonunda İngiltere, Rusya’yı Osmanlı Devleti’ne karşı tutumunda serbest bıraktı. Bu anlaşmaya göre Ruslar hem İstanbul’u, hem de Boğazları alabilecekler, İngiltere de buna ses çıkarmayacaktı. Ruslar bu yeni durumdan yararlanmayı planladılar. Balkan yarımadasında kurulmuş olan yeni devletleri Osmanlılara karşı tekrar kışkırtmaya başladılar. Osmanlılar Trablusgarp’ta savaşırken Sırbistan’ın başkenti Belgrad’daki Rus elçisi harekete geçti. Balkanlar’da Osmanlı Devleti’nin elinde kalan son toprak parçalarının Sırbistan ile Bulgaristan arasında paylaşılması için bir girişimde bulundu, iki devlet arasında bağlaşma imzalanmasını sağladı. Kısa bir süre sonra bu bağlaşmaya Karadağ ve Yunanistan da katıldı”: *ibid.*, 7–8.
27. “Avrupa devletleri asırlardır istedikleri gibi Balkanlar’daki Osmanlı hakimiyetini büyük ölçüde ortadan kaldırmışlar [dı] ... Ancak, Osmanlı Devleti nüfusunun çoğu Müslüman olan Makedonya, Arnavutluk, Batı Trakya gibi Balkan topraklarını hâlâ elinde tutuyordu”: Veli Şirin, *Tarih II Liseler İçin*, 111.
28. “Rusların da etkisiyle Balkanlar’da kurulmuş olan devletler ki bunlar zamanında birer Osmanlı vilayeti idiler, gizli anlaşmalar imzaladılar. Osmanlı Devleti’ni Balkanlar’dan tamamen atmak için yapılan bu gizli anlaşmalara Sırbistan, Bulgaristan,

- Yunanistan ve Karadağ katıldı. Balkan devletleri Osmanlı Devleti'nin Trablusgarp Savaşı ile uğraşmasından ve iç yapıdaki karışıklıklardan faydalanmak istiyorlardı. Savaşı başlatmak için ortaya attıkları bahane ise bir asırdır Avrupa devletlerinin yaptığı gibi Rumeli'nde Osmanlı idaresinde olan vilayetlerde ıslahat yapılması idi. Bu devletler, Osmanlı Devleti'nin elindeki şehirleri iyi bakmadığını ve Hristiyan toplulukların ezildiğini ileri sürerek yeni düzenlemeler istiyorlardı": ibid., 111.
29. "Avrupa devletleri Londra'da bir kongre toplayarak barış şartlarının görüşülmesini sağladılar. Ancak Balkan devletleri ile Avrupa devletlerinin Osmanlı Devleti'nin bütün Rumeli'den çekilmesini ve Edirne ve bütün Ege Adaları'nı bırakmasını istemeleri Osmanlı Devleti'ne çok ağır geldi": ibid., 111.
30. "Balkan Savaşları sonunda Osmanlı Devleti'nin Balkanlar'daki bütün toprakları elden çıkmıştır. Bu durum Avrupa devletlerinin asırlardır hayal ettikleri bir neticeydi. Türkleri bütün Avrupa'da çıkarmak düşüncesinin gerçekleşmesi, daha sonraki yıllarda Avrupalıları cesaretlendirmiş ve Türkleri Anadolu'dan da çıkarmak düşüncesine kapılmışlardı. 1918'den sonra İngiliz, Fransız ve İtalyanların Anadolu'yu işgal etmeleri bunun açık belirtisi olmuştu. Hatta İngilizler başta olmak üzere, Avrupalılar, Anadolu'daki Türk varlığını yok etmek için, Yunanlıları 1919'da Batı Anadolu'ya çıkarmışlar ve Ermenileri de kıskırtarak Anadolu'yu parçalamaya çalışmışlardı": ibid., 113.
31. Ahmet Başaran, Ali Sert, and Lütfi İlgin, *Liseler İçin Tarih*; Vicdan Cazgır, Servet Yavuz, and Niyazi Ceyhan, *Lise Tarih II*.
32. "Balkan Savaşları sonunda orada kalan Türklerin durumu günümüze kadar süren önemli bir konu olmuştur. Balkan devletlerinin tutumu zaman zaman bu ülkelerdeki Türkleri Türkiye'ye göç etmek zorunda bırakmıştır": [no author], *Tarih Lise II*, 64.
33. "Balkan Savaşları sonunda Edirne'ye kadar çekilen ordularımızın himayesinden uzak düşen milyonlarca Rumeli Türkü (ki, Rumeli Türklüğü'ne buraları fethedenlerin evlatları olarak Evlad-ı Fatihan denilirdi), Yunan, Sırp, Bulgar, Karadağlı vahşeti içinde kaldı. Yüzbinlercesi canını kurtarabilmek için Anadolu'ya doğru yola çıktı. Katliam, açlık, salgın hastalıklar, tabiat şartları ve beş asırlık bir vatandan ayrılışın kahrolmuşluğu içinde yine yüzbinlerce Türk öldü veya öldürüldü. Balkanlar'da Müslüman ve Türklerin bu acı durumları günümüze kadar, zaman zaman artarak devam etmiştir": Şirin, *Tarih II Liseler İçin*, 113.
34. "Balkan Savaşı sonunda, Bulgaristan ve Yunanistan sınırları içinde önemli sayıda Türk nüfus kaldı. Her iki ülke, çeşitli zamanlarda Türk nüfusu göçe zorlamak için baskı kullandı. Yakın bir tarihte Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye olan göç ve Batı Trakya Türkleri'ne karşı Yunanlıların baskıları, bu ülkelerin Türklere karşı nasıl bir tutum izlediklerini göstermektedir": Kemal Kara, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, *Lise I*, 27.
35. "Daha sonra Balkanlar'da Sırplar, Bulgarlar, Rumlar birleştiler. Türklere hücum ettiler. Türkleri kestiler. Bütün Balkanları aldılar. Elimizde yalnız Edirne'yi bıraktılar. Biraz sonra Avrupa birbirine karıştı. Cihan harbi ortaya çıktı. Bütün dünya alt üst oldu": Ahmet Refik Altınay, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi, Eski Zamanlar, Türkler, İlk Mekteplerin Dördüncü Sınıflarına Mahsus*, 129.
36. Mansel, Baysun, and Karal, *Yeni ve Yakın Çağlar Tarihi*, 163; İnal and Çalapala, *İlkokul Tarih V*, 119; Rakım Çalapala, *Sosyal Bilgiler V*, 172; Tahir Erdoğan Şahin, *Osmanlı Siyasi Tarihi Lise I*, 226; Şirin, *Tarih II Liseler İçin*, 111.

37. “Osmanlı orduları iyi idare edilmediğinden savaş kaybedildi. Düşman orduları Çatalca’ya kadar geldiler. Osmanlı orduları burada sıkı bir savunma ile durumu kurtardılar”: Kurtuluş and Kurtuluş, *İlkokul Tarih V*, 116.
38. “Osmanlı kuvvetleri kendisinden daha zayıfça bulunan Balkanlı müttefikler karşısında yenildi. Yalnız İşkodra, Yanya ve Edirne’de kahramanca dayandı. Fakat Bulgar ordusunun Çatalca önüne gelmesi üzerine Osmanlı hükümeti barış istedi”: Cezar, *Ortaokullar İçin Tarih III*, 156.
39. “Birkaç hafta içinde Balkan Yarımadası’nda elimizde kalmış olan son toprak parçaları da kaybedildi. Her ne kadar bazı büyük kentlerde kahramanca çarpışmalar olduysa da birlikler arasında uyum sağlanamadığından bu savunmalar da olumlu bir sonuç veremedi. 1912 yılı sonlarına doğru Bulgarlar Çatalca’ya kadar ilerleyerek İstanbul’u tehdit etmeye başladılar. Osmanlı Başkentinde top sesleri duyuluyordu”: Su and Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, 8–9.
40. “Trablus harbi devam ederken Balkan Birliği aktolundu (1912) ve Balkanlarda Osmanlı Devleti aleyhine birleşik ordular harekete geçtiler.... Bingazi’de bulunan Mustafa Kemal Bey Avrupa yolu ile memleketine geri döndü. Vaziyeti çok fena buldu. Orduda hizmet istedi. Akdeniz Boğazı mürettep kuvvetinin hareket şubesi müdürlüğüne tayin edildi. Rumeli’yi istila eden Müttefikler (Bulgarlar, Sırplar, Yunanlılar ve Karadağlılar) vilayetlerimizin taksiminde pek çabuk bozuştular. Aralarında harp başladı. Çatalca’ya kadar çekilen Osmanlı ordusu Edirne’yi geri aldı. Edirne üzerine ileri harekette Bolayır Kolordusunu erkân-ı harbiye reisi sıfatıyla tanzim ve idare eden Binbaşı Mustafa Kemal Bey idi. Mustafa Kemal Bey, mürettep kuvvetin erkân-ı harbiye reisi iken Çanakkale Boğazı’nın müdaafası şartlarını tetkike muvaffak olmuştur”: Sadri Ertem and Kazım Nami Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III*, 156–58.
41. Su and Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, 9; Şahin, *Osmanlı Siyasi Tarihi Lise I*, 226; Şirin, *Tarih II Liseler İçin*, 111.
42. Şahin, *Osmanlı Siyasi Tarihi Lise I*, 226; Şirin, *Tarih II Liseler İçin*, 111.
43. “Türk gençleri bir cemiyet yapmışlardı, adı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti idi. Bu cemiyete girenlerin çoğu iyi adamlardı. Meşrutiyet ilan olununca, iş başına onlar geçtiler. Fakat memleketi iyi idare edemediler. Türklerin düşmanları tam fırsattır dediler”: Altınay, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi, Eski Zamanlar, Türkler, İlk Mekteplerin Dördüncü Sınıflarına Mahsus*, 129.
44. “İttihat ve Terakki bu başarı üzerine yerini kuvvetlendirdi. Lakin cemiyetin ileri adamlarının ilerisi için düşündükleri bir değildi. Kimi İslam, kimi Osmanlılık siyasalarına taraftardı. Bunlar dünyanın gidişini anlamıyorlar, hayal peşinde dolaşıyorlardı. Bununla beraber ileriye gören bazı kimseler de ulusallığa dayanmak gerek olduğunu ileri sürüyorlardı. Fakat bunların sözleri o derece dinlenmiyordu”: [no author], *İlkokul Kitapları, Tarih V*, 158.
45. “Bir kısım subayların baskısı altında İttihat ve Terakki Partisi hükümetten çekildi. Hükümet ihtiyar devlet adamlarının eline geçti.... Bulgar ordusu Çatalca önüne kadar geldi. Edirne’yi kuşattılar.... Bu sıralarda İttihat ve Terakki Partisi yeniden idare başına geçmişti. Bulgarlardan Trakya’yı kurtarmaya uğraştı. Fakat başarı elde edemedi”: İnal and Çalapala, *İlkokul Tarih V*, 119.
46. “Savaşların bu kötü sonuçları üzerine İstanbul’da hükümet değişikliği oldu ve Kamil Paşa başkanlığında yeni bir hükümet kurularak barış istendi. Ancak Balkan devletleri ile Avrupa devletlerinin Osmanlı Devleti’nin bütün Rumeli’den

- çekilmesini ve Edirne ve bütün Ege adalarını bırakmasını istemeleri Osmanlı Devleti'ne çok ağır geldi. Hükümet kararsızlık içinde iken İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti/Fırkası Bab-ı Âli'ye bir baskın düzenleyerek hükümeti devirdi. (23 Ocak 1913) Mahmut Şevket Paşa başkanlığında kurulan yeni hükümet Avrupalıların isteklerini reddetti": Şirin, *Tarih II Liseler İçin*, 111-12. For the other two textbooks that refer to the coup, see Su and Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, 9; and Cazgır, Yavuz, and Ceyhun, *Lise Tarih II*, 70.
47. Loris Koullapis, "The Presentation of the Period 1071-1923 in Greek and Turkish Textbooks between 1950-2000," 292, 300.
  48. Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine*, 8-9.
  49. "Bu sırada Osmanlı hükümeti gaflet içindeydi. Balkanlar harbe hazırlanırken bizim askerin bir kısmı terhis edilmişti": Cezar, *Ortaokullar İçin Tarih III*, 156.
  50. "1912 tarihinde Bulgarlar, Yunanlılar, Sırp lar ve Karadağlılar hep birden memleketimize karşı savaş açtılar. Balkan Savaşı denilen bu harpte Rumeli'deki topraklarımızın pek çoğu elimizden çıktı. Türk sınırı Edirne'ye kadar geri çekildi. Ege denizindeki adalar ise Yunanlıların elinde kaldı. Trablus ve Balkan savaşlarıyla sınırlarımız çok gerilemiş oldu. Bu savaşlar Batıda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun dağılması sayılabilir": Zuhuri Danışman, *Tarih V İlkokul*, 104.
  51. "Yunanlılar sınırlarımızın içine girerek Selanik önlerine geldiler, şehri ele geçirdiler": İnal and Çalapala, *İlkokul Tarih V*, 119.
  52. "Bulgarlardan Trakya'yı kurtarmaya çalıştıksa da başarı elde edemedik. Barış istemek zorunda kaldık. Yapılan antlaşma gereğince, Osmanlı Devleti Midye-Enez çizgisinin batısında kalan toprakları Balkan devletlerine bırakıyordu": Çalapala, *Sosyal Bilgiler V*, 172.
  53. Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans*, 12.
  54. Mansel, Baysun, and Karal, *Yeni ve Yakın Çağlar Tarihi*, 163; Çalapala, *Sosyal Bilgiler V*, 172.
  55. İnal and Çalapala, *İlkokul Tarih V*, 119.
  56. Kara, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, Lise I, 27; Başaran, Sert, and İlgin, *Liseler İçin Tarih*, 120.
  57. [no author], *İlkokullar İçin Sosyal Bilgiler V*, 137.
  58. I. Tenen, *A History of England*, 631.
  59. G. B. Smith, *Outlines of European History, 1789-1935*, 293.
  60. A. D. Edwards and G. W. L. Bearman, *Britain, Europe and the World, 1848-1918*, 163.
  61. Koullapis, "The Presentation of the Period 1071-1923 in Greek and Turkish Textbooks between 1950-2000," 299.
  62. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk 1919-1927*, 13.
  63. P. Xochellis, A. Kapsalis, A. Andreou, A. Ismyrliador, D. Loykidou, K. Bonides, and S. Hatzisavvides, "The Image of the 'Other' in the School History Textbooks of the Balkan Countries," 63, 67.

# Chronology of the Balkan Wars

- 1899 Formation of the Albanian Union.
- 1900 First chair in Albanian Language established at the University of Napoli.
- 1901 Arrest of Macedonian leaders after the assassination of some Romanians and acute tension between Bulgaria and Romania. The Macedonians are tried but acquitted.
- 1902–3 Great Insurrection in Macedonia accompanied by raids from Bulgaria. The Ilinden Uprising (1903) organized by IMRO and the External Macedonian Revolutionary Committee leads to the establishment of the short-lived Krushevo Republic. The uprising is put down by the Ottoman forces. The situation is resolved by the introduction of the Mürzsteg reform program.
- 1904–8 Armed struggle in Macedonia between Greek and Slavic bands of irregulars, leading to widespread terror and destruction of human life and property. The Ottoman forces are unable to control the situation.
- 1905 Insurrection in Crete as a result of the tensions between Eleftherios Venizelos and Prince George over the question of union with Greece.
- 1905 (December 19) Nicholas of Montenegro grants a constitution, with an assembly elected by universal suffrage. The advent of the Karadjordje dynasty in Serbia leads to growing rivalry for leadership of the South Slavs.
- 1905–11 Rupture of relations between Romania and Greece over the treatment of Kutzo Vlachs in Macedonia by Greek bands, resulting in the expulsion of Greeks from Romania.
- 1907 Great insurrection of peasants in Macedonia, put down by military forces. Martial law is proclaimed throughout the country.
- 1908 (July) Young Turk Revolution. Temporary suspension of hostilities in Macedonia. On July 24 Abdülhamid II agrees to restore the 1876 constitution.
- 1908 (October 5) Ferdinand declares Bulgarian independence and assumes the title of tsar.
- 1908 (October 6) Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 1908 (October 7) The Cretans proclaim union with Greece. Britain, France, Italy, and Russia withdrew their forces from the island in July 1909.
- 1909 Tsar Ferdinand visits St. Petersburg and is received with royal honors. April 19: convention with the Ottoman Empire, which recognizes Bulgarian independence. Ferdinand makes an agreement with Russia, which assumes responsibility for the financial settlement. In November a draft treaty is concluded between Russia and Bulgaria. Ferdinand avoids committing himself, preferring a balance between Russian and Austria. He evades Serbian efforts to effect an alliance, unwilling to abandon his claim to all of Macedonia.
- 1909 (April 13) Counterrevolution against the Young Turks in Istanbul. The movement fails after reinforcements arrive in Istanbul from Macedonia (April 24).
- 1909 (April) Massacres of Armenians at Adana and other places, provoked by Armenian demonstrations.

- 1909 (August) Revision of the constitution, limiting the sultan's authority and giving the cabinet the right to initiate legislation.
- 1910 (January) The Military League, an association of officers, forces the Greek assembly to agree to a revision of the constitution. The league then voluntarily dissolves itself. Venizelos, the Cretan leader, becomes the new prime minister on October 18 and undertakes military and financial reform. On June 11, 1911, the revision of the constitution is completed.
- 1910 (April–June) Insurrection in Albania, the result of demands for autonomy and the end to the repressive Turkish policies. The revolt is put down with much bloodshed.
- 1910 (August 28) Nicholas of Montenegro proclaims himself king.
- 1911 (March 22) Ivan Geshov (Gueshov) cabinet is in charge in Bulgaria. An alliance is concluded between Bulgaria and Serbia on March 13, 1912, followed by a treaty of alliance between Bulgaria and Greece on May 29. On October 14 the Cretan representatives are finally admitted to the Greek assembly.
- 1911 (September 28) Outbreak of war between Italy and the Ottoman Empire in Libya.
- 1911–12 Albanian insurrections in the Ottoman Empire.
- 1912 (January 18) The sultan dissolves the parliament after a phenomenal growth of criticism against the government. In the elections on April 9 the Young Turks control the majority.
- 1912 (March 13) Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty and military convention.
- 1912 (May 29) Greek-Bulgarian defensive alliance.
- 1912 (July 21) The cabinet of Ghazi Ahmed Mukhtar Paşa, a non-CUP government representing the moderates, dissolves the parliament by force (August 5) and proclaims martial law.
- 1912 (October 5) Military convention between Greece and Bulgaria.
- 1912 (October 8) Montenegro declares war on the Ottoman Empire.
- 1912 (October 18) Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia declare war on the Ottoman Empire.
- 1912 (October 29) Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa resigns.
- 1912 (October 30) Kamil Paşa becomes the grand vizier then resigns on January 23, 1913.
- 1912 (November 28) The Albanian national assembly at Valona declares the constitution of a separate Albanian state.
- 1912 (December 3) Armistice ending the First Balkan War.
- 1912 (December 16–January 23, 1913) London Conference (Conference of Ambassadors).
- 1913 (January 23) Coup d'état of the Young Turks against the government, which was prepared to cede Adrianople to the victorious Balkan states. Mahmut Şevket Paşa becomes the new prime minister.
- 1913 (February 3) First Balkan War resumes.
- 1913 (May 30) Treaty of London concludes the First Balkan War. The treaty recognizes the independence of Albania and sets up a commission to determine the boundaries of the new state.
- 1913 (June 1) Secret Serbian-Greek alliance and military protocol against Bulgaria.
- 1913 (June 11–12) Assassination of grand vizier Mahmut Şevket Paşa (June 11, 1913) and

- appointment of Said Halim Paşa. Enver, Talat, and Kemal, a triumvirate that suppresses all opposition, in effect rule the country.
- 1913 (June 29–30) Second Balkan War starts with Bulgaria attacking Serbian and Greek forces in Macedonia.
- 1913 (July 12) Ottoman Empire declares war on Bulgaria.
- 1913 (July 13) Bulgaria asks for peace.
- 1913 (July 22) Ottomans reenter Edirne.
- 1913 (July 31) Armistice concluding the Second Balkan War.
- 1913 (August 10) Treaty of Bucharest, ending the Second Balkan War.
- 1913 (September 29) Treaty of Istanbul between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, which was not represented at Bucharest and held separate negotiations.
- 1913 (November 14) Treaty of Athens between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, which formally ends the hostilities between the two states.
- 1914–18 World War I. Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania initially proclaim neutrality.
- 1914 (February 8) The Turkish government accepts a program of reform for the Armenian provinces worked out by the powers under the leadership of Russia.
- 1914 (October 29) Turkey enters World War I.
- 1914 (November 4) Russia declares war on Turkey.
- 1915 The Dardanelles expedition.
- 1915 (January–May) The Allies attempt to make Greece enter the war by offering İzmir. Prime Minister Venizelos favors the plan and comes into conflict with King Constantine. Venizelos resigns on September 6. Bulgaria concludes an alliance and military convention with Germany and Austria, providing for mutual aid against attack by neighboring states. Bulgaria is to receive Macedonia and Dobrudja.
- 1915 (September 21) The Bulgarians begin to mobilize. The Serbs appeal to the Greeks for help. Venizelos, who returned to power on August 22, is eager to intervene but demands that the Allies furnish 150,000 troops (which Serbia was obliged to supply according to the mutual May 1913 treaty).
- 1915–16 Greek Nationalism Schism: King Constantine favors neutrality, while Premier Venizelos favors entering the war on the side of the Allies. On June 6–22, 1916, the Allies blockade Greece in order force it to join them. The Greek government yields, and the army is put on a peace footing (June 27). New elections are arranged.
- 1916 Battle of Dorian (August 2–21) and Battle of Florina (August 17–19). The Allies (Serbs, British, French, and Greeks) fight against combined German-Bulgarian forces. The Bulgarians take Serez/Serres, Drama, and Kavala, where a fourth of the Greek army corps voluntarily surrenders.
- 1916 (August 27) Romania declares war on Austria-Hungary. The Romanian armies are defeated before the end of the year.
- 1916 (August 30) A Venizelos pro-Allied movement takes place at Thessaloniki on September 29. Venizelos and Admiral Paul Koundouriotis establish a provisional government in Crete. On October 9 Venizelos goes to Thessaloniki, where the provisional government declares war on Germany and Bulgaria (November 23). On October 10 the Allies submit an ultimatum to Athens demanding the surrender of the Greek fleet. The Athens government yields, but new demands by the Allies are refused.





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